4-1 was the final scoreline in Maryland this evening as the US Men’s National team fell to Brazil in a dramatic departure from last weekend’s match. In the first half, there were problems all over the pitch for the USA while their second half performance was marked with issues in finishing and the within their own goal box.

Starting with the most improved group over the course of the match, the US midfielders were able to find a way to string together attacks in the second half.

We can all agree that midfield leader Michael Bradley has been astounding in the past two matches for the USMNT. Bradley’s confidence and ability to get the ball, hold it, and wait for the right move (or conversely, make the right move very quickly) was highlighted repeatedly tonight. He is a critical part of what makes the midfield function and is a key building block in the USA’s attacks.

The first half was marked by strong pressure from the Brazilians. Other than Bradley, the players of the midfield and its flanks were unable to deal with it effectively or make much of an impression. Jermaine Jones was extremely quiet tonight as was Jose Torres. Marcelo inserted himself into most of Landon Donovan’s touches on the ball, effectively silencing the headliner of the Scotland game and leaving little bite in the US midfield and wings.

The main difference was that Scotland afforded the USMNT time to make plays–Brazil did not. By the second half, the US found a way to deal with the pressure. The team became more proactive and gutsy. Although it didn’t always bode well for the defense because of openings for counter attacks, the USA played more aggressively in the second half.

Much of this aggression came from Clint Dempsey. Returning from injury, Dempsey entered the match around the 55th minute. Although the Texan wasn’t quite as sharp as the US may have hoped, he certainly injected life into the attack and worked hard to open things up for the USA. Herculez Gomez played a great match prior to Dempsey’s arrival, but the USMNT really took off after Dempsey joined the game.

With Torres off and Dempsey on, the line up shifted to a 4-4-2, which seemed to turn the flow of the match. I hope the USA dispenses with the one forward approach. I don’t know how much clearer it can be. The USMNT does not have a player who is extremely effective as a stand alone striker, and that’s okay. If that is not where their best chances come from, Klinsmann needs to accommodate a 4-4-2 structure.

In the final twenty minutes of the match, the USA had most of the run of play. Pato did get a goal in the dying minutes of the game, but overall, the USA played significantly better. They had several chances, moved the ball around well, and looked extremely dangerous. There were two moments in particular where everyone watching had to ask how the USA failed to score. One from Dempsey and the other when Rafael denied Gomez, Terrence Boyd, and Bradley. It was an incredible display from Rafael, but the USA were unlucky.

The most important takeaway for me from all of this possession and threatening play is that the USMNT do best with a two forward structure. They may still lose as they did tonight, but they’ll get significantly more chances. On another night, they might have finished one of their chances to go 3-2, and at that point, the match could have really turned on its head. However, the only way they’ll get close is by maintaining strong, dangerous play, and fielding two forwards seems to be the way to do that.

Although the USA were unlucky a few times, the same could be said for Brazil, who were denied once by the post. Tim Howard also came up with some great saves as he typically does. Howard is a fantastic anchor for the USMNT. Unfortunately, he did not get appropriate support from the defense in this match.

Fabian Johnson was great tonight. I think he played significantly better than he did even against Scotland, and his fellow defensive wingman, Steve Cherundolo was impressive as well. The issues arose from the center backs.

Carlos Bocanegra isn’t the fastest defender. Still, I think Captain America is the best that we have in that position. He is effective in the air, he defends smartly when he’s back, and he did a fine job tonight. It wasn’t level with the strong performances he pulled out for Rangers this year, but he coped well enough given the support issues he had next to him.

Oguchi Onyewu has had a tough past couple of years with injuries and working himself back into match fitness. Tonight was not a good night from him. He was sluggish, did not mark effectively, failed to communicate well with his fellow players, and was not quick enough for the off-side trap (cue Pato). It was a bad night from him, and it brought down the team in general.

Pointing out the negatives is easy, though. It’s finding the solutions that is troublesome. I’m not sold on Geoff Cameron. He played decently against Scotland, but the defense didn’t have much to cope with against Scotland. Their chances were few and far between. I don’t know if he would be very effective against the top teams in FIFA.

Michael Parkhurst came in towards the end of the match for Steve Cherundolo. I was impressed to see his ability to build plays and deal with outside pressure. I realize that Parkhurst is considered primarily a center back, but given his recent play at the right, I do see him shaping up more as a replacement for Cherundolo instead of a starting center back.

The other option is Clarence Goodson. At this point, Goodson is the person I would like to see tested out next to Bocanegra. I think Parkhurst could have a run out as well, but I’d like to see if Goodson’s experience with Brondby this past year would make him a better partner for Bocanegra.

I can’t see Parkhurst, Goodson, or Cameron ousting the Captain, nor would I want them to. Bocanegra is a strong enough defender, and at the moment, there is simply not another player who is better than him in that position. What the USMNT needs is to find someone who is effective where Bocanegra isn’t–namely the speed aspect–and keep them playing together. Practice makes perfect, right?

Given what I’ve seen tonight, my ideal line up for Canada would be: Howard, Johnson, Bocanegra, Goodson, Cherundolo, Edu, Jones, Bradley, Donovan, Dempsey and Gomez.

Canada will not be as strong as Brazil, but it should be a decent challenge and  help the USA recenter itself after tonight’s loss. I’ll be curious to see what Klinsmann does, but I hope he aims for consistency in the center backs and starts play with a 4-4-2 to provide the best possible attack for his team.

Manchester United recorded a comfortable enough victory over Bredan Rodgers’ Swansea side, but it was interesting to see that Gylfi Sigurdsson was able to take advantage of the same space in between United’s midfield and defence that Marouane Fellaini enjoyed a few weeks ago…

Manchester United lined up in their familiar 4-4-2 formation with Wayne Rooney playing deeper than this strike partner, in this case Javier Hernandez, and Antonio Valencia and Ashley Young this time chosen to start out wide.

However, as has become usual for United, two ‘passers’ played in central midfield, in Michael Carrick and Paul Scholes, meaning that United didn’t have a natural holding midfielder in the side, and therefore that there was space in between United’s defence and midfield lines.

This was the case when United player Everton a few weeks ago, with Fellaini playing more advanced than expected, with Everton a clear 4-4-1-1. The Belgian was able to operate in the ‘square’ between United’s two centre backs and two central midfielders, as neither Rio Ferdinand or Jonny Evans wanted to push up and leave their defensive partner in a 1v1 situation with Nikica Jelavic and neither Scholes nor Carrick was particularly winning to follow Fellaini’s runs forward.

Gylfi Sigurdsson was also able to take advantage of this space, as he too operated in the square space created between Chris Smalling, Ferdinand, Carrick and Scholes (see diagram), as a part of Swansea’s 4-2-3-1 shape.

Swansea may not have scored as many goals as Everton did but they still create similar sorts of problems. Sigurdsson was able to drift into the space in between the lines and try long shots, running at the United defence with the ball, and slotting through balls through for Danny Graham down the middle, or out wide to Scott Sinclair or Nathan Dyer.

The Icelander finished with five shots, four key passes and three attempted through balls, showing that he was at the heart of most of Swansea’s attacking play, and able to get the better of his direct opponents. United may not have dropped any points today, but again the same problem of not having a natural holding midfielder has been highlighted.

As always feel free to comment. You can follow me on twitter @TTTFootball.

You may also want to check out:

Manchester City 1 Manchester United 0 (30^th April 2012)

Arsenal and Norwich City played out a highly entertaining match, but what was most interesting from a tactical perspective was Norwich’s use of a 4-3-1-2 in attack that changed to more of a 4-4-2 when in defence…

In attack Norwich City were a 4-3-1-2 with Hoolahan in the hole…

In attack Norwich City deployed a narrow looking 4-3-1-2 formation, in an attempt to try and get Wes Hoolahan on the ball in central creative areas to instigate attacks for Simeon Jackson and Grant Holt up front.

Jonathan Howson operated as the deepest midfielder, with Bradley Johnson playing as a left sided central midfield and Elliot Bennett to the right operating as a mix between a wide midfielder and one playing more centrally.

Because Hoolahan (red ring) was drifting from the left hand side, Norwich’s left back, Simon Lappin, was given the whole of the left side to attack and it was no surprise that his 62 touches were more than any other of his team mates.

During transitions from attack to defence, Paul Lambert’s side resembled more of a 4-4-2 with Bennett tucking in from the right wing and Johnson moving into the middle to shield with Howson.

… but in defence Norwich changed to a 4-4-2 with Hoolahan moving over to the left

This meant that Hoolahan (red ring) drifted to the left wing to deal with the threat of Bacary Sagna running from full back.

As the diagram also shows, Jackson defended deeper than Holt, instructed to get in and around Arsenal’s deepest midfield player.

It was a clever tactics from Lambert and it worked exceedingly well. In attack they had enough width, but were also able to get Hoolahan in central positions from which he could create.

When Norwich needed to defend, they stayed narrow and compact and Jackson dropped to try and force Alex Song and Aaron Ramsey to make hurried decisions with the ball.

As always feel free to comment. You can follow me on twitter @TTTFootball.

Guttierrez and Ben Arfa both got forward in attack…

Newcastle surprisingly lined up in a 4-4-2. In keeping with the recent success of their 4-3-3 formation over the last few weeks and remembering that against Swansea City Jonas Gutierrez played centrally, I expected them to continue with a three man midfield.

But instead Demba Ba partnered Papiss Demba Cisse up front. Jonas Gutierrez started on the left instead, with Hatem Ben Arfa on the right and Johan Cabaye and Cheick Tiote through the middle. It was brave of Newcastle to go 4-4-2 at Chelsea, considering the last time they played 4-4-2 away to one of the ‘better’ London sides they lost 5-0 at Tottenham.

In attack they kept to this 4-4-2 with Ben Arfa (blue ring) more advanced and wider than Gutierrez (red ring) on the other side of the pitch in attack but both wingers did look to get forward.

…but in defence Ben Arfa didn’t track back and Newcastle changed shape

But it was in defence that Newcastle’s formation changed shape. Chelsea played as a 4-3-3 with Ramires getting forward from central midfield. Newcastle clearly tried to narrow their shape in defence, and became a 4-3-3. Guttierrez (red ring) tucked right in – although this did mean Newcastle were vulnerable to attacks down the Chelsea right – a reason why Bosingwa looked so good in the attacking third.

With Guttierrez essentially becoming a third central midfielder, Ben Arfa (blue ring) stayed further forward, admittedly also due to laziness, and Demba Ba drifted slightly left, taking up the shape I would have expected Newcastle to play in attack not just defence.

This meant Newcastle had 3 players forward to counter attack with and made it more risky for Chelsea to get their full backs forward. Guttierrez drifting in also meant Newcastle could try and crowd out Chelsea’s attacks in the middle of the pitch. Credit Pardew.

Presumably it is because enervate sounds vaguely similar to energise. It’s not uncommon for a word to be assimilated to another word which sounds similar – think of fortuitous drifting away to become a synonym for fortunate, or laconic becoming a synonym for ironic. But the case of enervate is unusual, in that by this process it’s acquiring a meaning which isn’t just different from its original meaning, but diametrically opposite to it. Can we stop this? I’d like to think so, but I doubt it.

With Kenny Arthur already gone and all of the second year youths – bar Dayle Southwell – dumped too, can the Mariners even fill their subs bench tomorrow? Charlie I’Anson has flu according to today’s Grimsby Telegraph and, according to Twitter, Kiernan Hughes-Mason is ill too. With both also out of contract, it could also be the last we see of them too. Times they are a-changing; expect a 4-3-3 formation tomorrow as Scott and Hurst look to change the shape of the side in the future. I think Soares, who now looks a direct replacement for Michael Coulson knowing what we know now, will play wide on the right of a front three where he won’t have to do the defensive donkey work Michael Coulson did. Liam Hearn will play on the left and cut in (as he did to set up Andi Thanoj at Wrexham) and Anthony Elding will play down the middle. In theory this will allow Artus, Thanoj and Disley to play in central midfield and should bring out the best in all three. The reality could end up the same pig’s ear when the club unsuccessfully tried the formation in September, resulting in going down 2-0 early at home to Newport and the experiment was abandoned. Town changed to 4-4-2 and went 20-odd games unbeaten. The rest is history.

Town fans always cry out for a 4-4-2 because that’s what Alan Buckley did. It’s how we rose up the leagues, leaping out of divisions like happy salmon. When Russell Slade came in and chopped and changed in his first season, no-one liked it. We stuttered and stumbled in mid-table and the fans cried out for a change. When it eventually did change, we got relegated playing tippy-tappy football that didn’t produce goals or clean sheets. Rob Scott and Paul Hurst had success at Boston and Ilkeston playing 4-3-3 and I’ve never been thoroughly convinced they like a 4-4-2. I get the impression they don’t fancy some of our players in a 4-3-3 and have had to adapt to try and get results. The four (so far) released players would all have been on decent wages for the club and the move has probably freed up almost £2,000 a week in salary. I don’t agree with ditching Michael Coulson, but I can understand the others. We have to hope the managers find another Liam Hearn or Shaun Pearson – a player in a lower league with something to prove. Whether it’s 4-4-2 or a 4-3-3 tomorrow, it’s the end of a season that started horrendously, got quite exciting but ultimately petered into nothing. Yet I’ve enjoyed it more than any other in the last 10 years. Weird.

The Argentine ‘short seasons’ system is often criticised and even ridiculed in other parts of the world, but it does have its virtues. For those not completely privy to how things work in Argieball, the league season is split into two half-length seasons known as the Apertura and Clausura (open and close). In some other South American countries that use the short season format, the winners of each short season face one another to determine an overall champion, but in Argentina two champions are crowned per season.

The 19-game season allows for some ‘smaller’ teams to become champion, for example in the 2009-10 season where Banfield and Argentinos Juniors won the Apertura and Clausura respectively. This season, there is the chance of a similar ‘upset’ taking place.

With Apertura champions Boca Juniors’ 1×1 draw away to Belgrano on Sunday evening, rosarino side Newell’s Old Boys travelled to El Viaducto knowing that a win would take them two points clear at the top of the table with only eight matches remaining.

Their hosts, Arsenal de Sarandí also had their eyes on top spot, a home win would bring them level on points with leaders Boca Juniors, whom they faced earlier on in the year in the Copa Libertadores.

After a woeful Apertura campaign (in which they won only once and racked up a ridiculous thirteen draws, finishing in 18th place), Newell’s have really turned things around and with club idol and former Paraguay coach Gerardo “Tata” Martino at the helm, they may even end the season with silverware. Furthermore, considering Argentina’s promedio system of relegation (relegation is determined by team’s average points totals of the three previous full seasons), Newell’s Clausura surge takes on additional importance.

Arsenal boss Gustavo Alfaro lined his team up in their favoured 4-4-2 formation, but they were without centre forward Luciano Leguizamón (suspended) and tricky Colombian winger Carlos Carbonero (injured in training), so Dário Benedetto and Diego Torres came in to replace them.

Newell’s Old Boys came out in their now-default 4-1-4-1 system, with the excellent Raúl Villalba screening in front of the defence, and exciting centre forward Maxi Urruti leading the line on his own.

The first half was fairly even and entertaining, both sides managed to give good accounts of themselves without ever managing to control the match. Newell’s went into the dressing room at half-time as the better side, however they managed to pass up some fabulous chances on goal, the most dramatic of which a Urruti strike that smacked the crossbar, even after some wonderful close control from the 21 year-old forward.

Second half

The only goals of the game came within ten minutes of the restart, with the home side taking the lead in the opening seconds of the second half. It was a lovely move from Arsenal on the edge of the box, with Zelaya pulling Newell’s left back Dominguez infield before cleverly releasing Diego Torres down the right flank. Torres duly delivered a lovely cross into the area, turned into the net by Dário Benedetto’s shiny bald head.

Newell’s were slightly taken aback by the goal at such an early point in the second half, but they regrouped quickly and grabbed an equaliser less than eight minutes later. There was an element of luck in the goal, as it was an attempted clearance from Arsenal defender Lisandro López that struck one of his team-mates and fell kindly for Newell’s Víctor Figueroa to finish. Fortuitous perhaps, but it was a very intelligent probing run into the box by Figueroa that left him unmarked when the ball eventually arrived at his feet, and the 28 year old put the ball away with ease.

The match did begin to tail off slightly after that, but we were still treated to a great display of quick end-to-end football, with plenty of pressing and a fascinating battle in the midfield between Gastón Esmerado and the superb Newell’s captain Lucas Bernardi.

Newell’s fluidity

For me, the most interesting aspect of the match was how the two sides reacted to one another and adapted, particularly Tata Martino’s Newell’s Old Boys squad.

The animated diagram below shows how both sides set up when Arsenal (playing left to right) went on the attack.

As you can see, Arsenal pushed their talented wingers high up the field, while bringing Zelaya more central to offer them two attacking options in the penalty area. In response to this, Martino instructed defensive midfielder Raúl Villalba to drop back into central defence, moving his side seamlessly from the 4-1-4-1 shape into a defined 5-4-1. As a result, Newell’s were will protected in the middle, and the industrious Zelaya was thwarted from finding space in the channels and causing havoc.

The diagram below shows how the team’s set up when Newell’s went on the attack.

Arsenal’s plan here was straightforward, to arrange their defence and midfield into two flat banks of four, even bringing Zelaya back to help with defensive duties. Usually this would have been very successful against a 4-1-4-1 system with just one striker, but once again Martino’s side morphed into a different shape, becoming more of an attacking 4-3-3 with the wide midfielders becoming dangerous wingers.

In fact, NOB’s equalising goal came about as a result of this smooth transition, as Arsenal were unable to pick up the incisive forward run of left winger Figueroa, leaving him free in the penalty area to score.

The result meant that Newell’s Old Boys stayed at the top of the table alongside Boca Juniors, but they ultimately failed to open up a valuable two-point lead over los Xeneizes. The single point saw Arsenal rise to fifth place, and remarkably still only two points off Boca and NOB at the top.

Header image: Olé

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 3-4-2-1

Pavel Brozek, still clinging on to hope for a place in Poland’s Euro 2012 squad replaced Georgios Samaras to lead the line. There were wholesale changes at the back with Scott Brown, Kelvin Wilson, Glenn Loovens and Mikael Lustig all dropping out. Thomas Rogne and Victor Wanyama came in to make a back three with Charlie Mulgrew, while Emilio Izaguirre and Cha Du Ri were used as attacking wing-backs on either side.

Frazer Forster was benched to allow Lukasz Zaluska some gametime, and of the outfield substitutes, only Anthony Stokes would not be considered “fringe”.

Motherwell Lineup

Motherwell 4-3-3

Motherwell were missing their most effective player in Keith Lasley, as he along with Jonathan Page were suspended. Steven Hammell and Lasley’s partner in crime, Steve Jennings returned from suspension.

Stuart McCall continued with the 4-3-3 formation that his side have persisted with for the past 2 seasons, so little surprise there for Lennon.

Differences with O’Neill’s 3-5-2

Lennon has briefly flirted with 3-man defences in his 2 seasons in charge, and clearly a lot has been taken from his time under Martin O’Neill, and everyone fondly remembers that successful system on the road to Seville (Paul Lambert, incidentally, frequently uses a form of 3-5-2 at Norwich).

But this was far removed from O’Neill’s vintage. Starting at the back, on either side of the ’3′, Lennon was using two exceptionally gifted ball-playing defenders in Mulgrew and Wanyama. On the flanks, two out-and-out speed merchants in Izaguirre and Cha (O’Neill’s was generally one-sided in using Alan Thompson – who wasn’t really a wing-back or full-back).

Indeed, Cha was deployed so far forward that Wanyama was used effectively as a conservative full-back, leaving the 3 centre-backs against Motherwell’s 3 forwards.

Pros and Cons

Lennon’s ambitious formation added more bodies to the midfield and forward areas, and so Motherwell’s central defence (along with holding midfielder Steve Jennings) had an uncomfortable afternoon. The full-backs had two speedy and athletic customers in Izaguirre and Cha, but the main problem was with the movement of Commons and Hooper. Commons acted as a number 10 playmaker, and Hooper pushed up (as a classic number 9) or more regularly dropped deeper (as a false 9).

Motherwell dealt with this in two ways – Jennings had to track two tricky runners, or Tim Clancy having to ‘step-out’ – clearly a method of Lennon’s to try to disorganise or poke holes in the standard two centre-backs/one holder triumvate.

Unfortunately, this didn’t work as well as was hoped for. Clancy didn’t mind stepping out to an extent – as it got the point that Hooper was dropping into the rest of Motherwell’s midfield – either that or dropping so deep as to become ineffective as a player (at one point gifting  Humphrey with a great chance).

Hooper is an excellent and improving striker, but there becomes a breaking point in terms of depth of playmaking.

The system also found the very best of Cha and Izaguirre, albeit the former continuing to suffer from being poor in the final third, and the latter still relatively unfit.

Taking Cha-nces

Shortly after Hooper’s mishap, Wanyama created a great chance for Brozek – again underlining Celtic’s 3 vs 3 at the back, because it works both ways. Once away from his “opposite number” Omar Daley, he had the freedom of the pitch to stride forward and play a through-ball to Brozek, whose finish was sadly rushed.

As the injured Ki was replaced by Paddy McCourt (retaining the unlikely centre-midfield role), Wanyama almost repeated the feat, setting up Commons who couldn’t get enough accuracy on his shot to trouble Darren Randolph.

On the stroke of half-time Commons and Brozek combined in an example of their vertical movement and interchanging unsettling the Motherwell defence, with the Poles shot hit against the keeper’s legs and out. It’s a shame for Brozek who was getting into the right positions, he was just lacking the bit of luck required to break his duck.

Celtic didn’t particularly recapture the creativity of the first-half during the opening 15 minutes of the second period, barring for a squandered Cha chance that is the Korean in microcosm. McCourt’s delicious through-ball was put into the path of Cha’s Olympic-sprinter-esque burst of pace, but the final ball was inexplicably useless, rolled gently into the goalkeeper’s hands.

Tony Watt

Despite Brozek’s promising performance, Tony Watt replaced him on the hour and within 3 minutes and 19 seconds had managed to achieve what the Polish international couldn’t.

By then Henrik Ojamaa had replaced Daley in a like-for-like change, but in the short space of time until the goal the Motherwell sub was simply not paying any attention to his opposite number, Wanyama, at all. Unsurprisingly, it was the same overlap and cross (with Cha tying up Hammill) used earlier, and though Watt’s finish was adroit, it was just as much the quality of the cross that resulted in the goal.

Another 2 and a half minutes later, Watt had the ball in the back of the net again. But this time, it was a success for Hooper’s movement into deeper areas, as the following slideshow explains in ugly fashion:

4-4-2s

Motherwell quickly went 4-4-2, not only in the hope of providing a bit of support to Higdon but also in an effort to double-up on the flanks more successfully. But the damage was done and Celtic could smell blood. Commons’ influence was increasing, but sadly he could not open his scoring account for the season, in what has become an incredible swing in form from last season. It’s only here, 50+ matches into Celtic’s season that he appears to be nearing his old self.

Celtic too, switched to 4-4-2 although it’s not clear why. The best explanation might be to find Lustig room in the team (without removing Cha), but it may have been to again go man-to-man with Motherwell; not that it mattered with minutes remaining.

McCourt (now playing on the left, with Wanyama centre of midfield) found Cha at the back-post to back it 3-0, truly ending the contest.

Conclusion

While not too much can be garnered from this performance in the long-term, it’s just another example of Lennon searching for a new system, an alternative to his trademark ‘lop-sided’ 4-4-2. The proposed formation not only has to provide defensive solidity (as in Europe, Celtic will be facing superior sides), but also room for creative and attacking players.

A 3-4-2-1 (or other variants on 3-5-2) ticks some major boxes. It puts a real emphasis on the wing-backs, and arguably Celtic’s best player in Emilio Izaguirre. It has flexibility, with Mulgrew and Wanyama both technically proficient and able to adapt into different roles quickly.

Finally the system can (arguably) provide a solid foundation for a dynamic front-three – most significantly to include a number 10 – a type of player that Lennon has long been coveting.

As far as experiments go, it was a fine success. And Watt’s quickfire double was the icing on the cake.

This turned out to be yet another admirable performance from Santiago Escobar’s Verdolagas as they secured a comprehensive three-goal victory in front of their home fans, securing their qualification and putting them atop Group 8 with eleven points in five matches.

Atlético Nacional made a couple of changes from the side that drew 2×2 with Godoy Cruz three weeks previously, bringing in Oscar Murillo and international cap Juan David Valencia to the back four, and selecting Diego Álvarez to partner live-wire striker Dorlan Pabón up front. Furthermore, creative midfielder Luis Mosquera was left on the bench, with Escobar preferring to go with the more reserved youngster Sebastián Pérez.

Peñarol, already eliminated, opted to rest some of their more important squad members like Dário Rodríguez and Luis Aguiar, and handed rare starting berths to the likes of 21 year old midfielder Facundo Guichón.

As the image shows, the home side lined up in a 4-3-1-2 formation, with the superb Macnelly Torres as the enganche drifting around behind Pabón and Álvarez. As usual, they counted on strong support from both wing-backs, often attacking with eight players, leaving only the centre-backs in their own territory.

Peñarol went with their now familiar 4-4-2 shape, a much more simple system to try and accommodate a team suffering cohesion issues since losing the fulcrum of last season’s side. Without the ball, they stay deep with two banks of four players attempting to protect the defence, but in possession they open up a bit more, almost into a 4-3-3 with right-sided Sebastián Cristóforo joining the attack.

The home side appeared comfortable throughout the 90 minutes, moving the ball around nicely and preventing Peñarol from causing any real trouble. However with their enthusiasm and pressing in their own territory, they did concede a lot of fouls in the first half, but fortunately for them the Uruguayans failed to make the most of these set-piece opportunities.

Curiously, it was through two rare free-kicks in favour of Atlético Nacional at the top and tail of the first half that shot them to a 2×0 lead by the interval. The first, on seven minutes, was a lovely cross to the back post from captain Macnelly Torres, which was headed down by Tula to allow fellow defender Murillo to poke the ball home. It was a clearly well-rehearsed move, and the joy on the faces of both coach Escobar and the players was one of seeing hard work having paid off.

Their second goal was less of a team effort and more of an individual piece of brilliance, courtesy of the tournament’s top scorer Dorlan ‘Memín’ Pabón. Faced with a free-kick from approximately 40 yards, to say that a shot on goal was speculative would be an understatement. Evidently though, Memín doesn’t see things the same way as the rest of us. Instead of a floated cross into the Peñarol penalty area, the 24 year old striker let off a magnificent strike from his traction-engine right foot, which took a wicked curve in mid-flight before bursting the back of the net.

The second half saw much of the same football, with the Verdolagas happy in possession and comfortable at the back. They even managed to score a third goal through a swift counter attack from right-back Bernal, galloping the length of the field before crossing for Diego Álvarez to score.

Atlético Nacional’s 4-3-1-2

The first thing to notice is that instead of the Brazilian-style 4-2-2-2 we saw in the opening group match against Universidad de Chile, in this match Santiago Escobar opted to line his side up in a 4-3-1-2 shape, similar to that used in the away match against Peñarol in February. As opposed to the rapid, ultra-direct approach of the 4-2-2-2, this system is geared towards giving extra protection to the centre-backs while promoting a patient, possession-based style of build-up play.

Throughout the match, Atlético Nacional were wonderful in possession. While they have gained a reputation for being a ruthless counter-attacking side, on Tuesday night the Verdolagas instead passed the ball amongst themselves calmly and instinctively, waiting for gaps to present themselves in the opposition ranks.

They did not abandon their counter-attacking threat completely however, and on a few occasions (most notably in their third goal) they displayed their spectacular talent of moving the ball from defence to attack with alarming speed.

Peñarol’s disastrous campaign

In the group stages of a continental tournament, one point from five matches is a woeful record for any club. However for the previous year’s beaten finalists, it is almost unbelievable. Despite forcing their way through to last year’s big history-soaked Libertadores final against Santos, with the help of a united squad and a bit of garra charrúa, Peñarol were the first team to be eliminated from the 2012 group phase, without recording a single victory.

The explanations for such a spectacular failure are actually quite clear. The state of the economy in Uruguay means that football clubs have no option but to sell players to stay afloat. Despite the strength of the national side, the Uruguayan domestic game is still lagging behind its neighbours, with some of last year’s Peñarol side ending up all over the continent and the rest of the world.

To best illustrate this huge player turnover, a quick look at the Peñarol team sheet shows that only three of Tuesday evening’s match day squad (González, Freitas and Albín) were involved in last year’s final, the rest were either injured or have moved on.

More holes than a block of Emmental

Even though the break-up of last year’s talented squad goes a long way to explaining Peñarol’s dismal performances in 2012, the blame doesn’t end there.

As I mentioned at the top of the post, Peñarol came out in a 4-4-2 formation, retreating into two defined banks of four whenever Atlético Nacional were in possession. The objective of this strategy is simple, to stay narrow and compact in order to restrict spaces for the opposition attackers, thus forcing them to give the ball away.

In theory, it was the ideal way to play against the Colombians, but Peñarol were let down by their execution. Instead of staying narrow and organised, the carbonero defenders were pulled inside and out by the roaming runs of Macnelly Torres and Dorlan Pabón, leaving gaping holes for Atlético Nacional to exploit.

I put together this diagram from an Atlético Nacional attack midway through the first half. The small red circle around Córdoba indicates that he is in possession, the blue arrows represent possible passing options, while the red arrows represent off-the-ball runs. I used the larger red circles to denote the space offered to the Verdolaga attackers.

As the diagram shows, Peñarol are attempting to keep two lines of four behind the ball, with even second striker Pérez coming back to defend. However Macnelly Torres, Peñarol’s captain and playmaker, is in oceans of space and from his position he is able to pick out any of his other attacking team-mates.

What follows is my view of how Peñarol should have set up their two banks of four:

Right away, you can see that the two lines are much narrower and very little space is offered to Atlético Nacional’s attackers.

What next for Atlético Nacional?

With their qualification to the knock-out rounds secured, the Verdolagas will now be looking further than their Group 8 adversaries, and towards potential last 16 opponents.

It is my opinion that Santiago Escobar will be looking at the more expressive, attacking sides like Lanús, Libertad and Unión Española as ideal opponents, considering his own team’s proficiency on the counter attack, while more organised, secure clubs like Boca Juniors, Vélez Sarsfield and Corinthians could cause them great difficulty.

For those interested in watching the complete match:

Note: Seeing as it has become the main body of material on this blog, I am considering ditching the ‘Game of the Week’ feature title, and instead just posting match analyses as and when I see fit, instead of being restricted to the one-per-week system. What do you fine folks think? Let me know in comments/email/twitter.

Celtic Lineup

Celtic 4-4-2

Celtic were without a number of key players – Daniel Majstorovic and Beram Kayal’s season has been ended prematurely, while Emilio Izaguirre continues his rehabilitation. 3rd choice right-back Mikael Lustig and Ki Sung-Yeung returned from injury.

As expected, Neil Lennon set-out with his preferred lop-sided 4-4-2 tactic, with Gary Hooper and Anthony Stokes the focal point in attack. Joe Ledley started on the left of midfield, while Charlie Mulgrew was chosen to deputise at left-back, allowing Kelvin Wilson to start.

Kilmarnock Lineup

Kilmarnock 4-3-2-1

Ryan O’Leary and Manuel Pascali remain Kilmarnock’s long-term absentees, while prolific striker Paul Heffernan received an injection in order to be fit enough to play. Dieter van Turnhout was fit enough for the bench, while Dean Shiels comes straight back into the side from suspension.

While many commentators labelled the system a particularly dour ‘Sheils’ 4-5-1, the manager has previously made efforts to bridge the gap between midfield and a lone striker – here, rather ambitiously using two attacking midfielders as part of a 4-3-2-1 (Christmas tree) – his son Dean, and the tricky Gary Harkins. (Typically managers might use a 4-4-1-1)

Open start

With the fine conditions and “cup final” vibe, both teams had an early attacking vibrancy. If anything, Celtic were probably too direct while Killie were enjoying a sizeable amount of possession. The gameplan for the underdog as always, is to survive the opening third (at least) and try and frustrate. These intentions were almost undone after a shocking pass from Udinese loannee Mahamadou Sissoko. His slack sideways pass along the 18-yard line was snatched by Hooper, whose shot was blocked. Credit to Cammy Bell for lightning quick reactions, darting from his line and surprising Celtic’s striker.

That massive chance preceded a flurry of opportunities for both sides. Two headers were the pick – one from Stokes which forcedBellinto another sensational save, and then Sissoko. The gangly centre-back was clearly the target of Kilmarnock’s set-pieces, though he was generally dealt with O.K. Celtic’s use of corners was slightly different, and something of an “in-vogue” strategy. The idea is to use your striker to block the defending goalkeeper, with the opposition marker also contributing to the congestion. This removes the goalkeeper from “collecting” duty close to goal, meaning precise crosses can be delivered into areas normally considered off-limits. Good defending combined with a little good luck, and Mulgrew’s deliveries while being supplied to specification, were made to look wasteful and too close to the ‘keeper.

The Christmas Tree

Sheils’ 4-3-2-1 formation proved problematic in a number of ways. The first, and most obvious is that it’s an inherently narrow system which concedes the flanks. Not only were the 3 ‘sitting’ midfielders deep and constricting space, they also provided the all important ‘outnumbering’ of Celtic’s central 2.

Sheils and Harkins in the Killie band of 2, when in possession supported the striker but without the ball dropped back down the flanks in an attempt to keep Celtic’s full-backs in check, though it was hardly man-marking. Joe Ledley suffered in being drawn into the central scrimmage, and James Forrest when not doubled-up on, couldn’t get the better of Ben Gordon. The onus then, was probably on Celtic’s full-backs to get forward, but the potential was there to leave the remaining 3 defenders against Kilmarnock’s front 3 – an unacceptable ratio of forwards to defenders. Kilmarnock’s width was being provided by their full-backs, with both Gordon and Fowler able to get forward on the counter with reasonable ease.

Celtic looked to the front pairing of Hooper and Stokes for attacking creativity, but crowded out and playing too far apart, there was virtually no linkup – none of the quick thinking that justifies their unconventional pairing, and probably the third match in succession that the combination has failed to inspire. Lennon’s search for attacking impetus saw Forrest switch over to the left (a frequent rouse) pitching Ledley in the centre with Wanyama, and Brown wide-right, and in one of the few positives Brown was emerging as the best player on the park – beating players, driving the team forward and posing a threat in the final third.

Lennon’s problem and changes

Lennon's problem

The beauty of Sheils’ system, was at times Kilmarnock could attack 2 centre-backs with 3 attackers, as per Heffernan’s chance on the cusp of half-time. Kelvin Wilson pressed midfielder Sheils on the edge of the Celtic area, leaving space for Heffernan to exploit, forcing a fine save from Forster.

This, along with the continuing problem of having two “limited” central defenders prompted Lennon into introducing Ki Sung-Yeung for Rogne on the hour, moving Wanyama to centre-back.

The change saw a swing of momentum back in Celtic’s favour, with Ki more capable of dropping back and taking responsibility of starting moves from deep – and Celtic couldn’t find the opener. Ledley was guilty of a glaring miss, and Bell denied Wanyama.

Belatedly (80^th minute), Samaras replaced Hooper, but wasn’t used as a striker. He moved out to the left, with Forrest shifted inside playing almost-level with Stokes making for a kind of 4-2-3-1. It didn’t appear to make a huge amount of sense, removing a ‘true’ striker when chasing a goal (particularly as the tiring Forrest has never convinced behind the striker), but two major events would ruin the plan.

 Final 10 minutes – Celtic’s downfall

It wasn’t a surprise when Mulgrew made a good chance for himself – seeing as Celtic’s full-backs were the “freest” players (at least after shaking off Harkins or Shiels), able to dribble quite easily into the Kilmarnock box – and again Bell made an excellent stop at Mulgrew’s feet. The move perhaps underlined the requirement for more positive and attacking intent from the full-backs.

But Killie still threatened, and the first killer blow was of course the goal. Again an example of their attacking midfielders in the band of 2 being allowed a free run at Celtic’s two centre-backs.

Johnson’s overlap on the left wasn’t tracked well (bearing in mind Kilmarnock’s spare man in midfield), and his cross met the onrushing van Tournhout (a like-for-like replacement for Harkins). The fluidity (enabled by having a spare man) of Kilmarnock’s midfield meant it wasn’t clear who should’ve been picking up the scorer – on paper it should’ve been Ledley or Mulgrew depending on communication, but posing the question is the triumph for Sheils.

The second fatal blow was the injury to James Forrest after all three substitutions had been made, leaving Celtic a goal down, a man down, and with 1 striker with time ticking away.

Much has been made of Stokes’ late penalty call – with Lennon almost blaming it single-handedly for the defeat – and in fairness to Willie Collum, it was a tough call to make. There was contact with the player (arguably minimal), yet no contact with the ball, though the incident happened at such a pace in such a ruck of bodies it was hard to make out. A telling piece of circumstantial evidence was that Stokes hit the deck at all – one would imagine if he had any choice in the matter that he would’ve went for goal. The decision was probably a fair one.

 Conclusion

Overall this could be considered a tactical victory for Shiels, and perhaps an example of unfortunate decisions for Lennon. It’s not as if Celtic hadn’t seen the 4-3-2-1 before, with Dundee Utd, St Mirren and of courseKilmarnockhaving previously fielded the shape.

The emphasis is always on midfield congestion, and therefore the onus on the wingers and full-backs to create. A natural solution (albeit difficult to effect in-match), would be a 4-3-3 – matching the bodies in the centre of the park while keeping the width. However; of all Celtic’s recently trialled formations, the 4-3-3 is the one found to be the least comfortable (so far). A problematic complication is Celtic do not have a clear recognised lone striker, one who could take advantage of supply from wide areas.

There were tactical concerns all over the park – the overloading of the centre-backs, the general outnumbering in the centre of midfield, the inability for the full-backs to get forward, the inability to get James Forrest on the ball, and the Hooper/Stokes’ isolation.

 Yet Celtic created enough quality chances to win the match. Hooper’s early miss wasn’t as easy as has been made out, yet it was key. Ledley’s too in the second half, and Bell’s heroic performance proved galling. Forrest’s injury was salt in the wound; telling of a day where nothing went right.

Although a markedly improved performance from preceding games, it was not enough to send the Hatters to Wembley and brighten up what has been a rather gloomy period for the club.

The Town played with an intensity and endeavour all over the pitch at Kenilworth Road, but simply failed to create enough clear-cut chances and as a result were unable to capitalise on an authoritative first-half display.

The match epitomised the club’s season so far. Despite taking the lead in the first-half after controlling the game, York were allowed to rally at the start of the second and Luton never truly reinstated their dominance. Of course, the lead was then squandered and the game finished with an unfavourable result.

Failure to kill off opposition has been the story of the season. In the Blue Square Bet Premier, Luton have lost 16 pts from winning positions: 8 games have finished in draws when the Hatters have been ahead. Yesterday, although a cup match, was another instance of this.

In truth, none of the players on the pitch had a particularly bad game, but equally, there were no exceptionally good performances.

Switching between 4-3-3 and 4-4-2, our attacking moves were still largely ineffective, yet no efforts were made to alter them. It became exasperating to watch as lofted crosses were continuously angled in towards Danny Crow and Stuart Fleetwood from deep.

With the front-line we had on the field, it was apparent that our wingers needed to hit the by-line and drill balls across the face of goal, but no change of approach was visible. Perhaps there was no instruction to do so. Puzzling.

Crow was again helpless upfront and did what he could with the type of service which is of little use to him. Fleetwood, however, who operated at times as a striker and others a winger, could shoulder some of the blame after not only failing to make an impact, but also turning over possession on too many occassions.

The latter’s performance was not one of his best which is why boos at Gary Brabin’s decision to replace him with Adam Watkins, who is arguably our most creative player, were possibly unfair.

Sacrificing a striker for a midfielder may have appeared a negative move, but it certainly changed things for the better almost instantly. York’s threatening spell was put to an end and the Hatters seemed to gain control once again, but, as the final score indicates, that wasn’t enough.

It is becoming clearer, with each passing game, that the problem is not the way the team is being set up. Whether it is 4-3-3, 4-5-1, 4-4-2, or any other, it currently does not matter. Formations pale into insignificance when the footballing philosophy is to simply punt the ball long to a short striker – or two.

The harsh reality is one of two things: either the squad has been poorly assembled and is unbalanced, or, the squad’s strengths are not being utilised out on the pitch. Either way, the blame can only be levelled at one man: Gary Brabin.

At this moment in time, we do not have two fit, confident and in-form strikers to deploy within a 4-4-2. We are strongest in midfield, so a 4-3-3/ 4-5-1 would seem most appropriate, but seeing as we often bypass the midfield in matches and do not possess anyone capable of playing effectively as a lone centre-forward who is fit, that does not seem viable either.

We are clearly in a worse state than this time last year. The atmosphere engulfing the club suggests it; statistics confirm it.

However, it is unlikely Brabin will suffer the same fate as Richard Money who departed at the end of March last year. It seems as though the Liverpudlian would have gone by now if he was ever going to. There have certainly been more opportunities to part ways by this point than there were during Money’s tenure.

Irrespective of the scepticism surrounding his managerial ability, Brabin still believes he is the right man to lead Luton to promotion and, interestingly, has expressed his intention to revert to a 4-4-2 from here on in.

The question is, does this intended adjustment show adaptability within Brabin, or does it suggest a loss of faith in his preferred system and style of play? And, will it even matter – if we persist with this notorious long-ball tactic?

Boca, the undisputed champions of the 2011 Apertura, came into the match on the back of two consecutive defeats (the last time that happened was in March 2011) and it appeared that cracks were beginning to appear in Julio César Falcioni’s previously watertight Boca team.

The home side, Arsenal, came out in a familiar 4-4-2 formation, often morphing into a 4-2-2-2 when in possession, with the two wide midfielders pushing up on either side. As you can see from the diagram below, right-sided Colombian midfielder Carlos Carbonero was the more attacking of the two, frequently striving to bomb forward and run at the Boca defence.

Predictably, Boca went with their usual 4-3-1-2 system, with Santiago Silva partnered by the more mobile Pablo Mouche in attack. Besides Silva, who arrived in the off-season from Fiorentina, this was the exact same side that stormed to the Apertura title in the second half of 2011.

Despite Juan Román Riquelme being the real brain of the team, it is the midfield trio that really gives Falcioni’s Boca side its distinct look. Leandro Somoza, the central player of the triumvirate, is the holder in front of the defensive line, often dropping back as a makeshift central defender when the team is under pressure. Diego Rivero and Walter Erviti, who play on either side of Somoza, play as carrileros (or midfield ‘shuttlers’), helping to protect the defence but also bursting forward to help out in attacking phases. The all-round qualities of the players in these two roles are crucial to the team, allowing them to shift so effortlessly from defence to attack.

Arsenal capitalise on early pressure

With the three points an absolute necessity, Boca briefly abandoned their usual secure and contained approach in the opening stages of the match and opened up in search of an early goal. The two carrileros Rivero and Erviti started much more advanced than usual, almost forming an attacking midfield line of three with Riquelme when Boca had possession, leaving Somoza to shield the back-line by himself.

In theory, this strategy should have allowed them to control proceedings and dominate play, but in practice it allowed Arsenal’s two main weapons – the wide midfielders Carbonero and Aguirre – a huge amount of space to run at the Boca defence. Although Boca did have most of the possession, they were horribly stretched whenever they lost the ball, eventually leading to them conceding the opening goal.

On nine minutes, Nicolás Aguirre picked up the ball on the left touchline and after shrugging off the half-hearted challenge of Boca right-back Facundo Roncaglia, he charged forward down the vacated flank. Upon reaching the 18-yard line he delivered a probing cross towards the penalty spot, right in-behind the Boca centre-backs and into the infamous ‘corridor of uncertainty’, where the ball was accidentally turned into the net by Boca’s Clemente Rodríguez. Rodríguez has to take the blame for the mis-hit clearance, but with Arsenal striker Leguizamón lurking behind him, he had to take some sort of action.

Boca bounce back

Only after conceding did Boca begin to find their rhythm in the match. After around 25 minutes they managed to gain control of possession and by instructing Rivero and Erviti to man-mark Aguirre and Carbonero respectively, they significantly reduced Arsenal’s danger down both flanks. Own-goal villain Rodríguez provided some much needed width down Boca’s left side, and through him they managed to orchestrate some meaningful attacks.

Boca drew level on 29 minutes through a composed finish from Pablo Mouche from the right side of the area. The move started with a high cross from Rivero on the right, which was headed into the penalty box by Riquelme. Santiago Silva challenged for the ball, but Arsenal’s Lisandro López made a wonderful last-ditch interception, taking the ball away from El Tanque. Unfortunately for Lisandro though, the loose ball fell to Mouche who finished superbly from a tight angle.

Ledesma comes off the bench to win it for Boca

In the second half, Boca were struggling to kick on from their equaliser, their passing was poor and Román Riquelme was near anonymous, often drifting out to the left away from the play. Arsenal looked the better side, almost taking the lead again when striker Luciano Leguizamón got in behind the Boca defence and appeared to have been brought down by Schiavi. From the replays it certainly seemed to have been worthy of a penalty, but referee Pablo Lunati waved play on.

Conscious of his side slipping out of the match, Boca coach Falcioni decided to bring on former Catania midfielder Pablo Ledesma in place of the disappointing Rivero, looking for some fresh legs in the middle of the park and a bit more natural attacking instinct.

It would appear to have been a stroke of tactical genius as only five minutes after coming on, Ledesma fired Boca into the lead, latching on to a Clemente Rodríguez cross. The midfielder was totally unmarked in the area, a result of his ‘marker’ Nicolás Aguirre failing to track back with him. It would appear that Aguirre became accustomed to having Rivero in that area, a player much less likely to make the late surge into the area.

In the lead for the first time in the match, Boca were happy to revert back to their safer and more defensive style. The trio of Ledesma, Somoza and Erviti were all on hand to protect the back four, as the away side successfully shut out Arsenal for the last twenty minutes.

Considering the week they had previous to this match (the 2×1 home defeat against Fluminense, and then the insane 5×4 defeat at the hands of Independiente), this result was absolutely critical to Boca Juniors. If they had failed to win, not only would it have left them in a precarious position in their group, but it would also have cranked up the pressure even further on their harshly-treated manager Julio César Falcioni.

It was not all positives for Boca though, in truth they did not play particularly well over the course of the match. Big summer signing El Tanque Santiago Silva struggled once again, and in conceding the Clemente Rodríguez own goal, vulnerabilities were highlighted in a defence that last year, looked like it would never concede another goal.

Arsenal will certainly be frustrated with the loss, considering that they put in a big effort and gave quite a decent performance. They caused Boca several headaches in the first half, particularly through the neat link-up play between Carbonero and Leguizamón, but once they went 2×1 down, they appeared to have ran out of steam.

They host relegation candidates Banfield at the weekend, before returning to play Boca again on wednesday, only this time in La Bombonera. They will be hoping for a similar performance, but perhaps with a little more luck.

All in all, it’s got me thinking. It’s impossible to pick a Top 10. There are literally 50 odd players you could bracket in as the greatest players of all time. What you could do, however, is pick a squad. 18 players (a starting XI and subs.) The reason for picking a selection in this format is self-evident – in lists of great players, defenders and goalkeepers hardly get a look in, yet I think they should be highly rated, based on the fact that if you don’t have them your team has no foundation. Could you imagine setting up a team with no keeper or defence?

So, it seems that I’m appointing myself as the first Asian Dr. Who, and the TARDIS is ready and waiting for me to go on my mission to collect what I think would be the greatest team of all time. Obviously, some people will disagree with my choices – what I have to say to them is – this is a well thought out squad and of course, you’re allowed to disagree – that’s half the fun of conjecture and debate. Feel free to submit your squad and comment below. I look forward to seeing your responses!

The first thing I’m going to do is pick a manager.

The Manager

For this reason, and this reason alone, Johann Cruyff is NOT going to be a player in my team. He is, for me, the greatest manager of all time.
As a manager, he is responsible for the late 1980′s Ajax revival, before creating the Barcelona “Dream Team” of the 1990′s.
At some point, he has been influential in the development of players such as Marco Van Basten, Frank Rijkard, Dennis Bergkamp, Aaron Winter, Danny Blind, Josep Guardiola, Ronald Koeman, Michael Laudrup, Gheorgie Hagi, Romário and Hristo Stoichkov. The foundations he laid at Barcelona have given rise to arguably the best club football team of all time. Guardiola’s (and arguably Rijkard’s) Barcelona. Those foundations have created Xavi Hernandez, Andreas Inesta, Gerard Piqué, Lionel Messi and Cesc Fàbregas.
That list alone could create a team that would frighten the bejesus out of most people.
He is a staunch advocate of “Total Football,” and subsequently, had a hand in the evolution of Tiki-Taka. As good as he was on the pitch, it’s incomparable to his influence as a manager/coach to football. If you’re going to have one man lead a team, it has to be Johann Cruyff.

The formation
4-3-3 / 4-2-3-1.
We could argue left and right about the 4-4-2 (or diamond 4-1-2-1-2) or the 4-2-2-2, but for me, the formation of choice is 4-3-3/4-2-3-1. I love it.  I find it’s the best way of lining up and dependent on the use of one DM or two, the weight of the team is spread evenly across the front and middle of the park. Sir Bobby Robson once said, “If you have a problem in the defence or the attack – look at the midfield,” although he also said  “We can’t replace Gary Speed. Where do you get an experienced player like him with a left foot and a head?” So don’t take all of his word’s as gospel. But I think he got that idea about the middle of the park controlling the game spot on.

The Starting XI
GK – Peter Schmeichel

You could argue that Peter Schmeichel had great defences in front of him. You could say that. But to watch him play would indicate something else entirely. He was dominant, commanding, and fearless. As a player, he won 5 Premier League titles, 3 FA Cups, 1 League cup, 4 Charity shields, 1 Champion’s League and 1 UEFA Super cup during his time at Manchester Utd, as well as titles with Brøndby, Sporting CP and Aston Villa. He won the Euro’s with Denmark in 1992 also.
Fergie himself stated that when buying Schmeichel that he was the “buy of the century” and I could not agree more. A man with 739 career games and 10 career goals (as a Goalkeeper) Peter redefined what it meant to be a goalie. Often he would save goals in unorthodox manners  with his feet and head on occasion. Tall, athletic and driven by a will to win that seemingly pushed the ball forward from the back, for me, there is no other choice. Not even my beloved Arsenal’s David Seaman. He holds the record for the greatest amount of clean sheets/games ratio of any GK that has played in the Premier League (42%)

RB – Cafù

The most capped Brazilian player ever. A born leader of men. Cafù originally began his career as a midfielder, but was swiftly persuaded by his coach Telê Santana at São Paolo to play in a wing-back position. He never looked back. From winning back to back Copa Libertadores with São Paulo in 1992/1993/1994, he moved to Juventude in 1995, then on to Real Zaragoza as part of the Cup Winners Cup team (that beat my beloved Arsenal) for the second half of that season. From there he moved to Italy with Roma and then A.C. Milan, winning Scudetto’s with both teams and playing for Milan in the Champion’s League Final in 2005. Internationally, he won the World Cup with Brazil in 1994 and 2002. He was known as “The freight train” and scored 18 goals in 525 club games.

RCB – Franz Beckenbauer

Two time European footballer of the year. 5 time Bundesliga winner (4x Bayern, 1xHamburg), 3 time European cup winner, World Cup winner, European cup winner. The man has accolades up to the eyeballs. During his time at Bayern Munich , he became the principal architect of the libero (sweeper) position, and would sit deep in the defence to collect the ball before bombing forward in possession to set up counter-attacks. This position was highly regarded in the catenaccio defence system of the 1960s in Italy and for that reason I would like to pair Beckenbauer with an Italian. And not just any Italian…

LCB – Paolo Maldini

Now, I know what you’re thinking – Maldini is a LB. Guess what – my team, my rules. Besides, Maldini has played as a Centre-back in games, so it’s not too much to ask of this 5 time Champions League and 7 time Scudetto winner. “Il Capitan” spent 25 years playing for A.C. Milan’s back line and in that time came second to George Weah as FIFA world player of the year in 1995. That is the highest rank that any defender has reached, and is testament to how good he really is. Maldini was never a great tackler, but he didn’t need to be – his positional awareness and reading of the game indicated he would hardly ever have to make a challenge in the first place.

LB – José Antonio Camacho

You thought I would go for Roberto Carlos, right? Naaaaah. Give me some credit! As good as Carlos was, I’ve opted for José Antonio Camacho. He was the Real Madrid LB from 1974 to 1989. He played over 500 games and won 9 La Liga titles in his tenure. He was good enough to walk straight into the starting XI at the time and earning 81 caps for Spain to boot. He also formed a great left-wing partnership with the wingers in front of him at the time and was instrumental in the Madrid team that won consecutive UEFA Cups (now Europa League).

DM – Paul Scholes

“He scores goals, He’s Paul Scholes.“
Manchester born and Manchester raised (well, Salford,) Paul Scholes has notched up 688 club appearances and 158 goals for Manchester Utd. In that time he has won the Premier league on 10 occasions, a FIFA world club cup, 2 Champions Leagues, 3 FA cups and 5 Charity Shields. He is the most admired midfielder amongst his peers, the best midfielder of a generation and a beacon of dedication to the game. He has steely resolve and above all, he has been able to adapt his game from an attacking midfielder playing in a 4-4-1-1 (behind the striker) to his more defensive role in the Utd 4-3-3. There is a certain midfielder that stated he always wanted to play alongside Scholes… can you work out who I picked next then?

DM – Zinédine Zidane

For me, the MF par-excellence. Singlehandedly he dragged France through the World Cup final of 1998 to beat the Brazil team that boasted the likes of Cafù, Roberto Carlos, Rivaldo and O Fenomeno himself (Ronaldo,) with two goals from set-pieces. Then there was THAT goal. The Champions League final goal (against Bayer Leverkusen). He won the Euros with Les Bleus before retiring internationally, only to come out of retirement and lead them to the World Cup final in 2006 against Italy. He will be forever remembered for his headbutt on Materazzi and subsequent sending off in his final game, but I wouldn’t let one bad incident tarnish his brilliant career. He had a club total of 681 appearances and 128 goals, he won La Liga, the Champions League, The UEFA Super cup and Copa Del Ray with Real Madrid, and a Scudetto with Juventus. Most importantly, he was a shining light in a Madrid team that boasted the likes of Luis Figo, Raúl, Ronaldo, David Beckham and Steve McManaman.

CAM – Roberto Baggio

Have you ever seen a Buddhist footballer with a deadly eye for goal? If you’ve ever had the chance to watch Roberto Baggio, you have.
637 club games. 292 goals. FIFA world player of the year AND Ballon d’Or winner in 1993. (He is NOT the older brother of Dino Baggio). He has famously scored goals in three consecutive World Cup tournaments for Italy (1990, 1994, 1998).  He was one of the originators of the 9 1/2 position – the support striker. However, he never really received the club or international accolades his skills deserved. Imagine if you will, Lionel Messi playing for Levante. Individually brilliant, but unable to support and be supported by the talent surrounding him. He scored 72 goals from 91 penalties (which is to this day an Italian record). Including his international goals (which then totals 106/122) this translates to 87%. He was a dead ball specialist. His character also speaks volumes. During the 1990 world cup in the 3rd place playoff against England, Baggio reneged on the opportunity to take a penalty in favour of Salvatore Schillaci taking it. This allowed Schillaci to win the Golden Shoe.

RW – Maradona

Do I really need to state why I choose Maradona? Goal. Of. The. Century.
Single handedly dragged Napoli to a Scudetto. Twice. Master of the Rabona. (And just like me, a left-footed, right sided player.)
I don’t need to talk about his accolades as a player or his stats. He is Maradona.

LW -  Eusébio

571 club games with a return of 585 goals. In fact, the only player in this list with a completely positive goal to game ratio. Winner of two European Golden Boot awards, Winner of one World Cup Golden boot. 11 time Premiera Liga winner with Benfica. Winner of the Bola de Prata on 7 occasions (Portuguese top goal-scorer). His team-mate Simões went on record to state “With Eusébio maybe we could be European champions, without him maybe we could win the League.” Playing on the left side with a right foot, he was simply devastating.

ST -  Alfredo Di Stéfano

The most dominant striker of all time. Led Real Madrid to 5 consecutive European championships. He could and would play any position on the pitch. In essence, he was the blueprint for what total football would become. 661 club games and a return of 484 goals.

Bench
GK – Bert Trautmaan – Played with a broken neck against Birmingham City in the FA Cup final and won the game for Man City, only to realise three days later through an X-Ray that he had been injured.
CB – Bobby Moore – Best English centre-back ever. Very much in the same mould as Franz Beckenbauer.

LB – Roberto Carlos – Le Tournoi. Dead ball specialist. Brazilian. Galactico.

MF – Gussepie Meazza – One of the deadliest inside-forwards in Internationale (and later Milan) history. Was able to successfully adapt his game for the midfield to devastating effect.

MF – Garrincha – The best dribbler in footballing history.

ST – Romàrio – Has scored 929 career goals. Part of the Barcelona “Dream Team”

ST – Michael Laudrup – Won La Liga 5 times consecutively with Barcelona (x4) and Real Madrid. His partnership with Romàrio was legendary.

Final Thoughts
So there you have it. MY Classic XI. There will be some names you agree with – there will be some names you won’t.
The bench may look a little strange, but at the end of the day I’m a tactician and I like to have options to switch it up. if for some reason the 4-3-3/4-2-5-1 wasn’t working, I’d switch to a diamond 4-4-2 (4-1-2-1-2) and bring on Romàrio and Laudrup.

On a more personal note, I had a struggle with leaving Bergkamp out because I think, much like Baggio, he is perfect for the 9 1/2 role. I also wish I could have David Seaman but his omission comes because of the dedication and strength of Bert Trautmann. In another life I would have Zidane and Vieira in the middle with Bergkamp in the hole. Are you drooling as much as I am?

Leave your thoughts and such below. I’d love to hear your Classic XI teams.