.

.

Flight 3597 departed Berlin-Tegel at 21:01 from runway 26L for a flight to Zürich. The Avro climbed to a cruising altitude of FL270. At 21:40 the crew were cleared to descend to FL240 and two minutes later further down to FL160. At that time the crew were carrying out an approach briefing for a runway 14 ILS approach at Zürich. Having been further cleared down to FL130, the crew were told to prepare for a runway 28 VOR/DME approach. Another approach briefing was carried out and the minimum descent altitude was found to be 2390 feet AMSL. At 21:58 the aircraft was cleared for the runway 28 approach.

.
At 22:03 the aircraft was descending to 4000 feet after which it turned right for the final approach to runway 28. At 22:04 a preceding aircraft reported having the runway in sight at 2.2DME. At about 22:05 the captain reported reaching the minimum descent altitude and said that he could see the ground. A little later the radio altimeter reported 500 feet agl, followed by a “minimum” warning. The captain then ordered a go around, but this was too late. The aircraft struck trees and crashed. The treetops were at 1784 feet AMSL.

.
On October 18, a treaty was signed between Switzerland and Germany a.o. regarding the use of German airspace for Zurich approaches at certain times of the day. After 10 p.m., incoming aircraft had to approach Zurich from the east to land on runway 28. While the other runways have ILS equipment, runway 28 only allows VOR/DME approaches. Over a two week period (9-22 November) 108 approaches were carried out on runway – 2,3% of the total number of landings for that period.

Weather around the time of the crash (2106Z) included snow:
LSZH 241920Z 16001KT 4500 -SN FEW010 OVC025 00/M00 Q1024 8829// // TEMPO 3000=
LSZH 242120Z 13002KT 4000 -SN FEW006 BKN015 01/M00 Q1023 8820// 99 NOSIG=

CAUSES: “The accident is attributable to the fact that on the final approach, in own navigation, of the standard VOR/DME approach 28 the aircraft flew controlled into a wooded range of hills (controlled flight into terrain – CFIT), because the flight crew deliberately continued the descent under instrument flight conditions below the minimum altitude for the approach without having the necessary prerequisites. The flight crew initiated the go around too late. The investigation has determined the following causal factors in relation to the accident:
- The commander deliberately descended below the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of the standard VOR/DME approach 28 without having the required visual contact to the approach lights or the runway
- The copilot made no attempt to prevent the continuation of the flight below the minimum descent altitude.
The following factors contributed to the accident:
- In the approach sector of runway 28 at Zurich airport there was no system available which triggers an alarm if a minimum safe altitude is violated (minimum safe altitude warning – MSAW).
- Over a long period of time, the responsible persons of the airline did not make correct assessments of the commander’s flying performance. Where weaknesses were perceptable, they did not take appropriate measures. The commander’s ability to concentrate and take appropriate decisions as well as his ability to analyse complex processes were adversely affected by fatigue.
- Task-sharing between the flight crew during the approach was not appropriate and did not correspond to the required procedures by the airline.
- The range of hills which the aircraft came into contact with was not marked on the approach chart used by the flight crew.
- The means of determining the meteorological visibility at the airport was not representative for the approach sector runway 28, because it did not correspond to the actual visibility.
- The valid visual minimums at the time of the accident were inappropriate for a decision to use the standard VOR/DME approach 28.”

.

.

www.flygc.info  Flight Simulator Software >

SkyShopOne >  SkyShopOne Reviews

Student Travel Services >

.

Books, CDs and DVDsClothing	Ground Transceiver
Gifts for Aviators	Hardware
Gifts	Heading Indicators
GPS	Headset Adaptors
Headsets	Headset Bags
iPad Accessories	Headset Cases
Pilot Supplies	Headset Connectors
Stocking Fillers	Headsets
Vouchers	Helicopter Headsets
Accessories	Helicopters and Autogyros
Accessories	Human Factors
Accessories for GPS	IATA Publications
Accessories for headsets	ICAO
Add-on Software	ICAO Amendments
Advanced Flying & Technique	ICAO Annexes
Aerad	ICAO Annexes
Aerobatics	ICAO Circulars
Aerodynamics and Principles of Flight	ICAO Circulars
Aeroshell Aviation Oil	ICAO Documents
AFE Aircraft Checklists	ICAO Documents
AFE Bargain Basement	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Recommends…	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Study Packs	ICAO European VFR Charts
AFE Study Packs	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
AFE UK VFR Flight Guide	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
Air Law	ICAO Publications
Air Law	ICAO Supplements
Airband Radios & Transceivers	ICAO Videos
Airband Receivers	IFR charts
Airband Transceivers	IFR Manuals & Charts
Airbox GPS	IFR Training
Aircraft Accessories	IFR Training
Aircraft Antennas	IMC & Night Training
Aircraft Cleaning & Polishes	Installation Accessories
Aircraft General Accessories	Installation Services
Aircraft Guides	Installation Services
Aircraft Maintenance & Homebuild	Installation Services
Aircraft Ownership	Instrument Flying
Aircraft Tie Downs & Chocks	Instrument Training
Airline In Cockpit DVD	Instrument Training Software
Airline Interviews	Instruments
Airliner Guides	Intercoms
Airspeed Indicators (ASI)	Jeppesen
Airsports	Jeppesen Airfield Manuals
Altimeters	Jeppesen ATPL Manuals
Altitude Encoder	Jeppesen VFR Country Trip Kits
Antennas	Jeppesen VFR+GPS Charts
ASA	Keychains & Magnets
ASA	Kneeboards
ATPL Training CBT	Kneeboards
Attitude Indicators	Lifejackets, Liferafts, ELT, PLB
Autogyros	Lightspeed
Autopilot	Lightspeed
Aviation Clocks	Lightspeed
Aviation History	Logbook & Licence Covers
Avionics	Logbooks
Bags & Flight Cases	London Helicopter Routes
Ballooning	Loud Speakers
Batteries and Battery Chargers	Meteorology
Becker Avionics	Meteorology
Bendix King Avionics	Microlights
Bendix King Honeywell	Microphones
Beyer Dynamic	Mountain High Oxygen systems
Beyer Dynamic	Nav Log Pads
Beyer Dynamic	Navigation
Boeing Posters	Navigation Equipment
Books	Navigation Equipment & Plotters
Books	Night Flying
Books & Publications	Non-released Antennas
CAA 1:250 000 VFR charts	Novelty Items
CAA 1:500 000 VFR charts	OAA Training Software
CAA Charts	Orlando Flight Training
CAA Publications	Overseas Touring
Calculator	Oxford Aviation ATPL Manuals
Calculator	Panel-mount Transceivers
Calendars	Parachutes
Career Guides and Job Hunting	Peltor
Chart Accessories	Peltor
Charts	Peltor
Checklists & Aircraft Guides	Pens, Pencils & Erasers
Circuit Breakers / Fuses	Photo Frames
Clocks	Pilot Bag
Clothing	Pilot Case
Coasters	Plotters
Collision Avoidance	Pnuematic Accessories
Compasses	Posters
Crecy Publishing	PPL Series Textbooks
Customised AFE Study Packs	PPL Student Study Packs
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training Software
Dividers	Professional Training
DVD	Psychometric Testing
Dynafoam	PTT Switches
Dynon Avionics	Radio Connectors
ELITE IFR Software	Randolph Engineering
Engines	Ray-Ban
Euro American School of Aviation	Reference
European Flight Guides	Reference Material
FAA Training	Reference Material
FAA Training Software	Relays and Solenoids
Fixed-Wing Headsets	Rulers & Protractors
Flight Computers	Safety and Survival equipment
Flight Guides	Schroth Harnesses
Flight Guides	Sennheiser
Flight Planning and Moving Map	Sennheiser
Flight Simulation	Sennheiser
Flight Simulators	Serengeti
Flight Training News	Skymap Accessories
Flightcom	Software
Flightcom	Stopwatches
Floatplanes	Sunglasses
Flying Instruction	Surecheck Checklists
FLYING TRAINING	Survival Equipment (General)
FLYING TRAINING ATPL	Switches and Connectors
FLYING TRAINING PPL	Technical & Systems
Free Gifts	Torches
French VFR Flight Guide	TOST
Fuel Testers & Gauges	Tracking Equipment
Funkwerk Avionics	Trade Supply Information
Garmin GPS	Training Posters
Garmin Panel Mount Avionics	Trig Mode S Transponders
General Accesories	Trolley
General Gliding Accessories	UK Farmstrips Guide
General Interest	V:ONE eyewear
General Interest	Variometers and VSIs
Gifts	Varios & Nav Systems
Glider Instruments	Vertical Speed Indicators (VSI)
Gliding	Video Camera
Gliding	Virtual Radar
Gliding Equipment	Vouchers
GPS, Recorder	Weather Stations
GPS, Handheld & Portable	Weather Stations & Windsocks
GPS/ Glass Cockpit Training	Windsocks
GPS/ Transceiver Bag	Wire and Crimps
Ground Speed Calculators	Worldwide Jeppesen Charts

David Clark H10-30

.

Status:	Final
Date:	25 JAN 1990
Time:	21:34 EST
Type:	Boeing 707-321B
Operator:	Avianca
Registration:	HK-2016
C/n / msn:	19276/592
First flight:	1967
Total airframe hrs:	61196
Engines:	4 Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3B
Crew:	Fatalities: 8 / Occupants: 9
Passengers:	Fatalities: 65 / Occupants: 149
Total:	Fatalities: 73 / Occupants: 158
Airplane damage:	Destroyed
Airplane fate:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:	Cove Neck, NY (United States of America)
Phase:	Approach (APR)
Nature:	International Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:	Rionegro/Medellín-José María Córdova Airport (MDE) (MDE/SKRG), Colombia
Destination airport:	New York-John F. Kennedy International Airport, NY (JFK) (JFK/KJFK), United States of America
Flight number:	052

.

Avianca Flight AV052 (Bogotá – Medellin – New York-JFK) took off from Medellin at 15:08 with approx. 81000lb of fuel on board. When arriving near New York, the aircraft had to enter 3 holding patterns. The first for 19 minutes over Norfolk, the second for 29 minutes over New Jersey, and the third pattern over the CAMRN intersection for 29 minutes. Over CAMRN the aircraft descended from FL140 to FL110. At 20:44:43, while holding at CAMRN for 26 minutes, the New York (NY) ARTCC radar controller advised AVA052 to expect further clearance at 21:05. At that moment the Avianca crew advised ATC that they could only hold for 5 more minutes and that their alternate Boston couldn’t be reached anymore due to the low state of fuel.

The flight left the holding pattern at 20:47 and the crew contacted the New York TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) who guided AV052 for a runway 22L ILS approach. On finals, at 21:15 the crew contacted JFK Tower and they were cleared to land four minutes later.
Due to the bad weather (300 feet ceiling, 400m visibility, RVR – runway Visual Range of 2400 feet and wind shear of ca. 10kt) the crew had to carry out a missed approach at 21:23. ATC vectored the crew for another approach. About 21:32, at 12 miles SE of JFK Airport, engines number 3 and 4 ran down.

Shortly afterwards followed by the remaining two. At 21:34, heading 250° and flaps at 14° and gear up, the aircraft impacted on a hillside in a wooded residential area on the north shore of Long Island. The starboard side of the forward fuselage impacted and fractured the wooden deck of a residential home.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The failure of the flight crew to adequately manage the airplane’s fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion
occurred. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather. Also contributing to the accident was inadequate traffic flow management by the FAA and the lack of standardized understandable terminology for pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states. The Safety Board also determines that windshear, crew fatigue and stress were factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the first approach and thus contributed to the accident.”

.

 

 

www.flygc.info  Flight Simulator Software >

SkyShopOne >  SkyShopOne Reviews

Student Travel Services >

.

Books, CDs and DVDsClothing	Ground Transceiver
Gifts for Aviators	Hardware
Gifts	Heading Indicators
GPS	Headset Adaptors
Headsets	Headset Bags
iPad Accessories	Headset Cases
Pilot Supplies	Headset Connectors
Stocking Fillers	Headsets
Vouchers	Helicopter Headsets
Accessories	Helicopters and Autogyros
Accessories	Human Factors
Accessories for GPS	IATA Publications
Accessories for headsets	ICAO
Add-on Software	ICAO Amendments
Advanced Flying & Technique	ICAO Annexes
Aerad	ICAO Annexes
Aerobatics	ICAO Circulars
Aerodynamics and Principles of Flight	ICAO Circulars
Aeroshell Aviation Oil	ICAO Documents
AFE Aircraft Checklists	ICAO Documents
AFE Bargain Basement	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Recommends…	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Study Packs	ICAO European VFR Charts
AFE Study Packs	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
AFE UK VFR Flight Guide	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
Air Law	ICAO Publications
Air Law	ICAO Supplements
Airband Radios & Transceivers	ICAO Videos
Airband Receivers	IFR charts
Airband Transceivers	IFR Manuals & Charts
Airbox GPS	IFR Training
Aircraft Accessories	IFR Training
Aircraft Antennas	IMC & Night Training
Aircraft Cleaning & Polishes	Installation Accessories
Aircraft General Accessories	Installation Services
Aircraft Guides	Installation Services
Aircraft Maintenance & Homebuild	Installation Services
Aircraft Ownership	Instrument Flying
Aircraft Tie Downs & Chocks	Instrument Training
Airline In Cockpit DVD	Instrument Training Software
Airline Interviews	Instruments
Airliner Guides	Intercoms
Airspeed Indicators (ASI)	Jeppesen
Airsports	Jeppesen Airfield Manuals
Altimeters	Jeppesen ATPL Manuals
Altitude Encoder	Jeppesen VFR Country Trip Kits
Antennas	Jeppesen VFR+GPS Charts
ASA	Keychains & Magnets
ASA	Kneeboards
ATPL Training CBT	Kneeboards
Attitude Indicators	Lifejackets, Liferafts, ELT, PLB
Autogyros	Lightspeed
Autopilot	Lightspeed
Aviation Clocks	Lightspeed
Aviation History	Logbook & Licence Covers
Avionics	Logbooks
Bags & Flight Cases	London Helicopter Routes
Ballooning	Loud Speakers
Batteries and Battery Chargers	Meteorology
Becker Avionics	Meteorology
Bendix King Avionics	Microlights
Bendix King Honeywell	Microphones
Beyer Dynamic	Mountain High Oxygen systems
Beyer Dynamic	Nav Log Pads
Beyer Dynamic	Navigation
Boeing Posters	Navigation Equipment
Books	Navigation Equipment & Plotters
Books	Night Flying
Books & Publications	Non-released Antennas
CAA 1:250 000 VFR charts	Novelty Items
CAA 1:500 000 VFR charts	OAA Training Software
CAA Charts	Orlando Flight Training
CAA Publications	Overseas Touring
Calculator	Oxford Aviation ATPL Manuals
Calculator	Panel-mount Transceivers
Calendars	Parachutes
Career Guides and Job Hunting	Peltor
Chart Accessories	Peltor
Charts	Peltor
Checklists & Aircraft Guides	Pens, Pencils & Erasers
Circuit Breakers / Fuses	Photo Frames
Clocks	Pilot Bag
Clothing	Pilot Case
Coasters	Plotters
Collision Avoidance	Pnuematic Accessories
Compasses	Posters
Crecy Publishing	PPL Series Textbooks
Customised AFE Study Packs	PPL Student Study Packs
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training Software
Dividers	Professional Training
DVD	Psychometric Testing
Dynafoam	PTT Switches
Dynon Avionics	Radio Connectors
ELITE IFR Software	Randolph Engineering
Engines	Ray-Ban
Euro American School of Aviation	Reference
European Flight Guides	Reference Material
FAA Training	Reference Material
FAA Training Software	Relays and Solenoids
Fixed-Wing Headsets	Rulers & Protractors
Flight Computers	Safety and Survival equipment
Flight Guides	Schroth Harnesses
Flight Guides	Sennheiser
Flight Planning and Moving Map	Sennheiser
Flight Simulation	Sennheiser
Flight Simulators	Serengeti
Flight Training News	Skymap Accessories
Flightcom	Software
Flightcom	Stopwatches
Floatplanes	Sunglasses
Flying Instruction	Surecheck Checklists
FLYING TRAINING	Survival Equipment (General)
FLYING TRAINING ATPL	Switches and Connectors
FLYING TRAINING PPL	Technical & Systems
Free Gifts	Torches
French VFR Flight Guide	TOST
Fuel Testers & Gauges	Tracking Equipment
Funkwerk Avionics	Trade Supply Information
Garmin GPS	Training Posters
Garmin Panel Mount Avionics	Trig Mode S Transponders
General Accesories	Trolley
General Gliding Accessories	UK Farmstrips Guide
General Interest	V:ONE eyewear
General Interest	Variometers and VSIs
Gifts	Varios & Nav Systems
Glider Instruments	Vertical Speed Indicators (VSI)
Gliding	Video Camera
Gliding	Virtual Radar
Gliding Equipment	Vouchers
GPS, Recorder	Weather Stations
GPS, Handheld & Portable	Weather Stations & Windsocks
GPS/ Glass Cockpit Training	Windsocks
GPS/ Transceiver Bag	Wire and Crimps
Ground Speed Calculators	Worldwide Jeppesen Charts

 

Bendix King AV80R

Status:	Final
Date:	11 MAY 1996
Time:	14:13
Type:	McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32
Operator:	ValuJet Airlines
Registration:	N904VJ
C/n / msn:	47377/496
First flight:	1969
Total airframe hrs:	68395
Cycles:	80663
Engines:	2 Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9A
Crew:	Fatalities: 5 / Occupants: 5
Passengers:	Fatalities: 105 / Occupants: 105
Total:	Fatalities: 110 / Occupants: 110
Airplane damage:	Destroyed
Airplane fate:	Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:	Everglades, FL (United States of America)
Phase:	En route (ENR)
Nature:	Domestic Scheduled Passenger
Departure airport:	Miami International Airport, FL (MIA) (MIA/KMIA), United States of America
Destination airport:	Atlanta-William B. Hartsfield International Airport, GA (ATL) (ATL/KATL), United States of America
Flight number:	592

.

ValuJet Flight 592 was a scheduled flight from Miami (MIA) to Atlanta (ATL). The inbound flight had been delayedand arrived at Miami at 13:10. Flight 592 had been scheduled to depart at 13:00. The cruising altitude was to be flight level 350 with an estimated time en route of 1 hour 32 minutes. The DC-9 was loaded with 4,109 pounds of cargo (baggage, mail, and company-owned material (COMAT)). The COMAT consisted of two main tires and wheels, a nose tire and wheel, and five boxes that were described as “Oxy Cannisters -‘Empty.’” This cargo was loaded in the forward cargo compartment.

Flight 592 was pushed back from the gate shortly before 13:40. The DC-9 then taxied to runway 09L. At 14:03:24, ATC cleared the flight for takeoff and the flightcrew acknowledged the clearance. At 14:04:24, the flightcrew was instructed by ATC to contact the north departure controller. At 1404:32, the first officer made initial radio contact with the departure controller, advising that the airplane was climbing to 5,000 feet. Four seconds later, the departure controller advised flight 592 to climb and maintain 7,000 feet. The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:07:22, the departure controller instructed flight 592 to “turn left heading three zero zero join the WINCO transition climb and maintain one six thousand,” which was acknowledged. At 14:10:03, the flight crew heard a sound, after which the captain remarked, “What was that?”

At that moment, the airplane was at 10,634 feet msl, 260 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS), and both engine pressure ratios (EPRs) were 1.84. At 14:10:15, the captain stated, “We got some electrical problem,” followed 5 seconds later with, “We’re losing everything.” At 14:10:21, the departure controller advised flight 592 to contact Miami on frequency 132.45 mHz. At 14:10:22, the captain stated, “We need, we need to go back to Miami,” followed 3 seconds later by shouts in the background of “fire, fire, fire, fire.” At 14:10:27, the CVR recorded a male voice saying, “We’re on fire, we’re on fire.” At 14:10:28, the controller again instructed flight 592 to contact Miami Center. At 14:10:31, the first officer radioed that the flight needed an immediate return to Miami.

The controller replied, “Critter five ninety two uh roger turn left heading two seven zero descend and maintain seven thousand.” The first officer acknowledged the heading and altitude. The peak altitude reached was 10,879 feet msl at 14:10:31, and about 10 seconds a wings-level descent started. Shouting in the cabin subsided. The controller then queried flight 592 about the nature of the problem. The captain stated “fire” and the first officer replied, “uh smoke in the cockp… smoke in the cabin.”

The controller responded, “roger” and instructed flight 592, when able, to turn left to a heading of two five zero and to descend and maintain 5,000 feet. At 14:11:12, a flight attendant was heard shouting, “completely on fire.” The DC-9 began to change heading to a southerly direction and at 14:11:26, the north departure controller advised the controller at Miami Center that flight 592 was returning to Miami with an emergency. At 14:11:37, the first officer transmitted that they needed the closest available airport. At 1411:41, the controller replied, “Critter five ninety two they’re gonna be standing (unintelligible) standing by for you, you can plan runway one two when able direct to Dolphin [a navaid] now.” At 14:11:46, the first officer responded that the flight needed radar vectors. At 14:11:49, the controller instructed flight 592 to turn left heading one four zero.

The first officer acknowledged the transmission. At 14:12:45, the controller transmitted, “Critter five ninety two keep the turn around heading uh one two zero.” There was no response from the flightcrew. The last recorded FDR data showed the airplane at 7,200 feet msl, at a speed of 260 KIAS, and on a heading of 218 degrees. At 14:12:48, the FDR stopped recording data. The airplane’s radar transponder continued to function; thus, airplane position and altitude data were recorded by ATC after the FDR stopped. At 14:13:18, the departure controller instructed, “Critter five ninety two you can uh turn left heading one zero zero and join the runway one two localizer at Miami.”

Again there was no response. At 14:13:27, the controller instructed flight 592 to descend and maintain 3,000 feet. At 1413:37, an unintelligible transmission was intermingled with a transmission from another airplane. No further radio transmissions were received from flight 592. At 14:13:43, the departure controller advised flight 592, “Opa Locka airport’s about 12 o’clock at 15 miles.” The accident occurred at 14:13:42. Ground scars and wreckage scatter indicated that the airplane crashed into the Everglades in a right wing down, nose down attitude.

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of the accident, resulting in a fire in the Class D cargo compartment from the actuation of one or more oxygen generators improperly carried as cargo, were: (1) the failure of SabreTech to properly prepare, package, identify, and track unexpended chemical oxygen generators before presenting them to ValuJet for carriage; (2) the failure of ValuJet to properly oversee its contract maintenance program to ensure compliance with maintenance, maintenance training, and hazardous materials requirements and practices; and (3) the failure of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to require smoke detection and fire suppression systems in Class D cargo compartments.

 .
Contributing to the accident was the failure of the FAA to adequately monitor ValuJet’s heavy maintenance program and responsibilities, including ValuJet’s oversight of its contractors, and SabreTech’s repair station certificate; the failure of the FAA to adequately respond to prior chemical oxygen generator fires with programs to address the potential hazards; and the failure of ValuJet to ensure that both ValuJet and contract maintenance employees were aware of the carrier’s no-carry hazardous materials policy and had received appropriate hazardous materials training.” (NTSB/AAR-97/06)

.

 

www.flygc.info  Flight Simulator Software >

SkyShopOne >  SkyShopOne Reviews

Student Travel Services >

.

Books, CDs and DVDsClothing	Ground Transceiver
Gifts for Aviators	Hardware
Gifts	Heading Indicators
GPS	Headset Adaptors
Headsets	Headset Bags
iPad Accessories	Headset Cases
Pilot Supplies	Headset Connectors
Stocking Fillers	Headsets
Vouchers	Helicopter Headsets
Accessories	Helicopters and Autogyros
Accessories	Human Factors
Accessories for GPS	IATA Publications
Accessories for headsets	ICAO
Add-on Software	ICAO Amendments
Advanced Flying & Technique	ICAO Annexes
Aerad	ICAO Annexes
Aerobatics	ICAO Circulars
Aerodynamics and Principles of Flight	ICAO Circulars
Aeroshell Aviation Oil	ICAO Documents
AFE Aircraft Checklists	ICAO Documents
AFE Bargain Basement	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Recommends…	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Study Packs	ICAO European VFR Charts
AFE Study Packs	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
AFE UK VFR Flight Guide	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
Air Law	ICAO Publications
Air Law	ICAO Supplements
Airband Radios & Transceivers	ICAO Videos
Airband Receivers	IFR charts
Airband Transceivers	IFR Manuals & Charts
Airbox GPS	IFR Training
Aircraft Accessories	IFR Training
Aircraft Antennas	IMC & Night Training
Aircraft Cleaning & Polishes	Installation Accessories
Aircraft General Accessories	Installation Services
Aircraft Guides	Installation Services
Aircraft Maintenance & Homebuild	Installation Services
Aircraft Ownership	Instrument Flying
Aircraft Tie Downs & Chocks	Instrument Training
Airline In Cockpit DVD	Instrument Training Software
Airline Interviews	Instruments
Airliner Guides	Intercoms
Airspeed Indicators (ASI)	Jeppesen
Airsports	Jeppesen Airfield Manuals
Altimeters	Jeppesen ATPL Manuals
Altitude Encoder	Jeppesen VFR Country Trip Kits
Antennas	Jeppesen VFR+GPS Charts
ASA	Keychains & Magnets
ASA	Kneeboards
ATPL Training CBT	Kneeboards
Attitude Indicators	Lifejackets, Liferafts, ELT, PLB
Autogyros	Lightspeed
Autopilot	Lightspeed
Aviation Clocks	Lightspeed
Aviation History	Logbook & Licence Covers
Avionics	Logbooks
Bags & Flight Cases	London Helicopter Routes
Ballooning	Loud Speakers
Batteries and Battery Chargers	Meteorology
Becker Avionics	Meteorology
Bendix King Avionics	Microlights
Bendix King Honeywell	Microphones
Beyer Dynamic	Mountain High Oxygen systems
Beyer Dynamic	Nav Log Pads
Beyer Dynamic	Navigation
Boeing Posters	Navigation Equipment
Books	Navigation Equipment & Plotters
Books	Night Flying
Books & Publications	Non-released Antennas
CAA 1:250 000 VFR charts	Novelty Items
CAA 1:500 000 VFR charts	OAA Training Software
CAA Charts	Orlando Flight Training
CAA Publications	Overseas Touring
Calculator	Oxford Aviation ATPL Manuals
Calculator	Panel-mount Transceivers
Calendars	Parachutes
Career Guides and Job Hunting	Peltor
Chart Accessories	Peltor
Charts	Peltor
Checklists & Aircraft Guides	Pens, Pencils & Erasers
Circuit Breakers / Fuses	Photo Frames
Clocks	Pilot Bag
Clothing	Pilot Case
Coasters	Plotters
Collision Avoidance	Pnuematic Accessories
Compasses	Posters
Crecy Publishing	PPL Series Textbooks
Customised AFE Study Packs	PPL Student Study Packs
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training Software
Dividers	Professional Training
DVD	Psychometric Testing
Dynafoam	PTT Switches
Dynon Avionics	Radio Connectors
ELITE IFR Software	Randolph Engineering
Engines	Ray-Ban
Euro American School of Aviation	Reference
European Flight Guides	Reference Material
FAA Training	Reference Material
FAA Training Software	Relays and Solenoids
Fixed-Wing Headsets	Rulers & Protractors
Flight Computers	Safety and Survival equipment
Flight Guides	Schroth Harnesses
Flight Guides	Sennheiser
Flight Planning and Moving Map	Sennheiser
Flight Simulation	Sennheiser
Flight Simulators	Serengeti
Flight Training News	Skymap Accessories
Flightcom	Software
Flightcom	Stopwatches
Floatplanes	Sunglasses
Flying Instruction	Surecheck Checklists
FLYING TRAINING	Survival Equipment (General)
FLYING TRAINING ATPL	Switches and Connectors
FLYING TRAINING PPL	Technical & Systems
Free Gifts	Torches
French VFR Flight Guide	TOST
Fuel Testers & Gauges	Tracking Equipment
Funkwerk Avionics	Trade Supply Information
Garmin GPS	Training Posters
Garmin Panel Mount Avionics	Trig Mode S Transponders
General Accesories	Trolley
General Gliding Accessories	UK Farmstrips Guide
General Interest	V:ONE eyewear
General Interest	Variometers and VSIs
Gifts	Varios & Nav Systems
Glider Instruments	Vertical Speed Indicators (VSI)
Gliding	Video Camera
Gliding	Virtual Radar
Gliding Equipment	Vouchers
GPS, Recorder	Weather Stations
GPS, Handheld & Portable	Weather Stations & Windsocks
GPS/ Glass Cockpit Training	Windsocks
GPS/ Transceiver Bag	Wire and Crimps
Ground Speed Calculators	Worldwide Jeppesen Charts

ASA Tri-fold long kneeboard

Deadly Crossroads

Bashkirian Airlines flight 2937 (a Tupolev 154) originated in Ufa (UFA), Russia and flew to Moscow (DME) to pick up passengers. From Moscow the aircraft continued as a charter flight to Barcelona (BCN). The flight used the RNAV-Route Salzburg – Traunstein – Kempten – Trasadingen at FL360. Communications were handed over from Munich to Zürich ACC at 23:30:11. At that moment one controller was responsible for the entire traffic in the Zürich airspace. He was monitoring two frequencies and two radar scopes. On one frequency (119,925 MHz) he was guiding one traffic for an approach into Friedrichshafen and on the other frequency (128,050 MHz) he had to control four aircraft.

Among these four aircraft were Bashkirian 2937 and a DHL Boeing 757 cargo plane, en route from Bergamo (BGY), Italy to Brussel (BRU), Belgium along RNAV-Route ABESI-AKABI-TANGO, also at FL360. Between 23:25:43 and 23:33:11 LT the controller tried serveral times to establish contact with Friedrichshafen by phone. Because of working on the telephone net of Skyguide, the controller was not able to reach Friedrichshafen. At 23:34:42 the Tupolev’s Honeywell 2000 TCAS gave a Traffic Advisory because of the DHL 757 in the area. Seven seconds later the radar controller issued descent instructions to flight 2937: “Descend flight level 350, expedite, I have crossing traffic”.

This descent was necessary for continuation of the flight to Barcelona and to achieve a vertical separation with respect to the approaching DHL Boeing 757. At 23:42:56 the crews of both aircraft received a Resolution Advisory (RA)-command from their TCAS. The DHL crew complied with this and initiate a descent. At the same time the Tupolev crew were trying to deal with the conflicting descent (by ATC) and climb (TCAS) instructions. Seven seconds after the Resolution Advisory-command, the ATC controller repeated the instruction to descend. The Bashkirian crew then decided to follow the ATC controller’s instructions. A little later the TCAS aboard the Boeing 757 gave the crew a Resolution Advisory to “increase descent”. They then contacted ATC, reporting that they were doing a TCAS descent.

.
Since both aircraft were descending, the TCAS of the Russian plane warned the crew to “increase climb” to avoid a collision. This was eight seconds before the collision. Just prior to the collision, both crews detected the other aircraft, and reacted to avoid the collision by attempting appropriate flight manoeuvres. Nevertheless, at 23:35:32 both aircraft collided at approx. FL354. The tail fin of the Boeing 757 struck the left side of the Tupolev 154 fuselage near both overwing emergency exits, while the Tupolev’s left wing sheared off 80% of the Boeing’s tail fin. The Tupolev immediately broke up in four pieces (left wing, right wing, main fuselage and tail unit including the engines).

The Boeing 757 lost control and crashed 8 km north of the Tupolev, just after losing both engines. That night, from 23:00 the configuration of the radar data processing of Skyguide was modified. Thus the system was operating in FALLBACK modus. This requires among other facts, that radar separation values were increased from 5 NM to 7 NM. Also, the STCA (Short Term Conflict Alert) was not available at that time. The STCA at Karlsruhe Upper Area Control Center (UAC) however did work. From 23:33:36 on the controller of Karlsruhe UAC, tried in vain to get in contact with Zürich-ATC until 23:35:34. Between 23:33:36 and 23:34:45 the busy signal was to be heared afterwards the ringing tone. According to his statements the controller tried repeatedly to establish the connection via the priority button, but it failed.

CAUSES: The following immediate causes have been identified:
– The imminent separation infringement was not noticed by ATC in time. The instruction for the TU154M to descend was given at a time when the prescribed separation to the B757-200 could not be ensured anymore.
– The TU154M crew followed the ATC instruction to descend and continued to do so even after TCAS advised them to climb. This manoeuvre was performed contrary to the generated TCAS RA.
The following systemic causes have been identified:
– The integration of ACAS/TCAS II into the system aviation was insufficient and did not correspond in all points with the system philosophy.
The regulations concerning ACAS/TCAS published by ICAO and as a result the regulations of national aviation authorities, operational and procedural instructions of the TCAS manufacturer and the operators were not standardised, incomplete and partially contradictory.
– Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company did not ensure that during the night all open workstations were continuously staffed by controllers.
– Management and quality assurance of the air navigation service company tolerated for years that during times of low traffic flow at night only one controller worked and the other one retired to rest.

.

.

A Colgan Air DHC-8-400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, crashed during an instrument approach to runway 23 at the Buffalo-Niagara International Airport (BUF), Buffalo, New York. The crash site was approximately 5 nautical miles northeast of the airport in Clarence Center, New York, and mostly confined to one residential house (6038 Long St, Clarence) . The four flight crew and 45 passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. There was one ground fatality. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

.
Flight CJC3407 departed Newark-Liberty International Airport, NJ (EWR) at 21:20 on a domestic flight to Buffalo Airport, NY (BUF). At 22:15:14 the Buffalo Approach controller cleared the flight for an ILS approach to runway 23: “Colgan thirty four zero seven three miles from klump turn left heading two six zero maintain two thousand three hundred til established localizer clear i l s approach runway two three.” The flight acknowledged that clearance.

.
At 22:16:02, the engine power levers were reduced to flight idle. At that time Buffalo Approach instructed the crew to contact Buffalo Tower. The crew extended the landing gear and the auto flight system captured the ILS 23 localizer. The captain then moved the engine conditions levers forward to the maximum RPM position as the copilot acknowledged the instructions to Buffalo Tower. At 22:16:28 the crew moved the flaps to 10°, and two seconds later the stall warning stick shaker activated. The autopilot disconnected at about the same time that the stick shaker activated. The crew added power to approximately 75% torque.

The airplane began a sharp pitch up motion, accompanied by a left roll, followed by a right roll, during which the stick pusher activated. During this time, the indicated airspeed continued to decrease to less than 100 kts. Eight seconds after the flaps had been selected to 10°, and at an airspeed of less than 110 kts, the crew retracted the flaps. Sixteen seconds later the flaps were fully retracted. Following further pitch and roll excursions the airplane pitched down and entered a steep descent from which it did not recover. The airplane impacted a residential house and was destroyed.

Weather reported about the time of the accident (03:20 UTC):
KBUF 130254Z 24015G22KT 3SM -SN BR FEW011 BKN021 OVC027 01/M01 A2979 RMK AO2 SLP097 P0001 60004 T00061006 51015=
[Wind 240 degrees at 15 kts, gusting to 22kts; light snow, mist with a visibility of 3 miles; few clouds 1,100 ft.; broken clouds 2,100 ft.; overcast 2,700 ft. Temperature 0.6°C, Dewpoint -0.6°C]
KBUF 130354Z 24011KT 3SM -SN BR SCT011 OVC021 01/M01 A2981 RMK AO2 SLP103 P0002 T00061006=
[Wind 240 degrees at 11 kts; light snow, mist with a visibility of 3 miles; scattered clouds 1,100 ft.; overcast 2,100 ft.;Temperature 0.6°C, Dewpoint -0.6°C

PROBABLE CAUSE: “The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the captain’s inappropriate response to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. Contributing to the accident were (1) the flight crew’s failure to monitor airspeed in relation to the rising position of the low-speed cue, (2) the flight crew’s failure to adhere to sterile cockpit procedures, (3) the captain’s failure to effectively manage the flight, and (4) Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed selection and management during approaches in icing conditions.”

.

 

www.flygc.info  Flight Simulator Software >

SkyShopOne >  SkyShopOne Reviews

Student Travel Services >

.

Books, CDs and DVDsClothing	Ground Transceiver
Gifts for Aviators	Hardware
Gifts	Heading Indicators
GPS	Headset Adaptors
Headsets	Headset Bags
iPad Accessories	Headset Cases
Pilot Supplies	Headset Connectors
Stocking Fillers	Headsets
Vouchers	Helicopter Headsets
Accessories	Helicopters and Autogyros
Accessories	Human Factors
Accessories for GPS	IATA Publications
Accessories for headsets	ICAO
Add-on Software	ICAO Amendments
Advanced Flying & Technique	ICAO Annexes
Aerad	ICAO Annexes
Aerobatics	ICAO Circulars
Aerodynamics and Principles of Flight	ICAO Circulars
Aeroshell Aviation Oil	ICAO Documents
AFE Aircraft Checklists	ICAO Documents
AFE Bargain Basement	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Recommends…	ICAO Electronic Publications
AFE Study Packs	ICAO European VFR Charts
AFE Study Packs	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
AFE UK VFR Flight Guide	ICAO Flight Safety Posters
Air Law	ICAO Publications
Air Law	ICAO Supplements
Airband Radios & Transceivers	ICAO Videos
Airband Receivers	IFR charts
Airband Transceivers	IFR Manuals & Charts
Airbox GPS	IFR Training
Aircraft Accessories	IFR Training
Aircraft Antennas	IMC & Night Training
Aircraft Cleaning & Polishes	Installation Accessories
Aircraft General Accessories	Installation Services
Aircraft Guides	Installation Services
Aircraft Maintenance & Homebuild	Installation Services
Aircraft Ownership	Instrument Flying
Aircraft Tie Downs & Chocks	Instrument Training
Airline In Cockpit DVD	Instrument Training Software
Airline Interviews	Instruments
Airliner Guides	Intercoms
Airspeed Indicators (ASI)	Jeppesen
Airsports	Jeppesen Airfield Manuals
Altimeters	Jeppesen ATPL Manuals
Altitude Encoder	Jeppesen VFR Country Trip Kits
Antennas	Jeppesen VFR+GPS Charts
ASA	Keychains & Magnets
ASA	Kneeboards
ATPL Training CBT	Kneeboards
Attitude Indicators	Lifejackets, Liferafts, ELT, PLB
Autogyros	Lightspeed
Autopilot	Lightspeed
Aviation Clocks	Lightspeed
Aviation History	Logbook & Licence Covers
Avionics	Logbooks
Bags & Flight Cases	London Helicopter Routes
Ballooning	Loud Speakers
Batteries and Battery Chargers	Meteorology
Becker Avionics	Meteorology
Bendix King Avionics	Microlights
Bendix King Honeywell	Microphones
Beyer Dynamic	Mountain High Oxygen systems
Beyer Dynamic	Nav Log Pads
Beyer Dynamic	Navigation
Boeing Posters	Navigation Equipment
Books	Navigation Equipment & Plotters
Books	Night Flying
Books & Publications	Non-released Antennas
CAA 1:250 000 VFR charts	Novelty Items
CAA 1:500 000 VFR charts	OAA Training Software
CAA Charts	Orlando Flight Training
CAA Publications	Overseas Touring
Calculator	Oxford Aviation ATPL Manuals
Calculator	Panel-mount Transceivers
Calendars	Parachutes
Career Guides and Job Hunting	Peltor
Chart Accessories	Peltor
Charts	Peltor
Checklists & Aircraft Guides	Pens, Pencils & Erasers
Circuit Breakers / Fuses	Photo Frames
Clocks	Pilot Bag
Clothing	Pilot Case
Coasters	Plotters
Collision Avoidance	Pnuematic Accessories
Compasses	Posters
Crecy Publishing	PPL Series Textbooks
Customised AFE Study Packs	PPL Student Study Packs
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training
David Clark	PPL Training Software
Dividers	Professional Training
DVD	Psychometric Testing
Dynafoam	PTT Switches
Dynon Avionics	Radio Connectors
ELITE IFR Software	Randolph Engineering
Engines	Ray-Ban
Euro American School of Aviation	Reference
European Flight Guides	Reference Material
FAA Training	Reference Material
FAA Training Software	Relays and Solenoids
Fixed-Wing Headsets	Rulers & Protractors
Flight Computers	Safety and Survival equipment
Flight Guides	Schroth Harnesses
Flight Guides	Sennheiser
Flight Planning and Moving Map	Sennheiser
Flight Simulation	Sennheiser
Flight Simulators	Serengeti
Flight Training News	Skymap Accessories
Flightcom	Software
Flightcom	Stopwatches
Floatplanes	Sunglasses
Flying Instruction	Surecheck Checklists
FLYING TRAINING	Survival Equipment (General)
FLYING TRAINING ATPL	Switches and Connectors
FLYING TRAINING PPL	Technical & Systems
Free Gifts	Torches
French VFR Flight Guide	TOST
Fuel Testers & Gauges	Tracking Equipment
Funkwerk Avionics	Trade Supply Information
Garmin GPS	Training Posters
Garmin Panel Mount Avionics	Trig Mode S Transponders
General Accesories	Trolley
General Gliding Accessories	UK Farmstrips Guide
General Interest	V:ONE eyewear
General Interest	Variometers and VSIs
Gifts	Varios & Nav Systems
Glider Instruments	Vertical Speed Indicators (VSI)
Gliding	Video Camera
Gliding	Virtual Radar
Gliding Equipment	Vouchers
GPS, Recorder	Weather Stations
GPS, Handheld & Portable	Weather Stations & Windsocks
GPS/ Glass Cockpit Training	Windsocks
GPS/ Transceiver Bag	Wire and Crimps
Ground Speed Calculators	Worldwide Jeppesen Charts

AirNav RadarBox 2010

Silence followed, and after a few minutes, the captain came back on the intercom and said, “Ladies and gentlemen, I am so sorry if I scared you earlier, but while I was talking, the flight attendant brought me a cup of hot coffee and spilled it in my lap. You should see the front of my pants!”

A passenger in Coach said, “That’s nothing. He should see the back of mine.”

That’s an old joke, not a personal anecdote. But the feeling is all too familiar. Two weeks ago, I was on a flight from Toronto to New York City — excuse me — to Newark, N.J., just outside Manhattan. I’ve taken this flight at least 10 times without incident. This one didn’t seem any different. I had an empty seat next to me, where I promptly dumped my bag and Us Weekly (carefully concealed under an Atlantic Monthly). We took off as usual and I put on my iPod. About 20 minutes before our scheduled landing time, the up-till-now smooth flight got a bit choppy. It happens, right? No big deal. Everyone buckled up and sat back.

Suddenly, the plane dropped sharply, leaving us all a little breathless. The captain summoned the flight attendant, a perky 20-something, to the intercom. She picked up the phone smiling, listened intently and hung up with wide eyes and pursed lips. The plane plunged further, bringing a collective gasp from fellow passengers. She strapped herself in, picked up the PA system and announced, “Ladies and gentlemen, the pilot has just informed us that we have a hydraulic engine problem on one side of the plane. Ground crew at Newark is standing by to help us land. Please do not leave your seats for anything.”

If you think about what she actually said, it wasn’t terrible, but all we heard was “engine problem.” Or “smoke if you got ’em.”

Another flight attendant, who I’m not sure was being entirely serious, asked if anyone wanted a beer. A sea of hands shot up; in fact I’m pretty sure some people put up both hands. The plane became uncomfortably warm and was shedding altitude in short, sharp drops. Most passengers around me were white-faced and/or breathing into air-sickness bags. The worst specimen was a middle-aged accountant type sitting across from me who told the flight attendant when we boarded that he was a very nervous flier. She had laughed and said it’d be over before he knew it. Retrospectively, a terrible choice of words.

In a somewhat anticlimactic twist, we survived. In fact, barely anything happened. We had a slightly unusual landing, which merely felt like the plane was hitting the ground too hard. I expected people to clap when we landed but no one did. The engine noise immediately after landing was deafening — much scarier than the landing itself — after which they quickly throttled down, and there was an eerie silence except for the sound of people sniffling quietly. A truck towed our plane to the gate.

Despite my initial giddy relief, I felt annoyed at having been horrified over what was basically nothing. They wouldn’t let us deplane for a little while after we landed, saying they had to “check something.” Finally a man burst out of his seat, demanding (somewhat churlishly) why they didn’t “check something” before they decided to fly the damn plane. At this, people started clapping. We all just wanted to get the hell off.

Looking back, I think I was overreacting. Still, I would suggest that all airlines consider restricting, if not outright banning, use of the phrase “engine problems” while in midair. It serves no purpose other than making everyone a little unhinged. Even if there is an engine failure, it’s not like any of us can fix it. Also, if you are announcing something like engine failure, could it be up followed up with something — anything — positive? Telling us to stay in our seats no matter what might have gone over a lot better if they’d added, “This is a minor technical issue, and we’ll get you on the ground safely.”

Also: Offering a planeful of terrified passengers a beer? Could something stronger not be kept on board for emergencies? I’m not asking for Patron but just something that gets you there a little faster, even Jack Daniels. When you have only minutes to live, you can’t waste them sipping. You need something that’ll hit you fast. A Bud Lite doesn’t cut it.

Ironically, as I watched the flight attendant explain the emergency-brace position, I was much less concerned with death than with my current circumstances. I could at least have gone down with my rockstar entourage and excessive designer luggage, à la Aaliyah’s Cessna 402B. Instead, I was on a short-haul commuter plane with a few dozen other horrified average folk, sipping on non-premium beer above the most terminally unglamorous place on earth: New Jersey.

If that’s how I’m meant to go, do me a favour: Just kill me now.

National Post

A Brazilian federal judge has convicted an air traffic controller of endangering air safety in connection with a 2006 mid-air collision that killed 154 people.

On Thursday Judge Murilo Mendes sentenced Lucivando de Alencar to three years and four months of community service and revoked Alencar’s professional license.

A court statement says another controller on duty during the accident has been cleared of the same charge.

Read more…

A Brazilian court convicted two U.S. pilots of negligence for their role in the 2006 crash of a Brazilian airliner over the Amazon rain forest that killed 154 people, but the judge suspended their sentence.

Joseph Lepore and Jan Paul Paladino were flying a small business jet that clipped wings with a Boeing 737 operated by Brazilian airline Gol, causing the airliner to plunge into the jungle in one of Brazil’s worst air disasters.

Federal Judge Murilo Mendes of the state of Mato Grosso said late on Monday the two pilots had failed to adequately check plane equipment that would have alerted them to the presence of other aircraft nearby.

Read more…

This photo taken on July, 2010 shows tourists resting on a small island located in West Lombok. Indonesia is to investigate the illegal sale of 13 islands in the latest of a series of corruption scandals in one of Asia's most popular tourist destinations, officials said on May 5, 2011. - AFP PHOTO

JAKARTA: A passenger plane carrying 27 people crashed Saturday as it was about to land in bad weather in Indonesia’s eastern province of West Papua, killing at least 15, officials said.

Transportation ministry spokesman Bambang Ervan said the Chinese-made Xian MA60 twin-turboprop plane belonging to a state-owned airline went down just before landing in Kaimana. The flight originated in Sorong, another town in the province.

”Given the condition of the wreckage of the ill-fated plane, it is hard to say that there are any survivors,” Ervan said.

Police Lt. Col. Antonius Wantri Julianto said 15 bodies had been found and rescuers were searching for other victims. They were hampered by heavy rain.

Nuno Sampurno, chief of the National Search and Rescue Agency, said the plane crashed into Kaimana Bay, several hundred meters from the airport.

Sampurno said the crash was believed to have been caused by bad weather which limited visibility.

The passengers included an infant and two children, Ervan said.

The Kompas daily newspaper said the plane was one of four MA60s owned by Merpati Nusantara Airlines.

Indonesia, an archipelago nation with more than 17,000 islands and 235 million people, has been plagued by a string of transportation accidents in recent years, from plane and train crashes to ferry sinkings. Overcrowding, aging infrastructure and poor safety standards are often to blame.

The Hindenburg airship explodes before landing at Lakehurst, New Jersey on May 6, 1937 taking the lives of 36 including passengers, crew and ground personnel.

May 6, 1937 was one of the most horrific days in United States aviation history. The airship Hindenburg exploded in mid-air shortly before landing at Lakehurst Naval Station in New Jersey.

The airship had been named for Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934), President of Germany  (1925–1934). He appointed Adolf Hitler as chancellor of Germany, which enabled Hitler to seize power when Hindenburg died in 1934.

Fourteen months after the first flight of the Hindenburg in March of 1936, the airship would make its final disastrous flight in May of 1937.

It was amazing that smoking was allowed, in the smoking room of the airship. Passengers weren’t permitted to leave the smoking room with a lighted cigarette.

Aboard the plane the fateful day of the explosion were 36 passengers and 61 crew members. 36 people died from the fire including 13 passengers, 22 crew members and one ground crew member.

Looking at photos of the fire, once it hit the ground, it is remarkable that 23 passengers and 39 crew members survived, of the  97 that originally boarded the Hindenburg.

This horrific photo shows the Hindenburg in flames on the ground at Lakehurst Naval Air Station in New Jersey.

 

Herbert Morrison, a reporter for radio station WLS in Chicago was given instructions to cover the Hindenburg landing at Lakehurst Naval Air Station in New Jersey. Morrison went from describing a routine flight, before it exploded, to a hysterical report of it exploding in mid-air.

You could sense the disbelief of Morrison in his voice that he was witnessing one of the most tragic events in aviation history. He is still famous today for his “Oh, the humanity” line he uttered during the broadcast.

Morrison was 31 when he covered the event in 1937 and would live to the age of 83, dying in January of 1989.

The holiday makers have returned to their homes up country, except the disorderly ones who are now housed in coastal jail cells. I have to admit, holidaymakers are an optimistic bunch. Each year they fight high traffic volumes and drunk drivers in order to reach their coastal destination, where they meet tens of thousands of like-minded folk who are trying to “get away from it all”.

Some choose to fly, but after reading a news report, I think many may prefer to take their chances with irate road users. Apparently, serious air accidents are climbing at a faster rate than minor incidents. When I first read the headline I assumed that the standard of training for aircraft engineers had dropped, and that being able to spell your name was the only pre-requisite to receiving a qualification. I thought that maybe there was a shortage of air traffic controllers, leading to overworking of current ones. I even thought that unqualified pilots were to blame.

The cause is far less sinister. Many plane crashes are now being attributed to birds. So far our feathered friends, or enemies as it were, have taken out a number of planes and helicopters due to collisions. Reports claim that these collisions have increased by 40% in the last year. Not even COSATU could arrange such an increase in strikes.

I am a nervous airline passenger to begin with and knowing that the plane I am travelling in could be taken out by a flock of seagulls (an actual flock, not the 80′s pop band) has not increased my confidence in air travel. Not only do I have the joy of sitting next a screaming child or cave-dweller with bad body odour while flying, but now I have to face the fact that my life could be ended by a budgie on its way to work.

I shall keep my feet planted safely on terra firma. At least I don’t have to worry about being taken out by pigeons or parakeets. The only bird I need to watch out for while driving is the vulture – more commonly known as the “Towtruck Driver”.

On Dec. 16, 1960, two airliners, one a United Airlines flight from Chicago, collided in mid-air over New York.

The United Airlines DC-8 collided with a Trans World Airlines Constellation in midflight over Staten Island. The TWA plane went down near a military airstrip in Staten Island, while the United plane crashed in the Brooklyn neighborhood of Park Slope. The New York Times reports a funeral home and a church were destroyed.

All 128 people on board the two planes, and six people on the ground, were killed.

As WBBM Newsradio 780′s Regine Schlesinger reports, initially, there was one survivor – an 11-year-old boy from Wilmette.

LISTEN: Newsradio 780′s Regine Schlesinger Reports

Stephen Baltz was on the United flight, going to join his mother and younger sister on a visit to his grandparents’ home in New York. He had remained at home a couple of extra days because of a sore throat.

Severely burned after the crash, Stephen was found alive in a snowbank. For all of that horrible Friday, doctors worked to save him as a nation prayed for his recovery and was riveted by his story.

Churchgoers in New York that night carried newspapers with Stephen’s picture and prayed for him, the New York Times recalled. Swarms of New Yorkers offered blood transfusions for Stephen, who was reportedly waking up and speaking in the hospital.

But Stephen died the next day, Dec. 17.

Stephen’s sister, Randee Kadziel, says this time of year is always difficult.

“I also lost my first baby boy 22 years after the crash, on Dec. 17, and we named him Stephen,” Kadziel said.

Kadziel says she saw her son’s death on the same date as a sign from her older brother that it was time for her to regain her faith. She says both Stephens now are always with her.

More On The Disaster From CBSNewYork.com

Image via Wikipedia

You’ve all seen the movies (some of them comedy, some of them drama) where a crisis on an aicraft flight deck leads the cabin crew to put out urgent appeals for a pilot or a doctor. There has not yet, however, been a movie where the aircraft crew need assistance from a plumber.

Yet truth can be stranger than fiction. It was a plumbing problem that very nearly caused an air transport disaster according to a report issued this week.

It reports on an incident of nearly three years ago where a blocked drain in the toilet on a Qantas Boeing 747  led to a flood that knocked out the aircraft’s  radar, cabin pressurisation, auto-pilot, auto-throttle and some fuel pumps. The pilots succeeded in landing the plane safely just minutes before (investigators say) the flood would have also disabled the plane’s communications, air speed, altitude and heading displays, warning systems, navigation and engine instrumentation.

In most circumstances , if you have a plumbing emergency, you can call Drain Doctor (telephone 0800 70 71 72 or visit www.draindoctor.co.uk). If you are a few thousand metres up in the air over Bangkok, however, you just better hope that there is Drain Doctor on board.

TYFYT

A Pakistani passenger jet slammed into a forested ridge outside Islamabad on Wednesday, July 28, killing all 152 people aboard in what was believed to be the worst commercial aviation disaster in Pakistan’s history.

The plane, which belonged to Air Blue, a private Pakistani airline, was on its way from Karachi to the Pakistani capital and had been flying through heavy fog and rain when it crashed at about 9:45 a.m. local time in the Margalla Hills region just outside Islamabad, authorities said. Pervaiz George, spokesman for the Pakistani Civil Aviation Authority, said there were 146 passengers and six crew members aboard.

Air Blue is a Karachi-based domestic airline that also flies to United Arab Emirates, Oman and the United Kingdom. It began service in 2004. Authorities have recorded the black box which should provide clues to this puzzling crash. This is the first case of the loss of a A321 craft like the one pictured above.

The Premise

In is a completely impossible premise, a private jet is hit by lightning which electricutes the crew and blows a hole in the cabin! Cue only uninjured teenage brat to come and save the day!

The Disasters Faced

Lightning, various dogdgy rescue attempts, hammy acting and a girl whose face you’d love to slap!

The Execution

Firstly I’ll start off by saying for a TV movie its really not that bad. There is some awful acting and sometimes the camera stays on something a beat too long (for example when a rescuer falls out the plane we’re treated to our teen girl screaming “noooo” and holding out her hand… then it stays there, and she could do a little pom-pom dance) but on the whole things are quite respectful. The actual disaster happens 15 minutes in after a quick pre amble which sets up your main lady as a precious little moo who just wants her parents love but they’re busy running a big business. The whole family theme runs throughout the movie and is bashed over the head a little bit. Once the big bang’s happened, new situations occur quite regularly and everything ticks along at a good pace and the fact the films only 84 minutes long keeps it fresh enough to hold your attention. It’s main problems stem from the wide range of acting talent and the fact the whole situation just could never happen anyway (not that we’d let that stop us enjoying a good movie).

The Effects

Effects are pretty grim it has to be said, but then they are used very sparcely and kept to quick plane shots which are dark and muddy to hide the low budget effect. Some of the props wobble (notably the plane dashboard!) but generally as the director has wisely focused on keeping the cameras straight on the people and not on the sorroundings, everything is passable.

Why It’s Worth Watching

Airspeed is kind of difficult to recommend as it does nothing new nor does it do anything overly well or badly. If you enjoy cliched scripts and hammed up acting however, Airspeed is quite entertaining, as is the Elisha Cuthbert’s screaming on occasion! There’s also a superbly wooden pilot too to keep you amused.

Favourite Character

While I was tempted to go with the lead (Elisha Cuthbert) for her landing segment in the film, Lynne Adams who plays the mother out acts everyone in the movie by a mile although she is severely underused and left to babble “My baby” all the way through the film, she does it well!

Best Death

Well there’s only one and that’s the rescue worker who gets blown out the plane… but that cues up for the best “noooo” in the film.

Weirdest Moment

While the whole premise is weird in itself, Captain Lopez gets the award for his absolute robotic monotone approach to speaking which is so jarring and unnatural, you could be forgiven for thinking its a comedy.

Conclusion

Airspeed is utter mediocrity in everything it does. It contains a tried and tested formula, a cliche ridden script, actors who are trying to lift themselves up above the melodrama but generally failing and some unintentionally funny moments. Just like an average TV disaster movie then I hear you say? Exactly, you get exactly what you see on the tin!

For instance, last night I had a dream where someone was asking me to tell them about a future event and I would tell them that my ability and power does not work like that, that I had to be asleep. Then, they would say, please just try and I would say, ”no, I can’t do it while I am awake.” And they asked a third time, ”please just try to see a future event.” And finally, I just went into a daze and said, “fine, I see a plane, a see something with a plane, news of something with a plane. Specifically, I see a large wing, an outline of a wing, some news with the wing. Look for news of a plane and something to do with the wing.” Then I just said, ”there, that’s all I can see right now.”

THIS MORNING, I see this in the news:

04-07-10  Boeing Co. said its 787 successfully passed an “ultimate load wing and fuselage bending test” in Everett.

The Chicago aerospace giant (NYSE: BA) said the plane’s wings and fuselage were tested by applying up to 150 percent of the “most extreme forces the airplane is expected to experience while in service.” The wings were flexed upward by about 25 feet and the fuselage was pressurized up to 150 percent of its maximum normal operating condition, Boeing said.

“Successfully completing this test is a critical step in the certification of the 787. This is further validation that the 787 performs as expected, even in the most extreme circumstances,” said Scott Fancher, vice president and general manager of the 787 program for Boeing Commercial Airplanes, in a statement.Boeing: 787 passes extreme wing-fuselage test – Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle):

Read more:

Now, this is what is interesting, it’s not the fact that this news just came out and obviously I dreamed about it before I saw this article. Because, anyone can read the news and pretend they dreamed of it…no, what is interesting is that my dreams are always tragic in nature. Does that mean something tragic is on the way for Boeing? OR for this specific plane? Or will there be an airline disaster soon in the news? Could it just be that the dream was JUST about this article I would read and it was my mind playing mental games with me in my sleep last night??? Well, if my past history of dreams continues, there will be something more to this dream. The BOEING story may be pure coincidence or it may to re-assure me that something is looming. I don’t know. As I have explained to you in the past, my dreams are often very symbolic and as hard as I have tried, I cannot always decipher them or completely and accurately interpret them. While, sometimes they are 100% dead-on, other times they are just warnings.

Also, remember what I have always told you. Visions like mine are simply POSSIBILITIES of future events and not always certainties…visions warn or give signs of things or events to come, these events or things can always be changed by great effort. Unfortunately, they usually are not and that’s why it seems as if people like me are actually seeing the future 100% accurately. Really, we are just “predicting possible outcomes.” — on a side note, I dreamed I was in a really strong “aftershock” of some sort…I was within the dream. Outside of being in an actual earthquake when I was a baby, I have never experienced one so it was interesting to feel that type of amazing power – I hope I just felt what someone else somewhere else experienced (I sometimes dream of other people’s experiences) and that this dream was not a warning for me personally.

K K

—-UPDATE: —— NEWS FROM TODAY>>>>WHILE IT”S ABOUT A PLANE AND CERTAINLY TRAGIC, THIS IS NOT BIG ENOUGH “UNLESS” 30 soldiers did die instead of the 3-4 being reported.—————————

04-09-10

(CNN) — A U.S. aircraft crashed in southern Afghanistan, killing three U.S. service members and one civilian employee, a statement from NATO-led forces said Friday.

The cause of the crash of the Air Force CV-22 Osprey was not known, said the International Security Assistance Force statement. Several other service members were injured in the crash late Thursday night.

The CV-22, which conducts long-range infiltration and resupply operations for the U.S. military, went down seven miles west of the city of Qalat, the capital of Zabul province.

Zabiullah Mujahid, spokesman for the Taliban in the region, said Taliban fighters shot down the aircraft. Another spokesman, Qari Yoseph, also claimed responsibility and said that 30 Americans had been killed.

————–UPDATE:————- THIS IS WHAT THE VISION WAS ABOUT, SAD TO SAY BUT THIS IS HOW MY DREAMS WORK, THEY ARE ALMOST ALWAYS AT A MASSIVE AND VIOLENT LEVEL—————-AGAIN, THESE VISIONS AND DREAMS ARE HAPPENING FASTER FOR ME, THIS LATEST PLANE VISION HAS TAKEN ME ABACK A LITTLE, I WISH I WOULD HAVE SEEN MORE, I WISH I COULD HAVE SEEN WHO WAS GOING TO BE AFFECTED ——— I AM HOPING THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH MY OTHER “ASSASSINATION DREAM” (THERE ARE TOO MANY SIMILARITIES, EXCEPT OF COURSE, THAT THEY ARE SAYING THIS WAS AN “ACCIDENT,” AND I HOPE IT WAS——-

POLISH PRESIDENT KILLED IN PLANE CRASH

(CNN) — Polish President Lech Kaczynski was killed early Saturday along with his wife, several top military officials, and the head of the national bank when their plane crashed at a western Russian airport, officials said.

“There are no survivors,” said Sergey Antufyev, the governor of Smolensk, where the plane was trying to land when it crashed.

———————

———————

——————— SPECIAL NOTE ON THE POLISH PLANE THAT WENT DOWN. First, witness reports said that they saw the wing of the plane hit a tree and seeing it snap off prior to the crash. Second, and more interesting to me, is that the coat of arms of Poland as well as its flag has an Eagle with 2 prominent wings on it:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coat_of_arms_of_Poland).

I just thought both points were interesting as it pertained to my brief vision on news of a plane and a wing.

 

——UPDATE—— MORE PLANE NEWS INCLUDING a BOEING plane GOING DOWN. INTERESTING HOW MANY AIR TRAGEDIES IN THE WEEK SINCE MY PLANE VISION—–

Jakarta, Indonesia (CNN) – A passenger plane crashed into a shallow waterway and broke in two after overshooting the runway in a remote area of Indonesia’s eastern Papua province on Tuesday, injuring 78 people on board.

Bambang Ervan, a spokesman for Indonesia’s Transportation Ministry, said investigators to the airport in the coastal town of Manokwari where the Merpati Nusantara Airlines Boeing 737-300 had been attempting to land.

—————– MORE——————-

April 13, 2010. By Gordon Gibb

Morganton, GA: At least three people were killed and a fourth is missing after a T-39N military training jet crashed and burned yesterday in a north Georgia forest. The plane crash set about 10 acres of woodlands ablaze after the jet went down just after 4:30 pm EST on April 12.

CNN reports there were four people on the plane, which was a military version of the twin-engine Saberliner executive aircraft manufactured by Rockwell. Three bodies had been recovered. The fourth person on board the jet was not accounted for as of this morning.

Reports suggest the T-39N originated at Pensacola Naval Station in Florida, about 400 miles south of where it went down, just north of Morganton, Georgia—about 80 miles north of Atlanta.

————–ANOTHER PLANE CRASH ——————SO MANY HIGH-PROFILE PLANE CRASHES SINCE MY PLANE VISION A MONTH AGO —————-

Child may be lone survivor in Libya plane crash

By the CNN Wire Staff May 12, 2010 — Updated 1945 GMT (0345 HKT)(CNN)

– A Dutch child is believed to be the only survivor of a passenger plane crash in Libya Wednesday that may have killed more than 100 people, the Dutch Foreign Ministry said.

The plane was carrying 93 passengers and 11 crew members when it crashed while trying to land at the Tripoli International Airport.

———————-ANOTHER———————

Plane carrying 44 crashes in Afghanistan

May 17, 2010 — Updated 1551 GMT (2351 HKT)Kabul, Afghanistan (CNN) — An airplane with 44 people on board has crashed in the mountains of Afghanistan, an Afghan government spokesman said Monday.

The plane was carrying 38 passengers and six crew members when it crashed en route from Kunduz to Kabul, said Raz Mohammad Alami of the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.

——————————————INDIA —————————–

Deadly plane crash in India

Slideshow posted in Eyewitness News | Saturday, May 22, 2010

Indian firefighters and rescue personnel try to extinguish the flames from the wreckage of an Air India plane that crashed in Mangalore, in the southern Indian state of Karnataka, Saturday, May 22, 2010. The plane arriving from Dubai crashed Saturday morning after it overshot a runway while trying to land in southern India, and officials feared as many as 160 people on board were killed.

((THIS ONE WAS A BOEING)) The Boeing 737-800 overshot the runway at Mangalore’s Bajpe airport early Saturday morning, sliding into mud and thick bush before exploding and bursting into flames.

———————-AGAIN, AMAZING TO SEE HOW MANY PLANE CRASHES SINCE MY ORIGINAL POST LESS THAN 2 MONTHS AGO———————ANOTHER————

Geoff Bent was a local lad born on Salford, Lancashire, and joined United on leaving school in the summer of 1948. After several seasons playing in the reserve and youth sides, he became a professional in 1951.
A good tackler and accurate passer of the ball, he was understudy to Roger Byrne which gave him very limited chances to show his real worth.
He did not play any first-team games during the 1957-58 season, and only travelled to Belgrade as cover for Roger Byrne – who had not been expected to play in the match due to injury, Byrne did in turn play the match and the trip proved unneccesary for Bent.
He tragically died instantly when the United plane crashed during the Munich Air Disaster.
Bent only managed to play 12 games during his time at Old Trafford