http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518525&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

(Relevant information beginning on pg. 69)

Iran depends on its maritime forces to protect the vital interests of the state. For this reason, modernization of the Iranian Navy and its irregular “partner,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Forces, has been a priority for the regime  over the past few decades.177 This attention has allowed the service to enjoy an advantage over its counterparts in the region (See Figure 4). Its maritime capacity has increased significantly over the past few decades, both in capabilities and  platforms. The Iranian Navy (IRIN) has 18,000 personnel (including approximately 2,600 marines and 2,600 in naval aviation), six large surface vessels (four frigates and two corvettes), almost 150 coastal patrol craft of varying sizes, 13  amphibious ships, and 26 logistic/supply ships. It also has passable maritime patrol capability with approximately 11 fixed wing patrol aircraft, including three aging P-3 Orion’s, and over 27 rotary wing aircraft of various models.178 Unlike the  Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Naval Forces (IRGCN), which will be further described later, the IRIN serves as Iran’s “regular” naval force, under control of the civilian government, with the mission of protecting the Iranian coast, especially  its ports and vital petroleum infrastructure.

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478853&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

The bell is not ringing yet. However, the clock is already ticking. Hidden behind the 9/11 attack, Iraq, Afghanistan, other fronts of the global war on terror, the Transatlantic rift, rising China, a reviving Russia, climate change and scores of other  international agendas, the Iranian nuclear genie suddenly rose from the shadows. The issue is about to develop into a major crisis. After years of being engaged in entangled negotiations with the EU-3 and the IAEA, all cheatings, hoaxes,  back-and-forth tactics, bargaining, missed deadlines, issued threats altered by ‘concessions’ and ‘goodwill’ gestures, finally the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has dramatically upped the ante, shifting towards more aggressive behavior, saber- rattling and open defiance in its standoff with the West over the controversial Iranian nuclear program. The reason for such change is found in the set of Iranian perceptions, which have been shaped by the regional and worldwide developments  since 2001.

http://openscenarios.ida.org/scenarios/261-The_Cruise_Missile_Challenge.pdf

In March 1986 during Operation PRAIRIE FIRE, the naval confrontation with Libya, US Navy A-6E Intruders sank or damaged two Libyan missile corvettes and one fast missile attack craft with Harpoon ASCMs and Rockeye cluster bombs before  they could threaten US ships.15 Two years later, the US Navy engaged the Iranian Navy during Operation PRAYING MANTIS after an Iranian mine struck and damaged the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58). Over a two-day period, US forces sank  or destroyed three Iranian warships. During the operation, the Iranian fast missile craft Joshan fired a Harpoon ASCM at a US naval formation. In response, the USS Simpson (FFG-56) fired four Harpoons, disabling the Joshan.

http://www.metransparent.net/IMG/pdf/PolicyFocus87.pdf

This study sheds light on Iran’s naval intentions and capabilities by exploring the military geography of the Persian Gulf and Caspian regions, reviewing the historical evolution of Iran’s approach to asymmetric warfare, assessing its naval forces, and evaluating its plans for a possible war with the United States. The study ends with a quick overview of several possible scenarios.

http://iraneconomy.csames.illinois.edu/full%20papers/Dadpay%20-%20IranAviation.pdf

Motivated the present conditions of Iranian aviation industry this paper studies the history of Iranian aviation in the past three decades and its evolution from a public franchise to a mixed industry encompassing private, semi‐private and public  airlines. Exploring its different aspects, it demonstrates how commercial aviation has become accessible in many parts of country through ambitious projects to construct airports in many provinces and regions. It also shows that how increasing demand for domestic air travels has made commercial aviation industry self reliant and in no need to compete in international markets. It exhibits that how government interferes in the industry daily activities through pricing policies, fuel subsidies and granting licenses to fly different routes.

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060728_gulf_iran.pdf

It is the second largest country in the Gulf one of the largest in the Middle East with an estimated area of 1.648 million square kilometers, and its strategic geography not only dominates the Northern Gulf but the shipping lines both inside and  outside the Strait of Hormuz. As Map 1 shows, Iran’s territory extends from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf, and it has land borders with Afghanistan (936 kilometers), Armenia (35 kilometers), Azerbaijan-proper (432 kilometers), Azerbaijan-Naxcivan exclave (179 kilometers), Iraq (1,458 kilometers), Pakistan (909 kilometers), Turkey (499 kilometers), and Turkmenistan (992 kilometers).

http://csis.org/files/publication/110329_Asymmetric-Contents.pdf

On Jan. 12, 2011, the Fars News Agency released a report in which the commander-in-chief of Iran‟s army, Brigadier General Attaollah Salehi, made revealing statements regarding the role of asymmetric warfare in his country‟s military doctrine. General Salehi was extensively quoted, stating that,

“All divisions of the Islamic Republic‟s military pay close attention to events in neighboring states and incorporate these into their asymmetric warfare training. For Example, if we train pilots in aerial combat, we actively link those lessons with asymmetric warfare.”

Despite an impressive number of personnel, Iran’s Armed Forces are not equipped with the latest technology and their performance in another major conflict is difficult to predict. The scale of Iran’s rearmament programme – launched after its effective defeat in the 1980-1988 war with Iraq (when in the final phase of the conflict it lost 40 to 60 per cent of its armour and artillery) – has often been exaggerated. Furthermore, much of the equipment that survived this war has become obsolete.Despite the bifurcated structure of Iran’s army, Tehran’s commitment to enhanced military professionalism and better military co-ordination appears secure. Instability along Iran’s borders and the formal US military and political presence in the Persian Gulf have increased the premium on Iran maintaining a modern, well-equipped and efficient army. Iranian leaders have learned through bitter experience that a disorganised amateur army of volunteers is no match against a modern professional force. The need, therefore, for a well-equipped and drilled army that can respond in a co-ordinated fashion to several challenges simultaneously is accepted by almost all of Iran’s leaders.Iran’s security policies in the 1990s reflected these concerns. Iran’s rearmament drive of the 1990s required investment in all the services and the import of new military hardware. More important still, to realise its objectives the regime had to upgrade its relations with the regular armed forces, giving them due recognition and a greater public presence. Military parades have again become commonplace and senior members of Iran’s clerical elite seem to make

Following are some details about Iran’s military capability. The totals include equipment held by the Revolutionary Guards, which operate on land, at sea and in the air:

(Questionable as a “scholarly work”, but useful if the provided information is accurate)

This is the story of Men and Women of the Imperial Iranian Air Force who proved that phoenix can rise again from the ashes.

(Questionable as “scholarly work”, but useful if the information is accurate)

During the late 1970s the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces, was undergoing a rapid increase in strength. In 1979 it was a largely mechanized and armored force of about 285,000 troops, organized in 3 corps, with headquarters in Tehran area, in Shiraz in the south, and in Kermanshah near the Iraq border. There was even Plans for a fourth corps, to be established at the new Chah Bahar complex at the eastern end of the Persian Gulf. Major ground formations included 3 armored divisions (One more in organization in Sistan) each with six tank battalions and five mechanized infantry battalions, 3 infantry divisions, 2 Imperial Guard Divisions and 4 independent brigades (1 armored, 1 infantry, 1 airborne and 1 Special Forces) and the Army Aviation Command. These combat units, backed up by the usual complement of support units, were said to be 85 percent operational. During the mid-1970s fully 80 percent of Iran’s ground forces were deployed along the Iraqi border, though official sources maintained that a large portion of these could be sent anywhere in the country within twenty-four hours by means of air force transports. Troop deployment was expected to shift south during the late 1970s with the opening of the Chah Bahar facility.

The foregoing discussion suggests that Iran’s security strategy stems from a complicated mix of strategic, domestic, and institutional sources. Any assessment of how Iran will respond in a crisis must determine not only the particulars, but also the current balance of influence among Tehran’s decisionmakers. Several observations of Iran’s security policy can be derived.

Iran’s foreign policy is too complex for simple description and prediction. However, the fundamental sources and security institutions described earlier shape both its direction and its application. The direction of Iran’s foreign policy is hardly  consistent: At times, the revolutionary imperative dominates; at other times, concerns over ethnic fragmentation or economic relations predominate. Nevertheless, patterns do emerge that can be described in some detail. The armed forces and  intelligence services will play an essential role in many of these decisions, particularly with regard to how Iran can best meet its security challenges. Although these institutions often play, at most, a limited role in formulating Iran’s objectives, their decisions shape the means used to pursue these ends.

Iran’s military plays an important role in Iranian society. In 1925, leaders from Iran’s military deposed the Qajar dynasty, establishing the regime of Reza Shah. Military leaders also played an instrumental role in the 1953 coup against Mosaddeq.  (However, the Islamic Republic deliberately tries to guard against this degree of military influence.) Religious leaders (like the Shah before them) try to employ the military to strengthen their positions and ensure their control over Iranian society. Thus, the military’s role in security cannot be separated from its overall role in Iran’s domestic politics. This chapter focuses on two issues. It first describes the military’s role in Iranian politics today. It then explores the question of whether the  armed forces would be loyal to the regime if political strife were to increase.

Myriad individuals, institutions, and organizations play important foreign policy roles in Iran. For issues of security policy—the focus of this report—several organizations are particularly important, including the intelligence services, the Islamic  Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the paramilitary militia known as the Basij, and the regular armed forces, or Artesh. Recognizing the role of the Iranian armed forces and security services is critical to understanding Iran’s security policy. These institutions will respond to the challenges of the 21st century, be it the return of Iraq as a major regional power, a powerful Turkish-Israeli axis, possible domestic turmoil in the southern Gulf states, a meltdown in Afghanistan, or other core concerns. Moreover, they must do so with a relatively limited budget (of at most $5 billion a year), inferior military equipment (relative to that of other regional powers), and a divided political elite whose only priority and goal might be survival.  These organizations, their relative power, and their institutional biases are discussed below.

The decisionmaking process in Iran can be, and often is, bewildering in its complexity. The large number of institutions, the important roles of nongovernment actors, overlapping institutional structures, the importance of personal ties, and lack  of a clear division of labor among security ministries often lead to conflicting policies and uncertain implementation.  Although planning for Iran’s national security is the constitutional task of the Artesh and the mandate of Iran’s other security  organizations, Iran does not have a single national security approach, or program of action. Policy outcomes are usually products of compromises reached by the security community itself and its political masters.

There is one question that plagues the minds of Iran’s population of male youths; Artesh or Pasdaran? Since conscription became mandatory in 1925 and the Islamic Revolution prevailed, National Service and its military organisations have been an all too constant chain around the ankles of Iran’s ambitious youths.

At an age where most people’s worries consist of parties and waist-lines, the majority of youths in Iran have more urgent matters at hand. Women are currently exempt from compulsory national service, but very few men have this option.

Their options are very restricted, and should be considered more outcomes than options. In the majority of cases, the government will choose conscripts’ destinations depending on qualifications, previous jobs and family members.The Artesh is Iran’s traditional army, with an info-structure similar to that of many armies around the world. It is said to be considerably more popular amongst the anti-government portion of Iran’s population. The Pasdaran on the other hand, is the ‘Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution’ and has close links with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ’s government. This path can often secure a good life for conscripts, but requires a minimum of 6-months as a member of the non-active military group the Basij, a group the Iranian government claim has over 20 million members and one that is often labelled terrorist by the West.

PhD student Keyvan Nayyeri, who recently served in the Artesh, admits he did not want to join the Pasdaran amid fears he would be labelled a terrorist by the West, but claims it is a lot easier to fulfil your time there.

Whilst awaiting conscription, Nayyeri blogged of wanting “to run faster and faster to get free, to see the world (but could not because of his military duties)”.  Job prospects are limited without completing National Service, and passports are often unobtainable. Nayyeri confirmed this by admitting he had to turn down many opportunities world-wide due to having not completed National Service, and said the end of his conscription would be like a birthday, offering him a new lease on life.

Nearly two years after the completion of his military service, Nayyeri, who now studies in Texas, America, states that his views ‘have completely changed’.  He claims that the service acts as a platform for young men to learn how to accept ‘social difficulties and problems in life’ in a country that otherwise has no means of doing this. Nayyeri goes on to say ‘as far as I can remember, almost everyone in my friends who hasn’t served (in the army) hasn’t been able to succeed in life’. Nayyeri admits though, that the length of service is harsh.

But it seems the government may have begun to take notice. In June 2009 the government announced they reduced the length of service, “The military service has been cut by two months in normal cases and by one month in underprivileged areas,” Brigadier General Moussa Kamali said.

“In the areas that (military) operations are being carried out, the term was 17 months… it has now been cut to 16 ” added Kamali, who is chief conscription officer of the armed forces. Military service for conscripts with a PhD fell 10 months and for master and bachelor graduates their time is 8 and 6 months lesser respectively.  Although this could act as an incentive for people to further their knowledge, it is unlikely to cement over their desire to completely eradicate compulsory service.  People could once pay off conscription for around $2000 (£1250), but this was removed in 2001 to result in only more frustration.

There are cases where men are exempt from their military duties, but exemptions are only accepted to men under certain circumstances. Being a single father, an only child, or the only son in your family are some of the circumstances which will result in exemption, with students and Iranians living abroad being exempt until they finish or return.

The country’s opinions on conscription seem to be spilt, with two groups emerging. The first being those who are involved with the military; this group believing that service is essential in developing youths into men, and they hold their experiences as evidence. The second, consisting mainly of youngsters who are yet to serve their national service, believe that they are throwing their ‘best years’ away, and these have their chained ambitions as evidence. Iran’s national service remains a very interesting and confusing topic, and it is obvious things can be lost due to its existence, but there are also things to be gained… most importantly a passport and a job.

There is one question that plagues the minds of Iran’s population of male youths; Artesh or Pasdaran? Since conscription became mandatory in 1925 and the Islamic Revolution prevailed, National Service and its military organisations have been an all too constant chain around the ankles of Iran’s ambitious youths.

At an age where most people’s worries consist of parties and waist-lines, the majority of youths in Iran have more urgent matters at hand. Women are currently exempt from compulsory national service, but very few men have this option.

Their options are very restricted, and should be considered more outcomes than options. In the majority of cases, the government will choose conscripts’ destinations depending on qualifications, previous jobs and family members. The Artesh is Iran’s traditional army, with an info-structure similar to that of many armies around the world. It is said to be considerably more popular amongst the anti-government portion of Iran’s population. The Pasdaran on the other hand, is the ‘Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution’ and has close links with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ’s government. This path can often secure a good life for conscripts, but requires a minimum of 6-months as a member of the non-active military group the Basij, a group the Iranian government claim has over 20 million members and one that is often labelled terrorist by the West.

PhD student Keyvan Nayyeri, who recently served in the Artesh, admits he did not want to join the Pasdaran amid fears he would be labelled a terrorist by the West, but claims it is a lot easier to fulfil your time there.

Whilst awaiting conscription, Nayyeri blogged of wanting “to run faster and faster to get free, to see the world (but could not because of his military duties)”.  Job prospects are limited without completing National Service, and passports are often unobtainable. Nayyeri confirmed this by admitting he had to turn down many opportunities world-wide due to having not completed National Service, and said the end of his conscription would be like a birthday, offering him a new lease on life.

Nearly two years after the completion of his military service, Nayyeri, who now studies in Texas, America, states that his views ‘have completely changed’.  He claims that the service acts as a platform for young men to learn how to accept ‘social difficulties and problems in life’ in a country that otherwise has no means of doing this. Nayyeri goes on to say ‘as far as I can remember, almost everyone in my friends who hasn’t served (in the army) hasn’t been able to succeed in life’. Nayyeri admits though, that the length of service is harsh.

But it seems the government may have begun to take notice. In June 2009 the government announced they reduced the length of service, “The military service has been cut by two months in normal cases and by one month in underprivileged areas,” Brigadier General Moussa Kamali said.

“In the areas that (military) operations are being carried out, the term was 17 months… it has now been cut to 16 ” added Kamali, who is chief conscription officer of the armed forces. Military service for conscripts with a PhD fell 10 months and for master and bachelor graduates their time is 8 and 6 months lesser respectively.  Although this could act as an incentive for people to further their knowledge, it is unlikely to cement over their desire to completely eradicate compulsory service.  People could once pay off conscription for around $2000 (£1250), but this was removed in 2001 to result in only more frustration.

There are cases in which men are exempt from their military duties, but exemptions are only accepted to men under certain circumstances. Being a single father, an only child, or the only son in your family are some of the circumstances which will result in exemption, with students and Iranians living abroad being exempt until they finish or return.

The country’s opinions on conscription seem to be spilt, with two groups emerging. The first being those who are involved with the military; this group believing that service is essential in developing youths into men, and they hold their experiences as evidence. The second, consisting mainly of youngsters who are yet to serve their national service, believe that they are throwing their ‘best years’ away, and these have their chained ambitions as evidence. Iran’s national service remains a very interesting and confusing topic, and it is obvious things can be lost due to its existence, but there are also things to be gained… most importantly a passport and a job.