Zum Abschluss dieses tollen Projektes habe ich noch ein paar Besonderheiten ausgepackt. Das Ü muss ja ordentlich in Erinnerung bleiben.

Projekt ABC: Ü wie…

…Überwachungsflugzeug

Die AWACS letzte Woche in München

…Übeltäter

Ein Übeltäter ist immer der Henker

…Überraschungsangriff

Das Projekt war eine schöne Herausforderung an die Kreativität und hat die Gedanken teilweise sehr beflügelt. Wirklich schade, dass es nun zu Ende ist.
Mir hat es sehr viel Spaß gemacht.

Bilder: T.R. aka Wortman

PakAlert

When waging war “by way of deception,” the motto of the Israeli Mossad, well-timed crises play a critical agenda-setting role by displacing facts with what a target population can be deceived to believe. Thus the force-multiplier effect when staged crises are reinforced with pre-staged intelligence. In combination, the two often prove persuasive.

That duplicity was on display when U.S. lawmakers were induced to invade Iraq in response to the mass murder of 9-11. That crisis alone, however, was insufficient. Military mobilization required a “consensus” belief in Iraqi WMD, Iraqi ties to Al Qaeda, Iraqi mobile biological weapons, Iraqi meetings in Prague, and so forth. Though all were false, those “facts” proved sufficient to induce an invasion of Iraq.

Such agent provocateur operations typically include collateral incidents as pre-staging for the intended main event. Ongoing incidents suggest a follow-on operation is underway. Recent history suggests we’ll see an orgy of evidence that plausibly indicts a pre-staged Evil Doer. Though Iran is an obvious candidate, Pakistan is also a possibility where outside forces have been destabilizing this nuclear Islamic nation with a series of violent incidents.

The Indo-Israel Alliance

December 2007 saw the murder of former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Mark Siegel, her Ashkenazim biographer and lobbyist, assured U.S. diplomats that her return was “the only possible way that we could guarantee stability and keep the presidency of Musharraf intact.”

President Pervez Musharraf had announced that resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict was essential to the resolution of conflicts in Iraq and neighboring Afghanistan. That comment made him a target for Tel Aviv.

During Bhutto’s two terms as prime minister, Pakistani support for the Taliban—then celebrated as the freedom-fighting Mujahadin—enabled her to wield influence in Afghanistan while also catalyzing conflicts in Kashmir. By fueling tension with India, she also fueled an Indo-Israel alliance as Tel Aviv provided New Delhi an emergency shipment of artillery shells during a conflict over the Kirpal region of Kashmir.

In January 2009, Israel delivered to India the first of three Phalcon Airborne Warning & Control Systems (AWACS) shifting the balance of conventional weapons in the region. That sale confirmed what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had earlier announced: “Our ties with India don’t have any limitation….” That became apparent in April when Israel signed a $1.1 billion agreement to provide India an advanced tactical air defense system developed by Raytheon, a U.S. defense contractor.

In August 2008, Ashkenazim General David Kezerashvili returned to Georgia from Tel Aviv to lead an assault on separatists in South Ossetia with the support of Israeli arms and training. That crisis ignited Cold War tensions between the U.S. and Russia, key members of the Quartet (along with the EU and the UN) pledged to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict.

More Game Theory Warfare?

Bhutto’s murder ensured a crisis that replaced Musharaff with Asif Ali Zardari, her notoriously corrupt husband. By Washington’s alliance with Zardari, the U.S. could be portrayed as extending its corrupting influence in the region.

On August 7, 2008, the Zadari-led ruling coalition called for a no-confidence vote in Parliament against Musharraf just as he was departing for the Summer Olympics in Beijing. On August 8, heavy fighting erupted overnight in South Ossetia. As with many of the recent incidents in Pakistan, this violent event involved armed separatists.

But for pro-Israeli influence inside the U.S. government, would our State Department have installed in office the corrupt Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan, leading to record-level poppy production? Is the heroin epidemic presently eroding Russian society traceable to Israel’s infamous game theory war-planners? [See “How Israel Wages Game Theory Warfare” and “Israel and 9-11” .]

In late November 2008, a terrorist attack in Mumbai, India’s financial center, renewed fears of nuclear tension between India and Pakistan. When the attackers struck a hostel managed by Chabad Lubavitch, an ultra-orthodox Jewish sect from New York, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announced from Tel Aviv: “Our world is under attack.” By early December, Israeli journalists urged that we “fortify the security of Jewish institutions worldwide.”

Soon after “India’s 9-11” was found to include operatives from Pakistan’s western tribal region, Zardari announced an agreement with the Taliban to allow Sharia law to govern a swath of the North West Frontier Province where Al Qaeda members reportedly reside.

Pakistani cooperation with “Islamic extremists” created the impression of enhanced insecurity and vulnerability for the U.S. and its allies. That perceived threat was marketed by mainstream media as proof of the perils of “militant Islam.”

With the Taliban and Al Qaeda portrayed as operating freely in a nuclear-armed Islamic state, Tel Aviv gained traction for its claim that a nuclear Tehran posed an “existential threat” to the Jewish state. Meanwhile Israel’s election of an ultra-nationalist/ultra-orthodox coalition further delayed resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

More delay is destined to evoke more extremism and gain more traction for those marketing the “global war on terrorism.” Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni argued after the assault in Mumbai: “Israel, India and the rest of the free world are positioned in the forefront of the battle against terrorists and extremism.”

In announcing that list, Islamabad was indicted by its exclusion even though Pakistan is dominantly Sunni and, unlike Iran’s Shi’a , abhors theocratic rule. The fact patterns suggest that Pakistan, not India, was the target of the murderous terrorism in Mumbai.

Advised by legions of Ashkenazim, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s recent mission to Islamabad was a diplomatic disaster. Abrasive and arrogant, America’s top diplomat reinforced Pakistani concerns that it is surrounded by hostile forces and that the nation is being set up to fail by Jewish nationalist advisers to a nation it considered an ally.

In a climate of heightened tensions, Clinton undermined U.S. interests, boosted the Israeli case for a global war on “Islamo-fascism” and lent credence to the Clash of Civilizations.

Destabilization as a Prequel to Domination

As Afghanistan and Pakistan join other nations being destabilized by outside forces, key questions must be answered:

Was India’s 9-11 a form of geopolitical misdirection meant to serve both the tactical goals of Muslim extremists and the strategic goals of Jewish nationalists? Who benefits—within Pakistan—from humiliation at the hands of India and the U.S.?

With Bhutto’s murder and Musharraf’s departure, the crisis in Mumbai drew Pakistani forces to the Indian border and away from the western tribal region. Was that the geostrategic goal of these well-timed crises? What role, if any, did Israel play?

Is delay in ending the occupation of Palestine part of an agent provocateur strategy? Was the latest assault on Gaza part of this strategy?

Each of these crises incrementally advanced the expansionist agenda of Colonial Zionists. Do these collateral incidents trace their origin to a common source? Is that source again using serial events to pre-stage a main event?

The public has an intuitive grasp of the source of this oft-recurring behavior. An October 2003 poll of 7,500 respondents in member nations of the European Union found that Israel was considered the greatest threat to world peace.

Is terrorism limited to “Islamo-fascists”? Are mass murders also deployed—from the shadows—as a strategy of geopolitical manipulation by those who Ashkenazim philosopher Hannah Arendt described as “Jewish fascists”?

Author, educator, attorney, merchant banker and adviser to policy-makers worldwide and U.S. Veteran

Jeff was counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (1980-87) working for Democrat Russell Long, son of Louisiana Governor and U.S. Senator Huey P. Long. Specialist in employee benefits law—pensions, 401(k) plans, stock options, employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), et.al. Tax-qualified employee benefit plans accounted for $17 trillion in assets (April 2007) and more than half the funds in the hands of institutional investors. As of 2007, ESOPs were in place in 11,500 firms nationwide, covering 10% of the U.S. workforce and holding $800 billion in assets. Law practice w/ former Senators Russell Long, Democrat of Louisiana and Paul Laxalt, Republican of Nevada, chairman of Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaigns.

The discussions are ‘part of regular ongoing exchanges‘ to strengthen bilateral defense ties. The Indian Army Chief will also attend a special ceremony in the Yad Vashem memorial, where he will lay flowers in memory of Holocaust victims.

The visit is also expected to allay fears that the inquiry by Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into controversial Barak missile deal may disrupt the robust defense ties between the two countries. Israel has become India’s No.1 supplier of arms and ammunition, overtaking Russia with of supplies constituting about 50 percent of Israel’s defense exports and about 30 percent of India’s defense imports.

The visit comes just before the first anniversary of the Mumbai-terror attacks last on 26 November at multiple locations including Chabad House (A Chabad house is a centre for disseminating Orthodox Judaism by the Chabad movement), during which over 170 people were killed, including the Chabad emissary to Mumbai and his pregnant wife. After the attack, Israel and India have increasingly cooperated on security issues especially beefing up the security along Indian coastlines, from where the terrorists had infiltrated during the attacks.

NowPublic

The Lord works in mysterious ways…

DEBKAfile

September 23, 2009,

Up above a big military parade in Tehran on Tuesday, Sept. 22, as Iranian president declared Iran’s armed forces would “chop off the hands” of any power daring to attack his country, two air force jets collided in mid-air. One was Iran’s only airborne warning and control system (AWACS) for coordinating long-distance aerial operations, DEBKAfile’s military and Iranian sources disclose.

The proud military parade, which included a march-past, a line of Shehab-3 missiles and an air force fly-past, was planned to give Ahmadinejad a dazzling send-off for New York and add steel to his UN Assembly speech Wednesday.

Dubbed “Simorgh” (a flying creature of Iranian fable which performs wonders in mid-flight), the AWACS’ appearance, escorted by fighter jets, was to have been the climax for the Iranian Air force’s fly-past over the parade. Instead, it collided with one of escorting planes, a US-made F-5E, and both crashed to the ground in flames. All seven crewmen were killed.

Eye witnesses reported that the flaming planes landed on the mausoleum burial site of the Islamic revolution’s founder Ruhollah Khomeini, a national shrine. According to Western observers, no distress signals came from either cockpit indicating that the collision and explosions were sudden and fast.

DEBKAfile’s military sources say the disaster was a serious blow to the Iranian Air Force not long after its first and only AWACS went into service in April 2008. It was a renovated version of the Russian Ilyushin 76, part of Saddam Hussein’s air force before it was transferred to Iran in 1991 during the first Gulf War.

Tehran hired Russian technicians to carry out renovations and install up-to-date radar. At the launching ceremony of the upgraded AWACS, Air Force commander Brig. Gen. Ahmad Miqani boasted its new radar systems were made in Iran and able to spot any airplane or missile at a distance of 1,000 kilometers from Iran’s borders.

The loss of this airborne control system has left Iran’s air force and air and missile defenses without “electronic eyes” for surveillance of the skies around its borders.

AWACS

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by: Daily.pk

As usual, right before the passage of an aid bill to Pakistan, a plethora of lobbies begin their disinformation campaigns. This latest one is pretty absurd. According to the Pakistanphobes that want to derail the aid package to Pakistan Islamabad has supposedly modified vintage Anti-ship US Harpoon missiles. This silly argument is as stupid as it sounds. Pakistan has a very advanced missile program and has tested short range, medium range and long range missiles. Pakistan has been testing the missiles for over three decades.

Much to the chagrin of its enemies, Pakistan has expedited its nuclear program. The ISIS makes it look its breaking news. It is now reporting that Pakistan has a Plutonium program. The ISIS analysts may have been living in a cave, because Islamabad has always had a Plutonium program. Obviously the program is ongoing and and will surely add to the number of bombs that it possesses.

Pakistan’s multifaceted missile program has various components

• Short Range Missiles: Hataf

• Medium Range Missiles: Shaheen

• Long Range Missiles: Ghauri

• ICBM/SLV: Taimur

The recent US charge about reverse engineering ancient US kits doesn’t make any sense at all.  The dispute highlights the level of mistrust that remains between the United States and a Pakistani military. So what are the reasons for the inane accusation. The New York Times sheds some light on the reasons:

• ..the subtext of the argument is growing concern about the speed with which Pakistan is developing new generations of both conventional and nuclear weapons. “There’s a concerted effort to get these guys to slow down,”

• At issue is the detection by American intelligence agencies of a suspicious missile test on April 23 — a test never announced by the Pakistanis — that appeared to give the country a new offensive weapon.

The Pakistan missile program is one of the most advanced in the world. Most international experts are very skeptical of the American claims.

• … the Harpoon missile did not have the necessary range for a land-attack missile, which would lend credibility to Pakistani claims that they are developing their own new missile. Moreover, he said, Pakistan already has more modern land-attack missiles that it developed itself or acquired from China. Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, a yearbook and Web-based data service

• “They’re beyond the need to reverse-engineer old U.S. kit,” …“They’re more sophisticated than that.” …the ship-to-shore missile that Pakistan was testing was part of a concerted effort to develop an array of conventional missiles that could be fired from the air, land or sea to address India’s much more formidable conventional missile arsenal.Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, a yearbook and Web-based data service

The Pakistani missile program is a program of survival, self-preservation, dreams, defense and direct competition with India. In many ways, the program is ahead of its much larger neighbor’s program. Its deterrent value was proven, even in its early stages of development when it kept more than 250,000 soldiers on the Pakistani borders at bay in 2002. It also prevented Bharat from attacking Pakistan in the 90s when Zia Ul Haq was president. The US claim is all the more ridiculous because Bharat has admitted that Pakistan has a very robust missile program.

The range of Pakistan’s India-centric missiles. The Pakistani missile program is helping it develop a space program

The range of Pakistan’s India-centric missiles. The Pakistani missile program is helping it develop a space program

WASHINGTON — The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to strike land targets, a potential threat to India, according to senior administration and Congressional officials.

The charge, which set off a new outbreak of tensions between the United States and Pakistan, was made in an unpublicized diplomatic protest in late June to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani and other top Pakistani officials.

The accusation comes at a particularly delicate time, when the administration is asking Congress to approve $7.5 billion in aid to Pakistan over the next five years, and when Washington is pressing a reluctant Pakistani military to focus its attentions on fighting the Taliban, rather than expanding its nuclear and conventional forces aimed at India.

While American officials say that the weapon in the latest dispute is a conventional one — based on the Harpoon antiship missiles that were sold to Pakistan by the Reagan administration as a defensive weapon in the cold war — the subtext of the argument is growing concern about the speed with which Pakistan is developing new generations of both conventional and nuclear weapons.

“There’s a concerted effort to get these guys to slow down,” one senior administration official said. “Their energies are misdirected.”

At issue is the detection by American intelligence agencies of a suspicious missile test on April 23 — a test never announced by the Pakistanis — that appeared to give the country a new offensive weapon.

American military and intelligence officials say they suspect that Pakistan has modified the Harpoon antiship missiles that the United States sold the country in the 1980s, a move that would be a violation of the Arms Control Export Act. Pakistan has denied the charge, saying it developed the missile itself. The United States has also accused Pakistan of modifying American-made P-3C aircraft for land-attack missions, another violation of United States law that the Obama administration has protested.NY Times. By ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER. Published: August 29, 2009 U.S. Accuses Pakistan of Altering Missiles.

Pakistani missiles: Hataf, Ghauri, Babar, Abdali missiles

Pakistan has first strike capability covering the entire South Asian Subcontinent . It also has 2nd strike capability with missiles that can reach deep into Indian territory. The 250 Nuclear and Hydrogen bombs keep the enemies at bay.

Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through second strike capability, possible hard and deeply buried storage andlaunch facilities, road-mobile missiles, air defenses around strategic sites and concealment measures,” the Congressional Research Service (CRS) said in its report on Pak nuclear weapons dating May 15.CRS is the research wing of US Congress, which prepares reports on issues of interest of the US lawmakers.

Pakistan began banking on missiles because of the US embargo on planes. “till the fleet of 500 JF-Thunder aircraft are ready, Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent will be the missile nuclear defense. Pakistan formally kicked off its medium-range missile programme in April 1998, with the first successful test flight of GhauriI missile followed by similar tests the next years involving the nuclear capable Ghauri, Shaheen, Ghaznavi and Abdali missile systems.

Whatever their origin, the missiles would be a significant new entry into Pakistan’s arsenal against India. They would enable Pakistan’s small navy to strike targets on land, complementing the sizable land-based missile arsenal that Pakistan has developed. That, in turn, would be likely to spur another round of an arms race with India that the United States has been trying, unsuccessfully, to halt. “The focus of our concern is that this is a potential unauthorized modification of a maritime antiship defensive capability to an offensive land-attack missile,” said another senior administration official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity because the matter involves classified information.

“The potential for proliferation and end-use violations are things we watch very closely,” the official added. “When we have concerns, we act aggressively.”

A senior Pakistani official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity because the interchanges with Washington have been both delicate and highly classified, said the American accusation was “incorrect.” The official said that the missile tested was developed by Pakistan, just as it had modified North Korean designs to build a range of land-based missiles that could strike India. He said that Pakistan had taken the unusual step of agreeing to allow American officials to inspect the country’s Harpoon inventory to prove that it had not violated the law, a step that administration officials praised.

Some experts are also skeptical of the American claims. Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, a yearbook and Web-based data service, said the Harpoon missile did not have the necessary range for a land-attack missile, which would lend credibility to Pakistani claims that they are developing their own new missile. Moreover, he said, Pakistan already has more modern land-attack missiles that it developed itself or acquired from China.

“They’re beyond the need to reverse-engineer old U.S. kit,” Mr. Hewson said in a telephone interview. “They’re more sophisticated than that.” Mr. Hewson said the ship-to-shore missile that Pakistan was testing was part of a concerted effort to develop an array of conventional missiles that could be fired from the air, land or sea to address India’s much more formidable conventional missile arsenal.

The dispute highlights the level of mistrust that remains between the United States and a Pakistani military that American officials like to portray as an increasingly reliable partner in the effort to root out the forces of the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pakistani territory. A central element of the American effort has been to get the military refocused on the internal threat facing the country, rather than on threat the country believes it still faces from India.

Pakistani officials have insisted that they are making that shift. But the evidence continues to point to heavy investments in both nuclear and conventional weapons that experts say have no utility in the battle against insurgents.

Over the years, the United States has provided a total of 165 Harpoon missiles to Pakistan, including 37 of the older-model weapons that were delivered from 1985 to 1988, said Charles Taylor, a spokesman for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The country’s nuclear arsenal is expanding faster than any other nation’s. In May, Pakistan conducted a test firing of its Babur medium-range cruise missile, a weapon that military experts say could potentially be tipped with a nuclear warhead. The test was conducted on May 6, during a visit to Washington by President Asif Ali Zardari, but was not made public by Pakistani officials until three days after the meetings had ended to avoid upsetting the talks. While it may be technically possible to arm the Harpoons with small nuclear weapons, outside experts say it would probably not be necessary.

Before Congress departed for its summer recess, administration officials briefed crucial legislators on the protest to Pakistan. The dispute has the potential to delay or possibly even derail the legislation to provide Pakistan with $7.5 billion in civilian aid over five years; lawmakers are scheduled to vote on the aid package when they return from their recess next month.

The legislation is sponsored by Senators John Kerry of Massachusetts and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, the top Democrat and Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as Representative Howard L. Berman, a California Democrat who leads the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressional aides are now reconciling House and Senate versions of the legislation.

Frederick Jones, a spokesman for Mr. Kerry, declined to comment on the details of the dispute citing its classified nature but suggested that the pending multifaceted aid bill would clear Congress “in a few weeks” and would help cooperation between the two countries.

“There have been irritants in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the past and there will be in the future,” Mr. Jones said in a statement, noting that the pending legislation would provide President Obama “with new tools to address troubling behavior.” NY Times. By ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER. Published: August 29, 2009 U.S. Accuses Pakistan of Altering Missiles.

Known and publicized Pakistan’s missile efforts consists of three components:

SHORT RANGE MISSILES:The short range Hatf-1 and Hatf-2, of Pakistani design and construction, were developed by the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO).M-11Since 1992, Pakistan has been constructing maintenance facilities, launchers and storage sheds for the missiles.  The missile has a range of more than 300 km and a payload of 500 kg. It is a two-stage, solid-propelled missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The missile was reportedly test-fired in July 1997.

• Hatf-1, Est. Range: 80 km, Est. Payload: 500 kg, Est. Launch Weight: 1500 kg, Propulsion: Single-stage, Solid propellant, Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

• Even though the Hatf-1, -1A, and Hataf-2were declared operational in the early 1990s, and the Pakistan Army tested the Hatf-1A in February 2000. Western observers feel that  both Hataf 1 and Hataf2 programs are likely to have been discontinued. Pakistani analysts find the Hataf 1 and 2 of a lot of value because of he proximity of any enemy movement. The older versions of the Hataf did not have a robust navigational system, but this functionality has been upgraded.

SHAHEEN MEDIUM RANGE:The Shaheen series of solid-propellant missiles were developed by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), which is also responsible for Pakistan’s plutonium bomb program.  They have been compared to the Chinese M-11 missiles. The locally produced longer range Shaheen-I and Shaheen-II appear are comparable to the Chinese M-9 or DF-15 missiles.

Hatf-3, (Tarmuk) (Comparable to Chinese M-11)Est. Range: 300 km, Est. Payload: 500 kg, Est. Launch Weight: N/A

• Propulsion: Two-stage, Solid propellant

• Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

Hatf IV. The DF-15/M-9 (NATO designation CSS-6) is a single-stage, solid-propellant, road mobile, short-range ballistic missile. It can reportedly deliver a 500kg warhead over a range of 600km; other reports suggest that with a smaller warhead, the missile could have a range of 800km. Pakistani government statements suggest that the missiles in Pakistan’s possession have a maximum range of 700-800km. Like the M-11 missiles, control during boost phase is exercised through “exhaust vanes or small scale vernier motors.” The M-9 has a reported 300m circular error probability (CEP) and is believed to employ some form of terminal guidance. Analysts suggest that the missile has a “strapdown inertial guidance system with an onboard digital computer,”….which “enables rapid targeting andeliminates need for wind corrections prior to launch.” Unconfirmed reports suggest that the “separating warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory.”Source NTI
Shaheen 1:The high-precision Shaheen-1 missile has a range of up to 700 kilometers (about 440 miles). It is a railroad platform-based mobile variant of the Pakistani Hatf-IV ballistic missile.

LONG RANGE GHAURI:The Kahuta Laboratories, which is also responsible for Pakistan’s uranium bomb program, has built the Gahuri missile which is also in production. It has been compared to North Korean Nodong and the longer range Taepodong missiles.The  Ghauri (Hatf-V) missile was tested in April 1998. The Ghauri is liquid-fueled and is Pakistan’s imported version of the North Korean Nodong, itself a fancy Scud. Official Pakistani statements claim the missile has a maximum range of 1500 km carrying a 700 kg payload, but analysis by the U.S. Department of Defense of the Ghauri puts the range closer to 1000 km. According to Dr. A. Q. Khan, who is credited with being the father of Pakistan’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the Ghauri flew 1100 km in its flight-test in April, supporting the Pentagon’s analysis. Press reports put the tested range as being between 700 km and 1200 km.The Ghauri is reported to have a relatively large diameter – 1.25 m. Pakistan is capable of producing nuclear warheads approximately the size of a soccer ball and weighing 400 kg, a size which would easily fit on a 1.25 m missile. Dr. Khan claimed that Ghauri is now “fully operational.” And when asked if Pakistan is now capable of deploying nuclear weapons, he replied, “No doubt about it, one should not be under any illusions.” He said it could be done within “not months, not weeks, but within days.”

Hatf-5, (Ghauri 1).‘A Strategic Missile Group (SMG) of Pakistan Army’s Strategic Force Command (ASFC) conducted a successful training launch of Ghauri Missile (IRBM)” . Pakistan’s liquid-engine ballistic missile program is spearheaded by KRL. Comparable to Soviet R-17, and Korean Nodong.

• Est. Range: 1000 km, Est. Payload: 700 kg,

• Est. Launch Weight: 16,000 kg.

• Propulsion: Single-stage, liquid propellant.

• Comments: Mobile platform. Status: flight-tested.

“KRL has also disclosed plans for longer-range versions of the Ghauri: the Ghauri-II and possibly Ghauri-III. A more powerful engine for longer-range versions of the Ghauri is under development.[37] Some statements attributed to Pakistani nuclear scientists and government leaders suggest that the Ghauri-II will have a range of 1,700km; other statements suggest that the Ghauri-III will have a strike-range of 2,000-3,500km” Comparable DPRK Taopodong

Hatf-VI (IRBM) Shaheen II is Pakistan’s longest-range ballistic missile system with a range of 2000 kilometers and has the potential to achieve 2500 kilometers in an advanced version. It is a two-stage solid fuel missile which can carry nuclear and conventional warheads with high accuracy.

April 26, 2008: Pakistan announced that, after nearly a decade of development, its Hatf VI IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) is ready for service. The system, also called Shaheen II, has a range of 2,000 kilometers, can carry a nuclear warhead, and hit any part of India. At least a dozen of these missiles are being built, andmoved around on mobile transporter/launchers. The Hatf VI will be a major part of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent against Indian invasion

… a 700-2,500km-range missile dubbed as the Shaheen-II, about which little is known.[30] Mock-ups of the missile displayed during the National Day celebrations in March 2003 suggest that it is a two-stage, solid-motor, road mobile system, transported on a 12-wheel TEL vehicle. Analysts speculate that the Shaheen-II is possibly a two-stage version of the M-9, or more likely a copy of the M-18, which was publicly displayed at an exhibition in Beijing in either 1987 or 1988. The M-18 was originally advertised as a two-stage system with a payload capacity of 400-500kg over a range of 1,000km.[31] U.S. intelligence sources suggest that Pakistan remains heavily reliant on external assistance for the Shaheen-II program and that China is actively assisting Pakistan through the supply of missile components, specialty materials, dual-use items, and other miscellaneous forms of technical assistance.[32].

Development flight tests of the Shaheen-II began in March 2004 when a 26-ton missile was launched from Pakistan’s Somiani Flight Test Range on the Arabian Sea.[33] According to the Chairman of Pakistan’s National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the missile covered a distance of 1,800km during the test. [34]. The missile was tested in March 2005, April 2006, and February 2007.[55] Subsequently, reports in summer 2007 stated that Pakistan had begun the process of deployment of the Shaheen-II.[53]

The missile’s basic airframe is made from steel, although some sections may be crafted out of aluminum. The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine that uses a storable combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid and kerosene. During the boost phase, four jet vanes are used for thrust vector control. It is also believed that the missile uses three body-mounted gyros for attitude and lateral acceleration control. In addition, “a pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control.” The Nodong’s range and throw weight has been variously estimated between 800-1,500km and 700-1,300kg, respectively.

BABAR HATF-7, Ra’ad (Hatf VII).CRUISE MISSILES: Pakistan schocked India and the world when it tested a stealth cruise missile in 2005. Babar Hatf-7. The Babar cruise missile can carry nuclear or conventional warheads. The 1.5-tonne, 22-foot long missile is capable of carrying a 250-kg warhead. It is believed Pakistan is working on developing a nuclear warhead that would fit into it. Since 2005, Islamabad has also carried out several tests of its Babur (Hatf VII) cruise missile, two such tests coming in March and June 2007.

05:19 GMT, May 11, 2009 As the country’s News Agency reported at the end of last week, on Wednesday Pakistan conducted a successful test-firing of its latest domestically manufactured cruise missile, known as Babur (or Babar, Hatf VII), exactly at the time President Asif Zardari was in Washington and due to meet US President Barack Obama.
The Hatf-VIII Ra’ad Cruise missile: Pakistan successfully tested a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile with a range of 350 km on Thursday. This cruise missile has been developed exclusively for launch from aircraft. The indigenously developed missile also had special stealth capabilities and could deliver all types of warheads with great accuracy. This cruise missile was tested on May 8, 2008

This subsonic nuclear capable missile, has a range of 700 km.[48] In addition, in August 2007, Pakistan tested a new cruise missile, the Ra’ad (Arabic for “Thunder”). This missile, which is air-launched, has a range of 350 kilometers.[1] Thus, along with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are increasingly part of Pakistan’s nuclear calculus. [2] Source: [49] “Pakistan Military Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile,” International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/25/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Missile-Test.php.[50] See “Nuclear Cruise Missiles,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2007, pp. 62-63,

IN DEVELOPMENT/PRODUCTION:ICBMS AND SLV Taimur:In the future, an even longer-ranged missile is likely, according to the Rumsfeld Commission. Analysts have estimated that Pakistani misisletechnology has grown beyond the basic stages and is capable of Intercontinental reach. Pakistan is working on the Taimur Sat. Luanch vehicle which has been kept under close wraps. The space and the ICBM program is closely linked.

AWACS (front view)

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By: Daily.Pk

The media myth of a global Islamic conspiracy never got much traction in America before 2001 because the minority Muslim American population simply did not seem like much of a threat, because Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States are loyal US allies, and because Americans generally have a positive attitude toward wealthy investors.

After 9/11 pro-Israel propagandists exploited public ignorance and created a nightmarish fantasy of al-Qaeda in order to put the US and allies into conflict with the entire Islamic world. What is al-Qaeda? What do they believe? What do they actually do?

Osama bin Laden first used the term “al-Qaeda” in an interview in 1998, probably in reference to a 1988 article written by Palestinian activist Abdullah Azzam entitled “al-Qa`ida al-Sulba” (the Solid Foundation). In it, Azzam elaborates upon the ideas of the Egyptian scholar Sayed Qutb to explain modern jihadi principles. Qutb, author of Social Justice in Islam, is viewed as the founder of modern Arab-Islamic political religious thought. Qutb is comparable to John Locke in Western political development. Both Azzam and Qutb were serious men of exceptional integrity and honor.

While Qutb was visiting the USA in 1949, he and several friends were turned away from a movie theater because the owner thought they were black. ‘But we’re Egyptians,’ one of the group explained. The owner apologized and offered to let them in, but Qutb refused, galled by the fact that black Egyptians could be admitted but black Americans could not,” recounts Lawrence Wright in The Looming Tower. Qutb predicted that the struggle between Islam and materialism would define the modern world. He embraced martyrdom in 1966 in rejection of Arab socialist politics.

Azzam similarly rejected secular Palestinian nationalist politics as an impediment to moral virtue. He opposed terrorist attacks on civilians and had strong reservations about ideas like offensive jihad, or preventive war. He also hesitated to designate any Muslim leader as an apostate and preferred to allow God to make such judgments. Inspired by the courage and piety of Afghan Muslims struggling against the Soviets, Azzam reinterpreted Qutb’s concept of individual and collective obligation of Muslims in his fatwa entitled “Defense of the Muslim Lands, the First Obligation after Iman (Faith).” Qutb would have prioritized the struggle of Egyptian Muslims to transform Egypt into a virtuous Islamic state while Azzam argued that every individual Muslim had an obligation to come to the aid of oppressed Muslims everywhere, whether they are Afghan, Kosovar, Bosnian, Thai, Filipino, or Chechen.

John Calvert of Creighton University writes, “This ideology would soon energize the most significant jihad movement of modern times.”

At Azzam’s call, Arabs from many countries joined America’s fight against Communism in Afghanistan. No Arab jihadi attack was considered terrorism when Azzam led the group, or later when bin Laden ran the group. Because the global Islamic movement overlapped with the goals of the US government, Arab jihadis worked and traveled frictionlessly throughout the world between Asia, Arabia and America. Azzam was assassinated in 1989, but legends of the courageous sacrifices of the noble Arab Afghans energized the whole Islamic world.

After the Soviets left Afghanistan, bin Laden relocated to Sudan in 1992. At the time he was probably undisputed commander of nothing more than a small group, which became even smaller after he lost practically all his money on Sudan investments. He returned to Afghanistan in 1996, where the younger Afghans, the Taliban welcomed him on account of his reputation as a veteran war hero.

There is no real evidence that bin Laden or al-Qaeda had any connection to the Ugandan and Tanzanian embassy attacks or any of the numerous attacks for which they have been blamed. Pro-Israel propagandists like Daniel Pipes or Matthew Levitt needed an enemy for their war against Muslim influence on American culture more than random explosions in various places needed a central commander. By the time the World Trade Center was destroyed, the Arab fighters surrounding Osama bin Laden were just a dwindling remnant living on past glories of Afghanistan’s struggle against Communism. Al-Qaeda has never been and certainly is not today an immensely powerful terror organization controlling Islamic banks and charities throughout the world.

Al-Qaeda maintained training camps in Afghanistan like Camp Faruq, where Muslims could receive basic training just as American Jews go to Israel for military training with the IDF. There they learned to disassemble, clean and reassemble weapons, and got to associate with old warriors, who engaged in great heroism against the Soviets but did not do much since. Many al-Qaeda trainees went on to serve US interests in Central Asia (e.g. Xinjiang) in the 1990s but from recent descriptions the camps seem to currently provide a form of adventure tourism with no future enlistment obligations.

Although western media treats al-Qaeda as synonymous with Absolute Evil, much of the world reveres the Arab Afghans as martyr saints. Hundreds of pilgrims visit Kandahar’s Arab cemetery daily, believing that the graves of those massacred in the 2001 US bombing of Afghanistan possess miraculous healing powers.

by: Daily.pk

Technology to cover range of 7,000 Kms, Pakistan, to increase its defensive capabilities, has started preparing intercontinental missile with a range of 7000 kilometres.

According to sources, the intercontinental missile has a range of 7000 kilometres and is capable of hitting its target falling within its range. The missile can contain nuclear as well as traditional warheads. The missile has been termed a significant milestone for the defence of the country and is believed to strengthen the defence. According to sources, the missile would soon be test fired.

PAF to get airborne refullers next year: Pakistan Air Force plans to induct four Chinese airborne refullers next year, in a move to counter the Indian Air Forces’ enhanced capabilities after New Delhi acquired six similar aircraft, an Indian news agency quoted the PAF chief as saying.

Air Chief Marshal Qamar Suleman underlined that the airborne refullers were necessary to match the IAF capabilities.

“This is an absolutely new capability which we are inducting. We never had this capability in the PAF,” Suleman added, maintaining, in order to match the IAF’s acquisition of the first of three Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), the PAF would receive four Chinese systems between 2011 and 2012.

He also termed as “alarming” the IAF’s intention of purchasing 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft, saying Pakistan needed “to have something matching.

RELATED POST:

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is expanding faster than any other nation’s

By: Daily.Pk

The Pakistan-India defence forces’ one-upmanship continues with the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) announcing it would induct four airborne refuellers based on the Il-78 platform by next year – six years after India acquired six similar aircraft.

Terming midair refuelling capability ‘extremely significant’, PAF chief Air Chief Marshal Qamar Suleman told Jane’s Defence Weekly: ‘This is an absolutely new capability we are getting, which we are inducting. We never had this capability in the Pakistan Air Force.’

And, to match the Indian Air Force’s acquisition of the first of three airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), PAF chief Air Chief Marshal Qamar Suleman told Jane’s Defence Weekly that his force would receive four Chinese systems between 2011 and 2012.

Suleman also termed as ‘alarming’ the IAF’s intention of purchasing 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), saying Pakistan needed ‘to have something matching’.

‘We knew about this requirement of the Indian Air Force for 126 latest-generation fighter aircraft. Yes, it is an alarming development because when they get 126 such capable aircraft, then we also need to have something matching to counter that threat,’ the air chief maintained.

The IAF is set to begin field trials later this year of the six combat jets that are in contention for its order, which might even go up to 200 to counter depleting force levels.

The first of the fighters are likely to be inducted in 2012.

Referring to the induction of the JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft co-produced with China, Suleman said the PAF plans to eventually induct up to 250 planes, making it the backbone of its inventory.

However, there was still a requirement for a more advanced fighter aircraft, as the PAF prepares to counter the future edge the IAF may acquire once it completes the planned purchase of 126 MMRCAs, the air chief maintained

Written by Dr. Dinesh Kumar,Western Defense Organization Bulletins

PAKISTAN THINK TANK

At the beginning of the 21st century, South Asia and the Middle East pose major challenges to international peace and security. Amid many turbulent political and military developments in the two regions, India and Israel find a growing convergence in their strategic interests. The emerging Delhi-Jerusalem strategic alliance is creating much concern in the Arab world, but could become one of the crucial factors maintaining global security.

Relations between India and Israel remained cold and strained until recently. Delhi consistently felt itself constrained to develop normal and friendly ties with Jerusalem yet followed a pro-active pro-Arab policy. In the 1970s and 1980s, working within the framework of a zero-sum game, India became one of the greatest assets the Arabs had in their diplomatic assault against Israel.

However, the new world order of the 1990s eroded the Indian perception of conflicting interest with Israel, as new strategic variables sidelined the traditional constraints (the sentiments of Indian Muslims, deference to Arab sentivities and non-alignment) from the Indo-Israeli bilateral equation. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc, India’s economic and defense related need to move closer to the West, as well as the beginning of the Middle East peace process, made Delhi realise that the continuation of the traditional negative policy towards Israel would undermine India’s national interests in the changing strategic landscape of the Middle East and beyond.

Grasping the imperatives of the changed global and regional politico-strategic milieu, Delhi gradually de-linked its Israel policy from the Arab-Israeli conflict and developed a new perception of common interests with Jerusalem. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations in January 1992, the two countries have rapidly developed close relations and cooperate in many areas of mutual interest – cultural, economic, political and matters of defense and security. After four decades of strained relations, the current phase of warm and special ties includes a strategic alliance between India and Israel. This report highlights the process of emerging India-Israel strategic cooperation, its significance for regional and global security equations and the growing Arab worries.

The Historical Background

During the first half of the 20th century, a dialectic relationship emerged between the Indian national movement and the Zionist movement in Palestine. Indian leaders saw a sharp contradiction between the goals of the Zionist movement and the Indian freedom movement, especially on the issue of partitioning countries on religious grounds.

Gandhi’s attempts to woo Indian Muslims for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity and Nehru’s negative assessment of the Zionist movement, which he considered the child of imperialism, led the Indian National Congress to adopt a pro-Arab policy in the Arab-Jewish conflict. This policy not only established a crucial link between Indian policy towards its Muslims and the trans-Muslim issues in Palestine, but also caused Indian leaders to view their Israel policy through the prism of Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it is important to stress that India’s negative attitude to the Zionist movement was not tainted by anti-Semitism.

After gaining independence, India adopted an ambiguous policy towards Israel; deciding on a half-hearted delayed recognition of the Jewish state but refusing to establish full diplomatic relations. The unfinished agenda of Kashmir, Nehru’s dream of leading a non-aligned bloc and the existence of a post-partition traumatised Muslim minority in India caused Delhi to view any positive gesture towards Israel as harmful to its vital interests.

The perception of serving Indian national interests by a negative policy towards Israel in the Middle East was so strong among the Indian leadership that even the failure of the Arabs to reciprocate during India’s wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965 and 1971), growing public dissension, and the formation of the pro-Israel Janata government failed to cut much ice in Delhi. If the price for making the Arabs happy was to refuse establishing full diplomatic relations with Jerusalem and criticise Israel at various international forums, the Indian leadership showed no hesitation to pay it..

Yet the Indian government’s attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict could neither ensure continued electoral support from the Muslims nor win the goodwill of Arab states. Indeed, in retrospect, some of its aspects proved counterproductive.

However, at the unofficial level, there were always some undercurrents helping to create a perception of converging long-term interests between India and Israel. The Israeli Consulate functioned actively in Bombay and some high level delegations exchanged visits. There was much sympathy for Israel among Indian right-wing intellectuals, organizations and political parties. The socialist and trade union movements of the two countries provided more links. Pro-Israel voices in the Indian Parliament and media were not uncommon.

A New Beginning

With the change in the international balance of power after the 1991 Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India and Israel finally found the opportunity to normalize their relations. The following factors were significant in this regard:

1. The end of the Cold War eroded the political and ideological relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. The depressed oil prices in the early 1990s somewhat reduced India’s dependence on oil from Arab states.
3. Repeated pro-Pakistan resolutions on Kashmir by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) further encouraged India to re-evaluate its Middle East policy.
4. After the Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991, the argument of annoying friendly Arab states and Muslims at home became irrelevant, as the Arabs, including the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), were themselves negotiating peace with Israel.
5. In the early 1990s, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism worsened the domestic and the regional security environment of India, and Delhi saw a common cause with Israel in this regard.
6. After the Gulf War, public opinion in India was once again demanding a fair attitude towards Israel.

Thus by the end of 1991, most of the actual and perceived constraints behind India’s policy of ‘no full diplomatic relations with Israel’ had lost their rationale. After much deliberation, the first significant policy change occurred when India voted to rescind the 1975 UN resolution ‘equating Zionism with racism’.

Moreover, this was the time when Delhi gradually began to identify Indian political and economic interests with the West. The role of the US Jewish lobby in stopping Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) sales to Pakistan and garnering support for India on Kashmir was not only appreciated by Delhi, but also apprised Indian leaders of the Jewish clout in the US. The Indian leadership became increasingly convinced that the American Jewish lobby provides a vital link of influence in American policy making and finance and that in order to fully utilize this link it was imperative to normalize relations with Israel. Against this background, Delhi upgraded its ties with Israel on 29 January 1992, on the eve of Prime Minister Narasimbha Rao’s high profile visit to the US.

Once the ice was broken, a new era of partnership began between India and Israel. Keeping a low profile for about a year, both countries worked hard to strengthen the institutional mechanism. Over a period of five years, India and Israel developed the vast institutional gamut of bilateral relations, which in normal circumstances requires a decade or more. The socio-cultural and political affinities between the two countries created a healthy atmosphere for improving ties. Thus, helped by fast changing international realities, the two countries moved very carefully but rapidly to develop a many-faceted friendship.

Flourishing Cultural Interaction and Economic Cooperation

India and Israel first emphasized economic and cultural ties. These were rightly considered not only mutually beneficial, but also instruments to build confidence and bridge gaps on the political and strategic issues. After 1992, there was a flood of cultural interaction between the two countries. Meanwhile, many high-level visit exchanges, including the high profile visits of Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres (1993) and President Ezer Weizman (1997), Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh (2000) and Home Minister L. K. Advani (2000) took place. Israel celebrated with a fanfare, “Shalom India” as a mark to India’s fiftieth year of independence. India reciprocated by organizing many cultural events all over Israel as part of the celebration of the fifty years of Israeli independence.

An increasing number of Indian students at Israeli universities and Israeli students at Indian universities have created effective channels of better understanding between the two countries. In the recent past, Israel’s image in the Indian press underwent a positive change. Though the traditional pro-Arab (anti-Israel) class of Indian politicians, diplomats and intellectuals still exists, its influence has significantly declined in the past decade. The cultural interaction of the past nine years has helped India and Israel to discover social, cultural and political affinities between them.

The establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992 also paved the way for greater economic cooperation between the two countries. India’s main interests are in the spheres of agriculture, technology transfers and using Israel as a platform to expand its commerce with the European Union and the US (with which Israel has free trade agreements.) Israel’s main considerations are the huge Indian market with more than 200 million middle class consumers, a link to the Far East and arms sales.

On this basis, the two countries established over 200 joint ventures in the spheres of engineering, ground water management, desalination, agro-industries and prevention of desertification, high-tech etc. Israeli investment in India increased from $0.36 million in 1992 to $1 billion in 1999. Both countries accorded ‘most favoured nation’ status to each other. Transport links and the financial and institutional infrastructure required to expand bilateral trade have also been developed rapidly. The volume of trade between the two countries grew from $202 millions in 1992 to more than $1 billion in 2000 and is being continuously diversified.

Considering the vast potential of Indo-Israeli economic cooperation, in coming years, we can witness more joint ventures, alliances and even mergers and acquisitions between Indian and Israeli companies. Under the shadow of congenial political environment between the two countries, a big jump in the bilateral trade can be expected in the years to come.

Symbiotic Military Interests

Even when normal diplomatic relations were missing, a fundamental understanding of long-run convergence of defense and security interests led India and Israel to maintain some secret military contacts. Israel started courting India to expand them after the Arab states failed to help India during its conflicts with her neighbours.

Israel’s impressive military successes against the Arabs were closely watched and quietly admired by the Indian military establishment. Israel’s help with arms and military hardware during India’s wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965 & 1971) indicated the potential for military cooperation between the two countries. The following instances of such cooperation are noteworthy:

1. Soon after the Indo-China war, Israeli Chief of Staff General David Shaltiel visited India in 1963.
2. After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated in October 1984, India sought Israel’s help to improve the protection of its important people. Israeli security specialists reportedly devised Rajiv Gandhi’s security system when he was Prime Minister.
3. Two Boeing 707 aircraft of India’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing’s (RAW) were fitted with Israeli equipment.
4. Since the early 1980s, Indian army and military intelligence officers are believed to be receiving anti-terrorist training in Israel.
5. In the late 1980s, India and Israel were engaged in a secret dialogue over destroying Pakistan’s nuclear facility in Kahuta and signing military agreements.

Strict secrecy was maintained over these contacts owing to political constraints and the involvement of sensitive security issues. But it is no exaggeration to say that the decision of the Indian government to upgrade diplomatic ties with Israel was also influenced by Delhi’s understanding of the importance of military cooperation with Jerusalem.

The normalization of bilateral ties in the post-Cold War period enabled India and Israel to develop their military ties on the basis of their security and commercial interests. During this period of uncertainty, the Indian military establishment was facing the following major challenges:

1. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s longstanding ally and the biggest supplier of arms, was a big strategic blow to India. Suddenly, crucial supplies of arms and military spare parts were interrupted. India felt the need to diversify its defense suppliers, realising the dangers of too much dependence on one source.
2. During the serious resource crunch in the early 1990s, India’s short-term defense preparedness depended not only on its ability to obtain crucial spare parts, but also on upgrading and optimising its existing forces.
3. India’s major defense projects like the Main Battle Tank (Arjun), Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), the Integrated Missiles Development Program (IMDP) are lagging behind because advanced technology and sufficient funds are not available.
4. In recent decades, India’s internal security environment has deteriorated to threatening levels. The availability of modern arms and weapon systems to terrorists has necessitated the introduction of the latest security technology.

Israel’s developed and research-oriented industrial-military complex is viewed by India as a good option answering some of its defense and security needs. Israel’s sophisticated expertise in manufacturing and upgrading high-combat aircraft, anti-tactical ballistic missiles, electronic warfare and communication equipment, as well as security technology are of particular interest to India. Indian military officials are not only interested in Israeli weapons and technology, but they have also shown interest in the Israel Defense Forces’ successful warfare strategies and concepts.

On the other hand, the Israeli quest for qualitative superiority in arms over its neighbours is closely linked to its tapping of more markets, and India is a big attraction in this regard. The volume of the Indian arms market reaches about two billion dollars and after the Pakistani nuclear tests (1998) and the Kargil crisis (1999), the demand of the Indian defense forces has soared. Today, after China and Turkey, India is the third largest importer of Israeli weapons. Notably, Israel does not have any objections to sell its arms and technologies to India, as it regards India as a responsible country with similar long-term interests.

As Southeast Asia is becoming an important destination for Israeli trade, Jerusalem has a profound interest in developing close military ties with India, which is one of the key actors safeguarding commercial shipping routes between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Moreover, since the Indian Ocean is becoming important for the security of both countries, Indo-Israeli naval cooperation is mutually beneficial.

After the nuclearization of South Asia in May 1998, India assumed greater importance in the long-term security concerns of Israel. The Jewish State has a vital interest in preventing the transfer of mass destruction technology from Pakistan to its declared foes in the Middle East. Close cooperation with India in the intelligence sphere is crucial in this regard.

The symbiotic nature of Indian and Israeli security interests caused the two governments, their defense forces and their industries to interact extensively in the development of India-Israel military collaboration. However, in order to avoid any potential backlash, many of these contacts and related decisions were kept secret. The followings are the major areas around which the Indo-Israeli military cooperation is focussed:

ARMS SALES

At first, despite intensive talks on military cooperation, India hesitated to buy weapons from Israel. However, after the Kargil crisis (1999), during which Israel acceded to the Indian request to speed up the delivery of military equipment and ammunition despite US pressures to implement an arms embargo on India, a new chapter began in the arms trade between the two countries and now the Indian leadership is working hard to remove the remaining political constraints hampering military cooperation with Israel. The Indian purchases from Israel include:

1. Two Dvora fast attack boats equipped with modern surveillance systems and a sophisticated gun system. Four more will be manufactured as a joint venture of Goa Shipyard Limited and Ramta of Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI).
2. An undisclosed number of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) made by IAI, including the recent deal estimated at $230 million.
3. The EL/M-2080 search acquisition and fire-control radar, which was developed for Israel’s Arrow anti-ballistic missile program by Elta Electronics Industries Ltd.,
4. Electronics suites for upgrades of the Indian Air Force’s Su-30, MiG-27 and Jaguar aircraft, as well as for Mi-35 helicopters.
5. Thirty sea-to-sea Barak missiles in a $270 million deal with Rafael.
6. Hi-tech sensors to help manning the Line of Control (LOC) along the India-Pakistan border.
7. A large quantity of artillery and rifle ammunition, 155mm shells and other sophisticated radars.

India has shown much interest in the Israeli expertise in AWACS and other electronic counter-measure technologies. Defense sources confirm that the talks for buying the ‘Green Pine’ radar (based on Israel’s anti-ballistic missile system) are in an advanced stage. The Indian defense establishment is also contacting Israel about the purchase of the advanced Phalcon surveillance aircraft (whose supply to China was cancelled by Israel under US pressure) in a bid to improve its early warning capability against the regional threats. Although officials have played down this project, defense sources maintain that good progress has been made on the prospective deal.

Israeli contractors are said to be competing with Western firms in many other areas, such as assault rifles, self-propelled guns, satellite programs, air defense systems, electronic fencing, ammunition, and small arms for the Indian security forces. India’s potential purchase list from Israel also includes equipment for special needs like vision gadgets, evacuation and rescue devices and techniques. To sum up, at a time when India is gearing to its 21st century military modernization plans, Israel has emerged a favoured supplier of imports.

UPGRADING AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY

The Indian armed forces find Israeli expertise valuable for meeting the challenge of upgrading its Soviet military equipment,. Israel was a major contender for the upgrading of 125 MiG-21 BIS aircraft. Though it lost the $400 million deal to the Russian firm, Mikoyan Design Bureau of Russia – the manufacturers of the aircraft – Israel was able to get the sub-contract to provide avionics and electronic warfare equipment for the upgrading of the MiGs. It is important to stress that in this case Delhi’s decision was more influenced by political reasons than by professional considerations.

The Indian defense market provides other prospects a big deals of upgradation. Sources close to the Indian defense headquarters suggest that India shortly needs to upgrade almost whole of its MiG-21 BIS, MiG-27ML, and MiG-29 aircraft fleet. Indigenous T-72 tanks are also considered to be in line for upgradation and Israeli company ELBIT has emerged as one of the favourite contenders. Another Israeli company, Soltam is already involved in upgrading one hundred and eighty 130 artillery guns to 155 artillery guns. In a significant move, the IAI and the Indian aircraft industry jointly bade for upgrading Indian assault helicopters Mi-8.

In the recent past, India has shown much interest in Israel’s internal security technology, equipment and methods to meet the threat of cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, the insurgencies in northeastern states, and the challenge posed by the naxalites (extreme leftist groups which advocate Maoist methods to eliminate the class differences) in many states.

The visit of Indian Internal Security (Home) Minister L. K. Advani to Israel (May 2000) was a major step towards strengthening the Indo-Israeli cooperation in this area. It is significant that Advani was given access to the Mossad’s offices to obtain an insight how the agency works. During this visit, Israel agreed to provide India with modern security equipment, as well as training.

Against this background, military intelligence reports claim that Israel has been given a contract to fence off the areas in the disturbed Kashmir region and is probably the only foreign country that has access to the sensitive installations in this border-state. Israeli anti-terrorism experts are training their Indian counterparts in checking infiltration along the borders, tracking movements of militants within the country, detecting explosives, defusing bombs and the use of many other devices and tactics developed by Israel.

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND JOINT WEAPON DEVELOPMENT

India’s three major defense projects: Main Battle Tank (Arjun), the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), and the Integrated Guided Missile Project are facing severe financial and technological constraints. Many Western defense experts regard them, especially the Arjun and LCA projects, as white elephants. However, despite numerous hurdles causing long delays and cost overruns, the vision of emerging a big power in the 21st century would let India tolerate the serious limitations linked with the success of these ambitious projects.

Indian defense sources believe that these projects can make a reasonably good headway if Israeli technology and expertise are available. They point out that the Israeli Merkava tank’s long battlefield experience in hot and hostile desert conditions may provide relevant technical and operative support for the Arjun project. The avionics developed during the Lavi aircraft project (which Israel abandoned in 1987) can be useful for the LCA. A similar possible link can be made between the two countries’ missiles programs. The Israeli surface-to-surface missiles Jericho I and Jericho II broadly resemble the Indian Prithvi and Agni missiles respectively. Recently, India has also shown serious interest in the US-Israeli anti-missile system based on the Arrow project.

Notwithstanding the symbiotic relationship between the specific Indian needs and the Israeli supplies, there are not enough financial resources in India to buy the relevant technology from the shelf. So joint ventures of the two countries will be mutually beneficial and practical in achieving the much-desired goals of India’s search for technological independence and Israel’s quest for qualitative superiority.

Independent defense reports say that the two countries have made significant progress in this direction and today the leading Israeli and Indian defense companies and research organizations are working jointly on many projects. These sources further claim that during last year’s visits of Jaswant Singh and L. K. Advani to Israel, this area was particularly emphasized. The formation of a Joint Ministerial Committee and the decision of conducting a dialogue between the National Security Councils of the two countries will further strengthen collaboration in this field.

Growing Strategic Understanding

The evolving Indo-Israeli cooperation in the sphere of defense and security brings us to the broader dimension of political and strategic issues. A defense and security partnership cannot fully develop or last long if it is based solely on symbiotic commercial military ties. It requires a proper framework of mutuality of overall political and strategic interests.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE KASHMIR ISSUE

In the post-Cold War period, India’s foreign policy-makers faced the difficult task of adjusting their Middle East policy to the changed realities in the region. Delhi began to perceive that it could serve its interests better by having close relations with both Israel and the Arab world. Thus, walking on a tightrope, Delhi consistently reiterated India’s traditional support for the Palestinian cause, but simultaneously worked towards developing close ties with Israel.

This was why Delhi preferred to keep a low profile in the region and avoid active involvement in the Middle East conflict. India expressed concern whenever there were setbacks to the peace process (for example, during the opening of the tunnel beneath the Temple Mount and the disturbances in the Har Homa neighbourhood) but, unlike in the past, it refrained from openly criticizing Israel.

At the United Nations, India gradually stopped sponsoring anti-Israeli resolutions. Though there is no appreciable change in the voting pattern of the Indian delegation at the UN on the issues related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the content analysis of speeches made by Indian delegates certainly reflects a softening of the Indian position vis-à-vis Israel. Significantly, during the millennium General Assembly summit at the UN, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh assured his Israeli counterpart Shlomo Ben-Ami that “India will start supporting Israel in international forums and organizations.” If this were to happen, it would have an enormous positive impact on the overall Indo-Israeli ties.

The ascent of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power in 1998 marked a new beginning in India’s attitude towards the Middle East. The new leadership in Delhi appears to have shed the inhibitions about dealing extensively with Israel, and prefers to maintain neutrality in the Middle East conflict. Sources close to India’s BJP Government are of the view that “following a pro-Arab policy could neither win over the support and loyalty of Indian Muslims nor the goodwill of Arab states. In fact, these policies have backfired and, for a long time, Arabs were allowed to influence our policies in the region”.

On the issue of Kashmir, Israel has been a consistent supporter of the Indian position. Though the problems in Kashmir and in the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories are of different nature, the globalisation of Islamic fundamentalism and the growing contacts between Kashmiri and Palestinian militants have created mutual worries for India and Israel. Similarly, after the NATO-led military intervention in Kosovo, both Delhi and Jerusalem have become more sensitive about any possibility of outside military intervention in Kashmir or the West Bank and Gaza.

Interestingly, realities in Kashmir have taken a different turn. In the wake of repeated anti-India resolutions passed by the OIC, India now regards Israeli security technology and intelligence a more valuable asset for dealing effectively with the Kashmir problem than the unfriendly attitude of the Arab/Muslim countries.

Grasping this strategic imperative, Delhi conveyed to the Arab leaders that in their dispute with Israel they could not take Indian support for granted, especially at the United Nations, unless they reciprocate by taking India’s interests in Kashmir into consideration. This new approach does not mean that Delhi will abandon its efforts to seek political support from the Arab world on Kashmir. What it implies is that, unlike in the past when the Indian support for the Arabs was taken for granted, India is now forcefully asserting its interests in the Arab world.

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND TERRORISM

The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism concerns both India and Israel. Jerusalem considers the spread of Islamic militancy in North Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East a direct threat to its security. Moreover, while the regional militant groups like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad are actively and directly involved in trying to undermine Israel’s existence, extra-regional Islamic militant groups look at the Jewish State as Islam’s “eternal enemy” and thus pose a potential threat to Israeli security interests.

India has also begun to bear the brunt of the growing Islamic terrorist activities. India’s internal and external security environment has been deteriorating sharply since the beginning of the 1990s. The role of Pakistan and Islamic mercenaries in abetting terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeastern provinces has added to Delhi’s apprehensions. The series of bomb blasts in Bombay in 1993 and the recent rise of terrorist activities in Kashmir have exposed India’s vulnerability to the violence instigated by Islamic fundamentalism.

Thus, India and Israel have mutual political and strategic interests in dealing with the menace of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The geopolitical locations of India and Israel also encourage a strategic understanding between them, as they are placed at either flank of the central Arab/Islamic bloc, with further significant Muslim population concentrations on the far side of each. Officially, both India and Israel stress this factor in their strategic relations, as it is the least controversial.

Notwithstanding their mutual concern over the threat of terrorism and their growing cooperation in fighting it, one must emphasise that the sources and nature of the terrorist threat faced by India and Israel do not automatically converge. Israel sees the threat emanating from Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in the Middle East, and considers Syria and Iran as the main sources of global terrorism. Paradoxically, India has good relations with Syria and of late has also developed reasonably close ties with Tehran. India’s threat is mainly from Pakistan, Afghanistan and some fundamentalist groups active in the Arab Gulf states, causing more concern with the Taliban-sponsored global terrorism, which for the time being has not affected Israel.

Nevertheless, the gradual globalisation of Islamic terrorism has provided a broad platform for close cooperation between India and Israel. Various intelligence reports suggest that, with the help of Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, some Pakistan-based Kashmiri militants are attempting to forge an alliance with Islamic militants active in the Middle East. In the recent past, after reports of the Israeli involvement in quelling insurgency in Kashmir, jihadi militant groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba, Harkatul Muhajeedin and Al-Badr have openly threatened to harm Israeli interests.

By fighting the menace of terrorism together, the two countries can enhance peace and security in the Middle East and South Asia. It was against this background that India and Israel have set up a Joint Working Group for combating international terrorism (together with the United Kingdom and France) and are closely cooperating at various international forums to fight this threat.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION

India and Israel are nuclear states – the former recently declared and the latter clandestinely. The hostile security environments around both countries made the nuclear program strategically important for their national defense and security. Though, officially, India and Israel deny any nuclear cooperation between them, the demonstration of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and the ongoing nuclear programs of certain Middle Eastern countries led to the emergence of discernible similarities between their nuclear interests.

India and Israel previously shared concerns over Pakistan’s nuclear programme in the 1980s, and it is widely believed that since then their intelligence agencies are in close contact over the issue. Moreover, not having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), both countries may benefit by supporting each other’s position while formulating their diplomatic response to the NPT. Notably, Israel did not react to the nuclear tests conducted by India in May 1998. It was not without significance that, despite being a close and special ally of the United States, which sponsored the sanctions and arms embargo against Delhi, Israel did not cut off its military ties with India altogether.

Notwithstanding Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi’s statement (during his visit to Islamabad soon after the Pakistani nuclear tests) that “Muslims feel more secure from any Israeli threats under the Pakistani nuclear umbrella” and popular sentiments in the Muslim world calling it the “pride of the Islamic nation”, Pakistan’s nuclear capability, so far, has fallen short of the fears of the “Islamic Bomb”. It is in Israel’s interest if the nuclear issue remains confined to South Asia, yet the possibility of its spilling over to the Middle East or Central Asia cannot be overlooked in the long term by either India or Israel. Under present circumstances, low profile nuclear intelligence cooperation seems mutually beneficial to Delhi and Jerusalem – a point often stressed by Israeli and Indian defense sources.

Concerns in the Arab world

The growing strategic ties between India and Israel and their ‘alleged cooperation’ in the nuclear field have created serious concerns in the Arab world. Some of them are listed below:

1. Arabs always had a feeling that India was in their pocket and now they are finding it difficult to cope with the new reality – an India developing close military ties with their adversary, Israel.
2. India-Israel military cooperation may give Israel an important place in the strategic equation between South Asia and the Middle East, thus undermining the Arabs world’s strategic depth in the inter-regional complex.
3. India’s close relations with Israel could help the latter to gain more acceptance on the Asian continent to the Arabs’ discomfiture, especially at the time of the second Intifada when the Arab League is working hard to isolate Israel.
4. Many rejectionist Arab states regard the possibility of an India-Israel-Turkey axis supported by the US as disadvantageous to their strategic and political situation.
5. Most importantly, the Arab world sees any kind of nuclear cooperation between India and Israel as a serious threat to its security.

Any kind of cooperation between India and Israel always created apprehensions in the Arab world, yet Arab protests were usually expressed privately. However, with the Indo-Israeli strategic collaboration gaining momentum in recent years, Arab leaders are becoming more vocal and critical of it. In July 1999, for the first time, the Arab League openly warned against the danger of growing India-Israel military cooperation. The Arab Follow Up Committee on the Hazards of Israeli Nuclear Activities underlined the need for the Arabs to confront Indian-Israeli cooperation, especially in the nuclear field, noting that it constitutes a grave threat to collective Arab security.

During his visit to Israel in May 2000, Indian Home Minister L. K. Advani assessed the prospects of Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation positively: “I support the expanded cooperation between Israel and India in all fields, including this [nuclear] field.” This further increased Arab apprehensions. There were strong protests from the Arab capitals against Advani’s comment. The pro-Arab lobby in Delhi became active and demanded an explanation from the Government. Some reports revealed that an Arab ambassador in Delhi went to the extent of openly warning India of the “unpleasant consequences” of its new friendship with Israel.

The growing Indo-Israeli strategic ties, especially the possibility and/or actual covert cooperation in the nuclear field, have provided Pakistan a fresh opportunity to gain support in the Arab world. Pakistan’s Government and media claim that Delhi-Jerusalem collaboration conflicts with Arab and Muslim interests. In general, the Arab press is also critical of the emerging military ties between India and Israel.

In the past, the Indian Government used to deny “any cooperation” with Israel in the sphere of defense and security. Now, Delhi’s vague position that the bilateral relations between India and Israel are not at the cost of India’s relations with the Arab world makes the Arabs wary. While categorically rejecting any nuclear cooperation with Israel, a senior Indian Foreign Ministry official chided the 18 protesting Arab ambassadors for looking unfairly at India’s strategic ties with Israel.

This was an unprecedented response from Delhi. Moreover, compared to the high-profile visits of Jaswant Singh and L. K. Advani to Israel, the decision of the Indian government to send only a Cabinet minister, M. M. Joshi, to represent India at the funeral of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad further indicated India’s changed priorities in the Middle East. Today, while Israeli diplomats and military officials are regular visitors at the South Block (Indian Foreign Ministry headquarters), the presence and influence of Arab diplomats there has shrunk substantially. Indeed, since India adopted a balanced approach in its Middle East policy, Arab expectations from India have declined.

It would be an error to term the emerging India-Israel alliance anti-Arab or anti-Muslim. Indeed, India has important strategic interests in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf States. While building strategic ties with Israel, India made intensive diplomatic efforts to develop close ties with the Arab/Muslim states. Nevertheless, the Delhi-Jerusalem strategic ties imply that India, especially under the right-wing BJP government, has abandoned its self-imposed inhibitions with regard to Arab sensitivities in dealing with Israel. Today, the Indian leadership is becoming increasingly convinced that it is in India’s interests to have close strategic ties with Israel, and these can no longer be kept hostage to its relations with the Arab world – a message clearly conveyed by the Indian Foreign Minister during his visit to Israel.

Challenges to the Alliance

The old issues that prevented Indo-Israeli friendship in the past still haunt both Delhi and Jerusalem, but they can no longer seriously threaten the emerging alliance. However, the following three issues could emerge as new obstacles:

INDO-IRANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

India has begun building strategic ties with Tehran. Yet the growing military power of Iran is one of the main long-term security concerns of Israel. Irrespective of the current economic and strategic rapprochement with Tehran, it would not be in Delhi’s interest to sell advanced technology and/or weapons to Iran because:

1. Such a step would adversely affect its ties with other Middle Eastern states – especially Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
2. As Iran is unlikely to abandon its plans to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, many Indian strategists believe that Iran could also become a threat to Indian security in the long term if the Islamic fundamentalists maintain their grip on policymaking there.

The Indo-Iranian rapprochement can also be positively utilized by Israel as a conduit for dialogue with Tehran, as few countries maintain good relations with Israel while also maintaining close relations with Iran without supplying it with arms. It may be recalled that on Israel’s request India brought the case of the “thirteen Iranian Jews” before the Iranian leadership.

ISRAELI-CHINESE MILITARY COOPERATION

Israel maintains strong military ties with China – a country that India regards as the main threat to its security. Israel gained a foothold in the huge Chinese arms market and may consider military sales to Beijing a possible means of influencing Beijing’s arms transfer to the Middle East. It is ironic that China is often thought to be supplying arms, including missile and nuclear technology, to Iran and other Middle Eastern states.

India’s main concern is that the Israeli arms and technology sold to China should not be transferred to Pakistan. Realising the long-term benefits of its strategic alliance with India, Israel has unequivocally assured the Indian leadership that its arms sales to China (or any other state near India) would not harm Delhi’s security interests. The formation of a Joint Ministerial Commission and the consultations between the National Security Advisors of the two countries will provide useful channels for the consideration of their apprehensions related to this issue.

AMERICAN OPPOSITION

From time to time, the US Administration has expressed its concerns over Israel’s sale of advanced weaponry to India for the following reasons:

1. Although the US does not consider India a military threat to its own troops (as in case of China), it is wary of a military escalation between India and Pakistan, which might lead to a nuclear war.
2. The White House was the biggest critic of India’s nuclear tests conducted in May 1998. The US not only imposed economic sanctions and an arms embargo on India, but also used its influence over its allies to enforce these.
3. In addition, Washington has good commercial reasons for objecting to Israeli weapons sales to India.

However, after the historic US tilt from Islamabad to Delhi in its South Asia strategic equation, US pressures on Israel not to sell advanced weapon systems to India have become milder. As Delhi and Washington begin to develop global strategic ties, the Indo-Israeli strategic alliance can act a useful catalyst, rather than a point of contention.

Prospects for the Future

The present strategic regional and global imperatives have created a consensus in Delhi and Jerusalem that their strategic alliance will be mutually beneficial in the short term as well as in the long term. Their special relationship has gone beyond the institutional framework and is gradually becoming stronger as their interaction multiplies.

India’s shift in its Middle East policy has reaped good dividends for Delhi. Indian diplomats quietly admit that the ‘Israeli card’ is becoming useful in dealing with the Arab states. It has helped India to assume an added importance for the Arabs, including the Palestinians. As the two sides compete to extract favorable statements from Delhi during the ongoing Al-Aqsa Intifada, India has a useful opportunity to carve out a role for herself in the volatile Middle East. Keeping strict neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict is crucial for Delhi to gain the confidence of both sides and thereby enhance its profile in the region and beyond.

The future of the Indo-Israeli strategic alliance is tied up with domestic issues, regional security and the global strategic environment. Presently, most of these variables seem to be favourable. Socio-culturally India and Israel are discovering a natural affinity, their economic cooperation is proving mutually beneficial, a partnership in the defense and security spheres is developing, and politico-strategically both states are moving towards each other.

However, it is important to acknowledge that the two countries still need to develop a clear common security threat. In the absence of it, joint ventures in defense and security become vital to the Indo-Israeli strategic alliance in the medium term and long term. If properly pursued, these joint ventures may burgeon into a partnership for the co-production of armaments for sale to Third World countries and both countries will gain appreciably from such collaboration. Similarly, joint military exercises by the Indian and Israeli armed forces would provide further strategic depth for their relationship.

On the political front, the return of normalcy in the Middle East and a subsequent resumption of the peace process would contribute positively to the building of the Indo-Israeli strategic alliance. Conversely, a major Arab-Israeli conflict might slow down this process, especially if the traditionally pro-Arab Congress party returns to power in Delhi.

Seeing India as the emerging power of the 21st century, Jerusalem needs to take into account India’s overall strategic objectives in the Middle East, which might not always coincide with Jerusalem’s. Israeli leaders also need to give more weight to Delhi’s concerns over the supply of advanced weapon systems to China. Meeting these concerns may yield Israel India’s support at the United Nations, where India is a strong contender for a permanent seat in the expanded Security Council. Similarly, India can play a constructive role in further legitimizing Israel’s acceptance on the Asian continent. Indeed, Israel’s strategic alliance with India could constitute the pillar on which Israel’s relations with the Third World are constructed.

Delhi-Jerusalem strategic ties can further be strengthened on the pattern of the Israeli-Turkish relationship. As India and Turkey have also begun to build strategic relationship, the possibility of a future Delhi-Ankara-Jerusalem strategic triangle cannot be ruled out. For those who believe in the importance of the balance of power, such a strategic triangle could provide stability and security to world’s two most turbulent regions – South Asia and the Middle East. Such a strategic bloc should also be encouraged by the US, as its global and regional strategic interests converge with Washington’s. Besides, it would protect and promote liberal democratic values in two regions dominated by dictatorial regimes.

To sum up: While the Cold War world order proved detrimental to India-Israel relations, the new millennium has set into motion forces conducive to a strong India-Israel strategic alliance, and this is the right time to nourish them