Attempt to describe anarchy and find an attachment to basic psychological principle. A well-accepted definition is rooted in etymology. ‘An’ in Greek traditionally means ‘opposite to’ or ’without’ – safe to say, a negation. ‘Archy’ is from the word ‘arkhein’ meaning ‘rule’ or ‘power’, similar to the ending –cracy, as in democracy. ‘Anarchy’ in political or human management jargon is ‘without rule or power’ though the expression can be applied to all hierarchical strata.

Applying this definition to a culture such as USA’s allows many interpretations, but many taken negatively. When one thinks of anarchy they think of disorder. Pierre Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin and Pyotr Kropotkin described their utopias based on merit, personal responsibility, hierarchical destruction and limitless innovation as a response to oppression connected to violent revolutions and personal annihilation. Not only was a person’s body and mind destroyed but attempts were, and still are made to end cultures, ideas, opposing realities and eschatological differences. The option to revolt hasn’t changed for some of us.

Mikhail Bakunin suggested “Three elements or, if you like, three fundamental principles constitute the essential conditions of all human development, collective or individual, in history: (1) human animality; (2) thought; and (3) rebellion. To the first properly corresponds social and private economy; to the second, science; to the third, liberty.” In the state of thought, there is little concrete conviction as to how anarchy can play a role, other than vagaries and generalizations of psychic diversity. We subjugate thought into the realm of persons or collate it into methodological analysis. In either discretionary path, thought and the mind are considered part of a natural order or technical gradation and not of equal footing, for mentality is never grounded but is expected to continuously take flight above nonhumans and into the arena of advancement.

Included in the category of anarchist is a choice to affiliate with those who can only see another person to their rational core, where a conflict resulting in death is often avoidable. While human management, or as Bakunin puts it “social and private economy” is for security and mortality avoidance, anarchy relies on mortal purpose. If the need to destroy another’s intentions arises, each will accept it as is. Security is then understood as what comes next: one dies with dignity and living faith in the continued intentions of anarchy.

The choice lies at the root of what many describe with biopsychosocial aptitude. Robert Hunter’s theory of anarchic competition is human pitted against human thus creating environmental, technological and mental upheaval only restored by understanding synergy within each influence. For many a time, anarchy or the common person has believed in wholeness versus destruction as the inevitable resolution to mired consequences. When destruction and chaos do arrive and thrive, knowing there is no need for whole – again leading to control, power, rule and ‘hierarchy’ – better serves an anarchic mandate according to any of Bakunin’s three principles. Our animality will designate order within the gestalt; science will over-imply categorical imperative; and rebellion can never be unified with those who cannot exclaim “Anarkhein!”

The realization there is a new form of ‘caput mortuum” – to use Bakunin’s term for those opposed to God’s majestic manifest of manly materialism – inaugurates a deadhead, freeloading usurpation to become like the snail and not a pack of wolves. Anarchy must evade condoned synchronicity of a ‘movement’ in order for a real biopsychosocial human development to occur in Murray Bookchin’s “second nature.” Only in a manifest of manly materialism can applied anarchy take place, for true nature, or our Anti-Tekne, is a place of survivalism with social revolutionary patterning always resulting as-is.

Stateless Socialism: Anarchism
by Mikhail Bakunin

Mikhail Bakunin 1866
Revolutionary Catechism
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II. Replacing the cult of God by respect and love of humanity, we proclaim human reason as the only criterion of truth; human conscience as the basis of justice; individual and collective freedom as the only source of order in society.

III. Freedom is the absolute right of every adult man and woman to seek no other sanction for their acts than their own conscience and their own reason, being responsible first to themselves and then to the society which they have voluntarily accepted.

IV. It is not true that the freedom of one man is limited by that of other men. Man is really free to the extent that his freedom, fully acknowledged and mirrored by the free consent of his fellowmen, finds confirmation and expansion in their liberty. Man is truly free only among equally free men; the slavery of even one human being violates humanity and negates the freedom of all.

V. The freedom of each is therefore realizable only in the equality of all. The realization of freedom through equality, in principle and in fact, is justice.

VI. If there is one fundamental principle of human morality, it is freedom. To respect the freedom of your fellowman is duty; to love, help, and serve him is virtue.

VII. Absolute rejection of every authority including that which sacrifices freedom for the convenience of the state. Primitive society had no conception of freedom; and as society evolved, before the full awakening of human rationality and freedom, it passed through a stage controlled by human and divine authority. The political and economic structure of society must now be reorganized on the basis of freedom. Henceforth, order in society must result from the greatest possible realization of individual liberty, as well as of liberty on all levels of social organization.

VIII. The political and economic organization of social life must not, as at present, be directed from the summit to the base – the center to the circumference – imposing unity through forced centralization. On the contrary, it must be reorganized to issue from the base to the summit – from the circumference to the center – according to the principles of free association and federation.

IX. Political organization. It is impossible to determine a concrete, universal, and obligatory norm for the internal development and political organization of every nation. The life of each nation is subordinated to a plethora of different historical, geographical, and economic conditions, making it impossible to establish a model of organization equally valid for all. Any such attempt would be absolutely impractical. It would smother the richness and spontaneity of life which flourishes only in infinite diversity and, what is more, contradict the most fundamental principles of freedom. However, without certain absolutely essential conditions the practical realization of freedom will be forever impossible.

These conditions are:

A. The abolition of all state religions and all privileged churches, including those partially maintained or supported by state subsidies. Absolute liberty of every religion to build temples to their gods, and to pay and support their priests.

B. The churches considered as religious corporations must never enjoy the same political rights accorded to the productive associations; nor can they be entrusted with the education of children; for they exist merely to negate morality and liberty and to profit from the lucrative practice of witchcraft.

C. Abolition of monarchy; establishment of a commonwealth.

D. Abolition of classes, ranks, and privileges; absolute equality of political rights for all men and women; universal suffrage. [Not in the state, but in the units of the new society. Note by Max Nettlau]

E. Abolition, dissolution, and moral, political, and economic dismantling of the all-pervasive, regimented, centralized State, the alter ego of the Church, and as such, the permanent cause of the impoverishment, brutalization, and enslavement of the multitude. This naturally entails the following: Abolition of all state universities: public education must be administered only by the communes and free associations. Abolition of the State judiciary: all judges must be elected by the people. Abolition of all criminal, civil, and legal codes now administered in Europe: because the code of liberty can be created only by liberty itself. Abolition of banks and all other institutions of state credit. Abolition of all centralized administration, of the bureaucracy, of all permanent armies and state police.

F. Immediate direct election of all judicial and civil functionaries as well as representatives (national, provincial, and communal delegates) by the universal suffrage of both sexes.

G. The internal reorganization of each country on the basis of the absolute freedom of individuals, of the productive associations, and of the communes. Necessity of recognizing the right of secession: every individual, every association, every commune, every region, every nation has the absolute right to self-determination, to associate or not to associate, to ally themselves with whomever they wish and repudiate their alliances without regard to so-called historic rights [rights consecrated by legal precedent] or the convenience of their neighbors. Once the right to secede is established, secession will no longer be necessary. With the dissolution of a “unity” imposed by violence, the units of society will be drawn to unite by their powerful mutual attraction and by inherent necessities. Consecrated by liberty, these new federations of communes, provinces, regions, and nations will then be truly strong, productive, and indissoluble.’

H. Individual rights.

1. The right of every man and woman, from birth to adulthood, to complete upkeep, clothes, food, shelter, care, guidance, education (public schools, primary, secondary, higher education, artistic, industrial, and scientific), all at the expense of society.

2. The equal right of adolescents, while freely choosing their careers, to be helped and to the greatest possible extent supported by society. After this, society will exercise no authority or supervision over them except to respect, and if necessary defend, their freedom and their rights.

3. The freedom of adults of both sexes must be absolute and complete, freedom to come and go, to voice all opinions, to be lazy or active, moral or immoral, in short, to dispose of one’s person or possessions as one pleases, being accountable to no one. Freedom to live, be it honestly, by one’s own labor, even at the expense of individuals who voluntarily tolerate one’s exploitation.

4. Unlimited freedom of propaganda, speech, press, public or private assembly, with no other restraint than the natural salutary power of public opinion. Absolute freedom to organize associations even for allegedly immoral purposes including even those associations which advocate the undermining (or destruction) of individual and public freedom.

5. Freedom can and must be defended only by freedom: to advocate the restriction of freedom on the pretext that it is being defended is a dangerous delusion. As morality has no other source, no other object, no other stimulant than freedom, all restrictions of liberty in order to protect morality have always been to the detriment of the latter. Psychology, statistics, and all history prove that individual and social immorality are the inevitable consequences of a false private and public education, of the degeneration of public morality and the corruption of public opinion, and above all, of. the vicious organization of society. An eminent Belgian statistician [Qu�telet] points out that society opens the way for the crimes later committed by malefactors. It follows that all attempts to combat social immorality by rigorous legislation which violates individual freedom must fail. Experience, on the contrary, demonstrates that a repressive and authoritarian system, far from preventing, only increases crime; that public and private morality falls or rises to the extent that individual liberty is restricted or enlarged. It follows that in order to regenerate society, we must first completely uproot this political and social system founded on inequality, privilege, and contempt for humanity. After having reconstructed society on the basis of the most complete liberty, equality, and justice – not to mention work – for all and an enlightened education inspired by respect for man – public opinion will then reflect the new humanity and become a natural guardian of the most absolute liberty [and public order. Ed.].

6. Society cannot, however, leave itself completely defenseless against vicious and parasitic individuals. Work must be the basis of all political rights. The units of society, each within its own jurisdiction, can deprive all such antisocial adults of political rights (except the old, the sick, and those dependent on private or public subsidy) and will be obliged to restore their political rights as soon as they begin to live by their own labor.

7. The liberty of every human being is inalienable and society will never require any individual to surrender his liberty or to sign contracts with other individuals except on the basis of the most complete equality and reciprocity. Society cannot forcibly prevent any man or woman so devoid of personal dignity as to place him- or herself in voluntary servitude to another individual; but it can justly treat such persons as parasites, not entitled to the enjoyment of political liberty, though only for the duration of their servitude.

8. Persons losing their political rights will also lose custody of their children. Persons who violate voluntary agreements, steal, inflict bodily harm, or above all, violate the freedom of any individual, native or foreigner, will be penalized according to the laws of society.

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10. Individuals condemned by the laws of any and every association (commune, province, region, or nation) reserve the right to escape punishment by declaring that they wish to resign from that association. But in this case, the association will have the equal right to expel him and declare him outside
its guarantee and protection.

I. Rights of association [federalism]. The cooperative workers’ associations are a new fact in history. At this time we can only speculate about, but not determine, the immense development that they will doubtlessly exhibit in the new political and social conditions of the future. It is possible and even very likely that they will some day transcend the limits of towns, provinces, and even states. They may entirely reconstitute society, dividing it not into nations but into different industrial groups, organized not according to the needs of politics but to those of production. But this is for the future. Be that as it may, we can already proclaim this fundamental principle: irrespective of their functions or aims, all associations, like all individuals, must enjoy absolute freedom. Neither society, nor any part of society – commune, province, or nation – has the right to prevent free individuals from associating freely for any purpose whatsoever: political, religious, scientific, artistic, or even for the exploitation or corruption of the naive or alcoholics, provided that they are not minors. To combat charlatans and pernicious associations is the special affair of public opinion. But society is obliged to refuse to guarantee civic rights of any association or collective body whose aims or rules violate the fundamental principles of human justice. Individuals shall not be penalized or deprived of their full political and social rights solely for belonging to such unrecognized societies. The difference between the recognized and unrecognized associations will be the following: the juridically recognized associations will have the right to the protection of the community against individuals or recognized groups who refuse to fulfill their voluntary obligations.’ The juridically unrecognized associations will not be entitled to such protection by the community and none of their agreements will be regarded as binding.

J. The division of a country into regions, provinces, districts, and communes, as in France, will naturally depend on the traditions, the specific circumstances, and the particular nature of each country. We can only point out here the two fundamental and indispensable principles which must be put into effect by any country seriously trying to organize a free society. First: all organizations must proceed by way of federation from the base to the summit, from the commune to the coordinating association of the country or nation. Second: there must be at least one autonomous intermediate body between the commune and the country, the department, the region, or the province. Without such an autonomous intermediate body, the commune (in the strict sense of the term) would be too isolated and too weak to be able to resist the despotic centralistic pressure of the State, which will inevitably (as happened twice in France) restore to power a despotic monarchical regime. Despotism has its source much more in the centralized organization of the State, than in the despotic nature of kings.

K. The basic unit of all political organization in each country must be the completely autonomous commune, constituted by the majority vote of all adults of both sexes. No one shall have either the power or the right to interfere in the internal life of the commune. The commune elects all functionaries, law-makers, and judges. It administers the communal property and finances. Every commune should have the incontestable right to create, without superior sanction, its own constitution and legislation. But in order to join and become an integral part of the provincial federation, the commune must conform its own particular charter to the fundamental principles of the provincial constitution and be accepted by the parliament of the province. The commune must also accept the judgments of the provincial tribunal and any measures ordered by the government of the province. (All measures of the provincial government must be ratified by the provincial parliament.) Communes refusing to accept the provincial laws will not be entitled to its benefits.

L. The province must be nothing but a free federation of autonomous communes. The provincial parliament could be composed either of a single chamber with representatives of each of the communes or of two chambers, the other representing the population of the province, independent of the communes. The provincial parliament, without interfering in any manner whatsoever in the internal decisions of the communes will formulate the provincial constitution (based on the principles of this catechism). This constitution must be accepted by all communes wishing to participate in the provincial parliament. The provincial parliament will enact legislation defining the rights and obligations of individuals, communes, and associations in relation to the provincial federation, and the penalties for violations of its laws. It will reserve, however, the right of the communes to diverge on secondary points, though not on fundamentals.
The provincial parliament, in strict accordance with the Charter of the Federation of Communes, will define the rights and obligations existing between the communes, the parliament, the judicial tribunal, and the provincial administration. It will enact all laws affecting the whole province, pass on resolutions or measures of the national parliament, without, however, violating the autonomy of the communes and the province. Without interfering in the internal administration of the communes, it will allot to each commune its share of the provincial or national income, which will be used by the commune as its members decide. The provincial parliament will ratify or reject all policies and measures of the provincial administration which will, of course, be elected by universal suffrage. The provincial tribunal (also elected by universal suffrage) will adjudicate, without appeal, all disputes between communes and individuals, communes and communes, and communes and the provincial administration or parliament. [These arrangements will thus] lead not to dull, lifeless uniformity, but to a real living unity, to the enrichment of communal life. A unity will be created which reflects the needs and aspirations of the communes; in short, we will have individual and collective freedom. This unity cannot be achieved by the compulsion or violence of provincial power, for even truth and justice when coercively imposed must lead to falsehood and iniquity.

M. The nation must be nothing but a federation of autonomous provinces. [The organizational relations between the provinces and the nation will, in general, be the same as those between the communes and the province – Nettlau]

N. Principles of the International Federation. The union of nations comprising the International Federation will be based on the principles outlined above. It is probable, and strongly desired as well, that when the hour of the People’s Revolution strikes again, every nation will unite in brotherly solidarity and forge an unbreakable alliance against the coalition of reactionary nations. This alliance will be the germ of the future Universal Federation of Peoples which will eventually embrace the entire world. The International Federation of revolutionary peoples, with a parliament, a tribunal, and an international executive committee, will naturally be based on the principles of the revolution. Applied to international polity these principles are:

1 . Every land, every nation, every people, large or small, weak or strong, every region, province, and commune has the absolute right to self-determination, to make alliances, unite or secede as it pleases, regardless of so-called historic rights and the political, commercial, or strategic ambitions of States. The unity of the elements of society, in order to be genuine, fruitful, and durable, must be absolutely free: it can emerge only from the internal needs and mutual attractions of the respective units of society….

2. Abolition of alleged historic right and the horrible right of conquest.

3. Absolute rejection of the politics of aggrandizement, of the power and the glory of the State. For this is a form of politics which locks each country into a self-made fortress, shutting out the rest of humanity, organizing itself into a closed world, independent of all human solidarity, finding its glory and prosperity in the evil it can do to other countries. A country bent on conquest is necessarily a country internally enslaved.

4. The glory and grandeur of a nation lie only in the development of its humanity. Its strength and inner vitality are measured by the degree of its liberty.

5. The well-being and the freedom of nations as well as individuals are inextricably interwoven. Therefore, there must be free commerce, exchange, and communication among all federated countries, and abolition of frontiers, passports, and customs duties [tariffs]. Every citizen of a federated country must enjoy the same civic rights and it must be easy for him to acquire citizenship and enjoy political rights in all other countries adhering to the same federation. If liberty is the starting point, it will necessarily lead to unity. But to go from unity to liberty is difficult, if not impossible; even if it were possible, it could be done only by destroying a spurious “unity” imposed by force….

…

7. No federated country shall maintain a permanent standing army or any institution separating the soldier from the civilian. Not only do permanent ,armies and professional soldiers breed internal disruption, brutalization, and financial ruin, they also menace the independence and well-being of other nations. All able-bodied citizens should, if necessary, take up arms to defend their homes and their freedom. Each country’s military defense and equipment should be organized locally by the commune, or provincially, somewhat like the militias in Switzerland or the United States of America [circa 1860-7].

8. The International Tribunal shall have no other function than to settle, without appeal, all disputes between nations and their respective provinces. Differences between two federated countries shall be adjudicated, without appeal, only by the International Parliament, which, in the name of the entire revolutionary federation, will also formulate common policy and make war, if unavoidable, against the reactionary coalition.

9. No federated nation shall make war against another federated country. If there is war and the International Tribunal has pronounced its decision, the aggressor must submit. If this doesn’t occur, the other federated nations will sever relations with it and, in case of attack by the aggressor, unite to repel invasion.

10. All members of the revolutionary federation must actively take part in approved wars against a nonfederated state. If a federated nation declares unjust war on an outside State against the advice of the International Tribunal, it will be notified in advance that it will have to do so alone.

11. It is hoped that the federated states will eventually give up the expensive luxury of separate diplomatic representatives to foreign states and arrange for representatives to speak in the name of all the federated States.

12. Only nations or peoples accepting the principles outlined in this catechism will be admitted to the federation.

X. Social Organization. Without political equality there can be no real political liberty, but political equality will be possible only when there is social and economic equality.

A. Equality does not imply the leveling of individual differences, nor that individuals should be made physically, morally, or mentally identical. Diversity in capacities and powers – those differences between races, nations, sexes, ages, and persons – far from being a social evil, constitutes, on the contrary, the abundance of humanity. Economic and social equality means the equalization of personal wealth, but not by restricting what a man may acquire by his own skill, productive energy, and thrift.

B. Equality and justice demand only a society so organized that every single human being will – from birth through adolescence and maturity – find therein equal means, first for maintenance and education, and later, for the exercise of all his natural capacities and aptitudes. This equality from birth that justice demands for everyone will be impossible as long as the right of inheritance continues to exist.

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D. Abolition of the right of inheritance. Social inequality – inequality of classes, privileges, and wealth – not by right but in fact. will continue to exist until such time as the right of inheritance is abolished. It is an inherent social law that de facto inequality inexorably produces inequality of rights; social inequality leads to political inequality. And without political equality – in the true, universal, and libertarian sense in which we understand it – society will always remain divided into two unequal parts. The first. which comprises the great majority of mankind, the masses of the people, will be oppressed by the privileged, exploiting minority. The right of inheritance violates the principle of freedom and must be abolished.

…

G. When inequality resulting from the right of inheritance is abolished, there will still remain inequalities [of wealth] – due to the diverse amounts of energy and skill possessed by individuals. These inequalities will never entirely disappear, but will become more and more minimized under the influence of education and of an egalitarian social organization, and, above all, when the right of inheritance no longer burdens the coming generations.

H. Labor being the sole source of wealth, everyone is free to die of hunger, or to live in the deserts or the forests among savage beasts, but whoever wants to live in society must earn his living by his own labor, or be treated as a parasite who is living on the labor of others.

I. Labor is the foundation of human dignity and morality. For it was only by free and intelligent labor that man, overcoming his own bestiality, attained his humanity and sense of justice, changed his environment, and created the civilized world. The stigma which, in the ancient as well as the feudal world, was attached to labor, and which to a great extent still exists today, despite all the hypocritical phrases about the “dignity of labor” – this stupid prejudice against labor has two sources: the first is the conviction, so characteristic of the ancient world, that in order to give one part of society the opportunity and the means to humanize itself through science, the arts, philosophy. and the enjoyment of human rights, another part of society, naturally the most numerous, must be condemned to work as slaves. This fundamental institution of ancient civilization was the cause of its downfall.
The city, corrupted and disorganized on the one hand by the idleness of the privileged citizens, and undermined on the other by the imperceptible but relentless activity of the disinherited world of slaves who, despite their slavery, through common labor developed a sense of mutual aid and solidarity against oppression, collapsed under the blows of the barbarian peoples.

Christianity, the religion of the slaves, much later destroyed ancient forms of slavery only to create a new slavery. Privilege, based on inequality and the right of conquest and sanctified by divine grace, again separated society into two opposing camps: the “rabble” and the nobility, the serfs and the masters. To the latter was assigned the noble profession of arms and government; to the serfs, the curse of forced labor. The same causes are bound to produce the same effects; the nobility, weakened and demoralized by depraved idleness, fell in 1789 under the blows of the revolutionary serfs and workers. The [French] Revolution proclaimed the dignity of labor and enacted the rights of labor into law. But only in law, for in fact labor remained enslaved. The first source of the degradation of labor, namely, the dogma of the political inequality of men, was destroyed by the Great Revolution. The degradation must therefore be attributed to a second source, which is nothing but the separation which still exists between manual and intellectual labor, which reproduces in a new form the ancient inequality and divides the world into two camps: the privileged minority, privileged not by law but by capital, and the majority of workers, no longer captives of the law but of hunger.

The dignity of labor is today theoretically recognized, and public opinion considers it disgraceful to live without working. But this does not go to the heart of the question. Human labor, in general, is still divided into two exclusive categories: the first – solely intellectual and managerial – includes the scientists, artists, engineers, inventors, accountants, educators, governmental officials, and their subordinate elites who enforce labor discipline. The second group consists of the great mass of workers, people prevented from applying creative ideas or intelligence, who blindly and mechanically carry out the orders of the intellectual-managerial elite. This economic and social division of labor has disastrous consequences for members of the privileged classes, the masses of the people, and for the prosperity, as well as the moral and intellectual development, of society as a whole.

For the privileged classes a life of luxurious idleness gradually leads to moral and intellectual degeneration. It is perfectly true that a certain amount of leisure is absolutely necessary for the artistic, scientific, and mental development of man; creative leisure followed by the healthy exercise of daily labor, one that is well earned and is socially provided for all according to individual capacities and preferences. Human nature is so constituted that the propensity for evil is always intensified by external circumstances, and the morality of the individual depends much more on the conditions of his existence and the environment in which he lives than on his own will. In this respect, as in all others, the law of social solidarity is essential: there can be no other moralizer for society or the individual than freedom in absolute equality. Take the most sincere democrat and put him on the throne; if he does not step down promptly, he will surely become a scoundrel. A born aristocrat (if he should, by some happy chance, be ashamed of his aristocratic lineage and renounce privileges of birth) will yearn for past glories, be useless in the present, and passionately oppose future progress. The same goes for the bourgeois: this dear child of capital and idleness will waste his leisure in dishonesty, corruption, and debauchery, or serve as a brutal force to enslave the working class, who will eventually unleash against him a retribution even more horrible than that of 1793.

The evils that the worker is subjected to by the division of labor are much easier to determine: forced to work for others because he is born to poverty and misery, deprived of all rational upbringing and education, morally enslaved by religious influence. He is catapulted into life, defenseless, without initiative and without his own will. Driven to despair by misery, he sometimes revolts, but lacking that unity with his fellow workers and that enlightened thought upon which power depends, he is often betrayed and sold out by his leaders, and almost never realizes who or what is responsible for his sufferings. Exhausted by futile struggles, he falls back again into the old slavery.
This slavery will last until capitalism is overthrown by the collective action of the workers. They will be exploited as long as education (which in a free society will be equally available to all) is the exclusive birthright of the privileged class; as long as this minority monopolizes scientific and managerial work and the people – reduced to the status of machines or beasts of burden – are forced to perform the menial tasks assigned to them by their exploiters. This degradation of human labor is an immense evil, polluting the moral, intellectual, and political institutions of society. History shows that an uneducated multitude whose natural intelligence is suppressed and who are brutalized by the mechanical monotony of daily toil, who grope in vain for any enlightenment, constitutes a mindless mob whose blind turbulence threatens the very existence of society itself.

The artificial separation between manual and intellectual labor must give way to a new social synthesis. When the man of science performs manual labor and the man of work performs intellectual labor, free intelligent work will become the glory of mankind, the source of its dignity and its rights.

K. Intelligent and free labor will necessarily be collective labor. Each person will, of course, be free to work alone or collectively. But there is no doubt that (outside of work best performed individually) in industrial and even scientific or artistic enterprises, collective labor will be preferred by everyone. For association marvellously multiplies the productive capacity of each worker; hence, a cooperating member of a productive association will earn much more in much less time. When the free productive associations (which will include members of cooperatives and labor organizations) voluntarily organize according to their needs and special skills, they will then transcend all national boundaries and form an immense worldwide economic federation. This will include an industrial parliament, supplied by the associations with precise and detailed global-scale statistics; by harmonizing supply and demand the parliament will distribute and allocate world industrial production to the various nations. Commercial and industrial crises, stagnation (unemployment), waste of capital, etc., will no longer plague mankind; the emancipation of human labor will regenerate the world.

L. The land, and all natural resources, are the common property of everyone, but will be used only by those who cultivate it by their own labor. Without expropriation, only through the powerful pressure of the worker’s associations, capital and the tools of production will fall to those who produce wealth by their own labor. [Bakunin means that private ownership of production will be permitted only if the owners do the actual work and do not employ anyone. He believed that collective ownership would gradually supersede private ownership.]

M. Equal political, social, and economic rights, as well as equal obligations for women.

N. Abolition not of the natural family but of the legal family founded on law and property. Religious and civil marriage to be replaced by free marriage. Adult men and women have the right to unite and separate as they please, nor has society the right to hinder their union or to force them to maintain it. With the abolition of the right of inheritance and the education of children assured by society, all the legal reasons for the irrevocability of marriage will disappear. The union of a man and a woman must be free, for a free choice is the indispensable condition for moral sincerity. In marriage, man and woman must enjoy absolute liberty. Neither violence nor passion nor rights surrendered in the past can justify an invasion by one of the liberty of another, and every such invasion shall be considered a crime.

O. From the moment of pregnancy to birth, a woman and her children shall be subsidized by the communal organization. Women who wish to nurse and wean their children shall also be subsidized.

P. Parents shall have the right to care for and guide the education of their children, under the ultimate control of the commune which retains the right and the obligation to take children away from parents who, by example or by cruel and inhuman treatment, demoralize or otherwise hinder the physical and mental development of their children.

Q. Children belong neither to their parents nor to society. They belong to themselves and to their own future liberty. Until old enough to take care of themselves, children must be brought up under the guidance of their elders. It is true that parents are their natural tutors, but since the very future of the commune itself depends upon the intellectual and moral training it gives to children, the commune must be the tutor. The freedom of adults is possible only when the free society looks after the education of minors.

R. The secular school must replace the Church, with the difference that while religious indoctrination perpetuates superstition and divine authority, the sole purpose of secular public education is the gradual, progressive initiation of children into liberty by the triple development of their physical strength, their minds, and their will. Reason, truth, justice, respect for fellowmen, the sense of personal dignity which is inseparable from the dignity of others, love of personal freedom and the freedom of all others, the conviction that work is the base and condition for rights – these must be the fundamental principles of all public education. Above all, education must make men and inculcate human values first, and then train specialized workers. As the child grows older, authority will give way to more and more liberty, so that by adolescence he will be completely free and will forget how in childhood he had to submit unavoidably to authority. Respect for human worth, the germ of freedom, must be present even while children are being severely disciplined. The essence of all moral education is this: inculcate children with respect for humanity and you will make good men….

S. Having reached the age of adulthood, the adolescent will be proclaimed autonomous and free to act as he deems best. In exchange, society will expect him to fulfill only these three obligations: that he remain free, that he live by his own labor, and that he respect the freedom of others. And, as the crimes and vices infecting present society are due to the evil organization of society, it is certain that in a society based on reason, justice, and freedom, on respect for humanity and on complete equality, the good will prevail and the evil will be a morbid exception, which will diminish more and more under the pervasive influence of an enlightened and humanized public opinion.

T. The old, sick, and infirm will enjoy all political and social rights and be bountifully supported at the expense of society.

XI. Revolutionary policy. It is our deep-seated conviction that since the freedom of all nations is indivisible, national revolutions must become international in scope. just as the European and world reaction is unified, there should no longer be isolated revolutions, but a universal, worldwide revolution. Therefore, all the particular interests, the vanities, pretensions, jealousies, and hostilities between and among nations must now be transformed into the unified, common, and universal interest of the revolution, which alone can assure the freedom and independence of each nation by the solidarity of all. We believe also that the holy alliance of the world counterrevolution and the conspiracy of kings, clergy, nobility, and the bourgeoisie, based on enormous budgets, on permanent armies, on formidable bureaucracies, and equipped with all the monstrous apparatus of modern centralized states, constitutes an overwhelming force; indeed, that this formidable reactionary coalition can be destroyed only by the greater power of the simultaneous revolutionary alliance and action of all the people of the civilized world, that against this reaction the isolated revolution of a single people will never succeed. Such a revolution would be folly, a catastrophe for the isolated country and would, in effect, constitute a crime against all the other nations. It follows that the uprising of a single people must have in view not only itself, but the whole world. This demands a worldwide program, as large, as profound, as true, as human, in short, as all-embracing as the interests of the whole world. And in order to energize the passions of all the popular masses of Europe, regardless of nationality, this program can only be the program of the social and democratic revolution.
Briefly stated, the objectives of the social and democratic revolution are: Politically: the abolition of the historic rights of states, the rights of conquest, and diplomatic rights [statist international law. Tr.]. It aims at the full emancipation of individuals and associations from divine and human bondage; it seeks the absolute destruction of all compulsory unions, and all agglomerations of communes into provinces and conquered countries into the State. Finally, it requires the radical dissolution of the centralized, aggressive, authoritarian State, including its military, bureaucratic, governmental, administrative, judicial, and legislative institutions. ‘ne revolution, in short, has this aim: freedom for all, for individuals as well as collective bodies, associations, communes, provinces, regions, and nations, and the mutual guarantee of this freedom by federation.

Socially: it seeks the confirmation of political equality by economic equality. This is not the removal of natural individual differences, but equality in the social rights of every individual from birth; in particular, equal means of subsistence, support, education, and opportunity for every child, boy or girl, until maturity, and equal resources and facilities in adulthood to create his own well-being by his own labor.
 
Bakunin Archive | M.I.A.

“In French it means “hobby horse”. In German it means “good-bye”, “Get off my back”, “Be seeing you sometime”. In Romanian: “Yes, indeed, you are right, that’s it. But of course, yes, definitely, right”….The word, gentlemen, is a public concern of the first importance.” -From the dada manifesto read by Hugo Ball at the first public Dada event on July 14, 1916

And with that declaration, Hugo Ball launched one of the most influential and important (anti-) art actions of all time, Dada.

Zurich of 1916 was the gathering place for refugees from war-torn Europe, a place where people came to find peace and stability.  It was also a relatively permissive environment that had a history of accepting the revolutionary ideas of Europe’s disillusioned intellectuals, including Lenin who was preparing his own revolution in 1916.  Therefore, it’s no surprise that artists, political activists, intellectuals, and regular citizens weary of the fighting and death in their native lands swarmed to Zurich, getting together at bars and cafes, planning new revolutions (political and otherwise) and discussing till all hours of the night the “future society”.

Among these refugees were Hugo Ball, his soon-to-be wife, Emmy Hemmings, Tristan Tzara, the Janco brothers, (Marcel, George, and Jules), Arthur Segal, Jean Arp, and Richard Huelsenbeck, the future founders of Dada and its home, the Cabaret Voltaire.  Many of the group’s original members were Romanian Jews escaping the ultranationalist and anti-Semitic tendencies rapidly taking shape in Romania, while others were Germans escaping the war.  They were united by their conviction that the horrors around them, the death and destruction, were rooted in outdated bourgeois values that still governed Europe, and that that societal order, with its inequalities and brutality, needed to be destroyed for another, more human, to be created.

And it was with this desire to destroy accepted values and tradition that Hugo Ball went to the owner of a bar in the old town of Zurich, the Hollandische Meierei, to ask its owner, Ephraim Jan, for the back room, to be used for a new project: a cabaret with singing, theatrics, music, visual art exhibitions, and all sorts of other performances that would disturb bourgeois sensibilities.  It was called the Cabaret Voltaire after the French philosopher who once had also challenged the status quo with his enlightened ideals, it opened for the first time on February 5, 1916.

This first event was not much different from the cabarets or soirees that Ball had organized before in Berlin.  Most artists involved came from an expressionist or futurist background, while the music was relatively tame and mainstream in those modern art circles.  But with time, the performances became more and more daring, pushing the limits of respectability to the ultimate climax on July 14, 1916, when the first soiree essentially dada took place.

Most of these artists, specifically Ball, Tzara, the Janco brothers, and Huelsenbeck, were well read in contemporary political theory, and sympathized with anarchic ideals.  Hugo Ball was a great admirer of the Russian anarchy theorist Mikhail Bakunin, who had also spent time in Zurich , but a few decades earlier in the 1870s.

Influenced by Bakunin’s ideas, Ball and his friends started to apply his theories, which Ball considered “to be Dada in political disguise”[1], to their new mode of art creation, whose name they also conceived anarchically, by chance.  The legend goes that the name for what they were doing was adopted by randomly sticking a knife into a dictionary and finding under the blade the noun dada, hobby-horse in French.  Conveniently enough, the name also means “yeah, yeah” in Romanian, or “yeah, right”, an obvious slap in the face to the tradition of “isms” epitomizing theory, order, and reason in the early 20^th century. Once dada became an international phenomenon, with adherents in all major world cities, artists started debating the origin of the name, claiming it as their own finding.

In the introduction to the first and only issue of the publication called the Cabaret Voltaire, where the idea of dada first appeared formally at the end of May 1916, Ball wrote a humorous account of the process of launching the cabaret, “When I founded the Cabaret Voltaire, I was of the opinion that there ought to be a few young people in Switzerland who not only laid stress, as I did, on enjoying their independence, but also wished to proclaim it. I went to Mr. Ephraim, the owner of the “Meierei” restaurant and said, ‘Please, Mr. Ephraim, let me have your hall. I want to make a cabaret.’ Mr. Ephraim agreed. So I went to some friends of mine and asked them, ‘Please, let me have a picture, a drawing, an engraving. I want to have an exhibition to go with my cabaret.’ And I went to the friendly press of Zürich and said, ‘Write a few notes. It shall be an international cabaret. We want to do some beautiful things.’ And they gave me pictures, and they wrote the notes. … It is to exemplify the activities and the interests of the cabaret, whose whole endeavour is directed at reminding the world, across the war and various fatherlands, of those few independent spirits that live for other ideals. The next aim of the artists united here is to publish an international periodical. This will appear at Zürich and will be called ‘DADA Dada Dada Dada Dada.’”

Unfortunately, the cabaret soon closed in June 1916, but dada was just beginning.  The Dadaists, despite an internal conflict brewing among them, rented a room for one night at the Waag Hall and there they held the historic July 14 Dada Soiree, which officially launched dada with Ball’s first version of the manifesto (anti-manifesto), Tzara reading his own manifesto, Huelsenbeck reading his phonetic poem, more wild performances, absurdist literary readings, avantgardist works of art, and general chaos.  Every gesture and every move was calculated for the most impact and shock in the audience, thus ensuring the group’s aim of destruction and negation of acceptability, aesthetic, and reason.  If art until then had been based on aesthetic, then dada was anti-art, and these performances were hideous and disturbing, like the war around them.

After the closing of the Cabaret Voltaire when Mr. Jan could no longer take the madness, the artists associated with dada moved on, first hosting regular exhibitions at Galerie Dada in Bahnhofstr 19, which also closed soon thereafter in June 1917, then to other cities bringing dada ideas with them and establishing local dada branches.  Those that didn’t remain Dadaists went on to create great work in other movements, particularly Surrealism.  However, Hugo Ball, who actually separated himself from Dada in early 1920, turned to Christianity and retired to Ticino until his death.  Tzara went on to establishing the Dada school of thought and become its main promoter and leader.

Since its closing in 1916, the building housing the Cabaret Voltaire on Spiegelgasse 1 has gone through many transformations.  In 1989, the space was a Teen ‘n’ Twenty disco, with only a plaque with the word dadaismus on the building, commemorating the cultural revolution’s origins.  But in 2002, while the building’s owner was considering turning it into offices, a group of artists, among whom Mark Divo, a conceptual artist now living in Prague, squatted the building and started a series of dada performances and festivals to raise awareness of its history and importance.

The excitement generated by these events were noticed by Swatch CEO Nick Hayek, and along with the Zurich City Social-Democratic Party and architecture magazine “Hochparterre”, petitioned the city government to open an arts center dedicated to dada at the location.  Swatch promised a few million francs in funding over a five-year period, with the expectation to sell its dada watches in the center’s shop.

And thus, in 2004, Cabaret Voltaire, funded by the city of Zurich and private funders, opened its doors as an institution.  What would have thought the fanatically anti-establishment dadaists about this institution dedicated to what cannot be institutionalized?  In one of his letters to Tristan Tzara after his break with Dada’s  direction under Tzara’s leadership, Hugo Ball, the original co-founder of the movement wrote, “I have another system now. I want to do it differently….I declare hereby that Expressionism, Dadaism and other “isms” are the worst type of bourgeoisie.  All are bourgeoisie, all bourgeoisie.  Evil, evil, evil” (Ball, Briefe, September 15, 1916, p 62-63).

IFT Project Space is in Nakatsu, Osaka. Check out their blog here: iftift.exblog.jp/

Sozialismoaren ildo nagusietako bi markatu zituzten liburu bi irakurri berri ditut. Egileak Bakunin, alde batetik, eta Marx eta Engels, bestetik, dauzkagu, Langileen Nazioarteko Elkartearen (I. Internazionala) hiru sortzaile nagusiak eta, I. Internazionala deseginda geratu arte, haren motore nagusiak eta etengabeko eztabaidan bizi izan ziren nortasun grinatsu eta indartsuak.

Errusiarra jatorriz aristokrata, alemanak jatorriz burgesak, munduko langileak askatzeko bidean eman zituzten euren urterik onenak, hirurek eman ere, baina bide horretan hautatutako bideak, Internazionalean bat egin arren (ez girorik adiskidetsuenean), erabat desberdinak ziren. Arrazoi nagusia, autoritatearen erabilera eta Estatuaren eginkizuna.

Haien botereari eta Estatuari buruzko kontzeptuak zein kontrakoak ziren ikusteko adibiderik onenetakoak Bakuninen Jainkoa eta Estatua eta Marx eta Engelesen Alderdi Komunistaren Manifestua liburuak izan daitezke. Edukiari ez ezik, ideiak garatzeko eta adierazteko estiloari dagokienez ere aldea izugarria da.

Egingo dudan alderaketa, jakina, guztiz subjektiboa da, eta bietatik atera dudan ondorioa, aurretik joan dadila, nire anarkismoa berrestea izan da, horretan ez diot inori ziria sartu nahi.

Has gaitezen alderdirik subjektiboenetatik, hots, estilotik. Bakunin irakurtzen hasi, eta igartzen zaion lehen ezaugarria, idazle anarkista gehienei igarri diedana, grina, pasioa da. Berbak ondo hausnartutakoak badira ere, bihotzetik, barren-barrenetik irtendako sentimenduak gordetzen direla agerikoa da. Hori izan daiteke Bakuninek liburuak bukatzeke uzteko arrazoietako bat. Diotenez, artikulua edo gutuna izango zena idazten hasi, eta halako batean liburu bihurtzen zitzaion hasierako asmoa. Beti ertzean bizi zen, eta aldez aurretiko planei baino gehiago, momentuko bultzadari jarraitzen ei zion. Hori ere antzematen zaie liburuko atal gehienei. Hala ere, zehatz eta argi iristen da adierazi nahi duen kontzeptura. Marx eta Engelsen estiloa hotzagoa da (alemanagoa, esango du baten batek), zientifikoagoa. Idatzitakoan hasierako eskema edo asmo jakin bati lotzen zaizkiola nabaritzen da. Horretan kutsu dogmatikoagoa ere suma daiteke. Jakina, Manifestua Alderdi Komunistak eskatutako lana da, Alderdiaren agiria izango zen, eta horrek ere eragina izan bide zuen. Baina hoztasun zientifiko hori Marxen beste liburuetan ere sentitu dut, Kapitala liburuan bai, behintzat. Agian horregatik dira egokiagoak burua hotzago jardutea gogoko dutenentzat. Ni pasioak mugiarazten nau gehiago.

Edukiari dagokionez, liburuak erabat desberdinak dira. Bakuninen lanaren helburu nagusia jainkoaren gezurra agerian uztea eta jainkoaren, autoritatearen eta batez ere Estatuaren arteko lotura historikoa erakustea. Horretan erlijioen mamian, funtsean sartzen da, eta, nire ustez, behintzat, ezin hobeto asmatzen du jainkoaren ideiaren jatorria, bilakaera eta batez ere atzean ezkutatzen duen asmakizuna azaltzen. Gauza bera egiten du Estatuari buruz, eta orrietan aurrera egin ahala argi uzten du bere mezua: jainkoa eta Estatua esklabutzaren, morrontzaren sorburua dira. Gizakiek sortu, asmatu, eta ondoren gizakia bera jarri zen haien esanetara, otzan. Estatua, gainera, gutxiengoaren pribilegioei eusteko tresna baino ez da. Esan behar da, zientziari buruz ere ez daukala iritzi askoz hobea, alderdi bati dagokionez behintzat: zientzia egia bakartzat badu ere, dioenez gizakien zientzia beti izango da bukatu gabea, beti izango da askoz gehiago ez dakiguna dakiguna baino; beraz, zientzialariak ezin dira sekula izan gizartea “gidatuko” dutenak, despotismorik krudelena litzatekeelako dakiten apurra absolututzat hartu eta euren zientziaren mende jartzea gizarte osoa. Onartzen duen autoritate bakarra norberak askatasunez onartutakoa da, guztiz partziala: zapatak egiteko, zapatariarena, zubiak egiteko, ingeniari edo arkitektoarena, gaizoa osatzeko medikuarena… Gauza bati buruz autoritatea denak besteen autoritatea onartzen du beste arloei buruz, hots, txandakako autoritatea, norberak askatasunez onartua, labur esanda.  Lerroetan Internazionalaren asmoen eta gorabeheren berri ere ematen du, batez ere Ginebrako kongresuan eztabaidatu eta erabakitakoen gainean. Estrategiak ere ematen ditu, horien artean nagusiena, Internazionalean ildo politikorik ez sartzea, batasunaren alde egiteko. Harentzat funtsezkoena langileekin, langileen artean, nekazariekin, nekazarien artean lan egitea, kontzientzia sortzea eta eurei egiten uztea da, botere berria bilaka daitekeen abangoardiarik gabe eta iraultza prozesuan bideak proposatuz baina ez inposatuz, langileak eta nekazariak eurak izateko iraultzaren jabe bakarrak.

Teorian, Marxek eta Engelsek gauza bera aldarrikatzen zuten, langileen iraultza langileek eurek egingo zutela, baina Manifestua batez ere alderdi baten ideologia, helburuak eta estrategia finkatzen ditu. Estrategia, bai, horixe hitz garrantzitsuenetakoa, lerro artean argi nabaritzen baita langileek boterea eskuratzeko balio duen estrategia oro dela balekoa, une batzuetan Alemaniako burgesiarekin bat egin behar bazen ere, berehala, garaitutakoan, haiei egiteko gerra. Marx eta Engelsen bidean alderdia funtsezkoa denez, garrantzitsua da benetako sozialistak eurak, komunistak direla erakustea. Horretarako, hainbat horri bestelako sozialisten burgeskeria edo atzerakoikeria frogatzeko darabiltzate. Bitxia anarkistei ematen dieten lekua, proudhonistak baino ez baitituzte aipatzen zerrenda horretan, burges txikitzat (aurrerantzean betikotuko duten leloa) joz, mespretxuz, eta haiei buruz Proudhonengan sekula sumatu ez dudan asmoa gaztigatuz: langileak burges bihurtzea eta gizartean burgesak baino ez geratzea. Beharbada ordurako kroniko bihurtuko zen anarkisten kontrako gezurraren erabilera hasita zegoen. Baina hori alde batera utzita, Manifestua funtsean hori da: alderdi baten ideologia, boterea eskuratzeko estrategia eta etorkizuneko Estatua antolatzeko ildoa. Dena joko politikotik, goitik, baina langileen, behekoen izenean.

Esandakoan argi ikusten da korronte bien aurkakotasun nagusia: boterea eta Estatua. Bakuninek, lehenago Proudhonek eta ondoren anarkista guztiek bezala, botere oro suntsitu nahi zuen, taldeko zein bakarkako askatasuna jarri zuen ororen gainetik. Gizartea langile guztiek euren burua askatasunik handienean eta eurek erabaki legez antolatzeko proposamena da. Horretarako, iraultzaren lehen unetik eskatzen du iraultza politiko hutsari bizkarra emateko eta gizarte iraultza eta iraultza ekonomikoa egiteko, hirurak batera. Eta horixe egiten ahalegindu ziren errusiarrak euren iraultzaren hasieran, baita Katalunia eta Espainiako langileek 30eko hamarkadan. Marx eta Engelsentzat, ordea, ezinbestekoa da lehen iraultza politikoa izatea, eta botere politikoa eskuratuta goitik, Estatutik, antolatzea beste guztia. Hori, langileen ordez, langileen “abangoardiak” egin behar du, hots, boterea eskuratu eta langile guztiei zer egin aginduko dien gutxiengo “aurreratuenak”.

Badaude beste alde batzuk ere, agian hain garrantzitsuak ez diruditenak. Esaterako, nekazariei buruzko planteamendua. Bai batek bai besteek ulertzen zuten zailagoa zela nekazariak iraultzara eramatea, zaila bezain ezinbestekoa, nekazariak zerbaiten jabe, lurraren jabe izanda, ezeren jabe ez ziren hirietako langileen aldean, zeukatena galtzeko beldur izan zitezkeelako. Baina iraultzan engaiatzeko bideak ez datoz bat. Bakuninen proposamena iraultza aldetik landa aldera langile engaiatuak bidaltzea da, langileen eta nekazarien elkarrekiko mesfidantza apurtzea, eta nekazariei kontzientzia komunista ematea. Marx eta Engelsen aburuz, bidea nekazariak langile bihurtzea da, landa antolatzeko modua hiriarena bezalakoa izatea, nekazariak proletarizatzea, alegia, industria bezala antolatzeko. Berriz ere, behetik eragindako iraultzaren alde egin beharrean, goitik pentsatutako bidea, beti euren ekonomiari buruzko iritzi zientifikoei jarraituz. Lumpenproletariotzari buruz ere ez datoz bat errusiarra eta alemanak. Marxek gutxietsi egiten zituen alprojak, lapurrak eta gaizkileak. Bakuninek, ordea, haiek ere iraultzarako indarra izan zitezkeela uste zuen, kontua haiengan ere gizarte kontzientzia sortzea zen, gizartea delako haiek bizimodu horretara eraman dituena.

Jakina, beste gauza batzuetan ere ikus daitezke aldeak, baina niri, behintzat utzi didan ideia honakoa da: Bakuninek bizian, esperimentazioan, norbanakoen errealitatean oinarritu zituen bere ideiak; Marxek eta Engelsek zientzian, aldez aurretik hartutako erabakietan, goiko jakiturian eta abangoardiaren asmoetan. Agian horregatik ez da bakuninismorik egon eta bai, ordea, marxismoa. Anarkismoak ez ditu inoiz inoren esanak bibliatzat, egia bukatutzat hartu, eta historiako anarkista guztien ekarpenak hartu ditu, malgutasunez, anarkismoa erreka bizia bihurtuz. Marx eta Engelsen jarraitzaileek euren komunismoa marxismo bihurtu zuten, eta haien ildo ideologikoetan beti izan du garrantzi handia “egilearen” izena: leninistak, trotskistak, maoistak…

Bukatzeko, liburu bietatik ateratako zati bana jarriko ditut hemen, adierazgarriak direlako, ez berez alderagarriak direlako, bata hausnarketa den bitartean, bestea programa politikoa delako, haietan ikuspegi bien ezaugarri batzuk ikus daitezkeelako baizik. Onena, dena dela, liburuak oso-osorik irakurtzea eta ondorioak ateratzea.

Bilakaera guztietan, zuzenak zein faltsuak, benetakoak zein irudimenezkoak, taldekoak zein banakakoak izan, lehen urratsa da beti zail gertatzen dena, lehen ekintza da zailena. Urrats hori gainditu eta lehen ekintza hori egindakoan, gainontzekoa berez gertatzen da, derrigorrezko ondorioa bezala. Erokeria erlijioso izugarri horren bilakaera historikoan zailena, mundu jainkotiar bat mundu errealetik kanpo jartzea zen. Lehen erokeria ekintza hori, hain berezkoa ikuspuntu fisiologikotik eta beraz beharrezkoa gizateriaren historian, ez da bat-batean egiten. Batek daki zenbat mende behar izan diren sinesmen hori garatzeko eta gizakien buruko ohituretan barnerarazteko. Baina, behin ezarrita, ahalguztidun bihurtu da, giza burmuinaz jabetzen den erokeria orok behar duen bezala. Imajina zoro bat: haren erokeriaren objektu berezia zein ere den, ikusiko duzue obsesionatzen duen ideia ilun eta finkoari munduko naturalena deritzola, eta alderantziz, gauza natural eta benetakoei, ideia horri aurka egiten diotenei, erokeria barregarri eta gorrotagarri deritze. Bada, erlijioa taldeko erokeria da, are boteretsuagoa tradiziozko erokeria baita eta haren jatorria urrunegi dagoen antzinatean galtzen baita. Taldeko erokeria izanda, herri baten gizarte izaeraren xehetasun guztietan, publiko zein pribatuetan, barneratu da, gizartean gorpuztu da, nolabait esateko taldeko arima eta pentsamendu bilakatu da. Jaiotzatik gizaki oro dago hark inguratuta, amaren esnearekin batera edoskitzen du, entzuten duen orotan, ikusten duen xurgatzen du. Bere izaera guztia hain barneraino elikatu, pozoitu, zeharkatu du, ezen geroago, bere izpiritua indartsua izan arren, izugarrizko ahaleginak egin behar baititu askatzeko, eta ez du inoiz erabat lortuko.  Gure idealista modernoak horren froga dira, eta gure materialista doktrinarioak, komunista alemanak, beste froga bat. Ez dute jakin Estatuaren erlijioa baztertzen.

Naturaz gaindiko mundua, mundu jainkotiarra herrien tradiziozko irudimenean ezarri ondoren, erlijio sistemen bilakaerak bere berezko bide logikoari jarraitu dio, bestalde, harreman politiko eta ekonomikoen bilakaera garaikide eta benetakoaren arabera beti. Izan ere, garai guztietan, ameskeria erlijiosoaren munduan, haien kopia zintzoa eta jainkozko sagarakuntza izan da. Horrelaxe bilakatu da erlijioa deritzon taldeko erokeria historikoa, fetitxismotik hasi eta, politeismo maila guztietatik igarota, monoteismo kristaura iritsi arte. (Bakunin, M., Dios y el Estado, 62, 63. or.)

Langileriak bere nagusitasun politikoa baliatuko du apurka-apurka burgesiari kapitala kentzeko, ekoizpen tresna guztiak Estatuaren, hots, klase zuzendari gisa antolatutako langileriaren esku zentralizatzeko, eta indar ekoizleen kopurua azkar handitzeko.

Hori hasieran, jakina, jabetza eskubidearen eta ekoizpen harreman burgesen bortxaketa despotikoaren bidez baino ezingo da bete, hots, ikuspuntu ekonomikotik gutxiegi eta  eutsiezinak irudituko duten neurriak hartuz; baina mugimenduak aurrera egin ahala gainditu egingo dira, eta ezinbestekoak dira ekoizpena guztiz  eraldatzeko.

Ondo ulertu behar da, neurri horiek hainbat eratakoak izango dira herrien arabera. Baina, herririk aurreratuenentzat, honako neurriak abiaraz litezke:

l. Lurren jabetza desjabetzea eta  errenta Estatuaren gastuentzat erabiltzea;

2. Zerga oso gehikorra;

3. Oinordekotzaren abolizioa;

4. Emigratu eta matxinoen jabetza konfiskatzea;

5. Kreditua Estatuaren eskuetan zentralizatzea, Estatuaren kapitala eta monopolio esklusiboa izango dituen Banku nazionalaren bidez;

6. Garraiobide guztiak Estatuaren eskuetan zentralizatzea;

7. Nazioko manufakturak eta ekoizpen tresnak ugaltzea, landu gabeko lurrak lantzea eta landutako lurrak hobetzea sistema orokor baten arabera;

8. Derrigorrezko lana guztientzat, industria armaden antolakuntza, batez ere nekazaritzarako;

9. Nekazaritza eta industriako lanak uztartzea, apurka-apurka hiriaren eta landaren arteko aldea desagerrarazteko neurriak, eta

10. Haur guztien hezkuntza publiko eta doakoa, egun egiten den bezala haurrek lantegietan lan egitea abolitzea; hezkuntza era ekoizpen materiala uztartzea, eta abar. (Marx, K., eta Engels, F., El Manifiesto Comunista, 64 eta 65. or.).

Testimoni

Liberale si definisce il nostro Parlamento nel suo insieme. Questo tornare al vecchio è segno distintivo dei nostri tempi nuovi. Fatta l’Italia, abbiamo finalmente gli italiani: cattolici, socialisti e comunisti all’ombra di Smith, del Fondo Monetario e delle guerre infinite e umanitarie. Imperando il mercato, non siamo più lavoratori produttori, ma clienti consumatori e, d’altro canto, come non esultare? Liberale fu Crispi con le sue leggi speciali, il suo colonialismo di retroguardia che ci condusse al disastro di Adua, e liberali, uno dopo l’altro, furono Rudinì e Pelloux con gli stati d’assedio e le leggi liberticide, liberale fu Bava Beccaris, decorato per il fuoco a mitraglia aperto su inermi morti di fame, liberali furono i giudici che seppellirono sotto secoli di galera e domicilio coatto socialisti e libertari. Liberale fu l’Italia delle stragi proletarie, l’Italia della Libia aggredita e della grande guerra, coi carabinieri che sparavano nella schiena ai combattenti e i centomila nostri soldati finiti in mano nemica e lasciati morire di stenti dal nostro governo perché la resa divenne diserzione. Tutti così moderati, borghesi e progressisiti, che val la pena ricordare ai neofiti del capitale la sorte dei dissidenti ai tempi dell’Italia liberale verso la quale stiamo ritornando.

Anarchica

Clotilde Peani nasce a Torino il 18 aprile del 1873¹, da una modesta famiglia di lavoratori, messa in ginocchio dalla crisi che investe l’economia europea, sconvolge il corso della moneta, frena bruscamente la “crescita” – araba fenice dei sacerdoti del “laissez faire” – ma non intacca l’incrollabile fede borghese nel mercato e nelle leggi del profitto. E’ in nome di questo credo che Marco Minghetti, deciso a colmare il disavanzo dello Stato senza rinunciare alle immancabili spese militari, come comanda la religione liberista, non trova di meglio che seppellire i lavoratori sotto una marea di tributi, esazioni e balzelli approvati da un Parlamento che ignota le imposta dirette, rappresenta esclusivamente se stesso e le classi agiate e si accinge a bocciare Scialoja e l’obbligo scolastico².
Il destino ha leggi sue intangibili e, a rigor di logica, Clotilde, non ha scelta: figlia di povera gente, le tocca in sorte un futuro classista da sartina, che l’oleografia borghese vorrebbe “signorinella pallida,” rassegnata e persa nei ricordi di un vecchio “notaro”. A scuola dura poco, appena il tempo di imparare a leggere, scrivere e a far di conto, poi la miseria la conduce in fabbrica, dove cresce rapidamente. E’ poco più che adolescente, quando prende a frequentare i socialisti libertari e a diffondere volantini, giornali e opuscoli “sovversivi”, che legge avidamente, imparando ben presto a cogliere gli interessi nascosti dietro le belle parole dell’amor patrio³.
“L’era democratica non è a priori favorevole alle donne”, è stato scritto. E non a torto⁴. Mentre le utopie socialiste sembrano collocarsi ancora fuori della storia, “il lavoro delle donne è un luogo tanto di supersfruttamento quanto di emancipazione” e “la società politica uno di esclusione e di riconoscimento”⁵. Clotilde lo impara presto a sue spese. “Nubile, anarchica” e naturalmente “di cattiva condotta morale”, secondo le formule burocratiche e la concezione “reazionaria” della vita, tipica dei questurini nella “liberale” età di Giolitti, la giovane donna si sottrae, consapevolmente al cliché della “moglie fedele” e della “buona madre di figli”, ma anche in questo caso non ha scelta e fa “vita irregolare”: ha opinioni politiche che portano il segno del pensiero di Bakunin Merlino e Malatesta ed è fumo negli occhi per una società ingessata nei formalismi borghesi, che si proclama liberale, ma chiude in gabbia il dissenso e si lascia tentare dalle aberrazioni lombrosiane; un società che mostra di vivere la “Belle époque” con l’aria dissacrante del “café chantant”, ma diffida del sesso femminile, escluso dalla cosa pubblica e circoscritto nel limbo delle mura domestiche, e se ipocritamente ha per sante le madri e le sorelle, intimidisce le mogli e riduce le donne libere al rango di prostitute e cocottes. Né, d’altra parte, la libertà sessuale suscita entusiasmo tra i compagni di lotta: i rari casi di “amore libero” si sono risolti in maniera amara con le donne che si sono autoemarginate, “forse perché i compagni ne disprezzavano il corpo”, o hanno fatto scelte borghesi, sposando i loro compagni, sicché i libertari hanno trovato “nelle loro donne, che ne temono la perdizione, i primi avversari e sono perciò con esse sempre in contrasto”⁶.   
Innamorata dell’anarchico romagnolo Dionigio Malagoli, va a vivere con lui “more uxorio”, come scrivono con aperto disprezzo i rapporti di polizia, poi lo lascia per il napoletano Giuseppe Di Domizio, un cartolaio anarchico conosciuto da tutte le questure del regno per le sue idee libertarie, e si stabilisce con lui a Londra⁷. Nella metropoli inglese, tra la fine dell’Ottocento e i primi del Novecento l’animo ribelle di Clotilde nasce a nuova vita tra i fermenti più avanzati dell’anarchismo internazionale, cui l’accostano la breve ma intensa amicizia che la unisce a Roberto D’Angiò e Giuseppe Ciancabilla, entrambi legati all’élite del movimento libertario francese e all’autorevole “Les Temps Nouveaux” diretto da Jean Grave⁸.
La donna che lascia la capitale inglese nel 1905 col falso nome di Angela Angeli ha intelligenza brillante e parola convincente, è una militante appassionata, una convinta antimilitarista e, soprattutto, è incompatibile con gli schemi della morale puritana e maschilista dell’Italia liberale e borghese. Passa abilmente tra le maglie strette del controllo poliziesco, fa giri di propaganda e si fa notare per le affollate conferenze, la passione libertaria e gli stretti rapporti che intrattiene col fior fiore del “sovversivismo” toscano. Fermata a Livorno e spedita con foglio di via a Napoli, dove l’attende Malagoli col quale s’è riconciliata, nel 1906 è già tornata alla militanza politica⁹. Coperta da un falso nome – ora si chiama Angiola Mallarini – è segnalata al circolo “Germinal” di Pisa, a Roma, Milano, Londra e Parigi, e ovunque prende contatti con nuovi compagni, ovunque contrasta sterili ribellismi, sostenendo la necessità di rispettare le decisioni adottate ai congressi, ovunque fa circolare stampa antimilitarista. “Come donna” – riferisce a Roma un questurino – “è pericolosa, perché suscita eccitamento tra la folla e con la sua audacia può trascinare i compagni”.
In realtà, non è facile fermarla, sicché a poco a poco la mancata sartina percorre per intero il cursus honorum dei più temuti compagni, sicché, a dicembre del 1910 si merita l’etichetta di sovversiva pericolosa.¹⁰.
I colpi prendono a giungerle ora violenti, uno dietro l’altro. Non ha ancora  cinquant’anni, quando, in rapida successione, la stretta repressiva causata dalla guerra e il fascismo, che allunga ormai la sua ombra implacabile e nera sul paese prostrato, la costringono a fare “vita ritirata”. Non è ancora una resa incondizionata se, nel 1925, tuttavia, il regime, che va perfezionando il sistema repressivo ereditato dallo stato “liberale”, è costretto a prendere atto: la donna, benché “tormentata da seri problemi di salute che spesso la tengono a letto”, non “dà segni di attività politica”, ma “resta fedele all’anarchia”¹¹. A quel punto, poiché l’oppressiva sorveglianza e le ripetute e intimidatorie perquisizioni domiciliari non bastano a piegarla, giungono “provvidenziali” – tra i sovversivi è ormai un’epidemia – i “segni di squilibrio mentale” che chiudono la dolorosa partita col fascismo e aprono a Clotilde le pesantissime porte dell’ospedale psichiatrico provinciale di Napoli¹². Nel calvario inatteso che l’attende, la donna non sarà sola. Come per una misteriosa predisposizione, un inspiegabile legame tra pazzia e sovversione, la donna incontrerà compagni di fede e di sventura e qualche smarrito “oppositore occasionale”, sepolto a vita per una frase sfuggita nel vino e nell’ira. Teresa Ravanello, che giungerà anni dopo, è solo la tenutaria d’un bordello. Ascoltando Mussolini parlare alla radio e minacciare guerre, non ha saputo frenare l’invettiva: “Parla, lui parla, fa i discorsi ma siamo noi che paghiamo le tasse”. Un anno di confino fatto di ribellioni, prepotenze e un feroce repressione, poi, com’è accaduto a Clotilde, come accade a molti di quelli che non si piegano, l’ha presa una follia inopinata, “un delirio cronico d’interpretazione” che non si spiega con le nozioni della scienza medica; come talvolta accade, è una pazzia che cova proditoria nell’ombra, senza dar segno della sua esistenza e d’un tratto cresce ed esplode. Il passaggio obbligato, però, sta nelle pieghe buie d’un regime che non sopporta asimmetrie, non accetta “sbandati” e “irregolari”, non tollera dissensi e conduce fino all’estrema disperazione chi prova ad opporsi. In quei tragici corridoi si aggireranno con la Peani Tommaso Serino, un disoccupato sorpreso a far propaganda contro il regime e improvvisamente “impazzito”, e il sellaio Salvatore Masucci, socialista libertario, che ha affrontato armi in pugno i fascisti e non ha avuto scampo: dopo anni di confino, carcere e fughe all’estero, è finito al manicomio civile e ci ha trovato la morte civile. Assieme a loro l’anarchico Vincenzo Guerriero, un irriducibile, passato per Ustica, Tremiti, Ventotene, Pantelleria e Santo Stefano, uno che la polizia liberale ha sbattuto in galera e manicomio con Crispi, Rudinì e Giolitti, ma non s’è arreso finché stenti, fatica e solitudine non l’hanno schiantato e ormai – scrivono i questurini – non è “più in grado di concepire e manifestare qualsiasi idea e tanto meno di natura politica”¹³.
E’ il 1930: Parigi, Londra, le conferenze, la stampa libertaria, tutto per Clotilde Peani si è fatto incredibilmente lontano e a poco a poco si spengono l’intelligenza brillante e la passione militante. L’Italia è un paese guerriero e i liberali, passati in massa nelle file fasciste, hanno bisogno di libertà di manovra sicché, dove non sono bastati il manganello e l’olio di ricino, tornano utilissimi il manicomio, la camicia di forza e i farmaci convulsivanti.
L’ultima notizia certa su Clotilde Peani risale all’agosto del 1942: è ancora ricoverata e tutto lascia credere che abbia chiuso i suoi giorni in manicomio¹⁴. A Napoli, a Port’Alba, dove a lungo trascorse i suoi giorni, né un fiore né un marmo ricordano ai giovani che passano il suo nome e il suo impegno per un mondo migliore.

Note

1] Achivio Centrale dello Stato di Roma, Casellario Politico Centrale, (d’ora in avanti ACS, CPC) busta (di questo momento b.) 3797, fascicolo (d’ora in poi f.) “Clotilde Peani”, cenno biografico al 24-3-1905.
2] Sulla politica economica di Minghetti e sul suo ruolo di uomo di governo della Destra, Raffaella Gherardi, L’arte del compromesso. La politica della mediazione nell’Italia liberale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1993; Aldo Berselli, Il governo della Destra. Italia legale e Italia reale dopo l’Unità, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997. Massimo M. Augello e Marco E. Laura Guidi, Gli economisti in Parlamento 1861-1922. Una storia dell’economia politica dell’Italia liberale, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2003. Antonio Scjaloia ministro dell’Istruzione Pubblica nel governo Lanza dall’agosto del 1972, fu confermato nel secondo Ministero Minghetti, ma si dimise il 6 febbraio 1874 per la mancata approvazione del suo progetto sull’istruzione elementare obbligatoria. Costituì una commissione d’inchiesta sulla scuola che raccolse una preziosa mole di documenti, oggi conservati nel l’Archivio centrale dello Stato. In proposito si veda Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, Fonti per la storia della scuola, IV, L’inchiesta Scialoja sulla istruzione secondaria maschile e femminile (1872-1875), a cura di Luisa Montevecchi e Marino Raicchi, Roma 1995. Sulle politiche scolastiche dell’Italia postunitaria si veda Francesco Cormino e Giuseppe Aragno, Il giacimento in fondo allo stivale, Scuola e cultura nel Sud, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1997.
3] ACS, CPC, b. 3797, f. “Clotilde Peani”, cenno biografico, cit.
4] Geneviève Fraisse e Micelle Perrot , Storia delle donne in Occidente. L’Ottocento, Economica Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995, p. 4.
5] Ivi.
6] Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Questura, Gabinetto, II Serie, 1881-1901, b. 128, f. “Associazioni sovversive”, nata n. 2887 del 15-6-1894.
7] ACS, CPC., b. 3797, f. “Clotilde Peani”, cenno biografico, cit.; ACS, CPC, b. 2946, f. “Malagoli Dionigio” e b. 1781, f. “Di Domizio Giuseppe”
8] Ivi, b. 3797, f. “Clotilde Peani”, cenno biografico, cit., b. 1612, f. “D’Angiò Roberto”. Su Giuseppe Ciancabilla e Roberto D’Angiò, si vedano Nunzio Dell’Erba, Giornali e gruppi anarchici in Italia 1892-1900, Franco Angeli, Torino, 1983, passim e le schede curate rispettivamente da Alessandro Luparini e Mario Mapelli per il Dizionario biografico degli anarchici italiani, Biblioteca Serantini, I, Pisa 2003, diretto da Maurizio Antonioli, Giampietro Berti, Santi Fedele, Pasquale Iuso, pp. 393-396 e 489-490.
9] ACS, CPC., b. 3797, f. “Clotilde Peani”, cenno biografico, cit.  
10] Ivi, nota senza numero del 21-12-1910 da Prefetto di Napoli a MI.
11] Ibidem, nota senza numero del 4-12-1925, da Prefetto di Napoli a MI.
12] Ibidem, nota n. 12365 del 27-11-1930 da Prefetto di Napoli a MI.
13] Per la vicenda della Ravanello e di Masucci, Guerriero e Serino, si vedano Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Prefettura, Gabinetto, II versamento, b. 48, f. “Relazioni mensili 1937”, sf “Relazione maggio”, nota 103319 del 26-5-1937 da Questore a Prefetto, e ACS, Confino Politico, Fascicoli Personali, b. 765; CPC, b. 2576, f. “Guerriero Vincenzo”, b. 3148, f. “Masucci Salvatore”; Rosa Spadafora, Il popolo al confino, La persecuzione fascista in Campania, I, Athena,  Napoli, 1989, pp. 317-318 e 376; Giuseppe Aragno, biografia di Guerriero Vincenzo in Maurizio Antonioli, Giampiero Berti, Pasquale Iuso e Santi Fedele, Dizionario biografico degli anarchici italiani, I, Biblioteca Serantini, Pisa, 2003, p. 781, e Idem, Antifascismo popolare. I volti e le storie, Manifestolibri, Roma, 2009, pp. 14-15 e 148-149.
14] ACS, CPC, b. 3797, f. “Clotilde Peani”, nota senza numero del 24-8-1942.

Marx and the Revolution of the Sacred

James Luchte

Contents

Opening: Marx and the Sacred

Chapter 1:  Into the Breach – the Meaning of Marx

Chapter 2:  Marx’s Criticism of Religion

Chapter 3:  From Religion to the Sacred

Chapter 4:  Marx and Sacred Rebellion

Chapter 5:  Marx and Contemporary Radical Theology

Chapter 6:  Marx, Heidegger and ‘Eigentlichkeit’

Chapter 7:  A Violent Sacred – Marx and Bataille

Chapter 8:  A Retrieval of the Sacred in Marx

Chapter 9: A Genealogy of the Sacred in Marx

Closing:  The Sacred After Marx

Opening: Marx and the Sacred

Religious suffering is at one and the same time the expression of real suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions.[1]

Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification.  It is the fantastic realization of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality.  The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma.[2]

Perhaps the most formidable obstacle in the task of retrieving a sense of the sacred in Marx consists in his repeated, and often polemical, statements against religion – or the edited selections of his editors and guardians.  Indeed, such an obstacle may in the end be one of our own making, as we are trapped within the labyrinth of our own historical understanding.[3] Yet, assuming, for the moment, that religion and the sacred are the same phenomena, if we take his pronouncement that religion is the opium of the people – which I purposely left out in the opening quotation – in isolation, we may be lead to believe that Marx felt that at best religion – and thus the ’sacred’ – is a narcotic, which while it may be utilized to alleviate pain, remains an illusory amelioration for a situation of humiliation and despair.  Religion is an opiate in that it not only implies sedation from the pain of a life of exploitation, but also – ambivalently – suggests a systematic and strategic attempt to deaden or absorb any critical impulse to liberation.  In this sense, Marx’s characterization of religion as an opiate is a forerunner of many of the most radical criticisms of religion and ‘negative’ theology in last century – Gutierrez, Miranda, Bultmann, Heidegger, Derrida, and Bataille.  Each of these thinkers, in his own way, articulated a sense of the sacred in the wake of Marx and his deconstruction of religion as an ‘ideology’ – despite, perhaps,his own blindness to the regulative status of his own ideas.

The kinship which is shared by each of these thinkers is a disdain for mere religion in favour of the ’sacred’.[4] Religion simultaneously constructs a ‘picture’ (Bild) for contemplation (Anschauung) and an organization that cultivates our captivity to that ‘picture’ (Wittgenstein).  The sacred, on the contrary, intimates ‘love’ (Badiou), ‘binding commitment’ (Heidegger), an engaged and affirmative eruption of liberation amidst finite existence.  Religion constructs its eternal church as an everlasting perpetuation of the ‘picture’, of an idol – a captivating grammar of existence – while the sacred exults in this moment of lived existence,[5] in the haeccitas of Duns Scotus.  If religion is a ‘rational’ and ‘systematic’ orchestration of feeling and phenomena, the sacred is an attempt to seek access to a phenomenon beyond the array of objectification towards traces of the numen.  Indeed, for Otto, one need only begin amidst this singular event.

In light of this preliminary distinction between religion and the sacred, it will be the task of Marx and the Revolution of the Sacred to excavate and disclose in the writings and historical activism of Marx an affirmative sense of the sacred which is alterior to his inherently negative conception of religion.  With Marx’s empathy in his ’sigh of the oppressed creature’, we can glimpse a sense of the sacred dissociated from a religious leviathan that merely serves to perpetuate suffering – we can begin to glimpse a sacred that exists as a radical commitment to liberation.  In this way, I will contend that Marx’s criticism of religion as an ideology of oppression and sedation in no way forecloses on a possible relationship between his work and Twentieth and Twenty-First Century attempts to articulate a sense of the sacred in the world.  There emerges in these latter attempts the possibility of an openness which discloses a topos for an encounter with a sense of a sacred not mediated by ‘ideology’ (or positive theology).

In this way, that which will be disclosed as the ‘unity’ and coherence in these encounters of Marx with different strands of contemporary theology and philosophy is the inner kernel of ‘love’ and ‘commitment’, of affirmation, against nihilism and oppression — it is this ‘inner kernel’ that is an openness to the sacred.  That which is sought is an indication in Marx’s writings and advocacy of a personal expression and articulation of the sacred which transcends both scientific prognostication and political advocacy.  What we seek is the deeper ground of the sacred in Marx.

To read the rest of this essay, please visit: Marx and the Revolution of the Sacred

Me pareció muy interesante mostrarles una cita del libro de Mijail Bakunin, “Dios y el Estado”, la cual hace una pequeña explicación de Dios y el mito de Adán y Eva. Nos muestra la verdadera cara de lo que representa Dios, con una crítica muy negra y cruda.

La Biblia, que es un libro muy interesante y a veces muy profundo cuando se lo considera como una de las más antiguas manifestaciones de la sabiduría y de la fantasía humanas que han llegado hasta nosotros, expresa esta verdad de una manera muy ingenua en su mito del pecado original.

Jehová, que de todos los buenos dioses que han sido adorados por los hombres es ciertamente el más envidioso, el más vanidoso, el más feroz, el más injusto, el más sanguinario, el más déspota y el más enemigo de la dignidad y de la libertad humanas, que creó a Adán y a Eva por no sé qué capricho (sin duda para engañar su hastío, que debía de ser terrible en su eternamente egoísta soledad, o para procurarse nuevos esclavos), había puesto generosamente a su disposición toda la Tierra, con todos sus frutos y todos los animales, y no había puesto a ese goce completo más que un límite. Les había prohibido expresamente que tocaran los frutos del árbol de la ciencia. Quería que el hombre, privado de toda conciencia de sí mismo, permaneciese un eterno animal, siempre de cuatro patas ante el dios eterno, su creador y su amo.

Pero he aquí que llega Satanás, el eterno rebelde, el primer librepensador y el emancipador de los mundos. Avergüenza al hombre de su ignorancia y de su obediencia animales; lo emancipa e imprime sobre su frente el sello de la libertad y de la humanidad, impulsándolo a desobedecer y a comer del fruto de la ciencia.

Salud y libertá’ (?)

Primary version of this post, with visual content, at Barry Stocker’s Weblog.

‘Anarchy, Socialism and a Darwinian Left’, Ellen Clarke. An article Clarke originally published in 2006, now freely available.

Hat tip. PhilPapers (New papers)

I’ve linked to this largely because of the surprisingly large number of people who are not aware that Anarchism refers to a tradition in political theory, not a descent in chaos. The point of Anarchist theory is to show who rule governed societies can emerge without coercion on a purely voluntary basis. I’m not advocating this point of view, but I am startled by sometimes encountering people who work in political theory and appear to be unaware of this position. Clarke refers to Left Anarchism, but there are many varieties of Anarchism: capitalist and socialist; conservative and progressive, revolutionary and evolutionary; and many other gradations.

The real merit of Clarke’s paper is to discuss the possibility of Left Anarchism, through game theory, in reaction to Peter Singer who uses ideas of game theory and co-operation to arrive at a more statist kind of leftism. Clarke’s comment on Anarchist ideology and its history are less detailed. Her main examples of Anarchist thought are Bakunin and Kropotkin, but she does not notes the differences between them. Kropotkin seems the most relevant to her case, since he was a biologist concerned with evolution. His vision was of anarcho-communism, while Bakunin advocated a society where economic property is taken over by workers’ collectives, but is not completely communistic in its attitude to private property. Kropotkin seems the most relevant to what Clarke argues, since he did write on Darwinism and the role of co-operation in evolution in his political theory.

Clarke’s argument focuses on the use of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ in theories of social choice and politics. For a full and expert explanation of the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ in philosophy, go to Steven Kuhn’s entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Briefly, this refers to two prisoners in isolation from each other. Various formulations exist, but they have the pattern that the best outcome for each prisoner is to co-operate with the police if the other does not, since the co-operator goes free and the non-co-operator gets a long sentence. If both act the same way, the best outcome is if both refuse to co-operate which is a better outcome for both than if they both co-operate. The dilemma for the prisoners’ is whether they can trust the other prisoner not to co-operate with the police and so have a reason to not co-operate with the police as well. The prisoners have an incentive to co-operate with each other, but if one behaves co-operatively to the other and the other does not, the latter prisoner benefits. This expresses a social and political dilemma that as individuals we do best if we exploit other people’s trust, but the average benefit of all individuals in society benefits if there is trust. The kind of game theory that looks at the dilemma, suggests that over time rational actors will build up reciprocity and trust, and will co-operate after a sufficient number of repeated experiences which show that trust and co-operation beat distrust and betrayal.

Clarke is concerned with this as an evolutionary survival strategy of humans, arguing that rationality and times lead us to co-operate without a coercive agent to make us obey co-operative rules, such as the state. However, there are more people who take the position that Clarke refers to ‘Axelrodian co-operation’ in which a coercive agent is necessary for co-operation to trust to get established. I’m inclined to agree with the latter position, though in a lore mitigated fashion than the left-statism that Clarke is arguing against. The reason, I would limit the role of the state more than most social democrats and conservative is that I would argue the achievement structural order for society as a whole, is to allow voluntary co-operation to flourish through the market, and all other forms of voluntary association.

The important thing here is that anarchy is not just a name for collapse. In political theory, it refers to a rich and varied tradition according to which there can be an evolving order without the state.

I was reading this recently – it’s some extracts from a book by Bakunin (prominent Russian anarcho-communist) which Marx had written notes in (the online text, on libcom, unfortunately doesn’t distinguish between who’s saying what, but I think I’ve worked it out from context – who’s calling who an idiot, generally). The topic, as one might expect, is the ‘workers’ state’ and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ (hereafter DOTP). It stimulated some thoughts in my brain, so I reproduce some of the exchanges, with my comments.

My sympathies are mixed – partly I agree with Bakunin, partly with Marx, and I think a lot of the time their exchange may be clouded by their rivalry and dislike of each other.

Bakunin: We have already stated our deep opposition to the theory of Lassalle and Marx, which recommends to the workers, if not as final ideal then at least as the next major aim — the foundation of a people’s state, which, as they have expressed it, will be none other than the proletariat organized as ruling class. The question arises, if the proletariat becomes the ruling class, over whom will it rule? It means that there will still remain another proletariat, which will be subject to this new domination, this new state.

Marx: It means that so long as the other classes, especially the capitalist class, still exists, so long as the proletariat struggles with it (for when it attains government power its enemies and the old organization of society have not yet vanished), it must employ forcible means, hence governmental means. It is itself still a class and the economic conditions from which the class struggle and the existence of classes derive have still not disappeared and must forcibly be either removed out of the way or transformed, this transformation process being forcibly hastened.

Warm-Fork: Is Bakunin denying that the proletariat is likely to have many enemies, even after the threshold of revolution has been passed? Surely not. Nor, presumably, is he denying that the proletariat will have to ’struggle’ with them in some sense, nor that it will have to meet force with force, nor that it will have to organise itself for such purposes.

So the precise dispute is when Marx says “it must employ forcible means, hence governmental means”, about which Bakunin says “It means that there will still remain another proletariat, which will be subject to this new domination”. So what is meant by ‘governmental means’ – my instinctive definition would be ‘establishing a centralised apparatus for initiating physical force against not-immediately-violent targets’. It’s certainly a plausible allegation that this inevitably makes people other than the intended counter-revolutionaries vulnerable to such an apparatus.

Bakunin: e.g. the common peasant folk, the peasant mob, which as is well known does not enjoy the goodwill of the Marxists, and which, being as it is at the lowest level of culture, will apparently be governed by the urban factory proletariat.

Marx: where the peasant exists in the mass as private proprietor, where he even forms a more or less considerable majority…either he hinders each workers’ revolution, makes a wreck of it, as he has formerly done in France, or the proletariat (for the peasant proprietor does not belong to the proletariat, and even where his condition is proletarian, he believes himself not to) must as government take measures through which the peasant finds his condition immediately improved, so as to win him for the revolution…easing the transition from private ownership of land to collective ownership, so that the peasant arrives at this of his own accord, from economic reasons. It must not hit the peasant over the head, as it would e.g. by proclaiming the abolition of the right of inheritance or the abolition of his property…Still less should small-holding property be strengthened, by the enlargement of the peasant allotment simply through peasant annexation of the larger estates, as in Bakunin’s revolutionary campaign.

Warm-Fork: Marx’s comments to a certain extent seem to bear out Bakukin’s accusation. He speaks of what “the proletariat…as government” must do with regards to peasant property, even in cases where peasants are the majority. This seems to imply that, as Bakunin says, “the peasant mob…will…be governed by the urban factory proletariat“. For all that Marxists declare the DOTP to be ‘the most rigourously democratic form of government’, this is a little disconcerting.

Marx’s idea, I think, is to preserve the ‘proletarian’ character of the revolutionary movement, and not ‘dilute’ it away from communism by bringing in a majority of aspiring property-owners – and I can empathise with that. But the problem arises precisely from his insistence on ‘governmental means’. Does the DOTP send its army, police force, militia, into the countryside? Does it impose its law onto the peasantry by force? If Marx doesn’t support that, he doesn’t make it clear, and events in the Russian Revolution hardly dispel the idea. But how is this anything but a military occupation, however supposedly benevolent?

I’ve argued before for something like a DOTP – an association preserving its proletarian character by restricting membership to those who forswear property claims. But this has to be consistent with the idea of democracy, which means it must be something less than a government. But it can still wield enormous power by non-governmental means – offering its protection, its technical aid, its products, etc.

Bakunin: If there is a state, then there is unavoidably domination, and consequently slavery. Domination without slavery, open or veiled, is unthinkable — this is why we are enemies of the state. What does it mean, the proletariat organized as ruling class?

Marx: It means that the proletariat, instead of struggling sectionally against the economically privileged class, has attained a sufficient strength and organization to employ general means of coercion in this struggle. It can however only use such economic means as abolish its own character as salariat, hence as class.

Warm-Fork: If the proletariat can only use such economic means as abolish its own character, why not also say it can only use such political means as do so – whatever such a constraint amounts to? That is, if we are to uphold some such ‘constraints’ against unrestricted ‘the-ends-justifies-the-means’ necessity, why not those that (sensible) anarchists insist on?

Bakunin: The Germans number around forty million. Will for example all forty million be member of the government?

Marx: Certainly! Since the whole thing begins with the self-government of the commune.

Warm-Fork: Though I inclined towards Bakunin’s side earlier, here Marx certainly seems to have the better of it – if there is to be decision-making on large scales (and if there isn’t, global warming at least will eat us all) then we must suppose direct democracy a practical possibility at whatever level. Though I do wonder – at what point does the label ’state’ become misleading?

Bakunin: By people’s government they understand the government of the people by means of a small number of leaders, chosen (elected) by the people.

Marx: Asinine! This is democratic twaddle, political drivel.

Warm-Fork: They continue in this way for a bit. It sometimes seems that Bakunin has a grossly unfair idea of what Marx is advocating (something like of our ‘representative democracy’, or worse, one-party rule), and Marx a grossly unfair of what Bakunin is advocating (a disorganised collection of ineffectual communities growing their own pot). Might they both be reasoning to themselves ‘this person misrepresents me so outrageously, they must be an idiot – so their position must be idiotic’?

Bakunin: But those elected will be fervently convinced and therefore educated socialists. The phrase ‘educated socialism’…

Marx:…never was used.

Bakunin:… ’scientific socialism’…

Marx:…was only used in opposition to utopian socialism, which wants to attach the people to new delusions, instead of limiting its science to the knowledge of the social movement made by the people itself; see my text against Proudhon.

Bakunin:…which is unceasingly found in the works and speeches of the Lasalleans and Marxists, itself indicates that the so-called people’s state will be nothing else than the very despotic guidance of the mass of the people by a new and numerically very small aristocracy of the genuine or supposedly educated.

Warm-Fork: In fairness to Marx, the idea of rule by the educated is not something I’ve ever found in his writing. In fairness to Bakunin, it does seem to have been found there by other ‘Marxists’.

A Ilusão do Sufrágio Universal:

“É verdade que, em dia de eleição, mesmo a burguesia mais orgulhosa, se tiver ambição política, deve curvar-se diante de sua Majestade, a Soberania Popular. Mas, terminada a eleição, o povo volta ao trabalho, e a burguesia, a seus lucrativos negócios e às intrigas políticas. Não se encontram e não se reconhecem mais. Como se pode esperar que o povo, oprimido pelo trabalho e ignorante da maioria dos problemas, supervisione as ações de seus representantes? Na realidade, o controle exercido pelos eleitores aos seus representantes eleitos é pura ficção, já que no sistema representativo, o controle popular é apenas uma garantia da liberdade do povo, é evidente que tal liberdade não é mais do que ficção.”

 BAKUNIN -A Ilusão do Sufrágio Universal  (em Ouvres, Vol. II, 1907) 

http://www.culturabrasil.pro.br/bakunin.htm

Just What the Hell is ‘Socialism’?

by the Tasmanian National-Anarchists

Some anarchists claim that anarchism is a form of ‘libertarian socialism’, while others claim that anarchism is totally opposed to socialism and everything it stands for. This begs the question: what exactly is ’socialism’?

‘Socialism’ is, in fact, a highly ambiguous term. This short article looks at what socialism is, or rather what it claims to be, and whether National-Anarchists (i.e. tribal anarchists) could be called ’socialist’ in any way, and to what degree.

WHAT DOES ‘SOCIALISM’ IMPLY?

Proudhon’s definition of a socialist was “one who hopes for the improvement of society”, but that is far too vague. By this definition, almost everyone is a socialist. Spengler’s claim that “all world improvers are socialists” is equally open to dispute; some capitalists see themselves as ‘world improvers’ too, however misguided they might be.

The Macquarie Dictionary defines socialism as “a theory or system of social organisation which advocates the vesting of the ownership and control of the means of production, capital, land etc. in the community as a whole”…but it is unclear from this what is meant by ‘community’.

This ambiguity over what constitutes the ‘community’ or ’social unit’ has led to many divergences between socialists, as socialists themselves have been both nationalist and internationalist, both cultural and economic in outlook. There is no one all-embracing kind of socialism.

But something many self-described socialists do have in common is a desire for more justice (which for some, but not all, is bound up with the idea of ‘equality’), often at the price of less freedom.

Not all socialists are opposed to hierarchy (Plato’s ‘Republic’ is socialist, but advocates a hierarchical caste system, for instance) but they ARE opposed to hierarchies which they see as being unjustified, i.e. lacking justice. Socialists are hostile to a ‘might is right’ kind of worldview not because they hate power per se, but because such power is seen as lacking justification (i.e. justice).

One potential negative quality inherent in socialism is the way it can lead to the resentment of higher or noble qualities. Too many socialists seem to want to make kings into peasants, rather than the other way around.

Another fault many (but not all) socialists possess is puritanism – they dislike things they see as being ‘useless’. This probably stems partly from Christianity and its hold over the European collective unconscious, but that doesn’t explain it entirely, as the same puritanical streak can also be found in socialists from non-European backgrounds, e.g. Islamic socialists.

This hostility to ‘uselessness’ means many socialists see whatever doesn’t further ‘the cause’ as being worthless – be it art, sport, religion, romance or love (Marxist regimes have taken this hostility to the extreme, liquidating or putting in concentration camps anyone seen as useless or reactionary).

Because of this hostility, socialists have often been portrayed as ‘joyless’, and it is true that certain socialists seem to regard any kind of happiness with suspicion.

But there are many exceptions to the rule…indeed, we can say that socialism, at its best, means having a strong sense of justice; at worst it means being motivated by resentment and envy.

National-Anarchists generally like a beer and a laugh and are far from puritanical, so we don’t really fit into this second category of socialist. But we do empathise with a different kind of socialism, one based on a communitarian version of justice (as opposed to a hyper-egalitarian one).

Before returning to this theme, let’s take a look at some of the main groups usually regarded as ’socialist’:

MARXIANS

Ironically, the ultra-materialist and anti-religious doctrine of Karl Marx has much in common with monotheistic religion – the iconography, the prophets etc. Perhaps this is unsurprising, given Marx was the son of a rabbi (and also, we might add, a kind of Jewish anti-semite who wrote racist diatribes against his own people).

The key to Marxism’s success was its adoption of the 19th century ‘progress’ paradigm: Marxists claimed (and still claim) that their form of socialism is ‘inevitable’, that its eventual triumph has been ’scientifically proven’ by Marx. But in seeking to make socialism ’scientific’, Marx made it soulless in the process.

Marxism is a product of the 19th century in its belief that society works like a machine; in this it is a typical byproduct of capitalism. Capitalism and Marxism are alike in their notion of ‘progress’, with ‘useless’ or ‘reactionary’ elements being swept aside or trampled under.

Marxist regimes have murdered over 100 million people in the last century, and it goes without saying that National-Anarchists oppose this hateful ideology and all that it stands for.

BOLSHEVIKS

Bolshevism claimed to put Marxist theory into practice, but like its sister movement fascism it was essentially a soldier’s movement (the word ‘comrade’ is military in origin). As Michael Walker astutely pointed out, finance capitalists loved bolshevism but hated fascism, while industrial capitalists loved fascism but hated bolshevism.

While National-Anarchists might respect bolsheviks for their courage and fighting skills, we have no sympathy whatsoever for their tyrannical political aims.

MAINSTREAM LIBERALS

Ranging from the ‘elite’ upper crust (satirised by Tom Wolfe as ‘radical chic’) to the standard upper-middle class types who frequently harp about the benefits of third world immigration (while conveniently not having to live in the same neighbourhoods as the worst of the immigrants), these are the most numerically common type of ’socialist’ found in Tasmania (and probably in the Western world as a whole).

These ’socialists’ are happy to compromise with capitalism if the latter is seen as somehow ‘reforming’ itself. Lenin famously described them as ‘useful idiots’, for the way they helped further the cause of internationalism and tyranny, while still claiming to be democratic and liberal.

NEW LEFT ‘SOCIALISTS’

Marxists mainly come from upper-middle class backgrounds, and have frequently been disappointed by the proletarians they claim to side with. Proletarians tend not to be internationalist in outlook; they generally don’t want revolution – merely an improvement of their and their family’s lot.

For this reason, in the 1960s, the so-called New Left arose, fixating on groups other than traditional proletarians they could exploit for ideological purposes. Immigrants and gays were the two favourite groups. For this reason, New Left socialists talk of ‘rights’ (not responsibility) for groups they want to exploit – immigrants, gays etc. – but ‘responsibilities’ (not rights) for the average Joe Sixpack.

As stated, their main aim seems to be to exploit minority groups, who they believe will help them usher in a hyper-egalitarian world order. But not all the minority groups actually share this aim, and for that reason one must feel a bit sorry for the ‘New’ Left types (whose ideas are actually getting pretty old by now).

The most noteworthy thing about the New Left is its high level of funding in proportion to overall membership. New Left groups like ‘Resistance’ and ‘Socialist Alternative’ have very few members, but seemingly endless supplies of materials, organisers etc., which means they must have some pretty wealthy backers. Not really surprising, as finance capitalists also bankrolled the Bolsheviks in 1917.

SO WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE?

Besides the so-called ’scientific’ kinds of socialism, there is also a ’socialism of the heart’.

Socialism does not mean ultra-egalitarianism – there is nothing in the word ’socialism’ which implies that it does. Nor do all socialists blindly believe in the ‘inevitability of progress’, especially when the word ‘progress’ has come to mean ‘making things worse than they already were’.

Socialists certainly want more justice – but that doesn’t entail buying into the hyper-egalitarian dogmas of the extreme left.

People are reluctant to work for the good of an intangible ‘All’. They simply won’t make sacrifices for abstractions like “a completely non-hierarchical society,” and nor do most of them even want one. Several generations of Soviet socialism produced, as one commentator notes, “not even the slightest manifestation of the antlike social altruism which would cause workers to work because they want to.”

Ironically, ‘proletarian internationalism’ works best only as a motivating force for upper-middle class communists!

But if ‘equality’ is an abstraction, COMMUNITY, on the other hand, is real – there is nothing abstract or intangible about one’s local community. If socialism means a refusal of social fragmentation, then National-Anarchists are definitely socialist. We regard ’socialism’ as being valid if it truly means ’social man’ – and not merely ‘equal man’, as some would have us believe.

To again quote Michael Walker: “Socialist initiatives are doomed to failure if the community of social members is not united by a common belief or identity which distinguishes it. In life [it is] the organism which wants to succeed.”

It seems like the more our technology progresses, the less we actually understand our own nature.

A genuinely scientific socialism would acknowledge ethnic identity as a reality, despite the claims of 20th century pseudo-science that it doesn’t exist. As Bakunin stated, “Diversity in capacities and powers – those differences between races, nations, sexes and persons – far from being a social evil, constitutes on the contrary, the abundance of humanity.”

National-Anarchists could be called tribal socialists or, if you prefer, communitarians. We agree with Georges Sorel that human beings identify with a tribe first and foremost.

Today these tribes still exist in various shapes and forms – but they are emasculated by the consumer society. One of the goals of National-Anarchism is give the tribes their power back.

Join us!

La filosofia di Lost. La filosofia di Lost? Davvero una serie tv può avere a che fare con la metafisica? O meglio può la metafisica avere a che fare con una serie tv? Fenomenologicamente la risposta affermativa è ineccepibile e La filosofia di Lost (Ponte alle Grazie, pp. 166; 10,20 euro) a firma Simone Regazzoni è la prova che si può condurre un’indagine rigorosa sul terreno della cultura pop sviscerando gli interrogativi “principe” dell’intera storia delle idee. Da Derrida a Heidegger, da Foucault a Freud passando per Cartesio, Gramsci, Aristotele, Nietzsche, Pascal, Schopenhauer, Sartre e Deleuze. Regazzoni, professore alla Cattolica di Milano, riesce, con una scrittura fluida, “narrativa” e accattivante laddove nessuno si era nemmeno avventurato – se non con risultati deludenti, nell’esplorazione della philosphy fiction. Dopo Harry Potter e la filosofia (Il Melangolo, 2008) e La filosofia del dr. House (Ponte alle Grazie, 2007 – con il collettivo Blitris), scandaglia l’Isola con gli strumenti della speculazione, evitando la forma saggio e costruendo uno spin off, un rizoma, di stampo filosofico della serie. Lo ho incontrato.

Tra tutte le serie televisive, perché Lost?

Cominciamo con il dire che molte, tra le nuove serie tv americane, meriterebbero attenzione da parte della filosofia, proprio nella misura in cui rappresentano le grandi narrazioni del nostro tempo. È come se la fine delle grandi narrazioni ideologiche avesse lasciato spazio a un ritorno delle narrazioni forti e strutturate nell’ambito del cinema, della letteratura e in particolare nelle nuove serie tv statunitensi. Con queste narrazioni credo sia urgente confrontarsi, anche inventando nuove forme mutanti di filosofia. Perché oggi più che mia la fiction è parte integrante di ciò che chiamiamo “realtà”. Non a caso, prima di Lost, mi sono occupato di dr. House e di Harry Potter. Quanto a Lost, ciò che in questa serie mi ha affascinato (perché prima di qualsiasi calcolo o ragionamento c’è questo: fascinazione, amore, ossessione da fan: non è possibile lavorare con la cultura di massa senza una certa dose di partecipazione) è stata la capacità di unire complessità e popolarità. Lost è un’opera d’arte – non esito a dirlo – che mostra come si possa essere, al contempo, radicalmente sperimentali e insieme popolari (stiamo parlando di milioni di telespettatori), mescolando filosofia e disaster movie, riferimenti biblici e fantascienza. Il tutto inserito in una narrazione di grande potenza ed efficacia, che sembra avvalorare la tesi di Orson Welles secondo cui la televisione ha una forza narrativa che il cinema non può eguagliare. Ecco il primo fattore di interesse, ai miei occhi, cui si connette immediatamente il secondo: l’effetto poetico di Lost. Umberto Eco, nelle sue Postille a Il nome della rosa, definisce “effetto poetico” la capacità di un’opera di generare sempre letture diverse senza esaurirsi. Ora, Lost è una macchina progettata per produrre le letture più disparate, rendendo lo spettatore una sorta di co-autore. Basta vedere che cosa accade in rete per capire fino a che punto funzioni la macchina narrativa di questa serie. Lost, detto altrimenti, è un universo narrativo in espansione transmediale. Alcune dichiarazione di Damon Lindelof, uno dei creatori della serie, sono a questo proposito molto significative: “Quando la serie sarà finita, e magari secondo le nostre volontà, il pubblico potrà ancora tornare indietro e ci sarà ancora spazio di interpretazione, come in qualsiasi opera letteraria”.

La filosofia e la tv, un rapporto burrascoso…

Sì, per molti filosofi oggi è ancora così. Ma questi filosofi non vanno presi troppo sul serio (Popper in primis naturalmente) se non come sintomo di una resistenza a un processo irreversibile di trasformazione della filosofia di fronte alla tv e, più in generale, ai nuovi media. Oggi non è più credibile, se mai lo è stato, il filosofo che, di preferenza in televisione, dichiara di non guardare la tv o di non possederla. È puro kitsch intellettuale: una caricatura del filosofo buona, ad esempio, per una serie televisiva italiana per famiglie. Certo, le caricature di filosofo non mancano, e devo dire che in fondo le amo molto. Non a caso spesso le uso nei miei libri come personaggi concettuali. C’è chi si chiede dalle colonne dei quotidiani, cito a memoria, “Guardare o non guardare Lost, 24, CSI, e quant’altro?” e chi accusa la televisione di essere un “paradigma pornografico”. Ora, è chiaro che queste accuse non sono altro che una forma di esorcismo verso un oscuro e inconfessabile oggetto del desiderio. Ma come ho già avuto modo di dire, questi filosofi sono dinosauri destinati a estinguersi. Non a caso la più importante rivista italiana di filosofia, Aut aut, dedicava nel 2007 un intero numero alla televisione dal titolo Davanti alla televisione, in cui si parlava anche dell’altro spauracchio di ogni intellettuale culturalmente corretto: i reality, a partire dal Grande Fratello. Presto occorrerà occuparsi anche di questo, a costo di scatenare nuove burrasche.

Locke, Rousseu, Hume, Bentham, Bakunin: troppo facile…

Troppo facile e banale. Lost fortunatamente non è un compendio di storia della filosofia. Altrimenti, almeno per quanto mi riguarda, sarei passato immediatamente ad altro. Sull’Isola ci sono nomi di filosofo come ci sono mille altri indizi letterari, mitologici, tratti dalla storia delle religioni. Sono tutti elementi di un gioco cui prendere parte, ma che non tollera strategie troppo prevedibili. Per questo se ci sono filosofi di cui non mi occupo nel mio libro sono proprio quelli il cui nome compare nella serie. Al di là dei nomi, sono le questioni filosofiche che l’Isola pone a interessarmi, a partire da quelle legate alle idee di mondo (è Desmond che dice: “Non esiste il mondo esterno”), di verità e, più in generale, di complessità. Leggo l’Isola come un sistema complesso cioè un sistema composto da un gran numero di parti che interagiscono in modo non semplice e in cui l’insieme è qualcosa di più della somma delle parti. Per questo chi sostiene, come il razionale Jack, che l’Isola è solo un’isola non arriverà mai a comprenderla. La razionalità di Jack sull’Isola, come nella realtà, è una semplificazione pericolosa. In un momento in cui anche importanti filosofi come Žižek o Badiou sembrano tentati di riproporre le virtù di un mondo ordinato che rompa con le logiche della complessità (tentazione che giudico pericolosa) mi sembra oltremodo interessante riflettere attorno alla questione della complessità così come viene messa in scena in Lost.

La questione dell’alterità, dell’altro, è un tema filosofico (di questi tempi più tangibile che mai) per eccellenza. In Lost è un punto centrale del meccanismo narrativo…

Sì, è centrale al punto che il termine “Altri”, con la maiuscola, diventa nella serie il nome di coloro che si trovano già sull’Isola al momento dell’incidente aereo. La tentazione potrebbe essere qui quella di evocare la filosofia di Levinas, in cui il concetto di “Altri” svolge un ruolo capitale. Ma se non chiamo in causa Levinas è perché in Lost gli Altri sono molto più traumatici di quanto non lo sia Altri in Levinas. Non a caso cito Sarte, en passant, che in una sua famosa opera teatrale fa dire a uno dei suoi personaggi: “L’inferno sono gli altri”. Gli Altri, sull’Isola, sono traumatici, sono una Cosa traumatica. Chi sono davvero? Che cosa fanno? Perché ci rapiscono? Perché ci attaccano? Perché ci imprigionano e torturano? Ecco tutta una seria di questioni che assillano i superstiti nel loro rapporto con gli Altri. Gli Altri, qui, non si lasciano facilmente addomesticare, non c’è nessuna fascinazione esotica verso di loro, ma prima di tutto conflitto e poi interazioni complesse. Ma quello che è più interessante è che agli occhi degli Altri sono proprio i superstiti ad essere Altri: dal punto di vista degli Altri i superstiti sono minacciosi, sono anch’essi Altri, gli Altri degli Altri. Il che significa che siamo sempre Altri per coloro che chiamiamo Altri. Altri è un concetto relativo alla posizione ci chi lo enuncia, come mostra bene John Locke quando afferma che Sayid è uno degli Altri per la Rousseau.

L’Isola viene paragonata alla radura di Heidegger…

Niente di più semplice per chi conosca un poco Heidegger. Credo che Heidegger ci abbia regalato, nel Novecento, uno dei più radicali e interessanti ripensamenti dell’idea di verità. Per farla breve, Heidegger pensa la verità non come adeguazione del linguaggio alla cosa, ma come non-nascondimento, come apertura di un orizzonte che nel suo aprirsi conserva sempre in sé un elemento di opacità, enigmatico e insondabile, una sorta di cuore di tenebra della verità. Per spiegare questa sua idea, Heidegger ha usato la figura della radura: la verità è una sorta di radura che si apre nel cuore di un bosco o di una foresta. Ora, ogni una radura per essere tale – uno spazio illuminato che si dischiude in una foresta – ha bisogno di conservare attorno a sé l’oscurità della foresta. Questa oscurità non è un difetto che nuoce alla radura, ma un elemento essenziale alla radura stessa. Se questa oscurità venisse eliminata, verrebbe eliminata anche l’apertura della radura. Lo stesso accade secondo Heidegger alla verità come radura: essa necessita sempre di un fondo di oscurità per manifestarsi. In Lost incontriamo spesso radure che si aprono nella foresta e che dischiudono una qualche verità: sempre parziale, che conserva sempre un elemento di opacità. Ecco perché ho evocato Heidegger. Più in generale, questa idea di verità è in assoluta consonanza con l’idea di sistema complesso di cui l’Isola è l’incarnazione. E questo con buona pace di quanti pensano che Heidegger sia una sorta di pensatore arcaicizzante e antimoderno. Non a caso il filosofo spagnolo Daniel Innerarity, parlando di come i sistemi complessi abbiano messo in crisi l’idea secondo cui i fenomeni possono essere sempre completamente svelati, ha evocato Heidegger che per primo ha posto l’accento sull’inevitabilità dell’occultamento. Venendo a Lost, direi che l’Isola ci mette proprio di fronte all’enigma di questo occultamento che sta alla base dei sistemi complessi.

Deleuze, Derrida e lo stesso Heidegger. Che cosa c’entrano con Lost?

Cominciamo con il dire che il mio libro non è, né non vuole essere, un saggio su Lost. La filosofia di Lost si presenta come uno spin-off filosofico (non a caso il sottotitolo è philosophy fiction) che prende spunto da un certo numero di questioni sollevate dalla serie per comporre un testo filosofico mutante, che si contamina con l’oggetto con cui si confronta, ne riprende alcuni elementi e strategie, e si propone esso stesso come oggetto filosofico in grado di circolare nella cultura di massa. Come testo filosofico pop. Date queste premesse mi sono preso la libertà di far interagire con l’Isola filosofi che in qualche modo mi sembravano in consonanza con alcune questioni sollevate dall’Isola. Questi filosofi sono i miei fantasmi che ho incontrato sull’Isola. Perché proprio loro? Di Heidegger ho già detto. Per quanto riguarda Deleuze e Derrida, sia l’uno sia l’altro si sono occupati, in momenti diversi, proprio di isole per elaborare una riflessione sullo statuto ontologico della realtà. Come se interrogarsi su che cos’è un’isola significasse interrogarsi nel modo più radicale su che cos’è la realtà o il mondo. Ciò significa che questi filosofi, per altro considerati difficili, si prestavano ottimamente a entrare con le loro questioni radicali nel mio testo mutante. Credo che quanto Wu Ming 1 ha scritto in Noi dobbiamo essere genitori a proposito di un certo modo di fare e concepire la letteratura valga oggi anche per un nuovo modo di fare filosofia: si tratta di portare dentro la popular culture un certo polemos filosofico per non ridurlo semplicemente a un gioco da tavolo accademico. Per parte mia cerco di portare una certa radicalità decostruttiva nell’ambito della pop culture. Perché credo abbia ragione Mark Taylor quando afferma che Derrida aveva sottovalutato il crescente impatto dei media e della cultura popolare.

C’è anche chi accusa Lost, 24, Battlestar Galactica, Prison Break, Dollhouse, ecc. di giustificare la tortura…

Niente di nuovo sotto il sole. C’era chi accusava Il Padrino di giustificare la mafia. Direi che è sempre buona regola di fronte alle opere di fiction attenersi all’idea che non ci dobbiamo aspettare storie con la buona morale incorporata. Altrimenti corriamo il rischio di introdurre anche nell’arte i politicamente o il moralmente corretto. Se c’è un’etica nell’ambito dell’arte, si può star certi che essa non ha nulla a che fare con l’idea di dover produrre messaggi edificanti. Poi naturalmente ciascuno è libero di preferire Il maresciallo Rocca a 24 o Lost. Per parte mia troverei artisticamente preoccupante non vedere in scena la questione della tortura e dei suoi dilemmi in opere d’arte del nostro tempo. E troverei francamente noiose opere che mostrassero quanto è brutta e cattiva la tortura. A un’opera d’arte chiedo che mi metta di fronte anche alla fascinazione che la tortura opera su di noi, alla tentazione che in certi contesti politici essa può suscitare. Mi pare che Lost e 24 facciano bene questo, proprio perché sono opere complesse. E poi non dimentichiamo che il rapporto tra un messaggio e colui che lo decifra non è un meccanismo semplicistico del tipo: vedi la tortura giustificata in una narrazione di finzione quindi giustificherai anche tu la tortura nella realtà. Per capire che tipo di fruizione sia oggi quella della cultura di massa basta vere che cosa accade in rete attorno alle serie tv: non si è mai vista un’interazione così attiva con l’opera d’arte.

C’è anche un pubblico, quello dei giovanissimi per esempio, a cui forse non vengono forniti tutti gli strumenti per confrontarsi con il “meccanismo semplicistico” della giustificazione della tortura…

Che strumenti dovrebbe avere? Chi decide quali dovrebbero essere? Dipende dall’età, dal genere, dal livello di cultura, dal tipo di formazione, dalla classe sociale, dal quoziente intellettivo? Credo che inoltrarsi su questa strada sia molto pericoloso: si arriva inevitabilmente ai comitati dei genitori, dei saggi o degli esperti, fino alla censura. Preferisco il rischio della libertà alla sicurezza della censura.

Il libro usa l’espediente dell’apostrofe, si rivolge a un lettore, anzi a una lettrice…

Sì, mi rivolgo per tutto il libro a un tu femminile (cosa insolita per un testo di filosofia) cui talvolta attribuisco idee e gusti diversi dai miei. All’inizio, nei miei appunti, il tu funzionava come una sorta di sparring partner – non pensavo che avrei mantenuto quella forma. Poiché però, al momento di dare forma al libro, non sapevo bene come orientarmi nel sistema complesso di Lost, ho scelto di farmi accompagnare e forse guidare da una figura femminile. Hai presente quando Kate aiuta Jack o Sawyer a seguire delle tracce nella foresta? Ecco, anche io avevo bisogno di qualcuno che mi aiutasse. Non volevo creare mappe che semplificassero la complessità, così ho scelto qualcuno che mi aiutasse a seguire delle tracce. Perché un tu femminile? Me lo sono chiesto anch’io e anche il mio editor (una donna, Cristina Palomba) che subito non era convinta di questa scelta. Non so perché, ma il fantasma del tu femminile era la dimensione più naturale per la mia scrittura in quel momento. A un certo punto questa forma mi si è imposta. E l’ho accolta senza nessun problema, tanto più che penso, proprio come Derrida, che i filosofi a venire siano donne.

Articolo pubblicato su Panorama.it (quando ancora mi ci facevano scrivere…)

Q democracia é essa que 1 acaba com a festa de todos?

Até onde vai a liberdade nossa  nesse mundo?

Li esse texto do Bakunin e me inspirei:

“Não é verdadeiro que a liberdade de um homem seja limitada pela de todos os outros. O homem só é verdadeiramente livre na medida em que sua liberdade, livremente reconhecida e representada como por um espelho pela consciência livre de todos os outros, encontre a confirmação de sua extensão até o infinito na sua liberdade. O homem só é verdadeiramente livre entre outros homens igualmente livres, e como ele só é livre na condição de ser humano, a escravidão de um só homem sobre a terra, sendo uma ofensa contra o próprio princípio da humanidade, é uma negação da liberdade de todos.
A liberdade de cada um só se realiza, pois, com a igualdade de todos. A realização da liberdade na igualdade de direito e de fato é a justiça.”

(Bakunin, p.63)

Costumamos citar Rousseau quando queremos falar de liberdade, mas se quisermos liberdade mesmo teríamos que citar Bakunin, mas poucos o conhecem.

Rousseau também defende a liberdade, porém quer que o homem aprenda a limitar a sua liberdade em função da necessidade do outro, é aí que prefiro pensar como Bakunin, a nossa liberdade deve invadir o outro e vice versa.

É aí que teríamos a ceitação total das nossas diferenças e conseguiríamos viver sem uma pessoa acabar com a festa dos outros. Aí sim seria democracia. Hoje em dia 1 acaba com com a festa de 30 e todo mundo acha normal, que democracia é esta? Tem um monte de gente dormindo  sossegado sem reclamar mas tem um neura infeliz que não consegue ver pessoas se divertindo e se realiza acabando com a festa dos outros.

Isso é polêmico sim!! Sair do senso comum é difícil sim!

Mas debater sobre isso é necessário, antes que vivamos em um estado de sítio velado ou disfaçado de civilidade politicamente correta.

As leis talvez sirvam para isso.

Retirar direitos básicos do cidadão por incompetência governamental.

Se alguém espirrou porque um fumante estava embaixo de um toldo de um bar.

Multe o bar! Multa de mais de 700 Reais

Se alguém fez barulho, chame o psiu!! Multa de 16 mil?

Se alguém se divertir na noite de São Paulo sem gastar 200 Reais (porque tem q ter vedação acústica, fecharam os butecos, etc) não conseguirá. Isso é justo?

Pobre não pode mais se divertir aqui, pois dá um gasto para a sociedade que não compensa. É assim que eles pensam?

Isso é só o começo. Se continuarmos aceitar leis desse tipo, que invadem o livre arbítrio e a liberdade do cidadão, o próximo passo é a ditadura.

De la fundamentalismul lui Bakunin, un anarhist rus, precursor al bolşevismului, care credea că revoluţionarii trebuie să fie tâlhari neînfricaţi, dărâmători ai statului exploatator, la teoria majorităţilor anarhice nu e cine ştie ce distanţă. Ideea însă e mai veche. Trecută prin filtrul analitic al marilor politologi, de la Montesquieu, Tocqueville, la M. N. Rothbard, anarhia grupărilor majoritare i-a influenţat pe specialiştii în drept constituţional în alcătuirea legilor fundamentale ale tuturor democraţiilor moderne. Reluarea ei obsesivă după destrămarea alianţelor, coaliţiilor indică o anume surexcitare a discursului politic ale cărei motivaţii şi involuţii merită discutate.

Mai importante sunt două lecţiuni, contradictorii şi mari consumatoare de energii, putere – opoziţie, ambele revendicându-şi binele comun, dar comunităţile de referinţă nu reprezintă majorităţi populare opuse, ci diferite segmente politico-sociale aglutinate conjunctural, ori partinic. Nicidecum ideologic. Acuzaţia de anarhie a majorităţii a căpătat consistenţă după alegerile locale de anul trecut, când votul uninominal la consiliile judeţene şi la primarii marilor aglomerări urbane a relegitimat stilul încărcat de conotaţii feudale al baronilor, un fel de clone ale foştilor primi secretari de judeţe, vătafi atotputernici, stăpâni pe destinul şi averile supuşilor, iar alegerile de la sfârşitul anului le-au extins pentru totdeauna influenţa asupra deciziilor legislative.

Opoziţia ireconciliabilă între cele două orientări nu are a face cu stânga şi dreapta ca în democraţiile consacrate, ci cu atitudinea faţă de executiv, clivajul electoral fiind mereu exacerbat de o parte sau de alta: una în destrămare(?), coaliţia de la putere, realizată în secret de lideri influenţi din PSD + PC şi PDL, sub directa îndrumare a preşedintelui, cu mai bine de un an înainte de alegeri, autonumită parteneriat, iar cealaltă, liberalii şi udemeriştii – sub 30%. Însă ecourile fostei dictaturi a majorităţii antinaţionale, puciste, protectoare a hoţilor şi a corupţilor etc., adică cei 322 „băieţii răi”, nu s-au stins, iar acuzele de trădare nu-i ocolesc pe liberali, chiar dacă PDL a realizat acelaşi compromis pentru care îşi condamnă adversarii. Mereu cu ochii pe sondaje, aşa-zisul megapartid prezidenţial păstrează mesajul anticorupţie, antisistem, considerându-se unic susţinător al unor proiecte de revoluţionare a uninominalului, a educaţiei, a…, în sfârşit, a tuturor sectoarelor vitale, vrând să impună spaţiului public imaginea de „băieţi buni”. Nicicând asemenea discurs dihotomic nu a impregnat mai ipocrit climatul politic de la noi.

Din fericire, ecourile bătăliei mai răzbat doar în mică măsură dincolo de ecranele televizoarelor şi de presă, deoarece motivările coincid, cu excepţia semnelor plus ori minus. Fenomenul miroase a muniţie politicianistă şi a populism expirat, iar încontrarea anostă îi va ţine departe pe alegători de urne. Concomitent, se încearcă promovarea subversivă a unui sistem politic bipolar, cu  doar două formaţiuni, ca în ţările anglofone. Scop ascuns? Blocarea liberalilor. Strategii nu ţin cont de evoluţia firească spre cele trei forţe ale PE, social-democraţii, popularii şi liberalii, formulă impusă şi de ultimele alegeri. Pentru o lungă perioadă. Sugestia confirmă strădaniile mediatice de a acredita ideea că nu există decât o singură alternativă viabilă la guvernare. Atacul continuu al PDL şi al Cotrocenilor, după tehnica vetustă a lupului singuratic, „unul împotriva tuturor”, afişată la vedere, dar contrazisă în culise, a reuşit totuşi crearea şi conservarea unui „cap de pod” în  imaginarul colectiv care le-a adus oarece avantaj la urne,  important şi la masa negocierilor.

Dacă definirea majorităţii rezultate din sufragiu ca anarhică ţine de sărăcia ideologică, efectele-i insidioase au zguduit serios statul de drept prin apelul la arbitrajul Curţii Constituţionale, fiindcă hotărârile-i partizane au generat dezechilibre serioase între cele trei puteri. În plus, împărţirea aleşilor în legitimi şi ilegitimi, în funcţie de interese de grup / de moment, catalogarea lor ca „buni / răi” ţine de infantilismul comunistoid, prinzând la o anumită categorie a alegătorilor fără mari pretenţii culturale. E de mirare că personalităţi cu studii şi doctorate la universităţi celebre, alături de ziare, reviste, televiziuni se înregimentează de o parte sau de alta, vrând să sugereze că miza ar depăşi nivelul comun de înţelegere.

Or elitele româneşti, începând cu revoluţia paşoptistă, s-au implicat în cu totul alt mod în instaurarea civilizaţiei şi a libertăţilor în spaţiul nostru frământat. Poate era cazul să învăţăm mai întâi că principiul majorităţii stă la baza oricărei societăţi avansate, dar nu e totuna cu autoguvernarea populară, iar apelul la popor se face doar prin scrutin, nu prin plebiscitare vocală în piaţa mare, nici prin folosirea abuzivă a pluralului coercitiv „noi” fără mandat din partea reprezentaţilor. Nu s-a dovedit eficientă nici stratagema călăririi mânzului prin sondaje „prefabricate” şi aprecieri sforăitoare că doar unii ar reprezenta majoritatea patriotică, binele public, iar ceilalţi, mereu acuzaţi, porecliţi, demonizaţi mediatic trebuie supuşi oprobriului public şi condamnaţi la dispariţie. Democraţie majoritară nu înseamnă desfigurarea adversarului, ci crearea, ocrotirea cu orice preţ a posibilităţii de a-şi susţine liber opiniile. De abia (in)acceptarea ultimei aserţiuni determină caracterul majorităţii ca tiranică, dictatorială, abuzivă, anarhică.

Alegerile europene nu au adus dramul de înţelepciune necesară renunţării la spectacolul mediatic pueril, iar apropierea actorilor politici de cetăţean şi adeziunea maselor rămân simple deziderate. Purtătorii de vorbe şi PR ai partidelor, aceiaşi, s-au mutat din nou în studiouri  media cu tot calabalâcul de rigoare, nu pe uliţele satelor.

Ce a fost va mai fi. (Q.e.d.)

Petru Tomegea

]]> http://beefysaint.wordpress.com/2009/05/28/bakunin-series-1/ Thu, 28 May 2009 15:00:57 +0000 polygonfarmer http://beefysaint.wordpress.com/2009/05/28/bakunin-series-1/

Some still images I’ve made using the character models for an unfinished short film which had the working title of ‘Bakunin’. The great Anarchist layabout himself.

The 3d character model in the background of the first image was made by my associate Niall Moran, based on a design by myself of course. This top image is the most recent thing I’ve done here. It was inspired by an RTE radio documentary I heard about a man called Mick Murphy AKA ‘Mile a minute Mick’, ‘Iron Mick’, ‘The Clay Pigeon’, ‘The Iron Man’ and ‘The Convict of the Road’.

Read or listen about him here:

http://www.rte.ie/radio1/doconone/1101280.html

Colaboración enviada por Esteban Torres (torrexa@yahoo.com)

Hace muchos siglos se practicaba la Alquimia, la Astrología y la Religión (o más bien las religiones). Con el paso del tiempo la Alquimia fue sustituida por la Química, la Astrología se convirtió en Astronomía y la Religión devino en Filosofía. Pero las cosas no ocurrieron de manera sencilla. Mientras que para el siglo V antes de nuestra era en Grecia ya se habían estructurado sistemas filosóficos refinados, en otras sociedades todavía se practicaban religiones primitivas, como el animismo. Respecto a la Química y la Astronomía, estas ciencias convivieron con la Alquimia y la Astrología hasta mucho tiempo después. No obstante, en las llamadas “sociedades modernas” la Alquimia (amuletos de aleaciones mágicas, sustancias homeopáticas milagrosas, etc.) y la Astrología (horóscopos, cartas astrales, etc.) aunque son rechazadas sistemáticamente por las comunidades científicas, todavía son aceptados por mucha gente, incluso por universitarios y políticos de alto rango. No obstante, aun cuando muchas personas “respetables” consultan adivinos, médiums, lectores del tarot, quirománticos, astrólogos, etc., la mayoría lo hace con discreción, sobre todo si su posición social o política pudiera ser afectada por el conocimiento público de esta afición.
Pero algo muy curioso ocurrió con la Filosofía y la Religión, ya que en pleno siglo XXI ambas conviven públicamente, aun en las sociedades “desarrolladas”. Actualmente científicos de primer nivel y políticos con altas responsabilidades no tienen empacho en declarar públicamente que practican alguna religión y que incluso sus decisiones más trascendentales las basan en esta creencia. En algunos países occidentales los presidentes, primeros ministros y otros altos funcionarios todavía juran ante la Biblia cuando toman posesión de su cargo. Aun países que cuentan con un stablishment de científicos destacados, como Israel, practican una política nacional basada en conceptos religiosos, con los cuales justifica su expansionismo.

Sin embargo, a la mayoría de las personas no les preocupa esta situación, e incluso aseguran que la Religión es necesaria para normar la moral de las sociedades, puesto que “si la sociedad no tuviera una base religiosa, se desataría el libertinaje”. Aun más: hay quienes aseguran que no puede existir una ética social o individual que no esté basada en conceptos religiosos, y que el ateísmo generalizado fomentaría el egoísmo, el hedonismo y la criminalidad.

No obstante, hemos observado a lo largo de la Historia que la mayoría de los discursos moralistas de los gobernantes y jerarcas de las iglesias nada tenían que ver con sus verdaderos sentimientos. Mientras que en público –y a veces también en privado– predicaban la justicia, la compasión, la equidad, etc., sus vidas transcurrían en medio de feroces luchas por el poder y el dinero. No se nos olvide que todavía a mediados del siglo XIX se consideraba perfectamente compatible con la ética cristiana la esclavitud de los negros, la explotación inmisericorde de los obreros (con horarios de hasta 12 horas diarias y salarios con los que apenas podían sobrevivir) y el trabajo infantil (recordemos a los niños limpiadores de chimeneas que aparecen en algunos relatos de Charles Dickens). En plena Era Victoriana, cuando la represión sexual llegó a extremos grotescos en los países protestantes, algunos miembros de la aristocracia y algunos jóvenes (y no tan jóvenes) adinerados no tenían objeciones morales cuando seducían a sirvientas urbanas o jovencitas campesinas, quienes terminaban sus vidas en prostíbulos o, en el mejor de los casos, en instituciones de caridad para “mujeres descarriadas”. 

Pero no todo esto quedó en el pasado. Actualmente todavía existe la explotación del trabajo infantil, la negación de los derechos de las mujeres (especialmente en los países islámicos), la depredación del medio ambiente, las guerras de rapiña (como las de Iraq y Afganistán), la tortura (tanto política como policiaca), el tráfico de armas, la trata de blancas, la trata de menores, la pedofília, etc. Aun cuando estas conductas son reprobables per se, resultan más preocupantes por el hecho de que muchos de quienes incurren en ellas se declaran creyentes y practicantes de alguna religión.           

Ante este panorama, ¿qué podemos pensar de quienes insisten en seguir fundamentando la ética sobre creencias religiosas y no sobre una sólida reflexión filosófica? Muchos moralistas simplemente son hipócritas o fanáticos perdidos, o las dos cosas. Sin embargo, quienes más me preocupan son quienes están sinceramente convencidos de que la religión es el único fundamento confiable para elaborar un código de ética que pueda normar la conducta de los individuos de todas las sociedades y en todas las ocasiones. ¿Por qué? Porque a lo largo de la Historia hemos presenciado las consecuencias de una ética irreflexiva que únicamente sigue los dictados de una camarilla autoproclamada “intérprete” de la voz de Dios, o de los dioses. Aun cuando las castas sacerdotales (o “jerarquías eclesiásticas”, como se les llama ahora), actuaran de buena fe, cosa que rara vez ha ocurrido, nada nos garantiza que sus opiniones sean dignas de acatarse ciegamente. Por ejemplo, ¿en qué siglo, en qué lugar y a qué persona le dijo Dios cuál era su opinión respecto al robo, el homicidio, el adulterio, el aborto, la eutanasia, el incesto, etc.? Con excepción del incesto, el cual está prohibido en la mayoría de las culturas, prácticamente todas las religiones difieren en relación con estos temas. Y lo que es peor: las opiniones de las castas sacerdotales han variado a lo largo de la Historia. Por ejemplo, durante la Edad Media europea la Iglesia Católica raras veces condenaba el aborto, especialmente si se cometía durante los primeros 40 días posteriores a la concepción, cuando todavía no se instalaba el alma en el feto (ver los escritos de Tomás de Aquino). Por lo que respecta al homicidio, las castas sacerdotales han adoptado todas las posturas imaginables. El quinto mandamiento de los cristianos, “no matarás”, debió haber contenido la siguiente aclaración: “a menos que te lo ordene la casta sacerdotal o directamente Dios”.

Se me dirá que la ética basada en la Religión es intrínsecamente buena y que las fallas que pudiera tener se deben a la mala interpretación de los libros sagrados. Ante tal aseveración me pregunto: ¿Quién o quiénes escribieron los libros sagrados? Hasta donde sé, la opinión de Dios o de los dioses que aparece en los distintos libros “sagrados” varía ampliamente. Por ejemplo, las “verdades eternas” que aparecen en los Vedas, el Corán, la Biblia, el Popol Vuh, etc., no se parecen mucho entre sí, lo cual significa que, o los escribas no tomaron adecuadamente el dictado divino o que los dioses han cambiado continuamente de opinión. También puede ser que todos estos libros no sean más que colecciones de mitos que han perdurado hasta la actualidad gracias a la autoridad y el poder de las distintas castas sacerdotales, que los han utilizado para preservar sus privilegios. Me atrevo a sugerir que esto último es lo más probable. Un hecho que abona a favor de esta aseveración es el caso de los libros que describen las antiguas religiones griega, celta y nórdica, los cuales, aun cuando se han preservado hasta el presente, están consideradas “oficialmente“, no como literatura sagrada, sino como simples colecciones de mitos, debido a que las castas sacerdotales que los sustentaban desaparecieron hace siglos.

Muchos creyentes de varias religiones me han comentado que, falsos o verdaderos, los “valores” religiosos son necesarios para preservar la paz social, la convivencia y, sobre todo, el sentido de la vida, tanto a nivel individual como social. A esto yo contestaría que el principio fundamental de toda ética es la verdad, y que si se acepta construirla sobre algo falso (por más noble que sea), tarde o temprano se caerá en la obediencia ciega e irreflexiva. Por ejemplo, los inquisidores católicos no se preguntaban si era cierto o no que Dios aprobaba la tortura a los herejes; lo hacían sin ningún remordimiento, creyendo ciegamente que estaban cumpliendo con los mandatos de su Dios, expresados a través de sus representantes terrenales, es decir, de los sacerdotes cristianos. Esto mismo pensaban los verdugos durante la llamada Noche de San Bartolmé, cuando fueron asesinados más de 50 mil hugonotes en Francia, por órdenes del Papado. Pero esto no sólo ocurrió en el pasado; actualmente siguen ocurriendo casos semejantes, como las lapidaciones públicas de las mujeres adúlteras en algunos países islámicos y los actos de los terroristas suicidas que se inmolan creyendo que con esto están cumpliendo con los mandamientos de Alah.                                                                                                                                         
Por otra parte, numerosas investigaciones sociológicas han demostrado que existen millones de personas que aseguran haber sido educados de acuerdo con los “valores” religiosos de sus padres y sin embargo no tienen empacho en mentir, engañar y defraudar. ¿Cuántos casos conocemos de criminales confesos que se han declarado “creyentes”? Y lo que es peor, ¿cuántos empresarios aparentemente honorables han hecho sus fortunas a base de engaños, fraudes, tráfico de influencias, etc.? ¿Y qué me dicen de los altos dignatarios de la Iglesia Católica que ordenan la excomunión de sacerdotes que incurren en el “pecado” de contraer matrimonio, pero toleran y encubren a ministros pederastas confesos? 

Pero tampoco debemos confiar en los mesías laicos. Carlos Marx y sus seguidores aseguraban que el Socialismo “científico” nos iba a dar la posibilidad de crear el paraíso en la Tierra. ¿Y qué paso? Se equivocaron en sus profecías, y el experimento social en la Unión Soviética y en otros países “socialistas” terminó en un infierno terrenal. ¿Por qué? Porque los nuevos sacerdotes laicos, creyéndose poseedores de la verdad absoluta, despreciaron las opiniones de los socialistas “utópicos” como Bakunin y Kropotkin, de los sociólogos “burgueses” como Max Weber y de los filósofos “reaccionarios” como Nietzsche. Pero su peor error fue despreciar la opinión de sus pueblos e impedir su participación directa en los asuntos del Estado, con lo cual cerraron el camino hacia la democracia, y ésa es la razón por la que todos los regímenes comunistas terminaron en dictaduras. Una vez que las nuevas teocracias laicas se apoderaron de los gobiernos, todo signo de disidencia fue aplastado inmisericordemente y, en vez de socialismo, se implantó el peor de los capitalismos: el capitalismo de Estado, un sistema ineficiente y paralizante de toda iniciativa individual.

Los países –y los planetas– que no aprenden de la Historia están condenados a repetir los mismos errores, así que si alguna lección nos dejaron los regímenes “socialistas”, con sus campos de concentración y sus purgas sangrientas, es que no se deben acatar los códigos de ética dictados por castas sacerdotales, ya sean religiosas o laicas.

Así pues, pienso que solamente una ética atea, basada en la reflexión filosófica y en hechos científicamente comprobados, podría ayudar a la sociedad mundial contemporánea a retomar el camino de la paz, la tolerancia y la solidaridad humana. Esto se debe hacer antes de que el fanatismo, la soberbia, la irresponsabilidad y la ambición desmedida nos lleven al suicidio ecológico o a la guerra atómica.  

¿ÉTICA O ÉTICAS? 

A fin de cuentas, no existen más que dos tipos de ética: la ética idealista y la ética realista.  El primer tipo de ética se basa en preceptos filosóficos o religiosos sin base científica alguna. El ejemplo más paradigmático de la ética idealista es el famoso “imperativo categórico” kantiano, que no es otra cosa que la versión laica de la ética judeo-cristiana. Aun cuando Kant no basa su ética en imperativos divinos, no es menos arbitrario al exigir al hombre que “ajuste sus acciones a los principios éticos universalmente admitidos” (ver la obra Crítica de la razón práctica). Estas afirmaciones tan contundentes, típicas de mentalidades soberbias como las de casi todos los filósofos idealistas, desde Platón, contrastan con el tono mesurado de pensadores como Epicuro, Diógenes de Laercio y Lucrecio.

¿Por qué es importante que un sistema ético tenga fundamento filosófico y  científico y no sea únicamente el resultado de una especulación filosófica que no toma en cuenta la Sociología, la Historia, la Biología, la Antropología, etc.? La respuesta es muy simple: Porque, a diferencia de la filosofía especulativa, la ética tiene como fin constituirse en guía de conducta de una sociedad real y concreta, y si no cumple con este cometido puede hacer más mal que bien. 
 
LA ÉTICA JUDEO-CRISTIANA

Cualquiera que haya analizado críticamente La Biblia concluirá que no se trata de un libro homogéneo, sino de una colección de textos agrupados arbitrariamente, que frecuentemente se contradicen incluso en materia de Teología. Sin embargo, en el Viejo Testamento, aun cuando abundaban las contradicciones, el tema central era la cosmovisión y los valores del pueblo judío. En cambio, en el Nuevo Testamento esta cosmovisión y estos valores fueron trastocados radicalmente, y los predicadores del Evangelio literalmente rehicieron la herencia hebrea y le agregaron toda clase de “novedades” teológicas, como el dogma de la Santísima Trinidad, la transustanciación y la divinidad del nuevo profeta (es decir, Jesucristo), así como la amenaza del infierno, el juicio final,  etc. Todo esto naturalmente tenía que repercutir en su ética. Ahora ya no se se trataba sólo de alabar (y obedecer) directamente al Dios único, sino que esto debía hacerse a través de su hijo (y posteriormente a través de innumerables vírgenes y santos). Aun cuando el hombre del Antiguo Testamento no era dueño de su destino (a pesar del cacareado “libre albedrío”), pues tenía que amar (y obedecer ) a Dios “por sobre todas las cosas”, el hombre del Nuevo Testamento (es decir, el cristiano) se sentía doblemente compelido, pues la amenaza del juicio final y el castigo del fuego eterno eran más temibles que todas las calamidades que de tiempo en tiempo lanzaba Jehová sobre la Tierra.

Así, la ética cristiana, además de considerar al ser humano como un perpetuo menor de edad que tenía que obedecer sin ninguna explicación una serie de normas y preceptos absurdos, aterrorizaba a sus seguidores con castigos que no se le ocurrirían ni al más refinado sádico. Por supuesto que todo esto no era gratuito: los sacerdotes y gobernantes sacaban abundante provecho de esta situación. Como todos sabemos, el primero que se benefició con la imposición de esta religión del terror fue el emperador Constantino quien, allá por el año 3l3, declaró al Cristianismo como la religión oficial del Imperio Romano. Posteriormente los papas y obispos utilizaron el prestigio de la civilización romana para para cristianizar a los reyes bárbaros del norte de Europa, y con ellos a sus súbditos. Obviamente, los evangelizadores se hicieron retribuir generosamente sus “servicios” y se convirtieron en consejeros y administradores de los reinos recién convertidos, con los consiguientes privilegios que esto significaba.

Muchos historiadores argumentan que fue gracias al cristianismo que los pueblos del norte de Europa absorbieron la civilización romana (y griega), y que de no ser por los predicadores cristianos este proceso hubieran demorado muchos siglos. Sin embargo, ésta es una soberana mentira: muchos pueblos del norte, particularmente los germanos, siempre estuvieron deseosos de pertenecer al Imperio Romano, al que admiraban como el paradigma de la civilización. Las cosas más bien ocurrieron al revés: los bárbaros del norte aceptaron el cristianismo porque venía respaldado por la civilización romana y, por lo tanto, bien podrían haber adoptado a los dioses paganos romanos si éstos hubieran venido “envueltos” en el paquete civilizatorio.

Pero, independientemente de la manera como ocurrieron las cosas, el caso es que la implantación del cristianismo en todo Europa significó también la imposición de una ética que promovía la sumisión, el temor y la renuncia al razonamiento y a la especulación científica y filosófica. Las actividades de los “sabios” de la Edad Media europea se reducían al estudio de la Teología y a adaptar al cristianismo las ideas filosóficas de Platón y Aristóteles (como fue el caso de Abelardo y Tomás de Aquino).

Actualmente todavía hay personas que creen que el cristianismo puede aportar algo a la humanidad. Estas personas parten del supuesto de que las instituciones terrenales (es decir, las iglesias cristianas) tergiversaron las enseñanzas de Jesucristo y las utilizaron para lucrar con la fe de los pueblos. No obstante, esta postura no es en absoluto original, pues no es más que una versión moderna de las propuestas de Lutero y Calvino, las cuales, como se sabe, no sirvieron para instaurar el reino de Dios en la Tierra, sino que propiciaron pavorosas guerras religiosas, persecuciones y un sentimiento todavía más opresivo entre sus seguidores, conocido como “la opresión de la ética protestante”, que en mucho propició la aparición del  capitalismo moderno (ver las obras de Max Weber). 

Aun suponiendo que se pudieran rescatar las “verdaderas” enseñanzas de Jesucristo, ¿cuáles son éstas? ¿Las de los Evangelios canónicos, las de los Evangelios apócrifos o las de las Epístolas de (san) Pablo y otros? Pero la pregunta más importante es: ¿Realmente existió un personaje histórico llamado Jesucristo o Inmanuel? Fuera de las apologías cristianas, en ningún texto de la antigüedad se menciona la existencia de un personaje con las características que se le atribuyen a Jesucristo. De sus contemporáneos, Poncio Pilato(s) ni siquiera lo menciona en sus memorias, y del sumo sacerdote Caifás no tenemos ninguna referencia a él. Por su parte, el historiador judío Flavio Josefo se refiere a Jesús como un “sedicioso” sin mayor trascendencia.

Haciendo acopio de buena voluntad y concediendo que Jesús fue un personaje histórico y que sus “verdaderas” enseñanzas son las que aparecen en los cuatro Evangelios canónicos y en las Epístolas de (san) Pablo, ¿qué enseñanzas éticas podemos extraer de ahí? Que el hombre es malo por naturaleza (nace con el “pecado original”); que debe ser purificado con el bautizo (y otros rituales que se inventaron posteriormente, como la confesión, la misa, el acto de comulgar y la extremaunción); que debe creer (y obedecer) ciegamente lo que dicen los textos sagrados; que debe despreciar su cuerpo y aborrecer todo lo relacionado con el placer mundano; que debe abstenerse de toda reflexión científica o filosófica que atente contra los dogmas; que, en caso de conflicto entre los textos sagrados y las órdenes o indicaciones de la jerarquía eclesiástica, debe obedecer a éstas últimas. 

LAS ÉTICAS TEÍSTAS

Algunos pensadores proponen una la ética basada en un dios mentalmente antropomorfo, que puede ser o no una persona. Pero antes de evaluar esta ética, debemos analizar exactamente en qué creen, qué es lo que proponen y en qué se basan los promotores de este tipo de creencias.

A diferencia de los seguidores del Cristianismo y de otras religiones, los teístas (panteístas, antrópicos y algunos agnósticos) no creen en textos revelados ni en profetas iluminados; ellos más bien manifiestan que tienen la “sensación” de que existe algo más que la realidad que percibimos con los sentidos y que el Universo no es producto del azar, sino el resultado de un plan preconcebido por un ente cuyos designios sólo podemos intuirlos a través de la meditación y la observación de la naturaleza y sus leyes.

Por ejemplo, los antropistas o antrópicos aseguran que las leyes y las condiciones del universo están “calibradas” de tal manera que propicien la aparición no sólo de la vida, sino de la vida inteligente y consciente. Dicen que si el Sol fuera más caliente o más frío o si la órbita de la Tierra fuera diferente (es decir, si la Tierra estuviera más cerca o más lejos del Sol), no hubiera ocurrido el fenómeno de la vida en este planeta. También aseguran que si el ciclo de la vida de las estrellas fuera más breve no habría tiempo de que se desarrollara vida inteligente en los planetas; que si ocurrieran con más frecuencia explosiones de supernovas, esto interrumpiría continuamente el desarrollo de la vida. En fin, estos pensadores suponen la existencia de un ente cuasiconsciente que elaboró desde el principio de los tiempos un proyecto o programa que ha venido guiando el desarrollo del Universo.

Las creencias de los panteístas son parecidas a las de los antrópicos, aun cuando su cosmología está menos desarrollada. Pero la diferencia fundamental entre ambos es que los primeros suponen que puede existir una comunicación “espiritual” entre el ente rector del universo llamado Dios y las criaturas inteligentes que lo habitan, mientras que los segundos no creen que se pueda establecer alguna clase de comunicación con este ser, y que cualesquiera que sean sus planes y proyectos trascendentes, éstos ya están contenidos en las leyes del universo.

Aunque no me parecen descabelladas estas ideas (especialmente si las comparamos con las propuestas absurdas de las religiones tradicionales), no creo que puedan servir de base para la elaboración de una ética universal, por la sencilla razón de que nadie sabe exactamente cuáles son las intenciones y cuál es la meta final de este ser rector del universo. Es más, nadie sabe exactamente qué desea este ser, si es que desea algo o si es que existe.  

LA ETICA REALISTA

La palabra “ateísmo” es engañosa, pues da la impresión de que quienes lo practicamos estamos en contra de alguien o de algo, o que negamos a alguien o a algo. Incluso existen algunos teólogos malintencionados que aseguran que los ateos somos personas soberbias que odiamos a Dios por pura arrogancia, como lo hizo hace mucho tiempo el rebelde ángel Luzbel. Esta opinión, además de ser una puerilidad, constituye una trampa, pues parte de dos premisas falsas: que existe Dios y que existe el Demonio. No vamos a discutir aquí la leyenda de Luzbel, pues no nos interesa el folclor judeo-cristiano. Lo único que vamos a dejar en claro es que no podemos odiar a alguien en quien no creemos. Si alguien le preguntara a un teólogo cristiano si odia a Odín, a Quetzalcoatl o a Zeus, seguramente contestará que no puede odiar a un dios falso (es decir, inexistente). Pues bien, los ateos consideramos que también son inexistentes los dioses de todas las religiones, incluyendo a Zeus, Jehová, Odín, Visnú, etc., pues jamás han dado una sola prueba de su existencia. Lo que dicen los textos “sagrados” como la Biblia, el Corán, los Vedas, etc. no constituye una prueba de su existencia, ya que ni siquiera hay certeza de la existencia histórica de sus autores. Y aun cuando pudiera documentarse fehacientemente la existencia del autor de algún texto “sagrado”, esto no sería garantía de que lo que escribió es verdadero. Por ejemplo, durante siglos se ha dudado de la existencia histórica del poeta griego Homero; sin embargo, si se llegara verificar con toda certeza su existencia, esto no garantizaría que todas las hazañas de Odiseo fueron reales, pues hasta ahora no se han descubierto rastros de seres parecidos a los cíclopes o a las sirenas. 

Consideramos que no se puede basar la ética en las enseñanzas de un dios cuya existencia nunca se ha demostrado, ya se trate de un ente filosófico como el dios de los antrópicos y los panteístas, o de un dios mitológico como el de todas las religiones basadas en textos “sagrados”. Por lo tanto, la única ética posible es la que dimane de una filosofía materialista y de ciertos hechos científicamente respaldados, y este es el caso de la ética realista, la cual parte del supuesto de que el Hombre no es más que un primate de la clase de los mamíferos, y que lo único que lo diferencia de los demás animales es el tamaño de su cerebro, su gran capacidad para manipular objetos y su legado cultural. La sinergia entre estas tres características es lo que ha permitido al ser humano los actuales niveles de conocimiento científico, de manipulación tecnológica y de desarrollo artístico. Hasta donde sabemos, el hombre es el único animal que ha podido acumular generación tras generación conocimientos científicos y metodologías tecnológicas y trasmitirlos a sus descendientes; también es el único animal capaz de apreciar la belleza en todas sus manifestaciones. Por otra parte, aunque no es la única especie que tiene en alta estima el amor en todas sus formas (quien posea una mascota seguramente sabrá que existe un lazo de amor entre él y el animal elegido como mascota), es el mamífero que más sufre si se le priva de éste, especialmente en la infancia (se ha comprobado que un bebé puede morir si se le priva de afecto durante los primeros meses de vida, aunque se le proporcione alimento y cuidados físicos).       

La ética realista también parte del supuesto de que no existe el bien “en sí” ni el mal “en sí”; es decir, que la bondad y la maldad no son ideas abstractas con vida propia, sino conceptos derivados de la convivencia social y de la Historia, y que fuera de las sociedades humanas éstos conceptos no tienen sentido alguno. Por ejemplo, un león no es “malo” porque mata gacelas para comérselas. Tampoco es “buena” una pantera que ofrenda su vida para defender a sus cachorros.

Otra premisa básica de la ética realista es que, si bien podemos calificar como buena o mala la intencionalidad de una acción, es todavía más importante analizar a quién o a quienes perjudica o beneficia ésta. Por ejemplo, si un monje hace penitencia “para expiar sus pecados”, ¿a quién beneficia su sacrificio? No sabemos si existe la divinidad a la que le “ofrece su dolor” o si a esta divinidad le agradan los actos de masoquismo; pero supongamos que existe este dios, que sí le halagan estas muestras de sumisión y que efectivamente perdona los pecados del monje. ¿Esto en qué beneficia a sus congéneres? Desde el punto de vista de la ética realista, este acto de penitencia no es una acción “buena”, sino más bien egoísta, ya que el monje sólo piensa en sus pecados y en su posible perdón, pero nunca en los beneficios que esto podría traer a sus semejantes.

Antes de analizar más a fondo qué es la ética realista, debemos tratar de entender qué es la ética, o más bien qué se ha entendido por “ética” a lo largo de la Historia. Etimológicamente, proviene del griego ethos, que significa carácter o comportamiento. Si consideramos que el Hombre es esencialmente un animal social (un zoon politikon, como diría Aristóteles), entonces también queda sobreentendido que se refiere al comportamiento del hombre frente a sus semejantes. Aunque los egipcios y los hebreos ya tenían preceptos éticos, éstos se circunscribían casi exclusivamente a “mandamientos” divinos; es decir, se trataba de normas morales absolutamente obligatorias y carentes de explicaciones o fundamentos. Los primeros pensadores que iniciaron el estudio filosófico de la ética fueron los sofistas, y de entre ellos destaca Protágoras, quien sostenía que las normas morales no eran mandamientos divinos sino deberes sociales que permitían el buen funcionamiento de las sociedades. Por su parte, Platón sostenía que existía un mundo moral ideal al cual debía adecuarse el comportamiento humano. Pero este eminente filósofo nunca se tomó el trabajo de explicar en dónde se encontraba este mundo moral ni cómo se había enterado de su existencia. Finalmente, Aristóteles, aunque aseguraba que la ética sólo podía basarse en la razón, y que su finalidad era la felicidad humana, sostenía que ésta debía ajustarse a los designios divinos. Posteriormente aparecieron otros pensadores que abordaron el tema desde distintas perspectivas, como Spinoza, Kant y Hegel (y otros muchos, cuya lista sería interminable); pero prácticamente todos coincidían en considerar a la ética como un catálogo de deberes y obligaciones dictados por la Divinidad, la Razón, la Naturaleza u otros entes abstractos cuyos planes y deseos sólo eran conocidos por algunos iluminados. Y ya que hablamos de iluminados, creo conveniente incluir a Sidartha Gautama, uno de los pocos pensadores antiguos que propuso un manual de ética más o menos sensato (El Óctuple Camino), cuyas ideas fueron retomadas por los estoicos.     

La síntesis presentada en el párrafo anterior está exageradamente resumida, ya que su única intención es enmarcar en una perspectiva histórica la idea equivocada que han sostenido la mayoría de los pensadores: que la ética es un catálogo de obligaciones que compelen al individuo a actuar de tal o cual manera, siguiendo los lineamientos de una entidad abstracta cuyos planes y deseos sólo ellos conocen o suponen que conocen. Por ejemplo, Hegel sostenía que el ciudadano debía sacrificarse por su patria; Ignacio de Loyola aseguraba que estaba justificada cualquier atrocidad para defender la “verdadera” religión (es decir, la religión católica), y no olvidemos el ya mencionado “imperativo categórico” de Kant.     

                                     
La ética realista, por el contrario, está basada en dos sólidos pilares: a) Una reflexión filosófica seria y rigurosa sobre hechos históricos, biológicos, psicológicos, y sociales verificables, y b) los fines e intereses del individuo y de la sociedad en la que está inmerso. Además, no exige más de lo que puede ofrecer un individuo mentalmente sano y que viva en una sociedad más o menos libre y empática. Como todas las demás, la ética realista propone el altruismo, pero no de cualquier clase: propone el altruismo razonado. Se trata de una ética de círculos concéntricos: primero yo, después mi familia, después mis amigos, después mis conocidos, después mi comunidad y finalmente toda la humanidad (no necesariamente en ese orden).       

La mayoría de los zoólogos coinciden en que los animales tienen como máxima prioridad la sobrevivencia y la satisfacción de sus necesidades. Por lo tanto, si yo también soy un animal y si lo más importante es mi supervivencia y mi bienestar, ¿por qué debo practicar el altruismo si no existe ninguna divinidad ni ente suprahumano que me lo ordene? Por dos razones: por conveniencia y por empatía. Por ejemplo, un padre enfurecido porque su hijo quemó su casa, probablemente arriesgará la vida para salvarlo de las llamas. En este caso el amor paternal es más fuerte que la furia por haber perdido su patrimonio. También puede ocurrir que, dominado por la avaricia, un hombre esté a punto de realizar un acto que pudiera hacerle perder a su mejor amigo. En tal caso probablemente renuncie a un bien muy apetecible con tal de mantener la amistad y el aprecio del amigo en cuestión.

Pero, ¿qué sucede cuando simplemente tengo la elección entre beneficiar a los demás o a mí mismo? Esto no se puede responder si no se ubica en un contexto real e histórico. En este caso, ¿quiénes son “los demás” y de qué beneficio estamos hablando? Por otra parte, si beneficio a “los demás”, ¿yo quedo excluido totalmente de este beneficio? Nuevamente recurramos a un ejemplo: Si “los demás” son mis hijos, y se trata de repartir el último pan de la alacena, yo creo que bien vale la pena hacer el sacrificio.         

Los ejemplos anteriores demuestran que todo es circunstancial e histórico. Pero también debemos hacer énfasis en que sólo con una apropiada educación de los niños, en el más amplio sentido de la palabra, se puede crear una sociedad empática y cooperativa. Desde que nace el niño recibe, principalmente de sus padres, un flujo continuo de una porción de la enorme herencia cultural que ha acumulado la humanidad a lo largo de milenios. Este mecanismo de asimilación o interiorización continúa en las escuelas y durante las interacciones sociales hasta la edad adulta y aún más allá. Dicho proceso educativo no consiste únicamente en la trasmisión/recepción de conocimientos y habilidades, sino también en el entrenamiento para el control de los sentimientos y emociones y para el refinamiento o afinamiento de los gustos y las percepciones. Si un hombre no aprende a controlar sus sentimientos y emociones se convierte en un individuo irascible, intolerante, patológicamente egoísta y finalmente en un inadaptado social. Si no logra refinar o afinar sus gustos y percepciones jamás logrará disfrutar del arte, la amistad, y el amor. No olvidemos que hasta para paladear un buen vino se requiere del entrenamiento y/o refinamiento del sentido del gusto.

Cuando el ser humano llega a cierta edad, comienza a tomar más en serio sus conflictos éticos, especialmente cuando se involucra por primera vez en proyectos (moralmente) idealistas, ya sean personales, políticos o comunitarios. Estos conflictos surgen debido a la confrontación entre sus intereses “egoístas” y sus ideales o intereses “altruistas”. No obstante, las más de las veces éste es un falso conflicto, ya que ambos intereses pueden no ser contradictorios. Por ejemplo, si un joven egresado de una escuela de medicina está indeciso entre instalar un consultorio en la ciudad e iniciar una lucrativa práctica médica o irse a recorrer rancherías para ayudar a curar campesinos, no tiene por qué angustiarse: puede optar por lo segundo y, si después de algunos años se le “acaba” el idealismo, podrá regresar a la ciudad. Si, por el contrario, la atención a los desamparados le satisface más con el paso de los años y esto le da sentido a su vida, puede decidir no regresar a la ciudad, aunque viva con ciertas limitaciones.                             
Todos los conflictos morales pueden arreglarse utilizando apropiadamente y con buena disposición el sano egoísmo y los buenos instintos. Así, desde el punto de vista del altruismo razonado, un hombre que arriesga su vida para salvar a alguien que se está ahogando puede ser calificado de imprudente; pero un individuo que sin arriesgar su vida no salva a alguien que se está ahogando, no merece otro adjetivo que el de moralmente autista. En el primer caso el hombre se dejó llevar por sus instintos de solidaridad y empatía, pero de cualquier modo prestó un servicio a la sociedad; en el segundo caso sólo puede decirse que se trata de un individuo que tiene embotados sus sentimientos de solidaridad y empatía, por lo que será disfuncional en cualquier sociedad.

¿Qué se requiere para implantar la ética realista en nuestro convulsionado mundo, antes de que nos destruya la guerra atómica, el cambio climático, el caos ecológico o alguna pandemia? En primer lugar, eliminar la influencia de las castas sacerdotales y demás “guías espirituales”. Mientras subsista la influencia de sacerdotes y otros intermediarios entre los dioses y la humanidad  que compelan a los hombres a seguir los deseos de las divinidades, todas las éticas tendrán como objetivo que los individuos y las sociedades cumplan con sus mandamientos, y estos mandamientos seguirán siendo los que les convengan a la casta sacerdotal. Pero también hay sacerdotes laicos promotores del culto a la Patria, a la Raza, a la Cultura Occidental, al Estado, al Proletariado, al Capitalismo, etc. (Hitler, Stalin y Pol Pot son apenas algunos ejemplos). Estos sacerdotes laicos sostienen que los individuos no valen nada si no están al servicio de una causa gloriosa y trascendente. Por supuesto que no estamos en contra de las causas grandiosas (como serían la conquista de Marte, la trasformación del Sahara en un vergel, etc.). A lo que nos oponemos es a que estas causas sean convertidas en fetiches y se obligue a los hombres a rendirles culto.

Otra cosa que impide la propagación de la ética realista es la perversión de los instintos provocada por una mala educación dentro de la familia, ambientes sociales demasiado adversos y el bombardeo ideológico de los medios de comunicación mercantilizados, que promueven el egoísmo miope, el hedonismo barato y la violencia gratuita. Esto propicia el embotamiento de los sanos instintos y de los sentimientos de solidaridad y empatía, y genera una multitud de individuos patológicamente egoístas o, lo que es peor, moralmente autistas, es decir, incapaces de conmoverse ante el sufrimiento ajeno o involucrarse en actividades sociales o comunales que no les reditúen recompensas inmediatas y tangibles.             

Finalmente tenemos la falta de visión histórica, social y política de las clases dirigentes. La mayor parte de los miembros de las plutocracias, especialmente en los países del Tercer Mundo, piensan que apartándose físicamente de la “chusma” y refugiándose en recintos amurallados y protegidos estarán a salvo de la delincuencia y de los conflictos sociales. No obstante, mientras formen parte de una sociedad, tarde o temprano también serán víctimas de un un robo, secuestro u homicidio y, en caso de un estallido social, serán los primeros en sufrir sus consecuencias. Su sano egoísmo debería indicarles que vale la pena sacrificar un poco de su riqueza para propiciar una comunidad humana más justa e igualitaria, lo que a su vez producirá seguridad, paz y armonía social.

ESTEBAN TORRES
ABRIL DE 2009

Otros artículos filosóficos:

El Jesús de Rousseau