Dear Lord Howell,

In the light of last week’s jailing of Bahraini human rights activist Nabeel Rajab, and last nights killing of 16 year-old protester Hussam Al Haddad, I write to you to request clarification of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office position on Bahrain the “Arab Spring”.

In particular, I request that make clear your position on the following statement attributed to you on the Bahrain News Agency website, dated 29th June, 2012:

“The Minister of State at Foreign & Commonwealth Office said that Bahrain was considered an example in the region and its situation should not be linked to the Arab Spring because the matters were completely different in this case, as the country had achieved remarkable reforms over more than ten years.”

http://www.iaa.bh/pressReleasedetails.aspx?id=243

The context is a meeting which took place in London that month between yourself and Bahrain Minister of Interior Lt-General Sheikh Rashid bin Abdullah Al Khalifa.

According to the BNA, Mr. Rashid Al Khalifa also met with the Director General MI5 Jonathan Evans, Home Office Minister James Brokenshire, Northern Ireland Minister Hugo Swire and Attorney-General Dominic Grieve, and others.

Your words on the FCO website seem more guarded:

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=781036282

I ask you plainly: Is is it or is it not HMG’s position that Bahrain is not part of, or “should not be linked to”, the “Arab Spring”? Is the BNA representing your position accurately?

Any objective analysis of the rhetoric, actions, goals and aspirations of the Bahrain opposition, the slogans, tactics, and attitudes of the protesters in Bahrain, and the often brutal and repressive actions of the current Bahrain government in response to the protests will show that Bahrain is indeed part of the “Arab Spring.”

Indeed, Bahrain has seen, as a percentage of population, the largest and most representative protests of all the countries that have undergone “revolutions of dignity” (as they are known in Arabic) since the current wave of protests began in December 2010.

Moreover, the things that the protesters are protesting about: the crisis of political legitimacy and representation in Bahrain, the lack of genuinely democratic and civil society institutions, and the Al Khalifa state’s institutionalised sectarianism, have direct parallels with the grievances of protesters and opposition movements in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, the Yemen and elsewhere.

In their final crises the regimes headed by Assad, Gaddhafi, and Mubarak all claimed commitment to “reform” with Syria, for example, holding elections. In these instances the FCO rightly condemned such “reform” as a sham, yet, flying in the face of objective evidence and expert opinion, it is only too happy to take Bahrain’s claims to reform at face value.

I worked on one of the Crown Prince of Bahrain’s reform projects 2007-2011, was an eye-witness to the initial uprisings in the spring of 2011, have submitted substantial evidence to the BICI, and know first hand the deeply divided nature of the present regime and the hollow, “on-paper” nature of so many of its reforms, pre- and post-BICI.

It might seem — from the perspective of London — to be an adroit piece of positioning to isolate the “Arab Spring” as a phenomenon affecting only the historically anti-Western Arab republics, to pretend that the monarchical dictatorships of the GCC are immune from the uprisings, and to view the extension of GCC power beyond the Arabian Peninsula as an opportunity to consolidate Western interests in a rapidly changing region.

However, such an approach takes no account whatsoever of the situation on the ground in the Arabic-speaking Middle East, where a new generation hungry for the democracy, freedom, civil and increasingly open societies found elsewhere in the developing world make little if any distinction between the any of the region’s post-colonial dictatorships, be they republican or monarchical.

All are seem as equally rotten, of-the-past, part of the problem not the solution. At the turn of the millennium, in the year 2000, you, Lord Howell, wrote eloquently of “the Edge of Now” calling for innovation in economic, political, and social thinking; more recently, you revised your thesis in the light of an “age of revolutions” demanding “new paradigms for leadership”. In 2007 you called for:

” … Deeper recognition by society’s leaders … of the changed nature of authority in all its forms. Deeper understanding that heavy centralism, uniformity and hierarchy are no longer the key requirements of order, that in an age of interactivity and networks, when people can talk back, Authority has to earn respect and loyalty in new ways , to concentrate on new tasks and learn new techniques of governing. The whole approach to the organization of society has to become far more modest and circuitous.”

http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-028/politics/30013952_1_new-age-revolutions-new-paradigm/2#ixzz23tnJ5VXe

Then you re-entered government. In the light of the on-going arrests and killings in Bahrain, it is very hard to square these sentiments with the level of support that the FCO is giving to the widely discredited and ultimately unsustainable regime in Bahrain.

I wonder whether the grieving father of young Hussam Al Haddad would think the Al Khalifa regime, “reform” notwithstanding, is in any way remotely capable of embracing the model of leadership you have described above.

In a C21st in which the world will undergo a profound reordering of geo-political power, a “new paradigm” is very much required for Britain’s foreign policy in the MENA region. Clinging to the old certainties of the mid-C20th will not serve the British interest of the mid-C21st.

What might serve long-term British interest in the region is to give even-handed and consistent support to all who seek to attain against a background of tyranny the freedoms that we all too often take for granted.

I look forward to reading your clarification on Bahrain and the “Arab Spring.”

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Mike Diboll.

CC

William Hague, MP
Alistair Burt, MP
Nicholas Soames, MP

Originally published in The Journal of Military History 74 (October 2010): 1272-73.  The review has been updated.

The traditional historical view is that religion played a limited role in European international relations and warfare after the Thirty Years War (1618-1648).  Historians have argued that political and economic interests prevailed over religion as the primary factors in international relations and the causes of conflict after 1648.  Dr David Onnekink, an Assistant Professor of the Early Modern History of International Relations at the University of Utrecht, has edited a collection of essays written by political, military, cultural, and religious historians that challenge, to various degrees, the traditional belief about the small role of religion in European international relations and warfare between the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and Peace of Utrecht (1713).  The essays examine what has been called the “Dark Alliance” between religion and war.  They stress the relationship between war, foreign policy, and religion.

The first four essays investigate the role of religion in the formulation of foreign policy in France, Spain, England, and the Dutch Republic.  Paul Sonnino looks at Louis XIV’s policy in the era of the Dutch War (1672-78).  He points out that religion, despite some religious dissent at home, played little role in the conflict, which included fighting the Protestant powers of the United Provinces and Brandenburg, as well as the Catholic powers of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, in the quest to gain the Spanish Netherlands.  But, after the conflict, the Sun King began to rid himself of religious dissention within his borders in the event of a new war.  In his essay, Christopher Storrs argues that Carlos II of Spain (1665-1700) pursued a pragmatic foreign policy allying with Catholic and Protestant powers in the struggle to defend the Spanish Empire against the designs of Louis XIV in Europe.  Even so, religion served a more significant role in the formulation of imperial policy abroad.  Andrew C. Thompson believes that the Protestant interest played an important part in British politics, and religious views influenced foreign policy and the pursuit of a balance of power.  David Onnekink asserts that Dutch foreign policy was swayed by the fear of the perceived Catholic threat of France, England (while James II was on the throne), and the Holy Roman Empire leading up to the outbreak of the Nine Years War (1688-1697).  However, he stresses that the conflict was not fought along religious lines.

Two historians deal with warfare during this period. K.A.J. McLay argues that the perceived role of Providence in battle was being replaced by a growing secular approach to the art of warfare.  He emphasizes the professionalism of operational planning, the structuring of command, and battlefield management in the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13). Preparation and skill had more to do with victories and defeats than the favor of Providence during this era.  In the other essay, Matthew Glozier studies French Huguenot refugees that fought in Anglo-Dutch supported invasions of France during the Nine Years War, in attempts to force Louis XIV to rethink the Edict of Fontainebleau (1685) that had taken away the right of Huguenots to practice their religion in France.  The author finds nothing predictable about Huguenot militancy.  Some Huguenots were inspired by their religious beliefs, while others fought as professional soldiers (p. 153).

The remaining essays address an assortment of issues. Jill Stern explores the rhetoric in Dutch political pamphlets from 1648 to 1672, and believes that religion continued to be an important factor in the matters of war and peace.  Stéphane Jettot discusses the role of politics and religion in the activities of three English diplomats at Catholic courts in Spain and France from the 1660s to 1680s.  Stephen Taylor looks at the views of the Englishman Roger Morrice with respect to his Protestant-oriented reporting of European events in the Entring Book, a journal of public affairs, in the 1680s.  Emma Bergin investigates Dutch pamphlets concerning the Glorious Revolution in England (1688-89), concluding that the Dutch public continued to see foreign policy issues in religious terms.  Donald Haks delves into how the Dutch States General employed religious rhetoric to unite their countrymen in defense against Louis XIV from 1672 to 1713.

This interesting collection of essays rekindles the debate over the influence of religion in western European politics and warfare in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The authors vary in terms of their methodology and opinions regarding the impact of religion on foreign policy and warfare.  But, these essays serve to show that religion continued to be a factor in international relations and warfare during this period.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

In the past few decades some historians have cast doubt that there was ever a Pax Britannica during the nineteenth century.  They argue that British power began to decline after the Napoleonic Wars.  These historians believe that Britain had limited means of using power after 1815 and that British military and naval power played a small role in preserving peace during the nineteenth century.

Dr Rebecca Berens Matzke, an Associate Professor of History at Ripon College in Wisconsin, refutes these arguments.  The author professes that Britain’s diplomatic and naval power during the mid-nineteenth century was based on economic and naval strength.  She stresses that the Royal Navy’s primary role was as a deterrent force in the nineteenth century.  With its intimidating fleet, enhanced by steam-powered warships, supported by strong political, economic, and financial backing, British naval power was a real threat.  British leadership had the primary goals of maintaining peace, stability, and equilibrium, in the quest of promoting and securing British interests.  Naval power was used to intimidate other states, deter conflict or limit the scope of conflict, as well as press home British offensive power when required.  Naval power allowed Britain to exert a free hand policy, instead of relying on allies, in crisis situations.

Matzke examines three diplomatic crises during the early Victorian Age (1838-1846).  These include crises with the United States over boundary issues in Maine and Oregon, along with the Alexander McLeod incident; the First Opium War with China (1839-1842); and the Syrian Crisis (1839-1841) in the eastern Mediterranean.  In her examination of the crises in North America, China, and the Mediterranean, Matzke shows that British naval power did influence other states during the early Victorian era.

The author makes a convincing argument that British diplomacy, backed by the Royal Navy, put Britain in the forefront of the Great Powers in the early Victorian age.  Her study is based on primary source research including private correspondence, notes, and journals of statesmen.  This study should be read by students and scholars interested in British diplomacy and international relations in the nineteenth century.

Dr William Young
University of North Dakota
Grand Forks, North Dakota

This article was originally published by AFP on June 25, 2012 . You can read the full story here.

LONDON (AFP) — It sounds like a brainteaser: how could WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange get from Ecuador’s embassy in London onto a plane to its capital Quito, without setting foot on British territory?

When he walked into the embassy on Tuesday seeking political asylum, the Australian ex-hacker pinned his hopes on Ecuador as his ticket out of extradition to Sweden, where he faces questioning over sex crime allegations.

But legal experts say the dramatic escape bid has lured 40-year-old Assange, who had exhausted his British legal options — into an apparent dead end.

Britain’s Foreign Office says that as long as the anti-secrecy campaigner stays in the embassy, which occupies a flat in London’s plush Knightsbridge district, he is beyond the reach of the police.

But if he steps outside, he faces immediate arrest by the police for having breached bail conditions, which include staying at his bail address between 10:00 pm and 8:00 am. And Scotland Yard officers are guarding the exits.

Barrister Carl Gardner summed up the situation as “a headache”.

“Merely the fact of giving someone asylum doesn’t mean they can travel across another country’s territory without being arrested,” he said.

“It’s not at all obvious how he could get to Ecuador.”

Paul Whiteway, London Director of the Independent Diplomat consultancy, said Assange could be arrested even before leaving the embassy’s Victorian mansion block, which faces the famous Harrods department store.

“The premises are covered by diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention,” he told AFP. “But in this case, the Ecuadorian embassy only occupies part of the building.”

He added: “The inviolability of the embassy ought to extend to forms of transport, but even if he were able to get into a car, what would happen at the other end? How would he get into an aeroplane without being arrested?”

The puzzle has already spawned a number of ambitious escape scenarios.

There has been speculation over whether Ecuadorian officials could bundle Assange out of Britain in a large “diplomatic bag” with immunity from search or seizure.

In a notorious case in 1984, the Nigerian government tried to kidnap former minister Umaru Dikko by smuggling him from Britain to Nigeria as diplomatic baggage. The plot was foiled by customs officials.

Gardner dismissed the idea that Assange would be put in a diplomatic bag as the stuff of “spy fiction”, but had his own inventive suggestion.

“Possibly the best way Ecuador could help him — and this sounds mad — is if they appoint him one of their representatives to the UN,” the former government lawyer said.

Legal experts say British authorities could reject any attempts to have Assange accredited as an ordinary diplomat.

But Gardner believes that if Assange was made a representative to the UN, international law could guarantee him safe passage to the UN’s New York headquarters and then to his post in Ecuador.

“From his point of view, it would be flying into the jaws of the lion,” he admitted, stressing that the plan involved “extreme legal creativity”.

Assange has said he fears that if he was extradited to Sweden, Stockholm would eventually hand him over to the United States.

The WikiLeaks website enraged Washington by publishing a flood of secret US information about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and more than 250,000 classified US diplomatic cables.

Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa, who has often been at odds with Washington, has said he is considering Assange’s asylum request and studying the WikiLeaks founder’s claim that he could be sentenced to death in the United States.

Correa insists Ecuador will make a decision “without bowing to absolutely any pressure”.

But he also said: “We don’t want to offend anyone, least of all a country for whom we have deep respect, like the United Kingdom.”

Whiteway believes British authorities are determined not to let Assange leave because his success could spark a wave of copycat asylum bids.

“It could open the floodgates to other cases of individuals involved in legal cases who might seek to avoid UK jurisdiction by claiming asylum in a foreign embassy,” he said. “That would surely be deeply unwelcome.”

Ecuador has pledged to take its time assessing Assange’s request.

In extreme cases, asylum-seekers have stayed holed up in embassies for years. In 1956, the United States granted Hungarian cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty refuge in its Budapest embassy. He stayed until 1971.

Bishop Ezekiel Kondo of Khartoum and Archbishop Rowan Williams

The Foreign Office reports there is no evidence of an anti-Christian pogrom being waged by the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum.

In a written statement given in response to a question from the Bishop of Bath and Wells, Foreign Office Minister Lord Howell on 23 May 2012 said “We have no evidence that there is a state orchestrated campaign against Christians. However, recent rhetoric by government leaders on the north-south conflict has led to tension between communities and fear of attacks against South Sudanese in Sudan, many of whom are Christians.”

The government’s view of the conditions in Sudan is at odds with reports from Sudanese Christians and NGOs. Southern Christians living in the North were stripped of their Sudanese citizenship and are being expelled to the South, forcing hundreds of thousands into refugee settlement. In a 12 Oct 2011 speech to university students in Khartoum, President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan stated: “Ninety-eight percent of the people are Muslims and the new constitution will reflect this. The official religion will be Islam and Islamic law the main source [of the constitution]. We call it a Muslim state.”

Last year Bishop Ezekiel Kondo of Khartoum reported that in his home province, South Kordifan, now on the Khartoum government’s side of the border between North and South, the Islamist government was engaged in the religious cleansing of the province, driving Christian Nuba across the border and burning the region’s principle town of Abyei.

The violence prompted a statement from the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Rowan Williams. “Numerous villages have been bombed. More than 53,000 people have been driven from their homes. The new Anglican cathedral in Kadugli has been burned down,” Dr. Williams reported, adding that “many brutal killings are being reported.”

However in his statement to Parliament last month, the minister said the British government was “very concerned by a recent attack on a church in Khartoum, although there was no evidence of state involvement. We welcome the announcement from the Ministry of Religious Guidance and Endowments of an investigation into the incident and urge them to ensure this enquiry is thorough, independent and timely. We continue to remind the Government of Sudan of their obligation to protect all of their civilians, including those in religious groups.”

In response to a second question from Bishop Peter Prince concerning the disputed border provinces, Lord Howell said the British government had pressed both sides to come to the negotiating table.

“We are also encouraging the Government in Sudan to put in place a political process of constitutional reform that will address the needs and views of all its people, including those in the conflict affected states of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei,” Lord Howell said.

In May 2011, the Sudanese army occupied Abyei following a three-day clash with South Sudanese troops. Christian Solidarity Worldwide reported that a dispute over who could vote in the independence referendum in the state led to the clashes. Sudan had argued that the Miseriya, a nomadic northern tribe that roam into Abyei in order to feed and water their livestock, should be included in the referendum, while South Sudan maintained that only the Ngok Dinka people who reside in Abyei should participate.

After the Sudanese Army entered the province, approximately 130,000 Ngok Dinka residents were displaced to the south and forced to seek assistance from aid agencies. Last week Sudan agreed to honour UN Security Council Resolution 2046 and pulled its troops out of Abyei.

CSW’s Advocacy Director Andrew Johnston said his organization welcomed the troop withdrawal. But the resumption of peace talks “must not be allowed to obscure the Sudanese government’s responsibility for the creation of humanitarian crises not only in Abyei, but also in Darfur and most recently, in the Nuba Mountains, where access is being denied to a civilian population that is deliberately targeted by the military and faces imminent starvation.”

Lord Howell told Parliament the UK has worked hard to “ensure United Nations Security Council Resolution 2046, which supports the roadmap, dealt with Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State under a Chapter VII mandate.”

“We continue to remind the Government of Sudan of their obligation to protect civilians and allow humanitarian access to both states. I welcomed the news that South Sudan have withdrawn their remaining security forces from Abyei on 11 May, and we now urge the Sudanese security forces to do the same,” the minister said.

First printed in The Church of England Newspaper.

My own view is that while an ethical case can be made for active intervention such a step would at this stage be foolhardy and premature. Ruling out military intervention does not mean sitting idly by to wait for the next Houla. This obviously raises the thorny question of what I would actually do if I woke up to find myself Foreign Secretary for the day. 

Below is my 7 Point Plan! 

1. The Annan 6 point plan is not just the right plan it’s the only plan. The Plan just needs to be properly implemented. We need to  strengthen the UN presence in Syria so that the calming influence of UN observers is brought more centre stage.

2. We need to coax Russia into using its influence to actively press President Assad to engage more fully with the Annan plan. The only way we are going to do that is by playing to Russian self-interest. We should stress that by engineering a safe transition for Syria, Russia could earn the goodwill of the Syrian people as well as neighbouring countries.  

3. The international community needs to reverse the fragmentation within the opposition. Sanctions on their own are not going to work. If I was a Christian in Damascus there would be no way that I would switch allegiances until the opposition had a more clearly thought out programme for democratic transition. All groups – Christians, businessmen, even Alawites – have to be able to see that they have a stake in a post-Assad Syria.

4. Licking the opposition into some form of coherent and credible shape would help to chip away at Assad’s supporter base. Even if the base proves more resilient than anticipated, developing a credible opposition at least remove some of the existing obstacles to military intervention. A tightening sanctions regime (stick) allied to a convincing political pact (carrot) might however make military intervention unnecessary.  

5. We need to revisit the idea of humanitarian corridors and safe havens. This is no easy task – either to set up or enforce – but the worsening situation on the ground requires us to look a fresh at how we meet the humanitarian challenge.

6. Turning to the wider region, the international community needs to store up the resilience of Lebanon’s confessional political system which is being sorely tested by the unrest in Syria. Shouldn’t we be encouraging the formation of a government of national unity in Syria to manage the emerging internal tensions? The government ought to impress on all parties the need to resolve the conflict in Syria in a way that does not endanger Lebanon’s hard won stability and calm.

7. Encourage the churches to take the following steps. First, reach out to the Russian Orthodox Church in the hope that additional pressure can be brought to bear on the Russian government. Second, look creatively at whether they can assist Lebanon’s religious leaders manage the confessional tensions. Third, get the churches to talk to the UK faith-based development agencies like CAFOD and Christian Aid as well as the mission agencies to see whether they are doing all that they can to meet the humanitarian need both in Syria and on its borders. They are after all the agencies of the Churches and the primary vehicle through which they do development and humanitarian relief.

Let me know what you think about my 7 Point Plan. Alternatively, let me know what you would do if you were Foreign Secretary for a day.

The juxtaposition here between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is striking. In a world where power is gradually seeping Eastwards – such that new polarities are emerging – bilateral diplomacy will become ever more important. This explains why the British Government is investing so heavily in building up its diplomatic network and presence in Latin American and the Far East.

Are there lessons here for the Churches and wider civil society?

If power is becoming more diffuse and if we really are entering a ‘G-Zero world’ then relying on traditional networks to influence policy is unlikely to have much traction. Organizing civil society demonstrations here in the UK might help to store up the government’s public diplomacy in international meetings. It might also on occasion serve to check certain policy stances adopted by the government that we find distasteful. But, when the government’s ability to realize the change we want is waning isn’t it high time we re-thought our own strategy of political engagement?

If we are concerned by the unfolding sectarian civil war in Syria and if we feel strongly enough that there are important principles that need defending then merely targeting the British Government to do more isn’t going to achieve much.

If Russia and China are the stumbling blocks for more concerted international action on Syria, then surely it makes better sense for us as Churches to reach out to the Russian Orthodox Church? If the response from the Russian Orthodox Church is muted, then we ought to redouble our efforts and identify those who do have access and influence with the Russian Orthodox Church.

All of this is by way of saying that churches and wider civil society need to rethink how they engage politically in a world that is undergoing far-reaching changes. Traditional methods of mobilizing and campaigning will become increasingly ineffective as the new disorder takes shape.

We need to take a leaf out of the government’s book. We need to look at ways in which we renew our alliances and relationships with partner organizations in those countries that are likely to have influence over the decisions that impact on our understanding of the common good.

Over the last 50 years an elaborate network of relationships has been developed that enables churches and civil society groups in the West to act as a voice for the voiceless. Institutions and bodies have been developed aplenty to structure these interactions. While we need to avoid any talk of reciprocity that strategy needs to be duplicated in reverse probably with a different set of partners.

Unless we are willing to think again about the Church’s mission in a networked centered world we are likely to find ourselves increasingly marginalized and frustrated. The first step in this recalibration is to recognise that even if the new rules are unclear the old ones don’t work.

Even though I don’t agree with everything in the Report, the Report’s very existence is to be welcomed. Last year the Foreign Secretary indicated that to save funds the Report would in future only be produced on-line.

The Report stands as an important record of the government’s human rights work over the course of the last year. Although an annual report can only look backwards it is a valuable tool in ensuring that there is public accountability and oversight at a time when human rights abuses across the world require Britain and others to show international leadership.

The Report deserves to be widely read. It is a helpful resource for anyone interested in Britain’s human rights record both on specific issues like freedom of religion or belief, and also particular countries of concern like Vietnam, Colombia and Uzbekistan. Interestingly and worryingly the Report lists a total of 28 countries in the ‘of concern’ category – the highest ever, with the inclusion of Fiji and South Sudan new entries to the list.

This year’s Report contains a specific section on the Arab Spring and Britain’s subsequent response. This section provides a helpful reminder of events even if the narrative presented is not always complete.

The Report makes much of David Cameron’s speech to the National Assembly in Kuwait on 22 February 2011 setting out the parameters of the UK’s approach to the Arab Spring. It omits, however, any mention that the Prime Minister was in Kuwait heading up a trade delegation to the Middle East primarily made up of arms exporters. How this fits in with the UK’s active support of a UN backed Arms Trade Treaty is far from clear.

This is not to imply that human rights should trump trade, but we do need greater clarity in the relationship between these two different strands of policy. The current strategy of using trade visits to also engage in “dialogue at all levels, including human rights,” is an obfuscation and needs revisiting. Separating out these strands of Britain’s foreign policy would allow a more structured dialogue on human rights and as well as on trade, which would be doubly advantageous.

The 2011 Human Rights and Democracy Report is in this respect a missed opportunity. Absent is any clear strategic framework to make sense of the Government’s human rights work. This makes its harder to assess the effectiveness of the work itself. The incomplete narrative also means it is difficult to gage whether and to what extent lessons have been learnt.

Denis MacShane, MP for Rotherham, who has recently taken a high profile stance against human rights abuses in Bahrain, needed little or no persuasion.  His undated letter was received this morning but it doesn’t make the usually highly qualified non-committal response typical of most politicians.  At least he makes it clear where he stands -

“Clearly arm sales to the region are a major problem as are the export of crowd control material.  Britain has a double standard – expressing support for democracy while looking for increased arms sales.”

“I worry more generally that the US and the Western powers want to see the army stay in power.”

However he’s also concerned about the alternative of an Islamist led parliamentary government.  I think perhaps he’s a little too pessimistic here as the Muslim Brotherhood covers a really wide spectrum of views and contains many moderates within its ranks.  Anyway he writes

“Sadly, the deeply reactionary politics of the Islamists and Salafists which already have destroyed the rights of many women in Egypt is not an alternative.  It will be a long slow process as Egypt gets a governance corresponding to the needs and aspirations of its’ people.”

What’s your view ?

To be fair scholars have been exploring this possibility for decades – Paul Kennedy’s seminal book the Rise and Fall of Great Powers (1984) is a case in point. Not suprisingly the financial meltdown of 2008 has resulted in a gold rush of simliar such publications.

Having enjoyed Charles Kupchan’s The End of the American Era (2002) I was willing to indulge his latest effort, No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn (2012).

As the title suggests, Kupchan’s core thesis is that the latest swing of the pendulum won’t result in a new American Century, a Chinese Century or even for that matter an Asia Century, it will be a world in which no one country dominates. He argues that a world where power is diffused across several zones isn’t new, but today’s globalised world is not one where different zones can exercise their power independently of one another.

What Beijing decides matters to Brussels, and what Brussels decides – if it can ever decide anything – matters to Washington and so on.

For Kupchan the end result is a globalised and interdependent world without a centre of gravity and without an anchor. Seen from this perspective the core challenge of our time is how we think about and practice world politics in a world that is no longer anchored by the West’s material and ideological primacy.

There is much that is familiar in Kupchan’s writings, but his argument that as emerging powers modernize, they are unlikely to slip neatly into the order that exists today, is challenging. If the existing order reflects our own modernity then surely it is presumptuous to assume that the emerging powers won’t bring to the table their own views about how to organize political, social, and commercial life?

The idea that we shouldn’t assume people want to become more like is a helpful tonic to much of today’s analysis about the transformations taking place in the Middle East today.

I’ve always been a little bit sceptical about the EU’s approach to the Arab Spring which is a modified version of the existing Neighbourhood Strategy first developed for Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. Put crudely this revised strategy amounts to an enlargement-lite strategy – where countries are rewarded with extra money, markets and mobility for delivering on key reforms without the promise of enlargement.

Even if EU member states can deliver much of the promised money, markets and mobility – which I think doubtful given the health of Europe’s economy and the state of public opinion – the strategy is built on the premise that countries comprising the Middle East and North Africa actually want to adopt European norms and standards. The evidence to date suggests otherwise and in some cases the trajectory is very clearly in the opposite direction.

Countries like Algeria and Egypt are fiercely protective of their independence and want to protect themselves from foreign and in particular Western influence. This is perhaps hardly surprising given the far too cosey relationships many of Europe’s leaders had with autocratic rulers in the region.

The nature of modernity that we slowly see emerging as the Arab Spring unfolds might well be very different to the one that we have crafted in the West. For a start our version of modernity – a product of the post-reformation era – saw religion removed from politics whereas what we are likely to see in the Middle East is a form of modernity where religion and politics are more closely aligned.

None of this is to say that we should throw our hands up in despair and reach for the JB and the sleeping pills. That others might not want to follow our path of modernity doesn’t diminish who we are or what we stand for. It merely means that we need to be tolerant of others who follow different paths.

Rather than resisting the move to multiple versions of modernity should we accept it and in so doing try to help shape the process? If we did so, might we find the end result, a form of global pluralism, nearer to our own set of core values? To do so however, we will need to recognise and accept, however shocking we may find it, that people don’t necessarily want to be like us.

Camp Liberty

The Archbishop of Armagh and six bishops of the Church of England have endorsed a public letter printed in the Guardian last week calling for the government to forestall a tragedy in Iraqi, as the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki begins moving 3,400 Iranian political refugees from their home in Camp Ashraf to Camp Liberty – “a new base that amounts to nothing more than a prison.”

Archbishop Alan Harper, joined by the Bishops of Bath & Wells, St. Albans, Oxford, Gibraltar, Stepney and Hull, along with the former Bishop of Oxford Lord Harries, leaders of the bar, members of Parliament and senior academics, stated Camp Liberty “is to be surrounded by a 4m-high wall, its residents will not have freedom of movement inside or outside the camp or access to their lawyers and family members, while sanitation, water and eating facilities are limited.”

The signatories to the 23 February 2012 letter said that they had “watched in horror” the refugees’ treatment at the hands of the Iraqi government and were concerned for their safety.

The Iraqi government has stated it will move the Iranian exiles, members of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MeK) to Camp Liberty by April 2012.  The MeK, allies of Saddam Hussein during the Iraq-Iraq war, is considered a terrorist organization by Iran and its members subject to arrest and imprisonment.

Following the U.S.-led conquest of Iraq in 2003, MeK members living in Iraq acquired “protected persons” status.  However as coalition forces withdrew from Iraq and the regime strengthened its ties with Iran, tensions mounted such that in April 2011 Iraqi troops attacked Camp Ashraf killing 34 and injuring 325.

Baghdad signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UN in December 2011 agreeing to transfer the MeK to a temporary transit facility where United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) would begin the process of their resettlement outside of Iraq.

However, the MeK members sent to Camp Liberty have been subject to police surveillance, harassment from members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and poor living conditions.  The open letter called upon government and the UN to “stand by the Camp Ashraf residents and protect their internationally recognised rights” and not “merely watch the Iraqi PM make a mockery of the UN and the principles it stands for.”

A “fair” foreign policy coupled with aid was a moral duty, Clare Short, told a meeting at Ripon Cathedral last week.  And it was also the “intelligent” thing to do the former Secretary of State for International Development and Labour MP for Birmingham Ladywood said in the first of this year’s St. Wilfred lectures on the theme of “Questions of Right and Wrong – the role of faith in contemporary society”.

In her 23 Feb 2012 talk, Ms. Short addressed the question “Aid – moral duty or national self interest?”  She opened her talk by asserting that giving aid was often a cloak for poor foreign policy choices.  “What is in our ‘intelligent self interest’ in a safer, more sustainable world which will be a better place for everyone, for all our grandchildren, is also what is morally right.”

“By the time New Labour got to Iraq, and the disgraceful air traffic control British Aerospace sale to Tanzania that was authorized by the British government, and the disgraceful Saudi Arms deals, that you could say there was all this ‘dirty stuff’ going on over here but we could say ‘oh we’ve got a lovely development policy over here’, and then something’s going wrong with morality. Because if you are using [aid] to camouflage other behaviour that is completely questionable then that’s not a moral outlook and I don’t believe that it is an intelligent self-interested outlook either.”

“What is morally right and what is in our intelligent self-interest is the same thing,” Ms. Short argued.

Britain was “on the wrong track in its foreign policy,” she claimed, stating that it had “made some good moves in its development policy – but you can’t be doing the wrong thing over here and the right thing over there, and then say we ‘belong with the sheep rather than with the goats’.”

“And if you won’t change that strategy for moral reasons, then the equivalent, perhaps, of ‘burning in hell for all time’ would be to see that ugly, divided, conflict- ridden world of suffering where we have to draw a circle round ourselves and try to protect ourselves from the turbulence and trouble that will otherwise come upon us,” the former minister argued.

First printed in The Church of England Newspaper.

Yesterday on the Andrew Marr Show, Foreign Secretary William Hague urged Israel to show restraint against Iran and to give sanctions time to work. Whether the Foreign Secretary genuinely believes in the efficacy of sanctions in this case is immaterial. Of course, they will not work. Iran has had time to find alternative markets for its oil, and is now able to lash out at British and French oil companies early, months before the sanctions were anticipated to take effect. The purpose of this move is to restrict oil supplies to Western Europe in order to inflate prices. At a time of crisis within the Eurozone, even the whisper of further financial problems would be a good political reason for any of Europe’s democratically elected leaders to ease off the anti-Iran rhetoric.

In the United States, the year further complicates the issue. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey, has also been calling for Israeli restraint “at this time”, which of course means “before November”. The Republican machine is already painting President Obama as weak on Iran and derelict in duty towards Israel. The constraints of the powerful office prevent Obama from publicly encouraging or condoning an attack on Iran, however, so the political fallout from an Israeli strike would likely be devastating before the presidential election. Urging restraint means Obama is pushing the Iran problem, at the very least, into his second term if not further.

In Israel, however, the issue is both politically and materially urgent. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu came to power in 2009 on a platform of dealing with the Iranian threat. So far, his term has included the flotilla incident, the degeneration of relations with Turkey and another stillborn attempt at Palestinian peace, but nothing on Iran. As Iran edges closer to the status of a nuclear power, this threatens not only Israel’s existence but also the legitimacy of its current coalition government. The political stakes are high, and perhaps too high to justify waiting.

In Iran, however, the nuclear development program is too politically important to be abandoned. This is why sanctions are useless. Any leader who appeared to bow to U.S. or Western pressure would find his life forfeit. For any Iranian leader, therefore, the rational option, is in fact, to continue developing nuclear weapons. The problem remains that even a strike today would only delay Iran’s nuclear development, not stop it. This would appear to legitimise Ahmadinejad’s ravings about dangerous “Jews” and could solidify his otherwise tenuous hold on power.

The general arguments for a strike revolve around the concept of “do something now or you’ll regret not doing it later” or the appeasement/Munich analogy. Arguments against a strike involve concepts of “you can’t win definitively with just a strike” and “you can provoke a larger war” or the Cuban Missile Crisis comparison. These considerations, however, are merely theoretical – the important variables are the domestic politics of each nation involved.

European governments will abhor an attack that disrupts Middle Eastern oil and creates another financial crisis. President Obama cannot endorse an attack on Iran while it threatens his re-election. Israel’s leaders are talking about urgency and the existential threat, and their own political positions depend on at least the appearance of dealing with Iran. The Islamic Republic, however, could absorb a strike and possibly emerge stronger, only slightly delayed in its development of nuclear weapons.

These are the problems. To those of us who enjoy living without the threat of nuclear annihilation, the options appear limited and the outlook somewhat bleak.

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has blamed a foreign conspiracy for trying to destabilise his country, suggesting that Western media outlets and governments alike are at fault for the mass uprising against his rule, which has left over 5,000 people dead since it began almost a year ago. With Arab League observers doing little more than overseeing Assad’s forces’ slaughtering of “terrorist” agitators – which apparently include women and children – the president should be grateful that harsh words is all that he is receiving from abroad. If the NATO-approved intervention in Libya proved anything, it is that Western firepower is easily capable of neutralising the weapons of terror deployed by despots in the Middle East.

However, the chances of a similar intervention are unlikely. Just last month Sir Peter Ricketts, David Cameron’s national security adviser, suggested that whilst similarities existed between Libya and Syria in terms of levels of violence, a similar path of resolution would not be pursued. According to Ricketts, the decision to intervene in Libya was because “we had urgent appeals from a wide range of people”. This, says Ricketts, is apparently not the case with Syria, despite the continued pleas from the country’s citizenry and the Free Syrian Army suggesting otherwise.

This selective intervention is typical of British foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. Whilst decisions to involve British forces in another country’s affairs have never been taken lightly, they have hardly been exercised with a consistent logic. Britain played a key combat role in Korea yet stayed out of Vietnam; intervention in Iraq remains fresh in the memory and the UK stays at war in Afghanistan, yet countless other dubious Islamic regimes in the region have been left alone; meanwhile, the UK even sent ground troops into Sierra Leone during a bitter civil war in 2000, yet has neglected to intervene in either Sudan or Zimbabwe, two countries of greater repression and suffering; and now Syria is left unaided despite the military support in Libya. Why has British interventionist policy been so haphazard and inconsistent? What motives decide whether British forces are deployed in another country’s territorial domain?

Ideological Justification for Intervention

Before intervening in the Libyan Civil War as part of the UN coalition, British Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the Libyan people’s “aspirations for greater democracy, for greater freedom, for greater rights should be met with reform, not repression”. One month later, in March 2011, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was passed, having been lobbied for by the UK and France in particular. A no-fly zone was imposed over Libya and the Royal Air Force and Navy began their campaign to help topple Colonel Gaddafi. When Gaddafi was finally deposed in October, Cameron claimed that he was “proud” of Britain’s role in giving the Libyan people “an even greater chance…of building themselves a strong and democratic future”. From these statements it appeared as if Britain’s intervening role in Libya was based on ideological reasoning: the support of democracy against authoritarian tyranny. Most British interventions since the Second World War have been justified along such lines.

When British forces joined the Korean War in 1950 after the passing of UNSC Resolution 84, it was with a clear message of anti-Communist intent. The North Koreans’ decision to attack the South was the ideological confirmation Britain and their Western allies needed to portray communism as an expansionist threat to newly-budding democracies throughout the world; the so-called “domino effect”. Though no existential threat was posed to the UK, nearly fifteen thousand British troops were committed to the Korean Peninsula. The fact that North Korea remains today the most committed communist country in the world is proof enough that the Western allies did not succeed in their ideological objectives.  Interestingly, British support for anti-Communism did not extend to committing ground forces to the Vietnam War, a far bitterer ideological struggle. It is possible that the incumbency of Harold Wilson’s Labour administration (1964-1970) – one leaning towards socialist policies – throughout the most intense periods of the war explains this inactivity. Labour’s animosity towards communism was perhaps not as strong as the previous Conservative governments or the ruling American administration, making ideological intervention less desirable. Maybe it was the memory of Korea that detracted the British from going into Vietnam. Either way, it marked a very inconsistent policy of foreign intervention against the supposed communist enemy.

Despite the close proximity to WWII, Britain committed almost 15,000 troops to Korea

This inconsistency has been mirrored in Britain’s recent history of intervention in the Middle East. The UN-opposed invasion of Iraq was officially sanctioned by the British and US governments because of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s supposed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). This was based on the ideological conviction of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly within and across authoritarian states. Later events would reveal the misinformation the British administration had acquired regarding Saddam’s nuclear programme. Basically, it did not exist. That did not stop the war in Iraq from continuing, the fateful repercussions of which are still noticeable on a daily basis in a country unprepared for post-war reconstruction. Given that nuclear non-proliferation is apparently so important to Britain, why have its politicians made no steps to intervene in Iran? The Iranians are far from covertly carrying out a uranium enrichment programme and are notoriously hostile towards the “west”. Although economic sanctions have been imposed, military intervention does not appear a viable option, suggesting proliferation concerns alone are not enough for British foreign policymakers.

The same can be said of the determination to stop Islamic fundamentalism, as part of the broader “war on terror”. Again, aside from the US, the British have been the largest military contributors to the War in Afghanistan. The determination to not only overthrow but to destroy the Taliban, decried facilitators of Islamic fundamentalism, has long been trumpeted as the goal of the mission. Yet, there has been no intervention in Yemen; in Somalia; in Pakistan, or any other nation that harbours Islamic extremists. Furthermore, the recent British involvement in Libya has arguably helped to increase the powerbase of extremist militants and their political associates, rather than sowed a fertile ground from which democracy can grow.

Al-Shabaab fighters plague war-ravaged Somalia. Yet these Islamic extremists have been left untouched by the UK

Can all these decisions really be the result of an inconsistent foreign policy application? It appears more likely that ideological considerations, however much they are declared to be so, have never been the primary motivator for British politicians and generals when intervening in a foreign country.

The US Alliance as Justification for Intervention

Although not as openly preached as ideological considerations, the importance of the US alliance to Britain has often been invoked as a partial reason for intervening in foreign conflicts. The determination to preserve the “special relationship” formed by Churchill and Roosevelt during the Second World War lingers to this day and has certainly played a significant role in British foreign policy over the past sixty years.

After staving off left-wing agitation during the inter-war period, Britain emerged as the strongest supporter of America’s anti-communist doctrine, the first test of which came in Korea. As we know, the British played a strong supporting role in helping the US force the communist invaders back north, albeit without capitalising on their gains. Despite the questionable success of the mission, the actions of Great Britain and the USA in Korea helped establish them as world leaders in the preservation and support of democracy. British politicians have been reluctant to relinquish this mantle ever since.

Having said that, there was no British intervention in Vietnam, despite US appeals. That in itself is enough to raise doubts over the importance of the US alliance in British interventionist policy. Conversely, Tony Blair’s decision to support the US to the hilt in the build-up to the Iraq War was widely seen as a desire to retain Britain’s privileged status with the world’s only superpower. The false intelligence gathered about Saddam’s WMD programme was compiled by the US, yet unquestioningly supported by the Blair government. The subsequent blame regarding the “non-legality” of the ensuing war and the failure to design and implement an effective reconstruction plan for Iraq has almost exclusively been directed at the US and the UK. Unlike the conflicts in Korea and Afghanistan, for instance, the UN, long derided as a US puppet institution, were not supportive of the Iraq invasion.

Although British forces have provided valuable assistance to US troops in Korea, Iraq and Afghanistan – all operations at least partly-instigated by the US – the British government has at times taken the initiative in foreign interventions. The recent support for the Libyan rebels is a prime example, where pressure from the UK and France helped sway a reluctant Obama administration into using its undoubted lobbying power to gain support from the UN. A more intriguing example is the successful deployment of British troops during the Sierra Leone civil war in 2000, when a British Special Forces unit was used in support of the Sierra Leone government against rebels backed by Liberian president Charles Taylor. Although not a prolonged intervention, it was nonetheless an unusual example of British forces intervening in foreign territory without the presence of the US.

British marines were a surprising addition to the Sierra Leone Civil War in 2000

Given that Britain has not always aided the US in its foreign battles, despite the obvious desire amongst a succession of governments to retain the “special relationship” between the two nations, it cannot be deemed the most important factor guiding British intervention policy. Again, as with ideological motivations, the invoking of the US alliance as a reason for supporting foreign intervention has been an all too inconsistent strategy.

Resources and Strategy – the hidden agenda?

Whilst British interventionism has often been legitimated by ideological claims and the “special relationship”, cynical observers would suggest that the real reasons for intervention are often far more sinister. For instance, the desire of Western nations to increase their geo-strategic influence over potentially-valuable regions, and thus enhance their power-projection capabilities away from their own homelands, is often touted as a covert motive for intervention.

All of Britain’s foreign interventions since the Second World War can be tied to this “hidden agenda”. Korea, for example, offered Britain an opportunity to strengthen its influence in East Asia, at a time of de-colonialisation. Simultaneously, the chance to reduce Soviet and Chinese influence on the Peninsula was undoubtedly a key factor, therefore tying in with anti-communist sentiment. By the time of the Vietnam War, however, British strategic interests in Asia were waning. Having seen their last Asian colony of Singapore merge with Malaysia in 1963, British politicians abandoned any last-ditch attempts to preserve a degree of imperialism. Attention was being turned to the equally-troublesome European Community instead. Furthermore, given that a new economic powerhouse allied to the West had emerged in the form of Japan, any lingering British concerns about communist domination of East Asia dissipated. Whilst this might not have been the case with the US, the Americans’ large presence in Vietnam also gave the British and other Western allies the confidence that their interests were being protected in any event.

The British support for the War in Afghanistan can to a degree be seen as a revival of British politicians’ desire to regain a foothold in the Middle East, long ago a bastion of British colonial strength. In support of the strategic goals of the US, Afghanistan presented an opportunity for Britain to develop its influence in the region, at the expense of larger powers like China, India, or even Pakistan. Although intervention in the former Taliban state now looks to have damaged the Western reputation amongst ordinary Afghans, the large British presence automatically makes them a key strategic decision-maker in a volatile region. The desire to root out supporters of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban would undoubtedly have influenced the British decision to support intervention in Afghanistan, but strategic considerations arguably played a larger role than the official line suggests. With the growing potential of a nuclear-armed Iran, the continuing tribal ruptures in Pakistan and the sectarian violence in Iraq, both the British and Americans may be using their deployment in Afghanistan as a hedge against future ruptures in the Middle East.

In Sierra Leone, a planned evacuation force of British marines ended up playing a decisive role in the civil war. Whether this was an uncontrollable escalation of events or an opportunistic strike by British generals hoping to gain sway with leaders in the resource-rich region is again hard to determine. However, the fact that Sierra Leone is a significant, if small, trading partner of the UK, and offers a plethora of mining and industrial opportunities to British companies, suggests there were hidden factors at play.

Whilst Korea and Afghanistan may have been driven by strategic considerations, the interventions in Iraq and Libya appear far more resource-driven. Although it would be unfair to suggest the Iraq War came about solely because of Anglo-American oil interests, the presence of “black gold” in Saddam’s country undoubtedly made a military operation far more appealing. Therefore the dual goals of securitising energy resources and overthrowing an uncompromising tyrant probably went hand in hand. The same could be said for Libya. Had Colonel Gaddafi’s grip on the country’s oil – a large proportion of which is sold to Britain –persisted amidst the civil war, the disruption of energy exports would also have continued. Sensing the opportunity both to help topple the deranged Gaddafi and at the same time secure a future stream of precious oil, the British took the lead in proposing a no-flyzone along with France, a similarly large beneficiary of Libyan oil reserves. Syria, meanwhile, whilst also a net exporter of oil, relies more on its Middle Eastern neighbours for trade than it does the nations of Western Europe; hence the importance attributed to the toothless Arab League observers. Could it be that the country’s relative lack of resource-importance in comparison to Libya has prevented Britain and its allies from an intervention? Whilst it is almost impossible to prove this, a great number of desperate Syrian citizens see the West’s malaise in relation to their country as inextricably linked with its relative resource deficiencies. If the “hidden agenda” really holds such credence amongst British foreign policymakers, the Syrians may have a long wait on their hands for support in toppling Bashar Al-Assad.

A cause for intervention? Iraq's productive oil wells were of great interest to the Anglo-American alliance.

Consistently Inconsistent

There has certainly not been a consistent doctrine for British intervention in foreign countries since 1945. Whilst any intervention has often been justified by the ideological tenets of liberalism and democracy, the genuineness of such claims are far from convincing. If British interventionism was directed by ideological concerns, reality would dictate that the UK would be embroiled in countless countries across the world. As it is, British forces are concentrated only in a select few. Why is that?

It appears a combination of unpronounced strategic goals, coupled with a desire to maintain strong relations with the US, largely sets the mould for British intervention. Although foreign policymakers are undoubtedly concerned by repressive regimes and anti-democratic political systems, these foibles alone are not enough to justify involvement in a foreign country.

Consequently, unless the Syrian Free Army and their political representatives can put forward a case outlining not only the ruthlessness of the Assad regime but the strategic importance of their country to the West, British military support is unlikely to be forthcoming. Whilst such a selfish foreign policy appears unfortunate, anything other than selective intervention is unrealistic. For the British, as undoubtedly with other states, it is self-interest that must come first.

This is a report on the Israel lobby’s influence over American (and consequently British) foreign policy. Its authors are two highly-rated American academics, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt; their facts are well-accepted and their conclusions are absolute dynamite!

The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy

“U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe. Nowhere is this truer than in the Middle East, a region of recurring instability and enormous strategic importance. Most recently, the Bush Administration’s attempt to transform the region into a community of democracies has helped produce a resilient insurgency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices, and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman. With so much at stake for so many, all countries need to understand the forces that drive U.S. Middle East policy.

The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially since the Six Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S. support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and jeopardized U.S. security.

This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the United States been willing to set aside its own security in order to advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond between the two countries is based on shared strategic interests or compelling moral imperatives. As we show below, however, neither of those explanations can account for the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel.

Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of the “Israel Lobby.” Other special interest groups have managed to skew U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.

In the pages that follow, we describe how the Lobby has accomplished this feat, and how its activities have shaped America’s actions in this critical region. Given the strategic importance of the Middle East and its potential impact on others, both Americans and non‐Americans need to understand and address the Lobby’s influence on U.S. policy.

Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts recounted here are not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account relies heavily on the work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great credit for shedding light on these issues. We also rely on evidence provided by respected Israeli and international human rights organizations. Similarly, our claims about the Lobby’s impact rely on testimony from the Lobby’s own members, as well as testimony from politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our conclusions, of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.

THE GREAT BENEFACTOR

Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level of support dwarfing the amounts provided to any other state. It has been the largest annual recipient of direct U.S. economic and military assistance since 1976 and the largest total recipient since World War II. Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003 dollars. Israel receives about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance each year, which is roughly one‐fifth of America’s foreign aid budget. In per capita terms, the United States gives each Israeli a direct subsidy worth about $500 per year. This largesse is especially striking when one realizes that Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income roughly equal to South Korea or Spain. …”

There are, of course, serious questions that need to be asked in light of this. Such as how is it that the British government can wage pointless wars on behalf of Israel, when our educational system is failing, the NHS is collapsing and order can’t even be maintained on the streets of our own cities?

How much money have we wasted on this? How many of our soldiers have been maimed or worse? How much hostility has this created towards us in the Middle East? And all for what exactly?

As for America, they really need to be doing more to free themselves from the yoke of Israel, seeing as many of their cities are in varying states of decline and post-apocalyptic decay. (For example: Failing dreams: California faces its own Great Depression)

and…

ENR(NW) demands that British foreign policy should seek to serve the interests of the indigenous nation(s) of the British Isles, and not those of a foreign nation!

General Sir David Richards

First printed in The Church of England Newspaper.

The Arab Spring could lead to outbreaks of Islamist unrest in Britain, the Chief of the Defence Staff has warned.

In a lecture given to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) on 14 December 2011,General Sir David Richards said radicalization born of the regime changes across the Middle East might well pose a domestic security threat for the U.K.

However, the collapse of the euro was Britain’s most immediate danger.  “I am clear that the single biggest strategic risk facing the UK today is economic rather than military,” Sir David said.

“This is why the eurozone crisis is of such huge importance,” he said, as “no country can defend itself if bankrupt.”

In his year in review address to the RUSI, the defence chief highlighted Britain’s strategic risks and opportunities.  The United States’ new strategic focus on Asia had lead to a refinement of the special relationship between the U.S. and U.K.  “I know this does not mean it will turn its back on Europe and NATO but countries this side of the pond need to think through what this means to us,” he said.

“NATO is the bedrock of our security,” Sir David said, and had “guaranteed peace in Europe for 60 years and, as Libya and Afghanistan demonstrate, enables us to project power efficiently in concert with others to pursue our national interests.”

But a changing world will see “new groupings” emerge.  “The most obvious is our alliance with the French,” he said, adding that military ties were now stronger than the “Entente Cordiale of a century ago.”

The military alliance with France was a “vehicle for joint action.  Libya sealed this for us and demonstrated the benefits to Britain, Europe and NATO of having a solid Franco-British core.”

He added that the UK “will require other carefully chosen alliances over the coming decade through which to influence the strategic landscape and help determine the outcome of fast moving crises, all at minimum cost. “

The nature of the risks facing Britain was also changing. “What is happening in Syria is in many experts view becoming a proxy conflict between Shia Iranians and Sunni Arabs,” Sir David said.

There was also the “risk that the Arab awakening leads to fissures and internal conflict that could be exported, including militant Islamism,” he said.

Departing from his prepared speech the general added that militant Islam and the Arab world have “diasporas reaching back to this country, as does Pakistan and other states struggling with instability.”

On the Alternative Theories of Pakistan and India about Jammu & Kashmir (And the One and Only Way These May Be Peacefully Reconciled): An Exercise in Economics, Politics, Moral Philosophy & Jurisprudence

 by

Subroto (Suby) Roy

Lecture to the Oxford and Cambridge Society of Lahore

March 14, 2011 (tentative)

“What is the use of studying philosophy if all that does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions of logic, etc., & if it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of everyday life?”

Wittgenstein, letter to Malcolm, 1944

“India is the greatest Muslim country in the world.”

Sir Muhammad Iqbal, 1930, Presidential Address to the Muslim League, Allahabad

 “Where be these enemies?… See, what a scourge is laid upon your hate,… all are punish’d.” Shakespeare

Dr Roy’s published works include Philosophy of Economics: On the Scope of Reason in Economic Inquiry (London & New York: Routledge, 1989, 1991); Pricing, Planning & Politics: A Study of Economic Distortions in India (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1984); and, edited with WE James, Foundations of India’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Hawaii MS 1989, Sage 1992)  &  Foundations of Pakistan’s Political Economy: Towards an Agenda for the 1990s (Hawaii MS 1989, Sage 1992, OUP Karachi 1993); and, edited with John Clarke, Margaret Thatcher’s Revolution: How it Happened and What it Meant (London & New York: Continuum 2005).  He graduated in 1976 with a first from the London School of Economics in mathematical economics, and received the PhD in economics at Cambridge in 1982 under Professor Frank Hahn for the thesis “On liberty & economic growth: preface to a philosophy for India”. In the United States for 16 years he was privileged to count as friends Professors James Buchanan, Milton Friedman, TW Schultz, Max Black and Sidney Alexander.  From September 18 1990 he was an adviser to Rajiv Gandhi and contributed to the origins of India’s 1991 economic reform.  He blogs at http://www.independentindian.com.

CONTENTS

1. Introduction
2. Pakistan’s Point of View (or Points of View)

(a)    1930  Sir Muhammad Iqbal

(b)    1933-1948 Chaudhury Rahmat Ali

(c)    1937-1941 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan

(d)    1937-1947 Quad-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

(e)    1940s et seq  Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi

(f)     1947-1950 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, 1966 President Ayub Khan, 2005 Govt of Pakistan, 2007 President Musharraf, 2008 FM Qureshi, 2011 Kashmir Day

3. India’s Point of View: British Negligence/Indifference during the Transfer of Power, A Case of Misgovernance in the Chaotic Aftermath of World War II

(a)    Rhetoric: Whose Pakistan?  Which Kashmir? 

(b)    Law: (i) Liaquat-Zafrullah-Abdullah-Nehru United in Error Over the Second Treaty of Amritsar! Dogra J&K subsists Mar 16 1846-Oct 22 1947. Aggression, Anarchy, Annexations: The LOC as De Facto Boundary by Military Decision Since Jan 1 1949.  (ii) Legal Error & Confusion Generated by 12 May 1946 Memorandum. (iii) War: Dogra J&K attacked by Pakistan, defended by India: Invasion, Mutiny, Secession of “Azad Kashmir” & Gilgit, Rape of Baramulla, Siege of Skardu.

4. Politics: What is to be Done? Towards Truths, Normalisation, Peace in the 21^st Century

The Present Situation is Abnormal & Intolerable. There May Be One (and Only One) Peacable Solution that is Feasible: Revealing Individual Choices Privately with Full Information & Security: Indian “Green Cards”/PIO-OCI status for Hurriyat et al: A Choice of Nationality (India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran).  Of Flags and Consulates in Srinagar & Gilgit etc: De Jure Recognition of the Boundary, Diplomatic Normalisation,  Economic & Military Cooperation.

5. Appendices:

(a)    History of Jammu & Kashmir until the Dogra Native State

(b)    Pakistan’s Allies (including A Brief History of Gilgit)

(c)    India’s Muslim Voices

(d)    Pakistan’s Muslim Voices: An Excerpt from the Munir Report

1.  Introduction

For a solution to Jammu & Kashmir to be universally acceptable it must be seen by all as being lawful and just. Political opinion across the subcontinent — in Pakistan, in India, among all people and parties in J&K, those loyal to India, those loyal to Pakistan, and any others — will have to agree that, all things considered, such is the right course of action for everyone today in the 21st Century, which means too that the solution must be consistent with the principal known facts of history as well as account reasonably for all moral considerations.

I claim to have found such a solution, indeed I shall even say it is the only such solution (in terms of theoretical economics, it is the unique solution) and plan with your permission to describe its main outlines at this distinguished gathering.  I have not invented it overnight but it is something  developed over a quarter century, milestones along the way being the books emerging from the University of Hawaii “perestroika” projects for India and Pakistan that I and the late WE James led 25 years ago, and a lecture I gave at Washington’s Heritage Foundation in June 1998, as well as sets of newspaper articles published between 2005 and 2008, one in Dawn of Karachi and others in The Statesman of New Delhi and Kolkata.

Before I start, allow me for a moment to remind just how complex and intractable the problem we face has been, and, therefore, quite how large my ambition is in claiming today to be able to resolve it.

“Kashmir is in the Supreme National Interest of Pakistan”, says Pakistan.

“Kashmir is an Integral Part of India”, says India.

“Kashmir is an Integral Part of Pakistan”, says Pakistan.

“Kashmir is in the Supreme National Interest of India”, says India.

And so it goes, in what over the decades has been all too often a Dialogue of the Deaf.  How may such squarely opposed positions be reconciled without draining public resources even further through wasteful weaponry and confrontation of standing armies, or, what is worse, using these weapons and armies in war, plunging the subcontinent into an abyss of chaos and destruction for generations to come?  How is it possible?

I shall suggest a road can be found only when we realize Pakistan, India and J&K each have been and are going to remain integral to one another — in their histories, their geographies, their economies and their societies.  The only place they may need to differ, where we shall want them to differ, is their politics and political systems. We should not underestimate how much mutual hatred and mutual fear has arisen naturally on all sides over the decades as a result of bloodshed and suffering all around, and the fact must also be accounted for that people simply may not be in a calm-enough emotional state to want to be part of processes seeking resolution; at the same time, it bears to be remembered that although Pakistan and India have been at war more than once and war is always a very serious and awful thing, they have never actually declared war against the other nor have they ever broken diplomatic relations – in fact in some ways it has always seemed like some very long and protracted fraternal Civil War between us where we think we know one another so well and yet come to be surprised more by one another’s virtues than by one another’s vices.

Secondly, with any seemingly intractable problem, dialogue can stall or be aborted due to normal human failings of impatience or lack of good will or lack of good humour or lack of a scientific attitude towards finding facts, or plain mutual miscomprehension of one another’s points of view through ignorance or laziness or negligence.  In case of Pakistan and India over J&K, there has been the further critical complication that we of this generation did not cause this problem — it has been something inherited by us from not even our fathers but our grandfathers!  It is two generations old.  Each side must respect the words and deeds of its forebears but also may have to frankly examine in a scientific spirit where errors of fact or judgment may have occurred back then.  The antagonistic positions have changed only slightly over two generations, and one reason dialogue stalls or gets aborted today is because positions have become frozen for more than half a century and merely get repeated endlessly.  On top of such frozen positions have been piled pile upon pile of further vast mortal complications: the 1965 War, the 1971 secession of East Pakistan, the 1999 Kargil War, the 2008 Mumbai massacres.  Only cacophony results if we talk about everything at once, leaving the status quo of a dangerous expensive confrontation to continue.

I propose instead to focus as specifically and precisely as possible on how Jammu & Kashmir became a problem at all during those crucial decades alongside the processes of Indian Independence, World War II, the Pakistan Movement and creation of Pakistan, accompanied by the traumas and bloodshed of Partition.

Having addressed that — and it is only fair to forewarn this eminent Lahore audience that such a survey of words, deeds and events between the 1930s and 1950s tends to emerge in India’s favour — I propose to “fast-forward” to current times, where certain new facts on the ground appear much more adverse to India, and finally seek to ask what can and ought to be done, all things considered, today in the circumstances of the 21st Century.   There are four central facts, let me for now call them Fact A, Fact B, Fact C and Fact D, which have to be accepted by both countries in good faith and a scientific spirit.  Facts A and B are historical in nature; Pakistan has refused to accept them. Facts C and D are contemporary in nature; official political India and much of the Indian media too often have appeared wilfully blind to them. The moment all four facts come to be accepted by all, the way forward becomes clear.  We have inherited this grave mortal problem which has so badly affected the ordinary people of J&K in the most terrible and unacceptable manner, but if we fail to understand and resolve it, our children and grandchildren will surely fail even worse — we may even leave them to cope with the waste and destruction of further needless war or confrontation, indeed with the end of the subcontinent as we have received and known it in our time.

2. Pakistan’s Point of View (Or Points of View)

1930  Sir Muhammad Iqbal

This audience will need no explanation why I start with Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the poetic and spiritual genius who in the 20^th Century inspired the notion of a Muslim polity in NorthWestern India, whose seminal 1930 presidential speech to the Muslim League in Allahabad lay the foundation stone of the new country that was yet to be.   He did not live to see Pakistan’s creation yet what may be called the “Pakistan Principle” was captured in his words:

“I would like to see the Punjab, Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of Northwest India… India is the greatest Muslim country in the world.  The life of Islam as a cultural force in this living country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory”.

He did not see such a consolidated Muslim state being theocratic and certainly not one filled with bigotry or “Hate-Hindu” campaigns:

“A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities… Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and my behaviour… Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states…. I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times.”[1]

Though Kashmiri himself, in fact a founding member of the “All-India Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference of Lahore and Simla”, and a hero and role model for the young Sheikh Abdullah (1905-1982), Allama Iqbal was explicitly silent about J&K being part of the new political entity he had come to imagine.  I do not say he would not have wished it to be had he lived longer; what I am saying is that his original vision of the consolidated Muslim state which constitutes Pakistan today (after a Partitioned Punjab) did not include Jammu & Kashmir.  Rather, it was focused on the politics of British India and did not mention the politics of Kashmir or any other of the so-called “Princely States” or “Native States” of “Indian India” who constituted some 1/3^rd of the land mass and 1/4^th of the population of the subcontinent.  Twenty years ago I called this “The Paradox of Kashmir”, namely, that prior to 1947 J&K hardly seemed to appear in any discussion at all for a century, yet it has consumed almost all discussion and resources ever since.

Secondly, this audience will see better than I can the significance of Dr Iqbal’s saying the Muslim political state of his conception needed

“an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it”

and instead seek to

“mobilise its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and the spirit of modern times”.

Dr Iqbal’s Pakistan Principle appears here the polar opposite of Pakistan’s 18^th & 19^th Century pre-history represented by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762)[2] saying

“We are an Arab people whose fathers have fallen in exile in the country of Hindustan, and Arabic genealogy and Arabic language are our pride”

 or Sayyid Ahmed Barelwi (1786-1831) saying

“We must repudiate all those Indian, Persian and Roman customs which are contrary to the Prophet’s teaching”.[3]  

Some 25 years after the Allahabad address, the Munir Report in 1954 echoed Dr Iqbal’s thought when it observed about medieval military conquests

“It is this brilliant achievement of the Arabian nomads …that makes the Musalman of today live in the past and yearn for the return of the glory that was Islam… Little does he understand that the forces which are pitted against him are entirely different from those against which early Islam had to fight… Nothing but a bold reorientation of Islam to separate the vital from the lifeless can preserve it as a World Idea and convert the Musalman into a citizen of the present and the future world from the archaic incongruity that he is today…” [4]

1933-1947  Chaudhury Rahmat Ali

Dr Iqbal’s young follower, the radical Cambridge pamphleteer Chaudhury Rahmat Ali (1895-1951) drew a picture not of Muslim tolerance and coexistence with Hindus in a peaceful India but of aggression towards Hindus and domination by Muslims over the subcontinent and Asia itself.  Rahmat Ali had been inspired by Dr Iqbal’s call for a Muslim state in Northwest India but found it vague and was disappointed Iqbal had not pressed it at the Third Round Table Conference.  In 1933, reportedly on the upper floor of a London omnibus, he invented for the then-imagined political entity the name “PAKSTAN”, P for his native Punjab, A for Afghania, K for Kashmir, S for Sind, and STAN for Balochistan.  He sought a meeting with Mr Jinnah in London — “Jinnah disliked Rahmat Ali’s ideas and avoided meeting him”[5] but did meet him.  There is a thesis yet to be written on how Europe’s inter-War ideologies affected political thinking on the subcontinent.  Rahmat Ali’s vituperative views about Hindus were akin to others about Jews (and Muslims too) at the time, all models or counterfoils for one another in the fringes of Nazism.  He referred to the Indian nationalist movement as a “British-Banya alliance”, declined to admit India had ever existed and personally renamed the subcontinent “Dinia” and the seas around it the “Pakian Sea”, the “Osmanian Sea” etc. He urged Sikhs to rise up in a “Sikhistan” and urged all non-Hindus to rise up in war against Hindus. Given the obscurity of his life before his arrival at Cambridge’s Emmanuel College, what experiences may have led him to such views are not known.

All this was anathema to Mr Jinnah, the secular constitutionalist embarrassed by a reactionary Muslim imperialism in that rapidly modernising era that was the middle of the 20^th Century.  When Rahmat Ali pressed the ‘Pakstan’ acronym, Mr Jinnah said Bengal was not in it and Muslim minority regions were absent.  At this Chaudhury-Sahib produced a general scheme of Muslim domination all over the subcontinent: there would be “Pakstan” in the northwest including Kashmir, Delhi and Agra; “Bangistan” in Bengal; “Osmanistan” in Hyderabad; “Siddiquistan” in Bundelhand and Malwa; “Faruqistan” in Bihar and Orissa; “Haideristan” in UP; “Muinistan” in Rajasthan; “Maplistan” in Kerala; even “Safiistan” in “Western Ceylon” and “Nasaristan” in “Eastern Ceylon”, etc.  In 1934 he published and widely circulated such a diagram among Muslims in Britain at the time.  He was not invited to the Lahore Resolution which did not refer to Pakistan though came to be called the Pakistan Resolution.  When he landed in the new Pakistan, he was apparently arrested and deported back and was never granted a Pakistan passport.  From England, he turned his wrath upon the new government, condemning Mr Jinnah as treacherous and newly re-interpreting his acronym to refer to Punjab, Afghania, Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan (sic), Afghanistan, and Balochistan.  The word “pak” coincidentally meant pure, so he began to speak of Muslims as “the Pak” i.e. “the pure” people, and of how the national destiny of the new Pakistan was to liberate “Pak” people everywhere, including the new India, and create a “Pak Commonwealth of Nations” stretching from Arabia to the Indies.  The map he now drew placed the word “Punjab” over J&K, and saw an Asia dominated by this “Pak” empire. Shunned by officialdom of the new Pakistan, Chaudhury-Sahib was a tragic figure who died in poverty and obscurity during an influenza epidemic in 1951; the Master of Emmanuel College paid for his funeral and was apparently later reimbursed for this by the Government of Pakistan.  In recent years he has undergone a restoration, and his grave at Cambridge has become a site of pilgrimage for ideologues, while his diagrams and writings have been reprinted in Pakistan’s newspapers as recently as February 2005.

1937-1941 Sir Sikander Hayat Khan

Chaudhary Rahmat Ali’s harshest critic at the time was the eminent statesman and Premier of Punjab Sir Sikander Hayat Khan (1892-1942), partner of the 1937 Sikander-Jinnah Pact, and an author of the Lahore Resolution.  His statement of 11 March 1941 in the Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates is a classic:

“No Pakistan scheme was passed at Lahore… As for Pakistan schemes, Maulana Jamal-ud-Din’s is the earliest…Then there is the scheme which is attributed to the late Allama Iqbal of revered memory.  He, however, never formulated any definite scheme but his writings and poems have given some people ground to think that Allama Iqbal desired the establishment of  some sort of  Pakistan.  But it is not difficult to explode this theory and to prove conclusively that his conception of  Islamic solidarity and universal brotherhood is not in conflict with Indian patriotism and is in fact quite different from the ideology now sought to be attributed to him by some enthusiasts… Then there is Chaudhuri Rahmat Ali’s scheme (*laughter*)…it was widely circulated in this country and… it was also given wide publicity at the time in a section of the British press.  But there is another scheme…it was published in one of the British journals, I think Round Table, and was conceived by an Englishman…..the word Pakistan was not used at the League meeting and this term was not applied to (the League’s Lahore) resolution by anybody until the Hindu press had a brain-wave and dubbed it Pakistan…. The ignorant masses  have now adopted the slogan provided by the short-sighted bigotry of the Hindu and Sikh press…they overlooked the fact that the word Pakistan might have an appeal – a strong appeal – for the Muslim masses.  It is a catching phrase and it has caught popular imagination and has thus made confusion worse confounded…. So far as we in the Punjab are concerned, let me assure you that we will not countenance or accept any proposal that does not secure freedom for all (*cheers*).  We do not desire that Muslims should domineer here, just as we do not want the Hindus to domineer where Muslims are in a minority. Now would we allow anybody or section to thwart us because Muslims happen to be in a majority in this province.  We do not ask for freedom that there may be a Muslim Raj here and Hindu Raj elsewhere.  If that is what Pakistan means I will have nothing to do with it.   If Pakistan means unalloyed Muslim Raj in the Punjab then I will have nothing to do with it (*hear, hear*)…. If you want real freedom for the Punjab, that is to say a Punjab in which every community will have its due share in the economic and administrative fields as partners in a common concern, then that Punjab will not be Pakistan but just Punjab, land of the five rivers; Punjab is Punjab and will always remain Punjab whatever anybody may say (*cheers*).  This, then, briefly is the future which I visualize for my province and for my country under any new constitution.

Intervention (Malik Barkat Ali): The Lahore resolution says the same thing.

Premier: Exactly; then why misinterpret it and try to mislead the  masses?…”

1937-1947  Quad-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah

During the Third Round Table Conference, Dr Iqbal persuaded Mr Jinnah (1876-1948) to return to India; Mr Jinnah, from being settled again in his London law practice, did so in 1934.  But following the 1935 Govt of India Act, the Muslim League failed badly when British India held its first elections in 1937 not only in Bengal and UP but in Punjab (one seat), NWFP and Sind.

World War II, like World War I a couple of brief decades earlier, then changed the political landscape completely. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 and Britain and France declared war on Germany on 3 September.  The next day, India’s British Viceroy (Linlithgow) granted Mr Jinnah the political parity with Congress that he had sought.[6]  Professor Francis Robinson suggests that until 4 September 1939 the British

“had had little time for Jinnah and his League.  The Government’s declaration of war on Germany on 3 September, however, transformed the situation. A large part of the army was Muslim, much of the war effort was likely to rest on the two Muslim majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The following day, the Viceroy invited Jinnah for talks on an equal footing with Gandhi…. As the Congress began to demand immediate independence, the Viceroy took to reassuring Jinnah that Muslim interests would be safeguarded in any constitutional change. Within a few months, he was urging the League to declare a constructive policy for the future, which was of course presented in the Lahore Resolution[7]…. In their August 1940 offer, the British confirmed for the benefit of Muslims that power would not be transferred against the will of any significant element in Indian life. And much the same confirmation was given in the Cripps offer nearly two years later…. Throughout the years 1940 to 1945, the British made no attempt to tease out the contradictions between the League’s two-nation theory, which asserted that Hindus and Muslims came from two different civilisations and therefore were two different nations, and the Lahore Resolution, which demanded that ‘Independent States’ should be constituted from the Muslim majority provinces of the NE and NW, thereby suggesting that Indian Muslims formed not just one nation but two. When in 1944 the governors of Punjab and Bengal urged such a move on the Viceroy, Wavell ignored them, pressing ahead instead with his own plan for an all-India conference at Simla. The result was to confirm, as never before in the eyes of leading Muslims in the majority provinces, the standing of Jinnah and the League. Thus, because the British found it convenient to take the League seriously, everyone had to as well—Congressmen, Unionists, Bengalis, and so on…”[8]

 Mr Jinnah was himself amazed by the new British attitude towards him:

“(S)uddenly there was a change in the attitude towards me. I was treated on the same basis as Mr Gandhi. I was wonderstruck why all of a sudden I was promoted and given a place side by side with Mr Gandhi.”

Britain, threatened for its survival, faced an obdurate Indian leadership and even British socialists sympathetic to Indian aspirations grew cold (Gandhi dismissing the 1942 Cripps offer as a “post-dated cheque on a failing bank”).  Official Britain’s loyalties had been consistently with those who had been loyal to them, and it was unsurprising there would be a tilt to empower Mr Jinnah soon making credible the real possibility of Pakistan.[9]  By 1946, Britain was exhausted, pre-occupied with rationing, Berlin, refugee resettlement and countless other post-War problems — Britain had not been beaten in war but British imperialism was finished because of the War.  Muslim opinion in British India had changed decisively in the League’s favour.   But the  subcontinent’s political processes were drastically spinning out of everyone’s control towards anarchy and blood-letting.  Implementing a lofty vision of a cultured progressive consolidated Muslim state in India’s NorthWest descended into “Direct Action” with urban mobs  shouting Larke lenge Pakistan; Marke lenge Pakistan; Khun se lenge Pakistan; Dena hoga Pakistan.[10]

We shall return to Mr Jinnah’s view on the legal position of the “Native Princes” of “Indian India” during this critical time, specifically J&K; here it is essential before proceeding only to record his own vision for the new Pakistan as recorded by the profoundly judicious report of Justice Munir and Justice Kayani a mere half dozen years later:

“Before the Partition, the first public picture of Pakistan that the Quaid-i-Azam gave to the world was in the course of an interview in New Delhi with Mr. Doon Campbell, Reuter’s Correspondent. The Quaid-i-Azam said that the new State would be a modern democratic State, with sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new nation having equal rights of citizenship regardless of their religion, caste or creed.  When Pakistan formally appeared on the map, the Quaid-i-Azam in his memorable speech of 11^th August 1947 to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, while stating the principle on which the new State was to be founded, said:—‘All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and specially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations., there will be no end to the progress you will make.  “I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities—the Hindu community and the Muslim community— because even as regards Muslims you have Pathana, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vashnavas, Khatris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on—will vanish. Indeed if you ask me this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain its freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free peoples long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time but for this (Applause). Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed— that has nothing to do with the business of the State (Hear, hear). As you know, history shows that in England conditions sometime ago were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days when there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State (Loud applause). The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the Government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist: what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen, of Great Britain and they are all members of the nation. “Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State’. The Quaid-i-Azam was the founder of Pakistan and the occasion on which he thus spoke was the first landmark in the history of Pakistan. The speech was intended both for his own people including non-Muslims and the world, and its object was to define as clearly as possible the ideal to the attainment of which the new State was to devote all its energies. There are repeated references in this speech to the bitterness of the past and an appeal to forget and change the past and to bury the hatchet. The future subject of the State is to be a citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective of colour, caste, creed or community. The word ‘nation’ is used more than once and religion is stated to have nothing to do with the business of the State and to be merely a matter of personal faith for the individual.”

1940s et seq  Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, Amir Jama’at-i-Islami

The eminent theologian Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi (1903-1979), founder of the Jama’at-i-Islami, had been opposed to the Pakistan Principle but once Pakistan was created he became the most eminent votary of an Islamic State, declaring:

 “That the sovereignty in Pakistan belongs to God Almighty alone and that the Government of Pakistan shall administer the country as His agent”.

 In such a view, Islam becomes

“the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. The philosophical foundation of Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. Lawmaking is their prerogative and legislation must correspond to the mood and temper of their opinion… Islam… altogether repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty and rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the viceregency (Khilafat) of man.”

Maulana Maudoodi was asked by Justice Munir and Justice Kayani:

 “Q.—Is a country on the border of dar-ul-Islam always qua an Islamic State in the position of dar-ul-harb ?

A.—No. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the Islamic State will be potentially at war with the non-Muslim neighbouring country. The non-Muslim country acquires the status of dar-ul-harb only after the Islamic State declares a formal war against it”.

“Q.—Is there a law of war in Islam?

A.—Yes.

Q.—Does it differ fundamentally from the modern International Law of war?

A.—These two systems are based on a fundamental difference.

Q.—What rights have non-Muslims who are taken prisoners of war in a jihad?

A.—The Islamic law on the point is that if the country of which these prisoners are nationals pays ransom, they will be released. An exchange of prisoners is also permitted. If neither of these alternatives is possible, the prisoners will be converted into slaves for ever. If any such person makes an offer to pay his ransom out of his own earnings, he will be permitted to collect the money necessary for the fidya (ransom).

Q.—Are you of the view that unless a Government assumes the form of an Islamic Government, any war declared by it is not a jihad?

A.—No. A war may be declared to be a jihad if it is declared by a national Government of Muslims in the legitimate interests of the State. I never expressed the opinion attributed to me in Ex. D. E. 12:— (translation)‘The question remains whether, even if the Government of Pakistan, in its present form and structure, terminates her treaties with the Indian Union and declares war against her, this war would fall under the definition of jihad? The opinion expressed by him in this behalf is quite correct. Until such time as the Government becomes Islamic by adopting the Islamic form of Government, to call any of its wars a jihad would be tantamount to describing the enlistment and fighting of a non-Muslim on the side of the Azad Kashmir forces jihad and his death martyrdom. What the Maulana means is that, in the presence of treaties, it is against Shari’at, if the Government or its people participate in such a war. If the Government terminates the treaties and declares war, even then the war started by Government would not be termed jihad unless the Government becomes Islamic’.

….

“Q.—If we have this form of Islamic Government in Pakistan, will you permit Hindus to base their Constitution on the basis of their own religion?

A—Certainly. I should have no objection even if the Muslims of India are treated in that form of Government as shudras and malishes and Manu’s laws are applied to them, depriving them of all share in the Government and the rights of a citizen. In fact such a state of affairs already exists in India.”

.…

“Q.—What will be the duty of the Muslims in India in case of war between India and Pakistan?

A.—Their duty is obvious, and that is not to fight against Pakistan or to do anything injurious to the safety of Pakistan.”

1947-1950 PM Liaquat Ali Khan, 1966 Gen Ayub Khan, 2005 Govt of Pakistan et seq

In contrast to Maulana Maudoodi saying Islam was “the very antithesis of secular Western democracy”,  Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (1895-1951)[11] during his first official visit in 1950 to North America was to say the new Pakistan, because it was Muslim, held Asia’s greatest democratic potential:

“At present there is no democracy in Asia which is more free and more unified than Pakistan; none so free from moral doubts and from strains between the various sections of the people.”

He told his audiences Pakistan was created because Hindus were people wedded to caste-differences where Pakistanis as Muslims had an egalitarian and democratic disposition:

“The Hindus, for example, believe in the caste system according to which some human beings are born superior to others and cannot have any social relations with those in the lower castes or with those who are not Hindus.   They cannot marry them or eat with them or even touch them without being polluted.   The Muslims abhor the caste system, as they are a democratic people and believe in the equality of men and equal opportunities for all, do not consider a priesthood necessary, and have economic laws and institutions which recognize the right of private ownership and yet are designed to promote the distribution of wealth and to put healthy checks on vast unearned accumulations… so the Hindus and the Muslims decided to part and divide British India into two independent sovereign states… Our demand for a country of our own had, as you see, a strong democratic urge behind it.  The emergence of Pakistan itself was therefore the triumph of a democratic idea.  It enabled at one stroke a democratic nation of eighty million people to find a place of its own in Asia, where now they can worship God in freedom and pursue their own way of life uninhibited by the domination or the influence of ways and beliefs that are alien or antagonistic to their genius.” [12]

President Ayub Khan would state in similar vein on 18 November 1966 at London’s Royal Institute of International Affairs:

“the root of the problem was the conflicting ideologies of India and Pakistan. Muslim Pakistan believed in common brotherhood and giving people equal opportunity.  India and Hinduism are based on inequality and on colour and race.  Their basic concept is the caste system… Hindus and Muslims could never live under one Government, although they might live side by side.”

Regarding J&K, Liaquat Ali Khan on November 4 1947 broadcast from here in Lahore that the 1846 Treaty of Amritsar was “infamous” in having caused an  “immoral and illegal” ownership of Jammu & Kashmir.  He, along with Mr Jinnah, had called Sheikh Abdullah a “goonda” and “hoodlum” and “Quisling” of India, and on February 4 1948 Pakistan formally challenged the sovereignty of the Dogra dynasty in the world system of nations.  In 1950 during his North American visit though, the Prime Minister allowed that J&K was a “princely state” but said

“culturally, economically, geographically and strategically, Kashmir – 80 per cent of whose peoples like the majority of the people in Pakistan are Muslims – is in fact an integral part of Pakistan”;

“(the) bulk of the population (are) under Indian military occupation”. 

Pakistan’s official self-image, portrayal of India, and position on J&K may have not changed greatly since her founding Prime Minister’s statements.   For example, in June 2005 the website of the Government of Pakistan’s Permanent Mission at the UN stated:

“Q: How did Hindu Raja (sic) become the ruler of Muslim majority Kashmir?

A: Historically speaking Kashmir had been ruled by the Muslims from the 14th Century onwards.  The Muslim rule continued till early 19th Century when the ruler of Punjab conquered  Kashmir and gave Jammu to a Dogra Gulab Singh who purchased Kashmir from the British in 1846 for a sum of 7.5 million rupees.”

“India’s forcible occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 is the main cause of the dispute. India claims to have ‘signed’ a controversial document, the Instrument of Accession, on 26 October 1947 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which the Maharaja obtained India’s military help against popular insurgency.   The people of Kashmir and Pakistan do not accept the Indian claim.   There are doubts about the very existence of the Instrument of Accession.  The United Nations also does not consider Indian claim as legally valid: it recognises Kashmir as a disputed territory.   Except India, the entire world community recognises Kashmir as a disputed territory. The fact is that all the principles on the basis of which the Indian subcontinent was partitioned by the British in 1947 justify Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan:  the State had majority Muslim population, and it not only enjoyed geographical proximity with Pakistan but also had essential economic linkages with the territories constituting Pakistan.”

India, a country dominated by the hated-Hindus, has forcibly denied Srinagar Valley’s Muslim majority over the years the freedom to become part of Muslim Pakistan – I stand here to be corrected but, in a nutshell, such has been and remains Pakistan’s official view and projection of the Kashmir problem over more than sixty years.[13]

The Bishop’s amendment was the most ambitious and substantial under consideration by the Grand Committee and as such it provoked a healthy and lively debate amongst Peers. His amendment seeks greater flexibility in interpretation of what is meant by welfare and greater independence from Government in the way that the health of the Military Covenant is audited and reported.

Despite the support of several Peers it is evident from the Minister’s response that the Government remains resistant to the Bishop’s proposals on the grounds that it amounts to a costly and unnecessary bureaucratic invention that dilutes rather than strengthens Ministerial accountability.

The Minister was right to highlight that setting up an independent office to review annually the Military Covenant would not be cost-free. But to claim that it would be ‘costly’ is to locate the amendment within a financial discourse that stresses the need for retrenchment in this new age of austerity.

It remains true, however, that the Bill’s existing provisions are not financially neutral. Making annual reports to Parliament would take MoD staff time and resources. The creation of an External Reference Group to help support the Ministry of Defence in its endeavours would also make some demand upon the public purse.

The Minister appears to have overlooked the possibility that contracting out this task to an independent body might result in financial savings.

Where, I suspect, cost becomes more of an issue is in the financial implications of any recommendations made to Parliament as to how the welfare of veterans might be improved.

As we have seen with the work of the Inspectorate to Prisons, reports by independent bodies can sometimes serve to cast a spotlight in dark areas that the government would rather keep out of public sight. These reports usually come with a long list of costly recommendations that the government of the day struggles to meet.

This brings me once again back to the main weakness of the Bill. As it currently stands the Government is allowed both to set its own exam questions and mark its own homework. That might be the most cost-effective solution but it is far from clear that these proposals would help to strengthen the Military Covenant. Members of our Armed Forces and veterans deserve a firmer guarantee than this.

None of this is to say that the Bishops’ amendment is necessarily the right way forward. But it is clear when reading Hansard that there is a fairly considerable majority opinion from all quarters of the House that holds that things still need to be looked at further if the Covenant is to be as effective as it could be.

Lets hope that Government looks again at Clause 2 and brings forward its own amendments. If not, I’m sure that the Bishop of Wakefield will put his amendment to the vote at the Report Stage.

Does our past collusion make us somehow complicit in the atrocities committed by Gaddafi’s Libya? Or, was the collusion necessary in order to dismantle Libya’s active WMD programme?

These ethical and political questions are unlikely to be tackled by the inquiry into the issues around the detention and rendition of terrorist suspects overseas. The aim of that inquiry, as the Prime Minister made clear, is to look at instances of malpractice so that the security services can get on with the work in hand.

The question of whether it is ever right to do business with repressive and authoritarian regimes is not new. But the question, as presented by David Cameron, as to how we negotiate the past when establishing diplomatic relations with the new Libya is one that is likely to need some urgent attention given the dramatic changes under way in North Africa and the Middle East.

The recent case of Abdel Hakim Belhdji suggests that being on the right side of history at the time of Gaddafi’s fall might not be sufficient compensation for those who suffered as a result our previous willingness to look the other way.

Beyond any investigation into specific cases of maltreatment, do we need to investigate and, if necessary, acknowledge more clearly the way that we in the West provided a life line to so many ancien regimes?

None of this is to suggest that Britain should engage in any act of self-flagellation on the diplomatic stage. Rather it is to press the issue of what role, if any, should penitence play, in the process of reconciliation set out by David Cameron in Parliament yesterday?