Tom Ricks, who I do respect, and love his books, wrote a very biased list of reformers in regard to the COIN movement inside the Army today (he works with a lot of them as well). A lot of these people, if not most, are beltway insiders (I don’t know everyone of them, but do most). They almost all get a lot of media attention for the wrong reasons. I disagree almost totally with Tom’s list. So, I published my own list below.  I disagree as I explain below. Read Tom’s list at the bottom of this post, then read mine here.

Happy Thanksgiving and Merry Christmas,

Don

My original message in reply to Tom Rick’s list posted on the Warlord Loop, a blog focused on strategy and warfare.  Some of today’s biggest thinkers contribute to this blog.

Why is it the guys on this list of “COINdinistas” the only ones noticed by journalists?

It is easy to read the bed time story to everyone. It sounds good, but more importantly to those in the beltway, it is easy to implement. It does not piss off anyone. It keeps the money flowing. Very few developing solutions that can be implemented today.

By solutions, I mean large-scale programs (not incremental improvements) requiring no substantial political or institutional changes. Not a surprise, as this is a high bar! So, we report on what is comfortable, easy to do, and does not offend many, except those we dont care to hear from anyway! It makes sure the pay keeps coming.

While it makes us feel good in the short term, it is killing us in the long term by minimizing their impacts and ideas. The key is organizational change. A focus on technology and ideas ignores the structural basis of present institutional behavior, giving too little attention to the methods which drive reform – and the countervailing forces which must be overcome.

That is one of my biggest arguments, we are advocating COIN, while not making the necessary structural and personnel laws and policies that will support moving the Army from the 2nd Generation to a 3rd Generation Force, that understand 4th Generation Warfare. I understand 4th Generation, not because, I think we can win it, but to avoid situations where we are putting our Soldiers (and all their cultural, structural biases) against it, with no way to win. This is what is occurring to us today be advocating what most in the beltway want to hear, we can win this one, if you employ this method!

Well, here is my list of the true change agents, some are being listened too, only one gets attention, rightly so for him, but all are people of character, who understand what has to happen for our Army and our nation to survive in the 21st Century. Don Vandergriff’s list:

1. BG H.R. McMaster. HR is the future of the Army! He can lead and command in any environment as demonstrated by his tenure as the commander of 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. He is one of the smartest people I know on the subject of war and then translate it to reality. The Army is smart in 1), promoting him to BG, 1) putting him at Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC-at TRADOC) writing the new doctrinal concepts for the future. HR also knows the people and training side as well, something that is not sexy, fun to report by anyone but a few, but is more important to armies than the other side (doctrine and tactics). HR is one of the reasons I have hope for the Army as he rises in the ranks.

2. COL Casey Haskins. Casey is leading the new Army training and education revolution through his concept of Outcomes Based Training and Education (OBT&E) that is already being written into Army training policies as we speak. COL Haskins performed incredible changes how the Army does basic training as well as its leader development when he was director of the Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, GA, and then follow on as commander of the 198th Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning, GA (where he took on and defeated the risk averse training and safety apparatus of the Army). He is now director of the Department of Military Instructon (DMI), where he, along with some great instructors, are changing the culture of West Point, while influencing the future of several thousand Army leaders.

3. COL (ret.) Andy Bacevich. He has torn apart the defense establishment for what it is, and what it is doing to the nation. I am impressed that he has gotten the attention he has on a few mainstream media shows, but if you notice, it is only for the moment, so they can say they are “fair and balanced.” Dr. Bacevich has incredible moral courage for taking on the entire defense establishment and as well as our poor defense strategy or lack there of. Several of his books, including American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (2002), The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (2005) and The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism (2008)show where he has been “a persistent, vocal critic of the US occupation of Iraq, calling the conflict a catastrophic failure.” In March 2007, he described George W. Bush’s endorsement of such “preventive wars” as “immoral, illicit, and imprudent.”

4. Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson. I consider Bruce the best of military historians, or at least one of the best. Bruce is currently, for the second time, leading the revolution in education at Quantico on teaching both officers and NCOs how to think. Bruce’s focus is on the way that modern armies adapt to radical change in their operating environments. He divides his time between historical research and assisting present-day military organizations with their own attempts to innovate. Bruce’s finest book of many, is Storm Troop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army from 1914-1918. I made it required reading for all my students.

5. Mr. Winslow Wheeler. It’s impossible to understand America’s wars unless one sees its political foundation in Washington — our “Versailles on the Potomac.” Few can give us that as well as Winslow T. Wheeler, Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information. “The conventional wisdom amongst the elite in Washington is that they have done a pretty good job of taking care of our national defense, that things may be a little expensive but we have the best armed forces in the world, perhaps even in history, and we do the best for our troops by giving them the world’s most sophisticated equipment which is, of course, the most effective. We have, so the elite asserts, demonstrated our ability by knocking off Saddam Hussein’s forces twice and are in general a model to the rest of the world on how to build equipment and provide for forces. That’s all crap. None of it is true. None of it stands up to scrutiny.” Win focuses on budget and acquisition issues, no fun at all, so it gets little attention, but if you study Winlow’s data, research and proposals, few if any can argue with him; so they ignore him.

6. Dr. Chet Richards. Chet has the best understanding of strategy I have seen. Chet Richards (Colonel, USAF, retired), is the author of several books including (most recently) If We Can Keep It: A National Security Manifesto for the Next Administration that focus on strategy. Again, he is ignored by the establishment, because what he advocates is opposite of our ventures everywhere, and you have to do your homework to understand what he advocates. Nothing he writes fits onto a power point exsum. Unlike other publications now coming out on the Iraq War and the counterinsurgency campaign there, Chet rejects the notion that policy-makers can predict how well any such effort will work. The track record of military occupations in culturally and religiously alien lands in modern times is not good in terms of the end result for the occupier, the effects on the indigenous population, and the standing of the occupying nation and army in the eyes of the rest of the world.

Original Message ——  What this list features isn’t the “brains” behind COIN, but rather those who most often are noticed by journos on the subject. Biddle, for example, isn’t exactly a savant on the study. One might have mentioned someone with a similar name, Birtle, but then that would require a more substantive understanding of who actually studies this stuff, and who is influential. When in doubt, look at the footnotes in the studies. On a tangential note, if we’re discussing influence, then Dilegge goes at the top, with Kilcullen. I deserve royalties for “COINdinistas.”

ALL Subject: [Warlord] Fw: The COINdinistas —– Original Message —– From: Dave Dilegge To: Dave Dilegge Sent: Sunday, November 29, 2009 4:35 AM Subject: The COINdinistas >From December’s Foreign Policy Magazine: The COINdinistas Who knows everything there is to know and more about counterinsurgency and its current role in U.S. military strategy? These guys. BY THOMAS E. RICKS | DECEMBER 2009

Pushed and prodded by a wonky group of Ph.D.s, the U.S. military has in the last year decisively embraced a Big Idea: counterinsurgency. Not everyone in uniform is a fan, but David Petraeus and the other generals in charge of America’s wars are solidly behind it. Here are the brains behind counterinsurgency’s rise from forgotten doctrine to the centerpiece of the world’s most powerful military:

1. Gen. David Petraeus The face of the 2007-08 “surge” in Iraq and now chief of Central Command. Gen. Stanley McChrystal is gonna try the same in Afghanistan, but “King David” rules this roost. ‘Nuff said?

2. John Nagl Writer on Petraeus’s counterinsurgency manual, now beats the coin drum from the outside as president of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). But it wouldn’t be surprising to see him in a top Pentagon slot within a year or two.

3. David Kilcullen The Crocodile Dundee of counterinsurgency. Former Australian infantryman with a Ph.D. in anthropology, and one of the most quotable people on the planet. His book The Accidental Guerrilla helped shape the year’s debates; he worked to steer the former Bush administration toward coin from the inside.

4. Janine Davidson The Pentagon insider in this crowd. Former Air Force pilot now sitting at the adult table in the policy shop of the secretary of defense.

5. Dave Dilegge Editor of Small Wars Journal. This is the town square of counterinsurgency, avidly read by everyone from four-star generals to captains on the ground in Iraq.

6. Andrew Exum Abu Muqawama blogger; with Nagl, another colleague of mine at CNAS; and co-author of “Triage,” an influential policy paper on Afghanistan. A former Army Ranger who is doing a Ph.D. on Lebanese militias, and in his spare time has been known to play paintball against Hezbollah — no joke.

7. Stephen Biddle Council on Foreign Relations. A latecomer to the coin debate who has written insightfully about both Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Exum, advised McChrystal on Afghanistan strategy.

8. Andrew Krepinevich Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Penned the classic The Army and Vietnam, about the failure of the Army to apply counterinsurgency in Iraq; wrote an influential Foreign Affairs article on the Iraq war and counterinsurgency.

9. Kalev “Gunner” Sepp Assistant professor, Naval Postgraduate School. Like Krepinevich, an Army officer who ruined his career by getting a Ph.D. at Harvard. Fought in El Salvador and kept his COIN powder dry for years until someone was ready to listen.

10. Col. Gian Gentile West Point professor who commanded a unit in Iraq. The skunk at the coin party who constantly points out flaws in the groupthink. Paints with a broad brush, but absolutely necessary to the debate.

Sorry about the language, this is not my video, just ignore it.

In August David Richards mused that the British army might be in Afghanistan for 40 years. Yesterday, the PM revealed his intention to turn provinces and districts over to the Afghans next year, paving the way for British troop withdrawals. Those two thoughts may be compatible, but only in the broadest interpretation of Richards’ long-termism.

Somewhere along the line, strategy seems to be shifting.  There hasn’t been a radical shift in political goals: the PM recently reminded us that securing a stable Afghanistan is ‘vital’ to make Britain safer. Debate rages (including here on KoW) about whether that’s right and, even if it’s halfway right, whether it can best be achieved by the sort of population-centric counterinsurgency/nation-building approach that NATO has been adopting.

But it’s intriguing that the PM should signal withdrawal just as the Army’s leadership prepares for the long haul, adjusting the physical and conceptual components of fighting power for Helmand-type operations. Just this week the military published JDP 3-40, a guide to how stabilization might be achieved in Afghan-like situations. It looks very ambitious to me – a way of striving to do Helmand better, not to avoid future Helmands.

Next year sees the Green Paper, and the start of the SDR. If the political decision by then is to wind down the Afghan mission, then the military, the army in particular, has some big problems. Should it structure and invest for low-intensity COIN? A more sceptical man than me might argue that if the Brits cannot turn Helmand, and they couldn’t hold Basra,  all the ambitious stabilization doctrine in the world is of limited utility. Moreover, he would add, what use is a strategy predicated on expeditionary forces capable of sustained deployment in the cause of rescuing failed states?

I’m still more optimistic than that. Are you?

Sound investment?

Happy Black Friday!!!!! If you are not from the U.S., it is just like Boxing Day in Canada.

For the Maze, I can’t really explain it so here’s the map.

Step 1: Go to the Ski Village

Step 2: Click the Red Button

Step3: Click the Red Button to show the Map.

The Map will look like this:

How to get the Yeti Costume:

Step1: You will need to find the end of the maze

Step 2: Go inside and it will look like this

Step 3: Walk over to the Big Bin That Says Prize

How to Get the Blue Pom Pom Toque:

Go to the Ski Hill

Click on the Big Bin That Says Free

This should come up, Click “Yes” and you now have this item.

New Sleds

Snow And Sports Catalog Cheats:

Click the Green Penguin’s Face for the Green Hockey Jersey

Click The Lime Green Penguin’s Face for the Green Goalie Gear

Click the word Ice in Ice Skating for the White Pom Poms

Oggi, nel forum METALDETECTOR PER TUTTI, l’amico 1500g ha posto un interessante quesito riguardante la possibilità di fare una stima approssimativa dell’età dei ritrovamenti in base alla loro profondità.

Si chiedeva infatti se fosse possibile dedurre l’età approssimativa di altri oggetti trovati in quel terreno in base alla loro profondità (tenendo come punto di riferimento la profondità di quelli già trovati e datati)

Recentemente mi sono incuriosito anch’io a questo argomento dopo aver letto un articolo di tale NASA Tom, un esperto di detecting molto conosciuto. Lui analizzava il comportamento degli oggetti metallici sulla battigia e mi ha dato spunti molto interessanti per ulteriori ricerche. Uno dei fattori più determinanti è la DENSITA’ dell’oggetto e quella del terreno.

Tom sostiene che, sostanzialmente e specie in spiaggia, l’”affondamento” prosegue fino a quando la densità dell’oggetto non è pari a quella del terreno che sta attraversando. Quando le due densità saranno uguali, la corsa si arresterà.

Sulla terra invece, oltre alla densità, ci sono tanti fattori in più da tenere in considerazione.

L’amico Iomirai infatti ricordava anche l’attività di “movimentazione del terreno” operata da lombrichi e talpe e le violente escursioni termiche.

Confermo anch’io l’importanza di tali fattori…

Ovviamente è raro che talpe e lombrichi possano vivere felicemente sotto la sabbia, quindi il loro effetto (che sulla terra è importantissimo) è trascurabile. Gli sbalzi di temperatura invece possono far “muovere” l’oggetto.
Ovviamente, specie in spiaggia, i temporali e il forte vento fanno la loro parte togliendo sabbia da sopra…

Approfondendo un pochino la cosa, una scienza che ci potrebbe aiutare è la cosiddetta Geologia Forense.
Questa branca della geologia, applicata a questioni criminal/legali, ha, tra i suoi principali obiettivi “…la rilevazione di corpi sepolti di qualunque natura mediante l’applicazione di metodi geofisici “no dig” e la rilevazione con conseguente attività di indagine su crimini ambientali.”
In altre parole è proprio quello che ci interessa…

Con un po’ di destrezza (ehehehe) ho trovato e ho iniziato a leggere un ebook gigantesco americano dove si parlava del comportamento di oggetti appoggiati sul terreno (pensate ad una pistola) e ai fenomeni che intervengono per farla “sprofondare” nel terreno.

Pensate che uno dei pionieri di questi esperimenti è stato nientemeno che Charles Darwin… Il padre della teoria dell’Evoluzione!

Per chi volesse darsi un’occhiata all’interessantissimo articolo (in inglese) di NASA Tom…
“LOVE IS DEEP” by NASA Tom

A questo punto l’amico Linux-Ubuntu ci ha ricordato che:

“Per quanto riguarda l’affondamento dei metalli è ovvio che in terra, dove ci sono alberi con notevoli foglie (castagni ad esempio) o dove ci sono pascoli con erba alta incolta, gli oggetti “affondano” di più perchè coperti dal materiale che cade, non certo per un problema di “galleggiamento”
La sabbia è un caso a se stante essendo in movimento perenne”

Mi viene in mente però una riflessione: “E nel caso di terra dove non ci sono alberi o altre cose che, cadendo dall’alto, ricoprano gli oggetti?”

Secondo gli studi di Charles Darwin descritti nel suo trattato “The Formation of Vegetable Mould Through the Action of Worms, bisogna tenere conto che due oggetti, poggiati sul terreno di prova nello stesso momento, ma con caratteristiche diverse (N.d.B3. ad esempio una linguetta di lattina e una moneta), dopo un tempo “T” abbastanza lungo si ritroveranno a profondità sostanzialmente diverse. Questo,
Se fosse come Linux propone, ovvero la profondità fosse solo legata alla “ricopertura” dall’alto di foglie etc, entrambi gli oggetti  sarebbero alla stessa profondità perchè ricoperti dalla stessa quantità di materiale “caduto sopra”. E ciò sarebbe in evidente contraddizione con gli studi di Darwin.

Faccio un  esempio concreto. Quante volte vi è capitato di trovare una linguetta di lattina a 10 cm e magari li accanto una moneta del 1800 alla stessa profondità? Trascurando situazioni particolari che possano aver creato delle anomalie, non credo quindi che nel 1800 bevessero CocaCola (bhè… nel 1866 si… ma solo in bottiglia…ehehehe).

In effetti il cosiddetto “SINKING RATE” (Coefficente di ‘Affondamento’) è influenzato da diversi fattori (questi sono tra i più critici ma ce ne sono tanti altri – e, per correttezza e dovere di riconoscenza, molti sono stati già indicati nel corso della discussione dagli esperti partecipanti) :

1) Densità del terreno

2) Composizione chimica del terreno

3) Densità dell’oggetto

4) Forma dell’oggetto e sua posizione tridimensionale del terreno

5) Peso dell’oggetto (LA GRAVITA‘!!!!!!!!)

6) Materiale di cui è composto l’oggetto

7) Attività animale nel sottosuolo (lombrichi, talpe e altri micro-macro organismi viventi)

Fenomeni Climatici ivi comprese le variazioni di temperatura e umidità

9) Sovrapposizione di materiale organico o inorganico per “caduta dall’alto” (è quello al quale si riferiva Linux-Ubuntu) o per spostamento superficiale.

10) Variazioni vegetative (anche questo…)

11) Movimenti tellurici

12) Presenza di altri materiali/oggetti che impediscono il movimento dell’oggetto

… ) Altri fattori

99) Azione meccanica di operatori di metal detector che interrompono l’affondamento attraverso lo scavo ed il recupero dei medesimi oggetti

Come si può vedere sono tanti i fattori da tenere in considerazione. Risulta quindi molto difficile tentare di costruire delle tabelline che ci possano aiutare nel mettere in relazione un particolare oggetto e la profondità ipotetica che potrebbe raggiungere.

Sarebbe bellissimo poter sapere in anticipo, in base all’età dell’oggetto che cerchiamo, sapere a quale profondità approssimativamente lo potremmo ritrovare, vero?

Le cose da analizzare, come potete immaginare sono un po’ troppe, almeno per poter fare una stima “sul campo” senza doversi portare a casa campioni di terreno da analizzare con spettroscopi, densimetri, gascromatografi etc etc.

E’ però vero che è possibile ALMENO TENTARE di farsi un idea (come si domandava l’amigo 1500g), in base alle condizioni MEDIE del terreno e al tipo di ritrovamenti fatti, di cosa ci potremmo aspettare di trovare.

Io aggiungo che sarà più facile capire quello che, per differenza, ci potremmo aspettare di NON TROVARE. Almeno non così facilmente…

Mi spiego meglio…

Se in uno spazio limitato trovo qualche moneta da 200 lire del 1970-80 a circa 20 cm di profondità, TEORICAMENTE, RIPETO TEORICAMENTE, sarà difficile che nei paraggi riusciremo a trovare monete più antiche.

Pur se in questo caso si parla solo in modo totalmente ipotetico e tutto ciò è suscettibile di errore, la teoria ci direbbe che monete più antiche PROBABILMENTE sono “UN PO’ PIU’ GIU’” (secondo gli studi effettuati da Darwin) rispetto a quei 20 cm ai quali abbiamo trovato le monete da 200 lire. Ciò implicherebbe che le monete più antiche potrebbero trovarsi a profondità “FUORI PORTATA” dei nostri amati metal detector.

Ma, ripeto… E’ solo teoria… La pratica spesso ci dice il contrario… Caspita…Sti’ vermi…

Happy WormSinking Hunting!

Bodhi3

1- Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

COIN is an intelligence-driven war. We are many years behind on building up our human assets, on the US, ally and host nation side. We should plan for the next conflicts long before we see them in the distance. Language programs should be funded accordingly and more languages offered to military and civilian elements who wish to learn. This is the first order of business; build the human resources and prepare them for the next step. Cultural training must go beyond a class with a slideshow and must be comprehensive in scope to be effective in future operations. Political support is another issue; often this is overlooked and it is the driving force needed to legitimize COIN both at home and in the host nation. Strong local/national leadership within the intelligence battle space will be instrumental in the success of an operation. There are no guarantees of complete success (I don’t say winning for fear the term is too narrow or limiting in scope) but there must be such leadership in place for when hostilities cease the transition to self-governance can take place.

2 – FIELD-BASED INDICATIONS & WARNING

Build pre-stability teams directly from military units, preferably at the company level. These teams will deploy with covert units and conduct intelligence operations long before conventional forces arrive. Intelligence collected must focus on political climate, the social and civil environment and current state of security. The information is sent to elite units in country for action but also it travels outside the AO, to joint forces and other customers. The idea of using effect-based outcomes could be used for these teams to collect, analyze and deliver intelligence live. This approach would help maintain the intelligence battle space more fluid but not designed to replace other standardized intelligence sharing processes. The approach would complement the current system into an alert mechanism that advises and sends intelligence and threat analyses live to the field commanders who need them.

3 – TECHNOLOGY A BAD GUY CAN’T FIGHT

It’s time to stop blocking the enemy’s punches. We are developing and deploying weapons systems, drones, and other high tech countermeasures to rival anything else in the world yet we don’t follow the enemy’s doctrine. What we need is a change in attitude toward technology which complements but does not run operations (that is because people should be brought back into the foreground). Here is a way to develop countermeasures to technology that has not been created yet. Since this process never ends how about we do more reverse engineering just like the enemy does? It takes a human mind to turn a cell phone into a detonator for IEDs but why wait until the need arises? Make them have to handle the unexpected, sometimes low-tech options. Lastly, there should be a stronger focus on targeting the enemy’s electronic media, communications, and services and shut them down. The idea is to reduce their ability to use cells, computers, etc. The enemy is adapting quickly to our dependence on technology so we should in turn target other areas of advantage they have. I know that monitoring SIGINT has been a priority in many cases overlooking the human factor but what if we deny the enemy the ability to communicate? That would definitely force the enemy to go back to smoke signals and face to face meetings.
I’m not trying to be funny, but we need to do a better job of paralyzing them.

Le New York Times en date de dimanche dernier nous sort une histoire digne d’un officier des Relations Publiques de l’armée américaine: les forces spéciales américaines soutiendraient une “révolte tribale” contre les Taliban dans plusieurs régions d’Afghanistan. Il s’agirait du programme Community Defense Initiative (CDI) établi par Stanley McChrystal et répondant de lui seul, hors la chaîne de commandement de l’ISAF.

La narration a quelque chose de familier: une dispute entre un chef tribal et un de ses concurrents soutenu par des “étrangers” (sous-entendu, venant du Pakistan) donne naissance à une révolte de fond contre les Taliban, bientôt soutenue militairement par les Américains qui s’empressent d’y envoyer des bérets verts pour encadrer les milices. Dans un deuxième temps, les Américains pensent pouvoir unifier ces mouvements dans une unité d’effort tout en en sauvegardant la spécificité “micro-locale” (le patriotisme des vallées comme dirait d’aucuns).

Qu’en penser, outre qu’il s’agit d’une tentative maladroite de nous faire penser que le même phénomène, celui de “guérillas accidentelles” qui se retournent contre l’ennemi takfir , peut se produire en Afghanistan comme il semble s’être déroulé en Irak?

-Premièrement: sur la genèse de l’idée, il faut renvoyer à des expériences déjà vécues par des bérets verts en Afghanistan et qui ont trouvé un écho favorable avec la publication et la circulation de ce pamphlet le mois dernier.

-Deuxièmement: cela me fait penser, plus qu’à l’Irak où ce sont les militaires des armes conventionnelles qui ont soutenu et encadré le mouvement, aux expériences françaises d’encadrement des maquis en Indochine (les fameux Groupements Commandos Mixtes Aéroportés). Mais il me semble que l’analogie historique, ancienne ou récente, doive trouver ici ses limites. En effet, les Méos et autres minorités ethniques étaient mobilisables et pouvaient être unies contre l’ennemi commun Viet. De la même  manière, la structure relativement hiérarchique des tribus irakiennes (notamment à Anbar) a plus ou moins garanti l’unité d’effort de toute la tribu. Mais en Afghanistan, ce concept a un autre sens qu’en Irak ou sur les Hauts Plateaux indochinois. Comme le montre par exemple la vulgarisation de David Kilcullen, les tribus sont en fait des groupes unis par des liens communautaires solides largement mitigés par un individualisme effectif, d’autant que la structure de l’autorité est triple, permettant à tout membre du groupe d’équilibrer le malik par l’imam, ou ce dernier par les Anciens. Bref, on aurait peine à trouver une tribu unifiée et obéissant comme un seul homme aux ordres d’un cheik!

-Enfin, il semble qu’il faille rester prudent sur la portée exacte de ce mouvement. Sans doute existe-t-il des alliances de circonstances en certains lieux. Mais on ne peut s’empêcher de penser au défaut inhérent de cette approche qui reflète avant tout les présupposés de ses auteurs: l’engagement trop subjectif au côté d’un groupe là où il serait plus pertinent sans doute de faire la balance entre les forces en présence. Une telle manoeuvre politique, garantissant de limiter les exclus de tout arrangement politique, a été tentée dans la province de KUNAR en 2005-2006 aux dires de David Kilcullen, avec succès semble-t-il.

Parking Meter.

Stay!

Go!

They are both bad options.  So are the other alternatives.  And yet when it comes to Afghanistan, the American president is hounded by all sides.  Stop Dithering!  Get us out of there!  How dare you second guess a General!  Surge!

It’s like learning to drive with your mother.  Stop!  Slow!  Faster! Aaahhh!  Noooo!  Concentrate!  Relax!

Sometimes it’s okay to just watch things unfold for a while.  Remember: troops are on the ground under the still-new leadership of Stanley McChrystal.  US forces have expanded significantly since Obama took office.  McChrystal is executing a new counterinsurgency (“COIN”) strategy.  So why does it feel like we are a Napoleonic Imperial army poised on a battlefield, waiting for the decision to charge or retreat?

The reality is that the situation in Afghanistan is progressing day by day, with or without a “decision” by Obama.  This is not to say that the deliberations in the White House are unimportant, but rather that they need to be seen in context.  “Wait and see” is a perfectly valid short-term strategy for any leader; sometimes a situation develops in your favor once things are in play.  And they are very much in play in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

So what can interested citizens of the world do?  Read widely, listen to others and think deeply about one of the great strategic problems of modern geopolitical history.

The Cowboy has been trying to follow this advice, and he has come around to supporting the McChrystal troop request.  After attending a National Security Conference on the situation last week and speaking with thinkers far more thoughtful than the Cowboy, it seems that this is the least bad option with the best odds of a least bad outcome.

Who has influenced the Cowboy’s thinking?  Who does the Cowboy like other than his trusty steed, who can be relied upon for many things, but on whose geopolitical insights the Cowboy has belatedly learned to place less stock?

Zbigniew Brzezinsky is one of the great minds in political science, with the academic grounding, the intellectual chops, and the real world diplomatic experience to be able to analyze and synthesize a large amount of information and develop a thesis without trite hyperbole.  While the Cowboy’s horse may be better at wrangling a literal mustang, Brzezinsky would be the clear choice when wrangling a metaphorical one, like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for example.  Brzezinsky’s talk at a recent dinner was like the performance of a concert pianist (inside joke here).  The Cowboy shook his hand and greeted him like a 1960s teenage groupie backstage at a Beatles concert.

The Cowboy also enjoyed speaking recently with John Nagl, who wrote the US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual together with David Petraeus.  Nagl is funny and approachable – always refreshing traits for a weary and humble Cowboy just off the trail.  Nagl’s story about appearing on the Daily Show with Jon Stewart in full uniform is amusing.  Nagl also shares the Cowboy’s conviction that a woman’s mother is a good leading indicator of future compatibility; lovely, smart and charming women tend to have lovely, smart and charming daughters – a hypothesis that has been tested at least once by the Cowboy (with positive results).  McChrystal is following the COIN Field Manual in Afghanistan with applicable variations from Iraq.  Remember that Iraq is a highly literate and urban population.  Afghanistan is the opposite.

And finally, the Cowboy likes Stephen Biddle at the Council on Foreign Relations.  Stephen is very sharp, thoughtful and open.  The Cowboy has had a few conversations with him over the past year, and he is a very pleasant person with whom to discuss the waning of American hegemony or any other topic in international relations that might interest you.  If you happen to see him across the room at a cocktail party, I would encourage you to pass the voluptuous blonde and head right for this soft-spoken Harvard man in a tweed jacket.  (Although the Cowboy would look the blonde in her eyes, tip his hat and smile as he passed.)  As the Cowboy told Stephen last week, the world needs more thoughtful communicators like him in the public space, and he definitely needs to get out more.

(You can skip the intros and pick up Biddle at 3:10.)

Here are a few more links to get you up to speed:

Biddle in the New Republic

All about McChrystal

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Amazon, PDF – 13.8 MB)

The McChrystal request

The Cowboy’s past thoughts

A decision about the troop request will be announced by Obama next Tuesday night.  All of those Afghan hounds will undoubtedly persist until, and even after the announcement.  As for the Cowboy, he has made his call.

Woof!

One of the hallmarks of good COIN is that it is not focused solely on military factors.  Indeed, politics and development are meant to take centre stage, with support from the military.  According to those in the know, like David Kilcullen, COIN should resemble ‘armed social work’. 

This concept is embedded in current US doctrine.  FM 3-24 clearly states

The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on supporting the local populace and HN government. Political, social, and economic programs are usually more valuable than conventional military operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and undermining an insurgency.

 

For it’s part NATO speaks of a Comprehensive Approach, which

is a structured and effective coordination at the local, national and institutional level, where each organisation’s efforts are complemented and mutually reinforced.  This should be with a view to achieving common, or at least similar, goals.

Sounds groovy.  How is it working in practice?

Frankly, not so well.  Take, for example, a single case of a single country trying to implement its version of the comprehensive approach.  This should allow us to see how things can be coordinated, without the difficulties of multiple actors (eg. how an Italian army unit works together with the Swedish Development Agency), let alone the chestnut of the ‘non-national’ NGOs. 

Canada has been active in Afghanistan since 2002.  It created a 3D Strategy to deal with the complex reality there: it would harness Diplomacy, Development, and Defence to provide a coordinated effort at countering the insurgency and helping to build a stronger state.

But look what happens when they try to operationalise (don’t you just hate that bureaucrat jargon?) this strategy:

[Canadian] officials in Afghanistan and Ottawa say the crucial element in the strategy – long-term development – is not happening because the Canadian International Development Agency has failed to issue the contracts and cash that are the lynchpin of success for Canadian and coalition forces.

How is it supposed to work?

The idea behind the plan, which has been running since the summer, is that the military moves into a village at the invitation of local chieftains, clears out any insurgents and the roadside bombs or weapons caches they left behind. Then military engineers perform a few quick-fix projects.

Sounds reasonable.  So what’s wrong?

CIDA money and contracts haven’t followed in sufficient volume to boost local employment and start the long-term development envisioned in the model village plan.

Oh.  That is strange, isn’t it?  Isn’t Development one of the D’s?

As it turns out, in 2005 during the last international policy formulation exercise, the minister responsible for CIDA did take an active role in the ‘whole of government’ process.  In her forward to the Development part of the 3D strategy she said:

I am pleased to present Canada’s International Policy Statement-A Role of Pride and Influence in the World: Development. It is an ambitious but achievable plan for enhancing Canada’s role in the fight against global poverty…I look forward to working with Parliament and all Canadians to make this vision a reality. 

Ah, but that was then, and this is now.  Note the disclaimer on the current CIDA website hosting the 2005 document:

Please note that this document was never officially adopted by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). It is available for reference only.

Upon closer inspection, it seems that the surface gloss of the Comprenhensive Approach, so vital to any modicum of success in COIN, belies a host of ‘conditions’.  For example, NATO tempers its commitment to the Comprehensive Approach with the following ‘yeah, but’:

…it must be done in a way that doesn’t compromise any organisation’s independence.  Nor must it infringe on the humanitarian space to which Non-Governmental Organisations understandably attach great importance.

Well, with that kind of a caveat the risk of a dis-integrated approach far outweighs the likelihood of a joined up strategy.  Magnify that across all Alliance and Coalition members and coherence is just about doomed.   This does not bode well as the Alliance and its constituent parts look to move away ahead.  The move (at least in some quarters) seems to be a transition from a military-led effort to a development-led one.  Will the dynamic change or will turf wars continue?

In the end, we are left with the familiar conundrum:

3D or not 3D, that is the question.

Attack the network methodology part 3: Network modeling and ISR synchronization
Asymmetric Warfare Group

Attack the network methodology part 2: Critical vulnerabilities and targeting
Asymmetric Warfare Group

Attack the network part 1: Oil-spot methodology
Asymmetric Warfare Group

Syiling di atas adalah syiling Straits Settlements 1/2 Cent tahun 1884. Rasenye komposisinye adalah gangsa (bronze). Kondisinye tak sure la plak, sebab ada tompok tompok tu. Syiling ni saya beli sama dengan syiling blank planchet sebelum ni, dengan harga rm10 sahaje. Tak tau lah ni original ke tak, sebab menurut kata penjual tu, dia dapat duit ni daripada kotak derma McDonalds. Orang Singapura yang letak kot duit ni.

Le Watson Institute for International Studies de l’Université Brown vient de co-produire un documentaire sur les “Human Terrain Teams” sous un angle certes critique mais apparemment assez bien documenté. Il a été projeté au festival dei populi de Florence et au festival du film international de Copenhague.

Une bande-annonce est visible ici, et le dossier presse peut être lu  ici.

I hear Sensei is here I will tell once I find out

Thanksgiving is a time to be thankful for the blessings that we have.  Even if you don’t have much, its still worth being thankful for. This is one of my favorite quotes for Thanksgiving:

“Thanksgiving Day is a jewel, to set in the hearts of honest men; but be careful that you do not take the day, and leave out the gratitude.”  ~E.P. Powell

This means that if you just eat turkey, your not really taking the message of thanksgiving. It is a time of prayer and thanks and you should take it very seriously. If there’s one thing that you do on thanksgiving, and if nothing else. No matter what religon you are, sit down and pray to God and be thankful.

Have A Happy Thanksgiving From Chrissjb15

Note: Derrick Crowe is the Afghanistan blog fellow for Brave New Foundation / The Seminal. Learn how the war in Afghanistan undermines U.S. security: watch Rethink Afghanistan (Part Six), & visit http://rethinkafghanistan.com/blog.

If Matthew Hoh could tell you one thing to help you understand the U.S.’s predicament in Afghanistan, he’d tell you:

The presence of our ground combat troops is not doing anything to defeat al-Qaida.

Think about that for a moment. We are paying roughly $1 million per troop, per year in Afghanistan. That’s roughly twice the per-troop cost in Iraq. We’ve suffered well more than 800 deaths in Afghanistan. And yet here is the former top civilian official in Afghanistan’s Zabul province, a former Marine who served in Anbar province in Iraq, telling us that the presence of our ground forces does nothing to defeat the organization that’s supposedly the target of our operations in that country.

So, if we’re not going about the business of defeating al-Qaida in Afghanistan, what are we doing?

We’re involved in a civil war in Afghanistan. We’re only taking one side in that civil war. And, our presence there is only encouraging the civil war to go on.

Hmm. This is all sounding very familiar.

I spoke to Matthew on Friday afternoon by phone from the front seat of my car. My first call to him went straight to voicemail, where I learned that apparently he’d had so many press calls about his resignation letter that his voicemail message directed inquiries on that topic to his email address. If you recall, the State Department took his letter seriously enough that it prompted job offers from Ambassadors Eikenberry and Holbrooke to get him to stay. Since then, Hoh has been the focus of a great deal of media attention, and for good reasons:

• With all the rhetoric about the “success” of the so-called “surge” in Iraq and its supposed lessons for Afghanistan, the opinion of a person with experience with both has a lot of heft.
• The fact that his feelings about the situation were strong enough to provoke a resignation and a subsequent rejection of a position in Washington gave him moral authority.
• And, Hoh was the beneficiary of good timing: his resignation came at a time when the media and policymakers had been cajoled into a willingness to entertain views outside the Washington, D.C. conventional wisdom that failure to send more troops immediately would lead to disaster.

Over the course of the past year, groups opposed to deepening U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan (such as Brave New Foundation’s Rethink Afghanistan project, the Get Afghanistan Right coalition and many other groups and individuals) worked relentlessly to keep a critical perspective on the war in Afghanistan in the public debate. These escalation opponents relentlessly hammered the proponents of a counterinsurgency (COIN) effort for their inconsistencies and self-contradictions, especially with regard to the COIN doctrine’s need for a legitimate host-nation partner. By the time the Afghan presidential elections exploded into a showcase of abject corruption and illegitimacy, these activists had laid the groundwork that helped the American people interpret the events of late August 2009 as a serious blow to the assumptions underlying the rationale for a deep military involvement. At the same time, President Obama refused to be rushed into a second troop increase in Afghanistan by an increasingly abrasive Pentagon whisper campaign, allowing the nation to take a collective breath and widen the debate about options. These factors, combined with cratering public support for the war effort, pushed policymakers and the media into a willingness to entertain views dissenting from those presented by General Stanley McChrystal. Enter Matthew Hoh.

Matthew’s letter is a four-page punch in the gut to the rhetoric of pro-counterinsurgency factions. It wrecks the idea that the U.S. will ever have a legitimate partner (referred to by the COIN field manual as a “north star”) in Afghanistan or that our strategy will lead to the destruction of al-Qaida. He ends the letter with regret that assurances can no longer be given that those who died in Afghanistan gave their lives in a mission worth the cost in “futures lost, love vanished, and promised dreams unkept.”

Hoh sees our presence driving the conflict in at least two ways. On one hand, our military support for the corrupt Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan assures the Kabul cartel that we will not allow them to be overrun by insurgents. Because of that perception, the GoIRA is not willing to work out a political settlement with their opponents to form a true national government. The support we have given thus far (which is very close to the maximum possible support we can give), however, is not enough to allow the GoIRA to crush the insurgency totally. Thus, within the constraints on U.S. and Afghan national power, the only possible solution to the conflict other than strategic failure is a political solution negotiated between GoIRA and it’s opponents–and that’s precisely what the GoIRA won’t seek as long as they can be assured of our continued military support.

[T]he only way to end this civil war is through political reconciliation, through some kind of political negotiation reaching to some kind of settlement. …The Afghan officials who are on our side have no interest in doing that. …They have no interest in giving up the position they have right now. And our presence there keeps them in power that way. I don’t really see them having any interest in taking Afghanistan into, you know, a modern age or a progressive country, all of the things we believed we were doing there for the past 8 years.

On the other hand, the U.S. presence fuels the ever-expanding insurgency, pulling people who resent our support for a corrupt, predatory government and who intensely resent outside interference in their lives into conflict with coalition troops.

In both the east and the south, where our troops were heavily engaged in combat…on a daily basis, those are areas populated by rural Pashtuns…The bulk of those people were fighting us just because we’re occupying them–not out of any ideology, not out of any real ties to the Taliban, not out of any hatred for the West. It was just because they did not want foreign troops, or, for that matter, the Afghan national army or Afghan national police, which do not represent them, in their valleys and villages.

…If you take the Korengal Valley, for example, which is well-known to the American people as “The Valley of Death,” …it’s 15-20 miles long, it only has about 10,000 residents, they speak Korengali…these are people who are not interested in things outside their valley. They prefer to be left alone. Of course, putting more troops in their valley is something they’re going to rebel against, especially troops from the central government, which does not represent them. …It’s really a question of these people wanting to determine their own existence and …govern themselves. For every Korengal we’re in, there’s a hundred that we’re not in, and if we were in [them], it would be the same issue of us having to fight them only because we’re occupying them.

On the topic of that corrupt, unrepresentative government, Hoh offered a couple of anecdotal examples of the corruption that permeates every level of government in Afghanistan:

I know a USAID official who got into a plane…with the governor of his province, and the governor had about $300,000 in a duffel bag with him. …The governor that I worked with had been removed from another province as the governor because he had been caught red-handed in a fairly extreme corruption case. Now this governor, Governor Sari, has been a friend of President Karzai for 35 years. So, after the U.S. embassy exposed this and complained about it, all Karzai did was move this governor…from one province to another province….To believe that the vast majority of Afghan officials that you’re working with have any allegiance to what we’re trying to do other than to enrich themselves or to make out in some manner is wrong.

I asked Hoh about the recent report on the quadrupling of the insurgency since 2006. According to at least one estimate, 10 percent of the estimated 25,000-man-strong insurgency were hardcore religious extremists, while the rest accepted training and funds from the “Taliban,” but lacked ties to their ideology or broader agenda beyond throwing out the invaders.

I completely agree. The number I’ve seen is that there are 25,000 “Taliban” (which I believe is an incorrect term to apply to the people who are fighting us because it makes a reference to the Taliban regime of pre-September 11, 2001, and I think that misleads people and causes confusion, particularly among the American public about who we are actually fighting there.). But if you go with that 25,000 number…only a few thousand of those are actual hardcore “Taliban” with a capital “T.” The majority of the rest of those groups are local fighters who are pretty independent of one another, just primarily concerned with their local areas, their valleys, their village, and who are tied to the Taliban with a capital “T” only through monetary or funding allegiances, and through a desire not to be occupied by a foreign power or by the other side in a civil war.

…But, if there are 25,000 troops now, Derrick…if we put more troops into the south, if we put 20,000 or 30,000 or 40,000 troops into the south, next year there will be 30,000, 35,000 or 40,000 enemies fighting us. As we move into more valleys and more villages…people are going to rebel against us.

So, the continued presence of massive numbers of U.S. troops removes the incentives for the GoIRA to negotiate a political settlement while providing the fuel for the growth of the insurgency. Hoh’s advice to policymakers? End combat operations and sharply reduce U.S. troop levels. Doing so would pull U.S. troops out of areas where locals fight us just because we are there and would compel the GoIRA to negotiate with their opponents. Otherwise the U.S. presence will continue to fuel an unsustainable dynamic whereby the GoIRA has a near-term upper hand but cannot decisively defeat their opponents while the opponents use our presence as a recruiting tool for the resistance movement.

You’re either characterized as all in our all out, and that’s wrong. I don’t think anyone is calling for us to completely wash our hands of Afghanistan and just walk away. When I call for withdrawal I call for stopping combat operations because it just doesn’t make any sense; all it does it just prolong the conflict. I call for some kind of political reconciliation to end the fighting there. So a withdrawal would have to be somewhat gradual while negotiations were going on.

But wait, one might ask: what about al-Qaida? Hoh’s policy prescription deals mainly with settling the civil war between the “Taliban” and the GoIRA. How does al-Qaida fit into this? Aren’t they the reason we’re in Afghanistan in the first place? Wouldn’t our withdraw allow them to reestablish “safe havens” and allow them to keep the ones they have in Pakistan?

I don’t believe al-Qaida needs or wants safe havens [like they had in 2001]. They just don’t operate that way. they recruit worldwide. They are really an ideological force that exists on the Internet. They influence individuals or their operations are carried out by these small, independent, autonomous cells that really don’t require much to operate other than a couple of rooms and a satellite phone or an internet connection. and if you look at the vast majority of attacks that have happened over the last decade regarding al-Qaida, they’ve been carried out by people not from the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, but residents of North Africa, residents of the gulf states or citizens of Europe or citizens and residents of the United States who do their preparation and their training in countries where the attacks occur. So this idea of a safe haven and their requirement for it is not borne out by any evidence of the way al-Qaida has operated for at least the last decade. After 2001, they evolved. They don’t need a safe haven. It would be great for the United States if they did have safe havens because then we could bomb them. So we have to attack al-Qaida as the organization as it exists and not as we want it to exist.

The concern that our presence their encourages people to respond to their ideology is a valid one. We’re currently occupying two Muslim countries, and we have to understand that lends credence to al-Qaida’s argument that it is defending the Muslim world from Western invasion.

How many recruits do they [al-Qaida] get per year? A hundred? Two hundred? The Muslim population is over a billion. You’re talking about such a small fraction. It’s really associated with such a fringe movement that we have to attack using human intelligence and using law enforcement techniques. Army brigade combat teams do not affect al-Qaida. Having 60,00 troops in Afghanistan is not affecting al-Qaida. …[T]he destruction of al-Qaida should be our priority…but we need to go after that organization as it exists and not with ground combat troops in Afghanistan.

Matthew said he’s pleased with the state of debate following his resignation and return to the United States.

I can tell you that one of the things that pushed me to resign was this feeling that I had, and I think most people had, or a lot of people had, particularly guys I was serving with in Afghanistan, that an escalation of troops and an open-ended commitment to supporting the Karzai regime seemed almost like a done deal all throughout the summer…There was no discussion of any other type of strategy…it seemed almost like a guarantee…I got home in September and that’s when I first heard there were debates on this within the administration…I’m very pleased the way the debates have been going. I’m not sure what’s going that’s going to happen with [the troop ]increase–I’m sure we’re going to get one. The best thing though …is that we’re going to get some kind of withdrawal date, which is what we need.  If we can get a withdrawal date within a year or two I’ll be very happy, because that’s so much better, so infinitely better, than some type of open-ended commitment or some type of 4- or 5-year plan. My thoughts are hopefully we can get some type of commitment to withdraw and stop combat operations within the next year or two.

I guess that’s being a realist. I’d like to see it stop tomorrow.

Brave New Conversations recently filmed a conversation between Hoh and Daniel Ellsberg. Here’s a clip:

You can find the full episode on the Brave New Conversations website.

Click the Modern Chair for the Coat Rack

Click the Tiny Leaf for the Shoe Rack

Click the Table Leg for the Woodstove

Click the Snow Fort for the Fireplace

Click the Snow Fortress Wall for the Icicles

Click the Brick for the Jack’ O Lantern

Click the Window for the Cauldron

Click the Sad Jack’ O Lantern for the LCD TV

Click the Tombstone for the Goofy Jack’ O Lantern

Click the Ticket Slot for the Piano

Click the Top-Left Window for the Bowling Alley

Click the Stove Knobs for the Fridge

Sarawak 1 Cent 1887
Harga Beli : RM19
Komposisi : kuprum
Tempaan : 1,605,000
Belakang Syiling : Rajah C. Brooke

I happened upon Bernard Fall’s classic article on “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency” the other day in the course of some other unrelated research, and it was as if this was written yesterday.  Clear-eyed and unsentimental, Fall– author of great books on COIN like Street Without Joy and Hell in a Very Small Place until he was blasted apart by a landmine in Vietnam in 1967 — this article still has the capacity to shock, like when it discusses the French Underground (and presumably Fall’s own actions):

The communists, or shall we say, any sound revolutionary warfare operator (the French underground, the Norwegian underground, or any other European anti-Nazi underground) most of the time used small-war tactics–not to destroy the German Army, of which they were thoroughly incapable, but to establish a competitive system of control over the population. Of course, in order to do this, here and there they had to kill some of the occupying forces and attack some of the military targets. But above all they had to kill their own people who collaborated with the enemy.

…or when it provides advice to the US regarding corrupt governments: (i.e. the Karzai brothers):

One can do almost anything with brute force except salvage an unpopular government.

Or the US’s COIN ops in Afghanistan or Iraq:

Some people have spoken of what is called the “oil-slick principle,” which has been described as the holding of one particular area, one central area, and working one’s way out of the center. That was fine when the French developed the concept for the Sahara, because in the Sahara there are obligatory watering points. If they have all the oases, those outside have to come in and get water. But Viet-Nam doesn’t happen to be the Sahara or an oasis. Thus, the oil-slick method succeeds mostly in pushing the Viet Cong units into the next province. Of course, it looks good, at least, because for one week there will be a “cleared” province. For the time being this is considered adequate until something more imaginative is discovered.

Funnily enough, I’m currently reading David Kilcullen’s fascinating new book, The Accidental Guerrilla, and he quotes Fall at length, especially from this article.  And Fall wrote this article about insurgency in 1965, when US troops numbered 184,000 in Vietnam — only 35% or so of our peak deployment of 543,000 in 1969.  The COIN heritage that Kilcullen writes about follows in Fall’s footsteps.