La reforma de los Organismos de Regulación (II): Mejoras en la gobernanza (The reform of the regulatory agencies in Spain (and II): Improving governance).

By Juan Delgado, Julio García Cobos and Antón García Díaz.

Nada es Gratis, un blog de economía casi siempre en español.

Regulatory and antitrust agencies must be independent and effective. What is the best configuration to guarantee such independence and effectiveness? In a series of posts, J. Delgado, J. García Cobos and A. García Díaz discuss alternative options to improve the institutional quality of regulation in Spain.

Published in European Competition Law Review , Issue 10, 2011

The legal framework in place, the emerging court decisions and the initiatives taken at European level seem to open new perspectives for private antitrust litigation in Spain. This article reviews the increasing role of the economic evidence in the quantification of damages in private enforcement cases in Spain.

An updated version of this article  has been re-printed in Global Competition Litigation Review, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2012.

Nada es Gratis, un blog de economía casi siempre en español.

Antitrust authorities wonder how to measure the impact of their actions with the aim of improving their effectiveness. Simple measures can help.

Published in El Derecho de la Competencia en Tiempos de Crisis (S. Martínez Lage and A. Petitbò, eds). Fundación Rafael del Pino y Marcial Pons. Colección Derecho no 34, 2010

The economic crisis has revived the debate on public policies to support the so-called “national champions”. There are multiple examples in which different governments have been accused of protecting domestic firms against a variety of potential risks. This chapter reviews the (in)efficiency of various public interventions aiming to protect specific firms and industries. The chapter advocates for a pro-competitive industrial policy compatible with antitrust rules.

Oxera Agenda, June 2010

Recent court decisions offer new perspectives on private antitrust litigation in Spain. Although case law is currently limited, the variety of cases highlights the possibilities of private enforcement both as substitute and complement to public enforcement. Juan Delgado, Chief Economist at the Spanish competition authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia), and Eduardo Pérez Asenjo of the Chief Economist Team, present an overview of private enforcement cases in Spain, focusing on the methodology used to quantify damages and the role of competition authorities in this process.

PERSPECTIVAS DEL SISTEMA FINANCIERO: Tarjetas de pago; (2009), nº 9

In recent years, antitrust cases relating to payment cards have increased worldwide. The proper functioning of the market for payment cards requires agreements between competitors but, to what extent such agreements are not just facilitators of cartels? The optimal determination of the fees for the use of cards and the rules governing the functioning of the market is a live issue both in the field of public policy as in academia. The increasing sophistication of economic analysis has enabled public authorities intervene more accurately in those markets. Should the market not provide an efficient solution, public authorities should follow closely the development of the payments card markets to ensure that consumer welfare is not harmed.

Published in Tratado de Regulación del Sector Eléctrico (F. Becker, L. M. Cazorla Prieto, J. Martínez Simancas and J. M. Sala Arquer, eds.). Aranzadi. December 2008

In the last two decades there has been substantial progress in the creation of a European single market and currency area. The process of creating a single market has been uneven in different industries. Power markets are an example of low integration. One of the obstacles to integration is the national character of security of supply policies. This chapter advocates for a “europeanisation” of security of supply policies in order to promote cross-border competition and facilitate the creation of a true European power market.

El blog de Bruegel

La Comisión Europea se plantea permitir que los operadores móviles cobren por recibir llamadas. Lo que puede parecer una carga adicional al usuario de telefonía móvil es en realidad un beneficio. En la actualidad, si un usuario llama desde Vodafone a Movistar, Vodafone debe abonar a Movistar una cantidad en concepto de terminación de la llamada. Dado que esta cantidad la pagan los clientes de Vodafone, Movistar puede establecer un precio alto sin perder clientes (los ingresos de los operadores por este concepto supusieron el 25% de su facturación en 2006 lo que quiere decir que una cuarta parte de su negocio lo hacen exprimiendo a clientes de otros operadores). Este sistema impide el descenso de las llamadas a móviles.

En el sistema alternativo desaparecerían los pagos por terminación. Cada operador determinaría  los precios que deben pagar sus clientes y no los que deben pagar los clientes de otros operadores. Por tanto, los precios serían más competitivos ya que aquel operador que estableciera precios altos perdería clientes (y no como ahora que se repercuten sobre los clientes de otros operadores). Este sistema ya se aplica en los EEUU y las tarifas de móviles son mucho más competitivas. Por ejemplo, T-Mobile ofrece llamadas ilimitadas por 99$ al mes en EEUU mientras que Vodafone en España por 100 euros al mes ofrece alrededor de 800 minutos (tarifa RELAX PLUS 100 asumiendo una duración media por llamada de 3 minutos). La posibilidad de ofrecer planes de precios por paquetes de minutos es limitada si los costes de un operador dependen de los precios fijados por los demás operadores.

Pagar por recibir llamadas implica pagar menos por hacer llamadas, mayor competencia y mejores precios en su conjunto. Al mismo tiempo simplificaría los sistemas de precios (no siendo necesaria la actual distinción entre operadores de destino). Adelante, Comisaria Reding.

Published in Tratado de Tributacion Medioambiental (F. Becker, L. M. Cazorla y J. Martínez Simancas, eds., 2008). Editorial Aranzadi. April 2008.

This chapter analyses different forms of market failures related to the environment. Apart from the classic examples related to the existence of externalities and public goods, the chapter focuses on the effect of uncertainty and asymmetric information on environmental policies and the interaction between environmental market failures and innovation-related market failures. Such overlap of market failures determines that the design of environmental policies is complex and cannot focus on the resolution of individual market failures in isolation.

En la reciente Sentencia del Tribunal Europeo de Primera Instancia (10 de abril de 2008) confirmando la multa de la Comisión Europea a Deutsche Telekom por abusar de su posición de dominio en el acceso a la red telefónica (bucle local), el Tribunal insiste en que “el control que (el Tribunal) ejerce sobre valoraciones económicas complejas hechas por la Comisión se limita necesariamente a comprobar si se respetaron las normas de procedimiento y de motivación, así como la exactitud material de los hechos, la falta de error manifiesto de apreciación y de desviación de poder”.

Mientras que el análisis económico juega un papel cada vez más crucial en la política de la competencia, el Tribunal sigue ignorando su relevancia y se limita a constatar que el texto está dentro de los márgenes. La evolución de la política de competencia hacia un sistema donde lo relevante es el impacto de las presuntas conductas anticompetitivas y no las conductas de por sí requiere que los jueces comiencen a pronunciarse sobre “valoraciones económicas complejas”.

Published in Energía y Regulación. (J.L. García Delgado and J.C. Jiménez, eds.). Aranzadi Civitas. December 2007.

This chapter assesses the current state of electricity regulation in Spain highlighting the main issues which reform is pending in order to achieve a fully competitive and efficient electricity industry. The restructuring of the Spanish power industry has failed to reduce concentration of supply and to incentivise new entry. Separation between generation and distribution is not fully effective. There is still scope to introduce new reforms in the Spanish power regulation in order to promote effective competition by removing distorting regulation, removing obstacles to the entry of new suppliers and creating incentives for rational behaviour of firms and consumers.

A summary version of this chapter is published at Boletín Inflación y Análisis Macroeconómico. Instituto Flores de Lemus. Universidad Calos III de Madrid. January 2007.

Contratto e Impresa Europa, n. 2, July-December, (2007).

In this paper for Contratto e Impresa, Juan Delgado describes the economic rationale underlying the Services Directive and its potential economic impact. Europe’s services sector is far from reaching its full potential. The Single Market Programme has been effective in removing obstacles to the cross border movement of goods and capital but the services sector has not received much attention. This has resulted in most services being regulated locally and services markets becoming more fragmented.

See video

The Globalist.

The European Court of First Instance’s judgment on the EU/Microsoft case has raised concern in the US. Juan Delgado explores the heated debate on the different approaches to antitrust policies in the United States and in Europe.

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Bruegel Blueprint Series, 2007

Can Europe’s nations go alone in their quest for a secure, competitive and environmentally-sustainable energy future? Or will this lead to a dispersion of effort, even to mutually undercutting national policies? If a common energy policy is the way forward, can the EU manage the necessary political arbitrage between 27+ different countries? This report seeks to answer these questions.

U.S.-Europe Analysis Series. The Brookings Institution. April 2006.

It is a truism that if you try to please everyone, you end up pleasing no-one. Europe’s controversial Services Directive has arguably fallen into this trap. When it was passed on February 16, 2006 by the European Parliament, angry trade unionists gathered at the doors of the Parliament, protesting that the parliament had gone too far. Frustrated supporters of liberalization, for their part, dismissed it as a watered-down version of the original proposal that would do little to advance the goal of a single market for services in Europe.

Cinco Días

The Bolkestein directive, which aims to remove barriers to the provision of services in the EU, has been surrounded by controversy. The author addresses a fundamental topic: The heterogeneous excessive regulation across different EU Member States.

Economic Theory, (2006); vol. 29(1), pp. 219-229.

Whereas in the absence of capacity constraints the Cournot outcome is the unique coalition-proof supply function equilibrium outcome, the presence of capacity constraints may enlarge the set of equilibrium outcomes. Interestingly, if capacities are sufficiently asymmetric the new equilibrium prices are below the Cournot price. These results have important implications for merger and privatization policies: specifically, capacity divestiture will not necessarily imply lower market prices.

The Price of Access: the Unbundling of the Local Loop in the EU

Published in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European Regulatory Framework (P. Buigues and P. Rey, eds., 2004). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Monitoring Competition in the Telecommunications Sector: European Commission Sector Inquiries

Published in The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European Regulatory Framework (P. Buigues and P. Rey, eds., 2004). Edward Elgar Publishing.

Journal of Economic Theory, (2004); vol. 114(2), pp. 231-254.

In an industry where firms compete via supply functions, the set of equilibrium outcomes is large. If decreasing supply functions are ruled out, this set is reduced significantly, but remains large. Specifically, the set of prices that can be sustained by supply function equilibria is the interval between the competitive price and the Cournot price. In sharp contrast, when the number of firms is above a threshold we identify (e.g., three if demand is linear), only the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a coalition-proof supply function equilibrium.

Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, (2003); no. 53(4), pp. 346-358.

This article explains why the interest in local loop unbundling is now waning in Europe, and why the whole process, while initially heralded as a major breakthrough, may turn out to be nothing more than a wasteful regulatory experiment with little benefit for competition.

The Journal of Industrial Economics, (2003); vol. 51(4), pp. 491-509.

We investigate price dispersion in a retail market (car tyres) characterised by outlets each selling a range of products, some of which are manufactured by their owners. Consumers face substantial price dispersion across outlets even for very tightly defined products. We show that this price dispersion has systematic components relating to retailer-manufacturer interactions. One specific result is that chains owned by manufacturers sell other manufacturers’ tyres on average nearly 20% more expensively than do independent stores and over 11% more expensively than their own equivalent branded product.

Revista de Economía Industrial, (2001); no.338, pp. 75-82.