The Russian newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets claims that after the August 2008 War, Russia was originally planning for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to form a confederation, and to recognise them as one state. The crux of the plan though was that the confederation would have been open for new members, specifically Georgia. However, despite Russia arguing that it would be easier to get other countries to recognise them together, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia refused. Apparently, the decision to instead recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia separately was then only taken three days before 26 August.

What to make of this story – is it true? It is not the first time that a newspaper reports about some secret plan for Abkhazia or South Ossetia, and most of these have seemed rather doubtful. In June 2008 it was Kommersant which claimed that Georgia had proposed dividing up Abkhazia to Russia. Perhaps we will know when the politicians involved write their autobiographies.

Algeria’s Entente Setif will be without striker Abdelmalek Ziaya for the second leg of the Confederation Cup final…. From BBC News. Full story

This site may contain information about: english footbal. The blog is also related to: english football clubs.

La Suisse a voté ce dimanche 29 novembre 2009 sur l’initiative intitulée “Contre la construction de minarets”, une initiative contre laquelle je me suis engagé (voir “Un grand NON à l’initiative anti-minarets le 29 novembre“). Le résultat est sans appel : le peuple suisse ne veut pas (ou plus, puisqu’il  en existe 4 déjà construits) de construction de minarets. Et le peuple a toujours raison. Pourtant, je ne peux que me méfier des conséquences à venir. La principale, celle de l’incompatibilité avec la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, est d’ailleurs déjà sous examen de l’ONU…

L’initiative contre la construction de minarets a passé la rampe, et haut la main (57.5% de oui, voir ici) ! Le peuple a toujours le dernier mot, j’espère qu’il en aura au préalable mesuré les conséquences. Parce que la portée de cette acceptation ira, quoiqu’en disent les initiants, bien au-delà de la simple interdiction de construire des bâtiments religieux (il était fort intéressant de voir Oskar Freysinger commençant son analyse en justifiant que rien ne changera pour les musulmans de Suisse). Je suis inquiet à divers titres.

D’abord, par la portée néfaste qu’elle apporte à la relation qu’entretient la Suisse avec les musulmans, que se soit en Suisse ou à l’étranger. Je plains les diplomates qui devront aller expliquer le résultat de cette votation dans les pays musulmans ; ou ceux qui devront négocier la libération des otages en Lybie ; ou les banquiers genevois dont les relations avec le monde arabe représente le fonds de commerce.

Ensuite, je suis inquiet pour l’image de la Suisse à l’étranger en général. Les médias internationaux se sont déjà rués sur ce résultat (voir sujet de la TSR, ici). La Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme sera sans le moindre doute saisie sur ce dossier (même si je ne pense pas forcément que la Suisse sera en tort). Tout cela venant déjà ternir une image déjà mise à mal par le dossier “paradis fiscaux”.

Finalement, je me dois de plaindre notre pays lorsqu’il retombe dans des travers de Kulturkampf. Je pensais que la laïcité avait fait son chemin au cours du temps. La différence des résultats obtenus entre les cantons catholiques romands et les cantons protestants romands démontrent malheureusement le contraire. Le peuple a toujours raison, et il faudra faire avec ce résultat. J’aurais personnellement préféré faire sans…

Documentation

Minarets: nouveaux recours à Strasbourg, TSR, 17 décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

L’interdiction des minarets combattue à Strasbourg, TSR, 15 décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

Minarets: Berne attend une décision de Strasbourg, TSR, 8 décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

Les Suisses auraient-ils voté tout haut ce que les Français pensent tout bas ?, Le Monde, 2 décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

Onde de choc en Suisse après la votation contre la construction de minarets, 20minutes.fr, 2 décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

Les anti-minarets veulent encore serrer la vis, Swissinfo, 1er décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

Minarets: interdiction discriminatoire pour l’ONU, TSR, 1er décembre 2009 (mise à jour)

L’extrême droite européenne lorgne la Suisse, Le Monde, 30 novembre 2009

Minarets: l’ONU se penche sur l’interdiction, TSR, 30 novembre 2009

Les sociétés européennes crispées face à l’enracinement de l’islam, Le Monde, 30 novembre 2009

Les Suisses inquiets des réactions musulmanes, 20minutes.ch, 30 novembre 2009

Swiss voters back right-wing minaret ban, The Times, 30 novembre 2009

Vier Minarette und ein Verbot, Frankfurte Allgemeine Zeitung, 30 novembre 2009

La Suisse fait la une des journaux européens, TSR, 30 novembre 2009

Minarets: le monde regarde la Suisse, Swissinfo, 30 novembre 2009

La Suisse vote massivement l’interdiction des minarets, Le Soir, 30 novembre 2009

Les Suisses interdisent les minarets, TSR, 29 novembre 2009

(GREEK NEWS AGENDA) The Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline is a significant project with geopolitical, economic and energy importance, Deputy Foreign Minister Spyros Kouvelis noted, speaking to reporters on the sidelines of a Black Sea Business Forum in Thessaloniki, on November 12. 
The 3rd Union of Black Sea and Caspian Confederation of Enterprises (UBCCE) business forum, entitled “Seizing New Investment and Trade Opportunities in the Black Sea and Caspian in the Post Crisis Era,” is being held in Thessaloniki on November 12-13.

It is hosted by the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises and the Federation of Industries of Northern Greece.
Addressing the event, Kouvelis stressed Greece’s commitment to the enhancement of co-operation with the European Union, through the establishment of “Black Sea Partnerships” within the “Black Sea Synergy” process, as well as through the new “Eastern Partnership” EU initiative.
Greece, he said, will have the chance to advance this perspective during the Greek Chairmanship of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), which commences on June 1, 2010.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization

History has a strange way of reinventing itself, sometimes because a gap needed filling, and sometimes even when no gap existed.

Take, for example, the case of one John Hanson. I recently received an email from an uncle of mine, suggesting that George Washington was not actually the first president of the USA. In my uncle’s words, “…not many peeps realize the pre-Washington history of the presidency”. His statement was founded upon the claims made here.

I found the claim intriguing, and decided to do some research in to the matter. What I learned was that this claim was essentially untrue, but I also learned a little more about US history and – more specifically – why the US came to be.

The “Hanson as original President” argument is based upon his appointment as President of the Confederation Congress in 1781. However, if one follows this argument further, even HE was not the first “President”, but rather the first ELECTED President, as  Samuel Huntington and Thomas McKean had served before him in that office, after the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.

However, I think one has to clarify the difference between the President of the Confederation Congress (which was the title these three men, and their annual successors, held), and the “President of the United States”: the former served when the US had no Executive Branch, and served largely in a ceremonial capacity only. Actually, to be specific, the United States did not even exist yet, so how could he be “the first President of the USA”?

Here an excerpt from Snopes:

“It is important to note that although both the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation used the phrase “united states of America”, neither of those documents was intended to create a single, unified country out of the thirteen former British colonies. Colonial leaders feared the creation of a too-powerful national government dominated by factions and so specifically refused to create a unified nation or to transfer sovereignty to a central government, Instead, they in effect created a national Congress to whom they could subcontract administrative tasks performed on behalf of all thirteen states: conduct foreign affairs, make war and peace, deal with Native Americans living outside the states, coin and borrow money, supervise the post office, and negotiate boundary disputes. Congress could NOT, however, raise money to carry out these tasks by levying taxes on the states, nor could it raise troops in order to defend the country or wage war, or even compel the states to comply with the laws it passed. In short, the Articles of Confederation created a Congress extremely limited in authority, with insufficient power to carry out the duties assigned to it”.

The Confederation Congress failed eventually, transferring responsibility for the national debt to the states in 1787.

The key to all this being that the Articles of Confederation did not create “The United States of America”, but an alliance of thirteen INDEPENDENT and SOVEREIGN states. The failure of this partnership led to calls for establishment of a centralized federal government, and thus was drafted the Constitution. From the perspective of understanding why and how the Constitution and US came to be, it is certainly very interesting and important to know about John Hanson and the Confederation Congress. It’s going a little far, it seems to me, to suggest he was the “First President of the United States of America”, though!

So the United States did not come to be as a result of the Revolutionary War, but rather because the Confederation of Sovereign States failed to operate under their intended principles of autonomous partnership.  The failure forced the drafting of the famed Constitution, centralizing authority and power, and establishing the US of A.

I love it when I learn something new!

Canadian History, Week 8

David Jay Bercuson, ed. Canada and the Burden of Unity. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1986.

David Jay Bercuson supplies a collection of articles that assess the historical relation between Canada’s federal government and its provinces in the Maritmes and the Canadian West. This is a study of the dynamics of regionalism, particularly with respect to economic development. Although history serves to supply examples and evidence in support of the authors’ arguments, most of the texts represent exercises in political economic theorizing. Two aspects of Canada’s National Policy – principally railways and to some extent tariff regulation — figure in a number of the discussions (immigration, the third aspect, is dealt with only incidentally and tangentially, and then in its reverse — as out-migration from Nova Scotia). The authors do not hesitate to offer their own solutions to what they see as debilitating problems. The overwhelming tone is one of protest: against the centralization of decision making and of the power to enact or deny policy directions that are of import to regions.

Bercuson opens the discussion with an evaluation of Confederation that equates the ideal of unity with disingenuous rhetoric. In his opinion, “mutual suspicions and rivalries,” which existed between the signatory entities prior to the realization of Confederation grew rather than diminished in its aftermath. While acknowledging that there are inter-provincial differences, Bercuson divides confederated Canada into three regions: the West, which includes British Columbia as well as the Prairie Provinces; the Maritimes; and Central Canada (the later additions, Newfoundland and the North are not discussed).  The burden of unity that the creation of Canada imposed on the outlying regions, according to Bercuson, is one of “permanent fiefdom to the intended heartland of Ontario and Quebec.” Further, he states, “Central Canada was destined by geography and federal policy to have an industrialized centre and an agricultural and resource-extraction periphery.”[1] Provincial protest notwithstanding, Bercuson is of the opinion that this relation, replete with unequal powers and disparate roles, was and is purposefully maintained by the federal government. Basically, the centralist argument is that unity is best for the greatest number (politically measured by seats in the House of Commons), and is, therefore, best for all. Bercuson concludes (and is supported in his conclusion by the other authors), that “the sacrifices called for in the name of ‘national unity’ have taken a heavy toll on the hinterland regions and no real national unity can be attained until national priorities have been rearranged.”[2]

Paul Phillips ties the National Policy, continental economics, and national disintegration together to argue that a complacently held belief in a fallacy — that Canada “exists as a single, independent, policy making unit” — has allowed multinational corporations to insinuate themselves into the Canadian economy very nearly to the point of controlling it.[3] In the absence of real, rather than idealized, Canadian political economic nationalization, multinationals have simply transformed Canadian regions into their own economic hinterlands. These hinterlands, though situated in Canada, are far more dependant on American contracts than on Canadian contacts and therefore are destined to compete intra-nationally and remain bereft of inter-provincial support systems. In isolation, with no say or influence in the making of U.S. policy, they are impotent in the face of externally generated instability and exploitation and are in fact likely to undergo “underdevelopment.”[4] Phillip’s solution requires that Canada regain control of its economic policies by implementing a new national policy that eliminates ‘branch plant’ conditions. This new national policy must regulate multinational behaviour within Canada, foster research and development of Canadian technology, and concentrate on making the most of Canadian natural resources.

For his part, Carman Miller argues in favour of restoring Greater Nova Scotia (lost with the separation of Isle St. Jean [Prince Edward Island] in 1769, and New Brunswick and Cape Breton in 1784). In his view Maritime unity still remains a potent source of regional power, unrealized due to the advent of Confederation, but necessary to access if Confederation is to work for the Maritime region. Ernest R. Forbes agrees that the Maritimes have not reached their full potential under the confederated agreement. Forbes argues that the provinces of the region were not adequately protected against misguided attempts of Central Canadian policy makers to impose symmetry in their transportation policies. He points out that attempts to mollify the western farmers while privileging central industrialists led to the destruction of the preexisting and successful Maritime regional transportation policy and to the undermining of their (also formerly successful) economy. T.W. Acheson agrees, pointing out that the tendency for ‘Empire-building’ in Central Canada allowed for buy-outs, corporate takeovers, and shut-downs of Maritime industries by non-Maritime interests – all for the sake of protecting Central Canadian industry from unwanted competition.

T.D. Regehr, finds that not only has freight rate discrimination against the West been the single biggest cause of western Canadian discontent, but that the provinces of the region are without means to effect a political solution. His suggestion is that they attempt an economic one: subsidizing alternate transportation systems to compete with rail and thereby force Central Canadian planners to reconsider their traditional philosophy towards rate-making. Regehr admits that “legal, financial and constitutional problems” will likely arise, but is apparently convinced no other alternative exists.[5] David E. Smith, while agreeing that Westerners have virtually no voice in the federal political arena, attributes this silence to their apparent determination to disassociate themselves from the federal Liberal party. As he does not see any point in expending energy trying to forge an affiliation in the face persistent hostility, the solution Smith suggests is devolution: the creation of agencies with quasi-executive power delegated from the federal government which would operate within each region. He argues that devolution is a legal and reversible move that would give the West some real control of policy implementation and allay distrust. It is somewhat ironic that what sounds like branch plant government is suggested in a text so critical of branch plant economics.

Colin D. Howell closes the collection of articles with an observation on Nova Scotia’s historical protest movement and search for meaningful federalism. He points out that, contrary to nationalist historiographical tradition, Nova Scotians who tried to create a more equal and fair federal system were exhibiting rational behavior that was no more indicative of disloyalty to the idea of confederation than was that of their erstwhile opponents. Howell’s unspoken suggestion — given that the theme of the book is that “‘national unity’ has created burdens that have not been equitably borne and serious national difficulties that have never been tackled” — appears to be that loyal Canadians should perhaps take up the ‘anti’ cause where historical Nova Scotians left off.[6]

Additional Resources:

Government of Canada, “Welcome to Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) at the Privy Council Office,” Intergovernmental Affairs www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/aia, Government of Canada Privy Council Office website, http://bit.ly/2bFL0d.

“Trudeau not worried about Western alienation,” posted to You Tube by mtthwwbstr, 21 November 2008.

[2] Ibid., 10.

[3] Paul Phillips, “National Policy, Continental Economics, and National Dsintegration,” in Canada and the Burden of Unity, 19.

[4] Ibid., 30.

[5] T.D. Regehr, “Western Canada and the Burden of National Transportaion Policies,” 137.

[6] Bercuson,  “Canada’s burden of Unity,” 11.

Canadian History, Week 7

Artist Unknown, “ Banner of the Nova Scotia Loyalists,” dated 1789, described as “likely a banner of the Nova Scotia Loyalists … Scholars have reiterated that the date is late to early nineteenth century and that the motto is appropriate to the Nova Scotia Loyalists. There has been some investigation but no successful link to any particular family. Heraldic expert Darrel Kennedy from the office of the Governor-General examined the item in early 2008 and recognized the design elements as a hatchment. … The banner was acquired from the Museum Book Stores, London, England post 1929 … is made of black silk and bears a rather elaborate achievement of arms. There are three shields of arms on each of which appears a golden box below the sun, the crest, and a stork. Below the shields, a scroll bears the inscription “RESURGAM” (I shall rise again).” Source: Library and Archives Canada, Acc. R5780-1.

Julian Gwyn. Excessive expectations: Maritime commerce and the economic development of Nova Scotia, 1740-1870. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1998. [Google books online preview: http://bit.ly/2ZDhME]

Using statistical analysis to back up his thesis, Julian Gwyn disputes the idea that Nova Scotia experienced a golden age of development prior to Confederation. He breaks his study into three periods:

• 1740-1815, which was largely determined and disrupted by war;
• 1815-1853, which was notable for the “stress of structural adjustments to peacetime economic realities” particularly during the “dreadful 1840s”;
• and 1853-1870, which saw optimism, revived with recovery from an economic depression, turn to disappointment.

Gwyn focuses on such indicators as regional differences, volume and type of imports, standard of living, trade reciprocity with the United States, and the balance of payments. In the course of his analysis, he documents a litany of economic weaknesses. He opens his account by stating, “Nova Scotia’s past may have been glorious but there is precious little evidence of it from the study of its economic history.”[1]

Overall, Gwyn does not view the Maritime region as having any particularly competitive advantages geographically or materially. What resources were available for exploitation in world markets (timber for example), were not systematically harvested. Neither were they marketed or integrated, horizontally or vertically, into comprehensive business plans (or, in the case of coal, the resource proved to be of inferior quality). Success, in his view, would have required organization and planning beyond what occurred and probably beyond what it is reasonable to expect should have occurred.

Nevertheless, Gwyn finds that there were missed opportunities. These might have been taken advantage of, but were not — because officialdom was blinded by an assumption that wealth naturally accrued to those who possessed territory, rather than to those who made optimal use of settler initiatives in a territory. Gywn, therefore, views the Acadian deportation as a debilitating step in terms of agricultural development. The loss of improved land (improved in a real sense agriculturally-speaking), and the loss of people with the knowledge to effect such improvement was not easily or readily overcome. From the first period through to the end of Gwyn’s study, official neglect of fishery potential is also viewed as myopic.

One resource that Gywn lists on the ‘advantage’ side of the historical economic ledger was British public spending. In his view, this was the real “proximate cause of what prosperity existed before 1815.”[2]

The factor that Gywn finds drove development most consistently was population growth. However, the development it fostered was deceptive in that it was extensive rather than intensive – meaning that it merely kept pace with population growth. In essence, more people caught more fish and bought more tea, but production and consumption did not move any further beyond what were really only subsistence levels.

The ‘excessive expectation,’ that Gwyn is critical of, was the idea that the appearance of ‘more’ meant that a future leap in prosperity was assured to all; that industrialization was sure to follow. Contrary to previous historiographers (W.S. Macnutt is mentioned), Gwyn argues that historical fact shows this scenario to have been false. He argues that the economic evidence indicates that “On the whole, the picture by 1851-52 was gloomy in the extreme. The performance of the colonial economy had largely disappointed the postwar generation, which blamed the failure on lack of enterprise by the capitalist class.”[3]

Gywn’s approach is interesting. He suggests, for example, that rather than regarding economic theory as a metaphor for how processes unfold, grow, or move through time and space, historians might do better to treat such a theory as a null model. It is also interesting that Gwyn identifies himself as a Central Canadian. In places his tone seems angry enough that it sounds defensive, and, I wondered, about what?

Ultimately, Gwyn finds that “Reciprocity had important, short-term economic reverberations,” although these were not nearly as substantial as contemporary politicians and newspapers alleged. As for the union of British North America, in Gwyn’s opinion:

Confederation, if initially not as important as some current historians suggest, realigned public finance and removed the fisheries from the jurisdiction of Nova Scotia, to which anyway its capitalists had largely paid only lip service. There is no short term evidence that Confederation, in any measurable way, harmed the provincial economy. Gywn allows, however, that there was certainly a perception that it had harmed Nova Scotia’s economy. I suspect that his statistics, no matter how well-marshalled, will not dissuade anyone who maintains a view contrary to his own from continuing to do so.[4]

Additional resources:

Robin Neill, “The Globalization/Continentalization Paradigm: with special reference to the Maritimes,” (September 2002), cached at http://bit.ly/3rKyGS.

Edward Hicks, handcoloured aquatint with etching, “ South Aspect of Halifax Nova Scotia in 1780.” Source: Library and Archives Canada, Acc. No. 1990-178-1.

Au mois de mai dernier, je mentionnais la mise à disposition des internautes du répertoire des noms de famille suisse, permettant de retrouver une bonne partie des informations liées à votre origine en Suisse (voir “Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse : recherchez vos origines“). Depuis, un projet à plus grande échelle a vu le jour : le portail biographique international, regroupant les données contenues dans le répertoire des noms de famille suisse, ainsi que les données des homologues allemands et autrichiens. Les données allemandes proviennent de deux sources, soit l’Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (ADB) et la Neue Deutsche Biographie (NDB), et les données autrichiennes proviennent de l’Österreichisches Biographisches Lexikon 1815–1950 (ÖBL). Saluons la création d’un tel projet et espérons qu’il ouvrira la porte à un portail comprenant tous les pays européens.

Au sujet du dictionnaire historique de la Suisse …

Le dictionnaire historique de la Suisse a pour mission d’éditer un dictionnaire sous forme de livre accessible à un large public, mais également sous forme électronique à accès libre sur internet. Démarré en 1998 et financé par la Confédération, il est en actuellement aux deux tiers de sa rédaction. Le volume 8 vient de paraître et s’ajoute à la collection existante :

Volume I: De Aa à Ban de l’Empire, Hauterive, 2002, 833 pages

Volume II: De Bandelier à Camuzzi, Hauterive, 2003, 888 pages

Volume III: De Canada à Derville-Maléchard, Hauterive, 2004, 840 pages

Volume IV: De Desaix à Fintan, Hauterive, 2005, 851 pages

Volume V: De Firl à Grize, Hauterive 2006, 891 pages

Volume VI: De Grob à Istighofen, Hauterive 2007, 894 pages

Volume VII: De Italianité à Lozza, Hauterive 2008, 880 pages

Volume VIII : De Lü à Muoth, Hauterive 2009, 861 pages

Ils peuvent être commandés, pour la version française, aux éditions Gilles Attinger, à Hauterive.

In this video, Tory Senator Hugh Segal speaks about George Brown’s role in Confederation. The video was shot near the Château Laurier on Canada Day. I thought that I would post this video because Christopher Moore is currently “live blogging” the Quebec Conference of 1864.

From Christopher Moore’s Canadian History blog: “Given the response to the live-blogging of the siege of Quebec, I think we will liveblog the Quebec conference of 1864 next. Starting tomorrow, we will remove to Monday, October 10, 1864 and see how we get along. ” See here.

IT major Infosys Technologies is looking at acquisitions in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, Japan and Australia, a top company official said. “The size of the company should be around $450-500 million,” Infosys chief executive and managing director S. Gopalakrishnan told reporters on the sidelines of a seminar organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII).

The US accounts for around 62 percent and Europe around 26 percent of the company’s total revenues of $4.6 billion. The company is now looking at increasing the revenue share from Europe to 30 percent.

Regarding recruitments, Gopalakrishnan said the company had hired 18,000 people in 2008, adding that it would look into further recruitment next January-February depending on the economic scenario.

Infosys is pursuing contract deals worth $1 billion, he added.

Canadian History, Week 7

“Fishermen,” photographed at Souris, Prince Edward Island, c.1920-25. Source: Library and Archives Canada / PA-043972.

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Ernest R. Forbes. The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A study in Canadian regionalism. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, c.1979. [Google books preview online: http://bit.ly/VPYYJ]

Ernest R. Forbes describes an instance of regionalist expression in the Canadian political forum. According to Forbes, the call for redress of Maritime rights and claims surfaced during a period of uncertainty after the Great War, concurrent with widespread enunciation of optimism by proponents of the Progressive movement. The principal fear of Maritimers appears to have been that their provinces were in danger of being left behind as the Central Canadian provinces availed themselves of opportunities to progress.

“ Children gathering potatoes in Prince Edward Island,” dated c.1921. Source: Canada. Dept. of Interior / Library and Archives Canada / PA-043964.

Initially, Forbes observes, the move to consolidate disparate Maritime groups by imbuing them with a shared sense of grievance was evident in farming and labouring circles by 1919-1920. Subsequently, business and political leaders championed the idea of forming a regional bloc that could force desired changes in federal policy. Forbes, sympathetic to the Maritime cause, ultimately finds that Central Canadian interests and powers used an alliance with progressives in the Western Canadian provinces – an alliance secured on a promise that Western concerns would be met — to subdue and dissipate the Maritime movement, without substantively meeting its demands.

“ In the Petitcodiac Valley near Moncton, N.B.,” dated c.1924. Source: Canada. Dept. of Interior / Library and Archives Canada / PA-041708.

Forbes traces the causes, for the Maritime Rights movement’s rise, to a general unhappiness over Confederation that had quieted but had not entirely vanished. However, he finds that the deciding impetus to renew protest arose out of changes made to freight rates. The rise in the rates was seen as undermining the ability of Maritime industries to compete with industries situated in central Canada. Taxation was another grievance. There was strong objection voiced to contributing monetarily to westward expansion if there were no immediate benefits to be reaped. The fact that Portland, Maine, had become a main Canadian grain port, while Maritime ports were being bypassed, represented a particularly galling loss of benefit that had been expected to accrue through Confederation — though perhaps economic ‘promise’ would be a more appropriate term than ‘benefit’, as having Atlantic ports appears to have been the only significant marketing differential the Maritime provinces possessed. Forbes explains that the excuse given for using Portland – i.e. Central Canadians feared American reprisals if they did not make good use of their Grand Trunk/St. Lawrence & Atlantic Railroad line — seemed disingenuous to Maritimers. Why the Maritime provinces had not objected to the Portland connection more forcefully and much earlier is not clear however. In any case, Maritime grievances were exacerbated with each relocation of a commercial central office to Central Canada — especially that of the Intercolonial Railway, when the Canadian National Railway was formed in 1923. There were also a series of political battles over losses in political representation. In Forbes’ view, over time, through aggregation, the combined scope of these problems expanded to transcend what had been traditional internal divisions that sectioned areas of the provinces into discrete pockets harbouring diverse viewpoints.

“ Tuna fishing,” photographed at Hubbards, Nova Scotia, c.1928. Source: Library and Archives Canada / PA-041872.

The disintegration of the movement in 1927 with the advent of more prosperous times leaves too many questions unanswered to described Forbes’ analysis as fully explanatory. The protests from the Maritimes appear to have had validity. Why was the movement so fragile? If hope was on the horizon, why quit? Surely Maritimers, if as thoroughly fed up with Central Canadian indifference as Forbes implies, would have been too angry and too savvy to simply accept platitudes and vague promises — even if preceded by a Royal Commission? If the roots of a common Maritime consciousness grew out of exceptionally hard times relative to other regions, then the nature of the hardship could have been described in more detail. In what ways were the Maritime mining strikes different from those in Western Canada? How were the ways in which Maritime families were faring different from Western Canadian families; in what ways worse? What exactly were the rates of migration in and out of the provinces? How did they compare with rates in other regions? Who owned the companies that made up the Maritime industries that were undermined?

“ Fishing scene, Little Wood Island off Grand Manan Island, N.B.,” dated c.1926. Source: Canada. Dept. of Interior / Library and Archives Canada / PA-047956.

Forbes’ description of the Maritime movement is illuminating as far as the view of the movement itself is concerned. As a Western Canadian, I did not find it particularly illuminating about the context in which counter-opinions were formed. This is really only problematic when Forbes attempts to explain the movement’s demise as being a result of actions on the part of more powerful opponents to the west. In my opinion, the emphasis on Mackenzie King’s bid to court Western Canadian votes could use some balancing against other possible factors. For instance, more attention might have been paid to the role of competing industries in Western Canada – British Columbian and Albertan mining for example – and the way in which these interests were connected (in some cases directly, as corporate holdings) to railroad policy makers and to the making of broader political policy. Forbes succeeds in raising an alert to the centrality of railroad policy and practice in Canada but I was disappointed that this point was not more thoroughly followed through.

“Canadian Immigration Building, Edmunston/Bridge Head, New Brunswick,” dated c. 1July 1927. Source: Canada. Dept. of Public Works / Library and Archives Canada / PA-135576.

Additional resources:

Jean Daigle, revue, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism, par Ernest R. Forbes, Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 33, no. 4 (1980): 592-594 [available online at érudit: http://bit.ly/MMPgT]

McGill-Queens University Press, press release, The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism, by Ernest R. Forbes, book web-page, McGill-Queens University Press website, http://bit.ly/1rgx9A.

Greg Marquis, “New Brunswick’s Population Growth Strategy in Historical Perspective,” paper presented at the at the New Brunswick and Atlantic Studies
Research and Development Centre Conference, “Exploring the Dimensions of Self-Sufficiency for New Brunswick” (St. Thomas University, 9-10 May, 2008), available online as a NBASRDC New Brunswick and Atlantic Studies Research and Development Centre, pdf.

Robin Neill, A History of Canadian Economic Thought (New York: Routledge, 1991), [Google books online preview: http://bit.ly/2EUwXx].

“Fishing scene,” photographed in the Kedgemakooge District, Nova Scotia, c.1925. Source: Library and Archives Canada/PA-042006.

Un homme discret, de consensus, et aux idées fortes a été élu aujourd’hui au Conseil Fédéral. Si une telle affirmation avait été prononcée il y a 25 ans, elle aurait paru plus que banale. Il n’en est rien aujourd’hui. La volonté de l’Assemblée Fédérale d’élire un homme de consensus est sans doute l’un des plus grands facteurs de réjouissance des dernières élections d’un Conseiller Fédéral. On doit s’en réjouir à plus d’un titre.

D’abord, par le retour à une volonté de politique consensuelle. Les derniers épisodes, peu glorieux, de l’éviction de Christophe Blocher, de la mise à l’écart par son parti d’Evelyne Widmer-Schlumpf et de la bipolarisation lors des élections fédérales de 2007 ont clairement affaibli notre système politique. Un système politique dont le mode de fonctionnement et d’élection se base sur une volonté de politique de consensus. Un système politique qui, s’il devait être remis en question, tendrait forcément vers un système majorité / opposition. Une tendance qui aurait été synonyme de régression à mes yeux.

Ensuite, parce que l’élection de Didier Burkhalter est une victoire de la politique des idées. Elle démontre en cela qu’être un homme de gouvernement, ce n’est pas renoncer à une volonté politique, ni à un programme. Si le consensus doit être préservé, ce n’est pas au détriment de la vision politique. L’Assemblée Fédérale a montré aujourd’hui qu’avoir des idées fortes n’est pas un obstactle à la capacité de gouverner.

Finalement, c’est la victoire de l’homme. Un homme discret, qui, à raison, souhaite protéger sa vie privée. Qui, à raison encore, ne souhaite pas voir l’échiquier politique se transformer en un théâtre de politique-spectacle. Au grand dam, évidemment, des différents médias. Didier Burkhalter a tenu sa position dans ce domaine, malgré une pression gigantesque apparue ces derniers mois. Notre pays ne peut que s’en réjouir. Félicitations à notre nouveau Conseiller Fédéral !

L’Assurance Invalidité (AI) perd chaque jour 4 millions de francs, soit un équivalent annuel de 1.4 milliards. Dès lors, deux pistes se présentent pour équilibrer la situation : réduire les prestations ou trouver de l’argent. La réduction des prestations a déjà été en partie mise en oeuvre dans la 5ème révision de l’AI (acceptée par le peuple en 2007 pour une entrée en vigueur en 2008) et le sera encore dans la 6ème révision prévue pour 2012-2013.

UN PROJET EN DEUX PARTIES

Trouver de l’argent, c’est la première partie de l’objet du vote : par une augmentation temporaire de la TVA de 0.4% (mais seulement 0.1% pour les biens de première nécessité et 0,2% pour l’hôtellerie) du 1er janvier 2011 au 31 décembre 2017.

La deuxième partie du projet soumis au vote n’est pas négligeable : la séparation du Fonds AI de celui du Fonds AVS, les deux formant actuellement un seul fonds. Ainsi, à l’heure actuelle, les liquidités de l’AVS servent … à financer l’AI. La création du fonds AI se ferait avec un capital initial de 5 milliards de francs prélevés sur le fonds commun.

UNE SOLUTION COHERENTE

Les deux parties forment un tout cohérent : il serait inutile d’augmenter le taux de TVA pour renflouer l’AI sans s’assurer au préalable que l’argent récolté soit bien utilisé pour l’AI. Dans cette optique, la séparation du fonds commun en deux est indispensable. D’autre part, séparer les fonds sans avoir quelque chose à y mettre, donc sans être capable de résoudre le problème de financement de l’AI, n’aurait aucun sens non plus.

LES ARGUMENTS DES OPPOSANTS

L’argumentation contre ce projet est simple : s’opposer à une (nouvelle) hausse des prélèvements fiscaux et à la levée des 5 milliards pour constituer le fonds AI depuis le fonds commun. Les opposants font valoir le droit de l’AVS à ces 5 milliards et considèrent que seule la réduction des prestations doit prévaloir pour sauver l’Assurance Invalidité.

QUE FAIRE ?

Je n’ai que rarement été de ceux qui préconisent une augmentation de la fiscalité pour résoudre les problèmes structurels de l’Etat. Et encore moins lorsque l’économie traverse une période de crise telle qu’actuellement (une nouvelle ponction fiscale réduit le revenu disponible des ménages et pèse sur la croissance). Par contre, dans le cas présent, deux points me poussent à soutenir le projet. D’abord, la hausse de la TVA est limitée dans le temps : les dates sont même ajoutées dans la Constitution (voir brochure d’information) afin qu’elles ne puissent être prolongées sans une consultation populaire. Ensuite, parce que l’entrée en vigueur a été repoussée d’une année (1.1.2011 au lieu de 1.1.2010), justement en raison des craintes de l’impact sur notre économie, susceptible d’être encore en récession au cours de l’année 2010. En outre, en dehors de l’aspect fiscal, la séparation du fonds commun en deux fonds séparés permettra un meilleur contrôle des charges liées à chaque type d’assurance. L’Assurance Invalidité est un pilier de notre paix sociale et permet à de nombreuse personnes de travailler au lieu d’être poussées en marge de la société. Préservons-la en votant OUI le 27 septembre au financement additionnel de l’AI par un relèvement temporaire des taux de la TVA.

Documentation

• La brochure d’information du Conseil Fédéral
• La proposition initiale de modification de la Constitution (de 2010 à 2016)
• La modification des dates d’applicaton (de 2011 à 2017)
• Les consignes de votes des partis et associations
• Le comité interpartis Protéger l’AVS, assainir l’AI, ainsi que le blog relatif
• Le comité Non à 8% de TVA
• Oui au relèvement temporaire de la TVA pour l’assurance invalidité (blog de Georges Tavernier, 9 juillet 2009)
• Oui au financement additionnel de l’AI (par Alain Maillard, blog du Centre Patronal, 11 août 2009)
• 0.4% pour la solidarité entre les générations (blog de Philippe Nantermod, 19 août 2009)
• Oui pour garantir l’AVS et l’AI ! (blog de Joël Zimmerli, 9 septembre 2009)

Canadian History, Week 5

Frank H. Underhill. The Image of Confederation. Toronto: CBC Publications, 1964.

This series of essays by Frank H. Underhill was originally prepared for the third season of the Massey Lectures in 1963.[1] The lectures, considered an important Canadian public lecture series, were named for Vincent Massey in recognition of his support for the humanities in Canada. Massey was also known as a staunch promoter of Canadian unity and identity. The Lectures were designed to allow noted scholars or public figures to speak on a subject of their choosing. Underhill chose to speak to the issues of unity, identity, and the nation, while commenting as well on those who would shape national opinion.

Underhill opened with a discussion of the climate of opinion in 1867. Reference to intellectual climate had been popularized by Carl Becker in 1932 with his publication, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. As in Underhill’s later text, Becker’s first chapter included ‘climate of opinion’ in the title. The phrase was one that Becker claimed was traceable to the 17th century. As used by Becker — and presumably by Underhill as well, though he makes no overt reference to Becker — the phrase underscores the points that:

• world-views change over time;
• historians can only make sense of arguments put forward in the past if the past intellectual context is understood;
• misleading results accrue to attempts to understand past pronouncements in light of present opinion.[2]

According to Underhill, by the 1960s it was obvious that the optimism inspired by the concept of nationality as understood by the Fathers of Confederation was no longer palatable in Canada. It was his opinion that “Nationalism was one of the great dreams of the nineteenth century. It has become one of the chief nightmares of the Twentieth.” He therefore set out to “review what Canadians, from time to time since 1867, have thought about their nationhood, its purpose and significance.”

He argued that, of the Canadian delegates at the conferences that gave rise to the British North America Act, none had been selected to represent discreet ‘racial’ or ‘national’ groups. In his view “If the Canadian delegates at these conferences spoke in any role but that of Canadians, they spoke as Conservatives or Reformers.” Further, he described them as overwhelmingly loyal to Britain, and, of the Confederation they designed he stated, “there is no doubt; it was fundamentally anti-American, a grand design to protect British America from American encroachments.”[3]

Underhill described Canadian nationalism in the 1870s and 1880s as exemplified by exponents of the ‘Canada First’ movement, including Charles Mair and John C. Shultz, and other “idealistic intellectuals,” such as Edward Blake and Goldwin Smith. The general thesis these men held in common, according to Underhill, was that there was “need of a truly national spirit in Canada.” Their vision, although temporarily popular enough to see the West secured to Canada, was displaced relatively quickly by stronger support for what Underhill characterized as the “nationalism … of John A. Macdonald – the nationalism of the protective tariff and the Pacific Railway.” This, in Underhill’s view, was a nationalism that appealed to a particular class:

the ambitious, dynamic, speculative or entrepreneurial business groups, who aimed to make money out of the new national community or to install themselves in the strategic positions of power within it – the railway promoters, banks, manufacturers, land companies, contractors, and such people.

Underhill noted that any benefits of the Macdonald/capitalist form of nationalism “were very unevenly distributed,” and the distribution “involved a tremendous amount of corruption.” Hence, in his opinion, a “heavy cost” had been paid, i.e., the “lowered standards of our public life.”[4]

Underhill appears to have resented those who applied “cold rational analysis [and] paid no attention to all the traditions and sentiments that had grown up in our Canadian past.” Some of the traditions that he presented as being of the most moment in his own time, however, read as essentialist and stereotypical today: French who were “instinctive” and insular and English who were more British than the British. To Underhill’s way of thinking, Wilfrid Laurier “was the greatest of all Canadians,” because embodying the qualities necessary “if we are to solve our difficulties between the two main communal groups.” He believed these were major difficulties that had to be resolved, or, he warned, “Confederation will fail.”

Interestingly, Underhill lauded Laurier and the “Laurier tradition” despite admitting they were “not popular” among his contemporaries in Quebec. He was of the opinion that “populist democracy” works best when restrained and led. Thus, whether French or English, whether fond of Laurier or not, Canadians needed “the guidance at the top of specialists, trained administrators, experts in economics, finance and science” if they were not to “go wildly astray.”[5]

The real problem, as Underhill saw it, was that, unlike other nations, “We Canadians are not a people who have ever shown much aptitude or genius for whole-hearted, deeply felt dedication to purposes and goals beyond those of our individual lives.” He regarded this as a severe handicap in a world where, for as much as he could make out of his foreseeable future, “the nation-state” would be the basic unit of identity – even if it was subsumed in “something wider” [an international trading bloc? an empire?].

The challenge that Underhill saw for Confederation as it moved into its second century would be to demonstrate that French and English Canadian men, “who have done great things together in the past,” could again come together and, “hope to do great things in the future.” He concluded by proffering a rather old vision, partly reminiscent of historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874), apparently inspired by Henri-Gustav Joly de Lothinière (1829-1908), but very redolent of Utilitarianism. For revitalizing what had been “the new nationality” of 1867, to revive popular approval of Confederation’s image, Underhill counseled that what was required of Canadians was that ‘we’ put the general good foremost.[6]

Additional Sources on Underhill:

Kenneth C. Dewar, “Frank Underhill: The Historian as Essayist,” Underhill Review (Fall 2007): 5-10 http://bit.ly/VcqZP.

Barry Ferguson, review of Frank Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur, by R. Douglas Francis, Manitoba History online,  http://bit.ly/87UMS.

Bruce Walton, review of Frank Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur, by R. Douglas Francis, Archivaria 23 online pp. 160-161 http://bit.ly/QIrgg.

[2] Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932), 5. Becker’s assertion that, “Whether arguments command assent or not depends less upon the logic that conveys them than upon the climate of opinion in which they are sustained” is Hegelian. On that point see, “Climate of Opinion,” Dictionary of the History of Ideas, University of Virginia Library, cached at <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/dhi.cgi?id=dv4-74>: According to Hegel, “Philosophy has to be related to a particular reality; it is to this relatedness that he refers in quoting the famous phrase, Hic Rhodus, hic salta. The concept of the spirit of the time has thus both a guiding and a limiting connotation. The latter connotation implies the historicist understanding of the spirit of the time. Related to this historicist view is the conception that the thought and culture of peoples are correlated with certain historical periods, that is to say, to certain trends of the spirit of the time. Transcending a spirit of the time makes a trend not only impossible but sometimes obsolete, as in the case when an individual or a group of individuals cling to a trend which has already been overcome.” See also Frank H. Underhill, The Image of Confederation (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1964), 44-45.

[3] Underhill, The Image of Confederation, 13, 2, 10-11.

[4] Ibid., 23-25.

[5] Ibid., 31, 54, 47, 55, 64.

[6] Ibid., 61, 69, 58, 1. Check, for example, “Utilitarianism,” <http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= Utilitarianism&oldid=27590827> which, when accessed in 2005, noted, “Utilitarianism was originally proposed in 18th century England by Jeremy Bentham and others. A similar concept can be found a little earlier in David Hume’s Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, who in turn reflects John Locke. However, the tradition of utilitarian ideas can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophers such as Parmenides.

 Revenir sur une décision populaire n’est pas démocratique. Sauf si c’est le peuple qui décide de revenir sur sa décision. Voilà pour la forme ce qui est proposé par la votation intitulée “Suppression de l’initiative populaire fédérale”. Qu’en est-il du fond ?

L’initiative populaire fédérale, telle que décidée en 2003 par le peuple, donne un droit d’initiative à la population sur le plan constitutionnel (comme cela a toujours été le cas) ET sur le plan législatif (ce qui est nouveau). En cas d’acceptation à la suppression, seul le plan législatif serait retiré, la proposition partant dans le sens d’un retour à la précédente version du droit d’initiative.

 LE PROBLEME

L’essence du problème posé par le droit d’initiative législatif réside dans notre système politique. Le système bicaméral impose que le Conseil national et le Conseil des Etats s’entendent sur la teneur d’un projet. Or, ces procédures sont très longues et ne peuvent garantir que la volonté des initiants soit respectée d’une part, et dans des délais raisonnables d’autre part. Le problème des délais n’est pas négligeable : que diraient les initiants si une initiative acceptée en votation venait à mettre plus de dix ans pour être mise en application ? Quelles seraient les mesures de recours si le contenu venait à ne pas satisfaire leurs exigences ? Voilà les questions auxquelles ni le Parlement, ni le Conseil Fédéral n’ont pu apporter de réponses.

 LA SOLUTION ?

La solution n’est pas élégante. Demander au peuple s’il accepte de retirer l’initiative qu’il a accepté en 2003 n’a rien de glorieux. Bien entendu, cette forme d’abandon devant l’échec est irritante, d’une  part parce que la loi est censée être au service de l’Homme, et non l’inverse, et d’autre part parce que l’on a le sentiment d’ouvrir une porte de sortie aux initiatives que l’Assemblée Fédérale jugerait comme inapplicables. Mais existe-t-il réellement une autre solution ? La seule possible résiderait dans un changement profond de notre système politique d’adoption des lois. Et m’est avis que le jeu n’en vaut pas la chandelle dans le cas présent. Le droit d’initiative constitutionnel étant préservé, il n’y a aucune raison de s’alarmer sur une quelconque perte de droits politiques. En effet, la constitution primant toujours sur la législation, le droit d’initiative législatif ne constitue en soi qu’une complication du système. Il peut donc être supprimé pour une simplification du système, raison pour laquelle je recommande de voter OUI le 27 septembre à la suppression de l’initiative populaire générale.

Documentation

• La brochure d’information fournie par la Confédération (pdf, 1.4 Mo)
• Le texte soumis à la votation (pdf, 0.5 Mo)
• Les consignes de vote des partis.

Photo tirée de photo-libre.fr

Canadian History, Week Four

Garth Stevenson. Ex Uno Plures: Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, 1867-1896. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. [Online preview: http://bit.ly/324B0 ].

The title of Garth Stevenson’s text refers to a play on the United States motto, E pluribus unum — “out of many, one” – a reference to the union of the original 13 states that was suggested by the first Great Seal committee in 1776. The Canadian word play has been ascribed to George Cartier who sought to signify the converse — “out of one, many.”[1] Stevenson notes that the Canadian federal union, unlike the American, had as its basis the distribution of powers to the provinces, not a cession of a portion of their powers to the central authority (hence the usage of the term ‘confederation’ which implied a less centralized relationship than ‘federation’).

In his detailed account of federal-provincial relations after Confederation to the installation of Wilfred Laurier’s government, Stevenson demonstrates that because the structure and rules set out in the BNA Act supplied the framework within which political activity took place, the Act shaped political activity. He observes that, “The structure and processes, as opposed to the content, of intergovernmental relations developed gradually through trial and error.”[2] He shows the patterns of political interaction to have been a complex mix of conflict and collaboration. Canadian federalism — in his view, an arrangement by which provincial governments sought and defended autonomy from the outset — was “the product of all these conflicting influences and pressures rather than a conscious design.”[3]

Stevenson begins with a brief description of the origins of Confederation. He finds the two main reasons for pursuing such a union originated in, and were chiefly beneficial to, the United Provinces: i.e. arriving at a workable political arrangement between Canada West and East; and supplying military defence, principally as security from American aggression (an issue more important to colonies with extensive American borders). He describes the three stages that led to Confederation as: the Macdonald-Cartier agreement to make it a priority; the allegiance of George Brown and cohort to the Canadian government plan; and the negotiations with the Maritime colonies at Charlottetown and then Quebec.

Subsequently, Stevenson maintains, the features of the BNA Act that caused the most friction in intergovernmental relations were many. They included:

• the appointed upper house of Parliament;
• dual seating of members of the House of Commons in a provincial house;
• and the ambiguous position of the lieutenant-governor as both a federal and provincial officer (a position Stevenson characterizes as an ambiguous “paternal despot,” because specifics about such questions as ‘acting on behalf of whom? at whose behest?’ were never established).[4]

As well, in addition to the policy of reservation (“effectively obsolete and redundant” by 1896), disputes arose over:

• the anomalous power of disallowance of provincial legislation;
• and inconsistencies between responsible government and federalism (partisanship and patronage existed in uneasy tension – the personal often over-road party loyalty, much as it had in the wholly representative system).

Then there was the overlapping distribution of legislative powers and dissatisfaction with how their relative strengths were decided. Although the prime minister dominated the process of intergovernmental relations with respect to policy directions, Stevenson notes that — with the exception of Manitoba, and to some degree British Columbia — the provinces “very rapidly escaped from the subordination Macdonald might have wished to consign them.”[5]

Stevenson assigns no small measure of importance to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in effecting this achievement. By 1887, JCPC decisions on issues involving the executive powers or properties of the two levels of government found in favour of the provinces, thereby effectively expounding “the notion that the two levels of government were equal in status.”[6]

Stevenson disagrees with historiographical claims that the senate had a significant role. He observes that “it is difficult to see any real substance in the Senate’s alleged role as a defender of regional or provincial interests. Certainly it played no significant part in resolving any of the issues that arose between the provinces and the dominion government.”[7]

Other features of the BNA Act that caused the friction in inter-governmental relations that Stevenson touches on include:

• the location of the capital within a province rather than in a separate district;
• the appointment of provincial court judges by the federal government;
• and the excessive complexity of financial provisions (all provinces, apart from Ontario suffered from financial difficulties and relied on federal subsidies).

Complications directly pertaining to the BNA Act provisions aside, Stevenson identifies the major issues that occupied the intergovernmental agenda as the “three perennial preoccupations of nineteenth-century Canadian politics: finance, the administration of justice, and religion”[8] Further, he finds that outright disputes tended to centre on “land, money, railways and religion.”[9] He illustrates that politics, law, funding, railways, and religion combined in various ways to heighten controversy surrounding intergovernmental negotiations on matters such as:

• demarking the western boundary and regulating liquor consumption in Ontario;
• land reform and guarantees of dominion operated steamship service in Prince Edward Island;
• the reluctant acceptance of, and ongoing truculence towards Confederation in Nova Scotia;
• the relation of Church, State, and Nation, and chronic financial problems in Quebec;
• whether to abolish tax-supported Roman Catholic separate schools in New Brunswick;
• Western alienation (which Stevenson remarks was “a dialogue of the deaf”), largely attributable, one way or another, to issues of tariff and control of land allocation in Manitoba and British Columbia.

Although Stevenson’s analysis does not indicate that religion on its own produced a great number of episodes of intergovernmental conflict, he is explicit about asserting that religion was a compounding issue in all instances. He argues that the 19^th century propensity for personal identity to be “anchored to religion” reinforced stereotypical views of peoples in distant regions – a signal of what other analysts have designated pluralistic ignorance.[10]

This ignorance is highly visible at one point of intergovernmental cooperation in Stevenson’s account: immigration, particularly the differential treatment that, racialized criteria supported. Pluralistic ignorance also marked a fundamental cleavage that in Stevenson’s opinion strengthened the governments of Ontario and Quebec. The negative attitudes of the residents of each towards the other left them decidedly reluctant to concentrate power in a central government that might be unduly influenced by the other.

The overall point Stevenson seeks to make is that, from an early date, the central government was unable to assert absolute dominance over the provinces. Geographically, Canada’s very large size inhibited centralization – both because timely long distance communication was difficult and because identifying with distant populations (distant enough to preclude routine face to face interaction) in such a way that their concerns could be understood was difficult. The decisions of the JCPC reinforced geographically determined tendencies towards provincial autonomy, as did the fact that “the British North America Act specifically enumerated some fields of provincial jurisdiction.”[11] By 1877, in Stevenson’s view, there was in place a “regime in which strong autonomous provincial governments competed on fairly equal terms with the central government for political authority, legitimacy, and power.”[12]

Additional Commentaries and Sources of Interest:

McGill-Queen’s University Press, promotional review, McGill-Queen’s University Press website, http://bit.ly/HKtUS .

William Gordon Casselman, “The Mottos of Canada,” billcasselman.com, http://bit.ly/XMfqE

[2] Stevenson. Ex Uno Plures, 188.

[3] Ibid., 14.

[4] Ibid., 217.

[5] Ibid., 206.

[6] Ibid., 284.

[7] Ibid., 329.

[8] Ibid., 101.

[9] Ibid., 178.

[10] Ibid., 34, 181.

[11] Ibid., 346.

[12] Ibid., 344.

Canadian History, Week Four

"Pawning The Flag"

“And some naughty children attempt to pawn their mother’s pocket-handkerchief; but are arrested by Policeman Punch, who was stationed ‘around the corner.’”

Courtesy Library and Archives Canada, source: A Caricature History of Canadian Politics by J.W.A. Bengough, Vol. 1&2, Toronto: The Grip Printing & Publishing Co., 1886.

Donald F. Warner. The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849-1893. Lexington: Mississippi Valley Historical Association and the University of Kentucky Press, 1960.

Donald F. Warner describes how calls for continental union have been voiced in different ways at various points in time by a varying collection of dissatisfied individuals, who occasionally appeared to be representative of larger dissatisfied group. The book is not about the idea of continental union so much as it is about what use was made of the idea and when. As an abstraction, Warner’s account makes it clear that the idea was most firmly established within the economic realm and related to commercial concerns. For example, Continental Union surfaced in the Canadas in 1849 during a time of economic uncertainty; was raised again from 1854-67, and voiced loudly in the Maritimes, when reciprocity and confederation were issues of import (as Warner puts it, “The colonial movement for annexation produced reciprocity, and the death of reciprocity revived annexation”)[1]; and the idea surfaced in the West from 1866-85, while the political and economic status of newly acquired territories was at issue, and, because tariff decisions had ramifications in the Maritimes, the issue also resurfaced there.

Collected and put in chronological order, these voicings, in Warner’s opinion, can be said to constitute a historical movement which peaked and collapsed in the 1880s and 1890s. However, the idea of annexation does not appear to have functioned as a driving force in its own right. It does not appear to have been widely held. Proportionately, very few Canadians seem to have been sincerely committed to absorption by the United States. Rather, raising the idea appears to have been a strategy, resorted to from time to time, in an attempt to move a political economic debate towards some other desired goal. Usually, access to trade, favorable tariffs and whether reciprocity with the United States could or would be negotiated, were the central issues. These issues in turn appear to have rested on a desire for greater say in local (regional/provincial) governance. Suggesting that annexation of Canada to the United States was a possibility seems to have been a way of both voicing a protest and underlining the protest’s seriousness — the greater the dissatisfaction, the more likely that somebody would play the annexation card.

Overall, in Canada at least, the idea of annexation, if not raised as an explicit threat, seems to have been perceived as one. What is striking about Warner’s description is how in the United States so little official interest in pursuing annexation existed. ‘Manifest destiny’ seems to have been more a point of pride – it was something that Americans could do if and when they chose – than a plan worth pursuing.

"Young Canada: 'We don't want you here!"

“”Young Canada: ‘We don’t want you here!’

John Bull: ‘That’s right my son, No matter what comes – an empty house is better than such a tenant as that!’”

Courtesy of Library and Archives Canada online, source: A Caricature History of Canadian Politics by J.W.A. Bengough, Vol. 1&2, Toronto: The Grip Printing & Publishing Co., 1886.

Additional Resources:

Library and Archives Canada, “Fear of Annexation by the United States,” Influence of the American Civil War, Canadian Confederation, Library and Archives Canada website http://bit.ly/uwHbC .

Canadian History, Week Four

Delegates who gathered at the Charlottetown Conference to consider the confederation of the British North American colonies.

Charlottetown, PEI, Sept. 1864. Source: Library and Archives Canada / PA-091061

W.L. Morton. The critical years: The union of British North America, 1857-1873. Canadian Centenary Series. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964.

In this volume W.L. Morton — co-editor, with D.G. Creighton, of the authoritative Canadian Centenary Series — surveys a decisive 16 year period surrounding Confederation. He describes the realization of political union among British North American colonies and the new dominion’s continental expansion. Although Morton has expressed disappointment with the text, and even if in places it is dated by a celebratory tone as well as teleological and essentialist assumptions, it still serves as a well organized description. The prose is clear and the analysis is thoughtful — admirably compensating for the lack of extant documentation of key negotiations (such as the Charlottetown conference).[1]

Morton presents the period he studies as marked by complex events. Regional interests, conflicting issues, and political and economic pressures that combined “in a pragmatic particularism peculiar to the country,” seemed destined to perpetually forestall attempts to unite the British North American colonies.[2] The Canadian union had failed to provide a stable and viable system of government but clearly by mid-nineteenth century the British North American colonies had problems in need of solution.

Morton isolates several problems as particularly important. There was a desire for competitive economic development that required not only entrepreneurial enthusiasm, vision, and talents of persuasion, but sufficient resident population to justify spending and attract funding. There was therefore a need for a land base that would both attract immigrants and accommodate natural increase – hence the interest in the lands granted under the Hudson’s Bay Company’s charter. There was also a need to improve communication routes so that transportation of people, messages, and trade goods could be carried out efficiently and over significant distances – potentially very vast distances if the Maritime colonies were to communicate effectively with British Columbia. Thus there was a desire to implement the latest technological solutions such as telegraphy and railways. Considerable funding had to be secured. Then there were problems of colonial defense, an issue brought forward in such events as the Trent Affair and in discussions about the presence of British garrisons in British North America — the British insisting that the colonies furnish more of their own defence, while colonists argued the expense was prohibitive and that without British protection they could not survive (Americans, Fenians, and any potentially acquisitive, “restless” foreign power were presented as possible threats[3]).

Morton, in sorting the opinions of men connected to the upper echelons of British and colonial society, finds that their solutions to these problems were limited to the options of colonial federation or American annexation. Of the two, federation appears to have been more acceptable to most individuals who had decided to settle north of the United States – in no small part because the American union was obviously under stress. The first question was federation among which colonies? The second, when? And the third, how – three points not easily resolved given the constant rise and fall of various weak and divided colonial governments and bouts of political paralysis. Despite economic, idealized, and practical pushes towards federation there was no shortage of opposition. The reasons for countering any proposals were diverse; the commitment to particular positions could be trenchant. For example, the French of Canada East were concerned to safeguard cultural norms and advance their own geo-political positioning; while Maritimers were reluctant to give up their customary eastward and seaward orientation, or to compromise increased powers of self-government recently won. Morton does not dismiss such opposition as petty, regional posturing; rather, he appears to regard it as evidence of real, meaningful difference that was structurally and culturally reinforced.

In Morton’s view, the conclusion that confederation was the answer, reached by key men such as Macdonald, Taché, Cartier, Tilley, and Howe, along with the fact that the colonial system of government enabled elites to engage in political negotiation and broker deals behind doors closed to public scrutiny in Charlottetown and Quebec, tipped the balance in favour of its implementation. International, high-level policy decisions were equally important. Morton argues that Britain reached a tacit agreement regarding continental balance with the American Union forces. After the conclusion of the Civil War, the British opted to withdraw militarily from North America (excepting the naval base at Halifax). In return, the U.S. government did not support any American attempts to effect annexation. And, critically, London capital remained available to all.

In Morton’s estimation, Canada, if not an inevitable outcome, seems to have been an inexorable one. The defeat of anti-confederationists may have been slow and the years of consolidation before 1873 difficult, but the partition of a continent in “one of the great national unions of the nineteenth century” — a union imbued with “moral purpose” — was not to be denied.[4]

Manitoba History 1 (1981), cached at <http://www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/mb_history/01/mortoninterview. shtml>, observes: “My work really came to an end with The Critical Years because that started out to be a book about the place of the West in Confederation. When the Centenary series came up I simply reshaped it somewhat to make it fit in. It didn’t quite come off; I meant it to crown my work and it has been a rather disappointing book. I don’t understand why because I think I did what I set out to do, to show how Confederation was possible only because the large scheme was followed and these outlying places like the Maritimes and the West were brought in to resolve the conflict between Upper and Lower Canada, between the French and the English. So anything I have done since has been just done for itself and not as part of an architectural scheme.”

[2] W.L. Morton. The critical years: The union of British North America, 1857-1873, Canadian Centenary Series (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), 8.

[3] Ibid., 30.

[4] Ibid., 228, 277.

Ottawa’s 1st South Asian Festival!

Come and discover South Asia in the heart of Ottawa, THE FESTIVAL IS SOUTH ASIAN … but YOU don’t have to be!

Home to many ancient civilizations, South Asian culture offers spectacular cuisine, dancing, music, arts & craft, and so much more. This festival promises to be a full day of fun for the whole family.

Confederation Park in Ottawa will be the scene of arts, cultural performances and stalls offering health education and screening, henna designers, traditional articrafts, and a great variety of culinary delights for everyone to enjoy!

This event will feature over 20 performers taking the stage and providing non-stop entertainment including dance, live vocal performances, and an interactive South Asian party with DJ Juakali!!
 
When: Saturday July 18, 2009
Time: 11AM to 8PM
Where: Confederation Park, Ottawa
Tickets: Admission is free

25 performances, food & fun stalls, cricket demonstrations and lots MORE!

Click HERE for more information or call: 613.291.8624

Chaque année, comme le Premier de l’An suit Noël, la fête du Canada suit celle du Québec, apportant un deuxième long week-end et permettant un sondage par les faits des opinions des Québécois. Malgré des hauts et des bas, la Saint-Jean reste le plus populaire des deux événements. Au Québec francophone, on est indiscutablement, en grande majorité, Québécois d’abord et (parfois) Canadien ensuite.

Bon, et alors ? Est-ce que cet attachement au Québec interdit de penser que, dans le contexte géopolitique actuel, l’appartenance à une confédération canadienne puisse être néanmoins, la meilleure option pour le Québec ? Nous avons deux nations qui ont indubitablement des valeurs communes et qui doivent vivre en relation constante avec le géant USA; n’ont-elles pas intérêt à mettre en commun leurs efforts et à harmoniser leurs politiques ?

Supposons que le Québec eut été indépendant depuis 1763, ou depuis 1931, est-ce qu’on ne serait pas, aujourd’hui même, à proposer une confédération canadienne ? Si nous étions séparés, n’y a-t-il pas des principes sur lesquels nous savons que nous sommes d’accord et donc des choses que voudrions convenir de faire en commun ? Quelles sont ces choses ?

D’abord, illusions et prétentions mises à part, nous savons que, pour l’avenir prévisible, notre politique internationale sera celle des USA et qu’il ne peut en être autrement. Nous savons aussi que notre politique financière et monétaire sera celle du Fonds Monétaire International et que nous en suivrons les directives… comme le font tous les autres pays du monde à qui le Fonds se donne la peine d’en donner. Faut il se mettre à deux pour aller prêter ces allégeances ? Une confédération canadienne peut s’en charger. Ensuite, si dans l’espace économique déjà bien poreux que constitue l’ensemble canadien au sein de l’Alena, des rapports économiques privilégiés peuvent être maintenus, n’est-il pas bon qu’existe un arbitrage ?

Si existaient aujourd’hui au nord des USA, deux ou plusieurs pays, il semblerait bien opportun qu’ils confient tous à une instance confédérale des responsabilités touchant la monnaie, les politiques financières, la défense, les relations internationales et le commerce interprovincial… Peut-être conviendrait-il, aussi, qu’ils affirment haut et fort leur volonté commune de maintenir la gratuité en matière de santé et d’éducation, ainsi que des normes de sécurité sociale, se garantissant un “espace de compassion” de taille suffisante face à la menace du désert social que sont les Etats-Unis.

Si le Canada n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer… Avec une répartition différente des pouvoirs entre Ottawa et Québec, peut-être, mais on comprend que c’est une autre question. À la première question qui est de se fédérer, la réponse serait sans doute oui. Oui, si on laissait la porte ouverte à une distribution négociée des pouvoirs que le simple logique des faits se chargerait d’imposer sans peine.

C’est cette porte, que le système actuel fait tout pour fermer. Quand on interroge la population québécoise sur son désir d’appartenance au Canada, on triche sans cesse, en présentant le statu quo de la distribution des pouvoirs comme la seule base de discussions. Cette attitude est bien révélatrice de la sordide manipulation qui est en marche depuis des décennies pour garder la “question nationale” au coeur du débat politique au Québec et voir à ce qu’elle ne soit jamais résolue.

Pourquoi le système ne veut-il pas que nous sortions de cette discussion ad nauseam d’une “indépendance” qui, dans le monde actuel, ne peut être, pour nous comme pour les autres nations, que la précision des conditions d’une universelle interdépendance ? Parce que cette discussion nous met les oeillères qu’on veut que nous portions.

Le système ne veut pas que nous discutions des choses vraiment importantes, comme la place du français au Québec, le partage des responsabilités entre le secteur privé et le secteur public, la politique de développement de nos ressources – commençant par celui de nos ressources humaines ! – et, bien sur, les mesures qui permettraient de réduire l’écart entre pauvres et riches et de créer une société plus juste.

Le système préfère nous garder dans une dichotomie simpliste entre “séparatistes” et “fédérastes”, échangeant des invectives au lieu de nous émanciper de notre véritable dépendance; celle qui nous asservit à des patrons économique désuets et à une fausse démocratie inefficace et corrompue.

Il ne serait pas bête que ceux d’entre nous qui voulons des changements, au Québec comme dans le reste du Canada, fédérions nos efforts pour échapper à cette manipulation du grand capital et proposer une confédération canadienne conforme à la volonté populaire.

Pierre JC Allard