56. When one says: “Perhaps this planet doesn’t exist and the light-phenomenon arises in some other way”, then after all one needs an example of an object which does exist. This doesn’t exist, – as for example does…
Or are we to say that certainty is merely a constructed point to which some things approximate more, some less closely? No. Doubt gradually loses its sense. This language-game just is like that.
And everything descriptive of a language-game is part of logic.

From the previous paragraph, what would act a evidence of a planet existing? Light rays, for one. So, what would be the alternate explanations when a planet appears to exist but actually does not? Wittgenstein is quick to note that the answer to that question is less important than what the question pre-supposes. To learn of what this existence is, we would need examples of things that exist and don’t exist.

To ask that question, it’s not just required but pre-supposed that something, somewhere exists. But Wittgenstein is attempting to re-state the sceptical difficulty in the right way – the sceptic at this point could still easily answer with Descartes cogito: “I think therefore I am”, by which only your mind and thoughts exist.

Accordingly, Wittgenstein changes tack, and wonders whether certainty is just too high a standard; a hypothetical point which can’t actually be reached. He rejects this assertion, because doubt, certainty’s opposite, ‘gradually loses it’s sense’. What this means is that doubt tends towards nonsense, as we approach certainty. Therefore there must be some actual point of certainty uncorrupted by doubt.

Finally, comes the most important point; the possibility that the sceptical difficulty may be better stated as a confusion about language, or a confusion about the logic of language, rather than as a hypothesis about our experience.