Come promesso, eccovi: F. Catalano, La Vita e il Respiro e Ogni Cosa, ed. Aracne, Roma 2009

Catalano è uno scienziato, che ha letto gli attacchi di Dawkins alla fede, e gli ha risposto con un libretto leggero e chiaro.

Catalano dice: se io riesco a dimostrare che non è possibile che la vita sia comparsa casualmente e improvvisamente dalla non vita (abiogenesi), tutto il sistema logico evoluzionista crollerà per effetto domino.

A mio parere Catalano realizza un buon percorso, in particolare – vedremo – nella critica al concetto di caso. E, si badi bene, in ogni caso, parlare di caso in ambito scientifico è epistemologicamente incoerente.

Catalano inizia dai saluti alla figlia (un nome orribile, che vi risparmio); quindi muove inchini ossequiosi a Dawkins, quindi si mette al lavoro.

I primi capitoli accumulano una serie di osservazioni, che provo a elencare – si tratta di confutazioni di singole teorie:
- l’ipotesi di abiogenesi non è sperimentabile, ergo non confutabile, ergo non scientifica (p. 24)
- le ipotesi di vita da altri pianeti non rispondono alla domanda base: donde la vita su quei pianeti? (pp. 37 ss.)
- le ipotesi sull’atmosfera primordiale sono inverificabili, cioè non abbiamo documenti diretti e attendibili (pp. 45-48)
- di conseguenza alcuni esperimenti ipotizzano atmosfere particolari…ma non se ne dà traccia alcuna (Idem)
- altri esperimenti giustificano l’assenza di tracce per la celerità delle trasformazioni: attenti, troppa celerità impedisce la graduale evoluzione! (Idem)
- gli esperimenti di laboratorio si scoprono troppo viziati dall’ideologia del ricercatore (pp. 49 ss. – esperimento di Miller)
- queste cose sono note agli scienziati, ma nascoste al pubblico (p. 56)
- altri esempi di coperta corta: devo togliere ossigeno per sintetizzare proteine, ma immetterlo all’istante per far vivere le nuove forme generate…(p. 60)

Per evitare di passare il tempo a confutare le molteplici teorie (di cui si dà nota aggiornativa a p. 67) l’autore spiega cosa non funziona alla base: l’abiogenesi contraddice i principi della termodinamica, e pretende che in natura si sia dato un caso di processo spontaneo dal disordine all’ordine (p. 72). Ma ”l‘ordine e la complessità non possono nascere dal disordine per effetto di semplici trasformazioni irreversibili all’interno di un sistema chiuso” (p. 85).
A questo punto i biologi evoluzionisti evocano l’energia libera di Gibbs (che riguarda reazioni chimiche spontanee). Catalano va giù secco: I. l’energia da sola non dà informazione, II. la complessità biologica ha niente a che vedere con le ben più semplici reazioni chimiche di Gibbs (pp. 86-87).
Così pure i fenomeni di neghentropia, per cui in sistemi aperti una dissipazione di energia può produrre informazione, non sono in grado di esaudire la complessità richiesta a livello biologico (pp. 96-97).
Insomma l’evoluzionismo non può nulla contro l’entropia. Fino ad ora. E questa è scienza.

Ultimi due passaggi

Primo: DIFFERENZA TRA MIRACOLO E SCIENZA. Surclassando il problema di un discorso sul caso (termine filosofico) in ambito scientifico, Catalano mostra che il livello statistico di probabilità che avrebbe permesso di far saltar fuori una cellula da un sasso è enorme (in negativo!). Contro la ragionevolezza. Piuttosto prossimo alla fede in un miracolo eccezionale che non alla disposizione ragionevole verso un fenomeno di natura.
Un esempio? Pensate a un tornado che, passando su una discarica, assembli un Boeing 747 (p. 110).
A p. 122 viene invece dato un criterio scientifico, ergo falsificabile, ergo condivisibile: poniamo un limite ragionevole alla possibilità di realizzazione di un fatto. Al di qua del limite parleremo di possibilità (casuale o meno), al di là parleremo di miracolo o di attesa non scientifica. Borel e Dembsky delineano la soglia nell’ordine – rispettivamente – di 166,09 bit (-log2 10 alla -50) e di 498,28 bit (-log2 10 alla -150) di contenuto d’informazione per un evento.
Per intenderci, la possibilità di vincere una lotteria mondiale (cui partecipassero tutti i 7 miliardi di individui) equivale a 32,7 bit (-log2  1/7.000.000.000), cioè è molto sotto la soglia proposta. L’abiogenesi a -log2 10 alla -863!! (pp. 120 ss.), cioè è assolutamente al di là della soglia proposta.

E così abbiamo risposto a chi invoca troppo facilmente il caso. Credere nell’abiogenesi è scientifico quanto venerare le stimmate di padre Pio!

Secondo: TEORIA SOSTITUTIVA, i FENOMENI SINTROPICI. L’ipotesi è semplice. Accanto a un principio di causalità che agisce efficacemente dal presente dell’azione verso il futuro dell’effetto, possiamo riconoscere un principio di finalità che dal futuro attiri a sè energeticamente i fenomeni caricandoli dell’informazione necessaria.
Ma và, questo è Aristotele riciclato. Sì, ma riciclato dalla scienza.
Infatti abbiamo “riscontro sperimentale nell’osservazione, in laboratorio, di antiparticelle e di fenomeni di non-località quantistica” (p. 103). Einstein è l’apripista per un’ipotesi del genere (e di qualsiasi altro genere, verrebbe da dire, un po’ grottescamente). L’equazione delle onde di D’Almebert e i potenziali antcipati (p. 104) sono la descrizione formale della nostra novella posizione. Fenomeni non entropici, ma sintropici, che manifestano una finalità intinseca, caratterizzati da un surplus di energia in un ristretto volume spazio-temporale, essi sono la base di successivi fenomeni entropici (Olivier Costa De Beauregard – p. 105). 
La conferma e il limite di tali fenomeni in campo biologico sta nel non poterli riprodurre in laboratorio (chiaro limite per l’epistemologia vigente; ma anche conferma di un plausibile modello di autopoiesi non direttamente modificabile).

Il che potrà valere come necessaria versione scientifica del più teleologico Intelligent Design.

Except for the Houston Rockets, probably no other team that achieved the playoffs last season has fewer expectations around than this year’s Philadelphia 76ers. They were .500 in the 2008-09 season and made the Magic sweat on the playoffs but we know how good they are and how deep they can get, so unless a lot of injuries and weird scenarios happen, this is a team that won’t blow our expectations.

A focus point for the 76ers in this upcoming season is to fit in Elton Brand into their system and Eddie Jordan was the guy hired to do it. After a poor start with the Wizards less Gilbert Arenas, Jordan was fired which was a shock because he’s a good coach and is definitely the right pick on the market for Philadelphia. Without Brand, the 76ers got back to Iguodala isotope that eventually took them to the playoffs and got them a win against Orlando, the question is: in which point are they willing to quit everything and get back to that?

Andre Miller left Pennsylvania. To replace him, they will most likely use a rotation with Lou Williams and 17^th overall pick on the 2009 draft Jrue Holiday, out of UCLA. At Shooting Guard, the Sixers have one of the best closers in the NBA in Andre Iguodala who is a physical freak, good shooter and an amazing playmaker. Philadelphia traded their backup Center, Reggie Evans, in the offseason to Toronto for Jason Kapono who comes to be their shooter out of the bullpen, somebody they really needed. They also exercised their contract option with Thaddeus Young, to keep him around longer. Young is probably the most physical small forward of the NBA behind LeBron James, which helps them on the inside game and gives them an option to play from the inside out with him, Brand and Dalembert.

During the feel games that Brand played with this team last season, they struggled a lot. They seemed confused all the time, conflicted between going inside with him and spreading the floor to open space for Iguodala. We can’t predict injuries, so it’s expected for Brand to play more games which could lead them to confusion again and coast them more game this season. Playing on the Eastern Conference, .500 could easily take you to the playoffs. I believe there are 16 better teams than the 76ers nowadays, so winning 41 games again will be tougher which probably won’t get Philadelphia into the playoffs.

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Sixers forwards, Thaddeus Young and Elton Brand showcased their modeling skills yesterday as the team unveiled their new retro style uniforms. Im sure you’ve heard the buzz around town about the Sixers being primed for a long playoff run and having a real shot at making the Finals this year. What? You haven’t heard a word about the Sixers? Really? Well maybe that’s because their most exciting offseason moves have been drafting a kid who won’t contribute for 3 years and bringing back Rodney Carney. Oh yeah, also in case you weren’t aware Samuel Dalembert is still the starting center for your 10.9.8.76ers.

In other depressing news, the Sixers’ fired their marketing director Eric Blankenship last week. My question is why? Don Draper couldn’t sell me on buying a ticket for this franchise stuck in neutral right now. You want people in the stands? Create a buzz, get an exciting product. You can’t market Sam Dalembert and Willie Green.

BTW: How skinny does Elton Brand look?

Having been asked to fill an entry on Monte Carlo for the incoming International Handbook of Statistical Sciences, I obliged by writing a short piece, whose utility is rather limited. Indeed, I am afraid I am not very much convinced of the use of such encyclopedias, as they try to provide entries on about “everything” but end up being partial, quickly obsolete, and not so informative… This may sound overly negative, but I never ever use this kind of books for my research or my teaching, so I wonder who does. Encyclopedias (encyclopedii?) were fine when the “whole” of Science could be crammed in three dozen volumes with a slow enough updating process. Current students most likely check on Wikipedia or at large on the Web and, given the price of those behemoths, it seems only libraries can afford them, and then this may be wasted money anyway! My misgivings actually extend to contributed volumes that are (were?) fairly common, mostly in connection with one conference or another, and whose utility is rarely demonstrated. It takes highly dedicated editors to turn contributed volumes into useful coherent books, one example being the 1996 MCMC in Practice book deeply edited by Wally Gilks, Sylvia Richardson and David Spiegelhalter, that still serves as a reference for MCMC methods. Even the traditional Valencia volumes, while giving a snapshot of the on-going research in Bayesian statistics, along with a collection of discussions, have lost some of their luster, when compared with the impact of a discussion paper in Bayesian Analysis… Having conference papers submitted to Bayesian Analysis and selected on the same basis as regular papers, as was done for Valencia 8, seems to me a much better idea than publishing separately a rather costly volume, not read by enough people. (The dates and locations of Valencia 9, the last of the kind, have been announced. It will be in Benidorm, on June 3-8, 2010.)

In “Peak Oil” is a Waste of Energy,” Michael Lynch, knocks down a strawman made to stand for the Peak Oil (PO) theory. He wants to do so because he believes concerns over PO could cause us to engage in “hare-brained,” “money wasting” and “unnecessary” alternative energy ventures. Given the danger of PO theory, it is strange that Lynch entirely avoids the theory and focuses on data points. Curiously, he thinks that pointing out where predictions or interpretations are wrong is the same as proving that the model is wrong. Were Lynch to be doing the social service of clearing up misconceptions about oil production and the consumption of oil that are commonly made by Peak Oilers, then this could be forgiven. He has chosen to ridicule his opponents, however. Mr. Lynch has given himself enough rope.

In this brief post I will describe some of the central premises of PO theory as well as summarize Lynch’s depiction. In doing so, I will show how his knockdown blows against PO theory are as imaginary as the foe he defeats.

Peak Oil theorists claim that there is ultimately a fixed amount of oil, regardless of whether or not it has been discovered. “Fixed amount” implies that during human time the processes that create oil will make so little that it will have no meaningful effect on the actual amount. Given this fixed amount, ceteris paribus, at some point we will reach a peak rate of consumption. After this point, we reach the rate of consumption that falls necessarily because the remaining oil will be that which is most difficult to access or produce. This means it will gradually become more expensive to the point that it will become too expensive.

Historically, peak oil theorists know that the sources we have discovered and developed presently have been those easy to find and cheap to produce. These theorists deduce that future discoveries will tend to be in places, and from sources, where recovery is not as easy or inexpensive as it has been in the past. Examples would be those from off shore sources in the arctic, oil sands, coal, or oil shales.

The conceptual premises that drive peak oil are the Second Law of Thermodynamics and the principle that it’s not mathematically possible to maximize for two (or more) variables at the same time. Concurrently, these imply the Principle of Net Yield and the Law of Diminishing Returns. The central ideas that derive from these premises are that it takes energy to find energy and produce that energy. At some point, the energy gain is too small to justify the search.

Lynch begins his caricature with a dual insult by association describing PO theorists as Malthusians that lack expertise. Lacking expertise, they base

conclusions on poor analyses of data and misinterpretations of technical material.

I don’t doubt that many people interested in PO are laypeople who are out of their depth in terms of expertise. It’s worth noting that only polymaths don’t encounter that problem when examining complex situations.

In this regard, should I presume that Lynch is comfortable slagging Malthus because he bases his conclusions on Malthus’s work on his own poor analyses of data and misinterpretations of technical material? Here’s why.

Malthus was an astute researcher and a meticulous analyst. It is true that Malthus was wrong when he argued that food production only increases arithmetically, while population increases geometrically. Technological advances changed the equation. What Lynch disregards is that Malthus’s conclusion was accurate with respect to the agricultural data he worked upon, as noted by David Hackett Fischer in “The Great Wave”. Malthus was guilty of induction which is a common flaw among humans and notably, the basis of Mr. Lynch’s argument. In other words, how things were done in the past, and what was possible in the past, doesn’t not necessarily determine future modes and possibilities.

Mr. Lynch then states

that most arguments about peak oil are based on anecdotal information, vague references and ignorance of how the oil industry goes about finding fields and extracting petroleum.

He goes on to anecdotally note that some PO theorists continue to move the peak point, others misconstrue the effects of oil field changes, and some lack understanding about mathematical applications in the oil industry.

Finally, Lynch outlines what he takes to be the core of Peak Oil theory:

for the most part the peak-oil crowd rests its case on three major claims: that the world is discovering only one barrel for every three or four produced; that political instability in oil-producing countries puts us at an unprecedented risk of having the spigots turned off; and that we have already used half of the two trillion barrels of oil that the earth contained.

Mr. Lynch then appears to disprove these statements, which I’m willing to grant, and, in doing so, concludes he has falsified peak oil theory.

All he has done is disprove three empirical statements. He did not disprove Peak Oil theory.

To disprove Peak Oil theory, in the manner he proceeds, which means he’s not assuming the discovery of an alternate energy source, he would have to show that the amount of available oil is infinite, with respect to our needs, or show that the Second Law of Thermodynamics does not hold when it comes to the practices of the oil industry.

Lynch chooses option Two.

But that may not keep the Chicken Littles from convincing policymakers in Washington and elsewhere that oil, being finite, must increase in price.

Environmental Capital intuits a difficulty in this notion.

Given that much of the oil that supply-siders are counting on costs a lot more to extract than the so-called easy oil of the Middle East, it seems fair to wonder whether that oil can be both cheap and abundant at the same time.

The problem that they correctly note is that it is impossible to maximize two variables in a closed system. We cannot have infinite abundance and infinite inexpensiveness. This is not a problem for Lynch, however, because the logical outcome of his view is that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is a social convention and that the oil industry can create perpetual motion machines.

Mr. Lynch wrote his op-ed to warn people about the dangers of allowing Peak Oil theory to influence us to engage in unnecessary, hare-brained, alternative energy ventures. Why would any reasonable person disagree with him, in the face of the perpetual motion machine he promises?

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Vous a-t-on dit une fois que Goethe était un scientifique ? Non ou vaguement pour mieux le discréditer ensuite (folklore para-scientifique, voire a-scientifique). Goethe était avant tout un écrivain poète, foncièrement humaniste ; on en parle en littérature, jamais on ne le cite dans les didactiques scientifiques. Pour ceux qui connaissent Johan Wolfgang von Goethe, 1749-1832, il évoque « Les Souffrances du jeune Werther », « Poésie et vérité », « Faust » … Œuvres magistrales qui rendent à la langue allemande une profonde beauté. Goethe brille moins dans le domaine scientifique, malgré sa découverte de l’os intermaxillaire, et ses productions le relèguent à la littérature.
A y regarder de plus près, on remarquera l’opposition entêtée de Goethe à la physique de Newton, « ne prêtez pas la moindre attention aux newtoniens » disait-il. Son traité des couleurs voulait démontrer l’erreur totale du physicien anglais. Il n’était pas le seul et ils sont légions encore aujourd’hui mais Goethe n’aimait pas la vraie science : la science officielle. Mais n’a-t-il pas un peu raison quand il prétend que la physique mathématique n’est pas le fin du fin en matière de connaissance ?

Goethe affirme s’être laborieusement consacré à la nature. Il ne l’a pas fait pour passer le temps en le considérant comme un divertissement pour poète dilettante. Fort cultivé, érudit il faut le reconnaître, Goethe a beaucoup observé et grandement réfléchi avec l‘immense envie de connaître la nature et le monde environnants: « J’ai poursuivi dans le silence, avec constance et avec passion, des considérations entreprises avec sérieux. » Preuve serait l’ensemble des œuvres scientifiques produites par l’homme : « Métamorphose des plantes » en 1790, « Traité des couleurs » 1810-1823, « Introduction préliminaire à un système d’anatomie comparée basée sur l’ostéologie » en 1795, « Composition géologique de Marienbad » en 1821, « Essai d’une doctrine sur les états atmosphériques » en 1825, « Mauvais usage des mathématiques » en 1826, « Principes de philosophie zoologique » vers 1830… Il fait d’ailleurs part de ses préoccupations scientifiques dans les deux « Faust », dans les « Conversations avec Eckermann », etc.
En se dispersant comme il l’a fait en voulant toucher à tout, Goethe a dû pas mal se discréditer aux yeux de la communauté scientifique de son époque. Il fallait déjà se spécialiser. Son opposition farouche et tenace aux théories de Newton, notamment sur les couleurs, l’aura définitivement mis à l’écart du monde des chercheurs.

En ce début de XIXème siècle, la science de Galilée et de Newton avait déjà fait son parti. Les choses n’ont guère changé. Objectivité, mathématique. Pour Goethe, ce n’était pas la seule voie possible et lui reprochait son orthodoxie. Pourtant, sa théorie sur les couleurs aura été un facteur aggravant pour sa réputation, ce qui lui aura ôté tout crédit par la suite.
La science de Newton n’est pas la seule possible, s’échine-t-il à marteler ; elle ne fournit pas une connaissance véritable, trop perverse à son goût car découpant artificiellement la réalité perçue ; les résultats obtenus sont tout aussi artificiels, il y a manipulation ; elle n’explique rien… Tels sont les anathèmes qu’il jette sur la science officielle. Sacrilège que nier la légitimité d’une démarche reconnue encore aujourd’hui : analyser, mesurer, calculer ? Goethe a-t-il de la haine pour la physique mathématique, archétype de la scienticité ?
Son traité des couleurs ne corrigeait en rien l’erreur de Newton mais il s’obstinait à avoir raison : « On a cherché par tous les moyens à me combattre, moi et mes doctrines, à tourner mes idées en ridicule. » Sans doute cela l’a-t-il conduit à construire une sorte de sociologie avant l’heure de l’institution scientifique : règles de routine, credo machinalement répété, esprit de caste, dogmes, étroitesse d’esprit et puérilité des « savants », jalousie… Goethe en fait encore un peu trop en accusant ses congénères de ne rien pouvoir démontrer, surtout pas la vérité : « Telle n’est pas non plus leur intention. Ils n’ont soucis que de prouver leur opinion. Ils dissimulent donc toutes ces expériences qui mettraient la vérité en lumière et découvriraient la position intenable de leur théorie. » Il ne réussira pas à saper la science de Newton qui se porte encore plutôt bien aujourd’hui.

Quelque chose semble gêner plus particulièrement Goethe. Ne reprocherait-il pas au savoir officiel , après tout, d’être trop quantitatif ? Non pas que la science mathématique lui soit étrangère, il la trouve « sublime ». Le grief est fait aux sciences de la nature qui ne fait pas cas du qualitatif pourtant essentiel pour comprendre la nature.
Tout n’étant pas mesurable, le newtonien procède à des abstractions et doit faire des choix arbitraires dénaturant ainsi la réalité. L’objet de l’analyse est souvent bien éloigné de l’objet dans sa réalité et la mouvance de cette réalité. Concepts abstraits, symboles et mesures finissent par rester des abstractions, fruits d’une manipulation imaginaire. S’y retrouve-t-on facilement d’ailleurs ?
Goethe dénonce l’illusion que donne la science quand elle fait correspondre des résultats théoriques à la réalité : elle n’explique toujours rien des phénomènes de la matière et de la nature dans leur dynamique propre. La nature, Goethe ne la voit pas de manière statique, il la sent comme un ensemble de forces, en mouvement perpétuel. Newton mesure la gravitation sans rien en savoir, au fond.

La science de Goethe est entachée de romantisme, de mysticisme et de métaphysique. Pourtant, il est clair que la science, la vraie, l’officielle, ne cherche à dire que le comment, jamais le pourquoi qui relève de la métaphysique. Savoir comment une chose fonctionne vous permet de la faire fonctionner selon vos désirs.
Mais Goethe, que cela ne satisfait pas, veut connaître l’intérieur des choses : « Les phénomènes sont vidés de leurs entrailles et embaumés à l’aide de nombres et de signes; sur le cercueil préparé par la science sont peintes de bizarres figures. » Il reproche aux mathématiciens d’échapper à l’essentiel et d’être dénués de valeur cognitive.
A l’instar de d’Alembert qui avait écrit « celui qui dit que deux et deux font quatre, a-t-il une connaissance de plus que celui qui se contenterait de dire que deux et deux font deux et deux ? », Goethe en veut à la tautologie de la physique mathématique : « Les démonstrations des mathématiques sont des expositions et des récapitulations plutôt que des raisonnements démonstratifs. » C’est un raisonnement qui se tient.
Buffon avait dénoncé en 1749 cette propension du scientifique à vouloir simplifier le réel en abstractions quand il le cerne mal. Les conclusions auxquelles il arrive sont tout aussi abstraites et les conséquences n’en peuvent être que faussées. Les dogmes indiscutables et immuables basés sur de tels fondements finissent toujours par s’écrouler. Le malheur est que du temps où ils ont valeur de Vrai, les recherches dont-ils sont l’origine ne peuvent que déboucher sur des erreurs.
Goethe était donc également épistémologue et a publié quelques ouvrages dans ce sens comme cet essai de 1792 sur « l’Expérience comme médiatrice entre l’objet et le sujet » que Claude Bernard cite dans son « introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale. » Goethe le poète restera un épistémologue existentiel, il jugera humainement la physique orthodoxe comme contraire à ses intérêts.

Si le scientifique classique retire l’objet de son étude de son environnement humain, Goethe veut faire l’inverse. Refus de l’abstraction théorique pure « c’est là précisément le plus grand malheur de la physique moderne d’avoir en quelque sorte séparé les expériences de l’homme, de ne vouloir reconnaître la nature que dans ce que montre les instruments artificiels, et, par là, de prétendre limiter et démontrer ce que la nature est capable de produire. » On pourrait dénoncer chez lui la conjonction d’empirisme et de mysticisme tant il est prêt à toute divagation mystique sur la nature et le cosmos. Il nous paraît difficile de mêler le spirituel au rationnel.
Einstein se heurtera au même obstacle “Je souffre de cette espèce de séparation entre la réalité de l’expérience et la réalité de l’Être.” Si Goethe a ses mythes, il n’est pas sûr que la science moderne n’ait pas les siens. La science rationnelle ne suppose-t-elle pas une certaine foi dans le pouvoir des mathématiques et dans la valeur des modèles théoriques qu’elle aide à construire.
A son tour, Goethe pourrait en bon droit subodorer du mysticisme dans la confiance que mettent les chercheurs en leur science. « Je tiens toujours pour plus profitable pour le savant de confesser aussitôt qu’il frôle toujours la métaphysique » plutôt que de chercher à dissimuler les présupposés sur lesquels on s’appuie. L’historien des sciences Abel Rey a écrit « Le culte de l’intelligence (qui comprend à la fois l’observation précise et la logique organisatrice) est un culte comme les autres. La raison est une émanation du mysticisme, peut-être son fruit, le plus parfait d’ailleurs, le plus achevé -d’autant plus achevé qu’il est absolument séparé. Le fruit mûr abandonne l’arbre. »

Goethe s’est avant tout passionné pour les phénomènes biotiques (de l’ordre du vivant). De ce fait, il condamne vigoureusement l’importance mise à l’analyse. Il lui réserve bien une place de choix mais son synthétisme le pousse à penser les êtres vivants comme des touts. L’analyse est destructrice : elle dégrade l’être sur lequel elle s’exerce.
« Ce qui vit peut être séparé en ses éléments, mais on ne peut plus le recomposer et l’animer. » Goethe semble bloqué par son éthique. Il refuse une science inquisitrice, « qui fait parler », et cruelle, qui prend la vie. Une telle science ne peut être bonne.
Si Goethe était encore des notres, il ne se gênerait pas pour dénoncer les méfaits de cette science froide et analytique. Quelle place fait-elle réellement à l’humain, aux individus, aux personnes ? De proche en proche, n’expérimente-t-on pas sur les animaux, puis sur les hommes, puis éventuellement sur des pays entiers ?
Le scientifique Goethe ne l’était pas : il s’assumait trop entièrement en tant qu’individu, ce qu’on ne pourrait lui reprocher en éthique. Mais la science, comme on l’a mentionné plus haut, réfute le sujet qui doit s’effacer complètement sinon à rendre la quête du savoir subjectif. C’est par définition ça la science.

Lorsque Goethe attaque Newton sur sa théorie des couleurs, il prétend qu’il l’a mal résolu. En réalité, il l’a mal posé. A la seule orientation physique de Newton, qui produit de l‘objectivité, Goethe veut en ajouter d’autres, la physiologie et la psychologie.
Son propre traité, il le veut pratique et utile dans la vie de tous les jours. Fie de corpuscules et de longueurs d’onde peu intéressantes pour les artisans tels les teinturiers ou les peintres. C’est encore dans la poésie qu’on comprend l’origine des choses et sa descendance ne se trouvera pas chez les physiciens classiques mais dans la lignée d’Helmotz et de son « Optique physiologique. »

Si Goethe a laissé un petit souvenir dans le panthéon des scientifiques, c’est dans le domaine des sciences naturelles. Il en fait son point d’honneur « Platon ne voulait souffrir aucun disciple ignorant la géométrie. Si j’étais à même de fonder une école, je n’y souffrirais personne qui n’eût choisi, pour s’y consacrer sérieusement et spécialement, quelque science naturelle. » Si le degré atteint par les sciences physiques et mathématiques est élevé, Goethe pense que ce n’est pas la mesure de leur valeur. Aussi le véritable objectif théorique est de « pénétrer jusqu’au phénomène originaire et se rendre maître de toutes les manifestations particulières. » Le phénomène originaire, primordial, primitif de Goethe qu’il nomme en allemand Urphänomen.
Cet Urphänomen conduit Goethe a formuler une théorie selon laquelle toute plante serait le résultat de « la métamorphose d’un seul et même organe », ce qui leur donne « un air de famille qui permet toujours de les comparer ensemble. » Précisons que l’on est à cheval sur le XVIIIème et le XIXème siècles, la classification des plantes est une nouveauté récente. Pour lui, il doit y avoir une plante primitive, originaire, une Urpflanze.
Cette Urpflanze qu’on ne peut appréhender qu’avec « les yeux de l’esprit » n’existe bien évidemment pas mais pour Goethe « les yeux de l’esprit » sont encore des yeux. L’Urpflanze a une existence sensible et spirituelle à la fois. Il voit dans ce schème dynamique une force créatrice qui peut être saisie par une intuition spécifique. On est très éloigné de la science officielle.

Car Goethe tombe là dans un profond mysticisme et se rend victime d’une illusion. Le reproche qu’il fait aux mathématiques, il ne le retourne pas contre lui. Par sa théorie sur les plantes, l’Urpflanze, il recoure au type et à la métamorphose, non à la tautologie mathématique qu’il exècre.
Goethe semble s’être appuyé sur ses prédécesseurs. Buffon écrivait vers la moitié du XVIIIème siècle « Il y a dans la nature un prototype général dans chaque espèce sur lequel chaque individu est modelé, mais qui semble, en se réalisant, s’altérer ou se perfectionner par les circonstance. » A la même époque, Diderot posait cette question : « Ne croirait-on pas volontiers qu’il n’y a jamais eu qu’un premier animal, prototype de tous les animaux, dont la nature n’a fait qu’allonger, raccourcir, transformer, multiplier, oblitérer certains organes ? » Le type correspond pour Goethe à l’unité d’organisation manifestée par les diverses plantes ; la métamorphose, corrélativement, rend compte des diverses variations constatées. Le fin de sa théorie repose sur le fait que toute plante est la répétition d’un même organe.
Si par commodité on peut dire que chaque organe du végétal est une feuille modifiée, pour Goethe, la feuille elle-même est le fruit de la métamorphose d’on organe primitif. Ces explications de la métamorphose frise le ridicule pour le biologiste moderne : il prétend que les formes végétales dépendent de contractions et d’expansions que subissent successivement les plantes au cours de leur développement. Il donne également un rôle au milieu dans ce phénomène.
Plus obscures encore ses suppositions quant à des tendances à l’œuvre dans les végétaux, verticale et spirale « toujours et éternellement conjointes ; en parfait équilibre, [ces tendances] produisent ce qu’il y a de plus parfait dans la croissance. » De quoi séduire bien des rêveurs mais pas de quoi nourrir la connaissance « exacte ». Mais Goethe n’a pas laissé qu’un souvenir extravagant.

Il est l’inventeur du mot « morphologie » et c’est lui qui a conseillé la méthode comparative. Sa grande réussite a été la découverte de l’os intermaxillaire chez l’homme, os recherché ou contesté depuis le XVIème siècle. Nul ne voyait cet os fusionné avec le reste mais lui l’a mis en évidence.
Son autre découverte que confirmera plus tard Kielmeyer (c’est moi lol) : les os du crâne sont un ensemble de vertèbres transformées. Cette intuition lui vient de sa théorie des métamorphoses des plantes (voir plus haut l’organe originaire et répété).
Chacun, depuis cette proposition faite par Goethe, donnait sa version quant au nombre des vertèbres soudées constituant le crâne humain. Goethe pense que « la tête du mammifère se compose de six vertèbres » : « Il y a trois vertèbres pour la partie postérieure renfermant comme le trésor cérébral et les terminaisons de la vie […] ; trois vertèbres formant la partie antérieure qui s’ouvre en présence du monde extérieur, le saisit et le comprend. » Goethe ne peut s’empêcher certaines allégories mais n’a pas a avoir honte de sa contribution à l’anatomie comparée.

On peut lui reprocher son attitude par trop alchimiste mais il a également esquissé une critique de la science, prélude à l’épistémologie. Pierre Thuillier, épistémologue de métier, nous livre le message essentiel de Goethe : « son refus d’une science obsédée par les mathématiques, son refus d’une science qui construit un arrière-monde désincarné, son refus d’une science dont les sujets doivent se nier en temps que sujets historiques. »
Le projet scientifique dénoncé comme « projet de domination », la mathématique présupposant toute une métaphysique elle aussi, Goethe s’en inquiétait sûrement et devait pressentir quelque catastrophe à venir : « On ne s’imagine pas tout ce qu’il y a de mort et de meurtrier dans les sciences. » Il retrouverait aujourd’hui son inspiration dans les combats d’écologistes.
On peut faire un procès à la science, au risque de passer pour obscurantiste, mais on peut se poser ces questions : la science orthodoxe est-elle le plus haut savoir ? L’indien d’Amazonie, du fin fond de sa jungle natale, ne sait-il rien ou moins que le chercheur en physique fondamentale ? A-t-il besoin de chiffres pour faire un arc efficace et savoir pêcher son piranha ? Est-il condamné plus que l’occidental à la disparition ?

Goethe n’a pas compris l’objectivité scientifique qui repose sur la rétraction du sujet individuel comme Pearson l’a décrite. Il tient absolument à impliquer le sujet dans le processus scientifique, sujet qui se construit lui-même dans ce processus et construit en même temps le monde qui l’entoure. Le sujet devient finalement ce qu’il croit voir, il devient le fruit de son imagination. Mais ce n’est pas de la science.

LIRE : ancien élève de l’École normale supérieure de Fontenay-Saint-Cloud, Nicolas Class enseigne la philosophie en lycée. L’auteur rédige une thèse sur la cosmologie de Goethe

Când alegea titlul ” Arhipelagul Gulag “, joc al conotaţiilor cuvântului rusesc “ostrov”, Alexandru Soljenitzyn sublinia că în Uniunea Sovietică teroarea statală absolută se manifesta   printr-o modulaţie a intensităţii având caracter insular. Invers, acolo în Rusia, însăşi modulaţia civilizaţiei posedă caracter insular ! Rusia ce urmează lui Petru cel Mare e comparabilă felului cum era structurată lumea civilizaţiei greceşti până la Alexandru cel Mare. În antichitatea elină,   civilizaţia “de vârf ” era prezentă numai în câteva oraşe, polis-uri, insule aflate într-o mare de barbarie. În acelaşi fel trebuie să vedem şi Rusia ultimelor trei secole : câteva oraşe de civilizaţie, iar în unele oraşe poate câteva cartiere, dar ele contau enorm, şi marcau diferenţa infinită faţă de   “varvarstvo”, ori faţă de ” mojicie “, dacă doriţi un termen echivalent pentru barbaria rusească. Cum s-a ajuns însă la această putere imensă a Rusiei, cuplată cu atâta barbarie ?  

“C’est la faute à Voltaire !”, putem spune şi noi.  Iată un excerpt dintr-o scrisoare din anul 1774, scrisă de regele Frederic cel Mare al Prusiei, către Voltaire (imediat după încheierea păcii de la Kuciuc   Kainargi, pe care Frederic cel Mare o compara ca importanţă cu pacea din Westphalia): “peut-être que, dans quelques siècles d’ici, il faudra puiser les belles connaissances chez les Russes. Tout est possible, et ce qui n’est pas peut arriver ensuite.”

Între Capitulaţiunea din 1740 prin care se afirma expres oprirea avansului apusean al Rusiei pe malul Niprului, şi pacea de la Kuciuc  Kainargi din  1774, prin care ţarina Caterina cea Mare primea hălci masive din Romania Orientală, care fuseseră totuşi,  totuşi,  garantate prin capitulaţiuni, Voltaire a organizat un lobby pentru Rusia în Franţa, care era cea mai mare putere a lumii la acel moment.

Textul complet al scrisorii lui Frederic cel Mare al Prusiei către filosoful Voltaire poate fi accesat aici http://blogideologic.wordpress.com/2009/04/19/premonitia-lui-frederic-cel-mare/ .

Frederic cel Mare dezvăluie detalii inedite privind acţiunea lobbistă a lui François Marie Arouet Voltaire (1694 -1778), un lobby în care l-a asociat şi pe matematicianul Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717  – 1783), secretarul Academiei Franceze (începând cu anul 1772).

+DE FRÉDÉRIC, ROI DE PRUSSE./A Potsdam, le 8 octobre [1774]. “Negociaţiunea voastră încearcă toate contratimpurile posibile.”- “Votre négociation éprouve tous les contre-temps possibles.” […] “mă voi limita la a trimite mărturia unui general către domnul d’Alembert, şi voi scrie ministrului meu la  Paris.”- “je me bornerai à envoyer le témoignage du général à M. Dalembert, et je ferai écrire à mon ministre à Paris.”+

Ar fi prea mult să spunem că acest lobby era o acţiune net anti–românească, deşi erau lovite în mod clar interesele româneşti. Într-adevăr, prin pacea de la Kuciuc  Kainargi din  anul 1774, nu mai era garantată frontiera răsăriteană a  Moldovei pe rîul Bug, aşa cum prevedea în mod expres Capitulaţiunea din 1740. Dar “ce-i mâna pe ei în luptă”, pe Voltaire şi d’Alembert ?  O tradiţie moralistă anti-Romania iniţiată  de filosoful francez Charles-Louis de  Montesquieu (1689 – 1755).

Din Contra Reformă, intelectualii francezi percep în primul rând Noaptea Sfântului Bartolomeu (noaptea dintre 23 şi 24 august 1572). Noi, românii, percepem în primul rând unirea principatelor româneşti de către Mihai Viteazul, plătit de Contra Reformă ca un condottier  spre a construi Romania Neoacquistica. Însă repulsia firească a intelectualilor francezi faţă de  masacrul din Noaptea Sfântului Bartolomeu, implicit repulsia faţă de Contra Reformă, a fost nelegitim transformată de Montesquieu, Voltaire şi d’Alembert într-un sentiment anti-Romania. Să reamintim, Romania apare în istorie prin acţiunea şi efectele Constituţiei Antoniniene din anul 212. Iluminiştii Voltaire şi d’Alembert fac tot posibilul pentru a preveni acea „regresiune a istoriei universale” chemată Romania Neoacquistica. “Progresismul” lui Voltaire şi d’Alembert va justifica ulterior politica lui Stalin faţă de România.  

Titus Filipas

The Magic advance to the second round of this year’s playoff series. During game 5 their star player, Dwight Howard, threw an elbow at Samuel Dalembert of the 76ers. He even got suspended for the next game. Take a look.

That’s one problem with the NBA, the players all have this ego, where they let their emotions go for the smallest things. Then fights break out and people get ejected and it just does not look good. Just play the game right.

WOW

Cool guy right here.

Dalembert and Howard, before things got testy

Timely move, Dwight Howard. Everyone’s favourite all-around nice guy has been suspended for Game Six of Orlando’s first round series with the Sixers for his elbow to the head of Leo Rautins’ main man Samuel Dalembert last night. Sure, this is bound to hurt the Magic, but it could be worse — If Howard had actually been ejected last night, like he should’ve been, Orlando would’ve likely lost the game and been down 3-2 heading to Philly without their star player.

So yeah, if you ask me, Howard’s suspension was completely warranted. Still, there’s some head scratching going on around the league after Boston’s Rajon Rondo received no further punishment for his hard foul on Chicago’s Brad Miller with a couple seconds left in overtime of the Celtics’ win last night. Seems about right to me — Rondo is, after all, arguably the greatest point guard to set foot on an NBA court. Seriously, though, I don’t think Rondo’s foul was as big of a deal — If there were to be any changes, it could’ve been upgraded to a flagrant 1, which at least wouldn’t have drawn a suspension.

By the way, I can’t mention Rondo without drawing attention to his numbers against Chicago thus far: 24.2 points, 10.2 rebounds, 10.2 assists and 3.2 steals per game. Ronnnnnnnddddddddooooooo!

East

1. Cleveland Cavaliers

2. Boston Celtics

3. Orlando Magic

4. Atlanta Hawks

5. Miami Heat

6. Philadelphia 76ers

7. Chicago Bulls

8. Detroit Pistons

1st Round:

1 Cavaliers vs 8 Pistons – My heart is with the Pistons (although I was totally advocating a tank job resulting in a chance at the Draft Lottery) but my brain is obviously with the Cavs.  Cleveland is a much better team than Detroit.  I could use this time to rant about how dumb the Billups trade was (until they get D-Wade, LeBron, or CB4 in 2010) or how I’m sure AI is flaking out on the team but I won’t.  Cavs dominate, Pistons grab one thanks to the vets, Cavs in 5.

2 Celtics vs 7 Bulls – With or without KG, the Celtics are head and shoulders above the Bulls.  The Bulls have some talent, such as John Salmons and Derrick Rose, but not nearly as much as Boston.  Rose is a dynamic player but Rondo is a better pure point guard, which is a perfect fit for Boston.  Chicago is a very young and immature team and Boston will be out to prove some people wrong now that they’re being written off, Celtics in a 4 game sweep.

3 Magic vs 6 Sixers – The Sixers are a very talented team.  They have a big time point guard in Andre Miller, a nice slasher in Igoudala, a defensive bigman in Dalembert, and an up and coming SF in Thaddeus Young.  Unfortunately, the Magic are just as talented.  Alston has performed excellently in relief for the injured Jameer Nelson, they have 3 point shooters all over the place, and D. Howard is the best center in the game today.  Philly has a shot if the Magic go cold from three but not even Dalembert can stop Howard, Magic in 5.

4 Hawks vs 5 Heat – The Hawks have a better team with Bibby, Josh Smith, Joe Johnson, and company but Dwyane Wade is insanely good.  Wade is fully capable of taking control of a series and dominating, he’s my MVP for the season.  I think the Hawks best chance to win is to force Wade to do it all himself.  With their versatility, Atlanta can wear him out a little on defense and he might get tired by the end of a long series.  I love the Hawks but I think D-Wade is too much, Heat in 7.

2nd Round:

1 Cavaliers vs 5 Heat – The showdown.  LeBron vs D-Wade.  The funny thing is, neither of them will decide the series.  LeBron and Wade are so close in talent that they will essentially cancel each other out.  While I like the Heat supporting cast in the long term, the Cavs are significantly better right now.  Moe Williams has been a huge addition and their bench is very deep.  I like the Cavs in 6.

2 Celtics vs 3 Magic – Now all of the KG talk is really going to heat up.  The Magic are no push over team like the Bulls were and KG may be needed in this series.  The key to this series is Stan Van Gundy’s coaching.  If he let’s his team jack up a ton of threes, they’re going to lose.  If he forces them to get the ball down low to Howard, the Celtics don’t have anyone to stop him.  Stan Van Gundy has shown me nothing as a coach, Celtics in 6.

Conference Finals:

1 Cavaliers vs 2 Celtics – Pretty much everyone’s preseason prediction for the conference final, the Cavs will host the Celtics.  Now, Boston will really need KG.  If KG can make it back in time for this series, I favor the Celtics slightly.  If he can’t make it back, I think the Cavs will squeak it out.  KG is tough and will play if he can, but I don’t think he can.  This injury seems pretty serious.  Too much LeBron, too much Big Z and Moe Williams, Cavs in 6.

NBA Finals:

1 Cavaliers vs 1 Lakers – This is what all of the sponsors want to see.  Kobe vs LeBron.  Moe Williams gets the edge over Derek Fisher.  Bynum and Gasol get the nod over Big Z, Ben Wallace, and Anderson Varejao.  I’m giving Kobe the slight edge over LeBron.  Kobe has done it longer.  Kobe is more clutch.  Kobe is a more complete player.  Kobe finally gets his ring without Shaq, Lakers in 6.

Es ist erstaunlich, welche subversive Kraft bis heute der Erfindung der Enzyklopädie innewohnt. Ob man historisch nun zu der von d’Alembert und Diderot nicht nur verantworteten, sondern zu weiten Teilen auch fabrizierten Ur-”Encyclopédie” greift oder zu Ambrose Biercens “Wörterbuch des Teufels” oder zur “Kulturgeschichte der Missverständnisse” von Eckhard Henscheid – immer entzündet diese Form, die eigentlich die sprödeste, nüchternste sein müsste, den Funkenflug des Witzes. Besonders in der Abgrenzung von Monumental-Schriften aus dem Geiste: “Jetzt zeig ich’s dir aber, Welt!” sticht das schlagwortartig Gefasste wohltuend sprudelig-nüchtern ab. Woran liegt das? Zum einen am Zwang zur Kürze, der schon Tacitus guttat. Und anderen aber sicher auch an dem Hautgout der Unverantwortlichkeit, der solch einem kurzen Eintrag plötzlich zuwächst, gleichsam als immunologische Reaktion auf die Überverantwortung, die man beim Abfassen eines Lexikoneintrags doch eigentlich wohl verspüren müsste. Wenn die Sache nicht die allerernsteste ist, warum sollte der auf sie angewandte Stil es sein? Natürlich darf der Leser etwa beim Pschyrembel höchste Akuratesse und größte fachliche Verantwortlichkeit erwarten. Hier hat der Gag, hat die locker-freche Sektlaunen-Assoziation, hat das Um-die-Ecke-Gedachte nichts verloren. Aber nehmen wir z. B. eine Enzyklopädie über Bob Dylan … gut, ein schlechtes Beispiel, denn die Dylanisten, allen voran Michael Gray, sind ihrerseits so in der semisakralen Bedeutungstiefe ihres Gegenstandes befangen, dass von ihnen Humor, welcher per definitionem Distanz voraussetzt, einfach nicht zu erwarten ist; sogar der sonst so verlässlich unbefangene Willi Winkler strauchelte übel durchs Buchstaben-Gelände seines Textes, als er die Heiligenlegende von His Bobness im flapsigen Stil zu erzählen versuchte. Darum war auch das Erscheinen der “Chronicles Vol. 1″ solch eine Wohltat – weil hier all das Lockere und poetisch Vergnügliche, das dem Durchschnittsdylanisten beim Kampf im Captain’s Tower von dem Zyklopen WIRKLICHER TIEFE aus dem Leib geprügelt wurde, ganz unvermutet da war, jenseits von apokalyptisch triefendem Geraune.

Mann, Scheiße, und jetzt bin ich wieder bei Dylan gelandet! Dieses neue Album, es wirft seine Schatten voraus …

Last night, the Sixers went from frustratingly mediocre to embarrassing in an 89-74 loss in Oklahoma City.  Shooting 40% from the field and 60% from the free throw line is how you play basketball when you want to lose to the Oklahoma City Thunder.  Superstar Andre Iguodala shot below 33% and Mr. Useful Sammy Dalembert poured in 0 points.

It was nice to read that instead of attempting to develop any post moves, Dalembert actually likes to shoot threes! Dalembert might as well begin blocking his teammates’ shots and see if he’ll be awarded negative points in the box score.

Did I mention the Thunder were playing without Kevin Durant?  DiLeo’s Sixers had no answer for Russian bloc country Nenad Krstic (who scored 20) and the corpse of Malik Rose, who I swore was either on Comcast or TNT at this point.

But there’s always a silver lining.  While reading ESPN’s Game Notes, I stumbled upon this good news:

Jim Caviezel, Hollywood’s next big thing in the late ’90s went on to star in the controversial Passion of the Christ and be the most remarkable thing about a night that was an insult to the sport of basketball.

Maurice Cheeks of the Philadelphia 76ers became the 5th coach now fired around the NBA so far this season.  Along with P.J. Carlesimo (Thunder), Eddie Jordan (Wizards), Sam Mitchell (Raptors), and Randy Wittman (T’Wolves) Cheeks now has his own number in the unemployment line.  This was probably the biggest firing thusfar and certain fans have every right to be outraged.  Cheeks led the surprising dark horse 76ers to the playoffs last year and was given Elton Brand to bump heads with Dalembert with rebounding and was canned, I don’t understand.  I guess a losing streak of any stature nowadays around the league means your ass in on the line.

Title : Encyclopedie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonne des Sciences, des Arts et des Metiers
Author : D. Diderot, M. D’Alembert
Date : 1777 – 1778
Dimensions : 26,0 x 21,0 cm

This is the Geneva Quarto Edition of the Diderot d’Alembert encyclopedia, with all 36 text volumes in beautiful leather spines, embossed in 3 parts, and orange and brown cardboard. Some volumes are slightly rubbed but the overall condition is very good. One book has the orange spine label torn.

The encyclopedia is not only well known for its many authors – among which Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu, but for its controversial history.

Some restorations are done over 10 of the affected volumes.

The two plates of the authors were made by Charles-Nicholas Cochin (1715-1790).

Two volumes – - missing the both title pages

This is a very important and rare edition. On international shops it is selling with over 18 000 euro. The first edition of this encyclopedia can be found at over 80 000 euro.
http://www.abebooks.com/servlet/ListingDetails?bi=882047921&cm_ven=PFX&cm_cat=affiliates&cm_pla=links&cm_ite=k158229&pfxid=a_180812523

Tome seizieme –missing the second title page
Tome vingtieme – the two title pages are switched.

Tome XXIV – has a missing ending. The volume is ending with PAU, the next volume is starting with PLA.

Tome trentieme – the last leaf has missing text as displayed in the picture.
Tome XXXV – has a corroded lower corner over several pages, but the text is not affected.

Tome trente-sixieme – last volume, has a major stain over the first few pages.

More about the authors on wikipedia

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We have been thinking about drama, history, and literature. October. Independence Day. Bastille Day. What have you, Dear Readers, being thinking about? All honor to the heroes of intellectual labor.

1. A solid body in a steadily moving, inviscid (and incompressible) fluid does experience no drag. That’s fine! However, a drag must appear when, by reversing the process, we observe the steadily moving body through the fluid at rest. Otherwise, who pays for irreducible non-steady motions which take place locally with the passage of the body? How can these two facts be brought together?
2. The explanation deals with an irreversible process: while a steadily moving fluid spontaneously embeds a body at rest, the reverse requires an external source of work (per unit time). This because, as shown by bernoulli613, the boundary of the body at rest becomes also a source of vorticity for the moving fluid. Can we say alike for Faraday’s Paradox on electromagnetic induction?

D’Alembert, Jean Le Rond (1717–83)

Mathematician, scientist and man of letters, Jean D’Alembert is a central figure of the French Enlightenment. As a young man he made significant contributions to the refinement of mathematical techniques, and later was actively engaged in the theoretical controversies which surrounded the gradual assimilation of Newtonian mechanics into the mainstream of European science. For twelve years (1746–58) he was co-editor, with Denis Diderot, of the Encyclopedia, the serial publication of which was one of the defining events of the Enlightenment period as a whole. D’Alembert frequented the various Paris salons where much of the intellectual fervour and high-spiritedness of the age was cultivated and given shape. As Secretary of the French Academy he worked assiduously to advance the cause of human knowledge.

D’Alembert’s philosophy is characterized by an abiding commitment to the clarity and precision which attends mathematical abstraction. He believed that in its essence the natural order is internally structured by laws whose operation can be articulated under the principles of geometry. All natural phenomena are to be explained under the terms of those basic mathematical principles that govern the scientific domain in which they are located (chemistry or astronomy for example), and all scientific domains could be brought ultimately to perfect consistency and systematic order within a comprehensive theory. The events and processes which constitute the natural order reflect the reality of the mathematical structure which underlies them. As he says in the Preliminary Discourse (1751) to the Encyclopedia (1751–65), ‘The universe would only be one fact and one great truth for whoever knew how to embrace it from a single point of view’.

1 Life and works

D’Alembert was the illegitimate son of Mme de Tencin and the chevalier Louis-Camus Destouches. Shortly after his birth he was left by his mother at the steps of the church St Jean Le Rond in Paris, a circumstance which gave the boy his name. While never formally acknowledging paternity, the father took a devoted interest in his son and provided for his education. Jean was enrolled in the Jansenist Collège des Quatre Nations under the name of Dalemberg, which was later altered to the form by which he is known to history. The boy’s intellectual gifts were apparent from the start; he was encouraged to pursue a career in theology, though he never expressed any great interest in it, studied law and medicine for three years, but was increasingly drawn to mathematics. Though his formal instruction in mathematics was limited, by 1739 D’Alembert had attained a sufficient mastery of the subject to submit a paper to the Academy of Sciences in which he pointed out some errors in a popular textbook of the time. On the strength of this and several other mathematical papers he was elected to the Academy of Sciences in 1741.

In 1743 D’Alembert published his Traité de dynamique (Treatise on Dynamics), a book which attracted the attention of the leading scientific authorities and helped secure his reputation as a most promising young savant. In this, his first major publication, he attempted to reconstruct the science of motion (mechanics) on a purely formal and mathematical basis, proscribing appeals to any such quasi-metaphysical notions as force or gravity and assigning observation and experiment to the subordinate role of confirming the basic principles of the theory. The axioms of geometry, together with the assumption of the impenetrability of the objects constituting a system, were all that was needed to establish the precision and certainty that should attend the study of motion. By this time Newtonian mechanics was well on its way toward gaining the ascendancy over the vestiges of Cartesian physics, and D’Alembert was in compliance with the best scientific opinion of the day in rejecting Descartes’ theory of vortices and his conception of nature as a plenum. In certain fundamental respects, however, D’Alembert retained a decided preference for a rigorous, Cartesian rationalism in his approach to scientific theorizing as opposed to the meticulous empirical observation and data-gathering which characterize Newton’s own researches (see EMPIRICISM; RATIONALISM). For D’Alembert priority should always be accorded to the strict logical formulation of the basic principles which grounded any scientific inquiry, and he maintained that such principles could be articulated independently of experience. While many of his contemporaries were impressed by the extent to which D’Alembert had apparently succeeded in preserving and carrying through to completion the best features of the Cartesian approach to physical science, others raised the suspicion that his attempts to mathematicize the foundations of mechanics were based on a confusion regarding the ineluctably empirical dimension of basic mechanical principles. In any case, the Traité de dynamique is secure in its place in the history of science for having clarified the central theoretical issues which remained to be addressed in working out the details of the Newtonian programme, preparing the way, in particular, for the later researches of Lagrange (see DESCARTES, R.; NEWTON, I.).

Over the next few years D’Alembert produced a series of scientific monographs in which he applied the principles worked out in the Traité de dynamique to specific problems including the behaviour of fluids, the cause of the winds, precise calculations for the incidence of the equinoxes and the vibration of strings, all impressive scientific achievements in their own right. Beginning in 1746, however, D’Alembert’s intellectual energies began to move away from such narrowly focused scientific investigations towards a more literary engagement with the broader currents of the Enlightenment movement that were gaining momentum across Europe. This year marks D’Alembert’s earliest involvement in the tempestuous history of the publication of the Encyclopedia which he was to co-edit with Denis DIDEROT for the next twelve years. In 1751 he produced the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia, the work for which he is best known; he would ultimately contribute, or make substantial editorial additions to some 1,500 articles on an enormous range of topics from mathematics and physics (which make up the largest part of his contribution) to music, philosophy and religion. In many of these articles D’Alembert is unabashedly partisan in his support of the philosophical campaign to secure the claims of science and enlightenment against the resistance of the political authorities and the chauvinism of the religious establishment. By his polemical zeal, for example, in his contentions against the unflagging hostility of the Jesuits to the whole Encyclopedia project, he makes known his willingness to be counted among the ranks of the philosophes who, in turn, were more than happy to have his considerable reputation as a scientist joined to their cause. The depth of D’Alembert’s commitment to the cause was challenged, however, when his article ‘Genève’ appeared in 1757 in the seventh volume of the Encyclopedia. He had intended to present a flattering view of the atmosphere of religious tolerance in Geneva at the time by imputing to the authorities there an advocacy of various doctrines associated with SOCINIANISM, such as the denial of the divinity of Christ. The Genevans were neither flattered nor amused. In the firestorm of criticism and vituperation that came down on his head in the months after his article appeared, D’Alembert resigned his position as editor and withdrew from the public controversies altogether, much to the disappointment of his more vociferous comrades including, notably, Voltaire. His further contributions to the Encyclopedia would be confined to relatively uncontroversial topics dealing with scientific matters with which he was especially conversant.

In 1754 D’Alembert was elected to the French Academy, and if the high profile and protracted controversies of the Encyclopedia project were too much for D’Alembert’s tastes, his membership in the Academy provided the ideal setting for his continued advocacy of the natural sciences. For some years prior to his election, the reputation of the Academy had been diminished in the public’s estimation by the perception that its members were perhaps too much beholden to the interests of the political establishment. With D’Alembert things changed. By virtue of his own reputation for scholarly achievement and personal integrity he was able to improve contacts with scientific establishments across Europe and cultivate friendly relations with foreign heads of state. Internally, he worked assiduously in the cause of progressive ideas by setting agendas and seeking to advance the careers of like-minded colleagues. In his speeches before the assembly and public addresses he championed the cause of the philosophic spirit and argued the material and moral advantages to a society in which it was permitted to flourish. In ways that were unprecedented he brought the affairs and proceedings of the Academy before the public and thereby enhanced the reputation of the Academy itself while raising at the same time the status and the influence of scientific and philosophic research. In 1772 he acceded to the office of permanent secretary of the Academy in which capacity he continued to serve until his death.

Throughout this period D’Alembert continued to write and publish books and essays on scientific and philosophical topics. In 1759 he published the Essai sur les éléments de philosophie; in the aftermath of the Jesuit expulsion from France in 1762 he published the highly polemical essay Sur la destruction des Jésuites en France (1765), in which he argued, in effect, that it was the rising tide of enlightenment which precipitated the downfall of this remaining bastion of religious obscurantism. His technical works in mathematics and physics were published in eight volumes as Opuscules mathématiques between 1761 and 1780. His voluminous correspondence, his many speeches and elegies were collected and published posthumously.

2 Philosophical outlook and the Preliminary Discourse

D’Alembert’s philosophy is of decisive importance to anyone who would understand the Enlightenment in its intellectual and theoretical (as distinct from its social and political) dimension because it manifests, more clearly perhaps than any other author’s, the delicate combination of French rationalism in the tradition of Descartes and Malebranche and British empiricism as represented by Newton and Locke (see Malebranche, N.; Locke, J.). As a mathematician of the very first rank, D’Alembert was entirely sympathetic to Descartes’ insistence upon the clarity and precision of basic principles and the need for rigorous deductive logic in establishing the linkages between one theoretical proposition and any others which might be linked with it. Like virtually all his contemporaries, D’Alembert was hugely impressed by the power of Newtonian mechanics to explain and integrate vast tracts of natural phenomena and predict future events, and by the extent to which observational and experimental data could be incorporated into a system constituted at its core by mathematical principles. To understand D’Alembert himself, and to appreciate his importance as a signal representative of the thought of this watershed period in human history, the relationship between the Cartesian and empirical strands of his work must be made out.

D’Alembert was unequivocal in his rejection of metaphysical principles as constituting an appropriate base for inquiry in the natural sciences. He repudiated the Cartesian doctrine of innate ideas and denied that Descartes’ Cogito had any value as a starting point in constructing the system of human knowledge. Appeals to divine intervention in the natural order had no place in trying to explain the connection between events or the relation between natural objects and the human perception of them. In this respect, D’Alembert adhered closely to the principles of Lockean epistemology as these were modified and expanded in the works of his friend and colleague, CONDILLAC. With Locke and Condillac, D’Alembert insisted that all knowledge begins by attending to the facts and that the way those facts appear to us is as close as we can ever hope to get to their reality. But the facts which present themselves to our experience are only isolated and fragmentary pieces of a greater systematic structure in which they are embedded, and for the full articulation of that structure one must have recourse to the principles of mathematics – specifically those of geometry – in order to represent the orderliness of natural events and processes. The basic principles of any science should consist in perfectly unambiguous and precise mathematical formulas together with whatever basic assumptions are necessary to secure their attachment to the objects which constitute the domain under investigation. The various discrete facts disclosed to our observations can then be expressed as formal propositions which could in turn be fitted into the deductive chain of formulas derivable from the basic principles.

D’Alembert rejected Descartes’ notion of the universe as a plenum because it was infected by the unwarranted metaphysical doctrine of substances. In his own conception of the universe, however, D’Alembert maintained that all parts of nature are systematically interrelated in a comprehensive structure of laws which evinces the same integrity, consistency and formal precision as any of the more extended and elegant proofs in geometry. Like Descartes, D’Alembert believed that the methodical and painstaking implementation of human reason would gradually serve to disclose this rational structure, and that, as it came into view, the empirical facts could find their place within it and thereby attain theoretical clarity. By setting his first priority on the articulation of the rational structure which informed all of nature, D’Alembert comports with the most fundamental aspects of Cartesian methodology and reaffirms the optimistic faith of his great precursor in the autonomous power of human reason.

In the Preliminary Discourse to the Encyclopedia D’Alembert presents an interpretation of the contemporary state of scientific research in which his own rationalistic conception of the structure of human knowledge forms the core. The Encyclopedia itself is conceived as a compendium of all the scientific truths so far achieved, but the greater utility and value of the work is found to consist precisely in its capacity to arrange and integrate these results so as to facilitate further research by revealing both the systematic interrelations between seemingly remote domains and the lacunas which remained to be filled in. D’Alembert compares the Encyclopedia to a road map: certain areas of the terrain of human knowledge are well understood and laid out in careful detail while the expanses between these areas are marked out only by the most rudimentary traces which might none the less provide a researcher with his theoretical bearings as he laboured to extend the boundaries of knowledge ever deeper into the realm of terra incognita. All of the articles in the Encyclopedia were to be knit together by an extensive network of cross-references so that an arbitrarily selected topic would lead the reader eventually to a comprehensive view of the whole structure in all its intricacies. The Encyclopedia, as the systematic embodiment of the whole vast range of human knowledge, would thus reflect the rational structure which constituted the natural order itself.

D’Alembert invokes a second metaphor in the Discourse, inspired by the prescient writings of the great English philosopher of science Francis Bacon, in which the ‘tree of human knowledge’, rooted in such fundamental disciplines as mathematics and logic, branches out into the various scientific subregions and extends ever further to include the most narrowly defined and detailed subject matter. Reconfiguring the Baconian conception of knowledge in accordance with the general principles of epistemology worked out by Condillac, D’Alembert recognizes three essential functions of the human mind: memory, reason and imagination. Under these three rubrics all domains of human inquiry, including history (sacred, civil and natural), literature and art, can be systematically interrelated. This second metaphor expresses D’Alembert’s view of knowledge as an organic unity, as something which grows from within when all of the various parts derive their sustenance from the flourishing of the others and contribute in turn to the flourishing of the whole.

To D’Alembert’s way of thinking there was no area of human inquiry which could not be incorporated into this unified and integrated structure of knowledge, and in this respect the Preliminary Discourse gives powerful and eloquent expression to one of the guiding inspirations of the Enlightenment period as a whole. In his own researches he made significant contributions toward bringing the study of language and aesthetics under the purview of science, and believed that ultimately even politics and morality should have to be subsumed under its methodology if there were to be progress. But here, D’Alembert’s attachment to rationalistic principles becomes deeply problematic, in that the more inscrutable and ambiguous aspects of human nature seem unamenable to anything like the geometrical precision that he made the hallmark of all true science. If from our historical vantage point his own philosophical commitments should appear somewhat dogmatic and unwarranted, we must at least acknowledge that the issues concerning the relationships between the various domains of human knowledge to which he was so acutely sensitive continue into our own day, reflected in the uneasy division within institutions of higher learning between the humanities and the ‘hard sciences’.

3 Reputation and influence

D’Alembert continues to enjoy a rightly prominent role in virtually all historical treatments of the Enlightenment period. He is one of only a few philosophes to have achieved the very highest standing as both a scientist and man of letters. His contributions to mathematics and physics stand as significant landmarks in the history of both disciplines. His indefatigable labours as secretary of the French Academy were profoundly efficacious in advancing the cause of enlightenment across Europe. Some of the most important historical figures of the age, including Voltaire, Frederick the Great and David Hume were proud to count him among their friends, a testament to both his high reputation and the warmth and integrity of his personality. His philosophical work was influential in the world of practical affairs as well, for example, in the formation of economic policy under the ministries of Quesnay and Turgot. And it is by no means the least of his contributions to have served as mentor to and helped to advance the careers of some of the brightest young minds of the rising generation such as Laplace, Lagrange and Condorcet. A close study of D’Alembert’s life and works provides an excellent point of entry into the world of the European Enlightenment.