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War People Farming Kill Alpha Ranch Passive

h2one2 — Mon, 16 Nov 2009 15:33:13 +0000

PAVLOV

francescozanolla — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 16:47:17 +0000

L’immortalità è uno stato mentale.
Come dire che, probabilmente, dobbiamo morire tutti prima o poi …

Ho Chi Min city.
L’odore che esala dalle strade è nauseante e denso. Come sempre. Come quando si chiamava Saigon.
Gas di scarico, sudore stagionato, acqua putrida, merda di capra e gallina e frittura di gamberetti di fiume.
Un’onda acre, che tende a stagnare sul terreno durante il giorno e che una brezza tiepida riesce solo in parte a disperdere, al calar della sera.
Probabilmente sanno che sono qui. Mi stanno addosso da quasi un cinque anni, oramai, ed io non ho più voglia di scappare. Vorrei soltanto mangiare qualcosa che non mi costringa a passare la notte abbracciato alla tazza del cesso.
E tra quei locali che riesco a scorgere dall’unica finestra della mia stanza al terzo piano dell’hotel Mekong, una topaia pretenziosa in via di dismissione, nessuno pare in grado di garantire una notte di sonno tranquillo.
Tanto meno, il MacDonald’s di cui intravedo in lontananza le insegne, sporgendomi abbondantemente oltre il davanzale.
Così, mosso da una curiosità disillusa, decido di andare a dare un’occhiata ed esco nell’aria umida della notte, rumorosa e speziata, su cui grava, immancabile, una nota fetida non troppo definita.

…un proiettile che fa il suo onesto lavoro, spappolando i lobi frontali del solito infame.
Un’idea ricorrente. Il paradigma di quella che sarà la mia fine.
Uccelli notturni a banchettare sulla mia carcassa, e dietro i profili delle colline erbose, ombre di cose morte da milioni di anni, pegasi in technicolor, commissari della Gestapo che scrutano ani, oscilloscopi difettosi.
C’è però comunque una cosa che dovrei ricordare: c’è sempre una luce alla fine del tunnel.
Terapia…

Dietro le ampie vetrate, sotto la stessa luce uniforme e algida che trovi a Vienna, a Bogotà o a Mestre-Venezia, è tutto un brulicare di vassoi che portano contenitori di cartone e plastica per alimenti, bicchieri colorati, cannucce e tovaglioli di carta.
Attaccati ai vassoi, concentrati e attenti, cercando di guadagnarsi un posto a sedere spostandosi tra giravolte e cambi di direzione nello spazio affollato, come ballerini di tango e milonga, i clienti: per lo più giovani vietnamiti e vietnamite, non più di diciotto anni, abiti all’occidentale ed un’espressione eternamente indecifrabile stampata in viso.
Dietro al banco, tutti indaffarati a friggere patate, spillare bibite, dare resti e distribuire sorrisi, come la politica aziendale impone, un plotone di loro coetanei coordinati da un ciccione sui quaranta, il cui culo minaccia di esplodere da un momento all’altro dalla cucitura dei pantaloni.
Alla fine ce l’hanno fatta.
Anche l’ultimo paradiso dei lavoratori è caduto sotto i colpi d’ariete del capitale globalizzato.
Non è difficile immaginare come ci siano riusciti.

I primi esperimenti cominciarono durante gli anni ‘70, al tempo delle ricorrenti crisi petrolifere, del blocco della convertibilità del dollaro, dell’austerità galoppante.
Occorreva qualcosa che spingesse i clienti a consumare. Sempre e comunque. Al di là di quelli che fossero i loro reali desideri e bisogni. E che funzionasse meglio della pubblicità, lo strumento fino ad allora deputato a raggiungere tali scopi.

…non credete a chi vi dice che dobbiamo essere più liberi, perché la schiavitù al nostro fremere quotidiano, all’infinita e articolata proiezione di significati immaginari che rendono la vita degna di essere vissuta, è tutto quello chi ci resta…

La sostanza si presenta come un gel, un gel poco denso, incolore, inodore, insapore.
Ne vengono irrorati tutti gli ingredienti delle pietanze servite nei ristoranti della celeberrima catena, dalle patate rifritte agli hamburger cinerei, passando per i filetti di pesce mutante, le insalate plastificate/cerate e i gelati paciugosi e stomachevolmente dolci.
Agisce, organicamente, su due livelli: i neurotrasmettitori che interpretano e diffondono gli stimoli della fame e i centri della memoria, riuscendo in qualche modo a bypassare, come non è ancora stato chiarito, le stratificazioni neurali “storiche”.
In pratica, la sostanza fa sì che ogni stimolo di fame che si genera nell’organismo umano venga associato il ricordo, visivo, olfattivo, tattile e ovviamente gustativo, dei prodotti della gamma MacRonald’s che si sono già consumati.
L’effetto è cumulativo e ciclicamente crescente, facendosi più intenso man mano che si continuano a consumare i cibi, e la sensazione che tende a prodursi nel soggetto, al momento dell’insorgenza dello stimolo della fame, è quella di una costante insoddisfazione, una latente mancanza di sazietà e una frustrazione strisciante, spesso associata a disturbi sensoriali e locomotori, che può venire compiutamente placata solo attraverso l’ingestione di uno o più prodotti della gamma MacDonald’s.
E’ un dato assodato che soltanto le più alte cariche del consiglio d’amministrazione della Società Madre conoscono la reale natura della sostanza.
Per tutti gli altri, dai capi divisione, agli Area manager, ai responsabili di zona e giù giù nella catena gerarchica fino ai direttori dei singoli locali e agli addetti alle cucine, che materialmente addizionano il gel al cibo, si tratta di una banale misura di profilassi antibatterica.

…sono così stanco.
Stanco di baciare le ombre. E di vivere in microcosmi interstiziali. Stanco di incontri fugaci nel silenzio irreale che precede battaglie decisive, sabbia in ampie onde mosse dal vento che inghiotte cattedrali abbandonate. Di girare di notte e consumarmi nel fuoco…

Riesco quasi a vedermeli davanti, i Charlie in delegazione diplomatica, completi blu costosi di taglio occidentale pagati un occhio della testa, a smascellarsi in ampi sorrisi compiaciuti mentre visitano lo stabilimento di Akron (Ohio) che impacchetterà e distribuirà in tutti gli States il loro prezioso riso.
“Un irrinunciabile occasione per rinsaldare i legami tra i nostri due paesi nel segno di una mutuamente proficua cooperazione economica” aveva detto il Presidente yankee, aprendo la sarabanda dei discorsi ufficiali, dopo essersi chiuso la patta dei pantaloni, rimasta spalancata in seguito all’ultima seduta nello studio ovale in compagnia di un plotone di stagiste under 24.
E poi, per suggellare la ritrovata intesa tra la Terra delle Opportunità ed il Gioiello del sud est asiatico, tutti a consumare un tipico pasto americano in un altrettanto tipico locale, allo svincolo sud dell’interstatale, tra la rivendita d’auto d’occasione di Sam Matszuchinsky, e il cavalcavia della linea ferroviaria.
Grande istrione e maestro di cerimonie, Ronald MacDonald in persona, uno dei tanti, per lo meno, in calzerotti e parrucca nuovi di zecca per l’occasione.
“Lei non crede che dopo l’incontro di stamattina” sussurra vagamente preoccupato il consigliere diplomatico Nyen Guen all’orecchio del suo primo ministro, mentre salgono sulla limousine per recarsi al pranzo ” forse dovremmo…”
“Solo perché abbiamo gentilmente declinato la loro offerta di aprire il nostro paese ai loro ristoranti? E per cosa? Un misero dieci per cento sui profitti direttamente nelle casse della Repubblica? Tanto per cominciare si trattava di un incontro riservato ed ufficioso, un semplice “pour parler”, come si dice in questi casi…e, poi, cosa non meno importante, nell’occasione di oggi siamo graditi ospiti del Governo Federale degli Stati Uniti.”
Nyen Guen annuisce. Suo padre, più di trent’anni fa, tendeva agguati alle pattuglie di Marines sulle rive del fiume dei Profumi, appena fuori Hue.
Quando, alcune decine di minuti più tardi, addenta di malavoglia un Cheeseburger che suppura salse e grumi di formaggio arancio, come e più del celebre agente chimico defogliante, si ricorda di quando suo nonno, che era a Dien Bien Phu, gli raccontò di essere sopravvissuto per quasi dieci giorni in un rifugio sottoterra, mangiando carne di topo essiccata e bevendo la propria urina.

Dopo quel lauto pasto, accompagnato dall’immancabile concerto della banda della contea, majorettes e pioggia di coriandoli, le proteste rumorose di alcune frange estremiste delle associazioni di veterani e un simpatico scambio di cotillon, (ciotole da riso in porcellana di Limoges versus hamburger immersi in un bagno d’argento e bicchieri da bibita grandi in cristallo di Boemia con cannucce in fibra di platino), un ricevimento serale nei a Washington, ed un fugace omaggio mattutino al monumento ai caduti della Sporca Guerra, la delegazione riparte, in perfetto orario dall’aeroporto Dulles.
Ma com’è, come non è, a tre quarti della traversata, una misteriosa piccola avaria al sistema di alimentazione di un motore, misteriosa perché investe alcune componenti che, stando al registro di manutenzione del velivolo, risultavano essere state appena revisionate, costringe il jet ad un improvviso scalo tecnico d’emergenza all’aeroporto internazionale di Sidney.
Per motivi di sicurezza, la delegazione non può lasciare il terminal dei voli internazionali.
Un’intera ala dell’edificio viene isolata e piantonata, restando a disposizione completa del corpo di spedizione diplomatico.
La sosta forzata dura cinque ore. Ad un cero punto si fa strada un certo languorino.
Provate a dire qual’ era l’unico punto di ristorazione funzionante nel settore riservato alla delegazione Vietnamita?

…il salmone, che un tempo risaliva le acque schiumanti di qualche ruscello canadese, ora riposa per sempre su un letto di tagliolini malamente agglutinati dalla panna, sminuzzato in bocconcini regolari.
Sorseggio un po’ di vino, un insipido rosato (californiano!), un’altra delle mie brillanti idee (certo che forse, quel Muller Thurgau…, ma, tant’è…) e inforco un’altra matassina di pasta scotta. Non è eccessivamente passata di cottura, solo quel tanto che basta per fartela sentire vagamente gommosa tra i denti, più o meno come la scolano in Francia, (d’altronde, come si chiama il locale? Chez Chao Nan -Nouvelle Cuisine…) quando te la servono al posto del pane per accompagnare qualche assurdo guazzetto di carne…

Il primo ministro della Repubblica Popolare del Vietnam che si rotola per terra, tra le proprie feci e pozze di vomito chiaro, in piena crisi di astinenza da polifosfati e grassi saturi, larva sbavante che digrigna i denti.
A vederlo ora, non direste che ha studiato alla Sorbonne.
“Chiamateli…chiamateli” mugola rosicchiando le gambe di tek della propria scrivania in preda a spasmi e tremiti inconsulti.
La task force Esteri, coadiuvata dall’incaricato d’affari della appena riaperta Ambasciata Usa, chiude i conti in meno di settantadue ore. Rapidi, agguerriti e letali.
E’ quasi certo che i panini e gli snack consumati durante la sosta in Australia siano stati trattati una dose decupla di additivo
Contratti…controllo del marchio…distribuzione esclusiva… Cargo transoceanici che attraccano al porto di Haiphong nella luce calante e diffusa del più classico dei tramonti monsonici, carichi di ogni ben di Dio: grossi quarti di bue, carne brasiliana, di bestie uccise da una forma sconosciuta di afta. Le prime diecimila confezioni regalo degli Happy Meal, con i personaggi dell’ultimo cartone animato di successo. Interiora di armadillo per l’impasto del Big Mac.

…tutta la notte abbracciato alla tazza del cesso.
Evidentemente il ristorante pseudofrancese che avevo scelto non era proprio quella perla di pulizia che mi era parso.
La carezza incorporea di un mirino laser sulle guance. Un’impressione fugace, come il tocco freddo di uno spettro. E’ stata quella a svegliarmi. Poi sono arrivati i conati. E la diarrea. Ma nessun colpo a frantumarmi la scatola cranica.
All’ Holyday inn di Boulder, Colorado, hanno tentato di fottermi col vecchio trucco del minibar avvelenato. A Samoa hanno avuto la cortesia di attirarmi in un vicolo buio, dove mi aspettava una specie di lottatore di sumo dai tratti inconfondibilmente polinesiani. A Bad Kirchenheim, dobermann iperstimolati nella sauna.
E me la sono sempre cavata.
Forse perché, in fondo, l’immortalità è qualcosa di più di uno stato mentale.
O forse perché Io sono Colui che sa…

Lessons for the Afghan War: The Effects of Counterinsurgency Warfare on the French Army in Indo-China and Algeria and the United States Military in Vietnam

padresteve — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 04:36:18 +0000

Note: This is an article that I wrote for a class a year ago which has been updated in order to show the lessons of history that can be useful in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

French Foreign Legionnaires in Indo-China

The effects of the wars Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military organizations internally and in relationship to their nations piqued my interest in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced me to start asking the question of what short and long term effect that these wars might have on the U.S. military. As such I wondered what historical precedent that there was for the question. My interest was furthered by my deployment with Marine and Army advisors to Iraqi Army and Security forces in 2007-2008. My search led to the French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam. Recently with the Iraq war winding down and ongoing war in Afghanistan which has gone from apparent victory to mounting concern that the effort could fail as the Taliban and Al Qaida have regained momentum amid widespread corruption by the Afghan government and weakness of NATO forces.

Thesis

The counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the French and American militaries in Vietnam and Algeria had deep and long lasting effects on them. The effects included developments in organization and tactics, relationship of the military to the government and people, and sociological changes. The effects were tumultuous and often corrosive. The French Army in Algeria revolted against the government. The US Army, scarred by Vietnam went through a crisis of leadership and confidence which eventually resulted in end of the draft and formation the all volunteer military. The effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are yet unknown but could result in similar situations to the militaries and governments involved,

Historiography

Foreign Legion in Algeria

There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth’s About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore’s We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy’s The Battle of Dien Bien Phu and General Paul Aussaresses’ The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, the authors, veterans of the wars, only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience in war can skew a writer’s objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.

Another source is found in the official histories written by the military forces involved in the wars. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be.

Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall’ Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.

Another source is the writings of participants who critically examine their participation in the wars. Many of these, French and American provide insights into the minds of leaders who are reflective and critically examine what happened to their military institutions in these wars. The best of these is French Colonel David Galula whose books Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice provide first-hand accounts of the subject combined with critical reflection. Galula’s works have been important to John Nagl, General David Petreus and others who helped write the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Other sources, both online and print, such as RAND, provide excellent analysis of selected topics within the scope of this essay, especially COIN.

French at Dien Bien Phu

The ability to dispassionately and critically examine and evaluate these sources over a period of several years was and integrate them with my own experience has been a critical to me. It has changed the way that I look at sources, and caused me to be much more aware of bias, the limitations of sources and the need to have a multiplicity of sources and points of view and to be suspicious of contemporary reports and accounts of the war in Afghanistan regardless of the source.

Analysis of the Issue

Viet Minh Supply Columns were Never Stopped by French Air power or Artillery

Joint US and ARVN Operation

The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the “legacy of conventional thinking” slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that “the population was the objective.”[2] Krepinevich notes that “any changes that might have come about through the service’s experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies.”[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people. Unfortunately instances of all of these have occurred or can be seen in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

French Prisoners after Dien Bien Phu: Many Survivors Would be Fighting in Algeria within Two Years

The French Army had the misfortune of fighting two major insurgencies back to back. The French military was handicapped even before it went into these wars. The Army came out of World War II defeated by the Germans, divided by loyalties to Vichy or one of the Free French factions. They were humiliated by the Japanese in Indo-China, while in Algeria France’s crushing defeat was devastating. “Muslim minds, particularly sensitive to prestige and baraka, the humiliation made a deep impression.”[4] French society was as divided as the Army; the economy in shambles, the government weak and divided. The Viet-Minh had prepared well making use of time and training to get ready for war. “Once full-scale hostilities broke out, the French, for budgetary and political reasons could not immediately make the large scale effort to contain the rebellion in the confines of small-scale warfare.”[5]

In both Indo-China and Algeria the French attempted to fight the budding insurgencies in a conventional manner. This was particularly disastrous in Indo-China when on a number of occasions battalion and regimental combat team sized elements were annihilated by Viet-Minh regulars. Between October 1^st and 17^th 1950 every French garrison along the Chinese border was over-run. The French lost over 6000 troops and enough equipment to outfit “a whole additional Viet-Minh division.” It was their worst colonial defeat since Montcalm at Quebec.[6] In Algeria when the fight began in earnest France’s “ponderous ponderous N.A.T.O forces found themselves at an impossible disadvantage,”[7] unable to have any influence off the main roads.

French Troops and Tanks in Indo-China: Road Bound Forces were often Defeated by Viet- Minh Forces

In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an “Air ground base” deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap’s forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. General Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the “air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories.”[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]

The most inventive French creation in Indochina was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide “permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas” to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that “the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth.”[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border “for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men.”[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 “If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves.”[14]

Algeria was different being part of Metropolitan France; there the French had support of European settlers, the pieds-noir. Many French soldiers had come directly from Indo-China. There French made better adaptations to local conditions, and realized that they had to win the population and isolate the insurgents from it and outside support. As Galula said, victory is the destruction of the insurgent’s political and military structures, plus “the permanent isolation from the population, not forced upon the population, but by and with the population.”[15] The lessons learned by the French in both Algerian and Indo-China were lost upon the Americans.

US Heavy Forces including Armor had Little Utility in Many Parts of Vietnam

The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, referred to as the “Army concept.” [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions “based upon the U.S. divisional force structure.”[17] Due to the imposition of an American template and organizational structure upon it, ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced.”[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of American troops poured in taking the lead against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong . The American method of counterinsurgency was costly. It was “almost a purely military approach”[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Instead of focusing on protecting the Vietnamese people and denying the Communists a safe haven the Army in particular believed that massive firepower was the best means to be“utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count.”[20] In the end the American defeat was a “failure of understanding and imagination.”[21] The one shining success was the Marine Corps experimentation with “Combined Action Program” platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results “in eliminating local guerillas”[22] but was killed by the Army.

NVA Main Forces

These wars tore the heart out French and American armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government’s “lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable.”[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called The Centurions had been turned into liars.”[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their “independent” nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. “They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: ‘Nous sommes trahis!’-‘We are betrayed.’”[25]

US Veterans of Vietnam Would Return to a Deeply Divided Country that turned its Back on Them for Years

The U.S. Army left Vietnam and returned to a country deeply divided by the war. Vietnam veterans remained ostracized by the society until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts “in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned.”[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007. These lessons however were not applied to Afghanistan and the Taliban which seemed to have been defeated have regained the initiative, policy is being debated amid discord in the west and there are reports of American and NATO forces becoming discouraged by the course of the war and concern that their efforts will be in vain. This is a dangerous situation to be in and if we learn from anything from our own history as well as that of foreign military forces in Afghanistan we need to be very careful in implementing strategy to get whatever we do right.

Training Team Base in Afghanistan: Some of these Bases Have proven Vulnerable to Well Planned and Coordinated Taliban Attacks

Conclusion

The effects of these wars on the French and American military establishments were long lasting and often tragic. The acceptance of torture as a means to an end sullied even the hardest French officers. Men like Galula and Marcel Bigeard refused to countenance it, while others like Paul Aussaresses never recanted. Americans would repeat the tactic at Abu Ghraib rallying the Iraqis against them and nearly losing the war because of it.

For the Americans, the effects of Vietnam continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Many incompetent leaders who had “ticket punched” their careers kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. The years following Vietnam were a severe test of the US Military and took years for the military to recover. Likewise It took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.

What are the lessons to be learned from these campaigns as well as from the various accounts? Andrew Krepinevich prophetically noted that the failure to learn the lessons of Vietnam “represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempting to fight a conventional war against a very unconventional opponent.”[27] Obviously, there are lessons to be learned, especially in understanding the nature of revolutionary war as well as the culture and history of our opponents. The U.S. has made some improvement in this regard but there is still much to be learned, especially since after the war the Army was “erecting barriers to avoid fighting another Vietnam War.”[28] From these wars we learn that nations and incompetent governments who mismanage wars can alienate themselves from the soldiers that they send to fight, with serious consequences. As far as historiography we learn that certain historical fallacies are evident when one reads the accounts critically and recognize the bias and limitations of the various sources.

[1] Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. “Revolutionary War” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,” Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986 p.849

[2] Galula, David. Counterinsurgency in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2006. First published by RAND in 1963. p.244

[3] Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986 p.213

[4] Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006 p 41

[5] Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27

[6] Ibid. p.33

[7] Horn. p.100.

[8] Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004 p.63

[9] Fall, Bernard B. “The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place.” Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1^st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967 pp. 456-457 Fall discusses in depth the lack of French Air support and the antecedents that led to the shortage following World War II.

[10] Pottier, Philippe(2005)’Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War’, Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874

[11] Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171

[12] Trinquier, Roger. “Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,” translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title “La Guerre Moderne” by Editions Table Ronde. p.87

[13] Windrow. p.652.

[14] Roy, Jules. “The Battle of Dien Bien Phu” Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York. p.xxx

[15] Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54

[16] Krepinevich. p.213

[17] Ibid. p.24

[18] Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005 p.138

[19] Shy. p.856

[20] Krepinevich. p.202

[21] Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993 p.314

[22] Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984 p.555

[23] Windrow. p.655

[24] Ibid. p.657

[25] Ibid.

[26] Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992 p. xx

[27] Krepinevich. p.275

[28] Ibid. p.274

War, Remembrance and Healing: A Chaplain, Officer and Historian Makes His Way Home

padresteve — Fri, 16 Oct 2009 21:43:44 +0000

The first version of this post was written in the spring of 2008 when I was doing a lot of soul searching and reflecting after Iraq. It was originally run in my church’s online news service. I post it now with some updates that have been brought about by new ways that I am rediscovering God and because of the current situation in Afghanistan which has become worse in the past year. As I read news releases about casualties and attacks on NATO forces and Afghan civilians, especially those in small outposts or serving as advisers and trainers I am reminded of my time in Iraq. Please don’t forget those who serve in Iraq and Afghanistan, or those who have served in prior wars. Especially keep in your prayers and help assist those who have returned injured in mind, body or spirit and those who made the supreme sacrifice.

Leaving a Bedouin Camp 1 mile from Syria

I have been doing a lot of reflecting on ministry and history over the past since returning from Iraq. Since I’ve been back about a year and a half I can say that I have changed as a result of my service there. Change can be scary but in my case it has been both necessary and probably good. Ministry, theology and history have been part of my life for many years; they have taken on a new dimension after serving in Iraq. When I first wrote this piece not long after returning I was in pretty bad shape but in the months since I have been attempting to integrate my theological and academic disciplines with my military, life and faith experience since my return. I’m not done yet by any means, but things are getting better, not quite like Chief Inspector Dreyfus in The Pink Panther Strikes Again “Every day in every way I’m getting better and better…Kill Clouseau!” but a slowly getting better with some occasional bumps in the road.

One of the things that I have wrestled with is my faith, and returning from war changes a man. Before I went to Iraq I thought that I had things pretty much together. When I came home and fell apart it also affected my faith, doing little things became difficult and the effects were exaggerated by my isolation. In a sense it was my Saint John of the Cross Dark night of the Soul experience. I felt that God had abandoned me, people would come to me with their crisis of faith and I had to dig deep to stay with them, but in doing so I became acutely aware of the fact that I shared this with them. I couldn’t hide behind my collar or the cross on my uniform as the crisis was an interruption which drove me out of my comfort zone and forced me to deal with the world that the people I minister among deal with every day.

Iraqi Police in Ramadi Escorting Civilians Across the War Zone of Route Michigan

There are those who believe that all forms of ministry are basically the same and that lessons learned are universally applicable and that somehow all ministries are proclamation oriented. Unfortunately that is not the case and one of the places that this is true is the Military Chaplain ministry. This mibnistry is much different than parish or para-church ministries and even different than other institutional ministries such as Police, Fire, Industrial or civilian health care chaplaincy. It is different in that it is more incarnation versus proclamation. We not only minster to our people but we live among them. We live the experience of those that we serve, especially in the uncertainly of war and deployments. Chaplains live in a world where we are fully military officers and fully ministers of our own church or faith tradition. As a chaplain I never lose my calling of being a priest, but I am a priest in uniform, a military professional and go where our nations send me to serve the Sailors, Marines, Soldiers and Airmen who I live among be that overseas, or in the States.

Always a Priest Eucharist with Advisers in the Far West of Al Anbar

There is always a tension in the military chaplain ministry. This is especially true when the wars that we are sent to are unpopular at home and seem to drag on without the benefit of a nice clear victory such as VE or VJ Day in World War II or the homecoming after Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There are those that oppose the military chaplaincy on theological or philosophic grounds, usually some manner of absolutist understanding of ministry, church-state relations or social justice considerations. My purpose is here not to defend military chaplain institutions against such criticism but rather to share the world and tension that military chaplains live in when our nation is engaged in unpopular which some consider unjust or illegal wars.

Isolated Base Camp for Advisers in Afghanistan

A lot of people have no “ethical” or “moral” qualms about wars that are easy to pigeonhole as just wars, especially if we win quickly and easily. It is my belief that when things go well and we have easy victories that it is easy for religious people, especially more conservative Christians to give the credit to the Lord for the “victory.” Unfortunately such “Credit” is given without them ever understanding or sometimes even caring about the human cost of war. Likewise it is easy for others to give the credit to superior strategy, weaponry or tactics to the point of denying the possibility that God’s involvement. Conversely and maybe even perversely I have heard some say that God has blessed the use of weapons or tactics that violate principles of fighting a “just war” especially that of proportionality. Such is the case in almost every war and Americans since World War Two have loved the technology of war seeing it as a way to easy and “bloodless” victory. In such an environment ministry can take on an almost “cheer-leading” dimension. It is hard to get around it, because it is a heady experience to be on a winning Army in a popular cause but I do think that many chaplains have a less “cheerleading” approach than many in conservative churches. The challenge for chaplains in such an environment is to keep our ministry of reconciliation in focus. To do so we must care for the least, the lost and the lonely and never forget the victims of war, especially the innocent and the vanquished, as well as our own wounded, killed and their families.

Iraqi Kids in Al Anbar Province, a couple of months before they could not venture outside because of insurgent attacks, children are never winners in war

We are now seeing the conflict in Iraq winding down and what until this year had been “the good war” in Afghanistan go bad and support for it decline. Strategy is being debated as how to best “win” the war in Afghanistan even as the United States withdraws from Iraq. The task of chaplains in the current war, and similar wars fought by other nations is different and really doesn’t allow for them to indulge themselves in “cheerleading.” In fact chaplains can themselves through isolation, lack of experience and fear can become more reflective and less “cheerleader” oriented the longer the war goes on without sign of appreciable progress, much less victory. They feel the onslaught of their soldiers doubts, fears as well as the loss of friends and the chapel congregation through being killed or wounded in action. This can take a terrible toll even for the most resilient of chaplain. In these wars, sometimes called counter-insurgency operations, revolutionary wars, guerilla wars or peace keeping operations, there is no easily discernible victory. These types of wars can drag on and on, sometimes with no end in sight. Since they are fought by volunteers and professionals, much of the population acts as if there is no war since it does often not affect them, while others oppose the war, all of which can affect the chaplain.

French Paratroops Landing at Dien Bien Phu

Chaplains volunteer to go with and place themselves in harms way to care for God’s people in the combat zone or far away from home. While they do this there are supporters of war as well as detractors who have no earthly clue about war or life in the military other then what they see in the media or experienced in peacetime or the cold war. Some supporters often seem more interested in political points of victory for their particular political party than for the welfare of those that are sent to fight the wars. This has been the case in about every war fought by the US since World War II. It is not a new phenomenon. Only the cast members change with the particular war.

Foreign Legion Troops in Indochina

In order to somehow make sense of going on we cannot simply think of what is politically expedient for either those who support or want to expand the war, or others who want it ended now, both of which have consequences many of which are bad. I think that we have to look at history and not just to American history to find answers, not simply answers to how to win or end the war but answers to the consequences that either course of action posits. Thus I think that we can find parallels in other militaries. I think particularly of the French professional soldiers, the paratroops, Colonials (Marines) and Foreign Legion who bore the brunt of the fighting in Indo-China. These men, not all of who were French were placed in a difficult situation by their government and alienated from their own people. In particular I think of the Chaplains, all Catholic priests save one Protestant, at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, the epic defeat of the French forces that sealed the end of their rule in Vietnam. The Chaplains there went in with the Legion and Paras. They endured all that their soldiers went through while ministering the Sacraments and helping to alleviate the suffering of the wounded and dying. Their service is mentioned in nearly every account of the battle. During the campaign which lasted 6 months from November 1953 to May 1954 these men observed most of the major feasts from Advent through the first few weeks of Easter with their soldiers in what one author called “Hell in a Very Small Place.”

French Troops on the March in Indochina

One author describes Easter 1954: “In all Christendom, in Hanoi Cathedral as in the churches of Europe the first hallelujahs were being sung. At Dienbeinphu, where the men went to confession and communion in little groups, Chaplain Trinquant, who was celebrating Mass in a shelter near the hospital, uttered that cry of liturgical joy with a heart steeped in sadness; it was not victory that was approaching but death.” A battalion commander went to another priest and told him “we are heading toward disaster.” (The Battle of Dienbeinphu, Jules Roy, Carroll and Graf Publishers, New York, 1984 p.239) This can be a terrible burden for the Padre who cares for such men. Ministry in such places is truly an incarnational experience because there is no place to hide and the chaplain is as vulnerable as his flock. It is the ministry that places us “in the valley of the shadow of death” where as the Psalmist says we are “to fear no evil for you are with us.” It is the ministry of Good Friday where to all appearances seems that God has abandoned the field and evil has won.

French Surrender at Dien Bien Phu

Of course one can find examples in American military history such as Bataan, Corregidor, and certain battles of the Korean War to understand that our ministry can bear fruit even in tragic defeat. At Khe Sahn in our Vietnam War we almost experienced a defeat on the order of Dien Bien Phu. It was the tenacity of the Marines and tremendous air-support that kept our forces from being overrun.

Legionaries in Algeria, many French Troops Went from one War in Indochina to another in Algeria only to have the De Gaulle Government throw the Military Victory Away and Cause a Crisis

You probably wonder where I am going with this, back when I first drafted this year and a half ago I wondered too. But here is where I think I am going. We live in difficult of times at home and in Afghanistan. It home we are mired in an economic crisis clouded by deep political division. In Afghanistan we are engaged in a hard fight where units we are taking casualties and the mission is being debated. Sometimes to those deployed and those who returned that their sacrifice is not fully appreciated by a nation absorbed with its own issues. This of course is not universally true as there a people of all political viewpoints who care for the welfare and attempt to ensure that those who serve are not abandoned as those men who served in Vietnam. I think that part of the feeling comes from the presentation of the war by the media which tends to focus only on the negative outcomes and not positive things that our soldiers accomplish. That can be discouraging to the men and women on the ground. One of the most difficult things for me upon my return was to see the bitterness a division in the American people and political establishments and becoming quite depressed about it. I stopped watching the perpetual news cycle and listening to talk radio. The hatred, ignorance and crassness of it all was disheartening and I refuse to take any part in something that is so hate filled, power driven and unredemptive.

USMC Training Team With Afghan Troops

For the French the events and sacrifices of their soldiers during Easter 1954 was page five news in a nation that was more focused on the coming summer. This is very similar to our circumstances today because it often seems that own people are more concerned about economic considerations and the latest in entertainment news than what is going on in Iraq or Afghanistan. The French soldiers in Indo-china were professionals and volunteers, much like our own troops today. Their institutional culture and experience of war was not truly appreciated by their own people. Nor was it fully appreciated by their government which sent them into a war against an opponent that would sacrifice anything and take as many years as needed to secure their aim. At the same time their own countrymen were unwilling to make the sacrifices needed to win and in fact had already given up their cause as lost. The sacrifice of French soldiers would be lost on their own people and their experience ignored by the United States when we sent major combat formations to Vietnam in the 1960s. In a way the French professional soldiers of that era have as well as British colonial troops before them have more in common with our force than the citizen soldier heroes of the “Greatest Generation.” Most of the “Greatest Generation” was citizen soldiers who did their service in an epic war and then went home to build a better country as civilians. We are now a professional military fighting unpopular wars and that makes our service just a bit different than those who went before us. I related to the French troops who fought in Indochina and Algeria as well as our own Vietnam Vets than I do to others. These is a kinship among us that goes beyond nationality, politics or age.

This is the world in which military chaplains’ minister. It is a world of volunteers who serve with the highest ideals, men and women who enlist knowing that they will be deployed and quite likely end up in a combat zone. We go where we are sent, even when it is unpopular. It is here that we make our mark; it is here that we serve our Soldiers, Sailors, Marines and Airmen. Our duty is to bring God’s grace, mercy and reconciliation to men and women, and their families who may not see it anywhere else. It is a ministry of reconciliation by the means of incarnation. Many times those outside the military do not understand this. It is a different world full of contradictions and ambiguity. Such situations even impact the families of those who serve.

When my dad was serving in Vietnam in 1972 I had a Sunday school teacher tell me that he was a “Baby Killer.” It was a Catholic Priest and Navy Chaplain who showed me and my family the love of God when others didn’t. As the country builds to the 2010 mid-term Congressional elections I anticipate that people from all parts of the political spectrum will offer criticism or support to our troops or the war in order to bolster their election chances which do not always coincide with what is in the best interest of the troops or the mission. Chaplains cannot be concerned about the politics nor even the policy as our duty is to be there as Priests, Ministers, Rabbis and Imams for those that we serve. We cannot afford to allow ourselves to be discouraged in caring for our men and women and their families because of all the strife in the body politic. In addition we must continue on because most churches and other religious communities, even those supportive of our troops really don’t understand the nature of our service or the culture that we represent. We live in a culture where the military professional is in a distinct minority group upholding values of honor, courage, sacrifice and duty which may be foreign or archaic to many Americans, or for those countries with troops and chaplains in Afghanistan or Iraq. We are called to that ministry in victory and if it happens someday, defeat. In such circumstances we must always remain faithful to God as well as to those that we serve.

For those interested in the French campaign in Indo-China it has much to teach us. Good books on the subject include The Last Valley by Martin Windrow, Hell in a Very Small Place by Bernard Fall; The Battle of Dienbeinphu by Jules Roy; and The Battle of Dien Bien Phu- The Battle America Forgot by Howard Simpson. For a history of the whole campaign, read Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall. I always find Fall’s work poignant, he served as a member of the French Resistance in the Second World War and soldier later and then became a journalist covering the Nurnberg Trials and both the French and American wars in Vietnam and was killed by what was then known as a “booby-trap” while covering a platoon of U.S. Marines.

There is a picture that has become quite meaningful to me called the Madonna of Stalingrad. It was drawn by a German chaplain-physician named Kurt Reuber at Stalingrad at Christmas 1942 during that siege. He drew it for the wounded in his field aid station, for most of whom it would be their last Christmas. The priest would die in Soviet captivity and the picture was given to one of the last officers to be evacuated from the doomed garrison. It was drawn on the back of a Soviet map and now hangs in the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Berlin where it is displayed with the Cross of Nails from Coventry Cathedral as a symbol of reconciliation. I have had it with me since before I went to Iraq. The words around it say: “Christmas in the Cauldron 1942, Fortress Stalingrad, Light, Life, Love.” I am always touched by it, and it is symbolic of God’s care even in the midst of the worst of war’s suffering and tragedy.

Madonna of Stalingrad

So as you can see I have done a lot of reflecting over the past year and a half. It has been a spiritual journey, an intellectual and academic journey and a personal journey of slowly healing and recovery. I have gone through some changes in the process which have not been easy, but certainly have deepened my faith even as I struggled and made me much more appreciative of life, love and peace.

I write in order to wrestle with what I have mentioned here, and I try to write something every night. I can full agree with Father Henri Nouwen in his book Beyond the Mirror as to the purpose that writing serves me in my journey.

“These many interruptions calling me ‘beyond’ compelled me to write. First of all, simply because writing seemed to be the only way for me not to lose heart to in the frightening and often devastating interruptions and to hold onto my innermost self while moving from known to unknown places. Writing helped me to remain somewhat focused amid the turmoil and discern the small guiding voice of God’s Spirit in the midst of the cacophony of distracting voices. But there is a second motivation. Somehow I believed that writing was the one way tom let something of lasting value emerge from the pains and fears of my little, quickly passing life. Each time life required me to take a new step into unknown spiritual territory, I felt a deep, inner urge to tell my story to others- perhaps as a need for companionship but maybe, too, out of an awareness that my deepest vocation is to be a witness of the glimpses of God I have been allowed to catch.”

Slowly Getting Better

I am healing though it has been at times painful, but faith is returning and I can say that though it has not been easy it has been worth it. I do hope that what little I do in my work and in my writing will be of help to those who struggle and those who recognize their own need for reconciliation, healing who need to hope again no matter who they are and what their circumstance.

Peace,

Padre Steve+

The Effects of Counter-Insurgency Operations on U.S. and French Forces in Vietnam and Algeria and Implications for Afghanistan

padresteve — Mon, 28 Sep 2009 04:38:56 +0000

1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment in Indo-China

Introduction

Primitive but Effective- Viet Minh Supply Column The French Could Never Stop them

There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth’s About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore’s We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy’s The Battle of Dien Bein Phu and General Paul Aussaresses’ The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, many only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience can skew objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.

Another source is official histories. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be. Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall’ Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.

Isolated and Besieged Dien Bien Phu

Another source is the writings of participants who critically examine their participation in the wars. Many of these, French and American provide insights into the minds of leaders who are reflective and critically examine what happened to their military institutions in these wars. The best of these is French Colonel David Galula whose books Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice provide first-hand accounts of the subject combined with critical reflection. Galula’s works have been important to John Nagl, General David Petreus and others who helped write the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Other sources, both online and print, such as RAND, provide excellent analysis of selected topics within the scope of this essay, especially COIN.

Effects of Insurgencies on the Armies that Fought Them

The conflicts in French Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam had major effects on the French and American military institutions. These effects can be classified in a number of ways. First, the manner in which each military waged war, including tactics and weapons systems was changed. The use of airpower, especially helicopters and use of Riverine forces provided an added dimension of battlefield mobility but did not bring victory. As John Shy and Thomas Collier noted regarding the French in Indo-China: “French mobility and firepower could take them almost anywhere in Vietnam, but they could not stay, and could show only wasted resources and time for their efforts.”[1] The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the “legacy of conventional thinking” slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that “the population was the objective.”[2] Krepinevich notes that “any changes that might have come about through the service’s experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies.”[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people.

Foreign Legion in Algeria

Surrender at Dien Bien Phu

In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an “Air ground base” deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap’s forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the “air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories.”[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed Riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]

The most inventive French creation was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide “permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas” to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that “the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth.”[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border “for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men.”[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 “If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves.”[14]

The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, the “Army concept.” [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions “based upon the U.S. divisional force structure.”[17] ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced.”[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of troops poured in, American counterinsurgency was costly. It was “almost a purely military approach”[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Massive firepower was the means “utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count.”[20] In the end the American defeat was a “failure of understanding and imagination.”[21] The one shining moment was the Marine Corps experimentation with “Combined Action Program” platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results “in eliminating local guerillas”[22] but was killed by the Army.

For both the French and Americans these wars tore the heart out of their armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government’s “lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable.”[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called ‘the Centurions” had been turned into liars.”[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their “independent” nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. “They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: ‘Nous sommes trahis!’-‘We are betrayed.’”[25]

Joint US-ARVN Operation

The U.S. Army returned to a country deeply divided and Vietnam veterans remained ostracized until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts “in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned.”[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007.

Conclusions and Possibilities

For the Americans, the debacle continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Incompetent leaders kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. It took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.

In Iraq the U.S. adapted, albeit belatedly to the nature of the insurgency and took advantage of Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) over-reach in the manner that they abused the Iraqi people. The situation turned dramatically in September of 2007 when Al Qaeda killed the most prominent Sunni Sheik outside of Ramadi. The Sheik had begun to work with Americans on security issues and his death turned much of the Sunni populace in Al Anbar and other provinces against AQI for the first time allying them with the Sh’ia dominated government. Changing focus the U.S. Forces focused on safeguarding the population and building up the capabilities of Iraqi forces. Within months because of the increased security and stability in Al Anbar the U.S. Marine trained and Iraqi led forces of the 1^st Iraqi Division were able to be moved to Basra where they retook the city from insurgent forces and to Diyala where they helped the government gain the upper hand. Success in Iraq did not come easy, American forces suffered their greatest losses since the Vietnam War in the cities, villages and countryside of Iraq. The U.S. is now in the process of drawing down as the Iraqis take over their own security. The process is not perfect as there still tension between Sunni and Sh’ia factions as well as Kurds and other minority ethnic groups. However it is still going better than most experts predicted.

The Author and Advisors with Iraqi Border Troops near Syria

Afghanistan is another matter. After early success in overthrowing the Taliban and isolating Al Qaeda the Americans and NATO pretty ran a status quo operation attempting to legitimize the Karzai government, eliminate the Opium poppy crops and establish government presence and security in outlying areas. There was a problem in this; both the Taliban and Al Qaeda used border sanctuaries in Pakistan and financial support from worldwide Moslem groups to continue the fight. As Al Qaeda and the Taliban built themselves up the Afghan government lost support. This loss of support was in large part due to rampant government corruption as well as to the perception of U.S. and NATO forces being occupiers and not liberators. This perception of the U.S. and NATO forces was in large part because they had ignored the lessons of French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq. Isolated from the population the bulk of NATO forces performed in a reactionary manner and often used aircraft and artillery to respond to Taliban forces often killing non-combatants by mistake. Each time this happened, the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders used the results to further bolster their image and portray the allies as the oppressors. As the Taliban took back much of the country they also returned to oppressive means to subdue the population by fear and intimidation.

Taliban Insurgents

The new American commander, General Stanley McChrystal has asked for more forces in order to run a proper counter-insurgency campaign which focuses on the security of the population to isolate the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Whether General McChrystal gets his forces and whether they are enough to turn the tide before all political and public support in the U.S. and NATO countries is lost is another matter. Right now the situation is tenuous at best. There are means to win this war despite the history of Afghanistan which suggests that this is not possible. The key is he Afghan population, if they believe that the U.S. and NATO are n their side, that we respect them, their culture, religion and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are the real oppressors the war can be won. This requires patience, forethought and deliberate measures to secure the population, build up a government that they can trust and de-legitimatize Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If that does not happen, the U.S. and NATO run the risk of repeating the story of the French in Indo-China. Unlike AQI and Iraqi insurgents the Taliban are very capable of running military operations capable of defeating small to medium sized units in isolated locations. They know the terrain, often have the support of the people, are highly mobile and not dependant on roads and can mass quickly at critical points. Last year the Taliban launched a large scale assault on an American COP which came close to overrunning it. They were repelled with heavy casualties but the incident demonstrated a capability that is growing. What I would be concerned about is the total destruction of an isolated post or a convoy which could be used to demoralize western nations. While I do not think that the Taliban could pull off the defeat of a major US or NATO base or force as the Viet-Minh did at Dien Bien Phu but the threat should not be minimized.

USMC Training Team in Afghanistan

How we learn the lessons of past insurgencies and revolutionary wars is important in Afghanistan. The stakes are higher than most would want to admit. A withdraw would be seen by militants outside of Afghanistan would be emboldened just as the Algerians were by the loss of the French in Indo-China. It would again provide Al Qaeda with a safe haven and secure base of operations. The stakes are high. Who knows what will happen?

Bibliography

Aussaresses, Paul, “The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture,” translated by Robert L Miller. Enigma Books, New York, 2005. Originally published in French under the title of “SERVICES SPECIAUX Algerie 1955-1957” Perrin 2001

Fall, Bernard B. “The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place.” Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1^st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967

Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961

Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006

Galula, David. “Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958.” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA 2006. Originally published by RAND 1963

Hackworth, David H. and Sherman, Julie. “About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior,” a Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, New York. 1989

Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006

Karnow, Stanley. “Vietnam, a History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War,” The Viking Press, New York, 1983

Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986

Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984

Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992

Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005

Nolan, Keith William. “The Battle for Hue: Tet 1968,” Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1983

Pottier, Philippe (2005) Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War, Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874

Roy, Jules. “The Battle of Dien Bien Phu” Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York.

Sheehan, Neil. “A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam,” Vintage Books, a division of Random House, New York, 1989

Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. “Revolutionary War”in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,” Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986

Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994

Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993

Trinquier, Roger. “Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,” translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title “La Guerre Moderne” by Editions Table Ronde.

West, F.J. “The Village,” Pocket Books, a division of Simon and Schuster, New York. 1972.

Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004

[2] Galula, David. Counterinsurgency in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2006. First published by RAND in 1963. p.244

[3] Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986 p.213

[4] Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006 p 41

[5] Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27

[6] Ibid. p.33

[7] Horn. p.100.

[8] Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004 p.63

[11] Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171

[13] Windrow. p.652.

[15] Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54

[16] Krepinevich. p.213

[17] Ibid. p.24

[18] Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005 p.138

[19] Shy. p.856

[20] Krepinevich. p.202

[21] Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993 p.314

[22] Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984 p.555

[23] Windrow. p.655

[24] Ibid. p.657

[25] Ibid.

[26] Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992 p. xx

[27] Krepinevich. p.275

[28] Ibid. p.274

the easily led...

4854derrida — Sat, 12 Sep 2009 19:11:42 +0000

(“The polity in place here is not, in fact, a democracy but, rather, it is what Dr. Robert Dahl [Yale] aptly describes as a POLYARCHY, i.e., that system of governance comprised of elite decision-making, followed by mere ratification—by the working class electorate—of what has, essentially, already been decided.”)

In a recent interview, Bill Moyers adduced the following to his doting host:

[Moyers]: “I was there when Kennedy chose to send advisers to Vietnam – and was there when LBJ escalated – they both acted from NOBLE INTENTIONS – actually they did – they wanted to stop Communism in Asia and spread democracy – but the advisers soon became bombers and the bombers became grounds troops and pretty soon, it became a regional crusade – and 12 years later, billions of dollars, and millions of lives later, including 60,000 American troops – we lost – BECAUSE THE US IS NOT GOOD AT THAT SORT OF THING” [stress added].

Well, gee willikers Bill, we’re sure trying our darndest, though, to get real good at it, aren’t we? How about the facts Bill—finally, fifty-five years on.

The French colonial incursion into the area met with defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and US engagement resumed imperial aggression—but not before the Geneva Accords mandating a free election had been quashed by US/Diem militaristic aggression. The “they” who asked us to be there amounted to elitist (read: financially viable) land-owning beneficiaries of French patronage, politically connected to the corrupt puppet state.

That, in fact, was the vital, core “truth” of US state/corporate journalism-as-stenography: a vague “they” want us to be there, proffered for decades to a gullible American public ever-ready to shore up the US-exceptionalism myth. That was it, Bill—full stop. Wake up, dear.

You say that you were there, Bill? What, then, did you have to say about Kennedy’s—or, rather, his clients’, the Diem regime’s—”strategic hamlets,” essentially US/client regime concentration camps?:

“The Strategic Hamlet Program was exposed as an almost complete failure in the aftermath of the November 1, 1963 coup that left Diem and his brother Nhu murdered. US officials discovered, for example, that only 20% of the 8600 hamlets that the Diem regime had reported ‘Complete’ met the minimum American standards of security and readiness. The situation had passed the point of possible recovery. The U.S. government never officially acknowledged the end of the Strategic Hamlet Program, but it quickly disappeared from diplomatic correspondence in early 1964….” [Wiki].

Or—and since you were there—were you, in fact, forthcoming in your condemnation of genocidal military “actions” like Operation Speedy Express, or Operation Wheeler Wallawa, which indiscriminate actions heedlessly bombing non-combatants—i.e., civilian sites—all in the service of “pacification”?

“Operation Wheeler/Wallawa was…an offensive…of which the My Lai Massacre by a section led by Lt William Calley was part” [Wiki].

“The commander of the 9th Division, Julian Ewell, was allegedly known to be obsessed with body counts and favorable kill ratios and said ‘the hearts and minds approach can be overdone’….The operation caused controversy when in 1972 Kevin Buckley, writing for Newsweek in the article ‘Pacification’s Deadly Price,’ questioned the spectacular ratio of U.S dead to claimed NLF (Vietcong) as well the low number of weapons recovered, and suggested that perhaps over 5,000 were innocent civilians….In an article in the December 1, 2008 Nation magazine, ‘A My Lai a Month,’ author Nick Turse asserts Operation Speedy Express was a deliberate attempt by the military to massacre civilians” [Wiki].

[Moyers]: [Kennedy and LBJ] wanted to stop Communism in Asia and advance democracy.”

One looks for any sense of ironic detachment in that statement—in vain. One of the minimal elements of which a democracy is comprised is that of a free and fair election. If the VAST majority of the people choose, in an open and above-board election, to enact some mode of communism, then we, as meddlers in that electoral process, are hindering the democratic process of which we claim—quite hypocritically—to be guardians.

Further, Bill, the polity in effect here at Empire is most assuredly NOT a democracy, in which case there seems to be no point in “spreading” that which the Founding Investors avoided like the plague. For example, we most certainly cannot claim for ourselves that a free and open electoral process obtains in America. It is, in its entirety, a corporate affair, i.e., the financially viable of Wall Street, K Street, the Fortune 500 CEOs, and the Banks decide who it is that will oversee their prerogatives for the four-year period of presidential office.

The polity in place here is not, in fact, a democracy but, rather, it is what Dr. Robert Dahl (Yale) aptly describes as a POLYARCHY, i.e., that system of governance comprised of elite decision-making, followed by mere ratification—by the working class electorate—of what has, essentially, already been decided.

What the US would like to “spread” throughout the world is a corporate-determined polity comprised of predatory capitalists and their slave-worker majority, i.e., a collective of workers bereft of union arbitration for a living wage. What we fear is not the ideological import of “communism” per se, which, in its purest guise is a collective of workers who own the means of production.

The only “freedom” our State officials have in mind is CORPORATE freedom, e.g., a rentier and Federal Reserve-controlled locus of activity “free” of oversight, controls, etc. Vietnam’s 1954 election represented a polity beyond the reach of US military/investor interests since one of the first “official” acts would have been to return what had been annexed to the exploited, indigent majority. The thought of that kind of equity existing beyond our control—and, more importantly, in full view of its own rank and file—was more than DC./Pentagon policy makers would brook.

[Moyers]: “I was there…”

You were a witness. Quite so. A problem inheres, though, as you were a SILENT witness in the face of US militaristic aggression—a “sin of omission,” as it were, in the face of what Robert Jackson—and, later, Telford Taylor—described as the supreme war crime. WE are war criminals. Hard to swallow, isn’t it Bill? Once again: the United States of America has engaged in militaristic actions which—according to OUR OWN JURISTS overseeing Nuremburg—can properly be described as war crimes. And, that corporate/military aggression ethic obtains—today.

Moyers’ apologetics for our preeminent role in that holocaust are ludicrous—and worse—in fact, in light of all the emergent, substantiated evidence since, e.g., My Lai. It’s a little too late in the day for half-truths, i.e., let us be careful to whom it is that we tacitly apply the label “venerable.” Owing to Empire, and, in fact, from its very spawning until today, far too much blood—CLASS blood, i.e., the blood of the poor—has been spilled for “cherished beliefs” to go unquestioned.

Robert Dahl

Participatory democracy

Greenwald: Moyers

Operation Speedy Express

Strategic Hamlet Program

(revision: 10/03)

Tres días de odisea en la carretera

Margara — Sun, 16 Aug 2009 08:14:05 +0000

Creímos que cruzar la frontera de Vietnam-Laos por Tay Trang iba a ser relativamente fácil. Es una frontera abierta desde hace sólo dos años, que conecta el norte de Vientam con el norte de Laos, muy conveniente para los viajeros que tras visitar Sapa se quieren adentrar en Laos.

Para llegar desde Sapa (Vietnam) a Luang Prabang (Laos), se necesitan 3 días y 3 noches en autobús:

Día 1. Salida desde Sapa hasta Dien Bien Phu, el pueblo vientamita más cercano a la frontera. 10 horas de autobús.

El recorrido fue “poco accidentado”. Sólo éramos 36 personas en un minibús de 20 plazas (de las cuales 12 vomitaron durante el recorrido), y tuvimos que parar un par de veces a esperar que las escavadoras recogieran desprendimientos de la montaña que habían caído en la carretera. El precipicio que en todo momento teníamos a 1 metro del autobús no daba tampoco mucha seguridad…

Día 2. Salida desde Dien Bien Phu hasta Muang Khua (Laos).

El autobús salió a las 5.30 y a las 6.00 pararon supuestamente para “breakfast”. Al final, el desayuno consistía en cargar el autobús durante una hora con infinitos kilos de telas, como si de un camión se tratase. Todo por no pagar las tasas en la frontera.

Finalmente llegamos hasta la frontera con Laos, donde se puede tramitar el visado sobre la marcha, y encontramos a 8 portugueses que estaban intentando cruzar la frontera por su cuenta. Alquilaron un coche con conductor en Dien Bien Phu y el tío les dejó tirados en la frontera, y ahora tenían que recorrer a pie los 6Km que hay entre el puesto vietnamita y el lao. En Vietnam los autobuses nunca se cosideran llenos, así que el conductor encantado de la vida los metió a todos en el autobús. Es decir, ya éramos como unas 30 personas, más maletas, más infinitos kilos de tela…

Tras el paso de frontera vino lo peor. No había carretera, era un camino ancho. Lleno de barro. El autobús se quedó atascado unas 4 veces en el barro y todos tuvimos que ayudar a sacarlo. Incluso cruzamos ríos… Forzaron tanto el autobús que quemaron los discos de embrague.

Una vez en esta situación, hubo gente que decidió emprender camino a pie porque supuestamente sólo quedaban 8Km para llegar. Nosotros decidimos quedarnos en el autobús porque aquí el tema de las distancias no lo tienen muy controlado, y cuando dicen 8 pueden ser 15 ó incluso 20.

El conductor y unos cuantos más vietnamitas no paraban de trabajar en arreglar el autobús, pero nuestras esperanzas de que lo arreglaran se desvanecieron cuando vimos el motor ENTERO y un millón de piezas tirados en la tierra. Esperamos y esperamos en el camino en medio de la selva, unas 7 horas, a ver si algún milagro ocurría. Teníamos el consuelo de estar bien acompañados por un londinense, una actriz portugesa, un hippie italiano y un padre de familia alemán de unos 50 que viajaba con su familia, y que se había quedado con su hija pequeña de 12 años para protegerla.

Y el milagro ocurrió sobre las 11 de la noche. La gente que había ido a pie (que al final tuvieron que pagar a motoristas para que les llevaran al pueblo porque estaba a 20 y pico kilómetros) habían conseguido pagar al dueño de un camión enorme para que nos recogiera. Cogimos las maletas de todo el mundo y nos metimos en el camión de “rescate”. Al conductor y sus ayudantes los dejamos allí mientras metían el motor de nuevo en su sitio. Seguramente pasaron la noche allí…

En definitiva, tardamos 18 horas en recorrer los 85Km que separan estos dos pueblos… Consejo para cualquiera que esté pensando en aventurarse a cruzar esta frontera: no lo hagáis!!

Día 3. Muang Khua – Udomxai (3 horas) y Udomxai – Luang Prabang (6 horas).

Todo fue sobre ruedas este día. Todos los “guiris” ya éramos una piña después de todos los malos ratos que habíamos pasado los días anteriores (con muchos de ellos llevábamos viajando desde Sapa), y lo pasamos genial.

Y llegamos a Luang Prabang después de 3 días de viaje sin parar!

That defining moment in time...

peedeel — Mon, 15 Jun 2009 10:56:04 +0000

“Mon Dieu!”

cried the gruff, angry voice of Lieutenant General Henri Navarre, Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, when he learned that Dien Bien Phu was surrounded, cut-off, and facing defeat. The impossible had happened. General Giap, Commander of the Viet-Minh forces opposing the French, had moved just under 50,000 combat troops with artillery onto the heights encircling the valley…something French intelligence had thought impossible! Over 55,000 Viet-Minh working night and day ensured an unbroken chain of supply to Giap’s front line forces, as they systematically reduced the French garrison to bloody tatters.

The French had totally underestimated their enemy. Their defeat ultimately was the death knell of French involvement in Indochina.

Is it not strange, how a single moment in history, a solitary decision taken (like the decision to occupy the very remote site of Dien Bien Phu), can change everything for all time?

For example, it was only with the recent opening of the Moscow archives that we learned Stalin, in the first few days after the Nazi invasion of the USSR, summoned Beria and Molotov to a meeting where he suggested they make peace with Hitler – no matter what the cost, or humiliation. He was prepared to surrender much of the Ukraine, Belorussia and all the Baltic states, in exchange for peace.

So, they summoned the Bulgarian Ambassador, Ivan Stamenov. He must act as intermediary to broker a deal with the Nazis. Surprisingly he refused, telling the shocked trio “Even if you retreat to the Urals, you’ll still win in the end!”

So one man’s intransigence, changed history. Because of Stamenov, Stalin ordered the USSR to fight on. Had the USSR surrendered during those first weeks of war, what effect might that have had on the future of Europe or the World?

Of course, Stalin’s panic was reinforced by Nazi propaganda. German arms had been victorious everywhere. He saw himself surrounded by defeat. Therefore he over estimated the ability of Nazi Germany to inflect a final defeat on the USSR.

Similarly, French arrogance led to them occupying a remote outpost hard to supply or maintain, because they did not believe the Viet-Minh capable of doing what they eventually did. The French totally underestimated their opponents, with fatal results.

The conflict between Nazi Germany and the USSR was a clash of opposing ideologies. It took on the mantle of a “Holy War”, the Teutonic Knights attempting to eradicate the Bolshevik Menace, while the Soviets defended Mother Russia, before eventually taking the conflict to the fascist homeland, absorbing Eastern Europe in the process.

The French in Indochina with their imperialistic mind-set, came up against a heady mix of Nationalism and Communism which eventually derailed them. For Giap and the Viet-Minh the liberation of their country and the creation of a socialist republic was nothing less than a religious quest. The French from day one were out of their league – they did not understand the forces they were up against, and consequently they got a good arsekicking.

Another defining moment on the world stage was the introduction of “Glastnost” by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR during the 1980’s. This was at least in part a reaction to criticism of the soviet cult of personality and the failure of Leninist Ideology. Increased political freedom saw the rise of nationalism, and the release of those ethnic tensions which the Soviet regime had violently repressed. So it came to pass that “Glastnost” and “Perestroika” were the final nails in the coffin of the Soviet Empire.

The Cold War ended. The threat of communism dissipated. The forces of capitalism had won a great victory…or rather (more accurately) communism had imploded, leaving capitalism unfettered to exploit almost the whole world!

Funnily enough, the recent economic problems with the banking sector were predicted by Karl Marx. What Marx didn’t foresee, was the intervention of the state to prevent the collapse of the banks. Where he saw economic collapse, he never imagined that nation after nation would step in and shore-up capitalism. Where he predicted (with Friedrich Engels) that socialism would evolve into communism where:

“class distinctions have disappeared, and all production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole nation, the public power will lose its political character.”

He did not understand that in accepting political power as the organisation of power of one class for oppressing another, he had only a small part of the overall equation.

And so the end of communism left a big hole in the social fabric of the world. Where did one turn when confronted by exploitation and oppression? Easy. Radical Islam stepped neatly into the ideological vacuum left by the dismemberment of the USSR. Where once the almost “religious” mantra of Karl Marx and his disciples provided hope and a channel for political ambition and aspiration, now the radical cleric uses the message of the prophet Mohammed for much the same ends – all of which are “political”! – hence the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s global vision – the death of capitalism, the eradication of Israel, and the founding of a new caliphate.

The present UK government provides subsidies for training courses in Islamic theology, but not for those in Christian or Jewish (or any other sort of) theology.

Wonder why?

Fear?

Asesino sin rostro: Chacal, de Fred Zinnemann

39escalones — Fri, 29 May 2009 00:01:39 +0000

- Me parece que le confunden con De Gaulle.

- ¿De Gaulle? Pero si ni siquiera ha estado en esta guerra…

Kelly’s heroes (Los violentos de Kelly). Brian G. Hutton (1970).

Francia, 1963. El imperio colonial francés se ha desmoronado. Argelia, joya de las posesiones francesas y el último vestigio de grandezas pasadas con que contrarrestar una realidad histórica y política que nos dice que las veleidades imperiales de Napoleón III y sus sucesores, monarcas o Presidentes, no otorgaron a Francia más dominios que aquellos pedazos de tierra prácticamente estériles desechados por el colonialismo británico, se ha independizado con la connivencia de las autoridades francesas, hartas de la larga y cruenta guerra que libran en tierras africanas desde 1954 y de dos décadas de continuos enfrentamientos bélicos (1954 es el mismo año del desastre francés de Dien Bien Phu en Vietnam y de la pérdida de Indochina como colonia tras otra guerra de nueve años después de la ocupación japonesa durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial). Los franceses han vivido en guerra prácticamente desde 1914, y la sociedad está fracturada. Argelia será el detonante de una división que perdura hasta hoy. Mientras gran parte de la sociedad francesa mira hacia dentro de sí misma buscando los valores, principios y fundamentos que la retroalimenten como democracia y que darán como resultado un lustro después el fenómeno de mayo del 68, la derecha más conservadora, la ultraderecha y el reconvertido fascismo de la época de Pétain, se resisten a abandonar la época de pompa, fanfarria y oropeles, promulgan la grandeza de Francia en el contexto mundial y culpan a De Gaulle, el “héroe” de la liberación del yugo nazi y de la tragedia colaboracionista (pese a contar con tan pocos méritos bélicos como apunta el diálogo que abre este artículo) para la mayor parte de los franceses, adversario ya desde entonces para la extrema derecha, entregada de buena gana a un servilismo criminal bajo el mando alemán que incluyó la deportación de ciudadanos franceses a los campos de exterminio y la presencia de tropas francesas con uniforme alemán en las campañas de Rusia o en la última defensa de Berlín, de la decadencia de Francia como portadora de valores eternos ligados al catolicismo y al imperio. Muchos de estos descontentos, germen de lo que después será el Frente Nacional de Jean Marie Le Pen, se agrupan bajo el símbolo de la Cruz de Lorena y las siglas O.A.S. (Organisation de l’Armée Secrète), grupo paramilitar integrado por miembros en activo o en la reserva del ejército y los cuerpos de seguridad que durante los años sesenta cometerá diversos actos terroristas tanto en Francia como en Argelia. Su principal objetivo no es otro que el, para ellos, responsable de todos los males de Francia, Charles De Gaulle, y realizarán varios intentos para acabar con su vida.

Este es el contexto inicial de Chacal, película del gran cineasta Fred Zinnemann (Sólo ante el peligro, De aquí a la eternidad), producción británica dirigida en 1973 y basada en el best seller (entonces esta literatura aún era digna) de Frederick Forsyth. Chacal (Edward Fox), personaje cercano en su concepción al famoso asesino a sueldo conocido como “Carlos”, es un meticuloso, implacable e infabible asesino internacional especializado en encargos de índole política. Nadie conoce su rostro ni su verdadera identidad y gracias a su camaleónica habilidad para cambiar de aspecto y a la inagotable reserva de documentación falsa con que cuenta, puede moverse por todo el mundo a voluntad sin despertar sospechas. La O.A.S., que ha fracasado en varios intentos de asesinar a De Gaulle, fracasos que además le han costado el fusilamiento de alguno de sus miembros más laureados (el personaje de Jean Sorel -sí, el mismo que petardea con un Alfredo Landa de peluca rubia y amanerado proceder en No desearás al vecino del quinto-, que pronuncia la lapidaria frase “ningún soldado francés levantará su fusil contra mí” justo antes de ser liquidado por un pelotón de soldados por supuesto franceses), le convoca en Roma para negociar la contratación de sus servicios. Esta vez la operación parece ser cosa hecha: la novia del oficial fusilado (Delphine Seyrig, habitual de la etapa francesa de Buñuel) ha entrado en contacto y se ha convertido en amante de un miembro del gabinete de seguridad de De Gaulle, y está al tanto de todos los movimientos del Presidente. Chacal accede y empieza a prepararse. Sabe que probablemente la inteligencia francesa vigila el hotel donde se produce el encuentro, pero no le preocupa. Lo suyo es desaparecer sin dejar rastro.

Absorbente, magnífica intriga internacional que nos lleva de Roma a Génova y de allí a París y a Londres, la película es un relato apasionante de la persecución por parte de las autoridades de un asesino sin rostro, capaz de camuflarse con toda credibilidad en la piel de un gigoló británico, de un profesor danés homosexual o de un anciano mutilado y condecorado en la Gran Guerra. Con las pocas pistas con las que cuenta, fruto de grabaciones ocultas y de torturas aplicadas a uno de los correos de la O.A.S. en Roma, con su instinto y su intuición como guía, el detective Lebel (Michel o Michael Lonsdale, otro actor de Buñuel en Francia) va construyendo de manera parcial, precaria, el puzzle que le lleva siempre un paso por detrás de un asesino escurridizo y vaporoso que pretende cumplir con su encargo en la celebración de la fiesta nacional francesa, durante una parada militar en la que De Gaulle, tras negarse a modificar su agenda pese a saberse en grave peligro, tomará parte. Sin embargo, algunas casualidades y unos incomprensibles errores propios ponen a Chacal muy cerca, más que nunca quizá, del sabueso que le persigue.

Zinnemann maneja prodigiosamente la tensión narrativa a pesar de la larga duración del film (141 minutos), siempre creciendo a medida que Chacal se aproxima a su víctima y que la policía a su vez se va aproximando a él, pero nunca superando los límites de un clímax que está reservado al frenético desenlace final. Consigue trasladar de manera creíble y sin excentricidades tanto el mundo clandestino de los mercenarios y las redes internacionales de fabricación y tráfico de armas y documentación falsa como los entresijos políticos de un gobierno como el francés, elude la pirotecnia y la acción pura y dura queda relegada en detrimento de una apuesta clara y acertada por el suspense continuo y cada vez mayor como vehículo de la trama, sin violencia gratuita, ejercicios innecesarios de rotura de cristales y chapa, y sin casquería alguna, desde luego de manera muy distinta y superior a esa espantosa nueva versión protagonizada por Richard Gere y Bruce Willis. Adaptación fiel y sobria de la obra en que se basa, sigue siendo una de las películas de acción y suspense más importantes de la cinematografía europea, en todo equiparable a cualquier producción norteamericana de la misma época, y añade la virtud, cosa infrecuente en este tipo de productos, de contar con interpretaciones solventes que cargan a los personajes de un pasado, de un poso personal que enriquece la acción, en particular los caracteres de Fox, hombre refinado, sibarita, culto y capaz lanzado quién sabe por qué al asesinato selectivo como medio de vida, y Lonsdale, un sencillo funcionario de seguridad que pasa en unas horas de dar de comer a sus palomas a verse metido en una misión en la que la democracia de su país está en juego. Al mismo tiempo, Zinnemann escoge una estética desprovista de artificios y apuesta por una fotografía más cercana al reportaje o al documental que le permita insertar imágenes reales de actos políticos o militares celebrados en París sin saltos de calidad y sin que chirríe cromáticamente.

En suma, producción apasionante que supera su mera naturaleza de película de acción y que nos pone tras la pista de esos hombres sin nombre que, aun hoy, se venden al mejor postor para la comisión de todo tipo de actos ilegales, a veces amparados por gobiernos como sucede con los mercenarios norteamericanos en Iraq, a veces bajo cuerda poniendo sus armas al servicio del mejor postor, como los soldados de fortuna de toda Europa, incluida España, que sirvieron por dinero bajo cualquiera de las banderas de la guerra de Yugoslavia o en los conflictos africanos por las riquezas naturales. Personas que vienen de la bruma y que se arriesgan a quedar para siempre sepultados en una tumba anónima sin que nadie sepa quiénes fueron, de dónde venían, qué esperaban de la vida.

La línea McNamara (Operation PRACTICE NINE)

jesuspdlr — Sat, 09 May 2009 07:55:50 +0000

El 7 de Septiembre de 1967, en una rueda de prensa celebrada en Washington, el Secretario de Defensa de los EEUU Robert McNamara anunció el proyecto para la construcción de una barrera de anti infiltración electrónica por debajo de la Zona Desmilitarizada (DMZ), que demarcaba la frontera entre Vietnam del Norte y Vietnam del Sur.

El objetivo principal de dicha barrera sería la de alertar cuando el enemigo intentase infiltrarse por dicha zona, sirviendo de aviso a las fuerzas aéreas y a la artillería para que mediante el uso de la fuerza, lo evitaran.
Conocida desde entonces como la Línea McNamara, representó una tentativa por parte de los militares de los EEUU de combinar tecnología moderna con las más viejas técnicas bélicas.

La creación de barreras artificiales defensivas es tan antigua como la propia guerra. Hay ejemplos como la Gran Muralla China o la Muralla de Adriano en Gran Bretaña construidas para evitar las invasiones de los pueblos bárbaros.

En Vietnam, el primer uso de este tipo de defensa artificial data del año 1620 cuando la dinastía de los Nguyen construyó dos enormes barreras en el centro del país que impidieron durante siete campañas las invasiones que desde el Norte comandaba la dinastía de los Trinh.
La rivalidad entre los Nguyen y los Trinh tendrían una importancia profética, ya que estaban apoyados por las dos potencias coloniales de la época, Portugal y Holanda, situación que se repetiría durante la Guerra Fría con EEUU y la URSS, dando origen a la Guerra de Vietnam.

El Ejército Francés también fue consciente de la importancia de las barreras de los Nguyen, y durante la 1ª Guerra de Indochina tuvo en mente la creación de un sistema de defensa que separara el Norte del Sur. Sin embargo, la derrota ante el Viet Minh en Dien Bien Phu, propició los acuerdos de Ginebra y con ello el fin de la presencia militar francesa en Indochina.

Rendición francesa en Dien Bien Phu.

Las siguientes barreras artificiales dignas de mención serian sin duda, la Línea Maginot creada antes de la WWII y la Línea Morice finalizada en 1957 y que recorría las fronteras Argelinas con Tunez y Marruecos. Esta barrera estaba formada por un cercado electrificado de 2,5m y con una tensión de 5000V. A ambos lados de dicha barrera se establecieron dos campos de minas de 50m de anchura, y filas ininterrumpidas de alambre de espino.
La superioridad de las tropas francesas y el dominio aéreo hizo que los intentos del Frente de Liberación Nacional Argelino fracasaran, reduciéndose las infiltraciones en un 90%. En los primeros siete meses que la línea estuvo en funcionamiento, el FLN perdió 6.000 hombres y 4.300 armas.

Desde el comienzo de la intervención americana en Vietnam se tuvo presente que las fronteras con Laos y Vietnam del Norte eran tremendamente porosas y permitían la infiltración tanto de hombres como de suministros. La idea de la creación de una barrera artificial fue considerada por los americanos en 1958. En 1961 el Jefe Militar del Grupo Asesor, el General Lionel McGarr propuso al Secretario de Estado Robert McNamara la creación de una barrera a lo largo de la frontera Laos-Vietnam del Sur.
Otra propuesta se hizo ese mismo año a instancias de la Organización del Tratado de Asia Sudoriental (SEATO).

El General Westmoreland, jefe de fuerzas estadounidenses en Vietnam, también estaba de acuerdo en la creación de una barrera a lo largo de la DMZ y de la frontera con Laos. En 1964 propuso hacer de esta obra un proyecto de desarrollo regional, y establecer tropas a lo largo de una franja de terreno que cruzaría Laos hasta la frontera con Tailandia, país que también funcionaría como barrera. Los funcionarios de Washington no mostraron entusiasmo por este plan y fue rechazado. Se pensaba que los bombardeos acabarían con los problemas de infiltraciones.

A comienzos de 1965 se puso de manifiesto que la prudente política seguida por los americanos en Vietnam no estaba dando resultados. La reacción de la administración fue aumentar de forma notable las tropas (de 184.000 hombres a finales de 1965 a 385.000 a finales de 1966) y lanzar la Operación ROLLING THUNDER, que consistía en un bombardeo sostenido sobre Vietnam del Norte.

El presidente Jonhson junto con sus asesores analizando los objetivos a atacar.

A mediados de 1966 se concluyó que ninguna de estas políticas era eficaz y que el aumento de tropas estadounidenses había significado un aumento de las infiltraciones norvietnamitas.
El número de vuelos que se efectuaron en Rolling Thunder durante 1965 fue de 55.000 y de 148.000 en 1966. Se pasaron a lanzar de 33.000Tn de bombas a 128.000TN, y el gasto creció de los 460 millones de dólares el primer año a 1200 millones en 1966.

Los líderes militares estimaron que los EE.UU deberían intensificar drásticamente la guerra aérea y movilizar sus reservas humanas. Instaron al presidente a considerar la posibilidad de invadir Laos, Camboya y el sur de Vietnam del Norte para obligar a Hanoi a cesar su apoyo a la guerra en el Sur.

McNamara pensaba que esta escalada bélica sólo conduciría a proseguir la situación de “tablas” y a continuar con el estancamiento.
En 1966 Roger Fisher un profesor de Harvard presentó una propuesta al Subsecretario de Defensa Jonh McNaughton para hacer frente a las infiltraciones que se efectuaban a través de la ruta Ho Chi Minh, Laos y la DMZ. La propuesta era bloquear estas zonas con barreras de alta tecnología y acabar así de una vez por todas con el problema.
En Abril de 1966 McNamara elevó su propuesta a la Jason Division, un grupo formado en 1959 por el Instituto de Análisis de la Defensa y compuesto por los 45 científicos mas destacados del país.

La propuesta de Fisher era básicamente la aplicación de los conceptos tecnológicos y físicos utilizados en la línea Maurice. El trabajo encomendado a la Jason Division era el desarrollo conjunto de esas ideas junto con los más modernos dispositivos electrónicos.
En Junio de 1966 se produjo una reunión en Massachusetts entre sus miembros y representantes militares, de la Casa Blanca, del Dpto.de Estado y de CIA. El 30 de Agosto se presentó el informe definitivo al Secretario de Defensa.

Las conclusiones de la Jason Division confirmaban los estudios anteriores. Negaban la eficacia de Rolling Thunder y afirmaban que desde Julio de 1966 los bombardeos no tenían ningún efecto notorio sobre la capacidad de Hanoi de montar y apoyar operaciones militares en el Sur. Se insistía en que aunque la campaña se dilatara en el tiempo, no se cortarían las infiltraciones y señalaba que algunas evidencias indicaban un aumento de la determinación de la DRV (República Democrática de Vietnam) de seguir en guerra para obtener una eventual victoria.
Respecto a la propuesta de McNamara decidieron dividirla en dos:

1. Crear una barrera guarnecida por tropas terrestres que trascurriría por el sur de la ZDM, desde el Mar de China a Laos. Su extensión sería de unos 75 Km.
2. Crear una segunda barrera, que sustentada en operaciones aéreas en Laos interrumpiría el tráfico que discurría por el Ho-Chi-Minh.

En ambas zonas se instalarían sensores y dispositivos químicos y acústicos que se accionarían por el aviso de las “button bomblets”, pequeñas minas diseñadas para emitir sonido cuando se pisaran. También se enterrarían minas de grava, artefactos indetectables con los detectores estándar, y que desprendían pequeñas bolas de plástico invisibles para los rayos X.
Los sensores transmitirían la información a una aeronave que serviría de emisor para el ordenador central ubicado en Tailandia. De aquí, se indicaría a los cazas la situación del objetivo a atacar, usándose preferiblemente bombas de racimo conocidas como SADEYE/BLU-26B.
Las necesidades materiales para ambas barreras eran de 240.000.000 de minas de Grava, 300.000.000 botton bomblets; 120.000 bombas de racimo SADEYE, 19.200 sensores y 68 aviones de patrulla. El coste estimado total para estos componentes era 800 millones de dólares por año. La Jason Division advirtió que además sería necesario desarrollar tecnologías nuevas para ir superando la capacidad del enemigo en superar la barrera, lo que supondría una inversión de 1.600 millones para proyectos de investigación y desarrollo, además de los 600 millones para el centro de mando en Tailandia.

El General Westmoreland y los jefes militares estadounidenses mostraron poco entusiasmo tras escuchar el análisis. Pensaban que la barrera el Laos sería ineficaz sin la presencia de tropas terrestres que prestaran su apoyo, y algunas voces eran partidarias de emplear todos esos recursos en la realización de operaciones móviles.
El grupo de análisis recomendó un estudio más detenido del proyecto, pero McNamara aprobó la propuesta inicial desestimando esa solicitud.

El MACV modificó la propuesta entregada por la Jason Division, optando por crear una franja de una anchura de 600 a 1.000m totalmente limpia de vegetación. Allí se extenderían alambradas de espino, minas y “centinelas electrónicos”. Detrás de esta zona se crearían unas torres de vigilancia, guarnecidas por una serie de bunkers armados desde donde se solicitaría fuego a las bases de artillería situadas más atrás y que contarían con centenares de cañones de 90, 105,155, 175 y 203 mm.
La barrera comenzaría en Cua Viet, junto a la costa de Vietnam del Sur por debajo de la DMZ , continuaría hacia el oeste por las Bases americanas de Gio Linh, Con Thien y seguiría por la carretera 9 hasta Khe Sanh, llegando al campamento de Loring Vei en la frontera de Laos.

Tanto los elementos en la franja como su anchura variarían según las condiciones orográficas del terreno a cubrir. En toda la franja se contaría con una guarnición de 15.000 soldados survietnamitas.

Barrera terrestre:

Los Marines y las unidades de Ingenieros de la Armada (los Seabees) iniciaron la construcción de la barrera en el verano de 1967, antes incluso de que se anunciara públicamente. Aunque su nombre oficial era PROYECT NINE o DYE MARKER, la obra fue conocida como LINEA MCNAMARA.

Fotografía tomada en el verano de 1967 en la que se puede apreciar el esbozo de la barrera defensiva.

Se decidió que la construcción se llevaría a cabo en dos fases, la primera consistiría en limpiar el trayecto, instalar el sistema de obstáculos y construir algunos de los bunkers y bases de fuego artillero. La segunda fase comenzaría después del monzón, estaba prevista finalizarse en Julio de 1968 y consistiría en completar la construcción de los puntos fuertes en el oeste y los obstáculos.

En Septiembre de 1967 los norvietnamitas lanzaron la 1ª fase de su levantamiento general (cuyo culmen sería la ofensiva del Tet) mediante fuertes ataques a las posiciones de los Marines a lo largo de la DMZ.
Los Marines, además de tener la responsabilidad de la construcción de la línea McNamara debían luchar con los norvietnamitas. El entorno presente en la zona para llevar a cabo la obra de la forma planeada dejaba mucho que desear.
El general Westmoreland expresó entonces su descontento por el trabajo de los Marines, pensaba que no se le estaba dando la prioridad que su importancia operacional requería, y pidió más y mejor trabajo tanto en su ejecución como en la gestión.

En Enero de 1968 cuando la Línea McNamara debería haber estado prácticamente operativa, se comprobó que tropas de Vietnam del Norte estaban congregándose alrededor de la Base de los Marines situada en Khe Sanh. El día 29 el Presidente de la Junta de Jefes del Estado Mayor, el General Johnson Wheeler garantizó al presidente Johnson la defensa de la Base, lo que obligó al General Westmoreland a ordenar a los aviones de la 7ª Fuerza aérea el lanzamiento de los sensores a lo largo de la franja de la DMZ mas próxima a la Base. Casi inmediatamente comenzaron a indicar la actividad enemiga. Había comenzado la 2ª Fase de la Ofensiva del Tet.

El cerco a Khe Sanh terminó en Abril, y los sensores fueron objeto de grandes alabanzas. El Coronel de los Marines David Lownds manifestó que sin ellos las muertes se habrían duplicado.
Lo sucedido en Khe Sanh detuvo la construcción de la Línea McNamara. Los defensores no recibieron al enemigo en un frente amplio, lineal; más bien fueron rodeados, el enemigo atacó desde todas la direcciones.

En esta primera oportunidad se pudo comprobar que a diferencia de la escasa vegetación existente en el norte de África, la geografía de Vietnam hacía imposible sellar las fronteras con barreras electrónicas, y los sensores serían eficaces únicamente para adquirir objetivos que se aproximaran a un perímetro determinado.

Barrera antivehicular:

La ruta del Ho Chi Minh era una serie de caminos que ya habían sido utilizados por el Viet Minh como enlace de comunicaciones durante la guerra con los franceses. En 1959 se empezó a usar como línea de suministro al Frente de Liberación Nacional (FLN) en Vietnam del Sur, penetrando en las Regiones Militares I, II y III, y discurriendo por puertos de montaña, selvas tropicales y tramos fluviales.

Las operaciones de ataque iniciales fueron ejecutadas en 1964 por las Fuerzas Aéreas de Laos, tomando el relevo la US.Air Force el 14 de Diciembre de 1965 con el lanzamiento de la Operación BARREL ROLL.

Con anterioridad a 1968 el conflicto en el Sur era una guerra de guerrillas, y las tropas del Norte estaban formadas en su mayoría por el FLN y por el PAVN (People’s Army of Vietnam), los cuales requerían unas 30Tn de suministros al día.
Aunque se lanzaron operaciones aéreas para acosar al enemigo y reducir estos cargamentos, fue imposible evitar que llegaran a su destino.

Después de la Ofensiva del Tet la naturaleza de la guerra cambió, el PLAF (People Liberation Armed Forces) que eran el brazo armado de NLF quedó tremendamente diezmado, propiciando que en 1972 la presencia de tropas norvietnamitas del PAVN aumentara de forma considerable en el Sur y con ello sus necesidades logísticas.
El 31 de marzo de 1968, el Presidente Johnson anunció que la aviación estadounidense no bombardearía Vietnam del Norte, exceptuando la zona de la DMZ donde la acumulación de tropas enemigas amenazaran a las fuerzas de los EEUU y de Vietnam del Sur. Las operaciones se dirigirían principalmente hacía la ruta del Ho Chi Minh.
El número de salidas medias diarias de los cazabombarderos que se dirigían a Laos aumentó de 25 en 1965 a más de 200 en 1969.

La línea McNamara como aplicación a la táctica aérea, siguió los mismos principios ya existentes respecto al uso de la última tecnología. Allí se pudo comprobar y perfeccionar in situ los elementos de guerra electrónicos, denominados en clave WHITE IGLU, y que se ejecutarían en una franja llamada MUSCLE SHOALS.

Se utilizaron alrededor de 20.000 sensores. Los principales eran de tres tipos:

-Acoubuoy: Medía 91cms, y se lanzaba en paracaídas para que quedara colgado de los árboles.
-Spikebuoy: De 1.67m, quedaba clavado en el suelo como un dardo. Estaba dotado de una antena que quedaba camuflada en la vegetación.
-ADSID (Air-Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detector): Fue el más utilizado, se asemejaba al Spikebuoy pero sólo medía 78cms.

Podían ser lanzados desde helicópteros

O desde aviones de combate.

También se desarrolló un nuevo sistema conocido como BLACK CROW que detectaba las emisiones de los camiones, ya que el material que circulaba por el Ho Chi Minh era transportado generalmente con ellos. Este flujo podía ser reducido bien por la destrucción de la pista o bien por la de los propios convoys. Un nuevo tipo de avión fue desarrollado para esta misión, eran aviones AC-130 artillados dotados con sistemas de visión nocturna, detectores de infrarrojos y con sensores térmicos que contenían tubos catódicos que reaccionaban ante el sistema de encendido de los vehículos.

AC-130 Pave Spectre

Una vez adquiridos los objetivos, estas mortíferas aeronaves podían destruirlo con facilidad, estaban armadas con cañones automáticos PAVE SPECTRE de 40 y 20mm.
La Fuerza Aérea afirmó que un Pave Spectre armado destruyó 68 camiones en una hora y más de 10.000 durante el conflicto.

Otras mejoras incluyeron la automatización del proceso de fuego, gracias a los ordenadores de a bordo que realizaban los cálculos de balística. También se mejoró la munición para aumentar su exactitud y se utilizaron bombas guiadas por láser que podían ser lanzadas desde grandes alturas sin afectar apenas la efectividad a la hora de alcanzar al objetivo. Otras bombas “simpáticas” fueron dirigidas al objetivo por radio (BULLPUP) y por cámaras de televisión (WALLEYE).

Tras el inicio de esta campaña, el enemigo respondió con un aumento del tráfico nocturno, pero los científicos americanos lograron también avances en la precisión de la navegación en malas condiciones de visibilidad. Se utilizaron radio balizas LORAN, que informaban al piloto de su posición en relación con los lugares donde estaban situadas. También se desarrolló un sistema de guía llamado PAVE PHANTOM para efectuar bombardeos sin ver el objetivo pero que se podían lanzar en el momento justo gracias a los datos de las Loran.
Aunque este sistema no era preciso para eliminar objetivos individuales, lo era para acabar con convoys y para bloquear caminos gracias a desprendimientos.

Además de los dispositivos que permitían localizar objetivos, se desarrollaron diversos sensores que eran lanzados desde el aire sobre el Ho Chi Minh. Estos aparatos se autodestruían ante una posible manipulación y disponían de una batería que los dotaba de una vida útil de varios meses. Algunos modelos detectaban movimientos o sonidos, otros eran sensibles a objetos metálicos.
Los datos recogidos por estos sensores eran transmitidos a receptores localizados en estaciones terrestres o a bordo de aviones que siempre sobrevolaban la zona. De estas estaciones los datos eran enviados también al centro de coordinación situado en la base militar de Nakhon Phanom en Tailandia llamado Centro de Vigilancia de Infiltración (ISC).

Desde el ISC los analistas evaluaban los informes. En unos cinco minutos ya se podía indicar a las fuerzas aéreas la situación, velocidad y trayecto seguido presumiblemente por el convoy. Al llegar éste a la zona prevista para el ataque, la munición era lanzada automáticamente.

El proyecto Igloo White estuvo operativo desde 1968 hasta finales de 1972. La cantidad de camiones destruidos aumentó desde los 5.500 el primer año hasta los 12.000 de 1971. Ese año se calcula que sólo el 20% de las provisiones militares que entraron en el Ho Chi Minh llegaron a su destino, convirtiéndose el camino en un gran basurero lleno de restos de vehículos, bombas, minas antipersona y polvo en suspensión.

Las operaciones cesaron en Diciembre de 1972. Las razones dadas eran las prometedoras perspectivas de alto el fuego y su alto costo. Además, el PAVN había bombardeado Saigón en Diciembre de 1971, representando este hecho para el presidente Nixon una violación de los acuerdos de alto el fuego de 1968 y ordenando la operación DEEP ALPHA, que suponía bombardear Vietnam del Norte hasta el Paralelo 20.

Los últimos ataques aéreos llevados a cabo por los EEUU aobre el Ho Chi Minh se produjeron en Abril de 1973 a cargo de los B-52.

Hacía Marzo de 1972, casi todas las tropas terrestres de los EEUU habían salido de Vietnam. Sólo quedaban algunos hombres en una estación de vigilancia situada cerca de la base de Quang Tri, en la Región I y que tenía previsto desmovilizarse en Mayo.
La tecnología de los sensores era clasificada y su forma de uso no había sido transmitida aún a los survietnamitas. El 28 de marzo se empezaron a registrar movimientos de tropas a plena luz del día, cosa que no sucedía desde la retirada estadounidense. Dos días después se produjo la invasión de la DMZ por parte de tres divisiones de infantería apoyadas por fuego de artillería. Los restos de la línea McNamara no consiguió parar el avance.

Conclusión:

La línea McNamara demostró que a pesar de la destrucción originada por los ataques aéreos, la recompensa operacional era poca si no se disponía de tropas terrestres dispuestas a entrar en acción.
La construcción a lo largo de la DMZ nunca tuvo el ritmo previsto, y con frecuencia era alcanzada por la artillería del PAVN. Los Marines no podían defenderse y mantener el ritmo previsto en la construcción simultaneamente. El tramo ya ejecutado lo había sido antes de la total implicación de los EEUU en la guerra, antes por tanto de que la lucha se extendiera de la forma que lo hizo posteriormente en el Sur.
También hay que tener en cuenta que los soldados comunistas que necesitaban ir a las regiones militares II, III, e IV lo tenían más sencillo desbordando la barrera por el Ho Chi Minh, circundando la DMZ.

La barrera antivehicular ejecutada en Laos causó mucha destrucción entre las fuerzas del Norte. Desde 1965 a 1971 se lanzaron un millón de Tn de bombas, pero la red tenía 13.000km de caminos, extensión imposible de sellar por los bombarderos. Los comunistas controlaban el nivel de lucha, y nunca lanzaban las operaciones bélicas hasta que el material necesario para ellas estuviera disponible.
Entre 1966 y 1971 se infiltraron a 630.000 personas, 100.000Tn. de alimentos, 400.000 armas, y 50.000Tn. de munición.
En los comienzos, los transportes los realizaban porteadores que transitaban por caminos estrechos, pero en 1972 había caminos pavimentados con la suficiente anchura para permitir el paso de blindados y la instalación de tuberías para el abastecimiento de combustible.
Richard Helms el director de de la CIA comentó:
“Antes de los bombardeo enviaban a tres hombres al sur para conseguir que llegaran dos. Ahora tienen que enviar cinco, pero en términos de beneficio neto, no hay apenas diferencia”

Dien Bien Phu ... Honneur et Fidélité

lecheminsouslesbuis — Thu, 07 May 2009 13:58:32 +0000

Encerclés dans un camp retranché, dans la cuvette de Dien Biên Phu, les troupes françaises commandées par le général de Castries résistent pendant cinquante-sept jours à l’offensive massive des troupes nord-vietnamiennes du général Giap, qui veut obtenir une victoire décisive après huit années de guerre. Privés de toute possibilité d’évacuation, les Français qui, pour la plupart, se sont portés volontaires pour un combat qu’ils savent perdu d’avance, subissent les tirs de l’artillerie ennemie qui, depuis les collines avoisinantes, pilonne continuellement leurs positions. Les Vietnamiens établissent également un réseau de tranchées estimé à 400 kilomètres autour de la cuvette. Fin avril, la pluie transforme en bourbier les positions françaises et vietnamiennes. L’aviation française est inefficace en raison des aléas météorologiques, du relief, peu favorable aux bombardements, et de l’intensité de la D.C.A. vietnamienne.Après de violents combats, le camp tombe le 7 mai 1954, scellant du même coup le sort de l’Indochine française. Les Français dénombrent 3 420 tués et disparus, et 11 721 prisonniers dont près de 5 000 blessés. Une longue captivité de quatre mois cause la mort d’environ 7 000 d’entre eux…

——————————————-

Ils attendaient dans la cuvette

Le tout dernier assaut des Viets.

Dans la boue, ils creusaient leurs trous.

Diên-Biên-Phû.

Depuis des mois dans la bataille,

Sous un orage gris de feraille,

Ils pensaient qu’ils tiendraient le coup.

Diên-Biên-Phû.

Le PC Gabrielle

Est tombé ce matin,

Isabelle tient encore,

On se bat au corps à corps.

Près du commandement, des gosses de dix-huit ans

Pour la France, tombent en chantant :

Contre les Viets, contre l’ennemi,

Partout où le combat fait signe.

On entend plus, sur la cuvette,

Que le cri de victoire des Viets.

Ils avaient tenu jusqu’au bout.

Diên-Biên-Phû.

Aujourd’hui tout le monde s’en fout

De Diên-Biên-Phû.

Mais nous, nous restons fiers de vous.

Diên-Biên-Phû.

———-

Jean-Pax Meffret

—————————————————-

http://dienbienphu.xooit.com/portal.php

http://www.dienbienphu.org/

Dien Bien Phu- Reflections 55 Years Later

padresteve — Wed, 06 May 2009 23:07:51 +0000

French POWs from Dien Bien Phu being marched into captivity

On May 8th 1954 the French garrison of Dien Bien Phu surrendered to the Viet Minh. It was the end of the ill-fated Operation Castor in which the French had planned to lure the Viet Minh Regulars into open battle and use superior firepower to decimate them. The strategy which had been used on a smaller scale the previous year at Na Son.

The French had thought they had come up with a template based on Na Son in how to engage and destroy the Viet Minh. The plan was called the “Air-land base.” It involved having strong forces in a defensible position deep behind enemy lines supplied by air. At Na Son the plan worked as the French were on high ground, had superior artillery and were blessed by General Giap using human wave assaults which made the Viet Minh troops fodder for the French defenders. Even still Na Son was a near run thing for the French and had almost no effect on Viet Minh operations elsewhere while tying down a light division equivalent and a large portion of French air power.

The French took away the wrong lesson from Na-Son and repeated it at Dien Bien Phu. The French desired to use Dien Bien Phu as a base of operations against the Viet Minh. Unfortunately the French chose badly. The elected to occupy a marshy valley surrounded by hills covered in dense jungle. They elected to go light on artillery and the air head was at the far end of the range of French aircraft, especially tactical air forces which were in short supply. Likewise French logistics needs were greater than the French Air Force and American contractors could supply. French positions were exposed and not mutually supporting. The terrain was so poor that French units were incapable of any meaningful offensive operations against the Viet Minh. As such they could only dig in and wait for battle. Even so many positions were not adequately fortified and the artillery was exposed. The French garrison was a good force. It was comprised of Airborne units, Foriegn Legion, Colonials (Marines), North Africans and Vietnamese troops. Many of the officers including LtCol Langlais and Major Bigeard commander of the 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion were among the best leaders in the French Army. Others who served in Indo-China including David Galula and Jaques Trinquier would write books which would help Americans in Iraq. Unfortunately the French High Command badly underestimated the capabilities and wherewithal of the Giap and his divisions.

Giap rapidly concentrated his forces and built excellent logistics support. He placed his artillery in well concealed and fortified positions which could use direct fire on French positions. Giap also had more and heavier artillery than the French believed him to have. Additionally he brought in a large number of anti-aircraft batteries whose positions enabled the Viet Minh to take a heavy toll among French Aircraft. Giap also did not throw his men away in human assaults. Instead he used his Sappers (combat engineers) to build protective trenches leading up to the very wire of French defensive positions. In time these trenches came to resemble a spider web.

Without belaboring this post the French fought hard as did the Viet Minh. Many French positions were overwhelmed by accurate artillery and well planned attacks. The French hoped for U.S. air intervention, even the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the Viet Minh. The were turned down. Relief forces were unable to get through. The garrison died, despite the bravery of the Paratroops and Legionaries. The French garrison was let down by their high command and their government and lost the battle due to inadequate logistics and air power. The survivors endured a forced march of nearly 400 miles by foot to POW camps in which many died. Many were subjected to torture and group discipline. Few French caved to the Viet Minh interrogations but some would come away with the belief that one had to use such means to fight the revolutionaries. French and their Algerian comrades would apply this lessons against each other within a year of their release. French soldiers and officers were shipped from Indo-China to Algeria to wage another protracted counterinsurgency. Militarily they had all but won that war when their government pulled out. French troops, especially the Legionaries and Paratroops felt betrayed by their nation, much like many Vietnam Vets felt about the United States government after that war. I find today that both our government and people are caring for our returning troops in a far better manner than the past. Even still the veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan share almost a spiritual link to our American and French brothers in arms who fought at Dien Bien Phu, the Street Without Joy and places like Khe Sanh, Hue City, the Ia Drang and the Mekong.

LtCol Bigeard at Dien Bien Phu

The lessons of the French at Dien Bien Phu and in Indo-China were not learned by the United States as it entered Vietnam. In fact the US Army made a conscious effort to ignore the advice of those that they called “losers.” It was an arrogance for which we paid dearly, Despite the efforts of General David Petreus and others these lessons have not been completely learned by western military organizations. Old habits die hard, counterinsurgency done right isn’t sexy. Despite a lot of institutional resistance from traditionally minded officers we have, thanks to General Petreus had a good amount of success in Iraq. I believe that Iraq will do okay in the long run. Someday I hope to take up the invitation of Iraqi friends to go back. I am concerned about Afghanistan. It has the potential to be Vietnam in the mountains. I do hope and pray that we will figure Afghanistan out. Will there be a situation where an isolated NATO garrison is overrun? One would hope not, but we cannot underestimated the Afghans and their ability to adapt to NATO tactics and weapons. A year or so ago the Taliban came close to overrunning an American Coalition Outpost (COP). Dien Bien Phu is a warning from history not to leave troops in places where their exposure leaves them vulnerable.

Last night at the ball game, Ray and Bill, the Vietnam vets who man the beer stand on the concourse behind home plate gave me a small memento. A small wooden coming from the Virginia Chapter of the Vietnam Veterans of America. On the back side a simple message: “Welcome Home.” Something that they did not get when they came home. My dad came home in 1974 after back to back 11 month deployments, one of which he was at An Loc, besieged for 80 days. He never talked about it. I go home next week. My dad is slowly dying and doesn’t have that much longer left, his physician cannot believe that he is still alive. I have to help my mom with funeral arrangements, some hospice stuff, billing issues with the insurance company and the nursing home. My dad had expressed his desire to be buried at sea in the Gulf of Tonkin. He told my brother he wanted this because it had the most beautiful sunsets he had ever seen. I do hope that we can fulfill that wish. As a Navy Chaplain I know I can work out the burial at sea, and pray that somehow I will be able to take him where he wants to go.

Thank you dad. Thank you Ray and Bill and all my Vietnam era friends and mentors, from the California Guard, SSG Buff Rambo, SSG Mickey Yarro and Colonel Edgar Morrison. Thanks also to SFC Harry Zilkan, SFC Harry Ball, 1st Sergeant Jim Koenig, Colonel Donald Johnson and Sergeant Major John Butler. I especially thank my former parishioners at the Fort Indiantown Gap Chapel. Charlie, Ray, General Smoker, Scotty and the rest of you. Thanks also to my Battle of Hue City brothers, Barney, Limey, General Pace, Sergeant Major Thomas. Thank you also to the French officers who did so much for their country and were treated so shamefully. A number of these men have passed on but I will not forget them. Others I have lost contact with. Please take the time to thank the Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan veterans in your lives. May no other veterans have to endure what all of you endured at the hands of your countrymen. May God bless all of you.

Peace, Steve+

On This Day, April 26: Chernobyl

Randy Roberts — Sun, 26 Apr 2009 08:25:05 +0000

April 26, 1986

Nuclear explosion at Chernobyl

On this day in 1986, the world’s worst nuclear accident to date occurs at the Chernobyl nuclear plant near Kiev in Ukraine. The full toll from this disaster is still being tallied, but experts believe that thousands of people died and as many as 70,000 suffered severe poisoning. In addition, a large area of land may not be livable for as much as 150 years. The 18-mile radius around Chernobyl was home to almost 150,000 people who had to be permanently relocated.

The Soviet Union built the Chernobyl plant, which had four 1,000-megawatt reactors, in the town of Pripyat. At the time of the explosion, it was one of the largest and oldest nuclear power plants in the world. The explosion and subsequent meltdown of one reactor was a catastrophic event that directly affected hundreds of thousands of people. Still, the Soviet government kept its own people and the rest of the world in the dark about the accident until days later.

At first, the Soviet government only asked for advice on how to fight graphite fires and acknowledged the death of two people. It soon became apparent, however, that the Soviets were covering up a major accident and had ignored their responsibility to warn both their own people and surrounding nations. Two days after the explosion, Swedish authorities began measuring dangerously high levels of radioactivity in their atmosphere.

Years later, the full story was finally released. Workers at the plant were performing tests on the system. They shut off the emergency safety systems and the cooling system, against established regulations, in preparation for the tests. Even when warning signs of dangerous overheating began to appear, the workers failed to stop the test. Xenon gases built up and at 1:23 a.m. the first explosion rocked the reactor. A total of three explosions eventually blew the 1,000-ton steel top right off of the reactor.

A huge fireball erupted into the sky. Flames shot 1,000 feet into the air for two days, as the entire reactor began to melt down. Radioactive material was thrown into the air like fireworks. Although firefighting was futile, Pripyat’s 40,000 people were not evacuated until 36 hours after the explosion. Potentially lethal rain fell as the fires continued for eight days. Dikes were built at the Pripyat River to contain damage from contaminated water run-off and the people of Kiev were warned to stay indoors as a radioactive cloud headed their way.

On May 9, workers began encasing the reactor in concrete. Later, Hans Blix of the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that approximately 200 people were directly exposed and that 31 had died immediately at Chernobyl. The clean-up effort and the general radioactive exposure in the region, however, would prove to be even more deadly. Some reports estimate that as many as 4,000 clean-up workers died from radiation poisoning. Birth defects among people living in the area have increased dramatically. Thyroid cancer has increased tenfold in Ukraine since the accident.

“Nuclear explosion at Chernobyl,” The History Channel website, 2009, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=415 [accessed Apr 26, 2009]

On This Day

1514 – Copernicus made his first observations of Saturn.

1607 – The British established an American colony at Cape Henry, Virginia. It was the first permanent English establishment in the Western Hemisphere.

1819 – The first Odd Fellows lodge in the U.S. was established in Baltimore, MD.

1865 – Joseph E. Johnston surrendered the Army of Tennessee to Sherman during the American Civil War.

1865 – John Wilkes Booth was killed by the U.S. Federal Cavalry.

1921 – Weather broadcasts were heard for the first time on radio in St. Louis, MO.

1937 – German planes attacked Guernica, Spain, during the Spanish Civil War.

1964 – The African nations of Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to form Tanzania.

1968 – Students seized the administration building at Ohio State University.

1982 – Argentina surrendered to Britain over Falkland Island crisis.

April 26, 1954

Geneva Conference begins

In an effort to resolve several problems in Asia, including the war between the French and Vietnamese nationalists in Indochina, representatives from the world’s powers meet in Geneva. The conference marked a turning point in the United States’ involvement in Vietnam.

Representatives from the United States, the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, France, and Great Britain came together in April 1954 to try to resolve several problems related to Asia. One of the most troubling concerns was the long and bloody battle between Vietnamese nationalist forces, under the leadership of the communist Ho Chi Minh, and the French, who were intent on continuing colonial control over Vietnam. Since 1946 the two sides had been hammering away at each other. By 1954, however, the French were tiring of the long and inconclusive war that was draining both the national treasury and public patience. The United States had been supporting the French out of concern that a victory for Ho’s forces would be the first step in communist expansion throughout Southeast Asia. When America refused France’s requests for more direct intervention in the war, the French announced that they were including the Vietnam question in the agenda for the Geneva Conference.

Discussions on the Vietnam issue started at the conference just as France suffered its worst military defeat of the war, when Vietnamese forces captured the French base at Dien Bien Phu. In July 1954, the Geneva Agreements were signed. As part of the agreement, the French agreed to withdraw their troops from northern Vietnam. Vietnam would be temporarily divided at the 17th parallel, pending elections within two years to choose a president and reunite the country. During that two-year period, no foreign troops could enter Vietnam. Ho reluctantly signed off on the agreement though he believed that it cheated him out of the spoils of his victory. The non-communist puppet government set up by the French in southern Vietnam refused to sign, but without French support this was of little concern at the time. The United States also refused to sign, but did commit itself to abide by the agreement. Privately, U.S. officials felt that the Geneva Agreements, if allowed to be put into action, were a disaster. They were convinced that national elections in Vietnam would result in an overwhelming victory for Ho, the man who had defeated the French colonialists. The U.S. government scrambled to develop a policy that would, at the least, save southern Vietnam from the communists. Within a year, the United States had helped establish a new anti-communist government in South Vietnam and began giving it financial and military assistance, the first fateful steps toward even greater U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

“Geneva Conference begins,” The History Channel website, 2009, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=2649 [accessed Apr 26, 2009]

Halong Cave and Peak

Mathai Joseph — Sun, 04 Jan 2009 06:17:50 +0000

The usual cruises in Halong Bay stop at a few islands to let you wander around while the boat loads up with water, kayaks, vegetables and seafood for the next meal, perhaps even a cook or two. Among the islands we stopped at was one with a limestone cave where lights picked out the odd shapes of stalactites and stalagmites. The Vietnamese love visual analogies and we were invited to look in the cave and among the scattered islands for the animal shapes around which our guide Cheung wove implausible stories. Was this a camel with head down supplicating its reluctant friend?

Another island had a hill top pavilion from where we were promised a grand panoramic view of a large part of the bay. The wise ones enjoyed the view from the sandy beach. Because what neither Cheung nor the signs on the path said is that it takes a very stiff climb up a several hundred steps to get to the top.

There are of course unexpected rewards for the foolhardy. I got there heaving and panting to find a group of what looked like seven Vietnamese vestal virgins facing a photographer using a camera with a lens the size of a small mortar. One by one they posed languorously against the railings, letting the setting sun outline their slim bodies under the folds of their white gowns while their long black hair hung loose to be ruffled by the sea breeze.

They finished just after I had started on the return journey and walked past me on bare feet, holding their high heels in the air. I smiled at them and asked, was this shoot for a magazine? They looked at me uncomprehendingly. Magazine, I repeated more weakly. ‘No Englis’ one said cautiously and turned away.

No-one speaks French either, in this former French colony, just 54 years after the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu that left the French with no choice but to leave. A delayed response to the French banning the use of the traditional Nom script for Vietnamese in the 19th C? After all, Le Dun Tho, the brilliant Vietnamese negotiator was based in Paris and spoke fluent French, as did Ho Chi Minh.

The poster shops popular with tourists were lined with images of Ho Chi Minh and rousing messages from the time of the war with the US. But no posters on General Giap, the hero of Dien Bien Phu. When Vietnamese talk about ‘the war’ today, they mean the long war with the US. The war of independence from their former colonial power has gone into distant history.

We Didn't Start The Fire

s13ky — Thu, 27 Nov 2008 09:01:38 +0000

Historical Timeline from 1949 to 1989:

Billy Joel

William Martin Joel, famously known as Billy Joel, is an American rock musician, songwriter and singer. He released his first hit single, Piano Man, in 1973. Recording Industry Association America labels Joel as The Sixth Best-Selling Recording Artist in the United States.

One of Billy Joel’s song in STORM FRONT album, We Didn’t Start The Fire, has been considered an essential education tool in terms of history. Each word in the song represents a clickable-historical event in the world. Check out the lyric below and hover your mouse on each word to see the hidden history behind it :

We Didn’t Start The Fire

Harry Truman, Doris Day, Red China, Johnnie Ray

South Pacific, Walter Winchell, Joe DiMaggio

Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Studebaker, television

North Korea, South Korea, Marilyn Monroe

Rosenberg’s, H-Bomb, Sugar Ray, Panmunjom

Brando, “The King and I” and “The Catcher in the Rye”

Eisenhower, Vaccine, England’s got a new queen

Marciano, Liberace, Santayana Goodbye

CHORUS

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

Joseph Stalin, Malenkov, Nasser and Prokofiev

Rockefeller, Campanella, Communist Bloc

Roy Cohn, Juan Peron, Toscanini, Dacron

Dien Bien Phu Falls, Rock Around the Clock

Einstein, James Dean, Brooklyn’s got a winning team

Davy Crockett, Peter Pan, Elvis Presley, Disneyland

Bardot, Budapest, Alabama, Khrushchev

Princess Grace, Peyton Place, Trouble in the Suez

CHORUS:

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

Little Rock, Pasternak, Mickey Mantle, Kerouac

Sputnik, Chou En-Lai, Bridge on the River Kwai

Lebanon, Charles de Gaulle, California Baseball

Starkweather Homicide, Children of Thalidomide

Buddy Holly, Ben Hur, Space Monkey, Mafia

Hula Hoops, Castro, Edsel is a No-Go

U2, Synghman Rhee, Payola and Kennedy

Chubby Checker, Psycho, Belgians in the Congo

CHORUS:

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

Hemingway, Eichmann, Stranger in a Strange Land

Dylan, Berlin, Bay of Pigs Invasion

Lawrence of Arabia, British Beatlemania

Ole Miss, John Glenn, Liston Beats Patterson

Pope Paul, Malcolm X, British Politician Sex

JFK, blown away, what else do I have to say?

CHORUS:

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

Birth control, Ho Chi Minh, Richard Nixon back again

Moonshot, Woodstock, Watergate, Punk-Rock

Begin, Reagan, Palestine, Terror on the airline

Ayatollah’s in Iran, Russians in Afghanistan

Wheel of Fortune, Sally Ride, Heavy Metal, Suicide

Foreign Debts, Homeless Vets, AIDS, Crack, Bernie Goetz

Hypodermics on the shore, China’s under martial law

Rock and Roller Cola Wars, I can’t take it anymore.

CHORUS:

We didn’t start the fire,

It was always burnin’,

Since the world’s been turnin’

We didn’t start the fire,

But when we are gone

Will it still burn on, and on, and on, and on…

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t start the fire

No we didn’t light it

But we tried to fight it

We didn’t start the fire

It was always burning

Since the world’s been turning

We didn’t…

Check out also the two versions of “We Didn’t Start The Fire” videos, the first clip consists of footages depicting the event behind every history while the last is the official one.

Va voir à Dien Bien Phu si j'y suis...

ibnkafka — Sun, 02 Nov 2008 00:51:17 +0000

C’est ce que j’avais dit une fois, lors de mes études en France dans les 90s, à un étudiant français qui me bassinait avec cette obsession typique de son pays de réhabiliter le passé colonial, après une demie-heure d’échanges stériles – “va voir à Dien Bien Phu si j’y suis“. Au Maroc, nous avons eu la bataille d’Anoual, qui fût un désastre militaire franco-espagnol face aux résistants d’Abdelkrim el Khattabi, désastre qui n’aboutit cependant malheureusement pas à une défaite franco-espagnole mais au contraire à la déconfiture de la résistance rifaine et à l’exil au Caire d’Abdelkrim, qui ne se laisse jamais dompter. J’aurais donc dû dire “va voir à Anoual si j’y suis“, mais malheureusement cette bataille est beaucoup moins connue aujourd’hui (alors qu’elle eût à l’époque un retentissement mondial), tant au Maroc qu’en France – et il est vrai que Dien Bien Phu, qui fût un éclatant désastre militaire français, fût couronnée par le déguerpissement définitif de l’occupant français – remplacé par son allié étatsunien, mais ça c’est une autre histoire…

En tout cas, en ce 1er novembre – merci à Youssef Boussoumah des Indigènes de la République de m’avoir rappelé cette date – une petite pensée à Giap et Ho Chi Minh, qui ne se contentaient pas – heureusement pour le peuple vietnamien – de parler, et apportèrent au Tiers-monde colonisé cet extraordinaire encouragement – “le Valmy des peuples colonisés” selon l’expression de l’historien français Alain Ruscio, ou “le 14 Juillet de la décolonisation” selon l’ancien officier français d’Indochine Jean Pouget – à se libérer des chaînes de l’asservissement. Bien évidemment, le peuple français, auquel Dien Bien Phu a fourni l’occasion de mettre fin à cette expédition coloniale désespérée et criminelle, peut également y trouver motif à réjouissance, de la même façon que le peuple allemand peut se réjouir de sa défaite militaire en 1945, qui mit fin à la dictature nazie. On relèvera par ailleurs qu’une partie du peuple français, plus particulièrement le PCF, prit fait et cause pour la résistance vietnamienne, tout comme ce parti avait soutenu à fond la résistance marocaine au Rif, même s’il fût hélas loin d’avoir la même lucidité lors des prolégomènes de la guerre d’indépendance algérienne (1). Ce sont là des choses dont je me rappelle lorsque des John Birchers font un spectacle son et lumières avec les crimes – que je nie pas du reste – du communisme – ces crimes sont relatifs, du moins aux yeux d’un Marocain ou d’un Vietnamien.

Il faudrait d’ailleurs un jour que je lise et rende compte de la biographie de M´Hammed Ben Aomar Lahrech, alias Anh Ma, général marocain de l’Armée populaire du Viet Nam (2), rédigée il y a quelques années par Abdallah Saaf, un professeur de sciences politiques très fin, très nuancé et trop méconnu – il est vrai que sa carrière politique, où il fût ministre de l’enseignement supérieur après une scission de l’OADP fomentée par Driss Basri, n’a pas joué en sa faveur. Et il faudrait également que je lise “Poussières d’empire“, de la jdidie de naissance Nelcya Delanoë, consacré au sort des Marocains restés en Indochine, puis, pour certains, rentrés au Maroc dans les années 70. Certains d’entre eux se rappellent encore d’Anh Ma:

N’avaient-ils donc jamais entendu parler de Maârouf, ce cadre du Parti communiste marocain envoyé à la demande d’Ho Chi Minh par l’émir du Rif Abdelkrim, à la fin des années 1940, pour monter un réseau de guerre psychologique à destination des troupes nord-africaines du Cefeo ? N’avaient-ils pas rejoint le Vietminh via ses tracts ou ses appels ? Bien sûr, ils en avaient entendu parler, mais il semble que la propagande communiste et/ou anticolonialiste ait eu ses limites – le faible nombre de ralliés suffit à le démontrer. Pour autant, ils ont très bien connu ledit Maârouf, Anh Ma de son nom de guerre vietnamien, mais plus tard, « au camp de Son Tay, dont il était le responsable ». Là, ils bénéficient d’« une véritable éducation ». La plupart apprennent à lire, à écrire, le vietnamien et l’arabe, tous reçoivent une formation politique.

Miloud Ben Salah : « Maârouf était membre de la hiérarchie vietnamienne et de son appareil de guerre, il avait beaucoup d’influence. Après le départ des troupes françaises, il a obtenu que les Nord-Africains soient regroupés à Son Tay, au pied de la montagne de Ba Vi [à une cinquantaine de kilomètres d'Hanoi], pour constituer des cellules de lutte pour l’indépendance de leur pays. Il a choisi une centaine de cadres vietnamiens qui parlaient bien le français pour nous éduquer, nous apprendre ce qu’était le communisme, le colonialisme… »

C’est ainsi que Son Tay se transforme peu à peu en un kolkhoze où les Marocains cultivent la terre, élèvent des vaches… Maârouf, bien que vivant à Hanoi, est responsable de l’organisation du camp. « Comme il était notre intermédiaire auprès des Vietnamiens, il nous a obtenu un tracteur, des camions et… l’autorisation personnelle de Ho Chi Minh de nous marier avec des Vietnamiennes. Il a largement contribué à améliorer nos conditions de vie. »

Ce lien entre Dien Bien Phu n’est pas farfelu – moins de 20% des combattants du corps expéditionnaire français étaient français:

French mainland- 2810 (18.6%)
Foreign Legion- 3931 (26%)
North African- 2637 (17.5%)
West African- 247 (1.6%)
Vietnamese (regular)- 4052 (26.8%)
Vietnamese (auxiliary)- 1428 (9.5%)

Et parmi les légionnaires, de nombreux Allemands, vétérans de la deuxième guerre mondiale…

Toujours est-il que le nombre important d’indigènes (asiatiques, arabes ou africains) dans le corps expéditionnaire sera considéré comme une des causes de l’échec français – foutaises à mon sens, car l’armée française en Algérie, majoritairement française même si avec une importante composante algérienne, ne fût pas victorieuse sur le seul plan où cela compte, le plan militaire.

Quelques liens: le site officiel – ou du moins présenté comme tel, car soutenu moralement par le ministère de la défense français – consacré à cette belle raclée – assez cocasse, et le ton du site me fait penser aux fameux dead-enders et no-hopers dont parlait Bush au sujet de l’Irak l’été 2003, et donne à penser que certains ne savent pas “que Franco est tout à fait mort“, comme chantait Jacques Brel – n’espèrez pas y trouver d’introspection sur la justesse supposée du combat du Corps expéditionnaire français en Indochine…

Tiens, à propos de dead-enders, voici le site de l’Association nationale des anciens prisonniers d’Indochine (ANAPI), guère torturé par l’introspection historique ou morale, et qui considère les anciens prisonniers du corps expéditionnaire français – qui ont indubitablement subi des violations des Conventions de Genève, puisque 7.708 prisonniers moururent en captivité, contre 2.293 morts au combat du côté français – exclusivement comme des victimes.

La version officielle du ministère français de la défense. Et aussi la médiathèque de ce même ministère, qui contient de nombreuses photos officielles de Dien Bien Phu, côté français. On ne peut pas dire que l’introspection ou la remise en cause soit à l’ordre du jour…

“La Guerre d’Indochine a-t-elle été un enfant de la guerre froide?“, par l’historien norvégien Stein Tønnesson.

Une vidéo sur Dailymotion sur la bataille d’Anoual, avec un survivant rifain.

“LA SIGNIFICATION HISTORIQUE DE DIEN BIEN PHU” par l’historien français Alain Ruscio.

Une analyse militaire de la bataille de Dien Bien Phu par un officier étatsunien, guère complaisant face à la prestation du commandement français – tout le monde s’accorde à dire que les combattants du corps expéditionnaire furent courageux: “At Dien Bien Phu the French violated nearly all of the principles of war at every level of war–strategic, operational, and tactical“.

“Dien Bien Phu – a personal memoir“, les souvenirs de Frederic Clairmont, membre canadien de la “International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam” (chargée de superviser l’application des accords de Genève de 1954, mettant fin au conflit entre France et Vietnam) – très critique à l’égard des Français.

Un article de Laetitia Grotti pour Jeune Afrique, sur l’”Epopée des Marocains du Viet Minh“. Et un entretien fascinant, intitulé “Patiences de la ruse“, avec Nelcya Delanöe pour la revue Vacarmes, où il est beaucoup question des Marocains du Vietminh.

Un site sur le documentaire “Gao Rang/Riz grillé” de Claude Grunspan, consacré aux cameramen vietnamiens des deux guerre du Vietnam, celle contre la France puis celle contre les Etats-Unis.

Un post sur Dien Bien Phu d’un fascinant bloggeur étatsuno-vietnamien, Linh Dinh, qui publie ailleurs sur son site la lettre de la CIA lui annonçant, en 1986, qu’il est sélectionné pour passer le stage de recrutement… En général, les bloggeurs sont plus discrets – prenez mon cas, je n’ai jamais fait état de mon dahir de nomination…

Le site de l’armée vietnamienne, avec quelques commentaires sur Dien Bien Phu.

Et puis quelques photos – avant…

Le bureau de poste militaire de Dien Bien Phu à la belle époque...

Avant d'être tortionnaire en Algérie, Bigeard fût un soudard en Indochine

et après…

(1) Le livre de l’ancien officier communiste Jean Brugié, en collaboration avec Isabelle Sommier, semble très intéressant.

(2) L’historien Moshe Gershovich l’écrit dans son étude “Collaboration and “Pacification”: French Conquest, Moroccan Combatants, and the Transformation of the Middle Atlas“:

“Among the means used by the Vietminh to convince North African soldiers to defect was a former World War II veteran and committed member of the Moroccan Communist Party, M’hammed Ben Aomar Lahrech. His instrumental role in the insurgency led to his rising to the rank of general in the revolutionary North Vietnamese army”.

Glory Days In Dayton

petebyrne — Sat, 23 Aug 2008 02:59:47 +0000

At the United States Air Force Museum in Dayton, Ohio, standing with arguably the world’s most beautiful airplane, ever; the 1932 Boeing P-26 “Peashooter,” was the U. S. Army Air Corp’s first low-wing, all-metal pursuit (fighter) plane, an aesthetic jewel of an airplane.

Unfortunately for my prospects of worldly success, I am a person who can identify, on sight, virtually every military aircraft to have seen service in any air arm in the world, between 1935 and 1955.

At the Air Force Museum in Dayton, Ohio, I spent an ecstatic day wandering among the beautifully restored wonders of military aviation. They were all there, the P-39 Bell Airacobra with its through-the-nose cannon, the P-51 North American Mustang, considered the ultimate propeller-driven fighter, the Korean War jets, the F-86 Sabre and the F-84 Thunderjet, last of the machine-gun armed, dog-fighters. While it’s always the fighters that catch my imagination, it was the bombers that got me thinking. The B-17, the B-24, the 36, the 47, the 52 and even the newest Stealth models, all testifying to the strategic reasoning for the existence of a national air force, independent of its antecedent role which until 1947, was as the aviation branch of the U. S. Army.

A friend told me of a conversation with a mid-ranking Marine Corps officer who observed that presently, the Air Force is a service in search of a mission. In the Iraq War, the Air Force is barely mentioned, gnashing its teeth in its role as an air-freight arm to the needs of the Army. And worse in Afghanistan where the civilian casualties resulting from misdirected Air Force ordinance have become a major diplomatic impediment to the effective prosecution of the war. Recently the Secretary of Defense castigated the armed services for foot-dragging in their implementation of new technical warfare applications. While the Air Force was not specifically singled out, note was made of several recent Air Force mishaps in the handling of thermonuclear weapons.

Reading between the lines, it seems that the Air Force, with its historic commitment to the decisiveness of strategic bombing, and with pilots being pilots, has been less than enthusiastic in its employment of things like pilot-less drone aircraft. While the Army has grabbed the ball, training enlisted ranks to operate drones, the Air Force, at last reading, is requiring that drones be the province of pilot-qualified officers only.

But service turf and historical ideologies are not restricted to the current dilemmas facing the United States Air Force. The Navy is now into its eighth decade of reliance upon the supremacy of the carrier task group. It’s been almost a quarter-century since a relatively simple and inexpensive Exocet missile took out an Argentine cruiser from a distance of twenty-four miles, and over sixty-years since the Japanese at Okinawa brought the most primitive of guided missiles to bear against a surface fleet. The Navy continues to argue that its fleet protection can handle all existing threats and that the United States Navy is not some third world force. Maybe, maybe not. I would think that during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Soviet missile and submarine officers argued against allowing our surface fleets their “privileged” off-shore-sanctuaries.

That leaves the United States Army. If you’ve seen the star-spangled general officers testifying before congress over the past fifty years, you may or may not have noticed that almost without exception, every Army comer wears among the bric-a-brac covering his chest, a small set of silver parachute wings. This ubiquitous badge of belonging may have begun finally to recede as a right of passage for rising army officers but its persistence in the face of a singular reality is instructive – that being the fact that while there may have been minor tactical successes (the Germans at the Belgian Forts and at Gran Sasso), there has never been a strategically successful airborne operation in military history. The German assault on Crete was Pyhrric. The scattered D-Day airborne drops were the stuff of drama, and it can be argued that they contributed somewhat to the success of the landing. But essentially, they were a costly sideshow. Later in 1944, Market Garden was a disaster, and at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the French capped the argument.

That leaves the Marine Corps. Despite the valiant fighting capabilities of the Corps, they remain a subsidiary arm of the Navy and would be wise to insure their future by staying that way. The contained island campaigns of the Second World War were made for a Marine Corps. In Korea and in Vietnam, the Marines lacked the size, firepower and support tail to be a decisive player or to make any more of a significant impact on those wars than the Army units on their flanks.

None of the above argues that the military are anymore incapable of learning from the past than any other institutions in a society. It’s just that when they don’t learn, the results can be stunningly dramatic – the Maginot Line, the Polish Cavalry of 1939, “Impregnable” Singapore, redundant battleship fleets or the debacle on the Yalu River in 1950. The Army with its unit rotation in Iraq and Afghanistan seems to have learned from the disastrous results of its “pipeline” replacement system that drained away unit cohesion in late WW II and nearly destroyed the service itself in Vietnam. The carrier Navy establishment’s initial disdain of the submarine arm is now a memory and the Marine Corp seems to eschew fads, sticking to the basics it does so well.

All of the above still leaves the Air Force facing a present and a future of pilot-less missiles and drones. While the very idea of the Air Force returning to the fold and once again becoming part of the Army will doubtless bring outraged howls from the guys in blue, maybe it’s time. As the United States “Army” Air Force, the USAAf of old certainly managed to find a mission, and also managed to do an incredibly great job of it.

Saint-Just in a Very Small Place

Saint Just — Tue, 19 Aug 2008 20:12:59 +0000

Do not be despairing, beleaguered French troops! C’est mois, Louis de Saint-Just, to the rescue! On the bounce, henh? Ho ho ho.

As you see, my petits touristes, we continue the travel of Le Grand Empire Français. The Sun, he never sets on the French Empire, after all. Well, perhaps he does set from time to time, but he comes up in the morning. Eh? Ho ho.

See we are in the green valleys of Vietnam. Oh! It looks like our soldiers seem to need a little aid, eh? Good thing I am here to lend the benefit of my expertise militaire. The Rhine and the Mekong, they are very much alike to me: wet in the middle, muddy on the sides. Ho ho.

Quite soon we will have the situation well in the hand, then we go about the loyal French colony perhaps to sample the rubber tree or a cashew. Then the little Viet people will greet me. Hear them call to me: “Ho! Ho! Ho!”

Laos: Where Bus Travel Meets Mud Wrestling

pirateindustry — Tue, 05 Aug 2008 06:42:22 +0000

“I don’t speak your filthy language”, said the lanky Israeli traveler in response to a request in Lao that he move his bag so someone could have the last seat on the bus. He was still frustrated from an incident earlier that morning where his negotiation style (i.e., towering over the locals and shouting at them while shaking fists) didn’t get him the price he wanted for a boatride down river. Because of him (the locals assumed we were together) we were embarking on yet another day of bus travel in Laos instead of floating gently downstream on the boat of a friendly villager.

At 5:40 AM the day prior, our bus from Dien Bien Phu into Laos left 10 minutes late to the horror of our very angry bus driver. After a violent tantrum, he stopped for a 40-minute breakfast 5 blocks from the station. He stopped again at the border for four hours where he apparently took a nap.

Over the border, as the roads got worse the ride grew more entertaining. Since bus drivers often demand more money from foreigners over the border we planned a mutiny as the driver napped at the crossing. In the end (no doubt sensing our preparedness for battle) he didn’t pull any shenanigans.

Once in Laos, we repeated the following drill every hour or so: bus gets stuck the mud, bus driver shouts something we can’t understand, we scramble out of the listing bus and push it barefoot through the mud occasionally reconstructing the road using large rocks and bamboo.

After a night in Muang Kwah, we tried our luck at negotiating a boat down river to Luang Prabang. It turns out that Laos is the least negotiable place we’ve been on this trip and our lanky Israeli’s shouting didn’t help our cause. He ended his charm offensive with “I hope there’s a fucking famine in this country.” Even our most charming negotiator (an American named Andrew) couldn’t recover from that so we were off to the bus station.

The final leg to Luang Prabang was different. No mud and a laid back driver with the biggest smile I’ve seen in Southeast Asia.. By the time we got off the bus in Luang Prabang, Mr. Deal Maker had already insulted the only tuc tuc driver at the station so we paid “a fortune” (not really) to get ourselves into town and here we are. Surrounded by good food and gorgeous scenery, we’ll probably spend the next few days debating heading North or South. In the meantime, expect shorter blog entries - sorry about this one.

Dien Bien Phu to Moung May; crossing into Laos. Day 10

Michael Khor — Fri, 10 Oct 2008 02:56:21 +0000

After 347 km, a major portion of which was spent in the mountains, my legs were begging for a full d

Moung Lay to Dien Bien Phu, in the footsteps of the Viet Minh. Day 9

Michael Khor — Wed, 08 Oct 2008 17:01:50 +0000

Hotel Lan Anh was run by typical Vietnamese; which means they won’t pass up on any opportunity