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Source: Telstra on track, no change in direction, says CEO David Thodey | Business Breaking News | News.com.au

Tak satu saham pun yang menjadi sorotan publik dengan sangat kritis di jagad pasar modal Indonesia layaknya saham PT Bumi Resources Tbk (BUMI), setidaknya untuk saat ini. Saking kritisnya, terkadang persepsi ikutan disangka fakta. Ya, badai rumor tak henti-hentinya menerpa bangunan kokoh perusahaan milik konglomerat yang pernah menduduki peringkat orang terkaya di Indonesia, Aburizal Bakrie.

PT Bakrie & Brothers Tbk (BNBR) mengklaim masih memegang 16% saham BUMI. Namun data PT Kustodian Sentral Efek Indonesia (KSEI) mencatat tidak ada satu pun perusahaan atau investor yang memiliki saham BUMI lebih dari 5%. Terlepas dari itu, sulit melepaskan BUMI dari asosiasi dengan grup Bakrie. Dan mungkin karena itu pula rumor dan spekulasi seolah menjadi teman hidup yang paling dekat dengan BUMI. Sebab, induknya pun tak luput dari serangan rumor.

Tapi mau bagaimana lagi, langkah dan strategi bisnis grup Bakrie memang kerap mengundang kontroversi. Polah tingkah ekstrem nan berani grup Bakrie pernah dituding menjadi salah satu penyebab kejatuhan pasar modal tahun 2008. Namun kesuksesan grup Bakrie dalam mencetak uang juga berangkat dari strategi yang sama. Begitu pula dengan BUMI. Perusahaan batubara terbesar di Indonesia sekaligus eksportir batubara terbesar di dunia ini, kini tengah menghadapi segudang pertanyaan dan spekulasi pelaku pasar lantaran aksi utang besar hingga US$ 3,325 miliar yang mungkin bisa bertambah lagi ke depannya.

BUMI dituding melakukan aksi nekat dengan utang tersebut. Pelaku pasar kemudian berbicara posisi beban utang BUMI, dampaknya pada kinerja jangka pendek perseroan, sampai-sampai mengkait-kaitkannya dengan dana kampanye politik Aburizal Bakrie. ”Banyak orang tidak mengerti kemudian berspekulasi sendiri tentang apa yang sedang kami lakukan. Bahkan sampai menuding pinjaman ini untuk dana politik. Itu sangat tidak logis,” tegas SVP Investor Relations BUMI, Dileep Srivastava dalam bincang-bincangnya dengandetikFinance, Senin (7/12/2009).

Menurut Dileep, spekulasi dan rumor yang berkembang di kalangan pelaku pasar tidak memiliki dasar yang jelas. Apalagi soal posisi beban utang BUMI seperti sering dibahas pelaku pasar. ”Orang cenderung melihat dampak yang terjadi dalam waktu jangka pendek, ketimbang melihat apa yang akan kami raih dan keuntungan yang akan kami berikan pada pemegang saham kami di masa mendatang,” jelas Dileep.

Dileep mengakui kalau skema ekspansi yang sedang dipersiapkan BUMI boleh tergolong ekstrem dan kelewat berani. Namun menurutnya, BUMI melakukan itu bukan tanpa perhitungan. ”Situasi ini mirip ketika kami memutuskan mengambil alih KPC (PT Kaltim Prima Coal) dan Arutmin (PT Arutmin Indonesia). Ketika itu banyak yang mengatakan kami terlalu nekat melakukan ekspansi,” ujar Dileep.

BUMI mengambil alih 80% saham Arutmin dari BHP Biliton pada 2001. Sisanya sebesar 20% yang menjadi milik PT Ekakarsa Yasakarya Indonesia yang juga merupakan perusahaan grup keluarga Bakrie dituntaskan pada tahun 2004. KPC sebelumnya milik British Petroleum dan Rio Tinto dengan kepemilikan masing-masing 50%. BUMI mengambil alih tuntas KPC pada tahun 2003.

BUMI yang saat itu masih merupakan perusahaan energi kecil-kecilan, sebagai wujud perubahan usaha dari usaha sebelumnya di sektor pariwisata yang mengelola bisnis hotel di Uzbekistan, kemudian mendapat reaksi dari pelaku pasar. ”Di tengah kondisi ekonomi saat itu, dimana perbankan sulit mengucurkan pinjaman kecuali dengan bunga tinggi, orang-orang mempertanyakan alasan kami mengambil pinjaman berbunga tinggi dan bernilai besar. Nilainya total sekitar US$ 1,1 miliar,” ujar Dileep.

Dengan pinjaman sebesar itu, tentu tak sedikit pihak yang lantas meragukan apakah manajemen BUMI mampu terus tumbuh dengan beban utang dan beban bunga yang harus ditanggung. ”Hasilnya, semua orang bisa membuktikan. Pada tahun 2007-2008, kami melunasi seluruh utang US$ 1,1 miliar dan BUMI menjadi perusahaan besar dengan zero debt (nihil utang), hanya dengan melepas 30% saham KPC dan Arutmin kepada Tata,” jelasnya.

“Anda investasi miliaran dolar dan seluruhnya kembali hanya dalam waktu 4 tahun. Adakah perusahaan lain yang mampu melakukan ini selain BUMI?” imbuhnya.

Sikap optimistis Dileep sebetulnya beralasan. Dengan investasi sebesar US$ 1,1 miliar yang orang bilang nekat, BUMI berhasil melunasi seluruhnya sekaligus mencetak EBITDA (laba sebelum bunga, pajak, demortisasi dan amortisasi) tertinggi perseroan sepanjang sejarah pada tahun 2008. ”BUMI melunasi seluruh utang US$ 1,1 miliar pada tahun 2008, bersamaan dengan peningkatan produksi hingga 2 kali lipat di 2008. Dan karena itu, kami pun mencetak EBITDA tertinggi yang pernah diraih pada tahun 2008,” ujarnya.

Produksi batubara BUMI sebesar 40 juta ton di 2003. Pada tahun 2008, produksi batubara BUMI naik menjadi 52,8 juta ton. Pendapatan BUMI tahun 2004 sebesar Rp 9,811 triliun. Pada tahun 2008, pendapatan BUMI mendekati US$ 4 miliar (hampir Rp 40 triliun). Laba bersih BUMI tahun 2004 sebesar Rp 1,21 triliun. Pada tahun 2008, laba bersih BUMI meningkat drastis menjadi US$ 654 juta (sekitar Rp 6,5 triliun).

Seluk-Beluk Maha Utang US$ 3,325 Miliar

Sukses dari akuisisi KPC dan Arutmin, BUMI kini sedang berencana ekspasi besar-besaran. Sejak periode Agustus hingga Desember 2009, BUMI meraih pendanaan raksasa dengan total nilai mencapai US$ 3,325 miliar.

Berikut daftar pendanaan eksternal yang diperoleh BUMI:

• Pada 5 Agustus 2009, BUMI melalui Enercoal Resources Pte Ltd menerbitkan obligasi konversi senilai US$ 375 juta. Obligasi konversi ini berjangka waktu 5 tahun dengan kupon bunga tetap sebesar 9,25%. BUMI memberikan opsi pelunasan tunai atas obligasi konversi ini saat jatuh tempo di 2014.
• Pada September 2009, BUMI melalui Bumi Netherlands BV meraih pinjaman raksasa dari China Investment Corporation (CIC) senilai US$ 1,9 miliar. Pinjaman ini terbagi ke dalam 3 struktur yakni pinjaman pertama sebesar US$ 600 juta berjangka waktu 4 tahun, pinjaman kedua US$ 600 juta berjangka waktu 5 tahun dan pinjaman ketiga US$ 700 juta berjangka waktu 6 tahun. Tiga pinjaman ini berkupon bunga 12% setahun dengan penambahan Internal Rate of Return (IRR) sebesar 7% saat masing-masing pinjaman ini jatuh tempo.
• Pada 13 November 2009, BUMI menerbitkan obligasi konvensional senilai US$ 300 juta. Obligasi berjangka waktu 7 tahun ini memberikan kupon bunga 12% per tahun.
• Pada 25 November 2009, BUMI melalui Enercoal, lagi-lagi mengeluarkan obligasi konversi senilai US$ 300 juta. Obligasi konversi ini berjangka waktu 7 tahun dengan kupon bunga 5%.
• BUMI juga memperoleh fasilitas pinjaman senilai US$ 300 juta dari Credit Suisse.
• Teranyar, BUMI meraih pinjaman jangka pendek 6 bulan dari JP Morgan senilai US$ 150 juta pada 7 Desember 2009.

Rincian penggunaan dana tersebut sebagai berikut:

• Investasi dan akuisisi senilai US$ 1,419 miliar.
• Pembiayaan kembali utang (refinancing) senilai US$ 1,3 miliar.
• Belanja modal (capital expenditure/capex) senilai US$ 314 juta.
• Equity swap senilai US$ 240 juta.
• Cap called option atas obligasi konversi senilai US$ 52 juta.

Menurut Dileep, BUMI sebenarnya bisa saja tidak melakukan refinancing atas utang-utangnya senilai US$ 1,3 miliar karena perseroan masih memiliki kas internal sebesar US$ 1 miliar.

“Kita punya pinjaman sebesar US$ 1,2-1,3 miliar yang akan jatuh tempo di 2009, 2010 dan 2011. Kas internal kita mencukupi untuk melunasinya, saat ini ada sekitar US$ 1 miliar,” ujarnya.

Skema Ekspansi Organik BUMI

Dileep mengatakan, jika perseroan tidak meraih pendanaan baru dengan jatuh tempo lebih panjang ketimbang pinjaman yang akan jatuh tempo di 2009-2011, maka kas internal tersebut tidak bisa digunakan untuk pengembangan proyek.

“Dengan adanya pendanaan baru tersebut, yang mana pembayarannya baru akan dimulai pada 2013, kami memiliki keleluasaan dalam menggunakan kas internal kami. Dana tersebut akan digunakan untuk pengembangan proyek Herald, Gorontalo, Citra Palu, Mauritania, Fajar Bumi Sakti (FBS) dan Pendopo,” ujar Dileep.

Berikut skema pengembangan proyek tersebut:

Herald Resources Ltd (lead dan zinc) sebesar US$ 211 juta. Jadwal operasi pada 2011. Target peningkatan EBITDA sebesar US$ 150 juta per tahun.

Gorontalo (emas) dan Citra Palu (tembaga) sebesar US$ 500 juta. Jadwal operasi pada 2013. Target peningkatan EBITDA sebesar US$ 900 juta per tahun.

Mauritania (bijih besi) sebesar US$ 300 juta. Operasi dijadwalkan 2013. Target peningkatan EBITDA sebesar US$ 250 juta per tahun.

FBS dan Pendopo (batubara) sebesar US$ 150 juta. Jadwal operasi pada 2011-2013. Target peningkatan EBITDA sebesar US$ 100 juta per tahun.

Total investasi pada 4 proyek ini mencapai US$ 1,161 miliar yang akan didanai dari kas internal BUMI yang telah leluasa untuk digunakan setelah dilakukan refinancing atas utang yang jatuh tempo 2009-2011.

Selain itu, BUMI juga menargetkan produksi batubara KPC dan Arutmin sebesar 111 juta ton di 2012. Untuk itu, dua anak emas BUMI ini akan menganggarkan capex sebesar US$ 1,1 miliar.

“KPC dan Arutmin mendanai peningkatan kapasitas produksi dari kas internal mereka sendiri. Jadi bukan berasal dari kas BUMI. Melalui peningkatan kapasitas menjadi 111 juta ton di 2012, EBITDA akan meningkat US$ 800 juta per tahun,” papar Dileep.

Dengan demikian, total nilai investasi BUMI beserta KPC dan Arutmin mencapai US$ 2,261 miliar. Namun proyeksi peningkatan EBITDA dari seluruh pengembangan ini mencapai US$ 2,2 miliar per tahun, setimpal dengan dana yang harus dikucurkan.

Berhubung pengembangan 4 proyek tersebut menggunakan kas internal BUMI serta capex KPC dan Arutmin yang berasal dari kas internal sendiri, maka BUMI kini masih memiliki dana akuisisi dan investasi sebesar US$ 1,419 miliar.

“Sebesar US$ 500 juta digunakan untuk pelunasan seketika akuisisi Fajar Bumi Sakti, Pendopo dan Darma Henwa,” ujar Dileep.

Meski Dileep tidak menyebutkan secara detil, namun setelah dikurangi US$ 500 juta tersebut, secara kasar BUMI kini masih memiliki dana segar untuk investasi dan akuisisi sebesar US$ 919 juta.

Akuisisi Newmont

Skema ekspansi selanjutnya adalah akuisisi Newmont. Dileep angkat bicara soal ini.

“Sebagian besar sisa dana tersebut akan dikucurkan kepada PT Multi Daerah Bersaing (MDB) dalam bentuk pinjaman untuk mengakuisisi 24% saham Newmont,” ujar Dileep.

MDB merupakan perusahaan patungan antara PT Multicapital (75%) dan pemerintah daerah Nusa Tenggara Barat (25%) dalam akuisisi 24% saham PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara. Multicapital merupakan anak usaha BUMI secara tidak langsung dengan kepemilikan 99%.

Total dana yang harus dikeluarkan MDB untuk mengakuisisi 24% saham Newmont mencapai US$ 884 juta.

BUMI telah mengucurkan pinjaman sebesar US$ 391 juta kepada MDB untuk pengambilalihan 10% saham Newmont. Pada akhir Desember 2009, BUMI akan kembali meminjamkan US$ 493 juta untuk akuisisi 14% saham Newmont sisanya.

Mengenai laba yang akan diterima BUMI melalui akuisisi tidak langsung 24% saham Newmont ini belum dapat diperkirakan. Namun proyeksi saat ini, Newmont diperkirakan bakal membukukan laba bersih lebih dari US$ 600 juta pada 2009.

“Saya tidak bisa menyebutkan berapa pemasukan yang akan diperoleh dari Newmont di masa mendatang. Namun anda menghitung sendiri berdasarkan proyeksi laba Newmont terhadap porsi kepemilikan kami di Newmont,” ujarnya.

Berandai-andai seluruh dana akuisisi 24% saham Newmont sebesar US$ 884 juta telah dikucurkan, maka secara kasar sisa dana masih ada sekitar US$ 35 juta.

Berau & BHP Biliton

Skema ekspansi BUMI tak berhenti sampai Newmont. BUMI kini tengah merancang ekspansi ke sektor pemasaran batubara. Salah satu target awalnya adalah dengan ikutan memasarkan batubara yang diproduksi oleh PT Berau Coal yang baru saja diakuisisi oleh Recapital Advisors.

“Kami akan mulai investasi dalam pemasaran batubara. Tujuannya agar membentuk posisi tawar terhadap pembentukan harga jual batubara di pasar. Pembicaraan sedang dilakukan dengan Recapital,” ujarnya.

Dileep juga mengungkapkan perseroan sedang ikutan memberi penawaran terhadap rencana divestasi tambang batubara Coking. Sayangnya ia tidak menyebutkan namanya.

Namun hampir dapat dipastikan, tambang yang dimaksud adalah konsesi Coking Coal milik BHP Biliton yang terletak di Maruwai, Kalimantan Timur. Dileep juga belum bisa menyebutkan dana yang disiapkan perseroann untuk keperluan itu.

“Kalau memang diperlukan, kami bisa mencari pendanaan lagi di pasar,” ujarnya.

Penerbitan Saham Baru

Belakangan santer kabar yang mengatakan BUMI berencana melakukan penerbitan saham baru yang mengkait-kaitkan CIC bakal menjadi pembeli siaga (standby buyer) dengan tujuan menjadi pemegang saham BUMI.

Dileep angkat bicara soal ini. Menurutnya, penerbitan saham baru memang salah satu opsi yang sedang dikaji perseroan. Mengenai CIC sebagai standby buyer, Dileep juga belum dapat memberikan kepastian.

“Sesuai regulasi, perusahaan terbuka dimungkinkan untuk menerbitkan saham baru untuk mendapatkan pendanaan. Itu salah satu opsi yang juga kami kaji jika memang diperlukan. Namun mekanismenya seperti apa, belum difinalisasi,” ujarnya.

Demikianlah kiranya skema ekspansi dan maha utang BUMI yang mengundang kontroversi itu. Meski banyak kalangan meragukan potensi keberhasilannya, namun BUMI mengaku optimistis jika seluruh rencana ini berhasil, maka mulai tahun 2013, BUMI akan mencatat kinerja keuangan yang mencengangkan.

“Proyeksi kami, mulai tahun 2013 pendapatan akan berlipat ganda dari apa yang diraih pada 2008,” ujarnya.
(dro/qom)

BUMI Raih Platts Top 250

A Petrobras  maior empresa brasileira em valor de mercado, apresentou  lucro líquido de R$ 7,303 bilhões no terceiro trimestre de 2009, contra R$ 9.843 bilhões no mesmo período em 2008, ou seja uma queda de 26% em relação ao mesmo período em 2008.

Veja os números:

^*Projeção média dos analistas de Ágora Corretora, BB Investimentos e Bradesco Corretora
^**Lucro antes de juros, impostos, depreciação e amortização

Kraft Foods Inc. (Kraft) today decided to directly approach the shareholders of Cadbury in a USD 16.3 billion hostile takeover bid. The two firms have been in negotiations since September when the Kraft made the initial offer to the Cadbury management. After the negotiations were not fruitful the Kraft management today decided to roll the ball in shareholder’s court.

The offer values a Cadbury share at GBP (£) 7.17 each which is a 26 percent premium to the price before Kraft made its original proposal. The offer is against the earlier expectations of the market analysts who had hoped that the current offer would be higher than the earlier bid.

Cadbury shares saw a 1.72 percent dip on the London Stock Exchange after the announcement was made but still managed to close above the bid price at £7.63 apiece. Kraft meanwhile seemed confident that the offer was fairly priced as the price was 13.9 times the value of Cadbury’s Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA).

The Cadbury’s management meanwhile seemed confident in their analysis of the situation when they claimed that the current offer is lower than September offer since Kraft’s share prices had dropped by 4percent since September.

“The repetition of a proposal which is now of less value and lower than the current Cadbury share price does not make it any more attractive,” Roger Carr, the company’s chairman, said in a statement. “As a result, the board has emphatically rejected this derisory offer and has strengthened its resolve to ensure the true value of Cadbury is fully understood by all.”

Source: nytimes.com

Analysts believe that the merger is a good and rational choice for the American manufacturer which will gain inroads in high growth markets like India, South Africa and Mexico with Cadbury brands like trident gums and Dairy Milk chocolate. Meanwhile they also noted that Kraft will have to raise the offer to at least £8 per share.

While the two firms still debate the issue the ball is now in shareholder’s court.

Irene Rosenfeld, the Kraft boss, took the battle to shareholders saying: ‘We remain convinced of the strategic merits for both companies of combining Kraft and Cadbury.’

In a direct challenge to Cadbury executives she said her proposal offers the ‘best immediate and long-term value‘ for Cadbury shareholders.

Source: dailymail.co.uk

If the bid is successful, it will be one of the biggest mergers of the year. As of now both the firms are readying forces for a battle that may stretch for months, with an army of investment bankers and lawyers.

A Dealogic’s profile of the deal by the Wall Street Journal.

WEG – A WEG apresentou seus resultados do 3T09, destacando-se consideráveis quedas nos principais indicadores financeiros em relação ao 3T08. Com o enfraquecimento das vendas no mercado interno (-8,1%) e principalmente no mercado externo (-24,6%), a empresa reportou uma diminuição de 13,7% na receita líquida e -15,1% em seu EBITDA. Vale ressaltar que, segundo a empresa, a tendência é de recuperação das vendas da companhia no curto prazo, uma vez que os produtos de ciclo curto (como motores para uso doméstico) demonstram forte recuperação em resposta ao reaquecimento do mercado de bens de consumo duráveis no Brasil. Já nos produtos de ciclo longo, a empresa continua a atender sua carteira de pedidos de forma eficiente.

BM&FBovespa – A BM&F Bovespa informou que celebrou com a Nasdaq, protocolos de intenções não vinculantes, para parcerias tecnológicas e comerciais de serviços e produtos. Entre os benefícios dessa parceria estão: (i) Desenvolvimento de roteamento de ordens entre os Estados Unidos e Brasil, através do qual Broker-Dealers americanos poderão enviar ordens de compra e venda de ações negociadas no sistema de negociação da BMF&Bovespa (Mega Bolsa), mediante contrato com um corretor brasileiro; (ii) Desenvolvimento de acordo comercial para que a Nasdaq possa distribuir, sem exclusividade, eletrônica e internacionalmente, os preços dos ativos negociados na BMFBovespa, sendo o mesmo direito conferido a bolsa paulista; (iii) Desenvolvimento de um acordo comercial para que a BM&FBovespa possa oferecer as companhias abertas brasileiras, produtos e serviços desenvolvidos pela Nasdaq, destinado a apoiar e facilitar as atividades de tais companhias, tais como de relação com investidores, de estruturação e assessoria aos conselhos de administração, de comunicado com o mercado e com analistas.

Fluxo – A Bovespa registrou a saída de R$ 467,516 milhões em capital externo em 21 de outubro. Em apenas dois dias após o governo ter decido taxar o capital externo que entra na bolsa em 2%, os investidores já retiraram R$ 1,729 bilhão de circulação. Com isso, no mês a bolsa brasileira acumula superávit de R$ 3,289 bilhões, resultado de compras de R$ 38,091 bilhões e vendas de R$ 34,801 bilhões. Em 2009, o saldo positivo recua para R$ 21,296 bilhões.

Este relatório foi desenvolvido pela equipe de análise de investimento da Gradual Investimentos. Trata-se de material de uso exclusivo da companhia e de seus clientes, não podendo ser publicado ou redistribuído sem prévia autorização escrita.

A Gradual Investimentos não mantém qualquer relação comercial com empregados das companhias analisadas e não recebe quaisquer benefícios financeiros das referidas companhias.

O presente relatório não deve ser considerado de forma isolada. Neste sentido, não só outras informações financeiras, mas também condições macroeconômicas devem ser consideradas pelo investidor.

Ainda que baseadas em perspectivas e estudos extensos da nossa equipe de análise, os preços, opiniões e projeções do presente relatório podem ser alteradas. Não obstante, a Gradual Investimentos não assume nenhuma responsabilidade em comunicar quaisquer destas alterações para as partes interessadas.

A Gradual Investimentos não deve, de maneira nenhuma, ser responsabilizada por ganhos ou perdas financeiras de clientes decorrentes de decisões tomadas com base neste relatório. ]]> http://naaltaounabaixa.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/tam-jbs-telemar-resumo-do-morning-call-de-hoje/ Fri, 23 Oct 2009 13:10:39 +0000 Equipe Gradual http://naaltaounabaixa.wordpress.com/2009/10/23/tam-jbs-telemar-resumo-do-morning-call-de-hoje/

TAM – A empresa comunicou que emitirá US$ 300 milhões em Bônus Garantidos, com vencimento em 2020. De acordo com o comunicado, os títulos pagarão cupons a cada semestre a uma taxa de 9,5% ao ano. Dado o perfil da dívida e a necessidade de novos investimentos no curto prazo, encaramos tal notícia de forma positiva.

JBS – Segundo informou a companhia, prosseguem os estudos que visam a unificação das operações de Bertin e JBS. Segundo a companhia, os atuais acionistas controladores da JBS e da Bertin deterão participação acionária indireta na JBS, por meio de uma nova holding. Encaramos de forma positiva tal anúncio, dado que há uma tendência de maior aproveitamento de sinergias da aquisição no curto prazo.

Telemar: No 3T09, as chamadas “Unidades Geradoras de Receitas”, ou seja, clientes somaram 60,5 milhões ao final de setembro/09, com apenas 651 mil novos usuários no trimestre e mais de 7,5 milhões de clientes em doze meses. Esse crescimento foi bem abaixo do 2T09 quando foram adicionados de 2,2 milhões. A Oi Móvel ainda é a principal alavanca, com adições de 886 mil novos clientes no 3T09, principalmente devido ao bom desempenho em São Paulo, onde a Oi já supera 10% de participação de mercado. Receita Bruta Consolidada totalizou R$11,6 bilhões, sendo 3,7% e 3,6% superior à do 2T09 e à do 3T08, respectivamente, principalmente devido ao desempenho das receitas de telefonia móvel e de comunicação de dados. Esse números vieram em linha. EBITDA Consolidado recorrente de R$2,65 bilhões, com margem de 35,1%, +1,6p.p. e +0,8p.p. em relação ao 2T09 e 3T08, respectivamente, e em linha com o esperado. Consideramos os resultados em linha com exceção do crescimento do número de clientes.

Fluxo – A Bovespa registrou a saída de R$ 1,262 bilhão em capital externo em 20 de outubro, com o início da cobrança do Imposto sobre Operações Financeiras (IOF) na entrada de capital estrangeiro para aplicações em renda fixa e variável. No dia, o Ibovespa recuou 2,88%, para 65.303,11 pontos, após ter atingido a maior pontuação desde 17 de junho do ano passado no pregão anterior.

Com isso, o superávit acumulado do mês de outubro caiu para R$ 3,757 bilhões, resultado de compras de R$ 35,933 bilhões e vendas de R$ 32,176 bilhões. Em 2009, o saldo positivo recuou para R$ 21,764 bilhões.

Este relatório foi desenvolvido pela equipe de análise de investimento da Gradual Investimentos. Trata-se de material de uso exclusivo da companhia e de seus clientes, não podendo ser publicado ou redistribuído sem prévia autorização escrita.

A Gradual Investimentos não mantém qualquer relação comercial com empregados das companhias analisadas e não recebe quaisquer benefícios financeiros das referidas companhias.

O presente relatório não deve ser considerado de forma isolada. Neste sentido, não só outras informações financeiras, mas também condições macroeconômicas devem ser consideradas pelo investidor.

Ainda que baseadas em perspectivas e estudos extensos da nossa equipe de análise, os preços, opiniões e projeções do presente relatório podem ser alteradas. Não obstante, a Gradual Investimentos não assume nenhuma responsabilidade em comunicar quaisquer destas alterações para as partes interessadas.

A Gradual Investimentos não deve, de maneira nenhuma, ser responsabilizada por ganhos ou perdas financeiras de clientes decorrentes de decisões tomadas com base neste relatório. ]]> http://bddecul.wordpress.com/2009/10/15/coin-ontario-et-champlain-3/ Thu, 15 Oct 2009 17:44:27 +0000 cuL http://bddecul.wordpress.com/2009/10/15/coin-ontario-et-champlain-3/

Fin.

Debt ratings agency, Fitch says that it expects the recent tariff war by new telecom entrants in India and the likely retaliation by incumbent operators, will have a significant impact on industry revenues and profitability.

The reduced tariffs will lower the ARPUs and operating margins for all industry players. In a recent report, Fitch stated that EBITDA margins of existing operators will fall on lower ARPUs in the near term. The exaggerated tariff reduction and competitive intensity will likely reduce ARPUs by 10%-15%, which is lower than expected.

The Indian telecom industry is witnessing price wars with the entry of the new telecom operators, which were allotted universal access service licenses (UASLs) in February 2008 by the Department of Telecommunication (DoT).

The new entrants (Aircel, Sistema Shyam Teleservices (SSTL) and Tata Docomo (GSM)) have launched aggressive tariff plans in an effort to garner subscriber market share. These new entrants have launched per second billing, either selectively or throughout their networks, while Tata CDMA has launched tariffs on a per call basis, irrespective of duration (Re 1 and Re 3 per call on local and STD, respectively). Following this trend, Reliance communication (Rcom) has reduced the tariff to 50 paise per minute for local, STD, roaming and SMS, for both off-net and on-net calls. BSNL has also launched per second billing plan in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa.

Fitch expects other incumbent operators to eventually match the reduced tariff plans, considering the adoption of mobile number portability in the near future.

Nevertheless, Fitch expects the Stable Outlook of the sector to continue, given the net monthly subscriber additions. However, the impending 3G and BWA auctions remain an event risk.

Fitch expects subscriber growth to be at a CAGR of 25%-30% over the next three years up to FY12, as compared to a CAGR of 44% in the last three years (FY07- FY09). The incumbent operators with strong balance sheets and strong portfolio of high-end customers in metro areas are expected to maintain their credit profile. However, Fitch expects new entrants to face increasing difficulties in garnering any meaningful market share, with already low tariffs leading to lower ARPUs, a lack of adequate spectrum quality and restrictions on spectrum sharing.

The telecom industry has yet to see service launch of other UASL holders like Etisalat DB Telecom India, Datacom, Telenor – Unitech wireless, Loop Telecom and S-tel. Fitch believes that the reduced industry profitability will likely expedite industry consolidation in the medium to long term.

Source: Fitch Ratings

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg

Valuing high growth companies is similar to answering a particular, open-ended question posed to me during an old business school interview: “Wade, how many ping pong balls can you fit in an empty 747 airplane?” Obviously, the estimation process is not an exact science, but rather an artistic exercise in which various techniques and strategies may be implemented to increase the accuracy of people’s approximations. The same principles apply to the tricky challenge of estimating the value of high growth companies like Facebook and Twitter.

Cash is King

Where does one start? Conceptually, one method used to determine a company’s value is by taking the present value of all future cash flows. For growth companies, earnings and cash flows can vary dramatically and small changes in assumptions (i.e., revenue growth rates, profit margins, discount rates, taxes, etc.) can lead to drastically different valuations.  As I have mentioned in the past, cash flow analysis is a great way to value companies across a broad array of industries – excluding financial companies (see previous article on cash flow investing).

Mature companies operating in stable industries may be piling up cash because of limited revenue growth opportunities. Such companies may choose to pay out dividends, buyback stock, or possibly make acquisitions of target competitors. However, for hyper-growth companies earlier in their business life-cycles, (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), discretionary cash flow may be directly reinvested back into the company, allocated towards numerous growth projects. If these growth companies are not generating a lot of excess free cash flow (cash flow from operations minus capital expenditures), then how does one value such companies? Typically, under a traditional DCF (discounted cash flow model), limited early year cash flows are forecasted out many years into the future until more substantial cash flows in the future are discounted back to today. This process is philosophically pure, but very imprecise and subject to the manipulation and bias of various inputs.

To combat the multi-year wiggle room of a subjective DCF, I choose to calculate what I call “adjusted free cash flow” (cash flow from operations minus depreciation and amortization). The adjusted free cash flow approach gives you a perspective on how much cash a growth company theoretically can generate if it decides to not pursue incremental growth projects in excess of maintenance capital expenditures (I use depreciation and amortization as a proxy for maintenance CAPEX.). I believe these figures are much more reliable in valuing companies because such cash flow based metrics are less subject to manipulation compared to traditional measures like earnings per share (EPS) and net income on the income statement.

Rationalizing Ratios

Other valuation methods to consider for growth companies*:

• PE Ratio: The price-earnings ratio indicates how expensive a stock is by comparing its share price to the company’s earnings.
• PEG Ratio (PE-to-Growth): This metric compares the PE ratio to the earnings growth rate percentage. As a rule of thumb, PEG ratios less than one are considered attractive to some investors, regardless of the absolute PE level.
• Price to Sales: This ratio is less precise in my mind because companies can’t pay investors dividends, buy back stock, or make acquisitions with “sales” – discretionary capital comes from earnings and cash flows.
• Price to Book: Compares the market capitalization (price) of the company with the book value (or equity) component on the balance sheet.
• EV/EBITDA: Enterprise value (EV) is the total value of the market capitalization plus the value of the debt, divided by EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization). Some investors use EBITDA as an income-based surrogate of cash flow.
• FCF Yield: One of my personal favorites – you can think of this percentage as an inverted PE ratio that substitutes free cash flow for earnings. Rather than a yield on a bond, this ratio effectively provides investors with a yield on a stock.

*All The ratios above should be reviewed both on an absolute basis and relative basis in conjunction with comparable companies in an industry. Faster growing industries, in general, should carry higher ratio metrics.

Taking Facebook and Twitter Public

Before we can even take a stab at some of these growth company valuations, we need to look at the historical financial statements (income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement). In the case of Facebook and Twitter, since these companies are private, there are no publically available financial statements to peruse. Private investors are generally left in the dark, limited to public news related to what other early investors have paid for ownership stakes. For example, in July, a Russian internet company paid $100 million for a stake in Facebook, implying a $6.5 billion valuation for the total company.  Twitter recently obtained a $100 million investment from T. Rowe Price and Insight Venture Partners thereby valuing the total company at $1 billion.

Valuing growth companies is quite different than assessing traditional value companies. Because of the earnings and cash flow volatility in growth companies, the short-term financial results can be distorted. I choose to find market leading franchises that can sustain above average growth for longer periods of time (“long runways”). Compared to the average investor, I tend to look out further in time until the apparent short-term “expensive” metrics eventually become “cheap.” Google (GOOG) is a perfect example – what many investors thought was ridiculously expensive, at the $85 per share Initial Public offering (IPO) price, ended up skyrocketing to over $700 per share and continues to trade near a very respectable level of $500 per share.

The IPO market is heating up and A123 Systems Inc (AONE) is a fresh example. Often these companies are volatile growth companies that require a deep dive into the financial statements. There is no silver bullet, so different valuation metrics and techniques need to be reviewed in order to come up with more reasonable valuation estimates. Valuation measuring is no cakewalk, but I’ll take this challenge over estimating the number of ping pong balls I can fit in an airplane, any day. Valuing growth companies just requires an understanding of how the essential earnings and cash flow metrics integrate with the fundamental dynamics surrounding a particular company and industry. Now that you have graduated with a degree in Growth Company Valuation 101, you are ready to open your boutique investment bank and advise Facebook and Twitter on their IPO price (the fees can be lucrative if you are not under TARP regulations).

DISCLOSURE: Sidoxia Capital Management and client accounts do not have direct long positions AONE, however some Sidoxia client accounts do hold GOOG securities at the time this article was published. No information accessed through the Investing Caffeine (IC) website constitutes investment, financial, legal, tax or other advice nor is to be relied on in making an investment or other decision. Please read disclosure language on IC “Contact” page.

M-am gandit sa aduc un plus de substanta articolelor relativ simpliste despre evaluari. Asa ca am decis sa concep un articol ceva mai detaliat.

In evaluarea afacerilor lucrurile nu sunt atat de simple ca doar un multiplu de EBITDA inmultit cu EBITDA auditata din perioada incheiata, valoare din care scadem datoriile purtatoare de dobanda si la care adaugam cash-ul. In realitate evaluarile sunt mult mai complexe si asta e doar versiunea cea mai simpla, si care desi ajunge sa fie discutata foarte mult, iar practicienii prefera s-o mentioneze in presa pentru simplitatea ei, asta nu inseamna ca doar asta se face.

Exemple de alte evaluari ale afacerilor ar fi:

• DCF (cautati pe investopedia ca sa intelegeti conceptul), dar in mare se bazeaza pe evaluarea azi a intregii valori create in viitor de catre obiectul de evaluat – este de departe cea mai corecta metoda, din pacate foarte susceptibila lipsei de antrenament managerial, ceea ce face ca evaluarile in Romania bazate pe metoda asta sa includa un grad ridicat de susceptibilitate, dar repet este metoda cea mai corecta
• yield/capitalizare, iarasi o serie de modele simpliste insa relativ utilizate, mai ales pentru afaceri care ofera rezultate egale in fiecare an, iar modelul asta mie imi da fiori, avand in vedere reducerea riscului doar la rata de discount (sau la comparatia cu rata de discount)
• evaluari ale activelor (in foarte multe forme existente, la valoarea de constructie, la valoarea de inlocuire etc) foarte rar utilizata in practica, insa e o metoda corecta daca lichidezi compania, sau daca aparent evaluarea afacerii este foarte mica si ai putea sa obtii mai mult pe active.

Un lucru foarte important de mentionat este ca evaluarea afacerii nu are niciodata o alta aplicatie decat cea din perspectiva unei tranzactii (desi exista evaluari din perspectiva managementului, actionariatului, bancii, toate celelalte forme doar sunt motive simplificate a unei tranzactii), si de asta “valoarea unei afaceri” pe care o mentionam foarte des are intentia unei valori de piata. Numai ca si evaluarea are un termen de valabilitate, fapt pentru care esta valabila doar la un anumit moment dat, deoarece anumite lucruri sunt foarte sensibile la piata, si am sa dau din nou exemplul cu EBITDA, cand evaluarea a picat in 18 luni din 8x in 4x, lucru care cred ca a intristat multi antreprenori care-si vad monetizarea averilor diminuata.

Poate ca aici e cazul sa explic ce fac eu in viata de zi cu zi. Eu am clienti aceste companii, pe care le inteleg si le fac tranzactionabile, le imbunatatesc indicatorii, si le explic ipotezele, incat sa avem tranzactii in beneficiul clientului (in cazul de fata vanzatorul).

PS. Am dat exemplul cu evaluarea firmei pre si post-lehman si intr-o discutie la TMC, si sper usor usor sa ajunga sa penetreze piata.

PS2. Din cand in cand voi reveni cu articole despre ce fac in viata de zi cu zi, insa daca vreti sa discutam afaceri ma gasiti la Osprey Partners.

Facing increasing competition and commoditization from traditional telecom products, service providers are either in the process of or planning for the move to next generation, converged, network infrastructures in order to offer new, revenue-generating services.

Making this transformation can be complex and difficult. However, if done correctly, working with a managed services provider and outsourcing all or part of the next generation network planning, implementation and management, the transition to the new infrastructure can occur quickly and efficiently and with reduced risk.

I was today speaking with a close friend working in a well-known bank who was asking for some credentials of some managed-services companies in Europe. Why? Because there’s a recent interest in the investment community to bet for companies delivering technology solutions through a managed services model as it seems that these companies have weathered the current economic recession better than any other companies (across different industries) that are focused on more traditional product and support sales.

Though profits from both groups have been negatively affected by the economy in the past year, managed services providers have been better able to generate cash flow, avoid wild quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in income and generally outperform traditional technology resellers. Top managed services providers hold their profits longer even as the economy headed down; therefore, it can be thought that they will begin their recovery sooner.

EBITDA is a reasonable proxy for a company’s ability to generate cash flow. Most of our clients are demanding EBITDA improvement measures so, we are supporting different telecom mobile operators in discussing a number of options available to managed services providers – ranging from network outsourcing to network management and operations to hosted applications – with the aim of addressing the potential EBITDA benefits associated with each of these options.

But there’s a relevant remark that should be advised to anyone before getting into managed services: Companies assessing managed services and outsourcing opportunities typically focus on the benefits while overlooking the risks, often resulting in failed initiatives. We therefore suggest a methodical approach whenever analysing such an opportunity as we consider it critical to maximize the benefits and avoid the pitfalls. Case you want to know why, I suggest to take a look at the following teaser. Will help you understand our positioning. Enjoy the reading.

Best, CVA.

We recently concluded an interesting and challenging assignment: reducing costs in a mobile telecom operator to improve EBITDA levels in more than 5 percentage points in a 6 months period. As said, extremelly challenging. Why? After more than 6 months of crisis, the most obvious operational inefficiencies in telecom operators have already been wrung out of the system recently. The low-hanging fruit has been picked, and yet more cost savings must be found. There was, in other words, a need for a new, more comprehensive approach to cost containment that looked beyond the obvious and delved deeper into the organization.

mmC Group used a pragmatic -quick-wins driven- unit cost reduction method based on extensive internal and external benchmarks to optimize costs. The methodology ensured ‘dedicated’ client participation and sign-offs on implementable ideas at all senior levels in the client organization. A robust tracking and monitoring mechanism was instituted to ensure systematic implementation and savings accruals to the client.

Savings worth a significant per cent of the addressable cost base were syndicated. Currently, we are assisting the client to implement and institutionalize an ‘internal’ continuous improvement program. Eventually revenue will get a boost as 3G services are adopted by consumers, but for the present and next years, cost optimization will be the way for operators to stay ahead of their game and to sustain long-term innovation capability. Please find next the cost reduction case slides we have prepared for this post. Feel free to ask for additional detail if required.

Enjoy the reading. CVA

]]> http://aikresearch.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/vivendi-revenues-up-24-driven-by-31-5-rise-in-sales-at-sfr-france/ Fri, 15 May 2009 17:48:20 +0000 aikservices http://aikresearch.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/vivendi-revenues-up-24-driven-by-31-5-rise-in-sales-at-sfr-france/ http://aikresearch.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/life-announces-q1-results-ukraine/ Fri, 15 May 2009 17:45:11 +0000 aikservices http://aikresearch.wordpress.com/2009/05/15/life-announces-q1-results-ukraine/ http://vladmaior.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/despre-cash-banci-si-vreme-buna/ Fri, 07 Aug 2009 06:39:23 +0000 vladmaior http://vladmaior.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/despre-cash-banci-si-vreme-buna/

Cred ca s-a vorbit enorm de mult despre criza pe toate canalele de comunicatie: TV, radio, internet (ca sa nu mai zic de canalele de social media) peste tot criza este subiectul principal. Tot ce se discuta pleaca de la criza sau duce la o dezbatere pe tema crizei.

O evaluare si un exit a unui client dintr-o companie in care detinea jumatate dintre actiuni, care activeaza pe o piata fara foarte multi competitori in acest moment, o piata cu o legislatie facuta parca sa ii ajute pe cei care au apucat sa lanseze afaceri in acest domeniu (din pacate, din motive de confidentialitate nu voi putea da foarte multe detalii), m-au facut sa realizez insa ceva: nu mai conteaza cat este EBITDA, sau cat este planul facut la inceputul anului de management si care si in conditiile actuale s-ar fi putut atinge, nu mai conteaza faptul ca, asa cum am zis, nu sunt foarte multi competitori pe aceasta piata. Punctul final este ca shareholder-ii sa poate afla cat de lichida este compania si cat de repede pot fi transformate in cash activele companiei. Lipsa de cash domina conceptia si preocuparile investitorilor.

De ce am vrut sa spun acest lucru? Pentru ca tot in aceste zile am discutat cu reprezentanti ai unei banci despre posibilitatea finantarii acestei afaceri. Desi am petrecut aproape 3 ani in domeniul bancar ma vad acum nevoit sa incerc sa le retransmit fostilor colegi de bransa faptul ca  tocmai lipsa cash-ului ii aduce pe clienti la banci. Nu dorinta nebuna de a mai contracta un credit, nu placerea de a ii explica cu pasiune unui reprezentant al bancii povestea afacerii si apoi sa primeasca remarci seci pline de cifre si explicatia “asta este politica bancii”. Nu. Ci lipsa de cash. Si eventual speranta unei COLABORARI cu banca.  

Stiu ca este un fapt evident nevoia de cash a unei companii, stiu ca sunt importanti indicatori precum free cash-flow sau CAPEX in analiza afaceri din perspectiva bancii. Dar ce bine ar fi totusi daca antreprenorii si managementul companiilor private ar primi raspunsuri bazate pe argumente solide si nu pe cele de genul celei de mai sus, la care mai adaug acum pe final si “astea sunt normele interne ale bancii, noi nu avem ce face”

Cred eu, ca e un putina lipsa de fair-play ca dupa ce bancile au pompat bani in companii viabile sau nu, pentru a atinge target-uri si cote de piata, acum sa raspunda ca mai sus. NU uit insa ce se zice despre banci “O banca iti da o umbrela cand e vreme frumoasa si ti-o ia inapoi cand incepe ploaia”

P.S. Poate ca intr-un post viitor voi ruga si reprezentanti ai unei banci sa ne scrie parerea lor.

Si inca ceva, englezismele din text sunt doar motivul lipseri unor termeni romanesti potriviti. Asadar scuze, dar e cel mai bine asa

EBITDA Formula Still Has Issues!

By Brian Madigan LL.B.

Peculiar initials, but what do they mean? The definition of EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.

It is said to be a measure of the profitability of a business. Frequently, a business will be prepared for sale. The business will be removed from the real estate it occupies. Separate financial statements will be prepared for each. The vendor’s objective is to make both aspects look good on paper. In many cases, there will be two different buyers, one for the business and another for the real estate.

There is a real opportunity here for some creative accounting. The real estate can probably stand on its own. Ultimately, the real estate should fetch a market price coincident with that otherwise found in the marketplace.

The business is a little different. Most businesses are sold on the basis of a multiplier calculated on net profits. Small businesses will trade from one-half of one year’s earnings plus inventory up to three times in some cases. Medium sized companies will often trade in the range of three to seven times earnings (with or without inventory) and large companies will trade for seven to fourteen times earnings (inventory included). This is the usual range for profitable companies listed on a major stock exchange. Obviously, the technology companies are an exception.

This is where EBITDA comes in. Stockbrokers and particularly stock promoters wished to have their companies appear in a very good light. In fact, it can make capital intensive marginally profitable companies look quite good on paper. Market analysts over the past few years have criticized this approach pointing out that it does not truly represent real operating cash flow. EBITDA omits to consider variations in accounting methods, cash required for working capital, debt payments and other fixed expenses, as well as capital expenditures. These issues are critical to every operating business, and it can be foolhardy to base an evaluation of a business on the earnings calculated in this manner. EBITDA has its place in a proper analysis, but don’t let the vendor establish a sale price using this method alone.

The Real Estate and Business Brokers Act governs the real estate profession in both matters: the property and the business. But it doesn’t say anything about how to undertake the math or which formulas to use. So, be careful and fully understand the accounting methods used to justify the sale price when you are considering purchasing an operating business.

Brian Madigan LL.B., Realtor is an author and commentator on real estate matters,

“Transpacific admits declared past earnings ‘inflated’” ~ the Australian…

Silly drama making headline from the Australian… property sales only made up $20m+ out of about $500 million in EBITA !!! though the earnings revision for the upcoming period is more worrisome – that is the real negative point

Article from: The Australian
TERRY Peabody’s Transpacific Industries admitted yesterday that past earnings had been inflated with undisclosed one-off items, such as profits from land sales.

And the company opted to reveal the items only after the completion of an “independent due diligence process” as part of an $800million fund raising to tackle its crippling debt levels.

The waste management business said yesterday it would in future report earnings before interest, tax depreciation and amortisation “splitting out underlying operating EBITDA from irregular items to facilitate greater transparency between reporting periods”.

Under this new approach, Transpacific revealed the $540.5m EBITDA reported in 2007-08 included included $48m of “irregular items”, including a $22.1m profit on the sale of land, a $17m reversal in a remediation provision and sundry items of $8.9m. Excluding these items, underlying operating EBITDA would have been $492.5m. Transpacific also revealed EBITDA in 2008-09 would fall 9per cent to $447m — significantly below early guidance.

Net profit is expected to be down 57 per cent to $61m, before a $210.3m charge, largely asset writedowns.

“Transpacific, if continuing to test the carrying value of goodwill, doubtful debts, contracts and listed securities and as a result the actual financial results may vary materially from the forecast financial information and any variation may be positive or negative,” the company said. The admission comes as the company attempts to raise $800m with its new cornerstone investor, US private equity group Warburg Pincus, which will invest up to $496m as part of the equity raising to reduce group debt of $2.1 billion.

Provided the raising goes ahead as planned, Transpacific will secure waivers and debt extensions from its lenders to avoid breaching loan covenants.

The recapitalisation plan, which will cut Mr Peabody’s stake in the company he chairs from 38 per cent to as little as 19per cent, must be approved by the Australian Securities Exchange and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.

Analysts were yesterday scathing of Transpacific, with Matthew Crowe of JP Morgan claiming the company had finally “come clean”.

“Transpacific has confirmed what we believe many in the market has suspected for a long time — that (2007-08) earnings included profit from asset sales that were not identified as such,” he said.

Mr Crowe said as late as December, Transpacific was suggesting it would record a 13-16 per cent rise in 2008-09 EBITDA to $600m. “Now management is flagging an underlying EBITDA result of less than $450m,” he said. “This release certainly contradicts management’s previous claims that its operating earnings were ‘recession proof’.”

Almost every other part of the company’s business has suffered from the impact of economic downturn.

“The only good news in this release was that banks have agreed to waive the debt covenant breach and extend existing bank facilities on condition that the proposed equity raising proceeds,” Mr Crowe said.

JPMorgan said this was the company’s fourth profit downgrade since its shares were suspended on February 16.

The bank has revised down Transpacific’s earnings by 5 per cent for last financial year, 11 per cent in 2009-10 and 9 per cent in 2010-11.

Another analyst said Mr Peabody’s position as chairman may be reviewed after the recapitalisation is completed and the suspension is lifted on Transpacific shares.

The company expects to launch the prospectus for the capital raising in two weeks.

Magasin de cuL