The French rightly pride themselves on having inspired American remakes like “the Dinner for Schmucks” and “True Lies.” They also rightfully complain that Americans always spoiled the artistic touch in the original movies. For once the roles are reversed in real life and not on cinema reels. The French remake being shot now in Mali of the 2003 ‘Mission Accomplished” flick starring George W. Bush does not, thus far, show any promise of improving on the American original action drama.

Credit should be given when due, Mr Hollande’s decision to put boots on the ground is a responsible choice– better late than never. However, the real question today is: does France have a credible exit strategy that does not result in another botched war in Northern Mali? President Hollande’s PR-minded visit to Mali’s liberated north along with the nation’s interim President Dioncounda Traoré felt like a an eery replay of George W. Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” moment aboard a US aircraft carrier. While Mr Hollande and his host were prudent not to declare the fight against Jihadis over, they had more rhetoric than concretes to offer as an assessment of the current situation. Most media stories reported the event without really questioning the next phases in the conflict.

Just as in 2003, Hollande echoed Bush’s pledges of grandiose plans for rebuilding Iraq. Like the images of Iraqis tearing down Saddam’s statue in 2003, footage of effusive and jubilant locals praising Mr Hollande and their liberators has been rolling on cable news channels around globe. A weak and temporary fill-in until Mali resumes its democratic regime interrupted by military coups, Mr Taroré did not have much to say about reconciliation with the North other than a vague willingness to negotiate with the MNLA. Behind the smiles, and the photos ops, no concrete plan seems to exist to fix Mali’s multidimensional failures.

On the security front, the draw down of France’s 3000 troops has already been decided. the official line is that ECOWAS troops will support Malian troops hereon forward. The United States has pledged $10 Million Dollars to help train Mali’s army. this being the same army that melted in battle last winter when Jihadis took it head on, one cannot help but wonder whether this check is a buy-out option from a hopeless task? Whatever the answer is, it is imperative that the Malian army be continuously supervised lest its undisciplined troops engage in yet another round of vigilante retribution against civilians they deem to be in cahoots with the enemy.

As of January 20, only 450 out of the 4500 ECOWAS troops pledged were already on Malian soil. Almost half are from Chad, the rest are spread between Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin and Togo. Of course, the devil is in the details; Benin sent policemen, and Ghana sent combat engineers — neither are exactly frontline combat troops. Of course, these numbers increased in the last 10 days but the questions remain valid: other than Nigeria’s and Chad’s troops, how soon can we expect that this mishmash can be forged into a credible fighting force?

Speaking of mishmash and cultural references, experience in Iraq and Afghanistan show that any foreign troops have a very short time window to adapt to local cultures and traditions. Sub-saharan troops are not an exception to this rule. Just as their Western counterparts in the past decade, they are entering into an alien culture whose intricacies and codes they must quickly grasp or risk being seen by locals as a serious nuisance in their lives. After all, who could forget how quickly Iraqis’ shouts of “Thank you America” turned into “down down America”?

Conspicuously absent when the going got rough, Europe’s leaders seem all too content to have dodged another war they could avoid. Of course, they pledged 50 Million Euros to fund the African contingent being deployed in Mali and to send trainers. Decidedly, the European Union is a coalition of the amnesiacs. over a decade, Western European nations diligently filled terrorist coffers with ransom money to free EU hostages. Way above the $100 Million mark, that money went a long way in helping Jihadis buy arms and train future terrorists. Consequently, the onus of showing responsible leadership remains on EU member countries. They should, at least, triple their financial and military assistance to France. if not for their own security, it is a step on the way to repair the damage their policies caused to Mali and the region’s security. Their credibility and commitment to combat international terrorism depends on it.

With Jihadis melting in nature, and quickly disappearing in the depth of the Sahara, France, African nations, and the world at large are better served by some candor: there are not enough troops on the ground. Mr Hollande does not yet have an exit strategy, Mali’s military and governance require years to rebuild. After the joy recedes, the people freshly liberated in northern Mali will be expecting all the rosy promises made to them to be fulfilled. For that to happen, the international community should follow France’s lead and shoulder its part of the responsibility. Anything short of a full Bosnia-style UN mission in northern Mali can not be a serious response to a an equally serious problem. For the sake of peace, we can only hope that today l’impossible n’est pas Français!

Frank Otchere, has successfully built and used a solar CooKit in Ghana. Expanding on what he has done, over 60 solar cookers have been constructed by villagers, and are being marketed for about $5 for one. Otchere and Bannerman had arranged to assist in supporting solar cooking in Ghana: Bannerman to focus in the Upper East, Upper West and Northern regions; whereas Otchere in the Eastern, Ashanti and Brong-Ahafo regions.

Efforts to improve on this invention by governments, individuals and nongovernmental organizations have been recorded enormously. Eleven women from the West Africa Network for Peace Building and the Women in Peace Building Network had a one-month training workshop in Ghana on making of solar stoves. The women were selected from Margibi, Montserrado, Bong, Nimba and Lofa. In a similar development, many participants from several parts of Togo and Ghana were present at a conference organized by Jeunes Volontaires pour l’Environnement (JVE), displaying solar cooking and solar water pasteurization. Construction workshops were also available to conference participants. Beneficiaries of a JVE solar project gave evidence of how solar cooking has touched lives in the Vo region. Present at the conference were Togo’s Deputy Director of the Ministry of Environment and the Minister of Youth, and representatives of the media.

In the northern region of Ghana, Grace Akawe supervises 90 solar cookers and the users in Tamale and the immediate societies; she goes there twice every week. Whereas in the upper west region, Jacinta Ziem supervises a entirety of 25 solar cookers and their users in the municipality of Wa and the surrounding areas, where she visits two Saturdays in a month. Both of them are famous in their vicinity and have grown a strong relationship among the users. As they do the supervision, they also teach the users of the solar cooker on the ways to maintain it and keep it fit to use at all times.

In Liberia, for instance, NGO Sustainability’s project is introducing Small Scale Solar and this move intends to sustain community participation in training on the use and making of solar cookers, enhanced cook stoves, solar pumps, WAPIs and solar lanterns. It is expected that upon triumphant achievement of this, the project would be initiated in other areas of Liberia as a scheme that assists in the alleviation of an adjustment to climate change. In a related development, True Faith Missions (Pastor Hal Nichols) has introduced solar oven to communities in Liberia and it is making a mammoth accomplishment and so far nine families have built and are using them, and the people were very glad to learn that they can cook rice using the sun.

In Nigeria, Prof. RoseAchunine had met with students of the Department of Physics and Industrial Physics at Evan Enwerem University in Owerri, a south eastern city. The students have designed their own edition of parabolic solar cookers and solar box cookers. They desire to enhance effectiveness and homogenize their designs to make the solar cookers more proficient and trustworthy for use by local inhabitants, as well as metropolitan inhabitants. They will carry on their endeavor to offer training workshops for the rural inhabitants. In a similar vein, Margaret Koshoni presented a solar cooking seminar in Lagos. The seminar was organized by the Cosmopolitan Women’s Club with over 400 participants from government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, women’s groups, schools, and even a few banks, in attendance. As a result of the usefulness of the seminar, Lagos State Government’s Commissioner for Women Affairs urged Koshoni to organize future workshops for the whole Lagos State Local Government Areas. On the same accomplishment, Renewable Energy Technology Company Ltd had a training program on solar cooking at New Bussa, Niger state. The company further collaborated with Girls Guide/Scout of America for the Girls Guide of Nigeria to replicate the workshop on solar cooking at the Women Centre in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria.

The Gambia is not left out of the solar cooker initiative. Lamin Sawo of the Health Education and Agricultural Development (AHEAD) discussed exploits in AHEAD’s large-scale solar cooking scheme in The Gambia, disclosing that 900 households now use solar cookers. AHEAD had carried out solar cooking trainings in five villages in Gambia and had workshops where it trained 12-15 women per village in the art of making and using solar cookers. These women that were trained in turn trained others. They have put up a trainers’ cooperative called Tilo Tabiro. In a similar effort, Boka Loho Organization, has built and demonstrated solar cookers at agricultural shows and other events. They manufacture cookers, tutor users, and also work with schools in the encouragement and support of solar energy usage. In supporting this move, the Gambia Ministry of Trade and Industry has trained women’s groups as users and carpenters in the making of box cookers for solar cooker making.

Mali has also bought into the initiative of solar cooker, as The Association of Handicapped Women of Mali (AMAFH) continues to put together solar cooker training for its members in Bamako, with assistance from the Association of Women Engineers (AFIMA) and monetary assistance from Dutch KoZon Foundation. At the moment AMAFH has taught 60 deaf and hard-of-hearing women, fifty women with leprosy and 20 mentally disabled women on means of utilizing CooKit solar cooker at two day training it organized for them.

The Togolese are also in the race to catch up with solar cooker revolution as Jeunes Volontaires pour l’Environnement (JVE) has taken its hot message to over 150 youths in the country. Over 100 participants from several cities in Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Benin assembled for a workshop in Notse. On this three-day workshop, participants learnt fundamental solar cooking concepts and skills; they crafted their own solar CooKits. JVE had organized Operation Amis du Soleil, a five-day gathering in the Casablanca quarter of Lome and this brought jointly numerous numbers of persons, the majority of which were youth, to be trained on solar cooker use and to make solar cookers for JVE’s solar water pasteurization project in Vo prefecture.

The prospects of solar cooker in West African urban poor communities are enormous; about 87% households use either kerosene or firewood in making their food in the region. In Nigeria, for instance, kerosene is no longer affordable generality of the populace as the price has skyrocketed in the face of subsidy removal and sharp practices by marketers who convert the commodity to aviation fuel. And those who use electric stoves are likely to opt for the solar cooker option too as power supply is epileptic and increasing in cost. Desperate search for firewood has been caused serious deforestation, exposing the communities to the vagaries of climate change. Those trainees who eventually venture into the business of making solar cooker are likely to be in for a boom, as the liquefied natural gas alternative to kerosene, electric and wood stoves is yet to kindle.

Of course, immediate areas of intervention should include support for businesses and not-for-profits engaged in training, production and support for users of solar cookers in West Africa. Government agencies, especially MDAs responsible for health, environment, energy, technology, women and the like, must be made to understand the organic place of these devices through behavior change workshops and exercises. In its discussion on sustainable energy for all, the regional body ECOWAS must take local technological inventions in the region serious and must commit more money for research and development where initiatives like this can be improved upon and standardized. This will be most imperative for ECOWAS as it pushes for West African regional integration as technology is a driving force for development.

Described as France’s “exclusive sphere of influence” or “pré-carré”, we still find today the French military across Africa, mainly in Senegal, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, the Central African Republic, Chad and Djibouti. With its multiple interventions in African countries, France’s role in postcolonial African affairs has shaped the destiny of many of its former colonies.

Military interventions date back to the decolonization era and have changed throughout time, depending on the context, however, they have remained in the form of political and strategic interventions. For instance, the interventions in Gabon and “Biafra” in the 1960s could both fall into the category of political interventions. In the case of Gabon, the French military intervention reinstated Leon M’ba in power, after a successful coup had taken place a few days earlier. Such an intervention showed that “a move against a leader closely aligned with Paris might invite intervention” mainly to maintain a “minimum of public order” and subsequently to protect important economic ties between the two countries. In the case of Biafra,  France sent weapons, through its partners in the region (Gabon, Cote d’Ivoire and Chad) for two main reasons: to diminish Anglo Saxon influence in Nigeria, one of Africa’s largest countries, and to secure oil reserves. In this case, supporting “self-determination” and fueling war was important, only because it was in line with French interests.

Strategic interventions on the other hand are defined as the occupation of a geostrategic location, which explains today why we still find multiple French military bases on the continent. In fact, the rapid deployment of troops in Mali was facilitated by the presences of these troops across West Africa. Also, the presence of these troops has allowed many leaders to “count on the protection of Paris”, through defense agreements, which subsequently may explain the weaknesses of many African armies today.

• Is the intervention in Mali justified?

Under the framework set by the U.N Security Council Resolution 2085, France intervened in Mali for two main reasons: First, because the intervention was officially requested by the Interim Malian president, Dioncounda Traore, and secondly because without such an intervention, the multiple groups occupying Northern Mali may have taken over the entire country. However, the issue with military interventions is that they are never as clear as they seem to be, especially when one looks at previous French interventions in other countries. So, is the intervention in Mali a strategic one, a political one or a humanitarian one?

On one hand, this can be viewed as a strategic intervention to fight “terrorist” organizations, which pose as a threat to French and other Western interests in the region. Mali is the third largest producer of gold and is showing signs of having large reserves of uranium and oil, like its neighbor, Niger. Allowing the various groups to march into Bamako would have resulted not only into thousands of French and other western citizens being held hostage but would have also jeopardized economic ties between both countries. Without an intervention, this could have also spilled over into neighboring Niger, the world’s fifth largest producer of uranium, where Areva, a French public multinational, operates since 1958. This could have subsequently aggravated the Boko Haram issue, gaining support from Niger and further destabilizing Nigeria, one of the world’s largest producer of crude oil and France’s largest African supplier of crude oil. This intervention has also led the U.S to draw plans to add a drone base in West Africa, filling the “gap in the Pentagon’s military capabilities over the Sahara, which remains out of reach of its drone bases in East Africa and Southern Europe”. Such a base would also require at least 250 Air Force personnel to supervise missions and maintain the planes.

Could this intervention be a political one, to later put in power a leader close to the West? Only time will tell, even though Francois Holland, French president, has pledged to put an end to “Francafrique”.

Is this a humanitarian intervention? It certainly can be viewed as one, since the request was made by Interim President, Dioncounda Traore, to get rid of the various groups imposing Sharia law and destroying mausoleums and precious manuscripts in Northern Mali. Taking over the capital, Bamako, would mean that Shariaw law would have been imposed throughout Mali, a secular state with a constitution that provides for freedom of religion.

Why is it that ECOWAS member countries and the African Union have been struggling to take care of the Malian problem? It may primarily be because this would expose the weaknesses of many West African countries and sending troops would also mean that ECOWAS countries would have to re-organize their armies, within their respective countries, to make sure no one takes advantage of the troops reductions. Other African countries, outside ECOWAS, could provide support by sending troops and this has already been done on many occasions, like in Sudan and Somalia, however, there are funding problems. An African-led military intervention in Mali would cost approximately $1 Billion and so far International donors have pledged $455 million, with the African Union pledging $50 Million. A foreign intervention in Mali was therefore necessary to stop the country from falling into the hands of Islamist groups.

• How will a military intervention resolve the problems Malians are facing today?

For now, most countries seem to be focused on the immediate objective, which is to oust the various groups occupying Northern Mali. However, what are the long term plans to make sure Mali doesn’t fall into the same situation in the next 10 to 50 years?  How long will the French army be operating in Mali, since the Malian army does not have the capacity to operate alone?

One of the recurring problems we see in Africa, since independence, is how to make sense of “nationhood”, when many national borders were “arbitrarily” drawn, and how to bring greater stability to a country where many languages, religions and cultures coincide. For too long, national armies have been solely relied on to bring such stability, by crushing any possible rebellions or revolts and sometimes participating in them, without creating structures with strong foundations to prevent conflict. Should some authority be given back to traditional rulers, scrapped during colonization and replaced by westernized elites, to provide some kind of stability and legitimacy to central governments? In other words, how can the state be accepted as the larger symbol, while at the same time accepting that it may be composed of multiple and equal (in rights) smaller nations? In order to accept the whole (the state), as Mazrui suggests, there should be some kind of homogenization of cultural identities, however how much is too much?

In the case of Mali, although military intervention against some of the Al-Qaeda affiliated groups is necessary, will such an intervention oust all of these groups from Mali? Several reports have shown that Quatar, an ally of France, may be financing some of the groups in Northern Mali to expand its influence in the region. Publicly denouncing, and imposing sanctions, although unlikely, on states funding these groups, would be the right path towards crippling them.

Also, will such an intervention respond to the demands made by the National Movement for the liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a group usually associated with the Tuareg population? Several reports are already mentioning various killings of Tuareg civilians, accused by the population of having started the current conflict. How can the interim government make sure this does not get out of hand?

There have been several Tuareg-led rebellions in the past 20 years, denouncing their marginalization by the central government and demanding more autonomy and respect of the cultures and rights of the people of the Azawad. Multiple agreements, between both parties, have been signed however, it seems like they weren’t enough to prevent conflict.  Although security sector reforms may be necessary to make sure the Malian army is better equipped and trained to protect the country’s national borders and fight Al-Qaeda affiliated groups, this conflict started as a political one, and it should be resolved as such. Nationwide elections won’t be enough and institutional reforms, such as better-decentralized programs to provide some autonomy to different parts of the country, will be needed. Finally, these post-conflict discussions will have to include civil society organizations and religious groups, so as to make sure that the various political structures put in place cater to all Malians.

Olivier Bucyana.

Afua Hirsch. “Mali’s army suspected of abuses and unlawful killings as war rages”. The Guardian. 19/01/2013.

Andrew Hansen. “The French Military in Africa”. Council on Foreign Relations.

Craig Whitlock. “U.S. plans to add drone base in West Africa”. Washington Post. 29/01/2013.

Daniel Bon and Karen Mingst, “French Intervention in Africa: Dependency or Decolonization”.

Gabe Joselow. “Donors Pledge $455 Million for Mali Force”. Voice of America. 29/01/2013.

J. Isawa Elaigwu and Ali A. Mazrui, “Nation-building and changing political structures”.

Mark Thompson. “Is Qatar fuelling the crisis in north Mali?”. France24. 23/01/2013.

Richard Valdmanis and Adama Diarra. “Mali secures recaptured towns, donors pledge funds”. Reuters. 29/01/2013.

France frees Timbuktu from extremists. Where are the African forces

French drive extremists out of Timbuktu and other parts of the Malian Country.

Vive La France!!!!!!!! They are yelling in the street of the ancient Malian city of Timbuktu and in other parts of Mali.

Where are the African forces?  Where was ECOWAS?  It is an organization of 15 African nations  and their mission statement reads:

Its mission is to promote economic integration in “all fields of
economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters …..”

Isn’t the burning and destroying of Timbuktu ancient historical landmarks a cultural matter?  Isn’t the implementation Sharia law a social matter?

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120702/islamists-trash-timbuktu-mali-fabled-desert-city

Extremists destroy Timbuktu shrines

The heads of ECOWAS in Abuja Nigeria need to get their resources amongst OTHER THINGS together!

If Africa is to be a world leader and possible the United States of Africa, then African nations MUST come to the aid of their own people.

Is great that France came the rescue of Mali. Yet this is a short-term solution.

African leaders must come together and come up with regional military strike forces to intervene with swift action to extremists, terrorists, natural disasters or whatever be the case.

I heard that the slow response from ECOWAS was due to assets being used to fight against Boko Haram in  parts  of Nigeria  and that logistical it would take a number of months to deploy to Mali.

For the ancient African textbooks to be lost in some of the Timbuktu libraries is a huge blow to the historical achievements of the African scholars and people. It is an African tragedy and a loss to the world community.

How will the lyrics of Bob Marley’s Africa Unite ever come to fruition ?

“Unite for the benefit (Africa unite) for the benefit of your people!
Unite for it’s later (Africa unite) than you think!”

God bless the peoples of Africa and it’s vast Diaspora.

Sincerely,

artikle13

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced on Jan. 28 that it will lend $18.4 million to the government of Mali, where French and African armies are battling Islamist insurgents. The loan had been agreed in November, but was awaiting the IMF board’s approval. ”In light of the tight fiscal policy that the Malian government adopted in its 2013 budget, we decided to go ahead with the board meeting despite the intervention,” Christian Josz, the IMF’s Mali mission chief, said.

More than the money, the decision is a signal to other international bodies—donors like the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Union—that the country is open for business again. It marks the latest step in a strange recent history as the agency has waited to support the country’s balance of payments through multiple coups and a civil war in the last year.

After all, there are only two conditions for IMF assistance: An internationally-recognized government and the ability to implement an IMF program.

Here’s a quick timeline of the last eighteen months:

September 2011. An IMF mission to Mali finds the government of Amadou Touré, a former general elected to a second term in 2007, to be on track to meet program goals and forecasts 5.4% growth in the next year.

December 2011. The IMF approves a new $46.3 million credit line for Mali, disbursing $9.3 million.

January 2012. Tuareg insurgents begin attacks in northern towns.

March 2012. The first coup: Touré is deposed by military officers who feel his administration was not aggressive enough toward the northern rebels. African and international organizations condemn the coup, withdrawing critical development aid.

April 2012. The rebels declare independence in the north. The IMF evacuates its resident representative and staff from Mali. The military hands control over to an interim government led by Dioncounda Traoré, as part of a deal brokered by the Economic Community of West African States.

May 2012. The military junta retakes power, after Traoré is attacked and evacuated to France during a demonstration. The rebels in the north proclaim an Islamic state.

August 2012. Following international pressure, a new civilian government is formed under Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra, but important cabinet ministers are linked to the military junta.

November 2012. An IMF mission led by Christian Josz returns to Mali to meet with Diarra’s government, and the country requests a switch from long-term credit facilities to a program of emergency loans. The IMF agrees, subject to board approval in January. After a recession of 1.5% of GDP during the chaos surrounding the coup, as government spending contracted, donors and tourists fled, the IMF forecasts 4%-5% growth for 2013.

December 2012. The army forces Diarra is forced to resign, and a new prime minister, Django Sissoko, takes over. The UN Security Council authorizes an African-led military force to defeat the militants in the north, but they aren’t expected to arrive until September.

January 2013. At the request of the Malian government, French forces begin a campaign against the insurgents, backed by Western logistical support and joined by African Union soldiers. They quickly took over the Islamist stronghold of Gao, and, the day the IMF’s executive board approved the credit facility, French-led forces had also taken the airport of Timbuktu and were advancing on the city center.

“What has changed since we negotiated that program two months ago, if anything, the uncertainty has reduced,” Josz told reporters on Jan. 28, noting that the vast majority of the country’s economic activity took place in the undisputed southern region of Mali and the early success of the intervention. The last remaining unknown is the possibility of another crippling drought like the one seen in 2011.

A significant share of Mali’s government spending in 2013, about $300 million, will be on military needs, Josz said. There is an overall budget shortfall of about $110 million, leading the government to freeze spending on other things until international donors can make up the gap. “Nonetheless,” Josz says, “the government has committed within this difficult environment to also prioritize education spending, health spending and social protection.”

The intervention seems to be going as planned and Konna and Douentza are back under government control and the allied forces are pushing further North. Now, the African nations of ECOWAS send their troops and currently there are forces from Chad on the Niger – Mali border (Eastern Mali) to invade the country and they will probably try to take Gao for MUJAO.

But there is a flip side to this successful intervention. The Islamists are expanding the conflict across the borders of Mali. Last week Islamists, under command by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, took over one hundred hostages in a gas plant in southern Algeria, near the border with Mali. The Algerian government took hard action and killed numbers of hostage takers and hostages as well. Belmokhtar promised there will be more of the same in the near future and not only in the region but inside the countries that are participating in the intervention as well. This is a direct threat to the Western world and must be taken seriously. The conflict in Mali could spill over into neighbouring countries, which is a real danger since the borders of northern Mali are hard to control thoroughly and the Islamists can move rather freely from one country into another. In Nigeria soldiers, under way to Mali, were attacked. The entire region can become a battlefield and when that happens, France and the African states won’t be able to restore stability and they’ll be needing more help. This would mean that more Western states have to commit troops and then the Jihadists have yet another, and in their eyes even better, reason to attack the Western states from within. Of course this is all very iffy, but there is a chance this could happen. And when this happens, there’s more than a regional conflict the world has to deal with. Let’s hope it will not come that far.

The author is the Managing Director and Principal of Kuranga and Associates, a full-service investment, political and economic risk consultancy, and asset management firm that specializes in Africa. He is also the author of The Power of Interdependence with Palgrave Macmillan Press.

In an effort to undermine regional efforts to militarily remove militants from Northern Mali that largely came out of Libya, the US State Department Deputy Secretary William Burns appointed Algeria as “lead negotiator in Mali”. The move was a diplomatic “slap in the face” to ECOWAS, the West African regional block that already appointed Burkina Faso as the international lead negotiator almost 6 months prior. While the move was seen as an attempt of the US to undermine the urgent regional call for military action that was supported by France, ECOWAS, and the African Union (AU), it may have had a residual impact that we are now seeing today.

The US has long held a stance of refusing to negotiate with terrorist. However in the case of Mali even their leading military official for Africa Carter Ham, said in the case of the terrorists that occupy Northern Mali “Negotiation is the best way”. I earlier criticized this as an attempt by General Carter Ham, AFRICOMs leader to increase the presence of AFRICOM in Africa. Not only has this served to embolden militant groups in Mali that led to their recent attempts to overrun the Capital of Mali altogether they have also turned and struck inside the territory of the US appointed “lead negotiator” as a way of ending the international operation in Mali. The hypocritical actions of the United States to first endorse a policy of negotiating with terrorists and then select their “lead terrorist negotiator” Algeria may have indeed encouraged the attack in Algeria. While recently the State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland repeated that “the United States does not negotiate with terrorist” including those that attacked the oil facility in Algeria which led to the killing of dozens of hostages and Algerian forces, in all actuality they already have. In this case their failed attempts to undermine ECOWAS and delay military action may have caused the tragic deaths of more in Algeria including 3 of their own nationals.

Kuranga and Associates Global Consultancy is a political and economic risk management firm with a principle practice area of Africa. To learn more about Kuranga and Associates go to www.kaglobal.net. © Copyright 2012 David Kuranga. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

David O. Kuranga; Ph.D. Managing Director Kuranga & Associates Global Consultancy Phone: 212.363.0936 – Email: david.kuranga@kaglobal.net http://kurangaandassociates.wordpress.com http://us.macmillan.com/thepowerofinterdependence/DavidOladipupoKuranga

French-led forces will likely face stiffer resistance as they proceed north into rebel-held territory [AFP]

French and Malian troops take two key towns with little resistance as troops from Chad arrive in Mali.

 French and Malian troops have entered the key central Malian towns of Diabaly and Doutenza, both of which have been in the hands of Al Qaeda-linked rebels for weeks.

A convoy of about 30 armoured vehicles carrying some 200 French and Malian soldiers moved into the town on Monday at about 0900 GMT, without meeting resistance.

Diabaly, 350 km north of the capital Bamako, had harboured the main cluster of rebels south of the frontline towns of Mopti and Sevare until French air attacks forced them to flee or attempt to blend in with locals, residents said.

A colonel in the Malian army had said earlier that a “fringe of the Diabaly population adheres to the jihadists’ theories and we must be very careful in the coming hours”.

French television footage from Diabaly has shown charred pick-up trucks abandoned by al Qaeda-linked rebels amid mud brick homes.

One resident said the rebels had fled the town which was abandoned by many of its residents, and those remaining lacked food and other essentials.

‘The total reconquest of Mali’

Malian officials also said that militants had retreated from Doutenza, where French and Malian forces arrived on Monday morning.

Paris said the aim of the 11-day old military offensive was total victory. “The goal is the total reconquest of Mali,” Jean-Yves Le Drian, French defence minister, said in televised remarks. “We will not leave any pockets” of resistance.

France began its military offensive in Mali on January 11, and has said that African nations must take the lead though it could be some weeks before they are ready to do so. Britain said on Monday that it would consider giving more help to French forces, but would not take a combat role in the conflict.

Rebels in Mali were reported Sunday to be abandoning some of their positions and converging on the mountainous region of Kidal, their northernmost bastion, 1,500km from Bamako and near the border with Algeria.

Kidal was the first town seized by an amalgam of fighters, some linked to al-Qaeda, and Tuareg separatist groups that started the rebellion in March last year.

Tuareg defections

Al Jazeera’s Jacky Rowland said there are reports of further Tuareg defections from the rebels as they feel their rebellion has been “hijacked” by the al-Qaeda affilated groups.

“The Tuareg have sensed which way the wind is blowing and they’re afraid of ending up on the wrong side as and when this conflict is resolved,” she said.

Meanwhile, the planned deployment of nearly 6,000 African soldiers continued slowly into Bamako, hampered by cash and logistical constraints. Only 150 African troops had arrived by Sunday.

Senegal, Benin and six other West African nations are contributing to the African mission which is expected to take over the baton from France, and Chad has also pledged 2,000 soldiers.

 Desire Kadre Ouedraogo, head of the Commission of regional west African bloc ECOWAS, estimated the cost of an African offensive against the armed Islamist groups at about 500 million dollars.

The European Union has pledged 50m euros to the International Support Mission for Mali.

source:

The Algerian hostage crisis may have been facilitated by the fluidity of the Malian border

At the start of the year, France agreed to send 2,000 troops to fight Ansar Dine in Northern Mali, as part of a cooperative military intervention organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). There success in halting the advance of the terrorists has been immediate. Nevertheless, intervention by a European power in one of its former colonies was always likely to be a touchy issue. This seems to have been proven by the motives of Katibat al-Multahemeen (The Masked Brigade), the perpetrators of the Algerian hostage crisis. Terrorist leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar demanded an end to French military intervention in Mali as a prerequisite for releasing hostages.

The French intervention in West Africa is now under intense scrutiny. With the desert wastelands of Southern Algeria a perfect location for terrorist training camps and a potential breeding ground for “Jihadists”, the possibility of the War on Terrorism crossing into Algeria looks increasingly likely. This is all the more so given the Ansar Dine control over the Northern Mali border, raising the prospect that they will act as cross-border facilitators of Islamic terrorism.

Should a similar group to Ansar Dine take control of Southern Algeria, what would the French do then? They have seemingly set a precedent by intervening in Mali. Would it not be hypocritical to abstain from an intervention in Algeria should it be required? Of course, historical factors must be considered. Between 1954 and 1962, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) and French troops fought one of the bloodiest wars of independence in history. Horrific atrocities were committed by both sides and, since the French withdrawal in 1962, lasting enmity between the contesting nations has persisted.

The horrors of the Algerian War remain engrained in the memories of French and Algerians alike

Given this recent history, French intervention in Algeria would be at the very least awkward, if not downright suicidal. There are likely to be few welcoming arms amongst the history-conscious Algerian populace. However, these historical considerations must be balanced against contemporary reality. The Sahel region is becoming infected with terrorist influences, with weak governments and impoverished populations providing excellent territorial opportunities and recruiting grounds for terrorists.

The West African region is one of traditional European influence, particularly French and British, and it might be expected that these two nations lead the fight against Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and their allies. Whether a French intervention in Algeria is necessary remains to be seen but it could either help eradicate or intensify the terrorist plague infecting the Sahel region. Such are the contradictions of history and the present day.

The author is the Managing Director and Principal of Kuranga and Associates, a full-service investment, political and economic risk consultancy, and asset management firm that specializes in Africa. He is also the author of The Power of Interdependence with Palgrave Macmillan Press.

Due to the ongoing operation, all countries that surround Mali in North and West Africa are now subject to the highest levels of security risk. Every mine, oilfield, and infrastructure investment, especially areas with large numbers of foreign nationals are subject attacks from militants allied to the Mali insurgency that originated out of Libya. The ability of the multinational coalition of forces to contain militants may not reduce the risk significantly as their allies may already be spread throughout the region. All governments in the area will need to spend more resources to combat the threat even as many surrounding countries are being forced to use their limited resources to send troops to Mali. Part of the residual affect is the potential for work stoppage. The aftermath of the siege in Algeria may cause investor in the region to become fearful of making future investments preventing any major expansions in the immediate region. Further the governments in the region may find themselves in a position where they need to raise revenue internally to meet security demands and to fund the mission in Mali. This may impact government services or lead to countries seeking higher rents on investors through taxes and fees. This risk will remain heightened in the region for the rest of the year and possibly well into 2014.

In addition to Algeria, Mauritania is the country that is most at risk. Political instability and increased militancy in neighboring Algeria has demonstrated the potential powder keg that could erupt in Mauritania. Further the Mauritanian President may not survive a major security crisis such as the one that occurred recently in Algeria. It is fully possible that the existing political leadership in Mauritania will not survive the war in Mali. Both countries remain at the highest risk levels. Instability in Mauritania is highly likely especially if the conflict in Mali spills over into their territory. Secondly, the situation in Algeria may deteriorate further as security challenges are still likely on the horizon. Finally, Nigeria, and other West African countries may feel the residual impact of the Mali conflict in some form of heightened instability. The Boko Haram terrorist network in Nigeria is known to have close connections with Mali insurgents. This heightened risk level will not change once the operation in Mali is concluded, it will likely continue long after the conflict has ended. Investors in all surrounding countries must remain vigilant and be mindful that what occurred in Algeria is a sign of what is potentially possible throughout the entire region for the foreseeable future.

David O. Kuranga; Ph.D. Managing Director Kuranga & Associates Global Consultancy Phone: 212.363.0936 – Email: david.kuranga@kaglobal.net http://kurangaandassociates.wordpress.com http://us.macmillan.com/thepowerofinterdependence/DavidOladipupoKuranga

I am curious to see the involvement from Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and to some extent Senegal and Nigeria, as the rebellion in Mali poses a clear threat to regional security.

Once again ECOWAS and the African Union let the situation rot for months until France finally decided to act without them.

Although the purpose of the campaign is clear and seems legitimate, the feasibility of the stabilization operation seems more complex, as the political situation in Mali has been chaotic since the coup d’etat. I doubt France will interfere further in Mali internal affairs and risk facing a situation similar to 2003 Cote d’Ivoire. Hopefully the continental and regional organisations will step in to facilitate the political and military process.

Malian troops have entered the key garrison town of Diabaly after French airstrikes pushed out Islamist rebels. But many residents wonder if they’re gone for good.

NIONO, MALI: As Malian troops enter Diabaly, a garrison town of 35,000 recently abandoned by rebels in response to French air strikes, France’s foreign minister has warned his African counterparts that “African friends need to take the lead” in the ongoing military campaign against Islamist rebels in Mali.

The Malian Army’s inability to hold Diabaly was just one of a string of military setbacks that prompted France to mobilize more than 2,000 troops on the ground and to call for West African nations to accelerate troop deployments to Mali. Islamist rebels gained control of the town – just 270 miles from the capital city of Bamako – only days after France intervened Jan. 11 to stem an ambitious rebel push southward to the town of Konna, in central Mali. Diabaly, with its relative proximity to Bamako, has since come to be viewed as a second frontline of a conflict that was originally envisioned as a limited air campaign to support Malian troops.

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