In its basic sense the doctrine of integration argues for a global consensus or a global compact that will define the threats and the challenges of the new era and, very important, will define new rules for the management of the international system.

First the new rules regulating the post 9/11 international system should be developed around new core concepts-conditional sovereignty, responsibility to protect, responsibility to prevent, that should become the pillars of a new doctrine of international community responsibility (along the directions developed in the so-called Blair Doctrine articulated in the 22nd April 1999 speech).

At a second level this doctrine “would seek to translate this commitment into effective arrangements and actions”. At this level the doctrine of integration aims to gradually develop a procedural consensus on the institutions and mechanisms designed for the management of the international system. All in all the doctrine of integration aims to provide a stable institutional framework capable of an integrated and concerted response in order to deal with the post 9/11 security challenges. According to Haass the fundamental task for a 21st Concert is that of reforming the multilateral security system in order to provide to international society the necessary tools, means and assets to deal with today security threats and also to create an institutional infrastructure, an institutional acquis that will assume the tactical management of the system. The doctrine of integration intends to promote a coherent strategic response, a concerted approach that will sustain global security arrangements that will manage common risks with a shared responsibility of tackling them. Today’s international security challenges demand collective answers, global arrangements and tools that will project a concerted approach for today’s new strategic imperatives. Finally, the practical aim of this strategy should be the pooling of power, institutional capacities and assets in order to create a community of action fulfilling the security tasks of the international society.

I think that the ultimate purpose of a grand strategy built on this conceptual basis (liberal internationalism and doctrine of integration) should be the project of building a functional infrastructure of global governance (James Steinberg, An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations, in Survival, Summer 2003,page 130) capable of enforcing a constitutional international order (built around the new rules of responsibility to protect, conditional sovereignty ) and using US power, the Euro-Atlantic community and the concert of democracies as vital assets of the international order.

A fundamental point should be made on the concert of liberal democracies concept. In order to become a vital functional asset of the international society assuming and enforcing the responsibility to protect as a core duty of a rule based international order/ or a constitutional international order, the treaty establishing this concert should adopt also a formal clause of structured cooperation similar to the one incorporated in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Art.I-40: “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish structured cooperation within the Union framework.”

This will mean not only creating standby multinational capacities capable of assuming the whole operational complexities of the Petersberg tasks or even the most demanding scenario that of expeditionary war as the NRF (NATO Response Force) is tailored for but also developing an infrastructure for operational planning, joint training and clear standards of interoperability. The Concert of Liberal Democracies should become an enforcement community, a crisis response community focused on developing high readiness capabilities around the European concept of multinational battle groups-some small speedy projectable units prepared for rapid insertion in some very demanding security circumstances. The Concert of Liberal Democracies should be focused on developing a pool of standby and high-readiness capabilities and assets in order to provide to the international society a critical mass of crisis response forces.

Engaging the world as a liberal Leviathan in order to recast the international system, to remake the world around new constitutional rules governing the use of force and making states accountable to the international society, is a must.

The US should not solve all the world’s problems by itself….but it should use this extraordinary window of opportunity provided by the unipolar moment for creating a multilateral “infrastructure of capacity and cooperation” (Ikenberry) capable of projecting a networked response in order to enforce the rules and norms of a constitutional international system.

American policy makers should use the unipolar opportunity to prepare the world for the post-unipolar era by designing a constitutional order and security arrangements that should gradually develop concerted power-projection capabilities for crisis response.

The US should use its unipolar assets in shaping a constitutional design for a post-unipolar moment era, an era far beyond the old classic geopolitical rivalries defined by a 21 st century Concert (Haass) and by a liberal Leviathan (Ikenberry): an enforcement community with networked power–projection capabilities for crisis response; this era should be fundamentally defined as a post-Westphalian world with an hyper institutionalized order structure reflecting a doctrine of international community responsibility (built around the new emerging norms such as conditional sovereignty, responsibility to protect, responsibility to prevent). A constitutional order should be developed as a widely integrative framework offering status-quo incentives to the potential revisionist players.

Octavian Manea

A new divisive issue between Russia and NATO has come to the fore: the deployment and development of ballistic missile defenses in Europe by the United States in Central Europe.

The debate regarding missile defense is not new. It dates back to the Cold War when the United States used the Strategic Defense Initiative, colloquially known as Star Wars to bankrupt the Soviet Union. Today however ballistic defenses have returned as an issue of international politics when the United States decided to retreat from ABM treaty signed in 1972 and develop this type of strategic defense in order to protect itself from countries like Iran and North Korea – the infamous “rogue states” from the “axis of evil”.

NATO has posited the development of limited ballistic missile defenses in 1999, in its revised strategic concept, when it recognized the risk and potential threat of NBC weapons proliferation and their means of delivery to its troops and territory. It is expected that by 2010 NATO will deploy a common Theater Missile Defense in order to protect from intermediate and short range ballistic missiles. It is also expected that NATO will develop and deploy in the near future a full scale missile defense system in order to protect its population centers from unconventional attacks and to counter NBC proliferation.

According to Stratfor the logic behind US ballistic missile defenses is to push back threats to its territory as far as possible. Consequently it makes sense to deploy a network of BMD outside the US, as ballistic missiles fired from the Middle East in the general direction of the United States must pass over Europe and also because there are easy to destroy in mid-flight rather than in their terminal phase. Moreover protecting its European allies is at least as important for American policy makers, as protecting US territory itself. BMD, even if they are limited also offer great political leverage in dealing with countries that are interested in proliferating NBC weapons and their means of delivery, as they are faced with the dilemma of credibility: How credible is our threat, if they (US & its allies) have the ability not only to destroy us in case of nuclear exchange, but also to defend themselves against such attacks? This question surely has started to hunt those governments which consider NBC weapons as a way of protecting themselves against American power.

The plans for the deployment of BMD in Central Europe, namely in Poland and the Czech republic, have raised many eyebrows in Kremlin, which in the past few months has reacted quite vehemently to them. Two of its generals in charge of Russia’s strategic arsenal have made threatening statements, saying that the sites in question will be targeted by Russian strategic forces. Lately President Putin warned against the deployment of BMD by saying that it will increase the chances of mutual destruction as well as characterizing these defenses as being part of US nuclear forces. Clearly Russia is sending out the message that missile defenses based so close to her borders are considered a serious threat to her interests.

However the limited deployment envisioned by the US, a battery of ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar site in the Czech Republic, advises against such perception at this moment in time. Furthermore the system is not specifically designed to deal with Russian ICBMs. Nevertheless Russia considers this deployment as another US and NATO move aimed at encroaching on Russian interests in Central Europe, already severely weakened since the fall of the Soviet Union and by NATO’s eastward expansions in 1999 and 2004. Placing such a strategic asset on Russia’s doorstep is only another challenge from the West, Russia’s traditional enemy, which could possibly threaten the efforts made so far by Kremlin to restore its power and influence in international politics. If this new US move is correlated with other courses of action adopted by Washington towards Russian interest in the last years (American presence in Caucasus, The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the ongoing struggle over Ukraine), Russia has good reasons to be concerned. It seems that the United States is interested in the long run to see that Russia does not pose a threat to its interests and for that it is ready to employ every mean available.

Ballistic Missile Defense is likely to increase tensions between Russia and the Western alliance, as both actors have conflicting interests on this issue at stake. In all probability it will not lead to a new Cold War, as it is feared by some. However the increase in tensions will not be without consequences. In the near future the issue of ballistic missile defenses will play an important part in the relations between Russia, NATO and the United States.

George VIŞAN