The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.

New poll: Capitalism not too hot

(monkeysmashesheaven.wordpress.com)

A recent poll has people talking. The results of the poll are a sharp contrast to the free-market triumphalism of the 1990s. Intellectuals were declaring the victory of capitalism. In the 1989 book, the End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama declared that history was over and that free-market, liberal society was the final form of human society, the end point of civilization. Others got a piece of the action too. Post-modern liberal Richard Rorty liked to say that Western liberalism, with all its flaws, is the best that has been offered up by history: The age of ideology is over, or at least it should be. Globalist capitalism, or its companion “capitalism with a human face,” was the new mantra. That was then.

The recent poll implies that most people correctly know that the system as it currently exists is bad for them. The poll, conducted across 27 countries, reports that only 11 percent of people think that free-market capitalism is working well. Of the 29,000 people polled, only one in five think that capitalism is working well.

Almost a quarter of all those polled, 23 percent, think that capitalism is fatally flawed. The majorities in 22 of the 27 countries support a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. The poll shows that the majority of humanity has some sense of their own oppression even if they do not understand their oppression scientifically.

One poll result has been the focus of much commentary: Double digits in the imperialist countries see capitalism as “fatally flawed.” Over 40 percent in France and 15 percent in the US think that capitalism is fatally flawed. This figure is making its way through the First Worldist “left” that stupidly sees the double digits as confirmation of their worldview. These kinds of polls are not new. For example, Max Elbaum, in Revolution in the Air, peddled the same claim about the 1960s. Elbaum reports that 3 million people in the US thought revolution was necessary at that time. However, seeing capitalism as “fatally flawed” or that “revolution is necessary” is not an endorsement of socialism. In fact, nihilism runs deep in First World. It is a good bet that many see all systems as fatally flawed. Although there may be support for social democracy or social imperialism or fascism in the First World, there is almost no support for actual socialism there.

Actual socialism is perceived as frightening by First World peoples for the same reasons that many express their disappointment with the current capitalist system. Most in the First World believe that they are entitled to more privilege, not less. The current economic crisis has resulted in a drop in the standard of living. No doubt that this is reflected in the numbers. In addition, under actual socialism, First World populations will have even less privilege than they do under the current capitalist system. Actual socialism on a world scale entails something close to an equal distribution of the global social product. Under such a distribution, virtually everyone in the First World will see their incomes cut drastically, their purchasing power reduced, their leisure time shortened, etc.  After all, Karl Marx wrote that the ruling classes would tremble in the face of communist revolution. The entire First World, almost without exception, trembles at the prospect of genuine proletarian revolution.

There is almost no social base at all for revolution in the First World. It is a mystery to the First Worldist why the First World workers are not lining up for revolution. The First Worldist, like Goldilocks, looks to find that combination of mass line and party building, spontanaity and commandism, agitation and propaganda, hot and cold, that  will be “just right.” What the First Worldist utopians don’t realize is that there is no key that will unlock First Worldist proletarian revolution because there is no significant proletariat in the First World. There are hardly any masses at all in the First World. There are plenty of asses, however. Maoist-Third Worldists, by contrast, recognize that since the vast majority in the First World oppose real socialism, revolutionaries in the First World must design minoritarian strategies.  Revolutionaries find themselves behind enemy lines in the First World. Real revolutionaries adopt Jacobin strategies appropriate to their unique conditions in the First World.

The same poll asked people how they perceived the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989. Poll results varied greatly across countries. The fall of the Soviet Union is mostly seen as a “good thing” in Europe, and, presumably, most of the First World: 79 percent in Germany, 76 percent in Britain and 74 percent in France feel that the dissolution was a good thing. However, 70 percent of Egyptians think that the fall of the Soviet Union was a “bad thing.” And, in Russia, Ukraine, and Pakistan, sizable majorities report that the fall was mainly a bad thing. In India, Kenya, and Indonesia, opinions are sharply divided.

Even though the Soviet Union in 1989 was not socialist, it is incorrectly perceived as both socialist and anti-imperialist by many. The poll results in many cases are, thus, less about the actual Soviet Union and more about the hostility that many in the Third World feel toward imperialism and capitalism. Such poll results can be more of an expression of pre-scientific, intuitive class hatred directed toward the Western imperialists. Ironically, the revisionist Soviet Union was imperialist also. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union became social imperialist. Even though the revisionists used socialist rhetoric, their actions were still imperialist.

Capitalism-imperialism has failed to guarantee a decent life for the vast majority of the world’s population. Most people in the Third World barely survive while most people in the First World live in relative luxury. Thus it is no surprise that opinions about the current system and about the Soviet Union would vary greatly. Similarly, opinions about revolutionary leaders also vary greatly between Western and non-Western countries. Stalin is seen as no different than Hitler in the West. However, in the ex-Soviet bloc, Stalin often polls as one of the greatest leaders of all time. It is a good sign that so many in the Third World understand that the system has failed them. It is the job of the communist to transform that basic intuition into a scientific understanding and revolution.

Sources

1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8347409.stm

2. Max Elbaum. Revolution in the Air, p. 2

I’m on the last strides of this book, and the author has decided to go back to the End of History, three pages from the end:

In any case, if anything is certain, it is that no idea is more chimeric than that of an end to history: to imagine that we have reached it, and that our societies have reached the pinnacle of their development is to attempt to deny events.

Better keep that in mind.

Punchline: when all seems gloom, always remember: the best is yet to come. That includes Peak Oilers as well.

In my opinion, that famous neo-Hegelian thinker Francis Fukuyama – the man responsible for the predication in the late eighties/early nineties that at the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end-of-history had loomed upon us, and it had shown free-market capitalism to be the victor over socialism – has gone from being a thinker of history, to an illustration of how exactly history has panned out. Allow me to explain.

In the work for which he is best known The End of History and the Last Man (1992), Fukuyama argued that the endpoint of man’s social and cultural evolution has been realised in liberal, free-market democracy, conflicting with other more popular Hegelian thinkers, most notably Karl Marx who asserted that ‘the end of pre-history’ would be the triumph of communism over capitalism.

Fukuyama was considered a key neoconservative thinker ever since the 1992 publication, and was often held by laissez-faire thinkers and businessmen as a source of justification for the pursuit of capital, as well as the primary reference for understanding why revolutionary fronts failed.

This was the opinion that Fukuyama held – in print – until 2003, when he released his book Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution, in which he realised the potentially dangerous cost of allowing the pharmaceutical industry a totally free charter to operate, without regulation from either the state or a non-departmental public body (or quango, as they are known colloquially).

Fukuyama cites in the book examples including the issuing of psychotropic drugs to children with behavioural problems, concluding that often corporations have dubious motives in creating and selling them. Ritalin, Fukuyama opines, is one such drug, created in order to cap a child’s instincts, stating that it ‘‘is prescribed largely for young boys who do not want to sit still in class because nature never designed them to behave that way’’ (p. 52). The state, of course, is not devoid of blame here, but attention should be paid to the power of the drugs lobby, especially in the United States, where most of Fukuyama’s attention is focused on.

The future would look even bleaker were biotechnology to be unregulated. Fukuyama worries that Human Genetics has the potential to be used as a tool for misuse, especially in the field of genetic engineering, where opinions on what is considered ‘normal’ be saved, and what is considered ‘abnormal’ be destroyed at the genetic root. Destroying disease would be an obvious benefit, but opinions on so-called racial, sexual, and biological normality in general would cause real tension. Furthermore, genetic engineering, unless curbed and utilised in some way, could be the play thing of the rich, thereby creating the potential of a wealthy “superior breed” – or as one philosopher has stated, a master race with the capabilities of “instigating a new class warfare”.

It is for this reason that once hardcore free-marketer Fukuyama has become concerned with who be trusted to decide the utility value of biotechnological advancements.

More recently Baroness Kennedy of the Shaws QC, chair of the Human Genetics Commission, in her lecture at Gresham College, noted that the argument of the day is not whether genetics be regulated or not, but rather how genetics be regulated?

The same argument, I would argue, goes for the economy in general today. The question, since the crash, should not be whether or not regulation should be set up overseeing the banking system, but rather how this regulation should operate. The Tories’ argument against Alistair Darling’s new plans to give the Financial Services Authority (FSA) new powers ‘to tear up contracts that would result in payments being made that would cause instability’ is that the FSA already has these powers. But the Tories want to scrap the FSA. It doesn’t take a genius to spot the inharmonious position George Osborne has taken of both wanting to come down hard on the City, but opposing the existing regulatory body of the financial system. If he were genuine about his concern for big bonuses (which he obviously isn’t) he would want to expand the FSA, and ask questions as to why they haven’t done more to seek out capitalist greed.

The sixty-four-thousand-dollar-question on the economy is the same one as for genetics, how should regulation operate. Francis Fukuyama, having gone from stating unfettered capitalism as historical victor, to realising that the future is in regulation, is the embodiment of that very question. It is no longer necessary to bicker about whether the invisible hand is the attitude to have towards the functioning of society and economics, but, rather, how best the state, and those it represents, should take full control.

I was surprised to see Ross Douthat, in commemorating the fall of the Berlin Wall, invoke Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History, a post-Cold War tract whose star has fallen somewhat since 9/11. Fukuyama argued that whereas the 20th century was marked by intellectual crisis between liberal democracy and its ideological competitors, fascism and communism, once the Soviet Union fell, only liberal democracy was left standing. Now, Fukuyama argued, there is no viable, transnational ideology remaining to compete with liberal democracy, which satisfies a human aspiration for freedom that the Cold War proved to be universal. Thus: the end of history. Liberal democracy is here to stay, and things will not get too much better or worse from here on out. Since his book came out, of course, Fukuyama has gotten slammed by critics on the right convinced that with the Islamist Menace, what we’re actually in is not the End of History a la Fukuyama, but the Clash of Civilizations a la Samuel Huntington.

The stronger critique of Huntington, I’d say, comes from the left. Fukuyama describes, in Douthat’s words,

the disappearance of any enduring, existential threat to liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.

Like Huntington, Douthat places “liberal democracy” and “free market capitalism” in the same breath. Like two syllables on Sesame Street that inch closer together until they become a single word. On a global scale, the ideological competitor to democracy – to one person, one vote, people’s meaningful exercise of voice over the decisions that impact their lives – is laissez-faire capitalism.

Thomas Frank’s One Market Under God offers a great (and very funny) exploration of how acts of consumerism get rebranded by elites as the new acts of citizenship and the market is christened as democratic. But markets are not democratic. And as Michael Moore reminds us with a confidential CitiGroup memo in his new movie, the people who the markets award the most power know this (as he says, the bottom 99% of the population “have 99% of the votes”).

Who will decide what happens to natural resources or public sector jobs in a third world country? The majority of the people who live there, or international elites with structural adjustment plans and threats of turmoil? Who will decide whether a group workers for a union? The majority of the people who work there, or managers that wield the power to harass and fire them?

Those questions will make history.

One of my very earliest memories is of walking with my parents and older sister on the banks of the River Elbe near Dannenberg in what was then (in the mid-1950s) West Germany. At that point the Elbe marked the border between the Federal Republic of (West) Germany and the (East) German Democratic Republic. The river here is very wide, but as I walked with my parents they explained that the men I could just about see on the other side were armed border guards and that they would stop anyone who wanted to swim across the river. The idea of wanting to swim across this vast river seemed absurd to me, and so I quietly thought of the role of these guards as being one of wanting to help people do what was in their best interests. Probably they thought the same. When just a few weeks later my father explained that one such would-be swimmer had been shot by the guards on entering the water, I did think that their particular service of helping citizens had been taken beyond reasonable limits, and as a three-year-old I changed my views.

But right then, East Germany was haemorrhaging citizens. By the end of the 1950s over two million people had fled their republic to seek a new life in ours. And so in August 1961 the most porous part of the East-West frontier – the divided city of Berlin – was closed with the erection of a wall that surrounded the western enclave. Even then, there continued to be regular (and often ingenious, but also often fatal) attempts to flee from the East to the West, including continuing attempts at the River Elbe where I walked as a child.

Today, November 9, marks the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall; or to put it more accurately, of the decision by the East German authorities (who were at that point in serious difficulty) to open the wall to informal transit in both directions. Not long afterwards the Wall did come down, and not long afterwards again East and West Germany were reunited. And as we know, the American political economist Francis Fukuyama declared at that time that we had reached ‘the end of history‘: the competition between ideologies was over for ever, and the West’s liberal capitalism had won.

Of course history didn’t end – and for the record and to be fair, Fukuyama has developed a much more nuanced view of international affairs since then, indeed last year he supported Barack Obama’s successful bid for the US presidency. There is, it is true, no longer a recognisable global ideological conflict between a capitalist and a socialist world view; but this has given way to lots of other conflicts, some of them very hard to contain in philosophical terms. The events of September 11, 2001, and what followed them were infinitely more alarming in many ways than the articulated and feared threats of the Cold War that, at least in Europe, never produced any actual conflict. Meanwhile in the states of the former East Germany, which often have had to suffer greater economic and social problems than the former West, a significant minority have started to feel some nostalgia for the old times, a condition that has been called ‘Ostalgie’ (a contraction of ‘East Nostalgia’).

Whatever may be the view of it now, the fall of the Berlin Wall was one of the very greatest iconic moments in history, unforgettable to all those who saw it, even if just on a television screen. Even if it made no clear statements about ideologies, it did declare that attempts by a state to suppress its own citizens could not work for ever. But it did not solve all of Germany’s problems for all time, never mind the world’s. Over the years, governments have increasingly failed to deliver a vision of where they think we should go. Economic boom conditions dulled some of the questions about vision, but they have now returned with a vengeance. So the right mood for the 20th anniversary celebrations of the fall of the Wall is not one of triumph and self-satisfaction, but one of re-appraisal of what western developed countries have been doing, and what they intend to do now.

That’s a job for all of us, and the time is right for it.

Seguindo novamente a rota Tegucigalpa-São Paulo, aproveito para colocar a íntegra da entrevista que fiz com Francis Fukuyama, publicada hoje no Estadão. Há 20 anos, enquanto o muro de Berlim se desmanchava, Fukuyama escreveu o controvertido artigo “O Fim da História”. Ame-o ou odeie-o, ainda é preciso lê-lo duas décadas depois.

O intelectual que viu na queda do muro o “fim da história” e o triunfo definitivo da democracia liberal não mudou de ideia vinte anos depois. Em 1989, Francis Fukuyama, professor de política comparada da Universidade Johns Hopkins, escreveu que, com o esfacelamento da URSS, o sistema democrático derrotava seu último rival no plano das ideias, o socialismo, e se impunha ao mundo como único modelo político. “O que podemos estar vendo não é apenas o fim da Guerra Fria, mas o fim da própria história: o encerramento da evolução ideológica da humanidade e a universalização da democracia liberal ocidental como última forma de governo humano”, escrevera Fukuyama em 1989. Mas, questionado pelo Estado duas décadas depois sobre as dificuldades da promoção de regimes democráticos no mundo, Fukuyama mudou de tom: “Acho que nunca disse que a universalização da democracia ocidental seria inevitável.”

Como os sr. avalia, 20 anos depois, o argumento de que o ideal democrático-liberal triunfou sobre seus principais rivais – absolutismo, fascismo, comunismo – e, dessa forma, a evolução das idéias políticas teria chegado ao fim com a queda do muro?

Há 20 anos eu discutia mais o rumo que as coisas tomavam do que a realidade concreta daquele momento. Mesmo assim acho que foi uma boa avaliação. Se compararmos 1989 com hoje, fomos de um mundo de cerca de 60 a 70 países que poderiam ser classificados de “democráticos” para algo em torno de 140 democracias atuais. Houve retrocessos em lugares como Rússia e Venezuela nos últimos anos. Mas, em termos gerais, parece-me que o consenso entre economias avançadas de que a democracia é o melhor sistema político continua extremamente forte. E é interessante notar que essa percepção não foi abalada nem sequer pela crise financeira que se iniciou no ano passado.

O sr. previu a universalização de democracias liberais. Hoje temos países como China e Rússia, que apresentam uma espécie de capitalismo centralizado, erigido em torno do Estado. Autocracias de livre mercado podem representar um novo modelo político?

O único que poderia ser considerado é a China. Rússia e mesmo Venezuela são tão dependentes do preço de gás e petróleo que não podem ser vistos como um modelo sustentável. A China é um grande país, cuja economia não depende diretamente da posse de recursos energéticos, e o governo chinês conseguiu alcançar uma impressionante posição de liderança em temas da agenda econômica. Mas há duas grandes questões. Primeiro, será que esse modelo pode ser exportado? E, segundo, será que os próprios chineses vão mantê-lo, já que a China continua sendo um país consideravelmente pobre, com sérias questões em seu sistema político? A meu ver, esses problemas não podem ser resolvidos pelo atual sistema autoritário chinês. Será que daqui a 15 anos, quando houver uma classe média chinesa maior, eles estarão satisfeitos com a política?

O sr. está dizendo que, no fim, a China também seguirá o rumo da democracia liberal?

Não sei se nos moldes ocidentais. Mas há razões para acreditar que é preciso mais participação no sistema político chinês. O topo do regime tem se mostrado habilidoso em conduzir a economia. Mas o baixo escalão tem altos índices de corrupção, incompetência e enfrenta sérias questões ambientais. Não é possível resolver esses problemas de cima para baixo, sob controle do partido comunista. A China não vai mimetizar democracias ocidentais, mas haverá mais pressão por transparência e prestação de contas.

Retorno à questão anterior: vinte anos após a queda do muro, o sr. ainda acha que a universalização da democracia é inevitável?

Não sei se é inevitável – aliás, acho que nunca disse que seria inevitável. No plano das ideias políticas, a democracia parece ser a única que temos, embora nem todos consigam implementá-la. Até agora, ela não foi substituída por algo superior.

Ao longo de sua carreira, o sr. levou o foco de sua análise da difusão da democracia ao redor do mundo para a prevenção dos chamados “Estados falidos” e a promoção de um aparelho estatal viável. Por que a mudança?

Há diferentes fatores por trás da ideia de desenvolvimento. Alguns países têm regimes democráticos e, em alguma medida, um estado de direito, mas possuem um Estado muito fraco. Essa não é a fórmula para o sucesso. É preciso ter as três coisas. Estados falidos se tornaram uma preocupação central para a comunidade internacional, porque são fontes de vários problemas – lugares como Afeganistão, Somália e Haiti. Fiquei chocado ao perceber que sabíamos mais como estimular a democracia do que um Estado viável em alguns lugares. Essa pode ser considerada a maior ameaça do sistema internacional, lugares onde existem governos fracos que não podem controlar seu território.

O sr. citou a crise que abalou a economia internacional no último ano. O aumento do papel do Estado na economia tornou-se inevitável?

Sim. Passamos por um ciclo iniciado com o presidente Ronald Reagan e com a premiê Margareth Thatcher, no qual havia uma pressão para reduzir o papel do Estado e desregulamentar a economia – princípios que ficaram conhecidos como o Consenso de Washington. Quando isso ocorreu, pouco após o início das crises econômicas na América Latina, tratava-se de uma mudança necessária. Mas ela foi longe demais. E a atual crise financeira é uma de suas consequências. Tínhamos um setor financeiro em Wall Street fictício, sem nenhum tipo de controle. Foi algo similar à crise asiática, quando houve um forte fluxo de capitais à região sem que os bancos estivessem submetidos a uma supervisão, provocando um choque na economia. Americanos não escutaram seus próprios conselhos sobre os perigos desse dinheiro desregulamentado. Produzimos uma crise global porque fracassamos em controlar Wall Street. Portanto, inevitavelmente haverá um retorno à intervenção do Estado. Mas não será como os anos 30, porque também aprendemos os perigos de interferir demais na economia.

O sr. escreveu sobre a influência da era Reagan e do fim da Guerra Fria no pensamento dos formuladores de política nos EUA. A guerra de 2003 no Iraque, por exemplo, seria a tentativa mal sucedida de repetir os acontecimentos do início da década de 90 na Europa do Leste. Como a queda do muro de Berlim mudou a política externa americana?

A queda do muro não moldou as concepções de todos os formuladores de política, mas, sobretudo, das pessoas que integraram a administração George W. Bush – boa parte delas havia trabalhado no governo George H. W. Bush. Esses funcionários viram uma espécie de “milagre político”. Tinha-se um ator como a URSS, que parecia ser algo perene no sistema internacional, o qual exigia uma política de poder com compromissos e tratados de controle de armas. Vem, então, Reagan e pede que Gorbachev “derrube esse muro” – algo que lhe rendeu muitas críticas, porque pensava-se que isso era pouco realista – e o tal muro cai em 1989, com a URSS entrando em colapso e, dois anos depois, literalmente deixando de existir. Isso criou a concepção de que esses regimes autoritários têm uma fragilidade intrínseca e podem ser abalados por uma “maré democrática”. Eu penso que há uma tendência global em direção à democracia, mas acredito que os eventos de 1989 foram excepcionais. Teremos ainda várias transições democráticas, mas elas serão lentas, difíceis, com reveses. O colapso de regimes autoritários é raro. Talvez aconteça no Irã nos próximos anos. Mas pessoas no governo Bush acreditavam que se tratava de um padrão que veríamos ser repetido no Oriente Médio. É aí que cometeram um grave erro. Ao final, uma democracia só pode ser estabelecida por fatores internos e não sob a mira de uma arma.

O sr. é um crítico da chamada escola realista, a qual advoga o pragmatismo e a política de poder nas relações internacionais. Obama, porém, tem sido associado a essa tendência. Que papel tem, hoje, a promoção da democracia na agenda externa dos EUA?

Obama está reagindo ao governo Bush. Obviamente ele não quer se envolver na retórica falha da difusão da democracia mundo afora. Mas tampouco acredito que ele seja alguém como Henry Kissinger, que tem, por princípio, uma política realista, a qual elimina a questão dos direitos humanos e da democracia de sua agenda. Mas Obama ainda não foi realmente testado. Ele não passou por uma situação na qual deve se posicionar de maneira realmente firme. Isso deverá aflorar, novamente, no Oriente Médio, onde ele se confrontará com países como o Egito – um regime autoritário que viola os direitos humanos, ou um aliado estratégico? Não acho que Obama seja um clone de Kissinger.

O sr. afirmou que, com o fim da Guerra Fria, os EUA deixaram de impedir que governos de esquerda e centro-esquerda chegassem ao poder na América Latina. Isso teria sido fundamental para a promoção da democracia e do desenvolvimento na região. O sr. pode explicar melhor essa tese?

Posso dar exemplos concretos disso. O atual embaixador chileno na ONU é Heraldo Muñoz, que no momento do golpe em seu país, em 1973, era membro de um grupo de estudantes marxistas. Estava envolvido na luta armada pela revolução socialista. Muñoz conseguiu evitar a prisão e fugiu do Chile. Após a volta da democracia, ele retornou ao seu país e hoje é uma das pessoas mais respeitadas na comunidade diplomática. O fato de o Chile, com pessoas como Muñoz, ser hoje um forte aliado dos EUA evidencia a diferença na forma como Washington lida com a América Latina desde o fim da Guerra Fria. Temendo a disseminação do comunismo, contribuímos com a polarização na região. Agora que essa lógica se esgotou, percebe-se que um líder como o presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, alguém saído da esquerda operária, pode ser um grande aliado da democracia. Hoje os EUA veem o Brasil de Lula como um poder estabilizador na América Latina, algo inimaginável no contexto bipolar.

Finalmente un dibattito appassionante. L’etica c’entra con l’economia? Ricordo le parole con le quali Francesco Giavazzi ha risposto al ministro Tremonti quando questi aveva sostenuto la necessità di etica nel fare credito: “Non sapevo che la sharia facesse parte della legge bancaria italiana”. Poi ascolto l’intervento di Guido Tabellini che, al convegno con il Cardinale Tettamanzi alla Bocconi a Milano, dice: “Talvolta si pensa che etica ed economia siano due mondi distinti e separati. Non è così”.

Il dibattito è cruciale e riguarda più che l’economia, l’uomo, come insegna l‘enciclica Caritas in Veritate. Infatti, se sostituiamo la parola etica con l’espressione “fattore umano” non solo capiamo meglio di che cosa si sta parlando, ma ci si rende meglio conto che il fattore umano è uno dei fattori fondamentali, imprescindibili dell’agire economico. Il fattore umano è quello che permette ad una società di funzionare senza sbranarsi, a due aziende di fare affari al di là delle leggi, a due persone di mettersi insieme al di là dei contratti. Le leggi sono sì di fondamentale importanza per lo sviluppo ordinato e “giusto” di una comunità, ma non è in esse che quella stessa comunità può riporre la propria speranza di crescita. L’etica, cioè il fattore umano, è il vero motore dell’economia perchè, come insegnano decine di trattati economici (mi piace citarne solo uno “Fiducia” di Francis Fukuyama) fa riferimento all’uomo, alla sua cultura, alle tradizioni di un luogo e di una comunità. L’etica è l’espressione economica della speranza dell’uomo. E chi la confonde con la shari’a non solo è un pessimo economista, ma da lui non compreri mai un’auto usata.

Fonte immagine: http://blog.zuin.info/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/aiuta.jpg

Currently reading René Rémond’s Introduction à l’histoire de notre temps – literally, “An introduction to the history of our time” (this, just the Portuguese version). Page 299, discussing the impact of WWI and the inception of Democracy all over Europe, and lo-and-behold:

During the period of unwinding immediately after the armistice, under the spell of the euphoria that fosters illusions, people came to believe that they had reached the end of history.

My rough translation there. Now, note this is a 1974 book! Funny enough, in 1992 a well-regarded academic, prof. Francis Fukuyama, wrote The End of History and The Last Man. It was a time of unwinding, immediately after the end of the Cold War. The argument put forward was remarkably similar: democracy had one the ultimate struggle. There would be peace. Trade, well-being and good sense would prevail. Seriously, no more wars.

Right.

I’m just glad Huntington decided to reply to Fukuyama’s book by writing the Clash. Not only does it make for great reading, it offers excellent advice on girls.

Punchline: Marx once said “History repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce”. I hope we are not in for the former, and don’t really care about the later.

(Photo: Gerald Martineau - The Washington Post)

Matthew Hoh, a former Marine Corps Captain, has become the first U.S. official to resign over the Afghan War. You can read his resignation HERE.

Many people, myself included, were hoping that President Obama would bring United States troops home. The fulfillment of this campaign promise is nowhere in sight. Why is that?

The reason is this: America can’t lose.

The U.S. has only one metanarrative: the triumph of liberal democracy. ESPECIALLY over religious strife. American-style democracy has saved us from the religious wars of the Middle Ages (the narrative says) and removed particular religion from the public sphere (the State). As Michael Novak says…the shrine has been swept clean. The problem is that what is now universal is not any religious narrative but the triumph of liberal democracy over all particular religious narratives. The empty shrine has BECOME god. He has appropriated the words ‘Freedom’ and ‘Liberty’ as his name. Jefferson and the other founding Fathers (Fathers? A religious form of leadership!) knew that Liberty requires ongoing bloodshed.

As demostrated at Hamburger Hill, we don’t have the categories to stop sacrificing until America is victorious and the deaths of our soldiers mean what they are supposed to mean. The moment our armed forces decide NOT to continue sacrificing their own lives and the lives of others, that moment they commit sacrilege against our heroes; how can we possibly make sense of the sacrifices we have already made if the heroes aren’t victorious? Or worse…if our heroes aren’t heroes at all, but victims?

“They will not have died in vain” is a central tenet of American civil religion. The only way to ensure that they didn’t die in vain is to continue sacrificing. To admit defeat is to change the status of our war dead from heroes to victims. And, as 9-11 and United Flight 93 amply demonstrate, the civil religion does NOT allow Americans to die as victims, EVEN if they’re civilians and not military.

Worse, to stop sacrificing also changes the status of THEIR war dead from enemy combatants and collateral damage to victims. This erases the necessary distinction between us and them. We are the chosen ones. We are the keepers of Freedom and Liberty. We are Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History.’

So, any move to end the war by peaceful means is a slap in the face of the American blood-thirsty gods.

The only solution is a religious one: we have to repent. Whatever allegiance we have pledged to the flag and to the republic for which it stands belongs to the god who would rather suffer violence than cause it. We have to decide that all the sacrifice necessary for peace and freedom was shed two millenia ago. We have to align ourselves with saints and martyrs; with holy victims rather than victorious heroes.

Until the eagle is deposed and the Lamb enthroned, the sacrifices will continue.

(The content of this post is heavily indebted to William Cavanaugh and Stanley Hauerwas)

Full interview here.

So to Robert Kagan, Fukuyama might argue:

“…the pessimism about civilization that we had developed as a result of the terrible 20th century, with its genocides, gulags, and world wars, was actually not the whole picture at all. In fact, there were a lot of positive trends going on in the world, including the spread of democracy where there had been dictatorship. Sam Huntington called this “the third wave.”‘

And (particularly with Russia in mind):

“Clearly, that big surge toward democracy went as far as it could. Now there is a backlash against it in some places. But that doesn’t mean the larger trend is not still toward democracy”

Fukuyama also points out on what he bases much of his thinking; extending Samuel Huntington’s framework:

“Huntington’s argument was that democracy, individualism, and human rights are not universal, but reflections of culture rooted in Western Christendom. While that is true historically, these values have grown beyond their origins.”

And what about China?:

“You cannot solve the problem of the “bad emperor” through moral suasion. And China has had some pretty bad emperors over the centuries. Without procedural accountability, you can never establish real accountability.”

You can teach people to be moral in this argument, and instill moral values, but without levers and counter-levers, we’re only a step away from tyranny.

Related On This Site:  Kagan’s new book “The Return Of History And The End Of Dreams“ seeks to challenge Fukuyama’s thinking…does it succeed?: Obama’s Decision On Missile Defense And A Quote From Robert Kagan’s: ‘The Return Of History And The End Of Dreams’

Stanley Kurtz suggested Fukuyama’s Hegelian influence is too much to bear:  From The Hoover Institution: Stanley Kurtz On Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington

Also:  From The American Interest Online: Francis Fukuyama On Samuel Huntington…A Few Thoughts On (Absolute) Idealism, Both Religious And Political/Philosophical

In my last post, I referred to conservatism as a dying ideology, and there are a couple ways of expanding on this.

On the most recent phenomena of conservatism (the Becktus Anti-Intellectus), some conservatives, such as Steven Hayward, claim that the conservative Ignorati can intellectually redeem themselves if they look up to the likes of Jonah Goldberg and . . . Glen Beck.

For a more insightful and historical perspective on things, I cannot recommend highly enough Bill Moyers’ interview with Sam Tanenhaus.

Tanehaus aptly notes that all the intellectual heavy weights on the right (Andrew Sullivan, Francis Fukuyama, David Brooks, Gary Wills and etc.) are not so much examples of intellectuals who betrayed conservatism. Rather, they demonstrate the phenomena of conservatism betraying intellectuals.

I gathered a couple of the following arguments from the Tanehaus interview:

1) The “take your government hands off my medicare” tea-bagger battle cry is basically a passionate defense of the status quo for the status quo’s sake.

2) While William F. Buckley Jr. modernized conservatism with his active exclusion of the John Birch nativists and the antisemities in the 50’s, the transfer of secessionist racism from the democratic party to the Republican party was brought about partly due to Buckley’s delayed renunciation of the segregationist movement in the 60’s.

3) Poppy Bush was crucified  in the presidential election of 92, and Bill Clinton transitioned American politics from Reagan conservatism to neo-liberalism. Bush Jr.’s 2000 election was a fluke blessed by the Supreme Court, and his reelection was driven by the carte blanche of political capital afforded by 9/11. Without these best of circumstances, the GOP has nothing to offer politically.

Tanehaus doesn’t make the arguments for why specific contemporary conservative intellectuals are merely so-called, but with the intellectual substance of Ben Stein’s creationism and George Will’s trenchant belief that global warming is a myth, who needs the moronic activity of Town-Hall crazies?

Soon I would like to address Jonah Goldberg’s political thought in a future post titled “Conservative Fascism: From Jesus to Jonah Goldberg”

————-

Update from 10/7/09:

I also appreciated Tanehaus’ distinction between realist conservatives and revanchist conservatives. The realists are presumably measured and pragmatic in their political goals, but the revanchists are right-wing radicals who speak in resentful terms of “reclaiming and restoring” America for Real Americans.

Professori Timo Vihavaisen mukaan Suomessa hyssytellään kriittistä keskustelua esimerkiksi maahanmuutosta.

Hyysäri on yllättäen kirjoittanut professori Timo Vihavaisesta aika laajan (ja yllättävän positiivisen) artikkelin:

Quote:

Kansakunta taas rähmällään Professori Timo Vihavaisen mukaan suomalainen älymystö vaikenee maahanmuuton ongelmista. Keskustelu vaiennetaan ja kriitikot leimataan aivan kuten 1970-luvulla. Tuskin tarvitsee olla ennustaja arvatakseen, että suuri osa niistä maahanmuuttajista, joita oma älymystömme niin innokkaasti on maahan haalimassa, tulee muodostamaan tulevien slummiemme kantaväestön. Tällaiseen tekstiin saattaisi törmätä “maahanmuuttokriittisellä” nettisivulla, mutta harvemmin professorin esseekokoelmassa. Katkelma on Timo Vihavaisen tuoreesta kirjasta Länsimaiden tuho (Otava). Vihavainen on Helsingin yliopiston Venäjän tutkimuksen professori, joka hätkähdytti suomalaisia viimeksi 1991 ilmestyneellä kirjallaan Kansakunta rähmällään, suomettumisen lyhyt historia. Neuvostoliiton kuolinkamppailun aikaan ilmestynyt teos käynnisti keskustelun Suomen lähihistorian kipupisteestä. Vihavainen kuvasi tragikoomisten esimerkkien kautta kulttuuria, jossa itsesensuuri kukoisti ja pisteitä kerättiin mielistelemällä itänaapurin totalitaristista systeemiä. Viime vuosina Vihavainen on julkaissut pääasiassa Venäjää koskevia teoksia. Kanava-lehden kolumneissaan hän on purkanut havaintojaan kulttuurin rappiosta, joka on hänestä aiheena muuttunut täydellisen epämuodikkaaksi. Arvot ovat muuttuneet niin täydellisesti, ettei kukaan kiinnitä asiaan mitään huomiota. Kolumneista kasvoi Länsimaiden tuho, jossa Vihavainen maalaa aatehistorian suuria linjoja leveällä pensselillä. Läntisten klassikoiden lisäksi tekstissä vilisevät venäläiset ajattelijat ja kirjailijat. Vihavaisen ydinteesin mukaan kulttuuri – pyrkimys totuuteen, hyvyyteen ja kauneuteen – on korvattu kyltymättömällä kuluttamisella. Uusi ihminen, narsistinen öykkäri, on omaksunut nihilistisen opin, jossa kaikki määritellään mielihyvän kautta. Länsimainen kulttuuri on kaivanut oman hautansa hukkaamalla perusarvonsa. Ja kansakunta on taas rähmällään, etenkin älymystö. “On tyypillinen älymystön tarina, että mennään halpaan. Suomalaisälymystö hairahti aikanaan stalinismiin, mutta se ei ole oppinut mitään”, Vihavainen sanoo. Moniarvoisuuttaan korostava postmoderni älymystö pitää kaikkea yhtä arvokkaana ja hyssyttelee kriittistä keskustelua poliittisen korrektiuden nimissä. Ennen vaiettiin Neuvostoliitosta. Nyt vaietaan esimerkiksi feminismistä ja maahanmuutosta. “Feminismi on ilman muuta tabu. Se on hyvin samanlainen kuin aikanaan sosialismi. Kaikki sanoivat, että olen minä jonkin sortin sosialisti, koska sosialismi tarkoitti kaikkea hyvää, mitä maailmassa oli keksitty”, Vihavainen sanoo. Hänestä feminismi ja naistutkimus ovat immuuneja kritiikille. “Se on kuin aikoinaan kommunistinen ideologia, joka todisti itsensä oikeaksi ja teki kritiikin mahdottomaksi, koska systeemin ulkopuolelta sitä ei voinut kritisoida.” Sitten päästään vielä polttavampaan aiheeseen, maahanmuuttoon. Vihavainen kutsuu kirjassaan maahanmuuttoa “länsimaisen kulttuurin itsemurhaksi”. Hänestä maahanmuutto on kuin hulluuden riemumarssi, jonka turmiollisuus tiedetään ennakolta. Silti siihen mennään mukaan, koska totuutta ei haluta katsoa silmiin. Kyseessä on niin suuri tabu, ettei vaihtoehdoista keskustella. Vihavainen väittää, että vallitsevan opin mukaan on väärin ja syrjivää olettaa, että muuttoliikkeestä voisi koitua pysyviä ei-toivottuja tuloksia Suomelle. Hänestä totuus on se, että vaikeudet ovat alkaneet jokaisessa Euroopan maassa, jossa maahanmuuttajien määrä on kasvanut tietyn rajan yli. “Meillä on hurskaasti kuviteltu, että maahanmuuttajat tulevat hoitamaan vanhuksia, tekemään muita pienipalkkaisia töitä ja palvelemaan kulutusyhteiskuntaa itse pahemmin kuluttelematta.” Ellei maahanmuuttaja opi kunnolla kieltä, hän jää toisen luokan kansalaiseksi ja katkeroituu. Seurauksena voi olla lähiömellakoita Ranskan tai Ruotsin tyyliin. Suurin osa ongelmista johtuu Vihavaisen mukaan islamista. “Islamin perussanoma on hyvin aggressiivinen. Islam on elävä uskonto, joka otetaan hyvin vakavasti tietyissä piireissä. Ihmiset, jotka tulevat maailman primitiivisimmistä maista – Somaliahan on ollut aina häntäpäässä mittareiden mukaan –, ovat kulttuurisesti hirvittävän kaukana läntisestä maailmasta. Kulttuurisokki on valtava”, Vihavainen sanoo. Hän ennustaa, että Suomessa eletään pian yhä enemmän islamismin ehdoilla. “Kaikkein aktiivisin porukka sanelee ehtonsa muillekin. Meillä on vastaavasta kokemusta taistolaisuuden ajalta.” Tanskalaispilakuvien aiheuttamat reaktiot ovat hyvä esimerkki. “Se oli pöyristyttävää, kun ajattelee, miten pyhä asia sananvapaus meille on. On herättänyt valtavasti myötäjuoksemista, että eihän meillä saa loukata maahanmuuttajien uskonnollisia tunteita.” Islamin pitäisi Vihavaisen mukaan uudessa ympäristössään eurooppalaistua, ettei Eurooppa islamisoituisi. Esimerkiksi sikhit tai hindut tuskin aiheuttaisivat ongelmia. Saati kiinalaiset. “Kiinalaiset sopeutuvat hirveän hyvin ja nopeasti. Yleisemmin missään maissa ei ole ollut ongelmia kiinalaisten kanssa, paitsi että he pärjäävät paremmin kuin kantaväestö.” Vihavainen suhtautuu nihkeästi jopa turvapaikanhakijoihin. “Poliittinen turvapaikka on vanhastaan vainottujen ihmisten oikeus. Samoin kuin tietysti heidän velvollisuutensa on lähteä takaisin, kun turvapaikkaa ei enää tarvita.” Venäläiset olisivat Vihavaisesta Suomeen sopivin maahanmuuttajaryhmä, koska he ovat kulttuurisesti meitä lähellä. Ongelma olisi se, että Venäjän johto käyttäisi todennäköisesti venäläisvähemmistöä politiikan välineenä. Venäläiset maahanmuuttajat saattaisivat Vihavaisen mukaan sopeutua Suomeen jo yhdessä sukupolvessa. Venäläisyydellä olisi suomalaisuudelle paljon annettavaa. “Venäjällä pidetään arvoja kunniassa. Kukaan ei esimerkiksi epäile, ettei korkeakulttuuri olisi parempaa kuin matalakulttuuri.” “Siellä keskustellaan ilman tabuja oikeastaan mistä tahansa. Siinä mielessä suomalainen kulttuuri on paljon ahdistavampi. Meillä on valtavasti asioita, joista ei voi puhua ilman kuonokoppaa. Eikä niitä voi näköjään edes ajatella.” Vihavaisen mukaan suomalaisten käsitys, jonka mukaan Venäjällä ei ole mielipiteen tai ilmaisun vapautta, on täysin väärä. Vapaampi mielipideilmasto ei tosin koske Kremlin arvostelua. Hän on välillä huolissaan naapurimaan suunnasta. “Venäjän ’suvereeni demokratia’ ei tarkoita muuta kuin sitä, ettei kansainvälisistä normeista välitetä.” Siirtolaisuuden seurauksista ja vaihtoehtojen hinnasta keskustelun avaava henkilö on Vihavaisen mukaan suuressa vaarassa profiloitua rotusortajaksi ja joutua sylkykupiksi. Tabut ovat immuuneja kritiikille kuten suomettumisen aikana, jolloin äärioikeistolaisleima oli herkässä ja lyötiin aivan järjenvastaisesti niihin, jotka itse asiassa vaativat normaalia demokratiaa. Mitä hän mahtaa ajatella Jussi Halla-ahosta? Vihavainen pitää Halla-ahon uskonrauhan rikkomisesta saamaa sakkotuomiota “pöyristyttävänä”. “Hän on totuuden puhuja, joka ei saa yösijaa. Mutta siitä huolimatta hän ei malta olla puhumatta.” Vihavainen rinnastaa Halla-ahon Tuure Junnilaan, joka leimattiin Kekkosen Suomessa äärioikeistolaiseksi, vaikka hän edusti pohjoismaista demokratiaa. Haluaako poliittisesti hyvin epäkorrekteja mielipiteitä luukuttava 62-vuotias professori Vihavainen itse kansakunnan sylkykupiksi? Hän on ensimmäinen raskaan sarjan akateeminen vaikuttaja, joka kritisoi näin suorasukaisesti Suomen maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa. “Tässä iässä ei kannata enää pelätä. En ole enää mihinkään pyrkimässä. Minullahan on jo eläke odottamassa, jos haluan lähteä.”

Suosittelen kaikkia niitä lukijoitani, jotka suhtautuvat nykyiseen menoon edes hieman kriittisesti, tutustumaan henkilökohtaisesti Timo Vihavaisen tähän Otavan kustantamaan uuteen kirjaan  Länsimaiden tuho.

Vihavainen kirjoittaa tässä juuri ilmestyneessä teoksessaan siitä, kuinka länsimaat (sellaisena kuin me ne tunnemme ja ymmärrämme) kulkevat kohti perikatoa. Kehitys ei ole enää pysäytettävissä.

Vihavainen perustelee näkemyksenä laajassa ja analyyttisessä teoksessaan muun muassa demografialla, siirtolaisuudella, maapallon lämpenemisellä ja taloudellisen painopisteen siirtymisellä Aasiaan. Kulttuurillamme on runsaasti sekä sisäisiä että ulkoisia uhkia.

Lännen 1800-luvun puolivälissä alkanut kukoistus päättyi 1900-luvun jälkipuoliskolle. Vahvan talouden, innovatiivisuuden ja hyvinvoinnin surkastuessa vain kuluttaminen kukoistaa. Koko läntinen elämäntapa on alisteinen konsumerismille. Vihavainen ei näe perustetta Francis Fukuyaman optimismille vaan päinvastoin ihmettelee, miksi lännen tuhosta on lakattu puhumasta nyt, kun se tapahtuu kiihtyvällä vauhdilla.

Vihavainen on kirjassaan tarkastellut 2000-luvun ilmiöitä kulttuurin muutoksen ja kriisiytymisen perspektiivistä pohtien Euroopan ja Amerikan kehitystrendejä ja niiden heijastumista Suomeen. Osansa saa myös kulttuurisesti omaleimainen Venäjä, jonka kehitystie on poikennut länsimaiden valtavirrasta.

Vihavainen on Helsingin yliopiston Venäjän tutkimuksen professori. Hän on julkaissut useita Venäjää käsitteleviä tutkimuksia. Kansakunta rähmällään – suomettumisen lyhyt historia (Otava, 1991) herätti aikanaan kiivaan keskustelun. Myös vuonna 2007 ilmestyneestä Opas venäläisyyteen -teoksesta (Otava) on otettu useita painoksia.

Lähteet: Otava, HS/Digilehti (Lyhyempi versio löytyy maksutta täältä)

Jk. Ihan tiedoksi Hyysärin toimittajaneroille, tämä blogi ei ole maahanmuuttokriittinen.

On Exploitation and other stuff.. for the nth time
(monkeysmashesheaven.wordpress.com)

“Dear Maoist-Third Worldist,

Here is a question that may have been asked before but perhaps needs further elaboration. I will divide this question into three parts.

1. The United $nakes has a parasitic economy, nearly everyone recognizes this except First World ‘leftists’, even Republicans and Democrats to some degree recognize it’s parasitic nature and the fact that it does not produce anything of significance. Yet, your concept that workers in the United States do not produce surplus value needs some further elaboration. As Marxists we know that income does not equate class, even in extreme scenarios. If a worker’s labor-power is worth $200/hr, but, a capitalist makes $400/hr from it, that would be a surplus of $200. I know that the capability to PAY workers $200/hr, the capacity to value labor so highly is due to parasitism, but, that hardly detracts from the fact that surplus value is still extracted. I have read your other articles on this and it is still not clear to me. Could you use, perhaps, an analogy or an easier example to grasp this concept?

2. On the concept of workers-being-exploiters: While it is true that workers would be exploiters given unequal exchange and other mechanisms of parasitism, granting that this worker is not exploited by virtue of value-added from the Third World, there is in fact an ontological problem in this. A grande capitalist is conscious of exploitation in a way. He is conscious that he is extracting profit. A First World worker is not conscious of his exploitation of others, in fact, his exploitation of others is not the worker’s ‘choice’, it is a fact of life outside of his political capacity and control. A worker may be an exploiter in the First World but he does not think like grand bourgeois, he has no method of advancing the extract of surplus in the third world, this is in fact the duty of the grand capitalists. The fact this divorce exists needs some elaboration.

3. Does the fact that the U$ is mainly unproductive, mainly services to realize profits produced elsewhere, make the wealth of the U$A a house of cards? An economy cannot be sustainable without production of surplus value. Iceland is an example of a parasitic economy collapsing. Any thoughts?”

*

Serve The People of MSH answers:

1. Your example is correct in principle. The problem is that it has nothing to do with reality. Labor-power is NOT worth $200/hr anywhere in the world. The value of labor-power–the cost of the commodities (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) needed to keep the worker alive and ready to work again another day–does not vary much from place to place. It is approximately a couple of dollars an hour–much less than the minimum “wage” in the U$ and most other First World countries.

Furthermore, we need to be clear on what we mean by making money from an employee’s labor. The situation that you describe might occur in a law firm in the united $nakes. If a lawyer gets paid $200/hr and the law firm charges $400/hr for his services, does that mean that $200/hr in surplus value is produced? No, mainly because no value whatsoever is produced. And even if the employee in this case produced value, it would not necessarily follow that he produced surplus value. We have discussed this issue many times before: the employer’s profit does not prove that the employees are exploited. In the First World, the exploitation of the Third World accounts for all profits AND a considerable portion of First World employees’ “wages.”

2. I don’t see any ontological problem there. Of course there are differences between groups. That’s nothing new. But a First World “worker” is an exploiter whether he recognizes that fact or not. besides, you haven’t proven that the big capitalists are more “conscious of exploitation” than anyone else. Doesn’t everyone know that capitalists get their money through the extraction of surplus value? That would seem to make everyone just about equally “conscious of exploitation.”

In any event, the exploitation (frequently the superexploitation) of the Third World is a systemic phenomenon: it is done by the First World as a whole (and certain countries in particular), not by individual enterprises, capitalists, and “workers.” A vagrant in the U$ is still an exploiter even if he does no “work” at all: he gets thousands of dollars’ worth of value every year from various sources (begging, welfare, charity, etc.), just because he is from the First World. Consider also a small company that makes, say, wooden furniture. If it gets all of its inputs (wood, nails, etc.) from First World countries, probably the owners and the employees would all say that it did not exploit the Third World; they might even pride themselves on that claim. But they do benefit from the exploitation of the Third World, albeit indirectly, because the superprofits from the Third World pervade the entire First World economy and benefit everyone (including undocumented migrants). 

In addition, First World “workers” ARE able to contribute to the extraction of surplus value from the Third World. For example, they promote U$ militarism, they enlist in the U$ armed forces, they demand even more restrictions on migration than the haute bourgeoisie wants (which makes them MORE reactionary than the haute bourgeoisie in that department). 

3. Yes, the U$ economy is a house of cards. Without other countries to exploit, the U$ would be far worse off.

End Imperialism of MSH answers:

Surplus value is not “extracted” from a worker merely because they are able to deliver profits to their employer over and above the cost of wages. If a worker is (a) unproductive and (b) a recipient of superwages, then no surplus value is being “extracted” from him whatsoever.

The idea that First World workers are unaware that they exploit Third World workers is totally belied by the fact that they vote imperialist, they act imperialist and the bastards think imperialist and talk imperialist every single day. Perhaps this writer thinks First World workers are chomping at the bit to smash imperialism, but just feel they have no choice in the matter, and so go along with imperialism despite themselves. I don’t.

This idea that First World workers are not supportive of imperialist policies is just another fairy tale which the (First Worldist) Left likes to tell itself before going to sleep. Besides the aforementioned First World “working class” support for imperialist politics and culture, and not to mention their predilection to racist abuse, in actual fact, routine First Worldist demands for more savings, higher wages, better jobs, etc., etc., precisely ARE imperialist demands, because they are not at all related to the political task of effecting imperialist disengagement from the Third World. Why would they be? That’s what makes such demands realizable in the first place.

Prairie Fire of MSH answers:

1. While it is true that profit does entail exploitation at some point in the production-distribution chain, it is not true that every employee in the production-distribution chain is exploited nor does it mean that every employee in that chain is producing value. It is a vulgar misconception of Marx’s works that holds that every employee produces value and also is exploited. In fact, Marx, in his discussion of merchant capital chains in Vol 3 of Capital, is very clear that non-productive workers such as clerks do not produce value. Just because an enterprise employes people does not mean that those people are necessarily the source of the profit. The clerks aren’t growing lettuce in the back of the super-markets. A bank does not make its profits by exploiting its tellers. Just because these enterprises are employing people does not mean that the employees are producing value and it does not mean that they are exploited. Whether one produces (surplus) value or not is a different, but related, issue from whether one is exploited or not. The US economy is one where the vast majority of employees are both non-productive (do not produce value) and are not exploited. 

According to Marx, the value of labor-power is what it costs to reproduce labor-power. So, the value of labor-power is basically the what it costs to keep the worker alive and working, subsistence level wages. In a pure model, the value of labor power converges with what workers are paid. However, in the real world, there are obviously employees who are paid much more than the value of labor-power and, in other places, there are employees who are paid less. As others have pointed out, labor-power is not worth 200 dollars/hour. 

We have shown in numerous articles that there is no reasonable sense in which First World workers are exploited. Let’s say that one defines exploitation as extraction of surplus value. If this is the case, then the majority of the US workforce is not exploited because they are not employed doing productive labor. Rather, they are employed in management, distribution, etc. They are employed in realizing value, not in its creation. Another method: Let’s say that one sets the bar for exploitation by holding that exploitation is when a worker makes less than the global social product divided by the number of laborers who contributed to the global social product. By this approach, even an Amerikan who earns a minimum wage is not exploited. (1) Another method: Let’s use an egalitarian distribution as a regulative idea to determine who is and who is not exploited. One is exploited if one receives a smaller share than what one would receive under an egalitarian distribution. Again, by this approach, even the poorest Amerikans are not exploited. (2)

To say that Amerikans are exploited is to basically claim that they deserve more of the global social product. An Amerikan who earns a minimum wage falls within the world’s richest 15 percent. 20 percent of the world’s population, mostly in the First World, account for nearly 80 percent of private consumption and income. To say that Amerikans, or First World peoples, deserve more is to say that Third World peoples deserve less. It is social imperialism, not Marxism, that maintains that First World peoples are entitled to more. 

2. Ontology is the study of what kinds of things exist. “Ontology” is basically another word for metaphysics. For example, traditional ontological problems are problems such as whether universals exist or whether there are natural kinds. Whether or not a worker knows he is an exploiter would fall within the purview of epistemology, not metaphysics. In any case, there is no problem here at all. Just because a capitalist or First World worker does not know he is an exploiter does not have any bearing on whether he is one. Whether one is aware of one’s social position does not affect that social position. Being an exploiter is an objective social relationship.

3. That so much of the US economy is non-productive is a sign of its decadence.

Notes

1. http://monkeysmashesheaven.wordpress.com/2008/07/06/blast-of-the-past-from-irtr-a-rough-estimate-of-the-value-of-labor/

2. http://monkeysmashesheaven.wordpress.com/2009/08/05/real-versus-fake-marxism-on-socialist-distribution/

Before retiring almost at the age of 90 earlier this year, Manhattan DA Morgenthau’s final indictments of his career were against a Chinese national by the name of Li Fang Wei, (aka) Karl Lee for the charges of money laundering and selling nuclear material to Iran’s military. Additionally, although there is no extradition treaty between the US and China, the DA wants Wei to face these charges in a US court. For the purposes of providing both context and a broader historical background, a larger story remains at hand here and therefore deserves some attention.

The end of the Cold War two decades ago supposedly represented for some the victory of Western secular free market democracy as the globally accepted modality of governance; as such, the development signified the “end of history”. Vanquishing one challenge with that being the former USSR and propelling in its place a plethora of new issues such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons coupled with the highly correlated subject matter of technology transfer presented a novel set of dilemmas. The case involving Li Fang Wei exemplifies that post-Cold War environment but it may be really overshadowed by what the late Samuel P. Huntington presciently forecast in his book from 13 years ago, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.

One of the dynamics prognosticated by Huntington concerned a multitude of antagonistic bilateral relationships which would begin to boil between the West and the Islamic world. Likewise, a Chinese national self-interest motivated by a natural desire to increase its status would inexorably seek more hegemonic influence upon economic and military affairs throughout the course of its growth as a means to enhance its standing both regionally and globally. By way of example, the PRC’s trade with Pakistan in the area of nuclear weaponry is cited along with the arms dealing being perceived as vindication for Western neoconservatives who militantly espoused the occupation of Iraq in order to prevent non-proliferation and to stop the spread of Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, neocons argue that the current instance of Sino-Iranian trade serves to be even moreso indicative of the failures characteristic of multilateral efforts to accomplish what sometimes can only be accomplished through a unilaterally Bismarckian form of Realpolitik where the outcomes are immediate, pragmatic and tangible.

Interestingly, the would-be father of neoconservative thought, Francis Fukuyama loudly proclaimed his voting for Barack Obama with a statement that implied any continuation of the previous status quo was intellectually unjustifiable in the face of what he saw as an unnecessary war coupled with an uncharacteristic state of fiscal profligacy normally not associated with his conception of the GOP.  Despite Fukuyama being instrumental to the formulation of the Reagan Doctrine concerning containment and covert action, his stance is in marked contrast to the thesis of pre-emptive and preventive war central to the Bush Doctrine.    

Contingency planners have to examine various simulations that can arise in the face of multiple bilateral conflicts. One such worst case scenario involves a four-front war which draws the reluctant global policeman of the US into Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran.  Something, however, that flies in the face of such intractability was the published report that the Bush Administration denied a request from Israel’s PM Olmert to back an Israeli-initiated bombing of Iran. On the other hand, there is the more recent news that Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta reportedly went to Tel Aviv a few months ago to expressly state or request that no bombing take place before notifying Washington first. A highly contentious topic surrounding Huntington’s thesis and recent wars concerns the  assertion that secular free market democracy is a misnomer due to the Western-Islamic conflict having a religious aspect to it. 

Escalating that very debate during the earlier part of this decade was Richard Perle’s response to the late Tim Russert of NBC where Perle affirmatively stated that one of his paper’s primary objectives, A New Strategy for Securing the Realm, also published in 1996, was to ensure that “Israel is surrounded by democracies”. Moreover, when Western and Eastern religions seek the active recruitment of others and their own sanctimonious exportations of exceptionalism from their respective standpoints, conflict is the unequivocal result. Similarly, Huntington’s thesis raises the declinist assertion of relative Western decline in that potential Sino-American disputes would arise from a zero-sum transfer of wealth to the Orient from the Occidental world; contentiousness then becomes reinforced by stark cultural and political differences such as American rugged individualism juxtaposed against a more top-down and centralized Confucian structure. Protectionism consequently arises as one outcome albeit in less overt forms compared to the trade wars of the 19th Century and the Depression-era Smoot-Hawley tariff bills while the benefits of globalization lack an optimal distribution, thus further stoking the flames of discontent.

In US Treasury bond auctions of late, foreign central bank participation, as indirect bidders or otherwise, comprises a very large percentage of the transactional volume that takes place. During the first half of the year, dealers were gaming the US central bank by offering as much as three times the supply that the Federal Reserve wanted to monetize and yields virtually doubled as a result. The Chinese have begun demanding more in Treasury Inflation Protected Securities as a dollar hedge while also not renewing and rolling over as much of their holdings as those come to mature. Whereas a century ago, the British pound sterling was the reserve currency of the world; all of the aforementioned brings into question the same status vis-a-vis the US dollar even though a complete transition to the renminbi would require much deeper and more liquid credit and debt markets in mainland China compared to their development at this moment in time.

CNN’s Fareed Zakaria interview with China’s Premier Wen Jiabao was broadcast less than one week ago. A familiar Western request was made by Zakaria whereby the Chinese would be more actively engaged with North Korea as part of a larger responsibility on a bilateral basis and furthermore that all such duties fall under the purview of a superpower’s responsibilities. Quickly rejecting what he regarded as a mischaracterization, the Premier replied that China has unbalanced development between rural and urban areas and as such, is still a developing nation. Wen Jiabao argued that China can therefore not be regarded as a superpower. The Premier also went to some length to state that Chinese relations with North Korea are not bilateral but really moreso specific to the Six Party Talks. However, one could argue that in parts of the US Rust Belt where reported unemployment rates approach 20% and Public Service Announcements routinely broadcast the locations of food banks coupled with a de-industrialization of moving away from manufacturing as a large component of the American economy; all of that represents the US as a developing nation. The exchange between the journalist and the Premier showed the difficulty of trying to bilaterally engage or delegate when the multilateral roles can be used for cover.        

Indubitably, the lack of singular bipolarity in a post-Cold War environment proves challenging to manage given multiplicitous  dynamics at play. A partial rebuttal to the declinist thesis and its morbidly Hobbesian qualities vis-a-vis the US fiscal situation  including all unfunded mandates and any off-balance sheet exposure would be where the Supreme Court, through constitutional authority and an amendment, overrides all other authorities and introduces austerity into the mix. Nevertheless, Huntington deserves credit for having forecast that a Sino-Islamic set of relationships would ultimately serve to foment the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the Middle East and Indian subcontinent.

I heard a fantastic lecture recently (and I recommend it if you have a spare 90 minutes you listen here) on the subject of Barack Obama by Professor Mick Cox who is in the department of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

The presentation is not terribly revelatory (it isn’t meant to be), but what Cox does very well is contextualise the events which took place, and this is done with his inimicable wit.

It cannot be stressed enough how severly popular Obama was, and surprising it was given the ticket with which he was running; a black president is one thing, but at a heightened time of US patriotism and war is quite another notion that caught Cox’s eye.

There is one caveat. Remember at the time Obama seemed to signify the saviourhood for every group that felt penialised; for Mexicans, despite usually being Catholic conservative and anti-abortion, voted in force for Obama. The socialist/liberal/left saw in Obama a revolutionary streak that gave appeal to the Democrats rather than wellmeaning fringe parties (such was the problem with Al Gore’s election loss, though, of course, Ralph Nader will tell you different). And also from the right, Wall Street voting trends took to voting Obama, Colin Powell cut ties with his party and that once hardcore Hegelian neo-liberal Francis Fukuyama put the final touches to destroying his illusion that libertarianism would be the final stage in history.

Celebrations all round, but this is all enough to see a problem. Obama running on a broad centre-left ticket with major support (and unbelievable amounts of funding) from those with natural centre-right tendencies. Its hardly surprising that today’s healthcare reform troubles have taken effect in the states.

Cox’ lecture is slightly before the Hannan incident and the complete uproar that took place, but certainly the mood change had registered with him. It was necessary to remember that even with Obama’s majority and initial popularity, the administration had to be prepared to engage in a war of ideas – even if attitudes were not necessarily in their court.

Though not from a naturally sympathetic source, Fred Barnes of Fox News has suggested plausible figures that Democrat popularity has slumped over recent weeks (now down to 49%) while the Republicans – who have gone all out on the issue of healthcare, even at the expense of sanity as with the case of Sarah Palin and her bellowing calls of ‘death panels’ – have stayed put at a consistent 40%.

Encouraging as it is that the Democrats still lead significantly, trends reveal that they might be losing the argument. I can’t help being pessimisstic about the whole situation, but the problem has been cooking since many voters – who usually have their houses on the right – felt that Obama was in debt to them, now they want their political currency back. And since one can find an infinite amount of problems with suggesting that the Singapore style is better for the world than the NHS, or that death panels determining the fate of the American public is the only possible alternative to leaving that decision in the hands of the invisible hand of circumstance, and with the soundness of the pro-reform Democrat argument, I’m sceptical of whether Obama’s efforts will amount to anything in the short-term. Unfortunately, it looks as though the plans will have to be shelved like Hillary Clinton’s plans were during Bill’s attempt at reshaping healthcare.

This is no slur on the Democrat side of the argument – plain to see that there are huge problems that such a huge, rich nation, should deny all its inhabitants free health care – but a large portion of the public have been struck dumb by dumb ideas. Given the landscape of Obama’s vote, a problem was bound to pop up at some point, and this is it.

Republik Indonesia didirikan di atas sebuah niat baik (untuk dirinya dan dunia), 64 tahun silam. Niat baik itu memerintahkan saya dan Anda untuk membentuk pemerintah negara Indonesia yang melindungi segenap bangsa Indoneia, apa pun latar belakangnya, dan yang melindungi tanah tumpah darah tempat kita berpijak sekarang.

Sejak 64 tahun lalu, kita juga sudah diminta untuk bahu-membahu memajukan kesejahteraan umum, bukan kesejahteraan orang per orang semata, untuk mencerdaskan kehidupan bangsa kita dan aktif memimpin dalam menciptakan ketertiban berdasar perdamaian abadi dan keadilan sosial pada aras global. Itulah genius deklarasi kemerdekaan kita, Pembukaan UUD 1945.

Beragam rezim politik pernah bangun dan tunggang langgang mencoba menafsirkan perintah tersebut.

Pergulatan abad ke-20

Pada 20 tahun pertama setelah kemerdekaan (sampai tahun 1965), kita mencoba mengisi kemerdekaan dengan pendekatan ideologis nasionalisme kerakyatan. Ideologi ini berakar pada tradisi pendiri bangsa yang ditempa oleh alam pergerakan yang bertitik tolak pada terutama dari aspirasi masyarakat agraris dan berorientasi pada pemenuhan kepentingan nasional melalui pembangunan karakter bangsa. Pada era ini, ideologis yang bekerja bisa kita sebut sebagai nasionalisme kerakyatan berbasis agraria dan berorientasi nasional.

Pembangunan ekonomi diarahkan untuk melindungi kepentingan industri nasional melalui nasionalisasi perusahaan-perusahaan asing dan perlindungan kepentingan petani melalui program reforma agraria. Budaya yang dikembangkan adalah gotong royong dan persatuan, terutama di antara kekuatan-kekuatan revolusioner Indonesia yang bersedia mengusung program-program untuk membangun masyarakat sosialis ala Indonesia.

Setelah tahun 1965, Orde Baru mengenalkan pendekatan ideologis kapitalisme pembangunan, berbasis agraria dan berorientasi nasional. Pendekatan teknokratis yang bertumpu pada kekuatan dominasi modal diperkenalkan. Modal asing dipersilahkan masuk melalui UU PMA 1967, sementara modal dalam negeri dikembangkan melalui peran birokrasi Orde Baru yang memunculkan mesin negara kapitalisme birokrat, yang berdampak pada ketimpangan sosial dan hilangnya demokrasi.

Dinamika abad ke-21

Karena krisis 1997 dan pergantian rezim 1998, kapitalisme pembangunan dilucuti dan digantikan oleh persaingan bebas di dalam dan luar negeri melalui liberalisasi perdagangan, investadi dan keuangan yang lebih radikal, misalnya melalui UU Penanaman Modal 2006.

Demokrasi multipartai diperkenalkan dan kebebasan individu terjamin melalui masuknya pasal-pasal perlindungan HAM ke UUD kita. Indonesia masuk dalam orbit apa yang disebut Francis Fukuyama sebagai  ‘Revolusi Liberal Sedunia’. Inilah pusaran persaingan bebas liberalisme berbasis industri dengan orientasi global.

Elite-elite yang mendorong proses ini kebanyakan adalah elite intelektual lulusan dalam maupun luar negeri, pengusaha-pengusaha generasi kedua elite bisnis lama maupun pengusaha- pengusaha baru yang menjalankan uang lama (old money). Pun politisinya sudah mulai banyak lahir dari kandungan industri politik yang melampaui tradisi kepartaian yang lama di Indonesia. Inilah rezim gagasan yang bertumpu pada rezim modal liberalistis yang mulai berdominasi dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir ini.

Inkubasi elite liberalistis ini mulai pada dekade 1980-an dan 1990-an dan ‘dilemparkan’ ke kekuasaan oleh moemntum Reformasi 1998.

Namun, pada saat bersamaan era 1980-an dan 1990-an juga ‘mengeram’ elite jenis lain. Mereka melawan elite Orba karena dianggap korup dan konservatif. Di lain pihak, mereka juga menjadi antitesis atas elite dominan Orde Reformasi yang liberalistis karena dianggap abai terhadap isu-isu keadilan meskipun sama-sama berorientasi global.

Elite-elite golongan ini berbasis dan berakar lebih heterogen, yang lahir dari pabrik, perguruan tinggi, LSM, maupun derakan-gerakan sosial, seperti gerakan buruh, perempuan, lingkungan, tani, dan yang juga berinteraksi dengan sebagian unsur pesantren maupun gereja. Mereka umumnya mengusung pendekatan sosialisme demokratis yang berorientasi global.

Orientasi sosialis demokratis ini mendambakan negara kesejahteraan yang menghargai kepemilikan pribadi dan bisnis swasta, tetapi ingin memastikan negara berperan besar memberantas kesenjangan sosial dan kemiskinan, dengan menerapkan pajak progresif terhadap yang berpunya dan memberikan jaminan sosial bagi yang berkekurangan.

Selain itu, meskipun pendekatan sosialisme demokratis ini menenrima globalisasi, mereka ingin mengawasi arus investasi, perdagangan, dan transaksi keuangan agar tidak ada akumulasi, konsentrasi, dan ekspansi modal yang tak terkontrol, Meski mereka belum pernah berkuasa, gagasan-gagasan mereka mulai banyak berkembang dalam beragam literatur, gerakan sosial dalam skala masif, memengaruhi opini dan kebijakan publik.

Pada akhirnya keempat pendekatan ideologis di atas adalah genius bangsa yang saling berlomba menerjemahkan nasionalisme Indonesia. Biarkan mereka tetap mempertandingkan gagasan, partaim dan pimpinannya agar kita punya alasan untuk memilih dan tidak menjadikan demokrasi ini ‘permainan’ yang sia-sia dan mahal karena demi Indonesia (melalui keempat gagasan itu) sudah banyak kebebasan, hidup nyaman, dan jiwa bernyali dikorbankan.

Sumber :

Menerjemahkan Nasionalisme Kita, Budiman Sudjatmiko | Caleg Terpilih DPR dari PDI-P
Kompas, 18.08.2009