Ziua Internaţională pentru Eliminarea Violenţei împotriva Femeilor. Da, şi? Pasă cui ar trebui?

Astăzi este Ziua Internaţională pentru Eliminarea Violenţei împotriva Femeilor.

În România multe femei sunt bătute, violate sau abuzate psihic, dar numai 16% dintre ele au curaj să reclame la poliţie.

http://www.realitatea.net/

Europarlamentarul român, Corina Creţu:

Pentru eliminarea violentei impotriva femeilor

Măcar de n-ar mai fi… de s-ar opri…

Când agresorul este adăpostit de hidoasa umbrelă a PD-L, parte a cohortei de nemoşaguri a unui ramolit cu pretenţii de Crai, chiar dacă ai curajul şi reclami violenţa, hărţuirea la locul de muncă, chiar dacă Poliţia-şi face datoria şi-l amendează pe * vajnicul * nemernic, chiar dacă NU e normal ca instituţia să-l tăinuie şi să-i muşamalizeze repetat ticăloşiile bastardului, victima e repede măturată prin mijloace şi scenarii diabolice, şi-atunci, nu poţi  să nu te-ntrebi, tu OM: oare fetele, nepoatele Tartorilor ar putea suporta suferinţele, durerile, tristeţile prin care-au trecut Sibilla ŞI nişte copile nevinovate ? Până când, Doamne… ?

Şi cum am putea noi, victimele nemernicului să spunem * iartă-i, Doamne că nu ştiu ce fac *… când ei, toată armata de şobolani au ştiut tot timpul exact ce fac…  De asta muşamalizarea şi pitirea mizeriilor sub preş, legea tăcerii a acelui * nimic nu răsuflă-n afara sistemului * reprezintă punctul pe i şi degetul pe rană, pentru că,  fenomenul NU e stopat şi există mereu riscul de-a se mai întâmpla! În Twin Peakse-ul  cărăşean, victimele sunt etichetate * nebune *, agresorii sunt ţinuţi în braţe, cui pasă… Hărţuirea morală la locul de muncă, ameninţările, împroşcatul cu invective şi folosirea limbajului obscen, vulgarităţie apostrofărilor la adresa femeilor, fetelor, abuzurile de influenţă, funcţie, putere, hărţuirea psihică, bătăile, etc. sunt ridicate la rang de * merite deosebite * şi-au binecuvântarea cui ar fi putut să reaşeze lucrurile pe făgaşul normalităţii, dar… n-a fost prost cine-a spus că * peştele de la cap se împute *, d-aia duhoarea persistentă de sub nădragii muherilor în izmene, * moralii *, * modelele *, însemnaţii…

Politica socială de*  succesuri *: NU protecţia copilului, ci protejarea imaginii instituţiilor, NU interes superior al copilului, ci interesele personale ale * divelor * şi * prinţişorilor * din dotarea * Împărăţiei *, NU prevenire, măsuri, soluţii, NU stoparea comportamentelor indecente, deviante şi-ndepărtarea cauzelor/agresorilor, ci pitirea mizeriilor sub preş, NU acceptarea tristei realităţi şi conduită ca atare, NU înfruntarea realităţii-adevărului dovezilor, ci, prigonirea şi hărţuirea victimelor, pentru că au avut şi au curajul de-aşi purta cu DEMNITATE durerile. Ticăloşii,  uniţi prin ticăloşiile la care se dedau, habar NU au ce este Moralitatea, Demnitatea, Cinstea, Respectul, jalnicii, caractere josnice, se-mbată cu falsa impresie c-ar fi nemuritori.

Victimele ca noi, mai sperăm încă în… JUSTIŢIA DIVINĂ, că-n rest… cui pasă… ?

http://sfinx777.wordpress.com/2009/10/07/protectia-copilului-dincolo-de-ziduri/

http://sfinx777.wordpress.com/2009/09/25/licitatii-comisioane-contestatii-caras-severin-twin-peakse/

http://sfinx777.wordpress.com/2009/07/22/nu-abuzului-sexual-fata-de-minori-sa-denuntam-brutele/

*******

* Conduita morală nu înseamnă pur şi simplu exigenţa de a renunţa anume la plăcerile vieţii, ci mai degrabă interesul plin de solicitudine pe care-l depune cineva ca să făurească o soartă mai bună pentru toţi oamenii. *   ( Albert Einstein )

* Adevărata moralitate nu constă în a urma cărarea bătătorită, ci în a descoperi adevărata cale pentru noi înşine şi a o urma fără teamă. *   ( Mahatma Gandhi )

* Moralitatea nu este propriu-zis doctrina prin care ne putem face fericiţi, ci prin care ne putem face vrednici de fericire. *   ( Immanuel Kant )

Sibilla

citate preluate de pe www.citapedia.ro

imagine preluată de pe google.ro – www.static,panoramio

El número de lectores, o al menos de visitantes, de este blog ha ido en aumento con el paso de los meses. Sin embargo, hay algunos lectores, muy fieles, que han estado presentes desde el inicio de estas crónicas, algunos más a la vista (con sus comentarios o mis referencias), otros detrás de bambalinas.

Entre estos últimos se encuentra el caso de Paulita, que no sólo es lectora de este diario, sino analista y crítica filosófica del mismo, al punto de, quizás sin saberlo, ser impulsora de algunos de los temas que a lo largo de tantos kilobytes se tratan en estas líneas.

La semana pasada, sorbiendo un té en nuestra cocina (de Nuria y mía), fue ella la que puso en mi mente, quizás sin querer, la materia de esta semana.

Espero, entonces, poder responder de manera honrosa, como un agradecimiento a todos estos lectores discretos, que sin embargo se oyen, cada tanto.

Epistemología

Cuando estudiaba Comunicación Social, en la Escuelita de Ciencias de la Información de la UNC, en el último año de carrera había una materia que a nadie pasaba desapercibida, sobre todo por su solemne nombre: “Epistemología de las Ciencias Sociales”.

A pesar del miedo generalizado, personalmente la materia me pareció llevadera y parte de ello puede deberse a que tenía a mi lado a Juan Manuel, un amigo y compañero de clase experto en filosofía, y además, en nuestro horario, la asignatura contaba con un profesor que era muy bueno (su nombre era Horacio Etchichurry).

Si mi recuerdo no me engaña, el eje de aquella misteriosa materia eran las llamadas “Teorías de la verdad”. El objetivo de estas teorías no es definir la verdad en sí misma, sino la forma en que se determina que algo es o no verdad.

Las “teorías de la verdad” son variadas y son motivo de estudio filosófico desde hace tiempo. Del espectro de opciones que nos fueron mostradas en aquel entonces, recuerdo algunos nombres e ideas sueltas que sólo valdría la pena nombrar si quisiera hacer gala de vanos conocimientos.

Reprimiendo esa tendencia, me limito a enumerar unas pocas opciones que sirven para ilustrar estas teorías: 

Por ejemplo, hay teorías que afirman que una proposición es verdadera si es evidente, es decir, si se presenta con tanta claridad y distinción a nuestras mentes que éstas no pueden por menos que aceptarla (el criterio de evidencia).

Por otra parte, la teoría del consenso sostiene que la verdad es cualquier cosa que es acordada por algún grupo específico.

El criterio de utilidad, en cambio, establece que una proposición es verdadera si resulta útil o funciona en la práctica

También, hay verdades subjetivas y objetivas; verdades relativas y absolutas, y cada una de éstas tiene una doctrina que las soporta argumentativamente.

Agradezco a wikipedia por la resumida información, y quien quiera más ejemplos, puede verlos aquí.

No hay dudas de que cada nueva teoría de la verdad es motivo de discusión y debate. De hecho, yo no tenía intención de meterme en este lío. Al menos, no hasta que Paulita sacó el tema, tan tranquila con su tibia taza entre las manos.

Mentiras Piadosas

Todo empezó con un debate sobre la validez de las así llamadas “mentiras piadosas”, aquellas mentiras que se pronuncian teniendo una supuesta buena intención como fondo.

Inevitablemente apareció en escena una “teoría de la verdad” que entraría en la categoría de absolutista, y es la que dice que hay ciertas afirmaciones que son completamente falsas o verdaderas siempre y para todos, por ejemplo “Mentir está mal” o “Siempre hay que decir la verdad”.

Yo, que si no creyera en Dios y en la filosofía espiritual, creo que sería discípulo del filósofo Kant (con sus imperativos categóricos y su deber moral universal), tengo tendencia a estas afirmaciones absolutas, sobre todo porque tengo en gran estima a la Verdad.

De todos modos, debido a lecturas y explicaciones recibidas a través de los años, siempre desde el punto de vista espiritual, esta vez me puse del otro lado.

Trataré de explicar mi visión: La verdad es una cualidad positiva, y desde el punto de vista espiritual, es también un atributo Divino (como el amor, la armonía, la paz, la sabiduría).

Siendo la verdad un atributo Divino no debería por ende causar daño. Incluso quitándole el ribete teísta, si aceptamos que la verdad es meramente una cualidad positiva, entonces no tendría que generar efectos negativos, por una simple cuestión de oposición.

Con este criterio, y postulando una “teoría de la verdad” basada en la filosofía espiritual, sólo se puede considerar como Verdad a aquello que genere consecuencias positivas, es decir que ayude a las personas a ser más felices; que en el sentido espiritual del término sería conocer la propia esencia, realizar ser parte de la energía universal, alcanzar la iluminación…

No Duele

Tal como experimentamos la idea de verdad en el día a día, es evidente que la verdad para unos (ya sean muchos o pocos), puede traer el perjuicio para otros (ya sean muchos o pocos). Esto no se pone en discusión porque, en general, consideramos verdad lo que nos parece objetivamente demostrable, un hecho en que la mayoría estamos de acuerdo.

De allí nace la frase popular que dice “La verdad no duele (o no ofende)”.

No hace falta analizar demasiado para darse cuenta que esta sentencia popular, al menos en la forma en que está usada, es errada. Digo que no hace falta analizar mucho, porque basta que uno piense cuánto le duele o le ofende que le digan una “verdad” negativa para darse cuenta.

¿Cómo es posible, entonces, que una cualidad positiva como la verdad me hiera así?

Quiero ser claro para no crear malentendidos: Hay situaciones que son dolorosas y no es culpa de nadie; decirlas no nos hace verdugos, y no decirlas es grave. Se me ocurre: “Se nos acabaron los ahorros” o “Hubo un terremoto en tal ciudad”.

No estoy hablando de estos casos. En realidad, me refiero siempre a cuestiones que están muy relacionadas con lo que entendemos como el compromiso moral, que es el terreno en donde la línea de la verdad se puede volver más ambigua.

Es justamente en el ámbito moral en donde la verdad, considerada como hecho objetivo, muchas veces sí duele. Por ejemplo, si hay una persona que es objetivamente fea, basándonos en los estándares de belleza de nuestra sociedad de hoy, ¿tiene uno derecho a decirle a esa persona que es fea, sencillamente porque es verdad? Alguien puede argumentar que ir a decirle a alguien que es feo por motu proprio no es verdad, es maldad.

Supongamos entonces que esa persona nos pregunta si es o no fea. Uno está obligado a contestar, ¿qué hace? ¿Se escuda en la bandera de la verdad objetiva o dice una “mentira piadosa”?.

No creo que haga falta hacer una encuesta para saber que en la mayoría de los casos, todos, instintivamente, optamos por deformar la verdad objetiva para así no herir al otro, aunque sea sólo para sentirnos mejor nosotros mismos.

Sin embargo, esta actitud no es cobarde ni, creo yo, equivocada.

La enseñanza espiritual dice que hacer hincapié o destacar las cualidades negativas de una persona no es correcto (al menos como regla general). Esto no se justifica, ni me absuelve, por el solo hecho de ser verdad. En un caso como el anterior, decir algo que no es “objetivamente verdad”, puede ayudar al otro a ser más feliz o mejorar (por ejemplo, tener más autoestima).

Parábola

En la ladera de una montaña de los Himalayas vivía sentado en postura de meditación un sabio asceta hindú. Después de muchas vidas de renuncia y penitencias, el hombre había llegado a la que sería su última encarnación en la tierra, ya en los umbrales de la iluminación.

Un buen día llegó corriendo un desesperado hombre, que dijo ser perseguido por una banda de enemigos, luego de lo cual se subió al árbol que servía de cobijo al asceta, pidiéndole por favor que no delatara su escondite.

A los pocos minutos llegaron los perseguidores, armados de machetes, y le preguntaron al asceta si había visto pasar al fugitivo. El asceta, ajeno a todo, prefirió no responder, evitando así entrometerse en un tema que no le concernía.

Sin embargo, los perseguidores no eran tipos blandos y amenazaron con cortarle un dedo de la mano si no hablaba. El asceta, siempre teniendo en mente que somos alma y no cuerpo, se mantuvo callado.

Los perseguidores le cortaron el dedo meñique de un machetazo.

Nuevamente, le inquirieron sobre el paradero del fugitivo. Ahora, el asceta empezó a pensar en responder. Sopesando el dilema de decir la verdad, lo cual implicaba la segura muerte del hombre trepado al árbol, o estar callado, lo cual implicaba perder más dedos, el asceta tomó una decisión que creyó neutral: Sin decir una palabra, sin casi moverse, hizo un gesto claro con los ojos y las cejas, indicando hacia arriba, en dirección a las ramas del árbol.

Los perseguidores lo captaron enseguida e hicieron bajar al pobre prófugo, que inevitablemente fue conducido a su muerte a fuerza de machetes.

Por su parte, el asceta quedó satisfecho, no había mentido, tampoco había “dicho” la verdad, al menos de su boca no había salido ni una palabra.

Cuando al tiempo, el asceta murió y ascendió a las esferas superiores, se encontró con Brahman, quien le informó que debía reencarnar una vez más (si la parábola fuera católica, aquí estaría San Pedro y le informaría que en lugar del cielo le toca el purgatorio, como mínimo). El asceta estaba muy desencantado, incluso enfadado, después de tantas vidas de penitencia tener que seguir esforzándose.

“¿Por qué?”, dijo el asceta. Entonces, Brahman le recordó aquel episodio del fugitivo, el árbol y los machetes. 

“Yo no dije ni una palabra”, se excusó el asceta ingenuamente, y agregó, “Además, me hubieran cortado todos los dedos”.

A lo que Brahman contestó, “Ni todos los dedos valen más que la vida de un hombre”, y continuó, “Si tanto los querías hubieras señalado en otra dirección”.

El asceta replicó, “¡Pero eso hubiera sido mentir!”.

Brahman concluyó, “Mira lo que sucedió por decir la ‘verdad’, aún cuando haya sido sólo con un gesto: un hombre murió y tú perdiste un dedo”.

Correcto

Por un lado, el asceta se dio cuenta del dilema y quiso escabullirse dando una respuesta a medias, sin “decir” la verdad, pero tampoco mentir. No funcionó. 

La pregunta es, ¿qué harían ustedes en un caso así? ¿Es la verdad, tal como la conocemos, tan importante como para merecer, en caso extremo, la muerte de alguien, o menos trágico, la ofensa de alguien?

Es desde esta perspectiva espiritual que yo adopté, en la cocina de casa y hablando con Paulita, el estandarte de “Decir la verdad no siempre es lo mejor”.

Una vez más, para que quede claro que no hago apología de la mentira y el engaño, quiero explicar que desde la visión espiritual que estoy postulando, la verdad es relativa; es decir, depende de lo que sea correcto e incorrecto.

Qué es correcto, también es relativo, y se puede definir simplemente como aquello que es bueno para nuestra felicidad a largo plazo (llámese conocimiento interior, acercamiento a Dios, evolución espiritual). Asimismo, lo correcto para nosotros siempre ayudará a la felicidad de los demás, ya que nuestra felicidad a largo plazo no puede estar separada de la felicidad ajena, teniendo en cuenta que todos somos parte de una misma energía universal.

Todo esto me lleva a cambiar la frase y postular entonces que, “Decir la verdad es siempre lo correcto”.

Aunque pueda no parecerlo, esta forma de ver la verdad puede ser mucho más difícil de cumplir que la forma tradicional. En este sentido que realmente “La verdad no duele”.

Crudeza

Desde el punto de vista espiritual, el concepto de Verdad, con mayúsculas, está indisolublemente unido a la idea de Dios. Para Mahatma Gandhi, por ejemplo, el objetivo de la vida era la búsqueda de la Verdad, y así lo llamaba él. En este sentido, el gran santo Swami Vivekananda, por ejemplo, hablaba de la búsqueda de la Libertad.

Volviendo a la verdad, la búsqueda cruda y honesta de ella, sin poner filtros a las heridas y las ofensas, sólo estaría considerada como correcta si uno la aplica, por propia decisión, hacia uno mismo, a nadie más. Es decir, si uno decide evolucionar espiritualmente y está dispuesto a enfrentarse a sus defectos de manera directa y sin desvíos.

Asimismo, dentro de esta opción se puede incluir la relación del Gurú con el discípulo, el cual admite, al menos tácitamente, que su maestro espiritual lo haga enfrentarse a las verdades más duras de manera de avanzar en el camino espiritual de forma más rauda.

Y hablando de maestros espirituales, me gustaría cerrar con unas palabras de Swami Premananda (en “La verdad”, Premananda Satsang Vol. II):

“La oculta mano de la Divinidad es en sí misma la verdad. Aférrate con firmeza a la soga de la verdad. No la sueltes, ni por un momento. No permitas que las ideas de clase, religión, raza, idioma o nacionalidad, manufacturadas por el hombre, te confundan. Permite que sólo te controle el deseo por la verdad”.

Fuentes Imágenes:

http://imagenes.hola.com/
http://schriftman.files.wordpress.com/
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/
http://www.norcalblogs.com/

“Immanuel Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in Königsberg, Prussia (Now Kaliningrad, Russia).  He was of Scottish descent and had a Pietist upbringing and education.  (Pietism is a form of Protestantism similar to Methodism, i.e. very conservative.)  He went to the University of Königsberg, where he received his PhD.  He taught as a privatdozent, which is a private teacher or tutor, paid by his students.  This meant a poor life, boardinghouses, and bachelorhood.

He began with an interest in science — physics, astronomy, geology, biology.  In fact, he introduced the nebular hypothesis, suggesting that originally, swirling gases condensed into the sun and the planets — basically, what we understand to be the reality today.  He also reintroduces Lucretius’s idea of evolution of plant and animal life.

In 1781, he published the Critique of Pure Reason.  Critique means a critical or careful analysis, and pure reason means reason which leads to knowledge that doesn’t require experiential proof, what is also called a priori (before-hand) knowledge.

He said he had been “awakened from his dogmatic slumbers” by reading Hume.  This is frequently misunderstood to mean that he was outraged.  Actually, he said that he had been dogmatically accepting of the traditional ideas about reason.  Hume enlightened him!  However, it is also true that Hume challenged him, in a sense, to rescue such concepts as cause and effect, which Kant felt were essential to the existence of science.  He took as his life’s  task to saving of the universe from Hume’s pervasive skepticism.

First, he makes a distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge:

It is a question worth investigating, whether there exists any knowledge independent of experience and all sense impressions.  Such knowledge is called a priori and is distinguished from a posteriori knowledge which has its sources in experience.  That there is genuine a priori knowledge, that we can advance independent of all experience, is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics….

Although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises entirely from experience.  For it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own faculty of knowing (incited by impressions) supplies from itself–a supplement to impressions which we do not distinguish from that raw material (i.e. impressions) until long practice has roused our attention and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.

What then are these a priori faculties of our minds?  The first stage of mind’s operation on experience is the transcendental aesthetic,  which states that all sense experience is synthesized “through” the concepts of time and space.

Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another….  Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense.  It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer perception is possible for us.

Since the capacity to be affected by objects must precede all perception of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances (i.e., space) can be given prior to all perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori;  and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain, prior to all experience, principles which determine the relations of these objects.  It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things.  If we depart from the subjective, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.

Time is a purely subjective condition of our human perception, and, in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing….  What we are maintaining is the empirical reality of time, its objective validity of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses.    Since our perception is always sensible (i.e., by the senses), no object can ever be given to us in experience which does not conform to the condition of time.  On the other hand, we deny to time any claim to absolute reality; that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolutely, as their condition or property independently of any reference to the form of our perception.  Properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses.  This, then, is what constitutes the ideality of time.

So time and space are necessary to perception, even though they themselves cannot be perceived apart from the events “in” them.  The next step is the  transcendental analytic,  which says that the mind applies certain categories of thought to ideas.  Without these categories, Kant says, we would not be able to think at all, and Hume couldn’t have come up with his arguments.  Hume, for example, felt that cause and effect were not objectively real; Kant says right! — they are a priori, in the mind:

1.  Quantity:  unity, plurality, totality.

2.  Quality:  reality, negation, limitation.

3.  Relation:  substance and accidents, cause and effect, reciprocity between active and passive.

4.  Modality:  possible-impossible, existence-nonexistence, necessity-contingency.

Finally comes the transcendental dialectic.  Kant believed that the mind seeks complete knowledge.  But it is limited to dealing with phenomena, appearances, only.  It can’t reach to noumena, the thing-in-itself.  Phenomena are all you have, but they are not real; noumena are real, but you can’t have them.  So, to discover that real world, we try to construct it.  Unfortunately, we err by trying to use the categories (logic), “designed” for phenomena, on the ultimate reality!  So we end up with contradictions that are irreconcilable.  Regarding cause and effect and free will:

If, however, we may legitimately take an object in two senses, namely, as phenomena and as thing-in-itself; and if the principle of causality applies to things only as phenomena and not as noumena, then we can, without any contradiction, think one and the same thing when phenomenal as necessarily conforming to the principle of causality and so far not free, and yet, in itself not subject to that principle and therefore free.

Suppose morality necessarily presupposed freedom of the will while speculative reason had proved that such freedom cannot even be thought.  In such case freedom, and with it morality, would have to make room for the mechanical interpretation of nature.  But our critique has revealed our inevitable ignorance of things-in-themselves, has limited our knowledge to mere phenomena.  So, as morality requires only that freedom should not entail a contradiction, there is no reason why freedom whould be denied to will, considered as a thing-in-itself, merely because it must be denied to it as a phenomenon.

Ultimately, Kant found that the existence of God, the soul, and ultimate reality is not something you can prove, because proof is based on phenomena and the categories.  Instead, they are heuristic, that is, we believe in these things because they are useful to us!  In saving science and religion from Hume, he proved that they had to be taken on faith!  Scholars and churchmen on all sides of the issues criticized the Critique, which ironically guaranteed its success.  Kant had no censorship problems to worry about at the time, because Frederick the Great — a brilliant man himself — ruled Prussia at that time.  Unfortunately for Kant and many others, he died in 1786.

(A note on Frederick the Great:  The King of Prussia, including much of Germany as well, he was, besides a consummate leader and politician, an accomplished philosopher and a passionate amateur musician.  He corresponded with Voltaire and Rousseau, and Bach wrote “A Musical Offering” for him, based on a melody the King had challenged him with.  He wrote a number of books, including A History of My Times and The Anti-Machiavelli)

In 1788, Kant wrote the Critique of Practical Reason.  Practical reason refers to the making of moral decisions.  In this book, he argues that everyone has a conscience, a moral law within their souls, not unlike the categories of the Critique of Pure Reason.  This moral law he calls the Categorical Imperative, which is phrased two ways.  The first is a variation on the Golden Rule:  Whatever you do, consider what kind of world this would be if everybody did the same.  The other is a little deeper:  Treat people (including oneself) only as ends, never as means to an end.  Never use them, we would say today.

In order to have morality, Kant believed we needed free will.  If you can’t make choices, how could you be responsible?  If you aren’t responsible for anything you do, like an animal or a robot, then what you do is neither bad nor good!  Also, he felt we needed the idea of immortality:  Since justice rarely happens within a lifetime, we need life after death to take care of that.  And, in order for eternal life to exist, or free will, or good and bad at all, we need to believe in God.

Notice that he doesn’t say that, first God exists, therefore….  He is actually saying that, although we can never prove the existence of God (or immortality, or free will, or good and bad), we must act as if he (and they) existed.  Religious thinkers of the time did not care for this way of thinking at all!

Kant wrote a good deal more.  In 1790, he wrote the Critique of Judgement, regarding judgements of beauty.  He notes that our sense of beauty is based on feeling, not reason.  We seem to “see” the harmony, the power, the miraculous in some things.  It is as if God so arranged things!

In 1793, when he was 69 years old, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone came out.  Here he argues (unlike Hobbes and unlike Rousseau) that we are born with the potential for both good and bad.  He does acknowledge, though, that a great deal of evil comes out of civilization, rather than our primitive nature.  In fact, a lot of what we now consider bad was probably originally necessary for survival in primitive conditions!

He also said that, although there is an inborn moral sense, it must be developed by moral instruction.  For this reason, he believes that religion is necessary — although he also points out that religion shouldn’t be dogmatic, and that beliefs such as original sin, the divinity of Christ, and the efficacy of prayer are mere superstitions.

In 1795, he wrote On Perpetual Peace, outlining the basis for international law.  In 1798, he came out with The Conflict of Faculties, arguing for the importance of academic freedom.  He died February 12, 1804, after long illness, and was buried ceremoniously in Königsberg Castle.  Over his grave is written

The starry heavens above me;

The moral law within me.”

The History Of Psychology, Part 2: The Rebirth

Dr. C. George Boeree

© Copyright 2000 C. George Boeree

Ali.♥

Richard Rorty

(source)

Richard Rorty has an interesting take on human rights. If we want universal acceptance of and respect for human rights, we shouldn’t try to argue about it. We shouldn’t attempt to work out rational justifications of human rights, or arguments that will convince people that human rights are a good thing. Instead, according to Rorty, we would achieve better results if we try to influence people’s feelings instead of their minds. And the best way to do that is by telling sentimental stories like “Uncle Tom’s cabin” or “Roots” etc., or by making political art. Such stories and art make the reader sympathize with persons whose rights are violated because they invite the audience or the reader to imagine what it is like to be in the victim’s position. The victim, who may be of another class, race or nationality and who seems so very different that he or she initially isn’t even considered to be of the same species and therefore cannot possibly claim to enjoy the same rights, is transformed by the story into a living human being. The sympathy engendered by the story gives the victim a human face. This person also grieves for the loss of children, also has an opinion and a moral sense. He’s or she not a barbarian. As a consequence, the victim can be given human rights.

This approach to human rights doesn’t justifying human rights in an abstract and philosophical way – something which according to Rorty isn’t possible anyway (Rorty’s a post-modern anti-foundationalist highly sceptical of the power of reason or rationality). Instead it motivates specific individuals to respect the rights of other specific individuals. So motivation instead of justification. And the focus isn’t so much on human rights themselves, but on humanity. When human rights are violated, it’s often not because people object to human rights, but because they consider the targets of rights violations as somehow outside the realm of humanity. Thomas Jefferson, for example, was very eloquent about human rights, but was a slave holder at the same time. Undoubtedly because he had convinced himself that negroes were more akin to animals than humans.

The big advantage of the sentimental approach is that is can convince people to accept others into the realm of humanity. Sympathy means after all the recognition that someone else’s suffering is akin to your own. Rorty harked back to David Hume for this insight:

Hume held that corrected (sometimes rule-corrected) sympathy, not law-discerning reason, is the fundamental moral capacity. Richard Rorty (source)

David Hume

Hence the importance of a “right to belong to humanity” in the words of Hannah Arendt (see here and here) and of the equal rights provision in the system of human rights.

This approach, or “sentimental education” as Rorty called it, can indeed be very useful, and I regularly use it on this blog (for example, there’s a blog series called “human rights stories“, and there’s also a lot of imagery used here). However, I think we should and can use both strategies, the emotional and the rational one. (I outlined the latter one here. In the field of morality, Immanuel Kant is of course the main exponent of the rational approach).

Thomas Pogge

The emotional approach isn’t without a downside. Human rights violations do not always occur because of a lack of sympathy or because of dehumanization. They are often the result of power structures, cultural practices, legal rules, institutions, international relations etc. Just engendering sympathy won’t do much good there. (Thomas Pogge is known for his work in this field). Moreover, sentimental education implies a willingness to listen – not a notable characteristic of many of the worst human rights violators, i.e. Taliban c.s. – and a certain standard of living that allows people to relax long enough to be able to listen. These are problems which Rorty recognized (source) and which indicate that his approach cannot be exclusive.

Sigo con mi investigación sobre el mal radical, que ya mencioné en este post, y sobre la cual planeo ir publicando notas relativamente aisladas, pero de alguna forma autosuficientes.

El misterioso camino del albedrío... o algo así.

Veamos como se da esta importante diferencia en la filosofía moral de Immanuel Kant.

Las leyes proceden de la voluntad; las máximas, del albedrío. Este último es en el hombre un albedrío libre; la voluntad, que no se refiere sino a la ley, no puede llamarse ni libre ni no libre, porque no se refiere a las acciones, sino inmediatamente a la legislación concerniente a las máximas de las acciones (por tanto, la razón práctica misma), de ahí que sea también absolutamente necesaria y no sea ella misma susceptible de coerción alguna. Por consiguiente, sólo podemos denominar libre al albedrío[1].

No es una cita sencilla en lo absoluto, pero se puede ver claramente que la legislación moral no depende de cada uno, y es por lo tanto universal. Así, sólo nos podemos considerar autónomos cuando obedecemos la ley moral, es decir, cuando nuestro albedrío se conforma a la voluntad.

Nicht Sehen trennt von den Dingen. Nicht Hören von den Menschen

Ein Spruch, der in fast jedem Buch und Artikel über Schwerhörigkeit, Ertaubung und Gehörlosigkeit vorkommt und der meist Helen Keller zugeschrieben wird — einer Taubblinden, die es ja wissen muss.

Dabei scheint der Spruch ursprünglich von Kant zu sein, dem Philosophen, der sein Leben fast ausschließlich in Königsberg verbrachte, was seiner Philisophie oft von naseweisen Erstsemestern zum Vorwurf gemacht wird. Hahaha, der habe doch von der Welt nichts gesehen und dann so einen Anspruch!

Ist es nicht interessant, dass der allgemein zustimmungsfähige Spruch über Taubheit und Blindheit von jemand zu sein scheint, der selbst kein besonderes Problem mit hören und sehen hatte?

Der Mann muss wirklich außergewöhnliche Vorstellungsgabe gehabt haben. Gut, okay, wir reden hier über Kant, stimmt…. Allerdings habe ich nirgends eine Quellenangabe gefunden, hat irgendjemand eine?

Immanuel Kant was born on April 22, 1724, in Königsberg, Prussia (Now Kaliningrad, Russia).  He was of Scottish descent and had a Pietist upbringing and education.  (Pietism is a form of Protestantism similar to Methodism, i.e. very conservative.)  He went to the University of Königsberg, where he received his PhD.  He taught as a privatdozent, which is a private teacher or tutor, paid by his students.  This meant a poor life, boardinghouses, and bachelorhood.

He began with an interest in science — physics, astronomy, geology, biology.  In fact, he introduced the nebular hypothesis, suggesting that originally, swirling gases condensed into the sun and the planets — basically, what we understand to be the reality today.  He also reintroduces Lucretius’s idea of evolution of plant and animal life.

In 1781, he published the Critique of Pure Reason.  Critique means a critical or careful analysis, and pure reason means reason which leads to knowledge that doesn’t require experiential proof, what is also called a priori (before-hand) knowledge.

He said he had been “awakened from his dogmatic slumbers” by reading Hume.  This is frequently misunderstood to mean that he was outraged.  Actually, he said that he had been dogmatically accepting of the traditional ideas about reason.  Hume enlightened him!  However, it is also true that Hume challenged him, in a sense, to rescue such concepts as cause and effect, which Kant felt were essential to the existence of science.  He took as his life’s  task to saving of the universe from Hume’s pervasive skepticism.

First, he makes a distinction between a posteriori and a priori knowledge:

It is a question worth investigating, whether there exists any knowledge independent of experience and all sense impressions.  Such knowledge is called a priori and is distinguished from a posteriori knowledge which has its sources in experience.  That there is genuine a priori knowledge, that we can advance independent of all experience, is shown by the brilliant example of mathematics….

Although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises entirely from experience.  For it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions and that which our own faculty of knowing (incited by impressions) supplies from itself–a supplement to impressions which we do not distinguish from that raw material (i.e. impressions) until long practice has roused our attention and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.

What then are these a priori faculties of our minds?  The first stage of mind’s operation on experience is the transcendental aesthetic,  which states that all sense experience is synthesized “through” the concepts of time and space.

Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another….  Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense.  It is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer perception is possible for us.

Since the capacity to be affected by objects must precede all perception of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances (i.e., space) can be given prior to all perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori;  and how, as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain, prior to all experience, principles which determine the relations of these objects.  It is, therefore, solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space, of extended things.  If we depart from the subjective, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever.

Time is a purely subjective condition of our human perception, and, in itself, apart from the subject, is nothing….  What we are maintaining is the empirical reality of time, its objective validity of all objects which allow of ever being given to our senses.    Since our perception is always sensible (i.e., by the senses), no object can ever be given to us in experience which does not conform to the condition of time.  On the other hand, we deny to time any claim to absolute reality; that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolutely, as their condition or property independently of any reference to the form of our perception.  Properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through the senses.  This, then, is what constitutes the ideality of time.

So time and space are necessary to perception, even though they themselves cannot be perceived apart from the events “in” them.  The next step is the  transcendental analytic,  which says that the mind applies certain categories of thought to ideas.  Without these categories, Kant says, we would not be able to think at all, and Hume couldn’t have come up with his arguments.  Hume, for example, felt that cause and effect were not objectively real; Kant says right! — they are a priori, in the mind:

1.  Quantity:  unity, plurality, totality.

2.  Quality:  reality, negation, limitation.

3.  Relation:  substance and accidents, cause and effect, reciprocity between active and passive.

4.  Modality:  possible-impossible, existence-nonexistence, necessity-contingency.

Finally comes the transcendental dialectic.  Kant believed that the mind seeks complete knowledge.  But it is limited to dealing with phenomena, appearances, only.  It can’t reach to noumena, the thing-in-itself.  Phenomena are all you have, but they are not real; noumena are real, but you can’t have them.  So, to discover that real world, we try to construct it.  Unfortunately, we err by trying to use the categories (logic), “designed” for phenomena, on the ultimate reality!  So we end up with contradictions that are irreconcilable.  Regarding cause and effect and free will:

If, however, we may legitimately take an object in two senses, namely, as phenomena and as thing-in-itself; and if the principle of causality applies to things only as phenomena and not as noumena, then we can, without any contradiction, think one and the same thing when phenomenal as necessarily conforming to the principle of causality and so far not free, and yet, in itself not subject to that principle and therefore free.

Suppose morality necessarily presupposed freedom of the will while speculative reason had proved that such freedom cannot even be thought.  In such case freedom, and with it morality, would have to make room for the mechanical interpretation of nature.  But our critique has revealed our inevitable ignorance of things-in-themselves, has limited our knowledge to mere phenomena.  So, as morality requires only that freedom should not entail a contradiction, there is no reason why freedom whould be denied to will, considered as a thing-in-itself, merely because it must be denied to it as a phenomenon.

Ultimately, Kant found that the existence of God, the soul, and ultimate reality is not something you can prove, because proof is based on phenomena and the categories.  Instead, they are heuristic, that is, we believe in these things because they are useful to us!  In saving science and religion from Hume, he proved that they had to be taken on faith!  Scholars and churchmen on all sides of the issues criticized the Critique, which ironically guaranteed its success.  Kant had no censorship problems to worry about at the time, because Frederick the Great — a brilliant man himself — ruled Prussia at that time.  Unfortunately for Kant and many others, he died in 1786.

(A note on Frederick the Great:  The King of Prussia, including much of Germany as well, he was, besides a consummate leader and politician, an accomplished philosopher and a passionate amateur musician.  He corresponded with Voltaire and Rousseau, and Bach wrote “A Musical Offering” for him, based on a melody the King had challenged him with.  He wrote a number of books, including A History of My Times and The Anti-Machiavelli)

In 1788, Kant wrote the Critique of Practical Reason.  Practical reason refers to the making of moral decisions.  In this book, he argues that everyone has a conscience, a moral law within their souls, not unlike the categories of the Critique of Pure Reason.  This moral law he calls the Categorical Imperative, which is phrased two ways.  The first is a variation on the Golden Rule:  Whatever you do, consider what kind of world this would be if everybody did the same.  The other is a little deeper:  Treat people (including oneself) only as ends, never as means to an end.  Never use them, we would say today.

In order to have morality, Kant believed we needed free will.  If you can’t make choices, how could you be responsible?  If you aren’t responsible for anything you do, like an animal or a robot, then what you do is neither bad nor good!  Also, he felt we needed the idea of immortality:  Since justice rarely happens within a lifetime, we need life after death to take care of that.  And, in order for eternal life to exist, or free will, or good and bad at all, we need to believe in God.

Notice that he doesn’t say that, first God exists, therefore….  He is actually saying that, although we can never prove the existence of God (or immortality, or free will, or good and bad), we must act as if he (and they) existed.  Religious thinkers of the time did not care for this way of thinking at all!

Kant wrote a good deal more.  In 1790, he wrote the Critique of Judgement, regarding judgements of beauty.  He notes that our sense of beauty is based on feeling, not reason.  We seem to “see” the harmony, the power, the miraculous in some things.  It is as if God so arranged things!

In 1793, when he was 69 years old, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone came out.  Here he argues (unlike Hobbes and unlike Rousseau) that we are born with the potential for both good and bad.  He does acknowledge, though, that a great deal of evil comes out of civilization, rather than our primitive nature.  In fact, a lot of what we now consider bad was probably originally necessary for survival in primitive conditions!

He also said that, although there is an inborn moral sense, it must be developed by moral instruction.  For this reason, he believes that religion is necessary — although he also points out that religion shouldn’t be dogmatic, and that beliefs such as original sin, the divinity of Christ, and the efficacy of prayer are mere superstitions.

In 1795, he wrote On Perpetual Peace, outlining the basis for international law.  In 1798, he came out with The Conflict of Faculties, arguing for the importance of academic freedom.  He died February 12, 1804, after long illness, and was buried ceremoniously in Königsberg Castle.  Over his grave is written

The starry heavens above me;

The moral law within me.”

The History Of Psychology, Part 2: The Rebirth

Dr. C. George Boeree

© Copyright 2000 C. George Boeree

Ali.♥

The great philosopher Immanuel Kant once said, “Science is organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life.” So often, I think we succumb to the mistaken notion that structure and creativity cannot work together to achieve a desired outcome. Yet, this is far from being true. Actually, in an environment that is too cluttered, creativity becomes stifled by that which is excessive and extraneous.

Clutter is something that we usually think of in relation to domestic activities. For instance, countless books have been written on the subject of getting rid of clutter around our houses. What is not addressed nearly as frequently is the issue of clutter in connection with the people and activities in our lives.

When we think of success and fulfillment, we usually turn our attention to what we want to add to our lives, disregarding the fact that it is every bit as important what we let go of as what we acquire. Although a chaotic environment can be used to foster creative endeavors, when you are spending time and energy on relationships or activities that are not bringing you any closer to your dreams and goals, you have to step back and examine whether or not those things and/or people should remain in your life.

I have spoken a lot about happiness in my SuccessDiva writing, and I am sure that many people would say that happiness is something they are searching for. But is happiness what you are really seeking, or are you craving the state of mind that you think happiness will  bring you?
In a way, happiness is a catchall for a sense of overall well-being that is not necessarily connected to any specific person or thing. It is different from joy, which conveys a sensation of exuberance.

In reading a chapter on happiness from Robert Nozick’s The Examined Life, Philosophical Meditations, I became more cognizant of how misguided the idea of pursuing happiness can be. If we were able to purchase happiness like any other consumer good, would our lives suddenly become perfect? Or must we experience trials and challenges and even crises in order to live a rich, full, complete existence?

Yes, there are moments in our lives when we seem so connected with our own inner bliss that, if someone asked us if we were happy, we would answer “yes” in a heartbeat. But how often is this feeling of happiness long lasting? Like a movie that you are momentarily touched by–yet forget the details of in days to come–happiness is fleeting. Happiness is the butterfly that alights on your hand, only to fly away a few seconds later.

Thus, we must get beyond “happiness” and strive towards a state of fulfillment that can be sustained. To a certain extent, I think Socrates was right when he said that the “unexamined life” is not worth living. When we let obligations control our decisions and the expectations of others become more important than our own personal needs, we have crucified our dreams on the cross of other people’s desires. We have given up our birthright.

Happiness can and does exist, and it is a viable pursuit. At the same time, it is contingent on other variables within our lives. If we are not following what we feel to be our personal calling, any sense of “happiness” we experience is merely an illusion. In the society we live in now, where “quick fixes” and instant gratification are heavily encouraged, many people never stop to look within themselves and honestly acknowledge that sense of incompleteness that exists inside them.

When they do recognize and admit their inner emptiness, they frantically search for ways to fill it. Sometimes they look towards such things as alcohol, drugs, and food to numb their pain, Other times they attempt to satisfy their inner longing with material possessions, a relationship, or even a child. The problem with all of these solutions is that they will never quench that insatiable thirst within the human soul. For until we become comfortable with who we are, we will not find peace through something or someone else.,

To a large extent, one of the reasons that so many relationships fail is because people enter relationships looking for a partner to meet a need within themselves that only they can truly fulfill. And it’s oftentimes easier to run into the arms of another person than to look within ourselves at the person we are. Some of us are so damaged and wounded from the battles we have fought through life thus far that to acknowledge our wounds is almost unbearable; for, in doing so, we must remember memories from our past that we have no desire to resurrect. Rather than reliving them, we would prefer to have new encounters and experiences erase those memories for us. But can they ever be erased entirely? 

Might it not be more effective if we faced our past, no matter how painful it is, and tried to make some sense of it? True, we might have to deal with a lot of destructive emotions such as anger, resentment, and even contempt. At the same time, unless we work through this emotional process, how can we move on into a state of forgiveness and inner peace? We must not only forgive those who have hurt us but also ourselves for the mistakes we have made.

It has been said that we have become a culture of victims. Rather than taking responsibility for ourselves and our behavior, we sometimes try to find someone else to blame our wrong decisions on. Or we may even say that circumstances conspired to force us into acting the way we did. Well, what’s the truth? If we allow ourselves to fall into the trap of victimization, we will always be at the mercy of unseen forces and events.

So, even though it may appear to be easier to blame someone or something else for a mistake that we make, in the end, we are letting go of our own personal power in doing so. The moment that you choose to take complete responsibility for your life is the moment when you will be at the peak of personal empowerment. Only then will you be able to apply the knowledge that you have absorbed and turn it from lumps of coal into clear, brilliant diamonds of wisdom.

Have you sometimes wondered why it is that in an age of nearly boundless opportunity, so many people still haven’t found inner contentment? I think one problem is that information has become so readily available and in such vast quantities that it’s difficult to know what to ignore and what to pay attention to. Similarly, it is all too easy to accumulate a multitude of acquaintances rather than a few, genuine friends. In a universe that promotes “the power of now”, we all want everything immediately–or, to use a somewhat trite phrase, we want to have our cake and eat it, too. Or . . . do we?

Robert Nozick, in his examination of happiness, presents an interesting hypothesis about an experience machine that would automatically give us any experience that we desire. By making use of this machine, we would feel the pleasure of things–or as he puts it, how they would feel “from the inside”. Although, on the surface, this machine might sound ideal, Nozick makes a strong point when he draws attention to the fact that, although we would feel these experiences, the fact they were not really happening but were instead a product of our imagination (via the machine, of course) would mean that we were essentially living in a dream world. And, even though we might enjoy escaping to a dream world every now and then, most of us would not want to live the rest of our lives in an illusion. In spite of all the pain we may associate with the real world, there are few people who would trade actuality for an existence that was nothing more than a fantasy.

For me, this hypothetical experiment that Nozick suggests puts a new spin on the idea of happiness being a preeminent achievement. Sure, to say that we are pursuing happiness sounds good, and it can even be good. The question is this: is it realistic? And even more than that, if we were given a life that consisted of nothing but happiness, would we be completely content? I find that part of what makes life so interesting is a variety of experiences. If the four seasons of the year were all spring, even though there might be a lot of beauty to appreciate, that fertile splendor might get rather commonplace after a while.

Well, like the seasons of the year, our lives are about seasons, too. To expect that there will not be a certain amount of sorrow and grief along our personal journey is not accepting reality.  And as we start to acquire more and more wisdom, we become more inclined to acknowledge those things in life over which we have no control. What we do always have the power to change is the lens through which we view the world. Also, we have the ability to choose the way we will spend our time and the people with whom we will share it. 

Susan Ford Collins, in her book The Joy of Success, makes it clear that deleting is as much a component of ultimate success as either creation or completion. “Success,” Collins says, “is being able to let go of an unworkable method or system. An outgrown relationship you’ve tried everything conceivable to fix. A well-paying job you’ve done the same way far too many times . . . Success is cutting out, down, or back.”

If we are the scriptwriter of our own lives, should anybody besides us be creating the plot or writing the lines? No. Yet, tragically, many people come to the end of their time on earth realizing that they only achieved a fraction of what they were capable of accomplishing. And, what is perhaps even worse, they oftentimes come to the startling realization that the dreams that became a reality belonged to someone other than themselves.

Thus, rather than using their own unique potential, they were allowing someone else’s vision of success and fulfillment to be lived vicariously through them. Generally, these unfulfilled individuals justify their decisions with heartfelt phrases about not having wanted to disappoint their mother or father, their spouse, their children, or their friends. But, what they are not realizing is that in not wanting to disappoint others, they have ended up disappointing the most important person of all–themselves. And, in disappointing themselves they have inevitably disappointed everyone else, too, for they have not been able to put their heart into what they have accomplished. This means that no matter how impressive the results of their labor appear to be, they are the product of time and effort rather than passion and enthusiasm.

When motivational guru Anthony Robbins ends one of his Personal Power II audio programs, he always says, “Live with passion”.  And even though I used to pay little attention to this key phrase, I now understand how much significance there is beneath the words.  To live with passion is the opposite of living the life of “quiet desperation” that author Henry David Thoreau spoke of. It is to be engaged fully in work that you find deeply satisfying or to be in a relationship or marriage that is ignited by the flames of love, ardor, and affection. When you are living with passion, you are able to appreciate the sensation of raindrops falling on your skin or the crackle of autumn leaves under your feet.

Moreover, when this passion and zest for life is combined with wisdom, you start to understand that it is in being that you will feel contentment rather than in having. Sometimes, you may have to give up certainty in order to embrace opportunity. You may have to walk more by faith than by sight, for those who play it safe are rarely the passionate souls. To let go of that to which you are accustomed in order to step out into the unknown is indeed a risk. Yet, isn’t life itself a risk?

Although tomorrow will give you another chance to start creating your ideal life, a lot of hours will pass  between now and then. And, since the one thing that none of us seems to have enough of is time, why not start now?

Live Without Limits!

Until soon,

Your SuccessDiva

This page and all written material at the SuccessDiva pages is written by Alexis Wingate. All rights are reserved. (C) Copyright by Alexis Wingate, the SuccessDiva

I never knew just how many famous people dropped off society’s radar because of Alzheimer’s/dementia! I was surprised to see certain people in this list, because often the news would only say that so-and-so passed away; the person’s Alzheimer’s/dementia diagnosis was not always mentioned.

(Please ignore the depressing soundtrack and overly dramatic ending; the names and faces are really the most interesting part of this video.)

Kant asserts that there is synthetic a priori knowledge. How is it possible to expand one’s a priori knowledge without consulting one’s empirical experience?

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 –1831) was a leading figure in the movement of  German Idealism initiated by Immanuel Kant and Hegel’s philosophy  expanded on Kant’s theory of knowledge by adding a social and historical element.

Kant had recognized that human beings create knowledge by using laws of reason to incorporate new sensual information cohesively into their previous understanding of reality. The demand to maintain a coherent picture of what is real – a necessary transcendental unity – creates rules of thinking that shape our view of reality.

Hegel realized that not only must individuals maintain a cohesive picture of reality, but societies and cultures must also maintain a collectively held cohesive understanding of what is real. It is not enough for me to know that I am a doctor. If I am truly to be a doctor other people must also see me as a doctor and thereby give me the authority and demand from me the responsibility of being a doctor. Reality is not only individual, it is shared. Hegel further saw that the collective understanding of reality that is held in common by all human beings of particular societies of culture develops through the course of history. In his book The Philosophy of History Hegel outlines a theory of how this development occurs. .You might be able to imagine even from this brief description how Hegel’s ideas were in turn developed by Karl Marx. Marx started with Hegel’s philosophy and added to it his insights about how oppression and class struggle are the drivers of history.

John Dewey was the third great American Pragmatist along with Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, but unlike Peirce and James, Dewey started his philosophical career as an Hegelian. John Dewey was not associated with Harvard as Peirce and James were. He attended the University of Vermont. The University of Vermont’s first president was James Marsh who was a contemporary of Ralph Waldo Emerson and the central figure of what is known as Vermont Transcendentalism. Marsh was a Kantian and ran a very liberal philosophy program at the University of Vermont. By the time Dewey was an undergraduate in that same philosophy department the philosophical alignment of the program had moved from Kant to Hegel. Dewey’s thinking turned toward Pragmatism after reading William James’ The Principles of Psychology.

Dewey’s version of Pragmatism maintained a Hegelian flavor in a number of ways. For one he wrote much more extensively than the other major Pragmatists of social topics. John Dewey is perhaps the most influential philosopher in American history. During his long career Dewey made major contributions in the areas of logic, ethics, sociology, democracy, and most famously education. Dewey saw the individual as inseparable to society. Society is what defines the individual. Without society there can be no individual. If the individual is the foreground, society is the background. If the individual is the object, society is the context. Without a background there can be no foreground. Without a context there can be no object.

I see Dewey’s thinking as typical of the advancement on German Idealism that the American Pragmatists were exploring and that advancement was process thinking. Having the advantage of Darwin’s remarkable theory of evolution and over a century of remarkable scientific advances, the American Pragmatists were beginning to see things in terms of whole systems . Dewey saw the relationship of the individual to society as a system and Peirce and James saw evolution as an evolving whole system.

Tate Britain

ANTHROPOLOGIES OF THE PRESENT

Two Talks in the Series ANTHROPOLOGIES OF THE PRESENT
Tate Britain, London SW1

Tuesday, 17 November 2009, 18.30–20.00

Kristin Ross, ‘Democracy for Sale’
Setting out from the controversy over Ireland’s ‘no’ vote to the European constitution, this talk will consider the current global stakes of the more radical form of democracy associated with the Paris Commune. Kristin Ross is Professor of Comparative Literature, New York University. Her books include The Emergence of Social Space (1988) and May ‘68 and its Afterlives (2002).

Tuesday, 8 December 2009, 18.30–20.00

Kojin Karatani, ‘The End of Capitalism?’
Capitalism may be on the verge of extinction, but it will not end by itself, because states do everything possible to prolong its life. This talk will consider the role of the state in this context and the counter-politics it provokes. Kojin Karatani is the author of Architecture as Metaphor (1995) and Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (2003) and a founder of the New Associationist Movement in Japan.

Peter Osborne, an editor of the journal Radical Philosophy, will act as Chair and Respondent.

The Auditorium, Tate Britain, Millbank, London SW1
£8 each talk (£6 concessions) – price includes drink reception afterwards
Tate.org.uk/tickets or tel. 020-7887-8888

Anthropologies of the Present at Tate Britain: http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/eventseducation/talks/anthropologiesofthepresent.htm
Posted here by Glenn Rikowski

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We cannot learn philosophy;  for where is it, who is in possession of it, and how shall we recognize it? We can only learn to philosophize.

– Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781), A838/B866

I thought it would be a good idea to run a series of posts entitled ‘Philosophy 101′ – posts which are short and snappy, and will help you curious readers to learn (or be reminded of) the basics in philosophy. Or at least my take on what the basics of philosophy are.

The first basic lesson is that there are no basic lessons. Sheer profundity, I know!

If you were a physics student you would be required to learn certain basics. Force = Mass x Acceleration, E=MC2. If you were a medicine student you would be required to learn certain basics about the human body, surgery and pharmaceuticals. If you were even an English literature or social work student you would learn certain basics about grammar, composition, literary methods and psychological theories. These basic theories than become cemented in these disciplines as doctrines – groups of beliefs which you don’t really question if you want to get by in that discipline.

But here in philosophy 101, there are no basic lessons. Philosophy, more than any other discipline I can think of, is not a doctrinal enterprise. If you were to tell a philosopher: Plato believes such-and-such, or, it is a feature of our world that blah-blah, or, humans beings are essentially rah-rah-rah, than philosophers would unanimously reply: really?

This is a significant first lesson because it is very easy to approach philosophy with this orientation, that is, to find out what ethical theories people subscribe to, or what doctrines great philosophers like Hegel or Wittgenstein held to. Now whilst it is pretty important to get a few of these essentials under your belt, and it is certainly appropriate to deploy labels to get a handle on complex theories, these kinds of questions should never be pursued as if they were the main game in philosophy.

This first lesson also throws light on the tension between theology and philosophy. Theology wants to insist on doctrines in the strongest sense of the word, and so carving out a helpful relationship with another discipline that is always questioning and always being suspicious of doctrine asserting activities is going to be hard work.

p.s. The irony is not lost on me that in making this point I am adopting quite a doctrinaire and parochial tone. Perhaps philosophy is not that free of doctrines after all.

“La democracia constituye necesariamente un despotismo, por cuanto establece un poder ejecutivo contrario a la voluntad general. Siendo posible que todos decidan contra uno cuya opinión pueda diferir, la voluntad de todos no es por tanto la de todos, lo cual es contradictorio y opuesto a la libertad.”

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), filósofo alemán.

There was more implied in Kant’s theory of knowledge than the fact that what we see is not an objective world in itself, but rather a picture that is created by us based on sense experience. (As if that wasn’t enough.) Besides stating that we are in an essential way the creators of the world as we see it, he was also saying that creating that world as it did had a responsibility inherent in it.

Kant recognized that as we go through life we are bombarded by sensual impressions and from those we compose an ongoing moving picture of reality. The picture of reality that we create must conform to certain rules of necessity in order to create a picture that is intelligible. As we put together our moving picture of reality all sorts of laws of necessity will demand our picture of reality must look a certain way so as to remain consistent and therefore intelligible. Some of these laws are enforced apriori, or prior to thought. Kant identified certain categories such as, time, space and being that all sensations were necessarily ordered into.

Other aspects of ordering are done more consciously using thought and reason. Every way in which we order reality has implied within it certain other necessary orderings. For instance, let’s say that we perceive a certain sequence of sensations – a shape, that is furry, has four legs and two eyes and barks and we put these sensations together into a dog. To remain consistent seeing this mental object as a dog means that by necessity the same object cannot also be a cat. In order to be consistent something being a dog makes it impossible for it to also be a cat. Within all of our conceptual categories there are uncountable numbers of implied laws that order and structure the rest of reality.

To put it another way, Kant understood human reason to be a constantly integrative process. As human beings are bombarded with a barrage of varied and incoherent sensations. These sensations are instantaneously filtered, ordered and congealed into a coherent picture of reality. This picture of reality, what Kant called a necessary transcendental unity, is the contextual background of all of our experience. The demand that this contextual background remain coherent from moment to moment places a constant demand on the way we order our perceptions.

Kant went beyond this more mechanical understanding of how reality is constructed by the mind by recognizing that by seeing objects in certain ways we were also committing to them being that way. In other words, if we see the object as a dog, we are committing ourselves to acting as if it is a dog. If it is a dog then we don’t go up and start talking to it and expecting it to answer back in human language. The laws of necessity are not only rules for how we must perceive things. They are also laws governing how we must act in relationship to things. When we see things a certain way we are committing ourselves to acting as if that is the way they are and we are responsible for acting in accordance with the way we see things.

It is a small leap from Kant here to William James’ conception of “The Will to Believe” in which he sees that what we choose to believe in fundamentally orients our perception of reality and as a result the way we act in the world. Truth in James’ brand of Pragmatism was created by our actions and our actions were determined by what we chose to believe.

Of all the American Pragmatists, however, it was Charles Sanders Peirce who was following on most directly from Kant. He held an integrated view of reality in which he simultaneously acknowledged the existence of different modes of being while insisting that all were equally real. His three modes of being were a rethinking of Kant’s fundamental categories.

Peirce claimed that reality was comprised of three modes of being that he called “Firstness,” “Secondness” and “Thirdness.” These were his three catagories. Firstness is the quality or character of things. It is “redness” or “hardness” or “coldness.” Secondness is the brute actuality of things. It is the event of experiencing the quality of something. Thirdness is the laws and habits that allow us to create a mental understanding of reality by relating things and qualities. In this we hear echos of Kant’s unknowable thing in itself, firstness, his concept of sensations, Secondness, and his transendental unity, Thirdness.

To Peirce, Thirdness was not a view of some external reality; it was an actual part of reality itself. Peirce did not see ideas as simply mirrors of the “real world;” they were as real as anything else. To appreciate the metaphysics of the Pragmatists, this point is critical and it has also become central to all forms of Evolutionary Spirituality that we find in the popular literature today.

It was in this third domain of reality that Peirce’s evolutionary philosophy was rooted because he saw our growth in knowledge about the universe as part of the growth of the universe itself. In Peirce’s understanding, the fate of the universe was in human hands because it would ultimately be determined by what Peirce imagined as an “unlimited community” of investigators. These investigators, through their shared inquiry into the nature of reality, would slowly converge toward a final agreement about what was ultimately true, and that truth would define the concluding state of the universe.

İnsanlar, bazen -hatta çoğu zaman- yaratıcılığın kökenlerini ararken, bilimsel araştırmalardan ziyade, tarihte büyük ve önemli paradigma değişimlerine yol açmış, o güne kadar duyulmamış kavramları tüm insanlığa kabul ettirmiş insanların hayat hikayelerinden de dersler çıkarmaya çalışır. Gidip onların yaşadıkları şehirleri, hatta duruyorsa evlerini ziyaret eder, biyografilerini falan didik didik okurlar.

Amaç, bu insanları kişiliklerinden, günlük hayatlarındaki davranışlarından ve çeşitli konulardaki görüşlerinden yola çıkarak, onların düşünce biçimini çözmek, bu şekilde onları yeni şeyler yaratmaya iten motivleri bulmaktır.

Ne yazık ki çoğu zaman beyhude kalan bu çabalar, zaten çoğu zaman bilimden çok magazinin kapsamı içine girer. Ve bu da doğaldır;  o insanların hayatlarının merak edilmesi bahsettiğim sebeplerden ötürü insani bir içgüdüdür belki de… Öte yandan da, bunun tamamen bilimsellikten uzak bir yaklaşım olduğunu da söyleyemeyiz, zira otizmin belirli alanlarda “büyük” eserler yaratmak için zaman zaman faydalı olabileceği de öne sürülmüştür. Ancak, bu ayrıntılı ve üzerinde dikkatle durulması gereken, eğilip bükülmeye çok müsait bir konu olduğu için, başka bir yazıda değineceğim.

Lafı çok da uzatmayayım, ben de dedim ki tarihte yaşamış bazı büyük düşünür ve bilim adamlarının hayat hikayelerine ilişkin küçük anektodlara sitede yer vereyim de milletimiz de az çok tanısın onları. Meraklısı zaten benden iyi biliyordur, onlar da görürlerse yanlışlarımı düzeltsinler.

Bu kapsamda, ilk örneğimiz bugüne kadar yaşamış en büyük felsefecilerden (ben düşünür demeyi tercih ederim genelde) Immanuel Kant olacak. Onu kısaca tanıtıp, daha sonra da rahmetlinin huyundan suyundan şöyle bir bahsedeceğim.

Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804)

Geç aydınlanmacı akımın en önemli düşünürü olan Kant, felsefenin metafizik dalında çalışmış ve nihai hakikate dair bilgiye ulaşılıp ulaşılamayacağı ile bu hakikate ulaşma yolları üzerine eserler vermişti. Kant’ın hayatı üstüne en geniş biyografik çalışma Manfred Kuehn’n yazdığı “Kant” ismini taşıyan biyografidir. Bunun yanında, Michael Fitzgerald’ın “The Genesis of Artistic Creativity” isimli kitabında da bu konuya dair bilgiler bulunmaktadır.

Kişilik özellikleri ve ilginç davranışları

• Kant, küçük yaşta dahi okul hayatını bir tür kölelik olarak görmüş ve bir zulüm dönemi olarak nitelendirmişti.
• Hiç bir zaman kendine empoze ettiği rutinin dışına çıkmamaya özen gösterir, neredeyse bir makine gibi hayatını sürdürürdü. Her türlü değişiklik, onun yararına olacağını sezse bile, onu rahatsız ederdi.
• Kendi fikirlerine karşı çıkılmasına karşı son derece sert tepki verir, tahammülsüz bir tavır sergilerdi.
• Kant, ancak kendisine eşit gördüğü insanlarla canlı ve içten bir sohbet içine girer, kendine özgü şakalar yapardı.
• İnsanın ancak kırk yaşında gerçek olgunluğa ulaşabileceğine inanırdı.
• Hayatı boyunca endişe (anksiyete) ve depresyon belirtileri göstermiştir. Sesten inanılmaz derecede rahatsız olur ve bulunduğu ortamın tamamen sessiz olmasını talep ederdi. Bir çok maddeye karşı alerjik reaksiyona sahipti.
• Seyahat etmek bir yana, yaşadığı şehrin biraz dışına çıkmaktan dahi hoşlanmazdı.

Hikayeler, sözleri ve anektodlar

Aşağıdaki bilgilerin bir kısmı bazılarınıza biraz acayip, hatta ciddi ciddi deli saçması gibi gelebilir ve yadırgayabilirsiniz, ancak iki unsuru göz önünde tutmanızı rica ediyorum. Birincisi, bu adamcağız 200 yıl önce ölüp gitmiş ve fikirlerini değerlendirirken yaşadığı döneme göre değerlendirme yapmak gerekebilir. İkincisi ise, evet gerçekten bunların bir kısmı çok acayip düşünce ve davranışlar.

• Immanuel Kant, hayatı boyunca kimseye borç para vermemiş ya da bağışta bulunmamıştır; kendisinin bunun için fazla egoist olduğunu söylediği rivayet edilmektedir.
• Komşularının saatlerini onun her gün öğleden sonra 15:30′da çıktığı düzenli yürüyüşlere bakarak ayarladığı yaygın olarak anlatılan bir hikayedir (yani ünlük takviminden o denli şaşmazmış). Mevsim ne olursa olsun, bir dakika sekmeden evinden çıkar, evinin üzerinde bulunduğu caddeyi sekiz kez gidip gelirmiş.
• Gençlik yıllarında evlenmeyi düşünmüş, ancak bunun getireceği gelir ve giderleri kıyaslayarak bu planını her zaman ertelemiştir. Sonuçta hiç evlenmemiştir.
• Yaşlılık zamanlarında kendisine bakıcılık eden kız kardeşine onunla aynı masada yemek yemesi için izin vermediği bilinmektedir (muhtemelen kız kardeşinin kendisinden daha az eğitimli olmasından dolayı).
• Bir yazısından: “Bir kadın bir erkeğin yüreğini daraltır. İnsanın bir arkadaşının evlenmesi her zaman için o arkadaşın kaybedildiği anlamına gelir.”
• Kant, kendisini dünyanın gelmiş geçmiş en kötü öğretmeni olarak görürdü. Zaten üniversitede ders vermeye başladıktan bir süre sonra öğrencileriyle ilişkisini tamamen kesmiştir (öğrencilerinin de pek bir şey anlamadığı derslerine girip çıkmak dışında).

Kant hakkında daha geniş bilgiye ulaşmak isteyebilecek arkadaşlar için şu kaynaklar yararlı olacaktır:

- Kant: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions)

- Kant: A Biography

- Basic Writings of Kant (Modern Library Classics)

An overview of the four major approaches to ethical reasoning, from Aristotle to Rand—and why they doth sucketh… (22:20):

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Stefan Molyneux runs Freedomain Radio, the largest and most popular philosophy show on the web. His books, podcasts, and videos are available free on the web. Mr. Molyneux accepts donations with the utmost gratitude.

This post looks at two articles by Simon Schaffer:

“States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy,” in The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. G. S. Rousseau, 1990, pp. 233-290.

“Genius in Romantic Natural Philosophy,” in Romanticism and the Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, 1990, pp. 82-98.

It makes comparison with some related points in Jan Golinski’s book Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820, 1992.  Unlike the last post integrating Schaffer’s and Golinski’s analysis of eudiometry, this one distinguishes the (complementary) positions of the two authors.

Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" prison

Since his earliest pieces (especially his 1983 piece on natural philosophy and spectacle), Schaffer had been exploring the tensions between natural philosophical inquiry and the forces leading to professionalized specialties.  In pieces circa 1990, Schaffer further explored the relationship between enlightenment political ideals—which stressed rational assent as a path away from enthusiasm and despotism toward a proper polity—and natural philosophy and the political pressures it created and to which it was subjected.

In “States of Mind”, in a move not unlike his and Steven Shapin’s analysis of Hobbes’ critique of experimental philosophy, Schaffer stresses objections, particularly that of Edmund Burke (1729-1797) that the politics of rational assent proffered by people like Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) simply cloaked alternative religion-like claims to political authority.

The transformation of politically important elements of cosmology—rather than the elimination of their significance—is once again central to Schaffer’s argument (see also the transformation of comets from omens to source of physical disaster).  Here Priestley’s objection to the pneumatic philosophy of souls and spirits (as in Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, 1777) brushes away the idea of mind as guided by spirit to allow the mind to be seen as a material organ with its own relationship to the material world, including its pneumatic aspects.  A new hygiene is now required to ensure proper reasoning: the elimination of unhealthy air and the creation of well-aired environments by “medical managers”.  Hence the importance seen in the program of eudiometry.  (Incidentally, readers should also be aware of the importance of historian Roy Porter’s work to the identification of a medical enlightenment).

Schaffer notes the close collaboration of Priestley with Jeremy Bentham as part of the provincial “Bowood group” under the patronage of the Earl of Shelburne.  Bentham was a strong supporter of Priestley’s chemical philosophy, drawing on its philosophical example and implications for hygiene in his own political arguments.  Bentham’s famous idea of the Panopticon itself represented a kind of laboratory of the mind, in which it could be determined how a proper state of reason could be restored—such as from a state of criminality or madness—in a process that could only be overseen by philosophically enlightened inspectors (yes, Foucault figures in here).  Schaffer synthesizes the points thus:

The members of such a [model] polity were to be governed through the complete management of their atmosphere and their surroundings.  The Panopticon relied on the link between the bodily situation of its inhabitants and the state of their mind.  The right distribution of light, air, and space prompted the right associations: every inmate would ‘conceive himself’ to be under constant surveillance. ¶ The Panopticon was an ‘enlightened’ project, concerned with rational order and moral reform, deriving its authority from the natural philosophical understanding of the work of the mind (234).

Golinski’s more directed concern with chemical experimentation highlights what kinds of experimentation were appealing or possible in different political environments.  He observes the importance for Priestley of simplicity of method and instrumentation, thereby allowing experiments to be widely replicated and the rational process of discovery to be shared by experimenter and audience alike.  The troubles with complexity of instrument formed part of the rhetorical arsenal against Lavoisier’s chemistry.

The shared rational experience could also carry its own burdens, particularly in the wake of the purported rationalism of the French Revolution.  The shared experience of breathing nitrous oxide, and the resulting delirium, could easily be attacked as being of a piece with the mad excesses of the Revolution, particularly for the experiments’ association with radical figures such as the physician Thomas Beddoes (1760-1808).  Chemistry became a regular target for anti-Jacobins such as Burke.  In the 1790s, Priestley’s house was destroyed and he emigrated to America.

It was in these circumstances that chemical experimenter (and poet) Humphry Davy (1778-1829) severed his relationship with provincial chemical philosophy, its radical political affiliations, and its experimentation with nitrous oxide, and moved in 1800 to conservative London and the new Royal Institution (RI, est. 1799).  Here Davy was able (eventually) to shed the controversies the provincial philosophers attracted.

Why "eventually" is included in parentheses: an 1802 cartoon by James Gillray of a demonstration on nitrous oxide done in 1800 at the Royal Institution. Davy is holding the bellows.

At the RI, Davy crafted a different relationship with the audience.  For example, by commanding the sophisticated apparatus of the voltaic pile, he was able to use its “galvanic fluid” to dissociate chemicals into their basic elements.  The pile was expensive, and not a common device of chemical experimentation.  Its creative use secured Davy’s reputation as a scientific “genius”.  In lectures, he did not come to experimental conclusions with an audience; he interpreted his carefully crafted performance for them.  In this position of responsibility, to the disappointment of some, he refrained from connecting chemical work to political philosophy, and enjoyed a productive career in the metropole (see also our primer on Faraday).

Davy demonstrates to a captive audience an electric light, powered by banks of voltaic piles kept in the Royal Institution's basement.

As I noted in January, in a 1986 piece Schaffer understood the rise of the idea of “discovery” by inspired geniuses to split scientific work into elite figures and ordinary laborers, which augured the “end of natural philosophy” and the rise of professionalized science.  In “Genius,” he elaborated that the extension of the disembodied force of “genius” from artistic masters to the work of philosophers in the late-18th century helped to dissociate their accomplishments from their political authority.

Where figures such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) would connect Romantic ideas to enlightenment ideals in his “attempt to connect the work of philosophical genius, natural power and popular right” (85), others called foul on the implication “that genius had been collectivized” (ibid).  For figures such as Burke, genius was localized and the process of achieving new insights stood apart from any rational process.  Ethics, not reason, was the only firm basis of polity.  Geniuses were themselves bound by ethical responsibilities not to exercise their powers inappropriately, as was said to have happened in the Revolution.  Rationally constructable principles discovered through genius could only be worked out subsequently.  Once they were, they could be taught to others, and possibly—as in the late-enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)—become a basis for authority.