Professional Knowledge Creation in the World-System

Building an anti-imperialist “anthropology,” plus an anthropology that studies imperialism, and that studies itself as a received invention of imperialism, means much more than just analyzing and questioning how anthropologists served this or that colonial venture. It means totally unthinking anthropology as a social science; more than that, it means totally unthinking social science. For whatever discussions of “decolonizing anthropology” have achieved, this ground was never covered in those discussions.

In the previous posts the discussion was centered on opening questions in a critique of the relationship between anthropology and imperialism, along with questions concerning the terms and concepts that, initially, appear to be central to the debate. Here we focus on the wider intellectual and geopolitical context of anthropology’s institutionalization, and the received baggage of 19^th century European social science. In particular, I resort to Immanuel Wallerstein for his analysis of the institutionalization and formalization of the social sciences, and how the very process of institutionalization created the knowledge boundaries, categories, and concepts we use today. Not least among these received conceptual boundaries, fundamental to the division of knowledge into “social sciences,” is the arbitrary construction of “society,” “economics,” and “politics.” Moving beyond the Eurocentrism of the social sciences also means getting past the false divisions in knowledge created by these institutionalized conceptualizations.

The particular works by Immanuel Wallerstein to which I will be referring, or that shape the overall discussion in some way, are:

Wallerstein, Immanuel M. 2006. European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power. New York: New Press. (Ch. 2, “Can One Be a Non-Orientalist? Essentialist Particularism,” 31-49)

Wallerstein, Immanuel M. 1999. The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-First Century. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Ch. 11, “Eurocentrism and its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science,” 168-184)

Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. 1996. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Ch. 1, “The Historical Construction of the Social Sciences, from the Eighteenth Century to 1945,” 1-32)

Wallerstein, Immanuel M. 1991. Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press in association with B. Blackwell. (Ch. 8, “A Comment on Epistemology: What is Africa?” 127-129; Ch. 9, “Does India Exist?” 130-134)

I strongly recommend these for a start. One really cannot “do” or “write” anthropology innocently any more after reflecting on these works.

The Institutionalization of the Social Sciences

In Open the Social Sciences, the Gulbenkian Commission led by Wallerstein, highlighted the main historical trends that led to the institutionalization of knowledge in universities. “The need of the modern state for more exact knowledge on which to base its decisions,” they observe led to the emergence of new, though still uncertain, categories of knowledge already in the 18th century. The university was until then a largely moribund institution, at least since the 16^th century, having been too tightly linked with the Church. In the late 18^th and early 19^th centuries, however, the university was largely revived as the primary locus for the creation of knowledge (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 6).

The revival of the university was not actually led primarily by the natural scientists, but rather those who stood to lose most from the development of a hierarchy of a value emerging from the split between science and philosophy (see the “two cultures” below). Instead, it was “historians, classicists, scholars of national literatures…who did most to revive the universities in the course of the nineteenth century, using it as a mechanism to obtain state support for their scholarly work” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 8). They sought the alliance of natural scientists in promoting the new university structures, in order to profit “from the positive profile of the natural scientists,” and in the process reinforcing the distinction, and the tension, between the humanities/arts and the sciences (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 8).

“The intellectual history of the nineteenth century is marked above all by this disciplinarization and professionalization of knowledge,” the Commission argued, pointing to “the creation of permanent institutional structures designed both to produce new knowledge and to reproduce the producers of knowledge” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 7).

In the wake of the French Revolution, and especially in Great Britain and France, the pressure for political and social reorganization were felt strongly by the powers that be. In place of a belief in the “natural order” of things, many now recognized the normalcy of change, and argued that,

the solution lay rather in organizing and rationalizing the social change that now seemed to be inevitable in a world in which the sovereignty of the “people” was fast becoming the norm, no doubt hoping thereby to limit its extent. (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 8).

“But if one were to organize and rationalize social change,” the Commission points out, “one had first of all to study it and understand the rules which governed it” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 8). Hence the proclaimed need for a “social science.” Social science was charged with developing “systematic, secular knowledge about reality that is somehow validated empirically” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 2). The classical premise of science at this point was two-fold: one, the Newtonian vision of a symmetry between past and future, and two, Cartesian dualisms of humans and nature, mind and matter, and so forth. Accompanied by notions of progress, and a finite, knowable world, the aim was to “facilitate the explorations and exploitation demanded by progress, and to make practical and realizable Western aspirations to dominion” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 4). Exploration, exploitation, and rapid social change, all pointed to the need to investigate order, and for that Newtonian physics offered the most useful support.

It was especially in the period from 1850 to 1914, when we witness a university boom in Europe, North America, and Australia, with many new universities being founded in that very period, that we also see the disciplinarization of knowledge in the form of the social sciences as we know them today (Gulbenkian, 1996, pp. 12-13). The five primary social sciences were history, economics, political science, sociology, and anthropology. Owing to the struggle between science and philosophy, and the social prestige of science, the primary emphases of these “social sciences” were the “emphasis on the existence of a real world that is objective and knowable, the emphasis on empirical evidence, [and] the emphasis on the neutrality of the scholar” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 15).

Between 1850 and 1945, the new social science disciplines were institutionalized: “This was done by establishing in the principal universities first chairs, then departments offering courses leading to degrees in the discipline” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 3). “Training” was institutionalized as was “research”: “the creation of journals specialized in each of the disciplines; the construction of associations of scholars along disciplinary lines (first national, then international); the creation of library collections catalogued by disciplines” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 3). Of course one of the key elements in this institutionalization was for the social sciences to stress the differences between them, what made them unique, and thus what required that a special place be made for them in the new universities. Institutionalization, disciplinarization, expanding world capitalism, and rapid social change thus all combined to create and shape the social sciences as we have known them. Each of these is tied into the others.

The Eurocentrism of Social Science

Wallerstein’s core argument is that the creation of the structures of knowledge, specifically the institutionalization of the social sciences, is a phenomenon that is inextricably linked to the very formation and maturation of the capitalist world system (or what others might loosely, and less comprehensively, refer to as imperialism or capitalist hegemony). There is nothing that is either natural, logical, or accidental about the institutionalization of the social sciences. The structures of knowledge are accepted ways of producing knowledge of the world. In particular, the universalism-particularism dichotomy, and all framings of knowledge that fit within or between that polarity (of especial relevance to anthropology’s intellectual mission, and central to the revival of cosmopolitanism), is part of the intellectual double bind of the capitalist world system (see Wallerstein, 1991, p. 128).

In broad terms, “social science has been Eurocentric throughout its institutional history,” Wallerstein explains, “which means since there have been departments teaching social science within university systems” (1999, p. 168). There should be no surprise here, he adds, since social science “is a product of the modern world-system, and Eurocentrism is constitutive of the geoculture of the modern world” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 168). In particular, “as an institutional structure, social science originated largely in Europe (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 168).

By “Europe,” Wallerstein means primarily western Europe and North America. One could broaden that, using native studies discourse, to mean Europe and European settler states. Even with that more expansive definition, Wallerstein observes that  “the social science disciplines were in fact overwhelmingly located, at least up to 1945, in just five countries – France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and the United States” (1999, p. 168). “Even today,” he continues, “despite the global spread of social science as an activity, the large majority of social scientists worldwide remain Europeans” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 168). Penetrating deeper, Wallerstein argues that,

Social science emerged in response to European problems, at a point in history when Europe dominated the whole world-system. It was virtually inevitable that its choice of subject matter, its theorizing, its methodology, and its epistemology all reflected the constraints of the crucible within which it was formulated. (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 168)

The Eurocentrism of social science has come under increasingly vigorous attack, especially in the period since 1945 with the formal decolonization of Africa, Asia, and much of the Caribbean, and Wallerstein sees this attack as “fundamentally justified.” Moreover, he argues, that “if social science is to make any progress in the twenty-first century, it must overcome the Eurocentric heritage that has distorted its analyses and its capacity to deal with the problems of the contemporary world” (Wallerstein, 1999, pp. 168-169). To do this, we must understand what constitutes Eurocentrism and its “many avatars” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 169).

There are at least five distinct yet overlapping ways that social science is Eurocentric, as Wallerstein explains. The Eurocentrism of social science is expressed in “(1) its historiography, (2) the parochiality of its universalism, (3) its assumptions about (Western) civilization, (4) its Orientalism, and (5) its attempts to impose the theory of progress” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 169).

While “institutionalized social science started as an activity in Europe,” Wallerstein’s argument is about much more than this important historical and cultural recognition. The problem with Eurocentric social science is that it has been “charged with painting a false picture of social reality by misreading, grossly exaggerating, and/or distorting the historical role of Europe, particularly its historical role in the modern world” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 177). “Whatever Europe did,” Wallerstein affirms, “has been analyzed incorrectly and subjected to inappropriate extrapolations, which have had dangerous consequences for both science and the political world” (1999, p. 178).

The Received Baggage of the 19^th Century

The “two cultures” division is one of the most fundamental bases for the modern world-system’s structures of knowledge. By the “two cultures” Wallerstein is drawing on the work of C.P. Snow, and referring to the division between the sciences and the humanities. “No other historical system has instituted a fundamental divorce between science and philosophy/humanities,” Wallerstein observes (1999, p. 183). It took about three centuries for this rupture to become triumphant in Eurocentric thought, and to become institutionalized. Now that this has taken place, the “two cultures” is “fundamental to the geoculture and forms the basis of our university systems” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 183).

It is this very split, between the two cultures, that enabled “the modern world to put forward the bizarre concept of the value-neutral specialist, whose objective assessments of reality could form the basis not merely of engineering decisions (in the broadest sense of the term) but of sociopolitical choices as well” (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 183). Indeed, one of the central foundations of the Eurocentric social sciences is this very idea of “objective science”:

The idea that science is over here and sociopolitical decisions are over there is the core concept that sustains Eurocentrism, since the only universalist propositions that have been acceptable are those that are Eurocentric. Any argument that reinforces this separation of the two cultures thus sustains Eurocentrism. If one denies the specificity of the modern world, one has no plausible way of arguing for the reconstruction of knowledge structures, and therefore no plausible way of arriving at intelligent and substantively rational alternatives to the existing world-system. (Wallerstein, 1999, p. 183)

With the split between the two cultures, the alternative to “science” was seemingly plagued by “a lack of internal cohesiveness, which did not help its practitioners plead their cause with the authorities, especially given their seeming inability to offer ‘practical’ results” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 6). This story should be very familiar to anthropologists, in their drive to create “applied anthropology” and anthropology in the service of military, intelligence, and colonial administration. The opinions of the authorities, especially those promising funding, and demanding practical benefits, have weighed heavily. From early on, “it had begun to be clear that the epistemological struggle over what was legitimate knowledge was no longer a struggle over who would control knowledge about nature (the natural scientists had clearly won exclusive rights to this domain by the eighteenth century) but about who would control knowledge about the human world” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 6).

One can sum up in this way the key dichotomies that arose from the 19^th century institutionalization of the social sciences, dichotomies that are vital to sustaining the Eurocentrism of the social sciences:

• science versus philosophy/humanities
• discontinuity-continuity
• state-centrism in analysis
• idiographic versus nomothetic
• determinism versus agency
• objectivity versus subjectivity
• politics versus economics

In review:

Anthropology’s Baggage

The Gulbenkian Commission devoted attention to each of the five social sciences. What follows is their description and analysis of the emergence, institutionalization and disciplinarization of anthropology. At the most basic level, the expansion of the modern world-system involved the European encounter and usually conquest of the peoples of the rest of the world. In particular, those people who were organized in social structures that Europeans classed as small, without written records, and not part of a geographically wide ranging religious systems, were classed as “tribes” or “races.” They became the domain of what would later be called anthropology. Anthropology had largely begun as a practice of explorers, travelers, and officials of the colonial services of the European powers, and then subsequently became institutionalized as a university discipline (Gulbenkian, 1996, pp. 20-21).

Anchored within the structures of the university, anthropologists were constrained to maintain the practice of ethnographic fieldwork “within the normative premises of science” (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 21). Some were of course attracted to ideas of a universal natural history of humanity, with assumed stages of development, but their discipline was one pressed into studying particular peoples, requiring a very specific methodology, that of fieldwork. Consumed with the ostensible interest in human difference, and the particulars of non-European modes of being, anthropologists largely adhered to an idiographic epistemology, with some lingering desires for developing nomothetic propositions (Gulbenkian, 1996, p. 22).

Anthropology’s special baggage then – in the preliminary type of analysis offered by the Gulbenkian Commission – was idiographic research, focused on the non-West, and in particular focused on tribes (not the non-Western “high civilizations” that were more the domain of the Orientalists). As we go further, this analysis will be deepened significantly, but it will be useful to remember some of the broad historical forces at work, as presented in this essay.

Afghanistan: Heads You Lose, Tails You Lose

Immanuel Wallerstein, Agence Global, November 1, 2009

Immanuel Wallerstein, Agence Global, November 1, 2009

The war in Afghanistan is a war in which whatever the United States does now, or that President Obama does now, both the United States and Obama will lose. The country and its president are in a situation of perfect lockjaw.

Consider the basic situation. The Afghan government in Kabul has no legitimacy with the majority of the Afghan people. It also has no army worthy of the name. It also has no financial base. There is almost no military or personal security anywhere. It is faced with a guerilla opposition, the Taliban, who control half the country and who have grown steadily stronger since the Taliban government was overthrown by a foreign (largely United States) invasion in 2002. The New York Times reports that the Taliban “are running a sophisticated financial network to pay for their insurgent operations,” which American officials are struggling, unsuccessfully, to cut off.

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Foto: Guardia Revolucionaria Iraní-AP vía La Jornada

Immanuel Wallerstein / La Jornada, 11 octubre 2009

Imagen de archivo de miembros de la Guardia Revolucionaria, la elite militar de la república islámicaFoto Ap Irán retorna al primer plano de la diplomacia pública. El presidente Obama, junto con el primer ministro Gordon Brown, del Reino Unido, y el presidente Nicolas Sarkozy, de Francia, sostuvieron una conferencia de prensa donde pareciera que le dieron a Irán otro ultimátum: o se conforma a sus demandas, lo que ellos llaman las demandas de la comunidad internacional”, para diciembre de este año, o enfrentará nuevas sanciones. Obama dijo que Irán está “rompiendo la regla que todas las naciones deben seguir”.

La ocasión inmediata fue el hecho de que Irán anunció –o desde el punto de vista de los tres líderes occidentales, Irán “admitió”– que está construyendo unas instalaciones cerca de Qom donde habrá 3 mil centrifugadoras para enriquecer uranio. Según Obama, esto significa muy poca cantidad para el propósito ostensible –la generación de electricidad– pero tiene el tamaño adecuado para producir material para cabezas nucleares. Ergo, Irán miente acerca de sus intenciones.

Parece que la inteligencia occidental descubrió la existencia de la construcción hace algún tiempo y siente que ahora esto está verificado convincentemente. El punto de vista occidental es que Irán anunció la existencia de la construcción porque ya estaba consciente de que la inteligencia occidental la había descubierto y estaba a punto de revelar el punto al mundo. El presidente Ahmadinejad dice que, bajo el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP), el requisito es que Irán debe anunciar la existencia de una construcción así con seis meses de anticipación a ponerla en funcionamiento, y por eso fue que lo anunciaron hasta ahora.

En cualquier caso, Obama está haciendo grande la cosa, y está usando este hecho en que todos concuerdan (la construcción de una planta) como base para obtener nuevas sanciones de Naciones Unidas contra Irán. Parece claro que Obama confía en que este nuevo hecho será suficiente para persuadir a Rusia y a China de dar su respaldo o por lo menos no oponerse a la resolución de nuevas sanciones en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU.

En efecto, la derecha estadunidense y los israelíes están diciendo “se los dijimos”. Desde su visión Irán ha estado mintiendo siempre, miente ahora, y como tal debe ser castigado seriamente. Es obvio que no piensan solamente en meras sanciones sino en bombardear la planta (y sin duda otras plantas nucleares conocidas). Así que, ¿estamos al borde de futuras sanciones?; o aun más, ¿de bombardear Irán, sea por Estados Unidos o Israel con el apoyo tácito de Estados Unidos? Es posible, pero en realidad no lo creo. Pienso que lo que está ocurriendo es un gigantesco “blofeo” de todos y cada uno.

Empezamos por Irán. Siempre he estado de acuerdo con la derecha estadunidense y los israelíes en que Irán intenta lograr el estatus de una potencia nuclear. Mi diferencia con ellos simplemente es que esto me parece normal, inevitable y no es para nada un desastre geopolítico.

Desde el punto de vista de Irán, hay tres potencias nucleares en las inmediaciones –India, Pakistán e Israel– que no sólo nunca han firmado el TNP sino que de hecho tienen armas nucleares, muchas armas nucleares. Sin embargo a ellos no se les acusa de violar las normas de la “comunidad internacional”. Entonces los iraníes dicen: ¿por qué la toman contra Irán? A diferencia de estos otros países vecinos sí firmó el TNP y hasta ahora nunca ha violado sus disposiciones específicas. No obstante, ahora se le denuncia públicamente por una violación de las normas internacionales mucho menor que la de los otros tres países. El presidente Lula de Brasil señala que Brasil también está enriqueciendo uranio y no ve nada de malo en que Irán lo haga.

¿Por qué hizo Obama su anuncio justo ahora si ya sabía desde hace algún tiempo que Irán construía esta planta? Él alega que primero quería estar absolutamente seguro de la calidad de sus informaciones de inteligencia. Pero es claro también que anunciarlo en este mismo momento es bastante útil en casa. Obama está siendo atacado por la derecha estadunidense por sus propuestas en atención a la salud y por su aparente vacilación en enviar más tropas a Afganistán. Hablarle duro a Irán protege un poco su flanco derecho y puede fortalecer su mano en lo político, para estas otras cuestiones.

Lo mismo podría decirse de Irán. Ahmadinejad, como Obama, atraviesa algunas dificultades políticas internas. Hablarle duro a Occidente es obviamente algo que le permite consolidar un sentimiento nacionalista en torno a su régimen islámico, especialmente si Occidente lo obliga a hablar duro también.

Rusia y China siempre han argumentado que podrían ser contraproducentes sanciones más duras. Ambos países tienen intereses económicos y geopolíticos en mantener sus razonables buenas relaciones con Irán. Por supuesto, tampoco quieren ir tan lejos en antagonizar a Estados Unidos. Así que es probable que continúen moviéndose con cautela, lentitud y ambigüedad. En septiembre, el presidente Medvediev de Rusia puede decirle alguna frase a Obama, que es crítica hacia Irán, una que haga sonreír a Obama. Pero eso no significa que Rusia vote por un resolutivo de sanciones en verdad serias en diciembre. Por una cuestión, los rusos (y los chinos) realmente no creen que más sanciones sean efectivas en cambiar la postura básica de Irán, y muchos analistas serios del mundo occidental tampoco lo creen.

Y en cuanto a las acciones militares, consideren lo siguiente: Obama enfrenta la exigencia del general Stanley McChrystal de que haya una escalamiento significativo del compromiso militar estadunidense en Afganistán. El grado en que el secretario de Defensa Robert Gates dé su respaldo a esto es todavía incierto. Hay ya oposición significativa entre los políticos demócratas. Y el público estadunidense parece estar dudoso en extremo. Obama reflexiona sobre la estrategia de largo plazo.

Pienso que Obama cederá, al menos parcialmente, y autorizará más tropas. Pienso que es en extremo improbable que haya un incremento semejante en tropas procedentes de otros países de la OTAN. De hecho, es bastante más probable que haya más retiradas de su parte. Dada la situación en Afganistán, ¿quién en Estados Unidos va a apoyar una acción militar real contra Irán? ¿Obama? ¿El Estado Mayor Conjunto? ¿El público estadunidense? Yo diría que tal acción militar es improbable en extremo. Y a los israelíes, cualesquiera que sean sus ansiedades y deseos, no se les concederán los necesarios derechos de sobrevuelo.

Entonces, ¿adónde nos deja esto? Al mundo lo deja en un empantanamiento. Muchas palabras y poca acción. ¿Es esto lo que Ahmadinejad quiere? Es probable. ¿Lo denunciarán la derecha estadunidense y los israelíes? Es probable. ¿Puede Obama hacer algo para cambiar la situación? No veo qué. Este momento será visto por los futuros historiadores como una pieza de evidencia más de la caída de la influencia geopolítica de Estados Unidos. Lo que los futuros historiadores dirán también es que Irán, al desafiar las resoluciones del Consejo de seguridad de Naciones Unidas, actúa igual que lo han hecho durante los últimos 50 años un gran número de países. Ni más ni menos. La promoción no es lo mismo que la realidad.

Traducción: Ramón Vera Herrera

© Immanuel Wallerstein

Immanuel Wallerstein, Agence Global, Oct 1, 2009

Iran is back in the forefront of public diplomacy. President Obama, jointly with Prime Minister Gordon Brown of the United Kingdom and President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, held a press conference in which they seemed to give Iran one more ultimatum: conform to their demands, what they called the demands of the “international community,” by December of this year or face new sanctions. Obama said that Iran is “breaking the rule that all nations must follow.”

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Immanuel Wallerstein

El pasado 26 de setiembre, el diario mexicano La Jornada publicó un corto, pero muy interesante artículo de Immanuel Wallerstein titulado “La política estadounidense y las intervenciones militares”. En su ensayo, Wallerstein hace un análisis de la influencia de la política partidista sobre la política exterior norteamericana que me resultó muy interesante. Pero antes de analizar el contenido del ensayo de Wallerstein, es necesario hacer algunos comentarios sobre su autor. Wallerstein  es un sociólogo e historiador norteamericano considerado  uno de los  científicos sociales  más  importantes de la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Su trabajo ha dado vida a influyentes teorías sobre el desarrollo de la economía capitalista global. En su obra más importante, The modern world-system (El moderno sistema mundial), Wallerstein aporta un nuevo modelo teórico y de interpretación histórica, cultural y social. Wallerstein es hoy en día uno de los más famosos críticos anti-sistema y uno de los analistas más severos de la política exterior de los Estados Unidos.

En “La política estadounidense y las intervenciones militares”, Wallerstein reacciona al debate de las últimas semanas sobre cuál debe ser la estrategia que  la administración Obama debe seguir en Afganistán. Al autor le preocupa que el Presidente acepte las sugerencias de su Secretario de Defensa y de miembros del alto mando militar y opte por incrementar el número de soldados estadounidenses en territorio afgano. Es claro que Wallerstein considera tal posibilidad un grave error.

Al indagar cuál será la dirección que la administración Obama adoptará en una situación tan peligrosa como la de Afganistán, Wallerstein nos lanza un pregunta que me parece medular: “¿Por qué es  tan difícil para Estados Unidos zafarse de intervenciones militares que patentemente están perdiendo?”. En otras palabras, Wallerstein quiere saber qué mueve al gobierno de los Estados Unidos a insistir en intervenciones militares poco exitosas y sumamente peligrosas. El autor reconoce que para los analistas de izquierda la respuestas es muy sencilla: porque los Estados Unidos son una nación imperialista que interviene militarmente “con el fin de mantener su poder económico y político en el mundo”. A Wallerstein no le satisface esta respuesta porque, según él, la realidad histórica es que desde 1945 los norteamericanos no han ganado una sola confrontación militar de importancia. Si como alegan los izquierdistas, Estados Unidos interviene  para adelantar sus intereses hegemónicos, por qué sus intervenciones han sido tan incompetentes. Para demostrar su punto Wallerstein pasa revista a las principales intervenciones militares estadounidense de los últimos sesenta años. Según él, los norteamericanos fueron derrotados en  Vietnam, en Corea y la primera guerra del Golfo lograron un empate, es claro que están perdiendo en Afganistán y la invasión de Irak de seguro será juzgada como un fracaso por los historiadores. En otras palabras,  el autor se pregunta qué clase de imperio es éste que no gana una guerra. O en palabras de Wallerstein: “¿Qué impulsa a Estados Unidos a involucrarse en acciones de tal derrota política propia, especialmente si uno piensa en Estados Unidos como una potencia hegemónica que intenta controlar al mundo entero para sacarle ventaja?”

Para el autor, la explicación está en la política interna de los Estados Unidos. Como toda gran potencia, los Estados Unidos son un país intensamente nacionalista. Según Wallerstein, todas las potencias –y en especial las hegemónicas–  “creen en sí mismas y en su derecho moral y político de afirmar sus (así llamados) intereses nacionales”.  Los Estados Unidos no son ni han sido la excepción. Es por ello que la inmensa mayoría de la población norteamericana es  y ha sido partidaria, desde un punto de vista patriótico, de que su país se afirme a nivel mundial “si es necesario militarmente”.   De ahí, que según el autor, el número de estadounidenses que ha mantenido una posición anti-imperialista desde 1945 sea una porción “políticamente insignificante” de la población. En otras palabras, desde la segunda guerra mundial, la mayoría de los norteamericanos han apoyado la afirmación imperialista de los Estados Unidos, motivados por un fuerte sentimiento patriótico.

Para Wallerstein, la política estadounidense no se divide entre opositores y simpatizantes del imperialismo, sino entre quienes son “fuertemente intervencionistas” y quienes favorecen el llamado aislacionismo. Sin embargo, estos últimos no son anti-militaristas, pues apoyan la inversión y el gasto militar, pero sí “son escépticos en cuanto a utilizar estas fuerzas en lugares ajenos”. El autor reconoce que tras esta división existe lo que él denomina como una “gama de posiciones intermedias”.

Intervencionistas o aislacionistas, la mayoría de los políticos norteamericanos no están dispuestos a buscar o proponer una reducción en el gasto militar por razones de política partidista. El aislacionismo tuvo una fuerte presencia en el Partido Republicano en el periodo previo a la segunda guerra mundial, pero a partir de 1945 se redujo y perdió fuerza.  Desde  el fin de la guerra, los republicanos han adoptado una actitud a favor de la inversión en el gasto militar y han criticado la supuesta debilidad o suavidad de la política exterior de los demócratas. La realidad histórica es que los republicanos no siempre han sido consistentes con su discurso y se han opuesto al envío de tropas estadounidenses a lugares como los Balcanes en la década de 1990. A pesar de estas incongruencias,   el público norteamericana tiende a ver a los republicanos como  halcones (“hawks”) patriotas.

Según Wallerstein, esta idea generalizad choca con la realidad histórica porque desde la segunda guerra mundial, los demócratas han sido más propensos a llevar a cabo intervenciones militares que sus opositores republicanos. A pesar de ello, los republicanos han acusado  sistemáticamente a los demócratas de ser palomas (“doves”), es decir, de faltarles valor, empuje y decisión en su política exterior. Esta acusación ha tenido un gran peso sobre la actitud de las administraciones demócratas de los últimos sesenta años. En palabras del autor, los demócratas han estado atrapados “en  la etiqueta de ser menos machos que los republicanos”, acusación ésta  muy costosa, políticamente hablando.

Wallerstein cree –podríamos decir, teme–  que la presión de este paradigma político puede terminar haciendo que el Presidente Obama opté por aumentar el número de soldados estadounidenses en Afganistán para no lucir ni débil, ni suave en su política exterior, ni hacerle daño a su partido.  Ello colocaría al joven presidente “en el sendero de la guerra de Vietnam”.

El autor cierra su ensayo señalando que es hora de que los norteamericanos “entiendan que las intervenciones militares estadounidenses en el extranjero son gastos militares increíblemente grandes en casa y no son la solución a sus problemas, sino el mayor impedimento para la supervivencia y el bienestar nacional estadounidense”.

Coincido plenamente con los planteamientos de Wallerstein. Es claro que la política partidista estadounidense juega –y siempre ha jugado– un papel muy importante en la formulación de la política exterior norteamericana. El autor identifica y explica muy bien la dinámica establecida entre los dos partidos principales norteamericanos desde  el inicio de la guerra fría: por un lado los republicanos con su patriotismo exagerado fomentando el militarismo y atacando a unos demócratas preocupados de ser acusados de débiles o de perder países ante el comunismo (China en 1949) o el terrorismo (Pakistán 20??).  Para entender la política exterior estadounidense no basta con enfocar sus intereses geopolíticos o económicos. Es también necesario atender el juego político doméstico en el que inciden elementos como el nacionalismo, el patriotismo, el excepcionalismo, el regionalismo, la religiosidad, el complejo industrial-militar, etc.

Me llamó poderosamente  la atención la visión que tiene Wallerstein de los ciudadanos estadounidenses, pues es claro que considera que la mayoría de éstos han adoptado actitudes imperialistas en los últimos sesenta años. Guiados por un fuerte nacionalismo y patriotismo, los estadounidenses no lucen en el ensayo de Wallerstein como el pueblo inocente y manipulable por el gobierno y los medios que algunos analistas han señalado. Todo lo contrario, para Wallerstein, sólo una minoría del pueblo norteamericano ha adoptado una actitud crítica ante las intervenciones militares de su gobierno. La mayoría ha apoyado la proyección y la defensa de los intereses norteamericanos con el uso de la fuerza. La perenne inocencia del pueblo norteamericano queda de esta forma terriblemente comprometida.

Esperemos que los temores de Immanuel Wallerstein no se concreten y que por el bien de su país Obama evite caer en la trampa de enviar más tropas a ese matadero de imperios llamado Afganistán.

Norberto Barreto Velázquez, Ph. D.

Lima, Perú, 29 de setiembre de 2009

Ekrem Ekici

Kocaeli/2005

“Yeni ırkçılık” tartışması, kapitalist üretim tarzında üretim araçlarının gelişmesine bağlı olarak ırkçılık ideolojisinin de kendini yenilediği ve biçim değiştirdiği görüşü ekseninde süren bir tartışmadır. Yeni bir ırkçılığın varolduğunu savunan görüşlere göre, kendisine biyolojik farklılıkları temel alan ırkçı yaklaşım, yerini görünüşte herhangi bir toplumsal grubun bir diğerinden üstünlüğü düşüncesine dayanmayan, ancak kültürel farklılıklar üzerinden bir ayrımcılık ve dışlama pratiği olarak kendini gösteren bir fenomen halini almıştır. Buradaki temel belirlenim, yeni ırkçılık pratiğinin “farklı” kültürel formlara yönelik olmasıdır. Etienne Balibar’a göre, “Yeni ırkçılık ‘sömürgecilikten kurtuluş çağına, eski sömürgelerle eski metropoller arasındaki nüfus hareketlerinin tersine çevrilişi, insanlığın tek bir siyasal alan içinde parçalanışı çağına ait bir ırkçılıktır”.[1] Dolayısıyla yeni ırkçılık, sömürgeci Batı toplumlarının önemli bir siyasal sorunu olan göç olgusunu akla getirmektedir. Bugün özellikle Fransa’nın yaşadığı iç karışıklık göçmen sorununun boyutlarını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Eski sömürgelerden sömürgeci ülkelere yönelen göç dalgası, göç alan toplumun –bu toplumun özellikle ulus devlet formasyonunda yapılandığı düşünüldüğünde- ekonomik ve kültürel yapısının homojenliği karşısında bir tehdit unsuru olarak belirmektedir. Dolayısıyla yeni ırkçılık tek tek bireyleri ya da bireyler topluluğunu hedef alan bir pratik olarak değil, bir toplumun yaşam tarzını hedef alan ve bu yaşam tarzını “farklı” olarak niteleyen bir pratik olarak kendini göstermektedir. Burada Frantz Fanon’un belirlemesi açıklayıcıdır: “Kendini rasyonel, bireysel, genotip ve fenotip belirleyerek sunan ırkçılık, bir kültürel ırkçılığa dönüşüyor. Irkçılığın nesnesi artık tek tek insanlar değil, özellikle belirli bir varoluş biçimi”.[2] Yeni ırkçılığın klasik anlamdaki ırkçılıktan ayrıldığı temel nokta kültürel farklılıkları kabul etmekle birlikte, görünüşte bir kültürler hiyerarşisini kabul etmemesidir. Kültürler ya da yaşam tarzları arasında varolan farklılıklar toplumların ‘saflığının’ bir göstergesidir. “Hiyerarşik bir modelin bırakılması pahasına (…) kültür de bir doğa gibi, özellikle bireyleri ve grupları a priori olarak bir soy kütüğüne, dokunulmaz ve değişmez bir şey belirlenimine hapsetme yolu olarak iş görebilir”.[3]

Yeni ırkçılığın ilk bakışta toplumlar arasındaki bir hiyerarşi düşüncesinden hareket etmiyor gibi görünmesi, bu pratiğin sonuçta bir ırkçılık pratiği olarak görülmesinin önüne bir set çekmektedir. Bu olgu göçmen sorunu bağlamında düşünüldüğünde yeni ırkçı söylem farklı kültürlerin ve faklı yaşam tarzlarının bağdaşamayacağı, dolayısıyla her kültürün kendi içine dönmesi gerektiği yönünde biçimlenmektedir. Sinan Özbek yeni ırkçı söylemin yapısını şu sözlerle ifade etmektedir: “Değil mi ki değişik kültürlerin varlığı insan uygarlığının yapı taşlarından biridir; öyleyse göçmenler kendi topraklarına dönmeli ve kültürleri korunmalı ve aynı zamanda göçülen coğrafyanın da kültürel saflığı sağlanmış olmalıdır”.[4] Bu anlamda yeni ırkçılık, klasik ırkçılık gibi dolaysız bir biçimde değil, dolaylı yoldan iş gören bir dışlama pratiği, ya da daha doğru bir ifadeyle bir ideoloji olarak kendini göstermektedir.

Buradan hareketle yeni ırkçılık denilen olgunun yeni bir ideoloji değil, ırkçılık ideolojisinin “yeni” bir biçimi olduğu söylenebilir. Çünkü ırkçılık ideolojisinin varlık zemini bulduğu üretim tarzındaki gelişmeler ve yenileşmeler ideolojilerin de kendilerini yenilemelerini ve bu yenileşme ile iş görmelerini beraberinde getirmektedir.  Yine burada Balibar’ın görüşleri önemli görünmektedir: “Farkçı ırkçılık mantıksal açıdan ırkçılık ve ırkçılık karşıtlığı arasındaki çatışmadan ders almış, toplumsal saldırganlığın nedenlerine siyasal olarak müdahale edebilecek gibi görünen bir meta-ırkçılık ya da ‘ikinci konum’ olarak adlandırabileceğimiz türden bir ırkçılıktır”.[5] Farklı toplumların kültürel yapılarının farklılığından hareketle bir dışlama pratiğini hayata geçirmek sınır kavramını gündeme getirmektedir. Yeni ırkçılık kültürel farklılıkları belirleyerek, içinde varolduğu toplumsal yapılanmanın sınırlarını da belirlemektedir. Bu yönüyle yeni ırkçılığın milliyetçi reflekse eşlik eden bir ideolojik form olduğu söylenebilir.

Yeni ırkçılık olarak tanımlanan ideolojinin aslında yeni bir ideoloji olmadığı Fransa örneğine bakılarak daha rahat anlaşılabilir. Eski sömürgelerinden önemli ölçüde göç alan Fransa’da göçmenlere karşı “yeni ırkçılık” olarak tanımlanan bir tutumun varolduğu bilinmektedir. Bu tutum, olağan olarak algılanmakla birlikte, 2005 yılının ikinci yarısında göçmenlerin başlattığı ayaklanma, ırkçılık ideolojisinin kapitalist bir toplumda hiçbir zaman yeni olarak değerlendirilemeyecek bir olgu olduğunu gözler önüne serdi. Toplumsal yapının en alt tabakasını oluşturan göçmenler, kendilerine biçilen bu rolün dışına çıktıkları anda “resmi şiddet” ile karşı karşıya kaldılar. Bu da yeni olanın ırkçılık değil, ırkçı eylem tarzları olduğu gerçeğini bir kez daha gösterdi. Yazıyı Sinan Özbek’in bu konudaki görüşleriyle sonlandırmak gerekirse, “Toplum içinde göçmenler ya da ırkçılığın muhatabı olan yerli gruplar bu hiyerarşinin en alt basamağını oluştururlar. Basamağın en altındaki gruplar, basamağın en altında olmanın verdiği rollere uygun davrandıkça ırkçı aşağılama ve saldırı bir normalitedir. Dolayısıyla ölümle sonuçlanan ırkçı saldırıların varlığı, sadece ırkçı örgütlerin bir eylem yeniliğini ifade eder”.[6]

[2] Frantz Fanon’un “Für Eine Afrikanische Revolution” adlı makalesinden aktaran: Sinan Özbek, içinde: Irkçılık, Bulut Yayınları, İstanbul: 2003, s. 123.

[3] Balibar, age, s. 32.

[4] Sinan Özbek, age, s. 134.

[5] Balibar, age, s. 32.

[6] Sinan Özbek, age, s. 135.

A Crisis of Capital

INTERVIEWS ON THE CURRENT CRISIS OF CAPITAL

 

 Although I don’t agree with all the views expressed in these two interviews, they make for interesting viewing. Both come from ‘Russia Today’ and were posted to YouTube.

 Immanuel Wallerstein interview, ‘Major crisis still ahead, past one was minor’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wBMnDLQr7-M

Gerald Celente interview, ‘Revolution Next for America’: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JhaEc_4zuFI

Posted here by Glenn Rikowski

The Flow of Ideas: http://www.flowideas.co.uk

Immanuel Wallerstein, Commentary No. 265, Sept. 15, 2009

In the last few weeks, there has been a marked increase of calls, coming from both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, for some kind of early “exit strategy” from Afghanistan. This is coming at the very moment that Gen. Stanley McChrystal, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates are about to recommend formally to President Obama an increase in U.S. troop commitments there.

Nothing is certain, but the general expectation is that Obama will agree to this. After all, during the elections, Obama had said that he considered U.S. intervention in Iraq a mistake and wanted an early withdrawal. One of the reasons he gave was that it had prevented sending enough troops into Afghanistan. This was a version of the “bad war, good war” concept. Iraq was a “bad” war, Afghanistan a “good” one.

There has apparently been much debate in the inner circle of President Obama about the wisdom of escalating U.S. military commitments in Afghanistan. It is reported that the leading opponent of troop escalation in Afghanistan is none other than Vice-President Biden. Biden has always been considered somewhat of a Democratic hawk. So how come he is now opposing troop escalation? The reported reason is that he now considers Afghanistan a hopeless quagmire, and that investing troops there will prevent the United States from concentrating on the really important zone, Pakistan. So we have a new version of the “bad war, good war” doctrine. Afghanistan has become a “bad” war; Pakistan is the “good” one.

Why is it so difficult for the United States to extricate itself from military interventions it is so patently losing? Some left analysts, in the United States and elsewhere, say it is because the United States is an imperialist power and therefore engages in such military interventions in order to maintain its political and economic power in the world. This explanation is quite insufficient, for the simple reason that the United States has not won a single major military confrontation since 1945. As an imperialist power, it has shown great incompetence in achieving its goals.

Consider the five wars in which the United States has committed large numbers of troops since 1945. The biggest – in terms of numbers of troops, economic costs, and political impact – was Vietnam. The United States lost the war. The other four were the Korean War, the first Gulf War, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the second invasion of Iraq. The Korean War and the first Gulf War were politically draws. The wars ended at the exact point that they began. The United States is clearly losing the war in Afghanistan. I believe that history will judge the second invasion of Iraq a draw as well. When the U.S. finally pulls out, it will be no stronger politically than when it went in – probably indeed the opposite.

So what drives the United States to engage in such politically self-defeating actions, especially if we think of the United States as a hegemonic power trying to control the entire world to its advantage? To answer that, we have to look at the internal politics of the United States.

All great powers, and especially hegemonic powers, are intensely nationalist. They believe in themselves and in their moral and political right to assert their so-called national interests. The overwhelming majority of their citizens consider themselves patriotic, and take this to mean that their government ought indeed to assert itself vigorously, and if necessary militarily, in the world arena. In the United States, since 1945, the percentage of the population who are principled anti-imperialists is politically insignificant.

U.S. politics is not divided between supporters and opponents of imperialism. It has been divided between those who are strongly interventionist and those who believe in “fortress America.” The latter used to be called isolationists. Isolationists are not anti-military. Indeed, they tend to be strong supporters of financial investment in military forces. But they are skeptical about using these forces in far-off places.

Of course, there is a whole gamut of intermediate positions between the extremes in this cleavage. The crucial thing to see is that almost no politician is ready to call for a serious reduction in U.S. military expenditures. This is why so many of them engage in the “bad war, good war” distinction. They justify reducing the use of military in the “bad” wars by suggesting that there are other, better uses for the military.

At this point, we have to analyze the differences between the Republican and Democratic Parties on these questions. The isolationist wing of the Republican Party was very strong before the Second World War, but since 1945 it has become rather small. The Republicans since 1945 have regularly tended to call for increased investment in the military, and have usually argued that the Democrats have been too “soft” on military questions.

The fact that the Republicans have been very inconsistent in this matter hasn’t seemed to affect their public image. For example, when President Clinton wanted to send troops to the Balkans, the Republicans opposed it. It didn’t matter. The U.S. public seems to take the Republicans at their word as patriotic hawks, no matter what they do.

The Democrats have had the opposite problem. There have been large numbers of books arguing, credibly, that Democratic administrations have been readier than Republican administrations to engage in military interventions abroad (for example, in both Korea and Vietnam). Nonetheless, the Republicans have constantly denounced the Democrats for being “doves” in their military views. It is true that a large minority of Democratic voters have in fact been “doves,” but not a large number of Democratic politicians. Democratic politicians have always worried that the voters will consider them to be “doves” and turn against them for that reason.

The Democrats have therefore almost always used the “bad war, good war” line. It hasn’t done them all that much good. The Democrats seem to be stuck with the label of being less macho than the Republicans. So it’s very simple. When Obama makes his decisions on these matters, it’s not enough for him to analyze whether or not troop escalation in Afghanistan makes any military or political sense. He worries above all that he himself, and more broadly the Democratic Party, may be labeled once again as the “sell-outs,” the “doves,” the ones who “lost” countries to the enemies – to the Soviet Union in the old days, to the “terrorists” today.

Obama will probably therefore send in more troops. And the Afghanistan War will go the way of the Vietnam War. Only the outcome for the United States will be worse, because there is no cohesive, rational opposing group to whom to lose the war – one that will allow U.S. helicopters to withdraw the troops without shooting at them. When Bertold Brecht got cynical or angry at Communist regimes, he told them that, if the people were rebelling against their wisdom, they should “change the people.” Perhaps that’s what Obama needs to do – change the people, his people. Or maybe, in time, the people will change themselves. If the United States loses too many more wars, its citizens may wake up to the realization that U.S. military interventions abroad and incredibly large military expenditures at home are not the solution to their problems, but the greatest impediment to U.S. national survival and well-being.

[Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein, distributed by Agence Global. For rights and permissions, including translations and posting to non-commercial sites, and contact: rights@agenceglobal.com, 1.336.686.9002 or 1.336.286.6606. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically, or e-mail to others, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To contact author, write: immanuel.wallerstein@yale.edu.

These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]

crise economica mundial

Um pouco em baixa nos jornais, talvez por causa da nova gripe, ou mesmo do pré-sal, que tem gerado um otimismo grande na mídia brasileira, existem sim avaliações tanto positivas como negativas a respeito da economia, fiz a leitura de algumas matérias e selecionei as que considerei mais relevantes para análisar o momento, começando pelas avaliações positivas feitas pelos bancos centrais:

BCE faz avaliação otimista sobre a econômia mundial

Tem a visão bastente sólida e pragmáticas feita pelo, economista Immanuel Wallerstein, responsável prever o término do capitalismo em 50 anos, e por dizer que  a crise descoberta agora, é na verdade fruto do modelo de desenvolvimento da econômia ao longo dos anos, Immanuel trabalha com a análise de ciclos Kondratieff , e diz que esta é uma crise desenvolvida ao longo de séculos por deficiências na estrutura capitalista, veja o que ele fala sobre a crise:

Colapso em Curso

Tem também esta matéria sobre  a preocupante questão dos Balçãs, que dependendo de como for levada poderá gerar a uma séria tempestade econômica em toda a UE.

Vendaval Báltico a vista

Bem, enquanto permanece este cenário de incertezas, vamos apostar no Pré-sal, e nas perspectivas milionárias que ele tem nos feito imaginar. Pelo menos uma perspectiva que tem se desenhado com cada vez mais intensidade, é a de que o Brasil sairá bastante fortalecido no cenário internacional com o término da crise.

Immanuel Wallerstein, Agence Global, September 2, 2009

There is a firestorm ahead in the Middle East for which neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. public is prepared. They seem scarcely aware how close it is on the horizon or how ferocious it will be. The U.S. government (and therefore almost inevitably the U.S. public) is deluding itself massively about its capacity to handle the situation in terms of its stated objectives. The storm will go from Iraq to Afghanistan to Pakistan to Israel/Palestine, and in the classic expression “it will spread like wildfire.”

Continues >>

Flying Whale, quoting Immanuel Wallerstein, writes that the most audible voices in the world left are either “free-standing intellectuals or…located in very small organizations.” This assertion strikes me as not-quite right. I think it’d be more accurate to say that the principal voices who advocate a comprehensive leftist world-view are free-standing intellectuals or in very small organizations.

I’d argue that there are plenty of powerful voices within large organizations, but that their work (if not their ideology) is confined to a relatively small number of issues. The weakness here is not necessarily that the folks who best articulate a comprehensive leftist world-view are within weak institutions (or no institution at all)– it’s also that the single-issue experts haven’t found better and more consistent ways to build sustainable coalitions that actually aggregate power in meaningful ways.

Jonas

Once every two weeks, world historical sociology scholar Immanuel Wallerstein writes a lengthy commentary on whatever world affair is currently foremost on his mind. His latest piece, “The World Left and the Iranian Elections,” discusses the fragmented views taken by self-identified leftists around the world. Some support Ahmadinejad openly (for example, Hugo Chávez); others are “virtually unconditional opponents.”

It’s an interesting read but I want to skirt the topic and highlight a single parenthetical sentence: “The principal voices of the world left today tend for the most part to be primarily that either of free-standing intellectuals or of activists who are located in very small organizations.”

I have no real way of evaluating this statement, but it strikes me as fairly accurate. The leading leftist governments of the world are either not particularly “left” per se or are often politically unhelpful (Exhibit A: the aforementioned Hugo Chávez). No one is ready to proclaim Evo Morales or Rafael Correa as a spokesperson of the global left. When I think of such spokespeople or leaders, I think of people like… Noam Chomsky, or Martin Khor, or Naomi Klein, or Vandana Shiva. All of these people have their flaws, but more importantly they fit perfectly into Wallerstein’s characterization. For who they are they have remarkable influence, but on a global (and surely on a world historical) scale their power is extremely limited.

All of which goes a long way towards explaining why – for example – in the midst of a tremendous global financial crisis that could and should be seen as an implication of the neoliberal, deregulatory agenda of the past 20-some years, no real reforms are being proposed in any of the circles that matter. The power dynamics are titled too far to one side.

Flying Whale

By Immanuel Wallerstein | Agence Global, August 1, 2009

The recent elections in Iran, and the subsequent challenges to their legitimacy, have been a matter of enormous internal conflict in Iran, and of seemingly endless debate in the rest of the world — a debate that threatens to linger for some time yet. One of its most fascinating consequences has been the deep divisions in this worldwide discussion among persons who consider themselves part of the world left. They have ranged in their views from virtually unconditional supporters of the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei analysis of the situation to virtually unconditional opponents, with multiple positions in-between. This may be as much a commentary on the state of the world left as it is on the state of Iran.

Continues >>

Immanuel Wallerstein, Esquerda.net, 29 de julho de 2009

Durante as últimas semanas, a atenção mundial esteve concentrada no Irão, onde houve um enorme conflito sobre as contestadas eleições presidenciais. Parece agora bastante claro que Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tomará posse como o próximo presidente do Irão com o pleno apoio do ayatollah Ali Khamenei. O presidente Barack Obama tem sofrido pressões consideráveis, principalmente das forças conservadoras dentro dos Estados Unidos, para assumir uma posição “mais dura” sobre as eleições iranianas.

Ao mesmo tempo, ao que parece, ele tem recebido conselhos opostos de Pequim. M.K. Bhadrakumar1 disse que Pequim alertou para a possibilidade de “deixar o génio da mobilização popular sair da garrafa, numa região altamente volátil que está à espera de explodir.” O mau exemplo de Pequim é a Tailândia, um país que não é dos mais importantes para a maioria dos comentadores e políticos americanos.

Seja como for, não é de todo claro o que quer dizer assumir uma posição “mais dura”, mas parece evidente que Obama foi cauteloso nas suas declarações públicas. Vejam o que tem ocorrido neste mesmo período. Em 24 de Julho, a Casa Branca anunciou que se prepara para reenviar um embaixador para a Síria, desfazendo uma decisão de há quatro anos do presidente Bush. E, em 25 de Junho, o presidente Hugo Chávez da Venezuela anunciou que o seu país e os Estados Unidos vão reenviar os seus embaixadores, os mesmo que tinham sido declarados persona non grata nos últimos dias da administração Bush.

Há quem se pergunte o que sentiu Obama quando leu as transcrições das gravações do presidente Nixon, que foram tornadas públicas a 23 de Junho. Entre outras coisas, estas fitas revelam uma conversa que Nixon teve com o secretário de Estado Henry Kissinger em 20 de Janeiro de 1973, sobre um acordo que os Estados Unidos estavam à beira de concluir com o governo do Vietname do Norte. Nixon e Kissinger viam-no como um acordo para salvar a face, que permitiria aos Estados Unidos uma retirada “com honra” da guerra, sabendo que, depois de uma “pausa decente”, o acordo resultaria numa vitória militar do Viet Minh.

Eles tinham um pequeno problema. Havia resistências ao acordo, por motivos óbvios, do presidente Nguyen Van Thieu, do Vietname do Sul. A discussão Nixon-Kissinger era sobre como lidar com este problema. Kissinger disse que o problema era se Thieu “vai deixar-nos assinar” o acordo. Nixon disse: “Deixar-nos… ha ha”. Nixon prosseguiu dizendo que Kissinger tinha de dizer a Thieu que os EUA “cortariam as verbas de assistência” se ele se recusasse a alinhar. Continuou: “Não sei se a ameaça vai muito longe ou não, mas eu não faria nada… cortaria a cabeça dele, se necessário.”

A única coisa que Obama sabe é que já não é realmente possível para o presidente dos Estados Unidos cortar a cabeça de ninguém, inimigo ou aliado, que o desafie. Já em Julho de 2007, Obama mostrou compreensão desta nova realidade, quando respondeu a uma entrevista durante a campanha presidencial. A questão era: “Está disposto a encontrar-se separadamente, sem pré-condições, durante o primeiro ano da sua administração, em Washington ou qualquer outro lugar, com os líderes do Irão, Síria, Venezuela, Cuba e Coreia do Norte?” Resposta: “Estou.” Foi atacado imediatamente pela sua rival democrata nas primárias, Hillary Clinton, que o acusou de “ingenuidade”. Agora é Hillary Clinton, como secretária de Estado de Obama, que está a cumprir o compromisso.

A verdade é que Obama não tem muita escolha. Não parece haver formas práticas que lhe permitam “cortar a cabeça” de Ahmadinejad, Chávez, Assad, Castro ou Kim Jong-Il. E não são só estas as cabeças que ele não pode cortar. Não pode afastar o primeiro-ministro de Israel, Nethanyau, do cargo. Também não pode fazer o Hamas desaparecer de Gaza. Sarkozy, Merkel, Putin, e Hu Jintao parecem todos bastante seguros nas suas posições. A verdade é que Obama vai em breve descobrir, se não o fez já, que não há muito que possa fazer em relação ao primeiro-ministro Nouri al-Maliki do Iraque, apesar de ser provável que al-Maliki se distancie cada vez mais da política dos EUA.

Que pode então um pobre presidente fazer? Refugiar-se na famosa citação do presidente John F. Kennedy, uma citação que Obama fez mais que uma vez: “Não devemos nunca negociar por medo, mas nunca devemos ter medo de negociar.” Isto não quer dizer que o presidente dos Estados Unidos seja impotente. Significa apenas que o melhor que pode fazer é negociar, ao mesmo tempo que se esquiva das críticas em casa.

No fundo, Obama partilha a preocupação de Pequim – não deixar o génio da mobilização popular sair da garrafa, porque o mundo de hoje é altamente “volátil” – e nenhum governo pode estar seguro do que vai acontecer. Governos, de todos os géneros, podem fazer concessões a mobilizações populares. Mas governos, de todos os géneros, não estão realmente dispostos a submeter as suas políticas e o seu poder às reivindicações populares.

Immanuel Wallerstein

Comentário nº 260, 1 de Julho de 2009

Tradução de Luis Leiria

1 M K Bhadrakumar: diplomata de carreira do ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Índia por mais de 29 anos, com cargos como embaixador no Uzbequistão (1995-98) e na Turquia (1998-2001). Actualmente escreve em diversos jornais.