Here are some thoughts on autonomy and solutions to Southern problems.

First, I don’t believe straightforward approach is going to work, for now it looks like some people thank that if two sides simply negotiate political terms then everything would go away. Terms are not terribly important here – whether they should have elected governors or special administrative region or whatever.

This is a negotiation between two societies, Southern muslims and mainstream Thai. The solution must be acceptable to the societies at large, terms laid out on paper is a very poor approximation of that settlement, and for now it’s the possibility of settlement itself that is in question.

On Thai side we have a very diverse society and vast majority of Thais don’t really care how muslims in the South conduct their affairs, and I can’t think of anything that would ignite their interest. If cultural identity is going to be a possible problem – Thais have a far bigger challenge with their own new generation. Introducing sharia might give them jitters, but it would mostly be a headache for the government, not for the people who’d be totally unaffected.

The resistance lies in a perceived threat to Nation-Religion-King, and the heart of this resistance lies in a very closed quarters. If muslims can manage to live without threatening that concept, and I believe they can and would, there should be no problem with the autonomy.

It’s like with trying new food – Thais usually shun any unfamiliar stuff and they need to be tricked into trying it, and they need their trusted friends skillful encouragement.

Practically it means the autonomy idea needs to be sold to a few selected individuals first and spread from there. For the sake of convenience let’s say Prem should be that first person, though it could be one of his aides or other members of Privy Council or someone else entirely.

The key here is not the ingredients or the recipe but psychological barrier, and that’s why I think the exact details of proposed autonomy do not really matter.

On the muslim side the picture is a bit more complex. They have the old separatist movement, largely retired, they have new generation of fighters, totally out of control, and they have current set of leaders, largely irrelevant. Ok, not irrelevant, but the formal leadership, MPs, senators, provincial and tamboon elected officials, do not talk about autonomy at all, at least in public. It appears that for them, and for daily governing of the region, autonomy is irrelevant, it won’t offer any clear administrative advantages and possibly reduce the flow of funds from central government. Perhaps for them it would create only more problems as the region is not economically viable to stand on its own feet in the short to medium term.

So there we have the problem of violence by the new generation of insurgents, and two other stakeholders with their own interests – old separatists want the autonomy, current leaders are indifferent.

For some time Thai government strategy was to get the old guard to negotiate and hope that they could somehow reign in the “yawe”. It’s understandable why Thais chose this approach because if it works they’ll get peace with all troublemakers at once, but there’s also a danger that “yawe” would break off any connection with old guard the moment they feel duped into a deal with Thais and we will be back to square one.

As the time goes this new generation of fighters also grows into an old news. Maybe they can still attract new blood for now but as Thais take better control of the breeding grounds and mainstream muslim society grows resentful of their war new recruits will be a lot harder to come by. Also pretty soon the “old hands” will naturally start growing out of it – running around the jungle and cutting people’s heads off is a very “teenage” thing, it might help you score some chicks but you’d better have a real job if you want to marry and get your bride’s father blessings. I’d say the biological clock would run alarm bells in less than ten years, we are five years into the insurgency already so in the next few years the old timers would start settling in and hopefully it would have a pacifying effect on the insurgency overall.

I’m sure Thai planners have taken these considerations in account, and winning the hearts strategy, however imperfect and even counterproductive it might appear, is absolutely necessary, and so are negotiations with whatever party represents the other side, and so is pouring development funds in the region and talking about political solutions, and so is military solution to armed insurgency.

Then, out of the blue, comes Chavalit and declares autonomy for the South in the form of a special administrative region as his party policy. That was an absolute disaster on all fronts. First, as I said earlier, Thai hardliners need a soft and inconspicuous approach, they need to be tricked in considering the idea in a safe and unprovocative enviornment, and Chavalit ruined it all, possibly for good – god knows how much time they’d need to get over this bad impression.

On the muslim side they are not stupid either – they don’t take Chavalit seriously, he’s not in the position to negotiate or promise anything, and they probably see him as an opportunist using the problem to his own political ends, and it also came hot on the heels of Chavlit’s “help” in Cambodia that had exactly opposite effect.

Chavalit’s political benefits are not clear, probably because they were never thought of and he didn’t consult with anyone. It’s not even his party to make electoral promises on behalf of. Autonomy might no go down too well in PTP’s strongholds in Isan – Thai state had long relied on Isanese to defeat the separatism there and many Isanese paid with the lives of their children for that. There could also be an exodus of Isanese who were relocated there years ago to create Buddhist community in the South.

Chavalit himself is also not a new face in the South, local Wadah faction came to prominence under his NAP and later TRT and it didn’t get anywhere and was trashed in 2005 elections. What are the chances of successfully resurrecting them? Perhaps Chavalit was simply afraid that they’d go with Sonthi’s (coup leader) new Matabum party. Either way even his sincerety is in serious doubt, nevermind his abilities to deliver.

Also making autonomy part of a political platform in Thailand’s internal politics effectievly kills any chances of it actually happening – it would become a commodity, stripped of any commitment and traded along with cabinet posts and other political spoils, not to mention the likelyhood of PTP not be able to break up the coalition and assume power after the elections, or keep it long enough to see the autonomy through. It also forced Democrats to take the opposing side even if it’s not where they want to be on the South issue, now they could be easily provoked and manipulated by being asked uncomfortable questions they’d rather not discuss in public.

And that’s why even muslim leaders gave Chavalit a cold shoulder despite being attracted to the idea.

Hopefully Chavalit’s intervention didn’t ruin the negotiations altogether and didn’t spook Prem and Co, and it wasn’t a major blow to the process altogether. Luckly he quickly disappeared from the spotlight without inflicting any more damage.

with Marc Hecker, Policy Review, 158, December 2009/January 2010, p. 3-19

The Afghan-Pakistan border region is widely identified as a haven for jihadi extremists. But the joint between local insurgencies and global terrorism has been dislocated. A combination of new technologies and new ideologies has changed the role of popular support: In local insurgencies the population may still be the “terrain” on which resistance is thriving — and counterinsurgency, by creating security for the people, may still succeed locally. But Islamic violent extremism in its global and ambitious form is attractive only for groups at the outer edge, the flat end of a popular support curve. Jihad failed to muster mass support, but it is stable at the margin of society. Neither the West nor its enemies can win — or lose — a war on terror. [...]

The linkage between terrorism and insurgency has been altered in the early 21st century. Instead of seeing high-volume popular support in an insurgency as the “soil” on which resistance and terrorism are flourishing — and counterinsurgency as a competition for that support — an additional paradigm is needed: the “tail.”

Read more

PressTv

The Pakistani military says it has discovered substantial evidence of Indian involvement in assisting pro-Taliban militants in the Khyber tribal region.

Khyber Agency area military commander Brigadier Fayyaz told reporters in Barra that they have found Indian-manufactured weapons and sophisticated ammunition, as well as some literature, during the ongoing offensive against the militants in Khyber Agency, a Press TV correspondent reported late on Monday.

“We have sent all the proofs of Indian involvement to the Foreign Office for their onward presentation at the appropriate forum,” he said.

The security forces have killed at least 61 militants so far and arrested some 87 others during the ongoing search operation, he added.

Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Abdul Basit told Press TV that the evidence acquired by security forces in Waziristan and the Khyber tribal region is being examined and the issue will be discussed at a high-level meeting in the next few days.

In a particularly interesting new paper from the National Bureau of Economic Research, Eli Berman, Joseph Felter and Jacob N. Shapiro examine whether employment reduces rates of political violence.

They find that contrary to the common belief that there is positive correlation between unemployment and violence, there is a “robust negative correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces and no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians.”

The figure below shows that in Baghdad’s largest districts, violence fell as unemployment increased but subsequently rose while unemployment fell.

Of important note, these results do not suggest that policies that increase employment cause violence. Instead,

they must lead us to doubt whether those policies actually decrease violence. What they certainly suggest is that the relationship between employment and violence is perhaps more complex than has been commonly assumed. To probe possible explanations for this pattern we now turn to a closer examination of the Iraqi insurgency where the negative correlation between unemployment and violence is strongest.

Suspected Islamic separatists shot dead three men in the latest bout of violence in Thailand’s south. Gunmen killed a Muslim villager in his house in Pattani province, while two Buddhist truck drivers were shot dead as they travelled to Narathiwat province with a goods delivery, both bodies and the truck were also torched.

More than 4,000 people have been killed in the southern provinces since an insurgency erupted nearly six years ago.

The three Spanish volunteer aid workers have been kidnapped by gunmen when their vehicle was separated from a 13 vehicle convoy in Mauritania.
Mauritanian police say the aid workers were attacked while delivering supplies to villages along a 400-kilometre road linking the capital, Nouakchott, to Nouadhibou in the north.
It is suspected to be a kidnapping by AQMI, al-Qaida in Islamic North Africa. The group operates mainly in Algeria but is suspected of crossing desert borders to spread violence in the rest of northwestern Africa.
In June, American Christopher Leggett, 39, was fatally shot in the Mauritanian capital, not far from a school he helped run. AQMI claimed responsibility, saying they killed the Tennessee native because he allegedly was trying to convert Muslims to Christianity.
In 2007, gunmen in Mauritania killed four French tourists that were picnicking on the side of a highway. In 2008, the world famous Dakar Rally auto race was canceled after organizer’s received threats of a possible attack.
Elsewhere in West Africa, the group also has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of two U.N. staffers in December, and the kidnapping of four European tourists a month later. One of the four Europeans, a Briton, was killed by his captors. The U.N. staffers and the other tourists were released.

Russian Railways officials report it was a bomb attack on a luxury passenger train – the second in two years – between Moscow and St Petersburg which has killed up to 39 people and injured nearly 100.
An investigative committee of Russian prosecutors found and removed elements of an explosive device at the site.
Echo of Moscow radio reported a hardline nationalist group (speculated to be a Chechen separatist movement) had claimed responsibility.

A Frenchman, Pierre Camatte, has been kidnapped in Mali by Al-Qaeda’s north African branch, a Malian security official said. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is the group which killed a Briton in May, the first time the Islamists had executed a Western hostage. The kidnapping prompted France to urge its citizens to “immediately leave the area due to a new escalation in the terrorist threat.” French people in Kidal, Gao and Tombouctou regions should “head back without delay to the capital,” the French foreign ministry said in a statement. They also urged its citizens to avoid northern Niger, which borders Mali. Camatte was snatched from his hotel in Menaka in the Sahel region of northern Mali, more than 1,500 kms from the capital Bamako and about 100 kms from the border with Niger, the region is plagued by Tuareg rebels, Al-Qaeda militants and traffickers. Mr Camatte is a regular visitor to Mali, where he is cultivating a plant known for its anti-malarial properties, he also manages a hotel.

The deputy chief of the Tajik National Security Committee Members claims an unknown number of fighters of a Tajik military unit who were loyal to rebel leader Mahmud Khudoyberdiyev have joined regional and global terror groups and have been fighting the Tajik government.
Khudoyberdiyev was a colonel in the Defense Ministry and led a brigade of troops. He led an unsuccessful uprising in 1997 and took control of a northern city in 1998 before fleeing to neighbouring Uzbekistan.
The Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan have tried to disrupt to NATO’s new supply line into northern Afghanistan in Tajikistan. On July 9, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, under the command of Mullah Abdullah, sent a force of 300 fighters into the town of Tavil-Dara and attacked a police station. Eleven days later, they attacked a remote military checkpoint near the Afghan border.

Former State Department official Matthew Hoh and former CIA agent Robert Baer answer the question: What is fueling the insurgency in Afghanistan?

Clip via Brave New Films

Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan could become at risk of destabilisation in the event of a US exit from Afghanistan. Indeed, the most persuasive practical case for bolstering troop numbers comes from Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Presumably, empowerment of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan would lead to spill-over effects, and thus empowerment of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. Is it really that simple though?

The government of Pakistan is not foolish. As rational actors, they should have a contingency in case of an American withdrawal from Afghanistan. After all, it has been on the cards for quite some time, and increasing resistance from insurgents over recent months has intensified speculation.

This contingency plan is co-operation with the Taliban, and Pakistan’s history supports this theory. Before the US invasion, Pakistan was a friend to the Taliban (along with Saudi Arabia, and others). Taliban leaders hid in Pakistan after the Soviet invasion, and there are many cultural links between the nations.

In light of the electoral fraud that led to President Hamid Karzai’s reelection, the US has been extremely wary of making any commitments or decisions until it becomes clear whether their Afghani allies have retained any legitimacy post-fraud.

There may be some hope, if President Barack Obama’s administration can put more pressure on Karzai to stamp out corruption and improve governing standards. Frankly, this commentator is not optimistic – If this were possible, it would have happened already over the last 8 years. Instead, things have deteriorated. There is now a strong chance of American forces leaving Afghanistan, which would doom the current government there.

As logic would dictate, there have been consistent murmurings for years that the Intelligence Services in Pakistan (ISI) are funding the Taliban in Afghanistan. It’s not ideologically motivated though. They have just been hedging their bets, in case of an American withdrawal and Taliban victory.

If Pakistan grant support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, they can use this as leverage for influence. This can then be used practically to secure Central Asian trade routes, and more strategically in their cold war against India. They can also place conditions to prevent the inflammation of aspirations amongst Pakistan’s own Pushtun population (which could be inspired by a powerful Pushtun Taliban in control of Afghanistan).

If the US left Afghanistan, this conditional support for the Taliban insurgency from Islamabad could become more explicit. After all, there would be limited US interests in the country at that point – and the US could be persuaded that a Taliban 2.0 with few links to Al-Qaeda poses very little threat to them.

There is evidence this is already happening. A clever Pakistan would have to ensure that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan wouldn’t empower their own Islamist militants. Remember, the Pakistani Taliban is a very separate organisation to that in Afghanistan. As expected, tensions between the two groups have heightened since the increase in attacks against the Pakistani government over the last few years, and they don’t tend to co-operate much.

All other things being equal, the Taliban bound for Kabul would probably have helped their ideological neighbours in the Pakistani Taliban. But they’re not. The current divisions are evidence that the Taliban in Afghanistan can be pragmatic as well as idealistic – and evidence that Pakistan knows exactly what it’s doing.

It’s pretty impressive really, because Pakistan is playing both sides. Even though everyone knows they’re compliant in attacks against the Afghani Taliban, they denounce the US incursions into their territory afterwards – maintaining plausible deniability for when the Americans leave.

Would an American withdrawal from Afghanistan empower the Islamic militants allied against the Pakistan? Luckily, it’s not as simple as that. Ungoverned spaces make fighting insurgency more complicated, but it’s nothing new. The Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan are already as ungoverned as these groups need.

In fact, allowing the retreat of insurgent forces to safety elsewhere away from conflict, may even allow Pakistani forces to consolidate their power in parts of Waziristan. Meanwhile, Pakistan will gain and employ its leverage over any new Taliban in Afghanistan, as it has done in the past and does so today in limited form.

© The Free Marketeer 2009

By: TimesOnline

World Agenda: BJP in the frame

for Babri mosque massacre

It’s new episodes on FATBIDIN.TV yet again! Nothing is holding us back!

FAT BIDIN PRESENTS…
THE LIFE & TIMES OF AN ISLAMIC INSURGENCY
Part 5 of 15
The Krue Se Mosque is the oldest mosque in Pattani at 500 years old. It’s seen some bloody times.

THE P1 NET SHOW
Episode 5 – Unboxing of the Wiggy
Know what a Wiggy is? It’s all explained in the unboxing.

FAT BIDIN PRESENTS…
THE LIFE & TIMES OF AN ISLAMIC INSURGENCY
Part 5 of 15
The Krue Se Mosque is the oldest mosque in Pattani at 500 years old. It’s seen some bloody times.

Short synopsis:
Zan Azlee, a Malay Muslim documentary filmmaker from Malaysia, travels to Pattani in Southern Thailand to see the violent Islamic insurgency there. He feels somewhat a kin to them since the locals are Thai-Malays and Muslim too. This film is banned from broadcast in Malaysia by the Prime Minister’s Office.

FAT BIDIN PRESENTS is a series which will host long form documentaries. Click here to see all the episodes.

Is it just me or has November 2009 been a hellish month for everyone? So, so busy and not much time for KOW. Anyway, I shouldn’t complain.

Via Danger Room I came across this interesting article in the the Army Times ‘Army tries to supplant Taliban in infowar‘.  There’s a lot to like about it.

Coalition officials have long despaired over the Afghan insurgents’ skill at turning what appear to be tactical defeats into strategic victories by virtue of their ability to push their version of events out to the local and international publics first, and by inflicting coalition casualties that often dominate U.S. and other western news coverage of engagements.

To counter the insurgents’ tactics, French devised an information operations campaign based upon the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine, which, he said, “emphasizes isolating the insurgent from the population.”

A former instructor of military history at West Point, French also drew from his studies of insurgencies, and from a study of Afghan culture and military history done by him and other leaders in Task Force Legion before deploying.

The first step in carrying out French’s plan was to take a page from his enemy’s book and make every combat mission first and foremost an information operation.

Exactly right, in my view, and good to see units like COL French’s Task Force Legion thinking first and foremost about how their operations shape the information environment. So why does it make me uneasy?  There are a few reasons:

1. It’s been done before. The history of counterinsurgency is littered with examples of the security forces parading captured insurgent arms (and insurgents, dead or alive, for that matter). The greater the delight of the counterinsurgent force with such fanfare, it seems to me, the closer the population is to the tipping point. See Vietnam ca. 1964, for example; also Algeria; and for that matter when the Bear went over the mountain in Afghanistan 20+ years ago. I can see this is psychologically rewarding but is it otherwise helpful? 

2. What exactly is the message here? I wholeheartedly agree that we need to deal with the apparent belief of the Afghan peasantry that the Taliban are more resolved in the long-run than we are. Unfortunately, it looks to me that their belief is pretty well-founded. In any event, does calling the Taliban cowards make us seem more or less sure of ourselves? Whatever else they might be the Taliban are not cowards–gangsters, intimidators, bomb-vest wearers with too much heaven on their minds, woman-oppressing girl-murderers, music hating banners of kite-flying, etc and so on, yes, but not cowards. Some of the villagers being loudspeakered here are themselves Taliban or are brothers and fathers of them. Shouldn’t we be focusing on those people whom we are trying to reconcile not kill. Surely the dullest Afghan peasant will be asking themselves on sight of NATO forces bristling with firepower, behind heavy armour, with helicopter gunships, jet bombers and robot planes above ’how brave would you be with an AK, a bag full of grenades, and a pajama top?’

3. Why are we getting into a pissing contest? Galula it was who wrote ’The counterinsurgent is endowed with congenital strength; for him to adopt the insurgent’s warfare would be the same as for a giant to try to fit into a dwarf’s clothing.’  I think it worth emphasizing that the insurgents aren’t meant to be able to beat a Western regular army toe-to-toe. The gross disconnect between the insurgent’s military means and his political aims is in large part what makes an insurgency an insurgency. It is assumed to be inherent in the nature of the thing that their ‘conventional’ capability is lacking. I fear that it diminishes an army as well-trained and led and equipped as the American to crow about its ability to kill large numbers of Taliban in a straight fight. Surely the implicit message should be ‘Bad boys will be punished in accordance with the law which we represent’ not ‘Cowards come and fight!’

4.  It doesn’t seem to be working. As it is noted in the article ‘The Taliban don’t even talk to the villagers, he added. Instead, they impose a 9 p.m. curfew on the village — only farmers working in their fields are exempt — and communicate with the locals by posting letters at night in the mosque.’ In other words, in the night time when the American parade has passed who walks the streets whispering to villagers ‘we’re not going anywhere—it’s your choice’? And who do the villagers believe?  I know it’s a truism that at the end of the day actions speak louder than words but literally at the end of the day who is still in the village talking softly and carrying the big stick?

I should emphasize that I know nothing about what Task Force Legion is doing beyond what I’ve read in the Army Times. Their commander seems very clever and, as I have said, there is a lot in the activities which the article reports upon which I think is very good. I’d like to know more about it. KOW readers are probably familiar with Sun Tzu’s aphorism ‘Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.’ I feel it very likely that your average illiterate Afghan villager after thirty years of war has become a very astute reader of body language. What does ours say about our strategy?

Another bomb has exploded at a branch of Spain’s Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, or BBVA, in eastern Santiago, no one was injured.

Chile has experienced more than 100 bombings since 2004, most of them involving low-power, homemade explosive devices. No one has died in the incidents or claimed responsibility yet.

By: RupeeNews

Peace is impossible to be attained in the region unless India stop its support to terrorism in Pakistan, foreign minister Shah Mehmud Qureshi said. In an interview to German news agency Qureshi said, “India is supporting the terrorists in the tribal areas and Balochistan.” “Pakistan is collecting concrete evidences against the Indian intervention in the Pakistani tribal areas and Balochistan,” said Qureshi. He also said that peace and security is impossible to be attained in South Asia unless India changes its hostile behaviour towards Pakistan. India igniting terrorism in Pak: Qureshi. The Nation.

We repeatedly reported the destructive and negative role of the 4 “Indian Consulates” and the 13 Indian “Information Centers”in Afghanistan. Several news stores about the Indian base in Tajikistan shed light on the nefarious Indian designs in building Chahbahar, the support for BLA terrorists in Baluchistan, the infiltration of Indian agents in anti-Pakistan groups like the TTP, and the direct role of the Indian RAW in sending suicide bombers into Pakistan. Rupee News has now once again been corroborated by the statements of one of the most powerful advisers to Mr. Zardari himself. As the level of frustration grows in ISAF, Indian RAW tried to pawn itself off as the stabilizing factor. here is an effort to send massive Indian forces to Kabul. A growing number of Think Tanks and journalists have seen through the facade of India as a world power? and are now looking at dramatically new solutions.

The Rand Corporation in a recent study as well as the Zibig Brezinski and others are now openly opposing the old Indian version of events. Of course RAW activities are not limited to Pakistan.

FINALLY, the US Administration is being told some home truths about the realities on the ground in Pakistan, especially relating to the “war on terror” and the Pakistan-US relationship. It has been evident for some time that the US and its intelligence agency the CIA have had a major falling out with the Pakistan military and especially the ISI. This occurred, it is believed, when the CIA sought direct intervention into ISI dealings in FATA and sought to take out some valuable operatives. But at a macro level, that was simply a reflection of a far larger distrust which was aggravated by the mounting US failures in Afghanistan. Unable to correct course, the easiest option was to target Pakistan and the ISI. Meanwhile, all evidence pointing to Indian covert activities in Balochistan and FATA from Afghanistan were simply being ignored by the US, despite the Pakistan government pointing this out. Some would say the US itself allowed the free flow of weapons from Afghanistan into FATA and Balochistan.

The Pakistani leadership also, despite publicly accusing India and providing evidence to that effect, has tended to downplay it in its interactions with US officials. Now with the visit of the CIA chief to Pakistan, the military through the ISI has directly raised the issue with its US counterpart, the CIA, and given evidence of Indian shenanigans in Afghanistan and possible US involvement in and support of these covert activities. This position has also been reiterated by the Prime Minister, who not only strongly took up these issues with the CIA Chief, but also pointed out the necessity of involving Pakistan in any Afghan strategy being devised by the US.

How could this be wrong?  I’m not even sure how to respond as I’m already hitting on way too many DHS profile markers.  For the record I will tell my daughters that burkas are a Muslim symbol of female oppression and subservience as they are considered barely human in their teachings.   What infuriating crap………..

Amended:

Where do I get off spouting off like this?   I am a world traveler with over half my life spent living in, yes actually living in not visiting, foreign countries.  I have spent years leaning about religions of the world from actual ‘living fraking people’.  I have a multiethnic/racial family that spans the globe and we all have great love for each other.  All that said I’ve never seen Islam as a positive influence.  That may have to do with the fact that 99% of the death and carnage I’ve seen in my life has been in the name of Islam.  But who am I to judge.  Oh yeah, an individual with a brain.

RupeeNews

ISLAMABAD – Serious differences are understood to have cropped up between Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency ISI and US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) over the latter’s dismal role in countering terrorism in Pakistan, TheNation reliably learnt on Friday.
According to well-placed sources, the differences between the two strategic partners in war against terror cropped up when ISI Chief Lt. General Ahmed Shujja Pasha in a meeting expressed his disappointment to his US counterpart, the CIA chief spymaster Leon Panetta, over the US failure to help Pakistan in counter-terrorism efforts.

Although there was no official confirmation either from the US Embassy or ISPR about the meeting, it was learnt that both of them had thought provoking talks here in which General Pasha had presented to the CIA official a shocking evidence about Indian interference into Pakistan by using Afghanistan soil. General Pasha, the informed sources said, had presented the evidence about Indian efforts aiding terrorism in Balochistan and Waziristan.

The sources said that General Pasha was critical to the CIA’s counter-terrorism strategy in Afghanistan and CIA’s failure to provide concrete actionable information to Pakistan in containing flow of aid to terror networks operating from Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan.

The sources said that the CIA chief is currently visiting Pakistan as a follow-up to the visit of US of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to address complains of Pakistan’s military establishment.

The CIA chief is to meet Army Chief General Ashfaq Pavez Kayani today and is likely to get the similar input from him, the sources said. He is also expected to visit Saudi Arabia before his return to USA. ISI Chief confronts CIA counterpart with evidences.

PressTv

Islamabad is under pressure to meet a deadline to explain the alleged sanctioning of the presence of a notorious US security contractor, formerly known as Blackwater, on the Pakistani soil.

At the request of the Lahore High Court (LHC), the government is supposed to file an explanation by Friday, November 20, a Press TV correspondent reported.

The court started to press the authorities on the matter, acting on a petition filed by Pakistan’s Wattan Party, the Pakistani daily The News International had reported earlier in the month.

Urging the across-the-board disarmament of the Pakistan-based US officials and military personnel as well as prosecution of alleged subversive elements, the party’s Punjab President, Hashim Shaukat Khan said the Interior Ministry let 200 Blackwater staffers enter Pakistan without clearing the customs “under American pressure,” the newspaper added.

Blackwater, now known as Xe Services LLC, attracted international condemnation for killing 17 civilians in Iraq in 2007. The State Department, however, has refused to waive the company’s permission to carry arms there.

It also continues to be extensively involved in Afghanistan where nearly 70,000 US-commissioned contractors almost doubly outnumber the US troops.

Washington has been exceedingly deputizing the companies, which are infamous for misusing their State Department-issued gun licenses. The move has been denounced as an effort at putting a non-military face on the US pursuits overseas

Iron.  Chariots.  Bows.   Armor.   Shields.  Formations.  Guns.  Trenches.  Aircraft.   Bombs.  Whatever the age, wars are never fought the same way twice.  But whatever the war, some things never change.  Alexander the Great surrounded his enemies during battle.  Stonewall Jackson flanked and surprise attacked them.  They won their battles, often outnumbered, due to superior strategies.  They knew where the enemy was and could attack when and where they wanted.  The brutality of Hitler led others to crush him and new technology that released the power of the atom demolished the resilience of the Japanese.

Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee.  That’s Cassius Clay but that’s also a fair description of guerilla warfare.  Guerilla warfare is how the Vietnamese made the USA retreat and how Fidel Castro and Che Guevara defeated Batista.  Sucker punch after sucker punch until theres an opening for the knockout.  Guerilla warfare thrives on conventional warfare.  Tanks are great against other tanks but they’re not so hot against some guerilla who can hear the tank coming and just run to fight another day.  The only way to defeat guerilla warfare is to remove the resources that give it power.

A sympathetic population is perhaps the strongest resource guerillas have in a war.  Not only are they potentially more troops but provide intelligence and protection.  If not outright spies, they are the very least scouts for the insurgents.  There is no way to win for a conventional army if they are fighting against Robin Hood.  Whichever side provides more of basic services to the population like food, water, housing, jobs, will automatically be asked for security aswell.  In conventional warfare boots on the ground are important, but in a guerrila war a bigger counter-insurgency effort can cause the civilian population to become uneasy.  Occupation with weapons will always lead to resentment because nobody likes to be intimidated.  Sure weapons make the people carrying them feel safe, but when someone is unarmed and surrounded by strangers carrying AK47’s or M-16’s it’s hard not to feel threatened.  Thriving communities are guerilla-proof.  People will protect themselves if they feel they have something to protect.

Even if excessive boots on the ground had no negative consequences, it still isn’t the most efficient strategy.  Just like most battles, information is the key to winning.  With advanced technolgoy like spy satellites, thermal cameras, and whatever other gadgets are out there that can track movement, combined with ground-information gained from undercover operatives and informants, there is no reason why quick-strike aircraft or some type of special forces shouldn’t be able to use guerilla warfare tactics against guerillas.  Conventional warfare is for conventional warfare and guerilla warfare is for guerilla warfare.  There’s no doubt the USA can win any old-fashioned war, but in order to win a modern war the counter-insurgency efforts must beat guerilla warriors at their own game, more mobile, more hidden, and most of all more population-friendly.