Održan je Kurs: Investiranje na berzi, u Novom Sadu. Devet polaznika različitih profila (programeri, preduzetnici, studenti, ekonomisti, nastavnica) upoznali su se sa osnovnim finansijskim instrumentima i analizama. Postupno, korak po korak, su otkrivane tajne berzanskog poslovanja. Predavač je svakom polazniku posvetio dovoljno vremena. Na sledeću oblast se prelazilo tek pošto je svima bilo razjašnjeno prethodno. „Svima mora da bude jasno“ da bi smo prešli na sledeću oblast, reči su koje je izgovarao posvećeni predavač. Često su časovi trajali duže od predviđenog a u toku pauza i nakon predavanja diskusija o berzi se nastavljala. Sam Početak kursa je prošao u atmosferi „upijanja“ novih informacija da bi kasnije to preraslo u interaktivnu razmenu pitanja, odgovora, učestvovanje u rešavanju zadataka i sl. Polaznici su često bili u neverici i postavljali su pitanja tipa: da li je moguće da tako nesto postoji!?, pa i ja ću moći isto tako da trgujem, primenjujem strategije i zarađujem novac, šteta što ovo nisam otkrio ranije i td. Samo predavanje je ogoljeno od suvoparnih definicija i teoretisanja sa kojima smo mogli da se susretnemo na nekim dosadašnjim predavanjima. Akcenat je na modelima prilagođenim za praktičnu primenu i lako razumevanje. Predavač na samosvojstven način prenosi svoje bogato znanje i iskustvo kako bi ste i Vi nakon kursa mogli samostalno da nastavite usavršavanje, dobijete motivaciju da investirate, zaradite novac na berzi i naravno, popločate put ka Vašoj finansijskoj slobodi. Izjave poput: „Ovo je pouzdan pokazatelj. Zicer.“, „Što više izbacis emocije sa berze, bićeš uspešniji!“, „Ovo je moja omiljena strategija“ , „Na berzi je najvažnija disciplina…ok“ i mnoge druge su neformalni saveti koje nećete moći pročitati u nijednoj knjizi; potkrepljuju prezentaciju znanja i iskustva. U svakom slučaju Investiranje na berzi je kurs koji će Vas podstaći na akciju, edukaciju i profit. Kurs koji će Vam proširiti vidike, dati nadu, i otvoriti put ka Vašoj finansijskoj slobodi. Prijavite se

Preuzeto: Mondo

Srpski ministar ekonomije Mlađan Dinkić izjavio je u petak da je u planu da država u Rudarsko-topioničarski basen (RTB) “Bor” investira 160 miliona evra.

Dinkić je rekao da će od tog iznosa 135 miliona evra biti za izgradnju nove topionice i fabrike sumporne kiseline, koje bi trebalo da budu izgrađenu za dve do tri godine.

On je dodao da će država investirati 25 miliona evra u kupovinu rudarske opreme i naveo da je Kanadska agencija za osiguranje izvoza (Export Development Canada – EDC) ponudila kredit po povoljnim uslovima.

Prema ranijim infromacijama Ministarstva ekonomije, RTB bi izgradnju trebalo da finansira robnim kreditom za koji će garantovati Vlada Srbije. Vlada se na to odlučila posle tri neuspešna tendera za prodaju RTB “Bor”.

Dinkić je kazao da će RTB Bor još neko vreme ostati u držzavnom vlasništvu i objasnio da se u “Bor” ulaže jer je cena bakra na svetskom tržistu porasla.

Preuzeto: Mondo

Srpski ministar ekonomije Mlađan Dinkić izjavio je u petak da je u planu da država u Rudarsko-topioničarski basen (RTB) “Bor” investira 160 miliona evra.

Dinkić je rekao da će od tog iznosa 135 miliona evra biti za izgradnju nove topionice i fabrike sumporne kiseline, koje bi trebalo da budu izgrađene za dve do tri godine.

On je dodao da će država investirati 25 miliona evra u kupovinu rudarske opreme i naveo da je Kanadska agencija za osiguranje izvoza (Export Development Canada – EDC) ponudila kredit po povoljnim uslovima.

Prema ranijim infromacijama Ministarstva ekonomije, RTB bi izgradnju trebalo da finansira robnim kreditom za koji će garantovati Vlada Srbije. Vlada se na to odlučila posle tri neuspešna tendera za prodaju RTB “Bor”.

Dinkić je kazao da će RTB Bor još neko vreme ostati u državnom vlasništvu i objasnio da se u “Bor” ulaže jer je cena bakra na svetskom tržištu porasla.

Ivan: Hej. Kako si, što ima novo?
Ante: Otvaram firmu.
Ivan: Čestitam. Kada počinješ?
Ante: Upravo gledam oglase. Prvo ću kupiti poslovni prostor.
Ivan: Kako ćeš to financirati?
Ante: Za polovicu imam ušteđevine, a za polovicu ću tražiti kredit od banke.
Ivan: Ti dakle ozbiljno namjeravaš sav svoj novac ulupati u ciglu?
Ante: Ali to je sigurna investicija. Ako ne krene, uvijek mogu prodati. Ako krene, ostat će mojoj djeci.
Ivan: Meni to izgleda kao da igraš rulet. Pola staviš na crno, pola na crveno. Ništa ne gubitš, ali niti ništa ne dobivaš. Čemu onda sva muka?
Ante: Nešto moram raditi!

Nemojte diversifikovati. Pruzmite kontrolu nad vašim novcem i fokusirajte se na vaše investicije. Tokom ove finansijske krize sam primio nekoliko udaraca, ali je moje bogatstvo ostalo netaknuto. Razlog je u tome što moje bogatstvo ne zavisi od tržišne vrednosti koja ide gore-dole (poznato takođe i kao kapitalna dobit). Ja skoro u potpunosti investiram za cash flow.

Na primer, moj cash flow je malo opao kada se spustila cena goriva. Moje bogatstvo je uprkos tome stabilno, jer svaka tri meseca dobijam ček poštom. Iako je cena naftnim akcijama, ili kapitalnoj dobiti, opala, moja malenkost nije zabrinuta jer dobija cash flow od svoje investicije. Ne moram da brinem o prodaji svojih akcija da bih ostvario profit.

Isto važi i za većinu mojih investicija u nekretnine. U nekretnine investiram za cash flow, što znači da svakoga dana primam čekove poštom – pasivne prihode. Investitori u nekretnine koji su investirali za kapitalnu dobit, poznati takođe i kao brzi preprodavci nekretnina – fliperi, spadaju u ljude koji su ozleđeni ovih dana.

Ako ste pogledali kroz do sada objavljena poglavlja novog MMFovog WEO mogli ste primjetiti da se u 4. poglavlju – How Linkages Fuel the Fire: The Transmission of Financial Stress from Advanced to Emerging Economies – prikazuje položaj Hrvatske. Hrvatska je u ‘nezavidnom’ položaj u odnosu na većinu drugih tržišta u razvoju.

Graf ispod prikazuje položaj prema dvije dimenzije: udio obaveza prema stranim bankama i zbroj tekućeg računa i fiskalne ravnoteže (oba su u deficitu u hrvatskoj). (Podaci za razdoblje između 2002-06) Ništa što već ne znamo, ali graf daje lijepu perspektivu. Kao što i novi Bilten HNBa kaže (Okvir 3.) u Hrvatskom vanjskom dugu prevladavaju obveze prema stranim bankama, tj. dominira kreditiranje domaćeg sektora (bankarskog i nebankarskog) od strane inozemnih banaka, što je posebno naglašeno nakon 2002. godine. Ne treba posebno naglastiti da su te strane banke pretežno iz zapadno europskih zemalja. Upravo ta snažna financijska veza sa razvijenim zemljama i posebno bankarska veza, kako kaže WEO, je glavna prijenosnica financijskog stresa i krize na tržišta u nastajanju. “Ekonomije u razvoju (nastajanju) sa višim udjelom stranih obveza prema razvijenim zemljama više su pogođene financijskim stresom u razvijenim zemljama nego zemlje u razvoju koje su manje povezane.”

Iako je trenutna financijska kriza još u tijeku, vidljivo je da je dotok stranog kapitala u zemlje u razvoju već usporio, te, pošto je financijska kriza sa korijenom u bankarskoj krizi razvijenih zemalja i zbog snažne veze između financijskog stresa u razvijenim i zemljama u razvoju, MMF zaključuje da će taj dotok stranog kapitala još snažnije usporiti i što je važnije sporije se oporaviti sljedećih godina. To predviđanje je potkrijepljeno iskustvima Južne Azije nakon Japanske krize.

“Sistemske bankarske krize u razvijenim ekonomija i njihovo dugoročno razriješavanje po svoj prilici će nagovijestiti poduži pad bankovnih dotoka u zemlje u razvoju – posebice u dijelu Europe u nastajanju.”

Rast izravnih plasmana izvana Hrvatskim privatnim poduzećima i rast plasmana domaćih banaka poduzećima je usporio u zadnjem tromjesečju 2008. Domaćim poduzećima je tako plasirano dvostruko manje nego u posljednjem krvartalu 2007. HNB napominje da je iako prema tome izgleda da su strane banke bile nesklone financiranju domaćih poduzeća, a domaće banke su uglavnom financirale javni sektor, potrebno je razumijeti da je i potražnja domaćih poduzeća bila umanjena zbog kontinuirane ekonomske aktivnosti.

Međutim, to može predstavlja potencijalno i malo veći problem. Naizgled, sve bi trebalo biti uredu kada se ekonomska aktivnost (domaća i vanjska potražnja) vratiti u normalu. Poduzeća će skočiti na pojačanu potražnju sa novim investicijama, što znaći da će potraživati kredite od domaćih i ino banaka. Problem sa kojim bi se domaće tvrtke, bilo u potpunosti orijentirane na izvoz ili sa paletom proizvoda koje se lako ‘pretvore’ u izvozni proizvod, mogle suočiti je da i sa povratkom vanjske potražnje ne budu dovoljno konkurentne i profitabilne zbog devalvacija valuta zemalja trgovačkih partnera Hrvatske (uz već poznate faktore slabe konkurentnosti). Znamo da su neke istočno europske zemlje pretrpjele znatne pritiske i deprecijacije svojih valuta. To bi prouzročilo pad profitabilnost u domaćem sektoru razmijenjivih dobara, što bi usporilo investicije i ostavilo zemlju u recesiji ili je možda produbilo ili znatno usporilo oporavak (više izgubljenog outputa, viša nezaposlenost) u odnosu na konkurentnije zemlje u okružju. (Možda se tu krije neka misao ili strijepnja Zdunićeve “ugriza u kiselu jabuku deprecijacije”?)

Prekasno je spriječiti prijenos krize te smanjivanje deficita tekućeg računa i proračuna neće odvratiti prijenos. Pričuve mogu amortizirati pad dotoka kapitala. No, smanjivanje dvostrukih deficita je bitno za pozicioniranje nakon što financijska kriza prođe i dotok kapitala se oporavi. Iako je upitno da li će se i kada (sigurno ne brzo) dotok stranog kapitala vratiti na levele prijašnjih godina, smanjivanje dvostrukog deficita će pomoći uspostavljanju stabilnosti i privlačenju dotoka stranog kapitala. To znači da ‘borba’ za privlačenje stranog kapitala tek slijedi ako je za prosuditi po prognozama i razmišljanjima MMF. Hrvatska ima neke adute koji bi mogli odigrati pozitivnu ulogu, primarno u privatnom bankarskom sektoru, ali ima i otežavajuće faktore.

Za imati na umu je da osim problema financiranja i kratkoročno prevladavanja financijske krize, postoje i dugoročna pitanja za koja se treba pripremiti i na koja će se morati odgovoriti politikom i reformama jednom kada kriza prođe.

Susjedi preko Dunava imaju zanimljiv site i članak/rezime o Hrvatskoj ekonomskoj situaciji. Zanimljivo je da se kod nas potpuno zanemaruje situacija u istočnom susjedstvu, kao da nam je samo EU slamka spasa, iako smo u svi u istoj, nezavidnoj situaciji i iako su nam to najbliži i važnij trgovinski partneri.

Zaista je čudan osećaj koji vam priža mogućnost promene imena analizirane zemlje nekom drugom zemljom iz regiona. Tako i u slučaju Hrvatske, možemo slobodno napisati, čitaj Srbija. Umesto jedne analize dobićemo dve, koje će tačno oslikati tekuće tendencije i probleme u ekonomiji obe zemlje, uz to i mere za njeno izlečenje, a da pri tom ne promenimo niti jedan znak interpunkcije. Isto važi i za BiH, Crnu Goru, Makedoniju. Svima nam je zajedničko da smo živeli na račun inostrane štednje, širili se preko gubera. Vreme je za povratak u prošlost i bolno suočavanje sa realnošću. Vreme je za početak nove, neke druge, tranzicije…

Vezano za naslov gornjeg članka, koliko su nam važna pitanja nacionalnog ponosa i busanje u prsa umjesto zdrave i korisne fiskalne politike pokazao je ministar Kalmeta danas. Po mnogo čemu smo mi više u starom regionalnom mentalitetu prošlosti, a manje u modernom naših zapadnih susjeda kojima toliko težimo.

Bez obzira da li se radi o premjeru ili blogeru (čije izjave su na istoj razini kvalitete kod nas) prije nego dublje i značajnije krenemo u diskusije i izjave o važnim temama poput mirovinskog sustava, valja se dobro informirati. U Hrvatskoj ne fali radova o mirovinskom sustavu, a i strani radovi su iznimno poučni. Kao jedan uvod, ispod je članak iz WSJ koji su napisali nobelovac Gary Becker i Isaac Ehrlich davne 1994. Bez obzira na datum, članak je svijež u svom pogledu i identifikaciji problema mirovinskih sustava kao da je i jučer napisan. Poučci primjera Čilea, Singapura i Hong Konga su zanimljiv, financijska održivost i utjecaji na realnu ekonomiju mirovinskih sustava važni. Obratite pažnju na omjere radnika i umirovljenika. Projekcije koje i danas manje više vrijede su da bi 2020. u Americi omjerio bio oko 3 radnika za svakog umirovljenika, Njemačkoj 3 ili niže, a Japanu čak samo 2. U Hrvatskoj danas, ne u 2020., taj omjer je 1.4!

UPDATE - Donji članak iz WSJ baziran je na nizu radova Prof. Ehrlich-a i njegovih kolega na Sveučilištu Buffalo o mirovinskim sustavima, posljedicama, utjecajima i otvorenim pitanjima. Neke radove o pitanjima mirovinskih sustava možete pronaći na posvećnoj web stranici Prof. Ehrlich-a. Također, molim vas pogledajte njegov komentar na dnu ovog posta gdje ističe još više radova novijeg datuma i njegovu stranicu na RePEc. Gary Becker-a, nadam se, ne treba previše prezentirati, ipak, njegova RePEc stranica je ovdje.

Social security: Foreign lessons

By Gary S. Becker and Isaac Ehrlich

Wall Street Journal – Mar 30, 1994

Social security — once widely regarded as
the diadem of the modern welfare state — has lost much of its glitter
in recent years. This is largely because the systems in the U.S. and
many other Western countries are facing major financial problems — not
this year or in the next few, but sometime early in the next century.

The difficulties are not an inevitable outcome of the basic concept,
but rather of the way it has been implemented. Western countries have
by and large adopted a defined-benefits pay-as-you-go system in which
the benefits to retirees are paid from concurrent contributions by
active workers. Asian countries, by contrast, have relied much less on
such systems.

Hong Kong and Taiwan so
far have had no mandatory pension schemes; South Korea has only
recently introduced a modest one; while Singapore, Malaysia, and 20
other Asian countries have relied mainly on a central provident fund.
This is a fully funded forced-savings plan that ties retirees’ benefits
to their own contributions. These contributions are accumulated in
individualized accounts managed by the government.

Chile and a few other countries have also adopted systems that mandate
contributions to individual accounts. In these retirement protection
systems, private funds compete for the right to manage individual
accounts. Since these systems have the advantage of competition among
private companies, they are superior to government-managed central
provident fund systems, which are in turn much better than
pay-as-you-go systems.

If workers
contribute 10% of their earnings during their working lives, they can
build up a substantial nest egg in a retirement protection system. For
example, a 3% real rate of return on savings for a period of 40 years
will ensure a pension after retirement of almost two-thirds of annual
real earnings for the subsequent 15 years. This 10% contribution is
only two-thirds of the current combined contribution by employers and
employees to Social Security in the U.S.

The government should have the obligation to add to the retirement
incomes of people who have not built up a sufficient fund over their
working lives to stay above the poverty level in retirement. This
obligation to provide a safety net for older people explains why it may
be desirable to mandate worker contributions. A mandate prevents young
people from neglecting to provide for their old age when they can count
on the government to help them out if they lack sufficient savings when
they are old.

Pay-as-you-go systems,
unlike fully funded plans, provide benefits to the elderly that are
tied not strictly to their own lifetime contributions, but mainly to
taxes on younger generations of active workers. These systems depend
critically on the support ratio — the number of people in the prime
labor-force-participation age groups of 20 to 64 available to support
the pensions of those age 65 and over. These support ratios have been
falling throughout the developed world.

In the U.S. the ratio has declined from 7.1 in 1950 to 4.7 in 1990, and
it is expected to drop to 3.3 in the year 2020. In West Germany the
rate is expected to fall to under 3 in 2020, and in Japan it may reach
as low as 2.

The support ratio has
declined partly because adult mortality has fallen, and partly because
birth rates are now very low. The average couple in most rich countries
produces fewer than two children; in Germany, Japan and some others, it
produces only about 1.5 children.

The
aging of the population implies that growing government spending would
be required to finance the cost of any given level of per-capita
benefits to retired people. As a result, higher taxes will have to be
imposed on relatively fewer workers. All the projections suggest that
unless benefit levels are reduced significantly, by the year 2025
government spending on social security will increase greatly as a
fraction of national output in the U.S. and other rich countries. In
the early 1970s it was estimated that a tax rate of 65% on earnings
would be needed in Chile to produce the full menu of mandated benefits
to the elderly. No wonder Chile went on to pioneer the privatization of
a pay-as-you-go system into a retirement protection system.

Quite apart from their financial difficulties, pay-as-you-go systems
also hurt the real economy. The underlying philosophy of these systems
is that society can behave like an extended family in which parents,
children and grandchildren engage in mutually beneficial transfers. But
in a family setting, different generations share in the industriousness
and productivity of one another. Parents’ old-age pleasure and material
comfort are directly linked to the productivity and success of
themselves and their children and grandchildren, while children are
also helped by the parents. A pay-as-you-go system does not have this
linkage.

Parents’ social security
entitlements are largely independent of their own contributions to the
social fund, and they are entirely independent of their children’s
contributions. This encourages families to decrease the support they
provide each other, and rely instead on government aid. It also
encourages reductions in birth rates, since parents become less
dependent on their own children for old-age support. But this decline
in family size puts further strains on the financial health of a
pay-as-you-go system.

Neither the
adverse financial consequences nor the harmful real effects of the
pay-as-you-go system need occur under fully funded schemes. Since
retirement payments are proportional to the worker’s accumulated
contributions, and the accumulated reserves are invested in financial
instruments that tend to yield a competitive rate of return, these
systems do not have the same effect on birth rates and aggregate
economic performance. Trends in fertility and longevity may still
affect market interest rates earned on deposits, but they do not have
other direct effects on fully funded schemes.

To ensure the success of a private system, it is desirable to leave the
business of management to private annuity companies that compete for
customers with their pension products. Governments should monitor the
behavior of these funds and require minimum levels of capital. The main
deficiency of a Singapore-style central provident fund is that the
government becomes a major investor and owner of private equity, since
it manages huge accumulating balances.

The evolution of the Singaporean central provident fund provides an
instructive lesson. The mandated combined contributions of employees
and employers rose to a peak of 50% of earnings in 1984, and are
currently set at the still exorbitant level of 40%. This
government-monopolized system has yielded a real return to workers of
only 2% a year from 1961 to 1992 — much less than what private equity
markets yielded in Singapore or elsewhere in Asia.

With the government running out of profitable investment options, a
partial privatization has already taken place in Singapore. Workers are
allowed to withdraw increasing amounts of their accumulated balances
prior to retirement for housing, education and health outlays, and more
recently also for investment in stocks, bonds and even gold.

A privately managed retirement system may seem wholly impractical and
out of touch with political reality. But this is precisely what Chile
has been doing for 13 years, since people there became fed up with the
public system. Several private funds actively compete in Chile for the
right to manage the savings that workers are required to put aside for
their old age. Government regulations require private management funds
to have minimum capitalization, and they limit investments to
particular categories of securities.

Although expenses were high during the early years in Chile, they have
fallen sharply over time as experience with the system has grown. The
inflation-adjusted annual rate of return on investments from 1981 to
1990 was more than 12%. And the pensions awarded so far under this
system have been generous compared with those offered by the old system.

Gradual Integration

Hong Kong’s 1992 draft proposal to establish a community-wide
retirement protection system is similar in spirit to the Chilean
system, but the government recently turned away from this promising
idea by proposing instead a pay-as-you-go system. Fortunately, mounting
public criticism may still revive the earlier plan. A few other
countries have either introduced a Chilean-style system or are
considering doing so.

Of course, older
workers in the U.S. who have been contributing to the traditional
Social Security system for many years will have to be gradually
integrated into a privatized system. Chile offered older workers the
option of either remaining in the pay-as-you-go system or transferring
into the privatized system and receiving a bond valued in proportion to
their accumulated past contributions. The transition there went
smoothly — perhaps because the bond values were rather generous — and
practically all older workers opted out of the traditional system.

The U.S. has done little to privatize its state enterprises. Its
privatization movement should begin with one of America’s most
significant industries: provision of security for elderly people.

—

Mr. Becker, 1992 Nobel Prize winner in economics, is a professor at the
University of Chicago and a fellow at the Hoover Institution. Mr.
Ehrlich is a professor at the University of Buffalo and visiting
professor at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.

Gore je stara afilijacija iz 1994. Sadašnja afilijacija prof. Ehrlicha je:

Dr. Isaac Ehrlich, SUNY & UB Distinguished Professor
and Chair of Economics, Melvin H. Baker Professor of
American Enterprise, Director, Center of Human Capital,
Editor-in-Chief, Journal of Human Capital,
Research Associate, NBER

Gradonačelnik Kragujevca Veroljub Stevanović, direktor JP”Putevi Srbije” Zoran Drobnjak i direktor JP”Preduzeće za izgradnju grada” Slobodan Krunić potpisali su danas Protokol o udruživanju sredstava  za finansiranje radova na izgradnji i rekonstrukciji saobraćajnica u Kragujevcu u iznosu od 200 miliona dinara.

Protokol vredan 200 miliona dinara

Prema rečima gradonačelnika Veroljuba Stevanovića grad Kragujevac će preko Preduzeća za izgradnju grada uložiti 100 miliona dinara a isto toliko i JP”Putevi Srbije”. Na taj način, kako je naglasio Stevanović biće kompletno rekonstruisana ulica Kralja Milana IV, bivša XVII udarne divizije u dužini od 2,5 km i ulica 9.maja u naselju Beloševac u dužini od 1,5 km a kompletni radovi bi trebalo da budu završeni do 6.maja Dana grada. Gradonačelnik Stevanović je izrazio i zadovoljstvo brzinom kojom se, od dogovora pre dva meseca do danas, stiglo do Protokola i najavio da će sličan Protokol biti potpisan između Grada i ministarstva infrastrukture do kraja februara a koji će podrazumevati ulaganja od po 200 miliona dinara. ”Tih 400 miliona biće utrošeno na rekonstrukciju i izgradnju glavne saobraćajnice u Petrovcu odnosno puta prema Topoli, kružne tokove u Korićanima i drugo”, zaključio je Stevanović.

Direktor JP”Putevi Srbije” Zoran Drobnjak rekao je da zapravo reč o rekonstrukciji dva regionalna putna pravca R212 odnosno izlaza iz Kragujevac ka Gornjem Milanovcu i R102 odnosno izlaza iz grada ka Rekovcu.Drobnjak je najavio i da će JP”Putevi Srbije” i u narednom periodu nastaviti da svoja sredstva ulaže u grad Kragujevac, odnosno rekonstrukciju i izgradnju značajnih putnih pravaca.

Opet, sve najbolje svima, posebice čitaocima bloga, ali ovdje nešto ne štima sa brojkama. Dvorane su uredu.

Prije niti dva tjedna, u jednom od Nedjeljnih Jutarnjih bila je priča o sportskim dvoranam izgrađenim za potrebe rukometnog prvenstva. Zanimljiva tema jer amalgamira više pitanja u jednoj priči – javno privatno partnerstvo, korištenje poreznog novca za izgradnju sportskih kompleksa (uglavnom loša ideja, pogotovo ako je Vladin novac) i naravno medijski uvijek popularno mlaćenje privatnog sektora zbog ostvarene dobiti. Naravno, tako se (in)direktno daje loša glas JPP, ali to je i ovako i onako bio cilj.

No što je posebno zanimljivo je način na koji autori članka analiziraju i predočuju troškove izgradnje dvorana, te izračunavaju dobit koju će privatno sektor ostvariti. Zanemarimo nepotrebno skakanje sa svota u kunama na svote u eurima i onda još 20tak godina unaprijed. Ako to citiranje u jednoj valuti, pa u drugoj čitaocima nešto znači svaka čast. Ja ne znam koliko će €/kn biti za tjedan dana, kamoli u sljedećih 20 godina. Ali dobro, vjerojatno ugovori i krediti imaju nekakve valutne klauzule pa je to i manje bitna točka. Uostalom, valjda će euro biti domaća valuta za 20 godina.

Ona bitnija točka je amatersko izračunavanje troškova izgradnje, održavanja i potom “enormne” zarade privatnih tvrtki koje su uložile u izgradnju sportskih dvorana. Uzmimo u obzir ovaj citat:

Tako će, primjerice, porezne obveznike 28-godišnji zakup zagrebačke Arene stajati 210 milijuna eura. Odnosno, svake će godine Grad Zagreb i Vlada investitoru plaćati 7,5 milijuna eura! Taj isti investitor u gradnju je utrošio 80,3 milijuna eura. Kad se tome doda oko 40.000 eura troškova godišnjeg održavanja, koje je preuzeo investitor, ispada da će na kraju 28-godišnjeg razdoblja Ingra, kao investitor, ukupno utrošiti oko 81,5 milijuna eura, a zaraditi nešto manje od 130 milijuna eura.

Slična je situacija i u Varaždinu. Građevinska tvrtka Max Bogl Tehnobeton u sportski kompleks u Varaždinu uložila je oko 190 milijuna kuna. Grad se pak obvezao da će mjesečno sljedećih 25 godina investitoru uplaćivati 2,8 milijuna kuna, a Grad će zauzvrat snositi troškove održavanja. Grad će tako u navedenom razdoblju uplatiti oko 880 milijuna kuna. Iako mjesečni troškovi održavanja još nisu poznati, jasno je da će velik dio nešto manje od 700 milijuna kuna biti čista zarada investitora. Gradonačelnik Varaždina Ivan Čehok iznimno je ponosan na to rješenje.

Greške u ovom pisanju bi trebao prepoznati svaki student ekonomije druge godine. Jednostavno peku oči. Ne znam da li je cilj ovakvog pompoznog pisanja samo uprti prst sramote u privatnike koji su se usudili zaraditi na štetu poreznik obveznika i u gradske oce koji su “navodno” oštetili buduće generacije nepotrebnim financijskim teretom, uz dozu insinuacija na korupciju. Zanemarimo sve pristranosti medija i pretpostavimo da autorima nije baš to cilj. I da je tome tako, teško je vidjeti kako uz ovakvu naivnu aritmetiku čitatelji neće dobiti baš tu ideju.

Ajmo reći ovako. Uz ovakov računanje, ako se autori slažu, ja ću od njih posuditi 1 000 000 KN, i za “četvrt stoljeća” vratiti im 2 000 000 KN. “Čista” zarada od 1 mil. KN zar ne? Bila bi kad ne bi bilo poreza na dobit koji bi trebali platiti na svoju “čistu” zaradu.

Ali zanemarimo porez na dobit, ionako samo stvara neefikasnosti. Svaki student ekonomije zna da novac ima vremensku vrijednost i da kuna danas nije ekvivalentna kuni za 20 godina. Tretirati ih jednako je elementarna pogreška koju nitko sa bankovnim računom (ili tko igra loto) ne bi trebao raditi.

Prije nego se dotaknemo samih isplata dvorana kroz niz godina, pojednostavimo malo situaciju. Recimo da vam ponudim ugovor koji kaže da ću vam točno za godinu dana isplatiti 1000 KN. Koliko to obećanje (ugovor) vrijedi danas? 1000 kn? Nema smisla platiti 1000 KN danas za obećanje da će te dobiti 1000 KN za godinu dana. Za tih godinu dana čekanja vaših 1000 KN je moglo biti u banci i uz realnu kamatu od 5% zaraditi 50 KN i imali bi ste 1050 KN. (Uvijek koristimo realnu kamatu za računanje. Ali pošto je Rohatinski za kormilom, vaša inflatorna očekivanja su ionako niska.) Znači opet….koliko ste voljni platiti za moj ugovor? Koliko morate izdvojiti danas da bi za godinu dana dobili 1000 KN? Da bi pronašli tu vrijednost, morate pronaći broj koji pomnožen sa 1.05 daje 1000 KN. ( V × 1.05 = 1000 KN)

Malo algebre i imamo da je V = 1000KN / 1.05 = 952.38 KN. Vrijednost V je tkz. sadašnja vrijednost novca ili present value na engleskom, u literaturi uglavnom označena sa PV ili nekim grčkim slovom. To je vrijednost novca koju ste voljni platiti za pravo da za neko vrijeme (u ovom slučaju jednu godinu) imate određenu svotu novca. Primjetite da je vrijednost 1000 KN kojih dobijete u budućnosti manja od vrijednosti 1000 KN danas. Da bi imali 1000 KN za godinu dana, danas morate staviti 952.38 na račun sa realnom kamatom od 5%.

Ok. Što ako ja obećam da će te dobiti 1000 KN tri godine od danas. Opet, morate uzeti u obzir da 1000 KN danas uloženo sa realnom kamatom od 5% za tri godine će vam donjeti 1157.625 KN. Znači sigurno mi nećete platiti 1000 KN danas da bi dobili 1000 KN za tri godine. Platiti će te mi 1000 / (1.05)³ što je cca. 863.837 KN. Tako bi mogli ići dalje i izmišljati razne primjere. Strika Žika vam ostavi ugovor koji kaže da će za točno 20 godina 1 mil. KN sjesti na vaš račun. Ali vama novac treba danas. Za koliko će te prodati taj ugovor kako bi ste novac dobili danas, odmah, a da niste oštećeni?

Možda su dobre duše iz Jutarnjeg spremne platiti taj ugovor za 1 mil. KN, ali ja svakako nisam. Ja sam vam spreman isplatit 376 889.4829 KN i ni lipe više, zato jer sam tih istih 376 889.4829 KN mogao staviti na račun sa realnom kamatom od 5% i za 20 godina imati 1 mil. kuna. A uz veću realnu kamatu od 7% neću vam ni toliko isplatiti. A još pošto ja ne poznajem vašeg striku Žiku, premija za rizika da je ugovor prijevara, ukupna realna kamata se penje na 10%.

Uglavnom, generalni zaključak je da (i bez inflacije) kuna u budućnosti vrijedi manje od kune danas. Da bi pronašli njenu vrijednost danas “umanjiti” ćemo je sa brojem koji ovisi o realnoj kamatnoj stopi i vremenskom razdoblju, i.e. diskontnom stopom. Ako se igrate malo sa gornjim brojkama, konkretnije ako produžite vremenski rok do kad trebate čekati na obećanu svotu od 1000 ili 1 mil. KN manja je sadašnja vrijednost svote. Naravno, zato jer što duže moram čekati na isplatu, manja je njena vrijednost danas.

Razumjevanje sadašnje vrijednosti i ovih mali izračuna vodi nas sada do utvrđivanja greške autora u izračunavanju troškova dvorane i dobiti. Da nastavimo sa našim primjerom, izvođačima radova (investitorima) Vlada i grad Zagreb, grad Varaždin, grad Split, itd. obećali su da će im svake godine (ili svakog mjeseca) biti isplaćena svota od S KN. Znači svota, S0 danas, S1 za jednu godinu , S2 drugu godinu, S3 tri godine od danas … i tako 20, 30 godina. Kako sada vrednovati taj ugovor? Ako bi sada zbrojili sve svote S0 + S1 + S2 + … + S28, došli bi do naivno krivog odgovora. Odgovor je pogrešan jer sadrži pretpostavku da je 1 kuna danas ekvivalentna 1 kuni za 28 godina ili čak duže.

Čisto zbrajanje tih kunskih vrijednosti iz različitih vremenskih razdoblja je doslovce (!) zbrajanje krušaka i jabuka. No naši autori su napravili upravo to. Primjerice za Zagreb, zbrajali su godišnje troškove održavanja od €40 000 koje plaća investitor (€40,000×28= €1,120 mil.) i dodali ih ukupnom trošku izgradnje od €80,3 mil. Na drugoj strani grad i Vlada će isplatiti godišnje €7,5 mil., tj. €210 mil. kroz 28 godina. ( €7.5mil×28= €210 mil) Kad oduzmemo troškove od isplate ispada baš kao što je i napisao da će Ingra kao investitor zaraditi oko €128 mil. iliti “nešto manje od €130 mil.” Ako se ne varam to je dobit od više od 60%, što bi dionicu Ingre trebalo katapultirati….što baš i nije bio slučaj. Slično je i sa Varaždinom. Troškovi i isplate se samo naivno artimetički zbrajaju tokom niza godina i iz toga izvlače zaključci da li je projekt po JPP dobro izveden ili ne. Ako je cilj ocjeniti da li je projekt izgradnja Arene bila dobra upotreba resursa ovo je loš način procjene. Ako je cilj bio ukazati da je JPP loš način izgradnje javnih objekata onda je ovo sasvim prihvatljiva procjena.

Svakako je neispravan način procjene. Ispravan način za izračunavanje je da prije nego što zbrojimo sve godišnje vrijednosti, svaku godišnju isplatu grada i/ili Vlade izvođaču radova pretvorimo u njenu sadašnju vrijednost (PV) i onda ih zbrojimo. Godišnje isplate pretvorimo u sadašnju vrijednost na isti načina kao i u gornjim primjerima – iznos S u bilo kojoj godini “umanjimo” sa diskontnom stopom (1+r)ˆT koja ovisi o realnoj kamati i vremenskom razdoblju (godina T). Tako umjesto samog zbrajanja godišnjih svota zbrajati ćemo njihove sadašnje vrijednosti S/(1+r)ˆT.

S + S/(1+r) + S/(1+r)² + S/(1+r)³ + … + ∑S/(1+r)ˆT

Primjerice 12 godina od danas, grad Zagreb i Vlada bi trebali isplatiti €7,5 mil. za tu godinu, što danas vrijedi €7,5 mil./(1+r)¹². To je znači isti onaj problem kao i sa ugovorm. Koliko ste spremi platiti danas da bi vam 2021 na račun dospijelo €7,5 mil? Ovisno o dugoročnoj kamatnoj stopi i vremenskom razdoblju, sadašnja vrijednost će biti drugačija, ali ako idete izračunavati primjetiti će te, kao što je prije rečeno, da što je duže vremensko razdoblje to je manja sadašnja vrijednost. Primjerice uz realnu dugoročnu kamatu od 8% zadnja isplata 2037. godine danas vrijedi €7,5mil./ (1.08)ˆ28 ili oko €869 352.90.

Kada dodamo te sadašnje vrijednosti svih godišnjih isplata sigurno nećemo završiti sa ukupnom isplatom od €210 mil, već sa daleko manjom vrijednošću koju onda oduzmemo od ukupnog troška izgradnje danas. Uz to, ako postoji određeni rizik da isplata u budućnosti neće biti koliko je obećana i očekivana, sadašnja vrijednost će biti još niža. To je zato jer možemo uskladiti za rizik ili kranji iznos (∑S) ili diskontnu stopu r kojoj dodamo premiju za rizik. Isti izračun vrijedi i za troškove održavanja. €40,000 za 28 godina nije isto što i €40,000 danas.

Ne želim više duljiti ili komplicirati, ali trebalo bi reći da većina investicijskih projekata ne isplaćuje jednu veliku sumu T godina u budućnosti, već isplaćuje tok profita svake godine tokom dužeg vremena. Znači profit neće biti isplaćen za 28 godina, nego tokom 28 godina. Takav projekt su i svaka od ovih rukometnih dvorana. Stoga, čak korisnije za procjenu isplativosti/profitabilnosti nekog investicijskog projekta od forumule za sadašnju vrijednost Sume niz godina od danas (što smo koristili gore) je formula sadašnje vrijednosti Toka Prihoda svake godine od danas u budućnost. Investicijski projekt koji bi svake godine trebao isplatiti neki Tok Prihoda (realni) ima sadašnju vrijednost Tok Prihoda/r. Ta sadašnja vrijednost nam govori koliko novca treba investirati sada sa realnom kamatom r da bi dobili taj Tok Prihoda svake godine.

To je iznimno koristan izračun i procjena projekata ili imovine koja daje prihode svake godine zauvijek. Možda rukometna dvorana neće postojati zauvijek, ali zemlja na kojoj se nalazi hoće i davati će prihode zauvijek. Objekt koji će možda zamjeniti dvoranu jednog dana će isto ostvarivati određeni prihod godišnje.

A izračun sadašnje vrijednosti Toka Prihoda je korisno kao dobra procjena sadašnje vrijednosti Sume prihoda tijekom određenog niza godina (što smo koristili gore). Primjerice za našu Arenu u Zagrebu. Isplata od €7,5 mil. godišnje tokom 28 godina (uz r 9%) ima sadašnju vrijednost od €82,699,349.41. Pretpostavimo da umjesto 28 godina, isplata od €7,5 mil. izvođačima radova traje zauvijek. (Jao pljačke ha?) Pa, jednostavno izračunamo da je sadašnja vrijednost tog toka €7,5mil / 0.09 = €83,333,333.34. Iako je izračun brz i prljav, procjena je razumno blizu točnom odgovoru. Ako bi promjenili kamatnu stopu ili vremensko razdoblje procjena možda ne bi bila toliko precizna, ali treba imati na umu da je sadašnja vrijednost iznosa dobivenih daleko u budućnosti vrlo mala, pa tako ne mjenja odgovor drastično.

Ovo je više za finance guys, ali svi koji makar prate svjetske i domaće financije ili se misle baviti investicijama trebali bi znati tko je Harry Markowitz. Tako, donji članak daje uvod u Markowitza i njegove jednostave ali britke komentare o uzorcima financijske krize. Nobelovac iz ekonomije 1990. i profesor na UCSanDiego, Markowitz je otac teorije portfelja čije se osnovne ideje – investicije koje nemaju međusobnu korelaciju smanjuju rizik, tj. mogu ga svesti na nulu, te je stoga diversifikacija poželjna - danas uzimaju zdravo za gotovo. To nije uvijek bilo tako. (Bold istaknuto je moje.)

Ukratko o njegovom Nobelu.

Još Markowitz komentara o sadašnjoj krizi.

Neki njegovi radovi.

Nasuprot Markowitzu i teoriji portfelja stoji Nasim Taleb. Prije koji dan gostovao je na Bloombergovom popularnom On The Economy talk-show i nazvao teoriju portfelja bedastoćom (što ne iznenađujue) i pozvao na odbacivanje i diskreditiranje investicijskih teorija i metoda Nobelovaca Merton i Scholesa kao i Markowitza, kroz oduzimanje profesorskih pozicija, ne zapošljavanja MBA studenata koji su prošli teoriju portfelja itd… Svakako poslušajte podcast! (mp3) (Bloomberg on the Economy je uostalom obavezno slušanje za sve u ekonomiji i financijama.)

The Father of Portfolio Theory on the Crisis

Harry Markowitz says valuation is the critical step.

In the early 1950s, when young Harry Markowitz was looking for an area of economics to pursue, a chance encounter with a stockbroker in Chicago led him to apply a new logic about risk to what had been an investment industry based on touting individual stocks. He revolutionized the investing world by showing how to create diversified portfolios that reduce risk and maximize return.

Our current credit crisis arose from an imbalance of risk and return in portfolios of mortgage-backed and other debt securities, so it seems timely to ask the father of modern finance what went wrong and what to do about it.

Now 81 and still teaching and advising funds, Mr. Markowitz has good news and bad news. The bad news is that bailouts to restore liquidity aren’t addressing the real problem. The good news is that once we have the information to measure the losses of bad risk-taking, markets will recover.

Mr. Markowitz doesn’t excuse the financial engineers who bundled complex mortgage-based and other securities. They violated the first principle of his portfolio theory. “Diversifying sufficiently among uncorrelated risks can reduce portfolio risk toward zero,” he says in an interview. “But financial engineers should know that’s not true of a portfolio of correlated risks.”

In traditional Markowitz-inspired investing, such as mutual funds and index funds, there is a discipline around variables such as asset classes and models of covariance. In contrast, collateralized mortgage obligations and related securities had no such discipline. These risks sank together. “Selling people what sellers and buyers don’t understand,” he says with understatement, “is not a good thing.“

In a now-famous paper on portfolio selection in the Journal of Finance in 1952, Mr. Markowitz wrote that risks that are not correlated with one another work best, while investments that move together — owning both Ford and GM — are riskier. This idea, which seems obvious now, was so novel then that when Milton Friedman reviewed Mr. Markowitz’s University of Chicago Ph.D. dissertation, he half-joked it couldn’t lead to a degree in economics because the topic was not economics. Mr. Markowitz got the degree and in 1990 shared the Nobel Prize in economics for portfolio theory.

As with all new information tools at our disposal, applying portfolio theory to investing entails its share of trial and error. Mr. Markowitz admits some people might object to asking him how to repair the credit crisis. “You, Harry Markowitz, brought math into the investment process,” he imagines some people thinking. “It is fancy math that brought on this crisis. What makes you think now that you can solve it?”

He draws a line between his portfolio theory and its later misapplication. “Not all financial engineering is always bad,” he says, “but the layers of financially engineered products of recent years, combined with high levels of leverage, have proved to be too much of a good thing.” In contrast, classic investment portfolios such as mutual funds and index funds continue to reduce risk.

In an essay recently posted on the Web site of Index Funds Advisors titled “What to Do About the Financial Transparency Crisis,” Mr. Markowitz calls for urgency in addressing the underlying problem of mismatched securities. So long as there is continued “obscurity of billions of dollars of financial instruments,” we run the risk of Japan-style stagnation. Banks there, with the support of the Ministry of Finance, refused to mark bad debts to market for a decade.

“Just as with all securities, the fundamental exercise of the analysis and understanding of the trade-off between risk and return has no shortcuts,” Mr. Markowitz says. “Arbitrarily assigning expected returns absent an understanding of the risks of the securities is precisely how the economy arrived at this point.”

Mr. Markowitz reckons it could take a year before we have the transparency we need. Assessing the value of mortgage-backed securities requires scrutinizing mortgages down to the level of individual ZIP Codes. “The valuation process will take as long as it takes, but it is the primary step toward effectively utilizing the very controversial bailout and avoiding the structural problem of a stagnant economy.“

How to avoid more such crises? Politicians need to learn a lesson. “If the choice is requiring mortgages for people who don’t qualify or keeping the banking system sound, we should learn to opt for sound banking every time,” he says. Also, since “financial engineers seem to get their necks chopped off periodically,” they shouldn’t get bailed out when it happens.

The father of modern finance knows how badly correlated portfolios create risk instead of controlling risk. Mr. Markowitz deserves a hearing from policy makers for his insistence that they focus on restoring information and transparency to the credit markets, making losses clear and resetting prices accordingly. To put the issue in probability terms, the odds are between very remote and nonexistent that the economy can recover until these basic steps are taken.

Baš kad smo pomislili da smo završili sa nacionalizmom i ušli u 21. globalizirano stoljeće, gdje državne granice i nacionalne barijere padaju, te se cijeli svijet sve više integrira, on nam se vraća. Ovaj put u obliku državnog uplitanja, sa političkim, nacionalnim ciljevima – bilo da su u pitanju internet domene, (Balkanizacija interneta) nacionalizirane naftne kompanije (Petro Nacionalizam) i protjerivanje stranih, Ruske prijetnje oko isporuke plina, rastućoj međunarodnoj važnosti zemalja poput Brazila koje prije nisu mogle ni svoje unutarnje probleme riješiti, više regulacija ili kočenje globalne migracija zbog populizma. Primjerice, da li će Hrvatska otežati imigraciju nužno potrebne radne snage raznih nacionalnosti?

Najveći svjetski investitori nisu više kompanije sa Wall Streeta, već državne investicijske kompanije u JI Aziji i Bliskom Istoku. Upravo su one pumpale novac u Wall Street tokom ove financije krize. Zbog straha od političkih agenda iza tih investicija, Zapad podiže prepreke. WSJ piše o svemu tome na naslovnoj stranici u ponedjeljak. Država se afirmira i vraća u određene domene individua, poslovanja i investicija. Iako se ne radi o klasičnom protekcionizmu više, Thomas Friedmanov “ravni svijet” je sve manje ravan. On vjeruje da se radi samo o epizodi, dok Daniel Yergin vidi kraj lake globalizacije.

Rise of Nationalism Frays Global Ties – Trade, Environment Face New Threats; Balkanized Internet

By BOB DAVIS, April 28, 2008

The world isn’t as flat as it used to be.

During the long march toward globalization, international borders and trade barriers came down. Communism fell. Protectionist walls in Latin America and elsewhere were dismantled. Governments — long prone to meddling in trade — took a back seat to broader market forces.

In a globalization manifesto, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declared that the Internet and other planet-spanning technologies were erasing national boundaries. The world, he said in a 2005 best seller, was flat.

No longer. The global economy appears to be entering an epoch in which governments are reasserting their role in the lives of individuals and businesses. Once again, barriers are rising. Call it the new nationalism.

“The era of easy globalization is certainly over,” says Pulitzer Prize-winning author Daniel Yergin, whose 1998 book, “The Commanding Heights,” detailed the triumph of markets over nations, starting with British deregulation under Margaret Thatcher. “The power of the state is reasserting itself.”

(Ostatak teksta niže)

Just a decade ago, Asia, Latin America and Russia were on financial life support from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. The U.S. was planning yet another round of global trade negotiations. The European Union was writing a constitution to shift power to Brussels from member nations.

Now borrowers shun the IMF and World Bank. Trade talks are shelved. Barriers to foreign investment are rising around the world. State-owned companies are expanding, particularly in oil and gas. Public support of immigration restrictions is growing in countries from the U.S. to India.

The rising influence of governments can be seen in massive state-funded investment pools, many backed by countries that were reeling financially a decade ago. Sovereign wealth funds from Asia and the Middle East are now propping up wobbly financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe, and may hunt next for real-estate bargains. The growth of state power may also serve to make dealing with global climate change — the most borderless of all issues — even more difficult.

Security Concerns

What accounts for governments’ bigger role? The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, refocused the world on security concerns that can be addressed only by national governments. Countries enriched by the commodity boom are increasingly asserting their power, with Venezuela nationalizing oil fields and Russia threatening to cut off natural-gas supplies to Western Europe. A backlash against economic integration has also pressured national governments to retreat from multilateralism: Big pluralities in 21 of 34 nations polled by BBC World Service in December said the “pace of economic globalization” is moving too quickly.

The changes don’t presage an era of full-blown protectionism. The 15 countries that have shared the euro since 1999 will, despite occasional grumbling, continue to do so. Governments continue to obey rulings by the World Trade Organization, even if they must rewrite their own laws to comply. Mr. Friedman, the flat-world theorist, says that the reassertion of state power may turn out to be an “episode” rather than a trend, and that technologies will continue to empower individuals across boundaries.

Even so, there are mounting indications that governments are on the ascendant.

National boundaries are going up even on the Internet, the emblem of the borderless world. The Internet was designed to be beyond the reach of governments, shifting power to individuals or private organizations.

Now, pressured by Russia, China, India and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. company that assigns Internet addresses is working on ways for countries to use characters from their home languages. The familiar .org, .com and country codes in Web addresses will be replaced with their equivalents in Chinese, Hindi and many other languages. While that should help locals navigate the Web, it would also put many sites behind curtains to users from abroad. That would spell the end of the days when anyone with a keyboard that produces Latin letters can see sites in any land — essentially taking the “world wide” out of the World Wide Web.

“We’re facing a step-by-step Balkanization of the global Internet,” says Columbia University law professor Tim Wu. “It’s becoming a series of national networks.”

The rising strength of national governments expresses itself in different ways. For rich countries, it generally means higher taxes and more regulation. In the 30 mostly rich countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, tax revenue as a percentage of the local economy was higher in 2005, the latest year surveyed, than a decade earlier. That’s because of the rising cost to governments of health care and social security.

In the U.S., the severity and scope of the current financial crisis has eroded the case for letting markets operate with ever-lower government guard rails. The current question is not whether regulation will increase, but by how much. All three presidential candidates say they would pass tougher financial-market regulation and would also boost government programs to retrain workers battered by the global economy.

In rich and poor countries alike, immigration has become a powerful political issue, as improved transportation makes it easier for people to move across borders and compete for jobs with locals. There are backlashes against Burmese in India, Haitians throughout the Caribbean, Bolivians in Argentina and Zimbabweans in South Africa. In 44 of 47 countries polled by Pew Research Center last fall, majorities supported further restrictions on immigration.

In poorer countries of Africa and Asia, meanwhile, rising global food prices are prompting governments to erect new export barriers. “There is no place in the world that grows the food we need if we’re forced to import,” says India’s finance minister, P. Chidambaram. “Therefore we have to be nearly self-sufficient in all food items.”

Growing Influence

Capitals that once had little sway on the global scene now have a lot. The influence of Brazil, for example, has grown along with its economy. A week after WTO trade talks collapsed in July 2006, U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab jetted to Brasilia to confer with the country’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, who also handles trade issues.

Mr. Amorim has become an unlikely power broker in the bid to wrap up the negotiations, which began in 2001. The talks broadly involve a prospective deal: The U.S. and Europe would slash agricultural subsidies if developing nations would lower their tariffs for industrial goods and broaden foreign financial firms’ access to their markets.

In the past, developing nations essentially ratified global trade deals negotiated by the U.S. and Europe. But Brazil, India and China are no longer following that script. Mr. Amorim has put together a group of 20 developing nations that want to limit market openings at home while pressing for agricultural liberalization abroad. Their assent is essential to reaching a deal. So far they have withheld it.

“Brazil holds the key to getting this done,” says Ms. Schwab.

‘It Was a Party’

Citizens of poor countries feel exhilarated by their governments’ new power. In Rio de Janeiro, Maria Aparecida Lemos, an AIDS patient who lost her sight, says she “celebrated like it was a party” last year when Brazil’s president voided a Merck & Co. patent on an AIDS drug. A Brazilian company now makes the drug, Efavirenz, for a fraction of what Merck was charging. Under global trade rules, developing countries have the right to override patents in emergencies, but few had done so for fear of retaliation.

Merck says it had already reduced the price of Efavirenz and was willing to cut further, but not enough to satisfy Brasilia. “Brazil may not be the kind of place you want to invest in,” says Jeffrey Sturchio, Merck’s vice president for corporate responsibility. Brazilian officials shrug off such threats, figuring the country’s growing wealth makes it a magnet for investment.

Energy companies have been among the first to feel the new nationalism. Since oil prices started rising in 2004, Russia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have nationalized foreign-owned oil assets, the first big wave of nationalization since the 1970s. After Venezuela’s state-owned oil firm doubled its ownership of heavy-oil projects along the Orinoco River last year, ConocoPhillips pulled out, taking a $4.5 billion charge. Exxon Mobil Corp. left as well, and is suing Venezuela for compensation.

Growing petro-nationalism has prompted Royal Dutch Shell PLC to change the global scenarios its economists create to help the company plot its next moves. In the 1990s, Shell’s scenarios assumed government power was diminishing. The company invested heavily in Russia’s Sakhalin oil fields, assuming it would see minimal interference. But as the Kremlin tightened its grip on the energy sector, Shell was forced to sell half of its stake in the project to Russia’s state-owned OAO Gazprom.

In this decade’s models, governments play a more central role. One of Shell’s two current scenarios envisions that government dominion over resources — nearly 80% of world oil reserves are controlled by state-owned firms — will continue. In the other model, governments are still at the center of decision making but recognize a common interest and agree to address climate change, says Jeremy Bentham, Shell’s vice president for global business environment.

Recognizing the powerful role of state-owned oil companies, Shell is investing heavily in unconventional oil sources, many of which have little prospect of expropriation. It recently announced a $10 billion expansion plan in the tar sands of Canada. It has also increased its focus on biofuels made from, among other things, algae and wood chips.

Pitney Bowes Inc., a postal-machine maker in Stamford, Conn., is also trying to adapt. Over the past decade or so, it had moved a lot of its production to China. It also had outsourced back-office computer operations to India.

But more recently, the company has started worrying about the security of those supply lines. “We’re always concerned that the nationalists there will come and take over” our suppliers in China, says Cynthia Schmitt, the company’s vice president for enterprise risk management.

So over the past three years, the company and its overseas suppliers have begun stockpiling more postage-machine components. Pitney Bowes also began insisting that its vendors in India have backup servers in other countries. So many U.S. companies do business in Bangalore and other Indian cities, Ms. Schmitt fears they could become terrorist targets.

Similar concerns are felt by other big companies. AMR Research Inc., a Boston consulting firm, says it surveyed supply-chain managers at big U.S. firms in March about how they would rank the risks they face doing business globally. About 30% of them rated “country risk” — geopolitical problems or natural disasters — as their most significant.

Some companies are seeking havens closer to home. As some U.S. corporations relocate operations from lower-cost spots in Asia, Mexico — which has a free-trade pact with the U.S. — has seen a surge in foreign investment, up 21% last year to $23.2 billion.

Some of the world’s biggest new investors are government-run investment funds. In the Middle East and Russia, sovereign wealth funds are powered by oil revenue; in Asia, they’re fed by other export earnings. In all, the funds have a total of $3 trillion in revenue and have used the money to buy stakes in Citigroup Inc., Merrill Lynch & Co. and other battered Wall Street firms. While the infusions have been lauded by the U.S. Treasury and capital-short Wall Street firms, they also aroused suspicions here and internationally that the investors could have political agendas.

Now, many national governments are raising barriers against such foreign investment. The U.S., Canada, Germany, France, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Hungary and Greece are proposing or enacting restrictions on investment by state-owned firms from other countries, according to a forthcoming study by the Council of Foreign Relations. China and Russia, which have sovereign wealth funds, are staking out “strategic sectors” where foreign investment would be restricted, say the study’s authors, investment-law specialist David Marchick and Dartmouth economist Matthew Slaughter.

National Muscle-Flexing

Muscle-flexing by national governments has also made it more complicated to tackle global environmental issues. In 1987, governments sent environmental ministers to Montreal to negotiate a global ban on the chlorofluorocarbons blamed for opening an ozone hole over Antarctica. The ministers expected the treaty would be ratified at home and enforced world-wide through trade sanctions. It was.

A decade later, the Kyoto Protocol flopped because the U.S. didn’t sign, and China and India weren’t required to limit emissions. Now, with national governments wary of making commitments, negotiators and think tanks in the U.S. and Europe are grappling with how to persuade states to take strong efforts to curtail greenhouse-gas emissions. One possibility: encourage governments to take specific actions to cut emissions now, and hold off on a treaty until states are more confident that their rivals are taking global warming seriously.

New nationalism could play out over a lengthy span, says Michael Klein, chief economist at the World Bank’s private-sector arm, the International Finance Corp. “Disparate national interests may pull [countries] in different directions and render global actions more difficult,” Mr. Klein says. “We’re in for several decades of these centrifugal forces.”

I dok u Hrvatskoj glavnu riječ u društveno političkom životu ima nova koalicija, raspodijela fotelja i tko će navući veću vreću iz proračuna, u ostatku normalnog svijeta glavnu riječ ipak vodi ekonomska politika sa ciljem veće ekonomskog rasta. Kod nas se još ne govori o podizanju poreza, ali nema ni govora ni o bilo kojem snižavanju stopa. Naravno ne može ni biti kada se sada nakon koaliranja gleda kako povećati stavke u proračunu zbog političkih razloga. Upravo suprotno od onoga što bi trebalo kako bi se mogli smanjiti i pojednostaviti porezi za/na građane i poduzetnike. Ako vam je promaklo, Bugarska je od 1. Siječnja zamjenila progresivni porez sa tri stope i uvela flat-tax od 10% – najniža u Europi i vjerojatno najniža u svijetu. Nova Poljska Vlada je isto najavila snižavanje poreznih stopa.

11 zemalja istočne Europe je do sada uvelo flat-tax (proporcionalni porez). Zemlje Zapadne Europe, koje su se u početku bunile zbog “nepoštene” porezne konkurencije novih članica, sada same režu poreze zbog povećane konkurencije iz Istočne Europe gdje se režu porezi kako si bi privukle investicije, olakšala ponuda i jednostavno stvorilo konkurentniju, zdraviju, ekonomiju. Jedna od razloga za uvođenje flat-tax u Bugarskoj je zbog smanjenja udjela sive ekonomije. Socijalisti u Španjolskoj obećavaju ukidanje poreza na bogatstvo jer je jedno od najviših u Europi i jer “kažnjava štednju.” Kod nas se smanjivanje poreznih stopa koristi samo kao jeftini izborni slogani, ne misli se ozbiljno o tome. Hrvatskoj nije nužno potreban flat-tax, iako uvođenje bi imalo neke benefite, jer problem, za sada, nije na prihodovnoj strani, već rashodovnoj. No Hrvatskoj jest potrebno smanjenje određenih poreza i rasterećenja ekonomije od rentijerskih skupina zbog kojih porezi jesu visoki. Da ne duljim….

A Supply-Side World

January 7, 2008 Page A12

Democrats in Congress remain committed to raising taxes on grounds that tax rates don’t much matter to economic growth, and in any case they only help the rich. They may be the last public officials on the planet to believe this. In recent weeks alone, some of the unlikeliest political leaders have endorsed tax rate cuts in the name of making their economies better.

Start in Europe, where Socialist Party Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero pledged in December that if re-elected, “One of the first decisions I would take is to eliminate the wealth tax [up to 2.5%],” which he says is one of the highest in Europe and “punishes savings.” Mr. Zapatero is no conservative. But he’s joining the European march down the Laffer Curve on taxes, having already phased in reductions in Spain’s corporate tax rate to 30% from 35% and its personal income tax rate to 43% from 45%.

Like France and Germany, Spain is cutting rates because of the tax competition from their European Union neighbors such as Ireland and East Europe. There are now at least 11 nations formerly behind the Iron Curtain with flat rate taxes of 25% or lower. On January 1, a new flat tax of 10% became law in Bulgaria, replacing its progressive rate structure and as far as we know the lowest such rate in the world. The newly elected Polish parliament is also planning to cut taxes, though an earlier flat-tax proposal earned a veto threat from the president.

And this just in: In the Middle East, Kuwait has decided to slash its corporate income tax on foreign companies to 15% from 55%. Finance Minister Mostafa al-Shemali argued for the cut, noting that Kuwait attracted less than $300 million in foreign investment last year, compared to some $18 billion in lower-tax Saudi Arabia (which has a religious tax but no corporate or income tax on Saudi nationals). “This law will encourage foreign investors to enter Kuwait,” says Ahmed Baqer, head of the parliament’s finance panel.

It’s getting lonelier all the time at the top for America, which with a corporate tax rate of 35% is one of the few developed nations left with a rate of more than 30%. Economist Dan Mitchell tracks these trends for the Cato Institute, and he finds that 26 developed nations have cut either personal or corporate income tax rates since 2005. Since 1980, OECD nations have sliced their average personal income tax rate by 24 percentage points, to 40% from 64%. Corporate tax rates have fallen by more than 20 percentage points. Foreign leaders have learned that, in a world of easy global capital flows, high tax rates chase away investment and entrepreneurs.

Some of these tax-cutting nations — such as Estonia, Ireland, Russia and Spain — have seen revenues rise even as rates have fallen. This is what turns socialists into supply-siders in Spain, if regrettably not in the U.S.

URL for this article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119966577645371099.html

Copyright 2008 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved

Osim što ne smatram Hrvatsku balkanskom zemljom i takvo brandiranje mi se ne sviđa, ovo je odličan članak u novom BusinessWeek magazinu o investiranju u JI Europi. Manje se govori o Hrvatskoj, no u usporedbi sa ostatkom regije mi smo najbolja destinacija za investiranje. Eh, ali lako je biti najprivlačniji u konkurenciji sa nestabilnom Srbijom (čitaj Kosovo) i Bosnom, uz siromašnu Albaniju. Hrvatska je još prije 7 godina imala čistu peticu za političku stabilnost, kao što svjedoči ovaj članak iz BusinessWeek 2000. godine. Onda smo dobili 3 za ekonomske reforme. Koju ocijenu dobivamo danas … više od 7 godina poslje? Da li su mnogi problemi ostali? Kad će Jadransko čudo?

Baš sam zauzet ovih dana (gotovo cijeli Ponedjeljak primjerice nisam ni bio pred kompjuterom) tako da blog malo pati nažalost. No da ne mislite da sam napustio blogosferu, evo par članaka koju su mi “zapeli zaoko.” Novi Lider je izašao danas, no svakako pročitajte članak Borisa Vujčića, viceguvernera HNBa u zadnjem broju. Osim što nas je ukratko informirao o ovogodišnjem sastanku MMFa i Svjetske Banke, Vujčić se dotaknu i “famoznog” MMFovog radnog papira o rizicima u zemljama JIE. Ukazuje da se nigdje ne spominje Hrvatski tečaj zasebno ili nekakvi zahtjevi MMFa da Hrvatska mora promjeniti tečajnu politiku (što možete i sami provjeriti jer je radni dokument dostupan na stranicama MMFa), kao što su bili naslovi u domaćim novinama. Takvih preporuka nema. U Hrvatskoj nije na pomolu financijska kriza.

U jednom djelu Vujčić kaže,

“…Hrvatska se poimence spominje samo u kontekstu ocjene MMF-a da se u uvjetima politike stabilnog tečaja, ograničavanje snažne domaće potražnje, koja povećava vulnerabilnost ekonomije, ponajprije treba oslanjati na restriktivnu fiskalnu politiku. To, međutim, piše i u svakom naprednijem udžbeniku makroekonomije..”

Rad, kao što sam ja i pisao prije, i kaže da je kontrola (smanjenje) fiskalnih rashoda glavni instrument obrane. Ne moramo čak ni ići u napredne makro knjige, za koje javnost nema interesa. Pogledajmo što Alan Greenspan kaže u svojim memoarima u vezi Argentine, s kojom se Hrvatska stalno uspoređuje iako ne pretjerano opravdano, i neke stvari će nam biti jasnije.

“Cavallovi pogledi na reforme (Domingo Cavallo je bio Argentinski Ministar Ekonomije) su mi zvučali mnogo razboritije nego neinformirana retorika koja je dolazila u to vrijeme od mnogih Argentinskih zakonodavaca i provincijalnih guvernera. Njihovi pogledi su podsjećali na fiskalnu neodogovornost ranijih desetljeća. Sjećam se da sam gledao u Cavalla preko stola na jednom od G20 sastanaka i pitao se da li je on svjestan da će backstop posuđivanja prema pesu ostati izvor podrške samo ako se ne koristi pretjerano. Održavanje velikog buffera dolara bi vjerojatno omogućilo održavanje fiksnog valutnog tečaja u nedogled. Ali, politički sistem Argentine nije mogao odoljeti korištenju izobilja naizgled besplatnih dolara u pokušaju akomoditacije biračkih zahtjeva. Postepeno ali neumorno, kapacitet posuđivanja u dolaru je iscrpljen.”

Hrvatska nema fiksni tečaj, ali opasnosti populističkih politika koje bi neizbježno bile fiskalno lakomislene ipak postoji. Gosp. Vujčić kaže da je vidio dotični rad i prije njegovog objavljivanja i kako za HNB ne piše ništa novog što se već ne zna. Nema novoga ni što se tiče javnosti, ako sa pažnjom pratite što se događa. Interpretacije rada u domećem tisku su proizašle iz novinarskih olovaka, ne stručnih radova i modeliranja. To dakako ne znači da nema problema i mjesta za unaprjeđenje ekonomskog zdravlja zemlje. HNB, kao primarius, već dugo poduzima mjere usporavanja vanjskog zaduživanja. To ste mogli i pročitati u Ponedjeljak u PD. Nove mjere HNBa koje će utjecati na ponudu kredita će detaljnije tek biti predstavljene, no ideja je sljedeća:

“Kako su banke dosad prednost u kreditiranju davale građanima nauštrb malih poduzeća, HNB-ova revizija mjera vodit će se ekonomskom logikom koja bi trebala utjecati na te preferencije. Dakle, valja očekivati određeni troškovni udar na kredite stanovništvu kojim bi se oni učinili manje profitabilnima, a to znači i svojevrsni poticaj kreditiranju poduzetništva.”

Nove bi mjere pogodovale i malim domaćim bankama koje nemaju velike inozemne izvore prihoda. Pošto uvijek postoji neki trošak, mjere će netkome stati na žulj, biti korisne u jednom pogledu a nekorisne u drugom. No postepeno smanjenje kreditiranja građana, tako da postane manje profitabilno, a povećanje domaćih poduzetnika u kreditiranju bi zapravo značilo kreditiranje investicija. No koliko će ta zamjena u ponudi kredita biti uspiješna, tj. do kolikog će selektivnog kreditiranje doći, ovisi i o poduzetničkoj klimi u zemlji. Bankama se ipak ne mogu ruke usmjeriti na arbitralan način. Tu opet dolazimo do teme koliko smo slobodni za pokretanje, razvoj, biznisa i natjecanje na tržištu da bi poduzetnici bili uspiješnijii i zašto nismo više. 

Današnji članak o Applied Ceramics, businessu u Hrvatskoj i općenito žalosnoj investicijskoj klimi u Hrvatskoj iz WSJ. Čisti primjer katastrofe za svih od filozofije glomazne države i političke ljenosti. Nisam ni znao do sada da se Applied Ceramics nije kvalificirao kao “greenfield” investicija. I onda se pitamo zašto ne proizvodimo više, di je taj pravi FDI, zašto nismo više konkurenti, zašto nam strani investitori ne dolaze onako kako bi Mesić htio. Sertić je car.

(Ja sam boldao najupečatljvije rečenice)

By KYLE WINGFIELD
October 25, 2007

SISAK, Croatia — The first thing you notice after passing the gate to the old iron works and the oak trees filled with shrapnel, but before you reach the shiny new machines for polishing silicon wafers, is the sign — brightly painted, low to the ground and slightly trapezoidal, straight out of Office Park, U.S.A. It represents the fresh face that Matt Sertic is trying to put on his depressed hometown, and Croatian business generally.

Two decades ago, Mr. Sertic left his job at these iron works to find success in Silicon Valley. Now he owns the communist-era building where he once worked and is equipping it to make various products for the semiconductor industry.

You might think that Croatian officials, facing 14% unemployment and mindful of the need for foreign investment, would move mountains to smooth the way for this local boy made good. Heavily shelled during the 1991-95 war with Serbia, Sisak is particularly desperate for jobs so that residents don’t have to commute — or move — to the capital, Zagreb, about 35 miles away.

If only. Mr. Sertic had to jump through more hoops than he cares to recount to open this week the Croatian division of his company, Applied Ceramics.

“You have to somehow see that people are not mean. This is just the way systems run, how they live here,” says Mr. Sertic, the president of the privately held firm out of Fremont, California, a supplier to Intel, Sony and Motorola, among others. The company has put $12 million into the Croatian venture, which employs about 100 people.

“You cannot be called, for example, ‘Applied Ceramics Croatia,’” he begins. “Why not? Well, someone might think that you are a state-owned company.” Another picayune trouble arose over naming the street out front — a public road that apparently existed without a name for decades — so that he could put an address on business cards and begin to advertise. “Everything [has] to run through official bodies, and so there are always a lot of people involved and with a lot of people nothing gets decided and nothing gets done, and everything turns political. Even the name of the street.“

Registering the business was more of an ordeal. First, the original California business-registration paperwork for the company was deemed too old. Then the Croatian authorities wanted the company’s current financial statements to magically be included in those same founding documents, which are now 13 years old. “So it took three months until some judge went on vacation, and another judge came and says, ‘All right,’” Mr. Sertic says with a weary chuckle.

To close on the purchase of a building and land, located on a larger industrial park, took over a year. In between the time Mr. Sertic thought he had a deal with the president of the iron works until he was able to move in this past March, he was forced to go through three separate public bids for the property. It took three months to get the supervisory board of the iron works to sign off on the sale, and even longer for them to vacate the place.

Then there were the taxes. Applied Ceramics received government approval to import new, American-made machines without paying the normal 22% tariff. Well, without paying it permanently, anyway. “You have to pay it, even though they return it back to you,” Mr. Sertic says. “So then you have to submit all these documents, and then they return the tax to you in two months.…If you don’t have additional money, then you just wait for this money to use it for the next import.

“So if next month comes another container of equipment, you have to pay again. You cannot tell them, ‘Look, you owe me one million, and here is coming another million, let’s split it, right?’ No way! You have to pay again. And so that’s how the state constantly works with your money, and basically my view is it stimulates you not to do anything,” he laughs again. Many small-business owners in Croatia choose to forgo the tax refund rather than deal with the bureaucracy and risk a visit from the state’s financial police.

Did he ever think about giving up? “Several times I came to the point that something seems it cannot be done,” Mr. Sertic says. “And then I would stop calling or pushing. And then I would find out that, two months later, things get done by themselves.”

He had decided to try the European expansion only after talking with a professor in Sisak whose students were training as machinists, chemists and metallurgical engineers. “Then he says, ‘You know, their best bet is they can be waiters in hotels or in restaurants,’” supporting Croatia’s main growth industry, tourism. “And that looked to me like a huge pity and a waste of talent.” With the professor’s help, he identified 19 young people who went to Fremont for six to eight months of training. They now form the core of Applied Ceramics’ Croatian team.

Eventually Mr. Sertic made it to Tuesday, when dozens of dignitaries, including President Stjepan Mesic, attended a grand-opening ceremony. “What Croatia needs is greenfield investment. We want investment in production for exports,” Mr. Mesic told me through an interpreter after the festivities.

Perhaps the president isn’t aware that, in his country, state incentives for such investments are, like the names of streets, subject to the interpretation of local officials. Applied Ceramics didn’t qualify for “greenfield investor” incentives, even though it represents an entirely new industry for the country, because it renovated an existing building rather than constructing a new one.

* * *

Mr. Sertic’s story, so far, has a happy ending. Many don’t. Lawyers and bankers in Zagreb say corruption in the country’s judiciary, particularly when it comes to registering property deeds, is pervasive. The Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation’s 2007 Index of Economic Freedom ranked Croatia only 30% free when it comes to property rights, 34% free from corruption, and 50% free for foreign investors. All three scores are below the world averages in those categories, and Croatia’s overall score of 55.3% free places it well below neighbors Slovenia (63.6%) and Hungary (66.2%).

“We have lost on a fairly steady basis good [foreign investors] who come in, try, can’t do it and get out,” says Mark Gero, a past president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Croatia who has tried since 2000, unsuccessfully so far, to set up a waste-management business.

In the past, Mr. Gero says, “it was who you know here, and the deals that can be done through the people you know.” Pressure from foreign investors working inside Croatia, as well as from outside forces such as the European Union, which Croatia aspires to join, has helped to level the playing field only slowly.

For his part, Mr. Sertic says he “never came to be in the situation that I had to grease up anybody with money or promises or anything like that.” But he’s aware that his new venture will be viewed as a barometer for how much has really changed. “Croatia got liberated in 1991, and then during this first decade, many Croatian Diaspora people returned to Croatia to start something, to invest somewhere, and some of them succeeded, but I would say especially small ones did not,” he says.

“So I would say in Silicon Valley there are several Croatian-owned companies that are now looking: Will I survive or not?” He laughs again. “Then they will decide that maybe they can go too.”

–Mr. Wingfield edits the Business Europe column.

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Kratka nota. Početkom Lipnja sam pisao o Martini Dalić i njenom komentiranju o “puštanju stranih investitora” da odu gdje hoće van Hrvatske. (Glupo Shvaćanje Liberalizma) Pri kraju teksta sam dao jedan primjer o poteškoćama s kojima se susreću strani investitori/poduzetnici u Hrvatskoj. Rekao sam:

Tipičan primjer problema sa investiranjem u Hrvatskoj je Američki Hrvat Matt Sertić koji je prisustvovao na konferenciji. Matt je predsjednik i direktor Applied Ceramics Inc. kompanije u Kaliforniji i jedan od donora Adriatic Institutu. Govorio je malo o svom projektu i problemima na koje nailazi o otvaranju high-tech pogona u Hrvatskoj te obajsnio da je njegova investicija primarno zbog emocija i ljubavi prema domovini. “Američki Hrvati uglavnom ne ulažu u Hrvatsku sa svojim glavama, već sa srcem.” To su naši “strani” investitori koji unatoč problemima ulažu u Hrvatskoj.

Za vrijeme konferencije sponzorirane od strane Adriatic Instituta, Sertić nije otkrivao previše detalja oko svog poslovanja u Hrvatskoj, ni gdje ni kada.

No, danas se otvara njegov visokotehnološki pogon u Sisku vrijednosti oko $12 milijuna, a na svečanosti bi trebao sudjelovati i Predsjednik Mesić. Na službenim stranicama Applied Ceramics Inc. objašnjeno je da je Sisak izabran kao idealna lokacija za realizaciju naših poslovnih ciljeva u potpori našem europoskom tržištu. Nadalje, ovakvo širenje omogućava Applied Ceramics-u tržišno vodstvo sa značajnom troškovnom prednošću i dostupnosti alternativa u opskrbljivanju svjetskog tržišta poluvodiča. Još na KapitalPlus i business.hr