This morning didn’t start out so… well.

With four hours of sleep and a raging red eye from sleeping in contacts slash leftover mascara from the epic California trip… I made the commute to rescue a dog. My dog, Scout, had been in boarding – Benny’s Dog Resort – for five solid days. After an early morning transfer across North Dallas, the work week starts and I discover (really just came to terms with as I knew the news before the epicness) my car insurance has been canceled. DUH DUH DUH.

“Irresponsibility is not a good trait missy!” – one of the overly supportive messages of text I received today after explaining my plight. Seven hundred plus dollars later… I’m insured and ramen is my new favorite entree.

Midday? Still downhill. I’ve gotten to the point where coworkers are starting to worry for my eye. So, executive decision maker that I am, I go home, swish swash that contact bugger, make an appointment for Lenscrafters on Thursday and head back to the 17th floor for uber productiveness.

Where does it turn around you ponder? Approximately 3p CST… confirmation that I will be attending our first conference of the year in Cancun, Mexico. Yes, it’s great, Cancun! But better? They’re enlisting me with a grande amount of responsibility and I’m more excited to prove myself then tan while boozing. Seriously. I am.

Quick dip into the mundane after work, a mild jog with the Scouters in preparation of our future visitor…

GRAHAM

Graham, formerly known as Gambler, comes to visit the good ole #333 (it’s officially home now because I’ve signed another lease) from August Dog Rescue. Perhaps his serendipitous arrival should be saved for another post, but today, while starting in utter insanity may have ended up to be one of the most splendiferous, karma-terrific, fuzzy feelings days.

“The question is not, can they reason? Nor, can they talk? But rather, can they suffer?” – Jeremy Bentham

K

Lets begin at the end Whats in a name? well quite a lot actually.

Well we have a trinity of characters with two of them appearing to resemble the same body. Jeremy Bentham(1748-1832)

the man who was so philosophical about the ideals of pleasure and pain (AKA john Locke when we see him on what is refered to as the island) and lived his life as a reformist and a believer in utilitarianism.

One of the quotes he was best known for was “The greatest happiness of the greatest number”

I think we see some elements of pleasure and pain in John Locke’s life as the named Jeremy Bentham though maybe with

a lot more pain than pleasure.

Then we come to John Locke(1632-1704) and his theorem of mind which I guess is why he was adorned as a great man

I cannot say I can agree and all his views but when I look at the times he lived in certain things that

were accepted then are not so acceptable in today’s society. On this level he did not have the same

ideals as Jeremy Bentham.

John Locke is said to have influenced Voltaire,Hume and Rousseau with his views on the self and consciousness with the writing of one of his more famous essays An Essay Concerning Human Understanding which portrayed the mind at birth as a Tabula Rasa .

From the Tabula Rasa things are then shaped by events and experiences Though I am not sure that is quite

what I see happening within Lost. when he is reborn after the incident I cannot tell whether the information

he gains are remnants of past memories or a trail of information purposely placed: put there to keep him on the right path.

Less we forget Christian Shephard has already succeeded in what we also see John Locke to do.

Some have ascribed him as the philosopher of freedom, what we see at the end of the 5th series of Lost is John Locke

free the others from leadership of Jacob but in doing so is he offering freedom or just a different kind of leadership.

Then we come to Christian Shephard Though this is not the name I know him by in philosophy. If this man is not Christian then

in my eyes he should be. He is known as the father of philosophy Rene Descartes(1596-1650) and as I saw him rise from the waters of the ocean

in season 1 he appeared to be a great father though his life off the island of letting alcohol get the better of him

depicts him as a man who knows too much of future and past events and wants to just forget it all through the liquor

of the bottle.

He was also a mathematician and scientist and played his part in the scientific revolution

Best known for his quote “Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am)

I have only tickled the surface of these great men and this is a good demonstration of the richness of Lost

you may think these names are just chosen by coincidence but do not mistake coincidence for the purposeful

movement of the hidden hand of the puppet master,

and so i shall end this blog as I began whats in a name? well quite a lot actually.

La realidad y sus cambios, el “ser” y el “no ser” filosóficos, a veces dan oportunidades a la filosofía de demostrar su verdadero valor. El caso del pesquero Alakrana es un ejemplo palmario de esto:

• los kantianos, que quisieran que cada comportamiento fuera norma universal y ésta fuera el patrón de todas y cada una las decisiones, reconocen cariacontecidos que debe primar el Estado de Derecho (un derecho más, el del Estado, que contrasta con el de los mares) sobre el gran Derecho, el de la Vida y su preservación.

• Los benthamistas, los utilitaristas, y aún más, los seguidores del padre de la filosofía de la Libertad, John Stuart Mill, pensamos siempre en ese principio que no falla, que estará bien aquello que dé mayor felicidad a mayor número de personas, y mal lo que dé mayor dolor a un mayor número de personas.

Los posibilistas buscan conjugar ambas cosas.

Los sofistas se preguntan por qué trajeron a España a los piratas.

Los socráticos les responden que por fidelidad a la ley, que no a la justicia.

Y Nietzsche abogaría por ser más personas y abolir a tantos ídolos con pies de barro, por convertir al camello en león, y al león en niño. Por liberar a nuestros compatriotas.

En cualquier caso, apasionante dilema, con el contrapunto trágico del dolor de las familias. Un dilema ético, y también un dilema de gestión, de desmanagement puro, pues todas las opciones tienen un lado malo, y de management de calidad, pues todas las opciones tienen un lado bueno y mucha repercusión. Quizá haga falta un poquito de filosofía del management para sacar del atolladero a los que hayan de tomar la mejor decisión.

 Yasin Yılmaz, İstanbul Üniversitesi,Cerrahpaşa Tıp Fakültesi, İngilizce Tıp Bölümü 4. Sınıf

 İnsan, tarihi boyunca otoriterlik arayışı içinde bulunmuştur. Bu arayış içinde varoluşu, ölümü, düşünmesi, sorgulaması daha doğrusu neden-sonuç ilişkisine ait gözlemlerini soru-cevap şeklinde belirtmesi, gelecek nesillere bırakacağı temel birikimleri oluşturma şansı vermiştir ona. Bu idea, kavramlar ve düşünceler dünyasında, kendi bilgisiyle kurduğu benzer vasıflara sahip, aynı merkez etrafında daireler çizen alanlar, birbirini karşılıklı etkilemiş ve birbirinin gelişimsel sürecinde ince ve sadece dikkatli bir gözlemle fark edilebilecek haleler oluşturmuştur; tıpkı suya eş zamanlı düşen yağmur damlaları gibi.

Tıp, felsefe ve edebiyat.  İşte aynı merkezden çıkan ve yeri geldiğinde aynı doğrultulara sahip olabilen üç temel alan. Tamamen insan ve insan yaşamının sahip olduğu değerleri konu alan tıbbın yanında felsefe, insan yaşamının varoluşsal ve bilgisel boyutu ile var olduğu evrendeki konumu ele alması nedeniyle tıbbın insan yaşamı boyutuna bir “ön bakış” katar. İnsanın daha çok toplumsal boyutunu ve toplumsal değerlerini ele alıp, toplum-insan sentezini yoğuran edebiyat ise, tıbbın içinde bulunduğu toplum tarafından benimsenmesinde önemli roller üstlenmiştir. İnsanlar arası iletişimde karşısındakinin duygu, düşünce ve acısını anlayabilme kimliğine erişme sürecinde tıpta duyarlılığı vurgulamıştır edebiyat. Her an etkilenen varlık olma konumunda insan, tıbbi alandan etkilenirken, doğal olarak ki sahip olduğu değerlerden sıyrılamaz ve duygusal-düşünsel bir etkinliğin içinde bulur kendisini.

 Tıp ile felsefenin en samimi olduğu ve birbirlerinin etkinlik alanlarında en çok boy gösterdikleri dönem Yunan uygarlığı dönemidir. Bu dönemde aort artere ismini veren Aristoteles gibi ünlü filozoflar yaşamıştır [1]. Hipokrat’la gelişen nedenleri mistifiye etme anlayışını terk etme, yerini modern tıbbın temeli sayılacak “doğal sebepler, doğal sonuçları doğurur” ilkesine bırakmıştır ki bu ilke aslında rasyonel düşünme felsefesinin tomurcuklanan özünü oluşturur. ”Kazanılan birikimler ile yetilerin sonraki kuşaklara aktarılma kararlılığı ve usta-çırak ilişkisindeki sanatsal haz”, aslında edebiyatın o dönemde tıp ile yakın bir ilişki kurduğunu gösterir bize [2]. Sadece batıda değil aynı zamanda doğuda da kendini filozoflarla gösteren tıp (İbn-i Sina, İbn-i Rüşd, Razi), bilimin eşzamanlı olarak tüm dünyada felsefe ve edebiyatla beraber geliştiğini belirtmede yeterli delillere sahiptir o zamanlardan.

Nitekim semantik bir inceleme yapıldığında, doğuda kullanılan hekim ve hâkim kelimeri aynı kavramlar üzerinden doğmuştur. Hâkim;  çok bilgili, feylesof ve hekim demektir ve hekim sözcüğü hâkim sözcüğünün inceltilmiş haldeki telaffuzudur [1]. Anlaşıldığı üzere filozof ve hekim, doğuda hemen hemen aynı ilime ve tecrübeye sahip birey konumundadır.

 Ünlü filozof ve hekim Galenos,  felsefe okuduktan sonra tıp tahsil etmiştir. Sinir sistemi ve kalple ilgili hayvanlar üzerinde diseksiyon yaparak anatomide önemli buluşlar gerçekleştirmiştir. Kendisinden yedi yüzyıl önce yaşayan ünlü filozof Pithagoras ekolüne mensup olup, yine tıbbi bilgisinin temelinde Pithagorasçıların kurduğu Sicilya Tıp Okulu’nun görüşleri yer alır. Bu okulun felsefesi, denge yani adaletin kurulması ilkesine dayanır ki, hastalığı da bu dengenin bozulmasına bağlar. Pithagorasçıların varlığın tözü saydığı “kutsal dört” ideasınca “tabiatın dört kökünü” dengeyle sağlamaya çalışırlar ve sonuçta “dört hılt (kan, balgam, kara safra, sarı safra)” ve “ dört mizaç (demevi, lenfavi, safravi, asabi)” oluşur. Bu dört hılt ve dört mizaç günümüzde psikolojide kullanılan beden yapısı ve karakter arasındaki görüşün temelini oluşturur [3].

 Batıda gelişmeler farklı bir atmosfer içinde olmaktadır. Tıbbın konvansiyonel mistik görünümünden ve kilisenin baskısından kurtulması için çalışmalar yapan Bologna Öğrenci Derneği Locası, MS 1000 yıllarında İtalya’da öğrencilerin daha düzenli ve topluca ders alabilecekleri ve bu derslerde öğrenilen bilgiyi gelecek nesillere aktarabilecekleri amacıyla “üniversitas” mantığının temeli sayılacak mekânlar inşa ettiler. Ve bu çalışmaları 1224 yılında kurulan Salerno Üniversite’si ile resmiliğe kavuştu, o günden itibaren batıda hastalık hakkında felsefi düşünce üreten kimseye “doktor” ünvanı verildi [1]. Böylece hem doğuda hem batıda tıp ve felsefe ortak bir zemin üzerinde toplumsal hayatta boy göstermiştir. “Evrenkent”te sistematikleşmeye başlayan tıbbi bilginin, üzerinde durduğu önemli noktalardan birisi de “anamnez”dir, yani öykü; hastalığın tıbbi öyküsü. Bu tıbbi öyküde hekim, hastanın hastalığına dair gözlemlerinden elde ettiği bilgilere hayal gücü katarak teşhis yolunda önemi bir adım atar. Bu adımda edebiyatın “insan-insan” ilişkisini örnek alarak, karşılıklı bir etkileşim alanına girer. Ve böylece “Önce teşhis, sonra tedavi”  (İbn-i Sina) ilkesi gereğince, edebiyattan aldığı hazzı ve estetiği bir sonraki amacına, yani tedaviye ulaşmak için kullanmış olur.

Evrenkentte bir sisteme giren tıp bilgisi meyvelerini yeni buluşlarla vermeye başlamıştır. 1300 yıllara doğru İtalya’da okumak için gözlük camları yapılmıştır[4]. Fakat toplumsal hayat istenildiği gibi gitmemektedir. Kilisenin her alana hâkim olma ısrarı, bilim yapmak isteyenleri kilisenin elinin uzanamadığı veya uzanıp da etkisiz kaldığı kente, İtalya’ya sürüklemiştir. Zira insan vücudu dokunulmazlık ve kutsallık taşımaktadır o zamandaki genel kabüle göre. Diseksiyon olarak sadece idam cezasına çarptırılan insanların bedenlerinde halka açık meydanlarda toplum üzerinde korku yaratmak amacıyla teşrihler yapılırdı [5]. Bu toplumsal hayat, o dönemde batı tıbbını İtalya’ya, merkez olarak da Bologna’ya kilitlemiştir. Böyle bir dönemde hekim Mondino dei Liucci, yaptığı kadavra diseksiyonları sonucu bilgilerini “evrenkent”in temel felsefesi olan “birikimi gelecek kuşaklara aktarmak” ilkesiyle ilk anatomi kitabını yayınlayarak (1316) Avrupa’ya duyurmaya çalışmıştır.

Doğuda “mualece (ilaç ile tedavi)”nin gelişmesine mukabil, Londra’da bugünkü manada ilk eczane açılmıştır (1345) [4]. Tüm bu gelişmeler olurken tıp, kendini kilisenin felsefeye ve edebiyata olan sert tutumundan dolayı felsefe ve edebiyattan uzaklaştırmak zorunda kalmıştır. Çünkü düşünmek, sorgulamak ve yanıtlar aramak suç, var olan egemen düşünceden farklı fikre sahip olmak aforoz edilmekti. ”Çok şeyleri merak ediyor ve düşünüyorsunuz; hâlbuki düşünülmesi gereken yalnız bir şey vardır.” [2] diyen kilisenin saltanatına boyun eğmek zorunda kalan felsefe ve edebiyat, yakın zamanda kendini geliştirebilecek bilimsel gelişmeleri dört gözle bekliyordu. Barutun keşfi ve monarşiyi her yönden zaafa uğratabilecek gelişmelerin yaşanması ile yıkılan monarşi, felsefenin önce Platon’un öğretisi olan idealizm (nesne ve olgular sadece zahiridir, gerçeği idealarda aramak gerekir) üzerine oturttu. Çünkü geçen zamanda felsefe alanında istenilen yol alınamadı. Karanlık çağdan çıktığına inanan batı; bireyi, doğayı ve aklı yücelterek bireyi temel alan “humanisme” felsefesini doğurdu. Artık dünyada her şey “humanus” etrafında dönüyordu. İnsan bedenini yakından tanımak, sadece masa başında disekse eden hekim ve öğrencilerin hakkı değil, o bedeni taşıyan herkesin hakkıydı.

 Ve Rönesans’ın dönüm noktasındaki isim, Leonardo da Vinci, kadavra üzerindeki teşrih çalışmalarını sanatsal bir estetikle sayfalara taşıdı ve tüm Avrupa’ya gösterdi. ”İnsan” değer kazanıyordu. Leonardo da Vinci’nin yaptığı çalışma hekimleri bilgileri üzerine tekrar düşünmeye sevk ediyordu ve bu beden üzerindeki akademik çalışmalar sayesinde Vesalius, tıpta Rönesansın zirvesine ulaşır De Humani Corporis Fabrica adlı eseri ile. Sistematik gözlemlere dayalı modern tıbbın temel taşlarından birini koyar Vesalius [6]; ki bu eserdeki kuramlar 17.yy’a kadar tüm Avrupa’da kabul görür. Ayrıca vücutta Pithagoras’tan itibaren varlığın dört tözünden hareketle oluşturulan dört hılt”tan biri olan “haema”nın dolaşımı da şüphe ve merak oluşturuyordu.

       Resim 1: De Humani Corporis Fabrica

Andreas Vesalius(1514-1563)’un De Humani Corporis Fabrica adlı eserinden bir çizim

Bu şüphe ve meraklar üzerine yoğunlaşan William Harvey, çağının fizikteki temel işleyiş mekanizması felsefesini göz önünde tutarak, dünyanın mekanik işleyişini insan bedeninde aradı ve nihayetinde kan dolaşımının mekanik ve devinimsel bir işleyiş olduğunun farkına vardı. Mekanikçi doğa felsefesinin izlerini taşıyan bu buluş, Harvey’in ismini günümüze kadar taşır ve bu felsefe yine ismi günümüze kadar gelen Newton’un yasasını oluşturur.

 Tıptan o günlerde varlık olarak uzak görülen edebiyat, aslında görüldüğü kadar da uzak değildir, çünkü edebiyat da kendini İtalya’da geliştirir ve Rönesans’ın hümanist anlayışının edebi basamaklarını oluşturan Girolamo Fracastoro (1478-1553)’u doğurur. Matematik ve şiirin “atomsal” yapısını çözümlerken hekimliğin muammalarına dokunur aslında. Evrenin atom denilen (a-tomos; bölünemeyen, kesilemeyen, parçalanamayan) parçalardan oluştuğunu savunduğu felsefesi ona epidemik hastalıklara ilişkin ortaya yeni fikirler koyma şansı verir. Epidemik hastalıkların “spor”lar aracılığıyla olduğunu iddia eder ve bu sporları yaşayan canlıdan ziyade küçük kimyasal maddeler olarak algılar. Sonuçta ortaya “Syphilis” tanımı çıkar ve ilk defa bir şiir kitabında sfilizden bahseder. (”Syphilis sive Morbus Gallicus”).  Ve yine şiirlerinde sfilisin tedavisi için cıva ve “guaiaco” önerir. Fakat yaklaşık üç yüzyıl sonra ortaya konulan  “germ theory” sporların yaşayan canlılar olduğunu kanıtladı; yine de unutturmadı kendisini Fracastoro, çünkü  “De Contagione”  adlı kitabında ilk defa tifüs hakkında bilgi verdi [7].

 Ünlü İngiliz şair ve oyun yazarı Shakespeare, ”As you like it” adlı komedi eserini aslında “Rosalynde” adlı esere dayandırır ve bu eserin sahibi ise dramatist hekim Thomas Lodge’dır. ”Treatise of the Plague” adlı incelemesinde veba hakkında önemli tespitlerde bulunur [8].

 Rönesans’ın insan üzerine topladığı ilgi, insanı ve bozulan dengesi sonucu oluşan hastalığı daha iyi araştırma fırsatı vermiştir böylece. ”Deney ve Gözlemi “ esas alan modern tıp bilimi, felsefe ve edebiyatta olduğu gibi kendi prensiplerini çizmektedir artık. Sistematikleşen bilgi hızla ilerlemekte ve alanını bir taraftan belirli ederken bir taraftan şeffaflaştırmaktadır.

 “Die Fortschritte der Medizin sind ungeheuer. Man ist seines Todes nicht mehr sicher” (Tıbbın ilerlemesi muazzam; insanın ölümü bile güvende değil!) derken Hermann Kesten, tıbbın ilerlemesindeki olağanüstülülüğü vurgulamaktadır. ”Aslında tıbbın sırrı, tabiat ana hastalığı iyileştirirken, hasta ile sohbet etmektir” diyen ünlü Voltaire mahlaslı filozof François Marie Arouet, hekim-hasta ilişkisindeki samimiyeti özetliyor yaşadığı çağda.

 “İnsan”a verilen değer, sömürgeye olan edebi savaşı, yani “Romantisme”yi doğurur batıda. Bu akımı savunan ünlü Fransız yazar J.J. Rousseau, kurtuluşu doğaya dönmekte arar. Doğaya dönüşle, insanın kendisiyle baş başa kalacağı, kendisini oluşturan duygu ve düşüncelerini keşfedebileceğini, böylece Rönesans’ın “değer”lendirdiği birey’i kendi bilincine eriştireceğini savunur ve romantizmin öncülüğünü yapar. Bu bağlamda hastane odaları da, sanatçının toplumdan izole edilerek “thanatos”a(ölüme meyil) karşı direndiği ortamlara dönüşür [9].

 Yine aynı şekilde, bireyselliğe verilen güçle ölüme meydan okuma Albert Camus’un   “Veba” adlı eserinde işlenir.  Hekimliğe bir sanat gözüyle bakılmaya başlanır romantizmden sonra, çünkü insan kendi bilincine vardıktan sonra ölüme sonuna kadar direnmeye başlar ve bir zaman sonra bunu düşünsel etkinlik ile duygusal hazza dönüştürür.

Hekim hasta ilişkisi üç boyutlu bir hal almaktadır yavaş yavaş, zira romantizmden sonra gelen realizm dalgası eleştiriyi getirmiştir yanında.

 “Bir hazakat zadeyim, midemi tıp tepti benim,

 Kırk katır tepseydi yıkılmazdı bu sağlam bedenim,

 Kapladı her yanımı sancı, elem, ağrı, bere,

 Bir mezar oldu cihan, sanki etıbba* haşere,

 Hastane sanarak çok yere girdim çıktım;

 İbret aldım oralardan da canımdan bıktım.”

                                                          Neyzen Tevfik

(*etıbba: doktorlar)

Neyzen Tevfik duyarlı sanatçı kimliğiyle zamanın doktor-hasta ilişkisini hem gülümseten hem düşündüren şekilde yermiştir [9].  Böyle doğudaki ve batıdaki sanatçılardan ve toplumdan gelen seslerden sonra çağda gelişen hekim ve hasta hakları “evrenkent”in sistematiğini toplum yönünde değiştirmeye ve geliştirmeye başlar.

 Resim 2:İnsan bedenindeki kompleks halin toplumsal hayata yansıdığını gösteren bir tablo

 Bu zamana kadar sadece bireyi önemseyen, yani sanatı sanat için yapan tıp, artık topluma açılmaya ve toplumla bağdaşmaya başlar.  Ve böylece sanatı toplum için yapmaya çalışır. (Sanat, toplum içindir; La Realisme). Ama bu eylem yine insandan çıkar insanın varoluşundan.

 “Entelektüel, zeka ile ilgili bir faaliyet(pozitif bilim, tıp, edebiyat) sayesinde az veya çok isim yapan ve kazandığı ünü kötüye kullanarak toplumu ve kurulu düzeni eleştiren bir nevi insan” diyen Sartre, tıbbın eylem literatüründe felsefede olduğu gibi değişiklik yapılması taraftarıdır.   “Als Gregor Samsa eines Morgens aus unruhigen Traeumen erwachte, fand er sich in seinem Bett zu einem ungeheuren Ungeziefer verwandelt [10].” diyerek “Die Verwandlung” adlı eserine giriş yapan Franz Kafka da dönüşümden bahseder. Bedeninde bilincini keşfeden insan, kendini başka insanda tanıyacak ve toplum içinde var edecekti artık. ”İnsan toplumun içinde özünü gerçekleştirmeli, insanın insan ile birliği kurulmalıdır” diyen Feuerbach, hekim-hasta ilişkisindeki üç boyutluluğu vurguluyor aslında; hekim-hasta-toplum. Hastane odalarında kalmıyor artık bu karşılıklı ilişki, topluma yansıması gerekiyor ve daha önemlisi toplumu ve değerlerini hesaba katması gerekiyordu.

 Tıbbın, insanın sorgulamasından itibaren yanında olan edebiyat ve felsefe ile olan mütekabil ilişkisi ona düşünsel ve duygusal etmenlerin çerçevesinde kurulu olan “etik” terimini hediye ediyor. (Deontology or the Science of Morality; 1834; Jeremy Bentham) [11]. Bu etik sayesinde her hekim ister istemez o toplumda ve çağda hüküm süren edebiyattan ve felsefeden bir pay almış oluyor ve yine ister istemez bu akımların içine girmiş bulunuyor.

 Tıp, felsefe, edebiyat. Farklı ve uzak alanlarmış gibi görünen bu triad aslında insan bedenindeki iradenin topluma yansıyan en saf halindeki ürünleri.

 “Beden, hakikate açılan yegâne dar kapıdır” diyen Schopenhauer, topluma açılabilmenin; toplumsal gerçeği, içinde düşünsel ve duygusal belirteçlerle model halinde taşıyan insan bedenini gerektiğince tanıyarak mümkün olabileceğinden bahseder, çünkü gerek toplum düzeni gerekse evrensel düzen insan bedeninde küçülmüş bir model şeklinde durmaktadır. Bu küçük fakat esasen büyük yapı, Protagoras’ın dediği gibi her şeyin ölçüsüdür.

Kaynaklar

1.Güntöre, SÖ.: Tıp ve Felsefe. Nobel Kitabevi, Adana, 2005.

2.Elbek,O.: Toraks Dergisi,8(2):130-133,2007

3.VIII.Türk Tıp Tarihi Kongresi,Tebliğ,16-18 Haziran, Divriği-Sivas, 2004

4.Medizin-Welt. Meilensteine der Medizin/  Deutschland: www.medizin-welt.info

5.Akar,M.:Sanatta Anatomi Çalışmaları;Türk Nöroşirürji Derneği Bülteni, 34; 20-26, Ocak 2007       

6.Ülman,YI.:Vesalius ve De Humani Corporis Fabrica:Tıpta Rönesans:Bilim ve Gelecek, 35; Ocak 2007

7.Rodriguez JA,Castellon.:Selected items from history of pathology-Girolamo Fracastoro;AM J Pathology,101(1):62,October 1980

8.student.britannica.com/comptons/article-9315349/Thomas-Lodge

9.Senemoğlu,O.:Eros/Thanatos Savaşımından İzlenimler,ANKEM Dergisi ,19(4):210-212,2005    

10.Kafka,F.:Die Verwandlung.Fischer Bücherei, Frankfurt am Main,1965

11.Erdemir,AD.: Lectures on Medical History and Medical Ethics.Nobel, İstanbul, 1995

Resim 1)tr.wikipedia.org/Andreas_Vesalius        

Resim 2) de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_Klimt                                                                                        

This post looks at two articles by Simon Schaffer:

“States of Mind: Enlightenment and Natural Philosophy,” in The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought, ed. G. S. Rousseau, 1990, pp. 233-290.

“Genius in Romantic Natural Philosophy,” in Romanticism and the Sciences, ed. Andrew Cunningham and Nicholas Jardine, 1990, pp. 82-98.

It makes comparison with some related points in Jan Golinski’s book Science as Public Culture: Chemistry and Enlightenment in Britain, 1760-1820, 1992.  Unlike the last post integrating Schaffer’s and Golinski’s analysis of eudiometry, this one distinguishes the (complementary) positions of the two authors.

Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon" prison

Since his earliest pieces (especially his 1983 piece on natural philosophy and spectacle), Schaffer had been exploring the tensions between natural philosophical inquiry and the forces leading to professionalized specialties.  In pieces circa 1990, Schaffer further explored the relationship between enlightenment political ideals—which stressed rational assent as a path away from enthusiasm and despotism toward a proper polity—and natural philosophy and the political pressures it created and to which it was subjected.

In “States of Mind”, in a move not unlike his and Steven Shapin’s analysis of Hobbes’ critique of experimental philosophy, Schaffer stresses objections, particularly that of Edmund Burke (1729-1797) that the politics of rational assent proffered by people like Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) simply cloaked alternative religion-like claims to political authority.

The transformation of politically important elements of cosmology—rather than the elimination of their significance—is once again central to Schaffer’s argument (see also the transformation of comets from omens to source of physical disaster).  Here Priestley’s objection to the pneumatic philosophy of souls and spirits (as in Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, 1777) brushes away the idea of mind as guided by spirit to allow the mind to be seen as a material organ with its own relationship to the material world, including its pneumatic aspects.  A new hygiene is now required to ensure proper reasoning: the elimination of unhealthy air and the creation of well-aired environments by “medical managers”.  Hence the importance seen in the program of eudiometry.  (Incidentally, readers should also be aware of the importance of historian Roy Porter’s work to the identification of a medical enlightenment).

Schaffer notes the close collaboration of Priestley with Jeremy Bentham as part of the provincial “Bowood group” under the patronage of the Earl of Shelburne.  Bentham was a strong supporter of Priestley’s chemical philosophy, drawing on its philosophical example and implications for hygiene in his own political arguments.  Bentham’s famous idea of the Panopticon itself represented a kind of laboratory of the mind, in which it could be determined how a proper state of reason could be restored—such as from a state of criminality or madness—in a process that could only be overseen by philosophically enlightened inspectors (yes, Foucault figures in here).  Schaffer synthesizes the points thus:

The members of such a [model] polity were to be governed through the complete management of their atmosphere and their surroundings.  The Panopticon relied on the link between the bodily situation of its inhabitants and the state of their mind.  The right distribution of light, air, and space prompted the right associations: every inmate would ‘conceive himself’ to be under constant surveillance. ¶ The Panopticon was an ‘enlightened’ project, concerned with rational order and moral reform, deriving its authority from the natural philosophical understanding of the work of the mind (234).

Golinski’s more directed concern with chemical experimentation highlights what kinds of experimentation were appealing or possible in different political environments.  He observes the importance for Priestley of simplicity of method and instrumentation, thereby allowing experiments to be widely replicated and the rational process of discovery to be shared by experimenter and audience alike.  The troubles with complexity of instrument formed part of the rhetorical arsenal against Lavoisier’s chemistry.

The shared rational experience could also carry its own burdens, particularly in the wake of the purported rationalism of the French Revolution.  The shared experience of breathing nitrous oxide, and the resulting delirium, could easily be attacked as being of a piece with the mad excesses of the Revolution, particularly for the experiments’ association with radical figures such as the physician Thomas Beddoes (1760-1808).  Chemistry became a regular target for anti-Jacobins such as Burke.  In the 1790s, Priestley’s house was destroyed and he emigrated to America.

It was in these circumstances that chemical experimenter (and poet) Humphry Davy (1778-1829) severed his relationship with provincial chemical philosophy, its radical political affiliations, and its experimentation with nitrous oxide, and moved in 1800 to conservative London and the new Royal Institution (RI, est. 1799).  Here Davy was able (eventually) to shed the controversies the provincial philosophers attracted.

Why "eventually" is included in parentheses: an 1802 cartoon by James Gillray of a demonstration on nitrous oxide done in 1800 at the Royal Institution. Davy is holding the bellows.

At the RI, Davy crafted a different relationship with the audience.  For example, by commanding the sophisticated apparatus of the voltaic pile, he was able to use its “galvanic fluid” to dissociate chemicals into their basic elements.  The pile was expensive, and not a common device of chemical experimentation.  Its creative use secured Davy’s reputation as a scientific “genius”.  In lectures, he did not come to experimental conclusions with an audience; he interpreted his carefully crafted performance for them.  In this position of responsibility, to the disappointment of some, he refrained from connecting chemical work to political philosophy, and enjoyed a productive career in the metropole (see also our primer on Faraday).

Davy demonstrates to a captive audience an electric light, powered by banks of voltaic piles kept in the Royal Institution's basement.

As I noted in January, in a 1986 piece Schaffer understood the rise of the idea of “discovery” by inspired geniuses to split scientific work into elite figures and ordinary laborers, which augured the “end of natural philosophy” and the rise of professionalized science.  In “Genius,” he elaborated that the extension of the disembodied force of “genius” from artistic masters to the work of philosophers in the late-18th century helped to dissociate their accomplishments from their political authority.

Where figures such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) would connect Romantic ideas to enlightenment ideals in his “attempt to connect the work of philosophical genius, natural power and popular right” (85), others called foul on the implication “that genius had been collectivized” (ibid).  For figures such as Burke, genius was localized and the process of achieving new insights stood apart from any rational process.  Ethics, not reason, was the only firm basis of polity.  Geniuses were themselves bound by ethical responsibilities not to exercise their powers inappropriately, as was said to have happened in the Revolution.  Rationally constructable principles discovered through genius could only be worked out subsequently.  Once they were, they could be taught to others, and possibly—as in the late-enlightenment philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)—become a basis for authority.

I was working with some teachers in a school the other day when the conversation turned to inspection and evidence. The new UK school inspection regime is based much more clearly on teachers’ and managers’ assessments of how they think they are doing – they have to fill in what is called a SEF, or self-evaluation form – which is then offered to incoming inspectors as the primary basis for their inspection. According to the Department for Education, evidence has to be rigorous, has to be written down and has to demonstrate ‘impact’. The inspectors then judge not just the quality of teaching and learning in school, but also the quality of the SEF. The idea is that the inspection becomes an assessment of teachers’ ability to assess themselves in the given form of the SEF.

Since I have taken a long-term interest in encouraging reflection and reflexivity in the posts in this blog , I was interested to note my own resistance not to the idea of self-evaluation but to the way it was being put forward and the ideology of relentless improvement and scrutiny that it implies.

Firstly the idea strikes me as performative, in the sense that the instrument of the SEF helps bring about the environment of testing and examination that forms the basis on the current British government’s understanding of what the education process should be about. Since 1997 children in school have been relentlessly tested: now it is the turn of teachers and managers. They have to sit their own equivalent of an A level exam, where they are obliged to answer the questions as well as comment on their ability to answer the questions.  In a way one has to admire the symmetry of this, since it is now the case that both teachers and students have an experience of education which is rooted in being good at passing exams. Just as students in private schools are coached early on in how to get top marks in exams, no doubt teachers in the most aspirational schools will become more and more adept at completing SEFs.

My second locus of resistance was that it reminded me of Jeremy Bentham’s idea for the building of a prison using the idea of a Panopticon, a device for observing prisoners without them knowing when and how they were being observed. He described it as  “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example.” Bentham was concerned to cut the costs of running prisons, which he thought would be possible if prisoners so internalised the idea that they were being watched that they policed themselves, thus reducing the need for guards. Michel Foucault took up the idea of the Panopticon in Discipline and Punish as a metaphor for the way that contemporary societies discipline and normalise their citizens. Just as students may experience school as being a stagger from one set of anxiety-provoking tests to the next, so teachers must always be on the alert for the unannounced inspection which will judge how they have been judging themselves.

My third difficulty is the way that the SEF revolves around the usual dualisms of successful/unsuccessful, positive/negative, strengths and weaknesses, broken/fixed within a context in which evidence is considered to be largely unproblematic. However, much of school life, like life in general, revolves around experience that is neither positive nor negative, but needs interpreting since it is quite likely to be an amalgam of both, depending on what you hold to be of value. As Wittgenstein observed, the meaning of the world does not lie in the world.

Finally, and related to the last point, the last thing that the SEF can call into question is the point of filling in the SEF itself and the assumptions that it makes about how to demonstrate improvement. Even if one were to accept the SEF as a useful process, there is still a great deal of judgement involved which is contestable, not just the judgement of teachers filling in the SEF, but also involving the inspectors’ judgement about the teachers’ judgement. This would be fine if inspectors were interested in the process of contestation and argument. My suspicion is that they are not or are severely constrained from being so interested: they do not want to engage in arguments but want to know whether something happening in school is successful or not in ways which the government has already made very explicit. There is little room to question whether schools can improve their results year on year, whether the exclusive focus on success in passing exams squeezes out other important characteristics of belonging to a learning community, and whether it is possible to entertain pluralistic discussions in schools which are open-ended, leading simply to more discussion, rather than terminating prematurely in a judgement about whether something is successful or not. Perhaps, as Zhou En Lai, the Chinese foreign minister said when he was asked for his assessment of the French Revolution: ‘It’s too early to say.’

There was an example of what I am pointing to in terms of the contestability of judgement which arose in the same discussion where teachers were telling me about an examiner who came to judge a group of students for a group drama performance. According to the two school teachers present, one of whom is herself an examiner, the performance was worthy of an A. According to the outside examiner, who was also a senior figure in the examination board, the performance was worth a C. Although his judgement was challenged after the results came out, there was no second-guessing such a senior figure in the examination board. The judgement stood. This was the only module in which the students received a C, since their other modules received much higher grades. Of course, the examiner may have been right. Alternatively, exams are not always fair. However, since so much depends on the inspection and the examination process the ability to question has to be a key part of the process.

I am not suggesting that teachers and school managers should not be encouraged to reflect on what it is they are doing and think about how they might do it differently. In my experience good teachers are doing this all the time anyway. What interests me about this particular manifestation of school inspection is the way that it mirrors the overall approach to education during the last two decades. It consists in hyper-vigilant scrutiny, an ideological obsession with ‘improvement’ and a predilection for written documentation as a primary form of evidence.

Utilizando-se do cálculo de maximização do bem, de onde se  tira a ideia de que o benefício de uma maioria vence a derrota de uma minoria é um princípio seguido pela ética utilitarista, também muito usada no Jornalismo, o que seria, de forma resumida, “os fins justificam os meios”. Essa máxima foi trazida, pela primeira vez, por Jeremy Bentham (1748—1832) e John Stuart Mill (1806—1873):

“Uma ação é moralmente correta quando produz (maximiza) o maior bem (felicidade – prazer) para o maior número e/ou produz o menor mal (infelicidade – dor) para o menor número”.

A prática da ética utilitarista é mais uma forma de as mídias, de um modo geral, conseguirem alcançar a tão almejada audiência, aliás, a audiência é o que as emissoras de comunicação mais querem, além de ser um dos objetivos principais no momento de idealizar um programa. Isso faz com que o desejo de “democratizar” ideais se volte para o egocentrismo presente no ser humano e, consequentemente, nos veículos de comunicação. Mas, não podemos e nem devemos generalizar.

É também uma maneira muito polêmica de denunciar, é o que podemos chamar de denuncismo e deve ser feito com muito cuidado para não ferir princípios e/ou denegrir imagens, o que significa dizer, muitas vezes, que a ética nem sempre é tão ética quanto deveria ser. Podemos dizer que nem sempre podemos considerar que uma determinada maioria traduz realmente a maioria que deveria, então,  a seguinte frase pode ilustrar bem: “a ética utilitarista justifica os meios quando os fins são expressos por usufrutos coletivos”.

Vale considerar aqui também que cada caso é um caso. É sempre bom usarmos de atitudes “Robinhoodianas”, desde que não quebremos as regras da sociedade como não roubar ou, até mesmo, matar. Um erro não justifica o outro. Acredito que, para tudo, vale uma atitude consciente. Todos possuem dentro de si uma voz capaz de definir o certo e o errado, também de acordo com a cultura de vida na qual esteja inserido, e isso deve ser utilizado muito bem, no momento de decidir o que é viável ou não em situações como essas. Quer exemplos?

Vejamos:

O acontecimento recente do vazamento das informações contidas na prova do Enem e a forma como isso virou notícia. Uma tentativa de venda da prova para uma jornalista do jornal O Estado de São Paulo, que agiu corretamente ao memorizar as questões, averiguar a veracidade do fato e divulgar, com furo de reportagem. Ela soube ser ética, apesar do utilitarismo.

Há fatos e fatos. O que não podemos esquecer jamais é de que somos jornalistas e devemos saber fazer o bom uso da prática dessa profissão, seguindo os princípios que dizem que somos os responsáveis por divulgar tudo o que é de interesse público e não de  interesse do público, o que é bastante diferente. Um diz respeito à utilidade pública e o outro diz respeito ao sensacionalismo.

Vote na enquete referente a este assunto clicando aqui.

Contatos:

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Just like every year, Sarah’s mother was dressed as Jeremy Bentham’s dead body. She had a wood and glass case made up just like Jeremy Bentham’s cabinet at the University College London. Sarah wore a British university custodian costume, which was actually a ’sexy maid’ costume because Masks & More didn’t sell a British university custodian costume. She wheeled around her mother’s viewing booth on a dolly.

Just like every year, Sarah got drunk and said Dead Jeremy Bentham’s Custodian a lot when people asked what she was supposed to be. Except this year, about halfway through the night, Sarah’s mother suffocated and died. Then Sarah said My Mother’s Pallbearer and cried into her Jim Beam.

PS: COME TO OUR HALLOWEEN PARTY TONIGHT! BEN & SCOTT & SCOTT’S HOUSE//PHILADELPHIA!! 7:30 PM

Cet extrait est la première partie d’un article intitulé “Quelle justice pour une paix durable : regards croisés de John Rawls et Paul Ricoeur sur la justice” (se reporter en fin de page).

Emmanuel Sena AVONYO, op,

enestamail@yahoo.fr

____________________________________________________________________________________________

PREMIERE PARTIE

Deuxième partie >>>

L’histoire ne nous fournit que des exemples de paix violées, de guerres injustes et cruelles, de champs dévastés, de villes réduites en cendres. L’épuisement seul semble forcer les princes à la paix[1]. Dans les cours de philosophie politique comme dans les cafés philosophiques privés, on se demande inlassablement quelle justice pour une paix durable dans un monde qui favorise de flagrantes inégalités de puissances, de revenus et de propriétés. L’idéal de justice autorise-t-il la peine de mort ? Est-il juste de légaliser l’avortement ? Est-il juste de mener une guerre préventive ? La paix est-elle le résultat d’une justice unilatérale ?  Est-il vrai que celui qui veut la paix doit préparer la guerre ? La paix est-elle à la portée de l’homme ? La justice est-elle la garantie d’une paix durable ? La charité dispense-t-elle de la justice ? Quel modèle de justice sociale pour une paix durable dans notre société en mal de repères et peu respectueuse de la morale normative ? Pour apporter notre contribution philosophique à la réponse à cette dernière question qui récapitule toutes celles qui la précèdent, notre démarche opère un double parti pris méthodologique qu’il convient de justifier dès le départ.

Premièrement, nous faisons de la justice un préalable à la paix, comme le laisse percevoir l’intitulé de cette analyse. En effet, chez les Grecs, la justice (dikaiosunè) est une norme de la nature. Le juste ordonnancement de la nature et l’organisation de la polis sont ordonnés au bonheur (Eudaimonia) et à l’épanouissement humain dont le caractère suprême est un climat de paix[2]. La paix comme un état de concorde et de tranquillité durable est recherchée par-dessus tout, elle est la fin de toutes les luttes pour la justice. Si la paix est l’état naturel de tout corps politique, la justice en est la santé et le préalable. Tout homme qui désire la paix doit pratiquer la justice comme la condition de tout bonheur. La paix véritable est à comprendre comme œuvre de justice parce que la justice est une composante essentielle de la vie bonne. De même, les objectifs de la 53^e Assemblée Générale de l’UNESCO pour une culture de la paix exhortent les hommes à plus de justice pour bâtir une paix durable. Quel contenu donner à cette justice ? C’est la question qui nous conduit à un second parti pris.

Deuxièmement, nous choisissons de rechercher un modèle de justice dans la Théorie de la justice[3] de John Rawls. Il y a une diversité de réponses concurrentes apportées à la question de la justice sociale en vue de bâtir une communauté politique pacifiée. Certaines conceptions invoquent les droits inaliénables de l’homme, d’autres quelque notion de contrat social, d’autres encore le critère d’utilité. Notre choix de nous confronter à John Rawls s’explique par la prétention universaliste de la justice comme équité[4] (conception politique et non compréhensive de la justice) et par le caractère incontournable de cette théorie dans l’enseignement de la philosophie morale et politique dans le monde anglo-saxon. En outre, la critique enrichissante qu’en a fait Paul Ricœur peut paraître féconde et riche de la promesse d’une paix sociale. Mais notre propos consistera à en examiner la convergence avec la justice comme équité de Rawls.

Si nous considérons tout l’éventail des conceptions rivales de la justice et les multiples questions que pose la paix, nous parvenons  à l’évidence que la question qui mobilise notre attention est d’une brûlante actualité. Pour mener à bien cette réflexion, nous exposerons d’abord les principes de la justice comme équité en tant que premiers fondements d’une conception politique de la justice. Nous relèverons ensuite les paradoxes de la justice procédurale de Rawls. En analysant les objections faites par Ricœur à la justice comme équité de Rawls, nous nous interrogerons enfin sur la légitimité philosophique de l’articulation entre la logique d’équivalence de la justice et la surabondance de l’amour supra-éthique comme chemin vers une paix durable.

I    LES PRINCIPES DE LA JUSTICE POLITIQUE DE JOHN RAWLS

John Rawls envisage la société comme un système d’équité où les contractants coopèrent au bien de tous. Les principes de la justice, en tant que composante essentielle d’une conception politique de la justice, spécifient les termes équitables de la coopération sociale dans un régime démocratique. Ils concernent l’assignation des droits et devoirs fondamentaux et la division des bénéfices qui proviennent du système de coopération sociale. Ils présentent des enjeux politiques indéniables.

1          John Rawls et la théorie politique de la justice

John Rawls (1921-2002) se présente comme un héritier des théoriciens du contrat que sont Locke et Rousseau. Il se revendique aussi d’une filiation kantienne. Partisan de la démocratie socio-libérale, Rawls développe une approche du lien social visant à articuler le caractère de sujet de droits (d’individus membres d’une société) et les rapports socio-économiques afin que justice sociale et efficacité économique puissent aller de pair[5]. Rawls propose une doctrine sociale de la justice comme équité dans sa Théorie de la justice. Les analystes politiques considèrent cet ouvrage comme l’un des plus importants textes de philosophie morale et politique de notre temps. Rawls se fixe deux objectifs : premièrement, fournir une analyse convaincante des droits et des libertés de base ainsi que de leur priorité ; deuxièmement, compléter cette analyse par une conception de l’égalité démocratique qui s’appuie sur l’égalité des chances et le principe de différence. Ce principe encore appelé la « différence de distribution » dit qu’il n’est acceptable de tolérer les inégalités que lorsqu’elles sont au bénéfice de tous ou quand elles promeuvent les plus défavorisés.

L’approche rawlsienne de la justice préconise que les droits, les libertés de base et leurs priorités garantissent de manière égale à tous les citoyens les conditions essentielles au développement adéquat et à l’exercice plein et conscient de leurs deux facultés morales : le sens de la justice et la conception du bien. C’est sur ces deux facultés que portent les applications fondamentales des objectifs de la Théorie de la justice[6] : l’application des principes de la justice à la structure de base de la société et l’application des facultés de raisonnement des citoyens à la réalisation rationnelle de leur conception du bien. Le concept de “structure” signifie le système unifié de coopération d’une société, l’ensemble des institutions politiques, sociales et économiques de tout régime démocratique (Justice et Démocratie, p. 248).

Rawls définit la justice comme l’équité du processus de choix des principes de la justice. Elle est « la première vertu des institutions sociales comme la vérité est celle des systèmes de pensée »[7]. L’on peut tirer deux conséquences de cette définition. Premièrement, Rawls fait de la justice le principe du politique, au même titre que la vérité celui du théorique, fondant ainsi la justice dans le politique. De même que personne ne pourrait spéculer rationnellement sans avoir comme postulat fondamental le principe de vérité, tous devraient poser la justice comme principe axiomatique, base de toute démarche politique, précédant tout acte et tout acte la supposant. Etant les vertus premières du comportement humain, la justice et la vérité ne souffrent d’aucun compromis.

Deuxièmement, la justice quitte la sphère du droit et du positivisme pour échoir aux individus sociaux considérés comme des sujets capables d’un sens de la justice. Le droit naturel les rend aptes à jouir de l’inviolabilité que confère la justice aux sujets moraux qui ont leurs propres systèmes de fins. Le “polythéisme des valeurs” et l’option libérale l’emporteront sur la centralité du droit positif.  Le juste est à construire, il ne s’impose pas de l’extérieur. C’est pour prévenir les conflits des conceptions du bien que les principes de la justice seront choisis au moment de la délibération publique sous un voile d’ignorance.  Le modèle de justice politique que propose Rawls ne peut s’appliquer que dans la structure de base d’un Etat parfaitement démocratique où les libertés fondamentales sont garanties.

En effet, la conception politique de la justice dont nous voulons relever les enjeux est destinée à servir de base aux institutions politiqu es d’une démocratie constitutionnelle. Qu’entend-on par justice “politique” ? La justice comme équité de Rawls est présentée comme une conception politique de la justice parce qu’elle concerne seulement la sphère du public, de la communauté politique, et non les autres formes d’associations humaines qui ne posent pas les mêmes problèmes. “Le politique désigne les groupements dont on ne choisit pas librement de faire partie et où l’exercice du pouvoir coercitif de l’Etat représente toujours une menace pour les droits et les libertés”. Le politique désigne encore tout domaine limité auquel s’appliquerait la théorie de la justice (Justice et Démocratie, p. 363).

Ainsi, la théorie de la justice est l’application politique de la doctrine du juste comme équité. La justice comme première vertu des institutions politiques recherche en tout l’équité. Cette forme de justice s’appuie sur deux principes : le principe d’égale liberté pour tous et le principe de différence. Ces principes sont choisis sous le voile d’ignorance, c’est-à-dire dans une situation où ceux pour qui ces principes s’appliqueront sont supposés ignorer, au moment du choix, leur conception du bien et les avantages liés à leur position en société.

2          Les principes de la justice

Les principes de la justice ont pour objet l’équitable distribution des biens sociaux et économiques dans les institutions politiques qui constituent la structure de base de la société et le système de coopération sociale.  Dans sa Théorie de la justice, John Rawls a présenté une formule provisoire des principes de la justice[8]. La formulation définitive est proposée dans son ouvrage Le libéralisme politique[9]. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit des principes de la plus grande liberté pour tous et de la différence de distribution.

a)        Le principe d’égale liberté pour tous

Le principe de la plus grande liberté égale pour tous[10] s’énonce ainsi « Chaque personne a un droit égal à un ensemble pleinement adéquat de libertés et de droits de base égaux pour tous, qui soit compatible avec un même ensemble pour tous, et dans lequel les libertés politiques égales, et elles seules, doivent être garanties à leur juste valeur.»[11] Rawls demande l’égalité dans l’attribution des droits et devoirs. Ceci passe par la définition d’une liste de libertés en faisant en sorte qu’elle soit à la fois la plus étendue possible, et le plus compatible possible avec l’ensemble du système politique. Il y a les libertés politiques (liberté d’association, droit de vote, droit de postuler à un poste public),  les libertés d’expression, de pensée, de conscience, de réunion, les droits à l’intégrité physique, psychologique et morale.

Le principe de la plus grande liberté est lexicalement premier. C’est-à-dire que les libertés forment un ensemble inaliénable et non négociable. On ne peut limiter la liberté qu’au nom d’une liberté plus grande, jamais pour des avantages socio-économiques. En effet, une réduction de la liberté doit renforcer le système total de libertés partagé par tous. Les libertés sont si fondamentales qu’aucun avantage ne peut leur être prioritaire. Ce principe formule la priorité de la liberté. Cela implique que la réforme des institutions politiques est prioritaire dans sa conception d’une théorie libérale de la justice. Toutefois, les libertés ne peuvent, en elles-mêmes justifier le laisser-faire, ni même le capitalisme (défini comme la propriété privée des moyens de production).

b)        Le principe de la juste égalité des chances.

Ce deuxième principe énonce un double principe (deux conditions) : la juste égalité des chances et la différence de distribution.  Le deuxième principe s’énonce ainsi : « les inégalités sociales et économiques doivent satisfaire à deux conditions : a- s’attacher à des positions et à des fonctions ouvertes à tous selon une équitable égalité des chances, b- être au plus grand avantage des membres les plus désavantagés de la société »[12]. Selon Rawls, l’égalité est aisée à établir si l’on décrit les partenaires sociaux de la même façon et les situe de manière égale, dans une position symétrique les uns par rapport aux autres[13]. Il apparaît clairement que conformément à la lecture faite par Alexis de Tocqueville dans De la démocratie en Amérique, il ne s’agit pas d’une égalité des fortunes mais d’une égalité des chances et des conditions[14]. L’égalité ne peut avoir lieu qu’en des rapports, et non entre des choses.

Le principe de différence fait appelle au principe du maximin (la maximisation de la part minimum) comme stratégie d’évitement de risque dans les questions de partage. Le principe de différence instaure une discrimination positive en faveur des plus désavantagés.  Cela se justifie par le fait que dans les échanges, inégaux il y a un point d’équilibre où l’on préfèrera des inégalités moindres à celles plus grandes. Il ne doit y avoir d’inégalité que s’il y va de l’intérêt de chaque membre de la société et surtout des plus défavorisés. En d’autres termes, des inégalités ne pourraient être justifiées que si la société en tire elle-même un plus grand avantage (optimum de Pareto). C’est pour cette raison que, selon Rawls, un taux d’épargne particulièrement élevé doit, au total, alléger la charge de ceux qui ont à le supporter. Concrètement, une personne talentueuse aura donc droit légitimement aux revenus plus élevés que lui vaut son talent si la collectivité en profite aussi par le reversement de l’impôt.

En favorisant les libertés publiques et l’égalité des chances et en autorisant la discrimination positive dans la redistribution des biens pour corriger certaines inégalités de fait, les principes de la justice énoncent deux types de priorités : premièrement, la priorité de la justice sur l’efficacité et le bien-être (au sens de Wilfred Pareto) ; deuxièmement, celle du principe de l’égale liberté (libertés de base) sur le second principe de la justice. Rawls concilie libertés poltiques et justice sociale. La justice n’est plus égalitaire mais équitable. Rawls affirme que ces principes et règles de priorité de la justice comme équité, même s’ils sont incomplets, devraient être convaincants dans le contexte de leur application. Quels sont les enjeux de la justice politique de Rawls ?

3          L’intérêt politique de la justice comme équité

En défendant la liberté de citoyens, l’égalité des chances et la prise en compte de l’intérêt des minorités et la priorité du juste sur le bien, la justice comme équité représente une avancée socio-politique considérable. Examinons-en trois  principaux enjeux : la fondation de la justice procédurale dans la position originelle, la réfutation de l’utilitarisme, le projet d’une société politique juste. Le premier intérêt est au service du deuxième, et les deux premiers au service du dernier.  Les principes de la justice (le premier en l’occurrence) ne reçoivent application que dans un modèle démocratique construit sur des institutions politiques justes.

a)        La position originelle et le voile d’ignorance

Cette double fiction a une portée politique importante. Elle ouvre les voies d’une citoyenneté égale basée sur un compromis politique au sujet des principes de la justice. Mais la fiction ne crée pas une société politique, elle permet de convenir des règles de coopération sociale et de partage économique.  Ainsi, la « position originelle » n’est pas un état a-social ou pré-social mais un état fictif dans lequel sont mis en scène les membres présumés d’une société qui font abstraction de leurs conditions particulières réelles en vue d’un choix équitable. La fiction de la « situation originelle » offre aux contractants, couverts par le “voile d’ignorance”, de choisir raisonnablement les principes devant régir l’ordre social. L’allégorie du « voile d’ignorance » pose que les partenaires ignorent leur place, leur position ou statut social, leurs capacités naturelles, et les contingences qui les mettraient en conflit[15].

Dans la position originelle, les partenaires disposent néanmoins d’une autonomie morale et d’une connaissance générale de la société politique et des règles économiques, ce qui leur permet de faire des choix rationnels. Il convient pour plus de clarté dans notre propos de faire une distinction entre les deux parties la position originelle qui correspondent aux deux facultés de la personnalité morale complète engagée dans le processus politique. Il y a la capacité d’être rationnel et la capacité d’être raisonnable. Les partenaires en tant que représentants rationnellement autonomes des personnes dans la société, de leur conception du bien et dans leur capacité à réviser et  à poursuivre rationnellement cette conception, représentent le Rationnel. Ces partenaires ne jouiront de leur autonomie complète, le Raisonnable, que lorsque leur conception du bien aura progressé après le processus de construction de manière compatible avec le respect des termes équitables de la coopération sociale (société bien ordonnée).

Ainsi, dotés d’abord du Rationnel, ils accèdent après au Raisonnable, qui est la capacité des partenaires à avoir un sens de la justice, une capacité à respecter les termes de la coopération sociale. Le Raisonnable touche alors aux contraintes auxquelles les partenaires sont soumis. L’autonomie rationnelle n’est que celle des agents artificiels alors que l’autonomie complète reflète l’idéal politique à réaliser dans le monde social. Rawls veut montrer ainsi que la personne dans la position originelle n’est pas “moralement neutre”, confinée seulement dans la notion de rationalité. Malgré cet exercice de justification,  il semble évident que Rawls n’arrive pas à convaincre sur ce plan. Si le Raisonnable n’est que la deuxième partie de la position originelle, cela ne reconnaît pas aux partenaires un sens originaire de la justice. D’où les critiques formulées contre Rawls. D’ailleurs, la supposition d’un parfait accord entre les hommes est l’un des axiomes les plus contestés de sa théorie. Chacun est invité à se confronter lui-même aux textes de Rawls, surtout dans Justice et démocratie, Seuil, coll. Points, pp. 171-174.

Rawls pense une situation originelle totalement hypothétique où des individus, déjà membres d’une société démocratique (d’où l’inutilité de l’hypothèse d’un état de nature) choisiraient les règles devant régir leurs rapports sous un voile d’ignorance. En définissant de manière procédurale et argumentative une charte politique de répartition des avantages sociaux, Rawls pose un fondement politique aux principes de la justice. La justice rawlsienne ne fait référence à aucune fondation substantielle des principes de la justice, qu’elle soit cosmocentrique ou théocentrique. Ses principes ne sont pas à découvrir dans un ordre transcendant, ils sont à construire de façon procédurale par la fiction contractualiste. La justice est à construire. C’est un procédé constructiviste, artificialiste et déontologiste. Rawls ne prend pas appui sur un « état de nature » mais sur l’idée d’une « situation originelle » qui suppose l’équité[16].

L’intuition de la théorie de la justice comme équité consiste à se représenter les principes premiers d’une justice formelle comme faisant l’objet d’un accord originel dans une situation initiale définie de manière adéquate[17]. Bruno Bernardi définit la justice de Rawls comme une équité de position originelle et une équité de distribution[18]. Car le recours à la situation originelle et au voile d’ignorance permet d’éviter les conflits d’intérêts et les inégalités sociales qu’engendrent les choix effectués par des personnes conscientes des positions avantageuses qu’ils pourraient en tirer. « Il est clair, affirmait Rawls, que c’est la manière dont les institutions sociales utilisent les différences naturelles, permettant à la chance d’intervenir, qui définit le problème de la justice sociale.»[19] Les institutions de ce genre s’inspirent des doctrines utilitaristes.

b)        La réfutation de l’utilitarisme

La supposition de la position originelle et l’allégorie du voile d’ignorance qui l’accompagne sont hypothétiques, mais elles permettent d’entrevoir une alternative à l’utilitarisme qui est une doctrine morale exclusive des faibles et des minorités politiques. « Mon but est d’élaborer une théorie de la justice qui représente une solution de rechange à la pensée utilitariste… (dont) l’idée principale est qu’une société est bien ordonnée, et par là même juste, quand ses institutions majeures sont organisées de manière à réaliser la plus grande somme totale de satisfaction pour l’ensemble des individus qui en font partie.»[20] Rawls assignait comme objectif à la justice comme équité d’élaborer une conception politique de la justice pour remplacer celle qu’on trouve dans l’utilitarisme. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Wilfred Pareto, Henry Sidgwick, Edward Moore, Jeremy Bentham incarnent les plus grandes figures de cette tradition morale inspirée par l’approche libérale du modèle économique classique et néo-classique.

Les utilitaristes considèrent dans leur ensemble que le but de l’État est de chercher le bien être collectif, considéré comme la somme de l’utilité des individus. Il s’agit d’obtenir le maximum de satisfaction pour le plus grand nombre, en sacrifiant en cas de nécessité les « moins utiles » de la société. L’utilitarisme repose en effet sur une théorie de la valeur et de l’utilité restrictive selon laquelle toute personne est évaluée selon la quantité de bien-être qu’il procure à la société. Ce principe d’utilité est selon Rawls « un principe agrégatif de maximisation, sans tendance inhérente ni à l’égalité, ni à la réciprocité.»[21] Ce principe ne considère pas les citoyens dans leur particularité et dans leurs droits mais s’attache à les évaluer par rapport à un groupe pris dans sa globalité. Cette conception de la justice, qui ne recherche que l’efficacité sans égard pour l’égalité, viole les intérêts légitimes des citoyens et les exigences de la réciprocité.

John Rawls ne partage pas cette vision de la société politique. Il se propose de corriger ces déséquilibres sociaux par une meilleure redistribution des revenus et richesses de la société. Car une conception politique de la justice doit prendre en compte les exigences de l’organisation sociale et l’efficacité économique. La critique rawlsienne de l’utilitarisme est féconde, vu l’enjeu politique que l’égalité des chances et la réduction des inégalités représentent. Mais une objection peut lui être faite. Rawls lui-même apparaît comme un utilitariste. La recherche d’une meilleure situation sociale pour les plus défavorisés comporte une idée d’utilité. Mais l’utilité que peut procurer une redistribution des biens selon le principe de différence ne serait que de courte portée, puisqu’une discrimination positive est toujours au détriment de quelqu’un. Rawls corrige un déséquilibre par une autre forme d’inégalité.

Il n’est cependant pas négligeable de vouloir « établir une procédure équitable de telle sorte que tous les principes sur lesquels un accord interviendrait soient justes. L’objectif est d’utiliser la notion de justice procédurale pure en tant que base de la théorie.»[22] La théorie de la justice comme équité, même si elle ne convaint pas tous ses détracteurs, peut fournir une base morale plus appropriée pour les institutions d’une société démocratique. C’est en cela que le projet politique de Rawls trouve une pertinence.

c)        Le projet d’une société politique juste

Selon Rawls, un des objectifs de la justice comme équité est de procurer une base philosophique et morale acceptable aux institutions démocratiques. Il part du principe selon lequel une société politique juste, qui ne vise pas uniquement son bien-être global au détriment des citoyens, doit considérer les agents engagés dans la coopération sociale comme libres et égaux. Cela exige de savoir comment les revendications de liberté et d’égalité doivent être comprises de façon à permettre des débats sur le sens et le fondement des droits et libertés constitutionnelles. La justice comme équité vise à renforcer la culture politique publique des sociétés démocratiques de même que les traditions d’interprétation de leurs constitutions[23].

D’un point de vue politique (public, communautaire), cette culture démocratique s’expérimente à travers la délibération, c’est-à-dire des discussions publiques sur les questions essentielles du droit politique. C’est pour définir les cadres de cette société politique juste et équitable que Rawls a eu recours à la fiction de la position originelle. Toutes les règles de partage convenues le sont sous le voile d’ignorance, dans la méconnaissance des ses avantages et de sa position sociale. Les citoyens ne considèreront pas leur ordre social comme un ordre naturel fixe, ni comme une structure institutionnelle justifiée par les doctrines religieuses. A ce titre, aucun parti politique ne devrait chercher à limiter les droits fondamentaux d’une classe ou d’un groupe donné[24].

L’idée fondamentale de la justice comme équité est que la société est considérée comme un système équitable de coopération sociale, à travers le temps, d’une génération à la suivante (Théorie de la justice, p. 30). C’est selon Rawls, l’idée centrale et organisatrice de sa conception politique de la justice destinée à un régime démocratique. Pour y parvenir, il faut une « société bien ordonnée », c’est-à-dire une société effectivement régie par une conception publique de la justice. L’idéal d’une société bien ordonnée a d’autres implications : la société sera guidée par des règles et des procédures publiquement admises par tous comme appropriées pour leur conduite. Au nom de la mutualité et de la réciprocité prônées par la justice comme équité, tous les citoyens s’acquitteront de leur tâche selon les règles convenues. Les avantages rationnels (pour le bien de chacun) seront évalués par un critère public et accepté.

L’initiative de Rawls reste un projet dans la mesure où il n’a fait que poser l’hypothèse d’une société bien ordonnée dont les structures devaient servir de base à des institutions d’une société juste en général. Elle ressemble bien à une « idée régulatrice » (Rawls parle  justice régulative, J & D, p. 246) de toute société politique ayant des visées socio-économiques. Une justice politique repose sur des bases morales, mais elle est concue pour des institutions politiques, sociales et économiques . C’est ainsi que Rawls veut éviter les avatars de l’utilitarisme qu’il réfute. En y substituant une « utopie réaliste », un modèle de justice formelle anhistorique soutenue par une métaphysique antisacrificielle du sujet politique, John Rawls a prêté le flanc à d’énormes critiques. Paul Ricœur lui a objecté qu’il a ignoré qu’un sens de la justice précède tout formalisme.

Conclusion partielle

Une société politique juste est celle qui applique la justice comme équité. Rawls trouve la conception politique de la justice la plus acceptable dans la justice comme équité. La conception politique de la justice est l’une des fins les plus importantes d’une démocratie constitutionnelle. Dans une démocratie le critère de la justice réside dans sa conception politique. Cette justice “ne se contente pas de fournir un fondement à la justification des institutions politiques et sociales sur lequel l’opinion publique doit s’accorder mais qui contribue aussi à en garantir la stabilité d’une génération à l’autre” (Justice et Démocratie, p. 245). Rawls veut éviter de fonder une telle justification sur les seuls intérêts individuels ou de groupe. Cela ruinerait la stabilité de l’institution politique. Il rappelle qu’une conception politique de la justice ne doit pas être compréhensive (portant des idéaux de vertu personnelle, générale ou religieuse, c’est l’exemple de l’utilitarisme et du perfectionnisme). Une telle morale ne saurait fonder une justice publiquement acceptable et ne s’accorde pas avec la conception politique de la justice.

A SUIVRE,

DEUXIEME PARTIE :

LES PARADOXES DE LA JUSTICE PROCEDURALE SELON PAUL RICOEUR

TROISIEME PARTIE :

QUELLE DEONTOLOGIE POUR UNE PAIX SOCIALE DURABLE  ?

________________________________________________________________________________

VOIR >>> REFLEXION SUR LA BIODIVERSITE ET LA TECHNOSCIENCE

APPROCHE PHILOSOPHIQUE DE LA DEMOCRATIE

L’ATELIER DES CONCEPTS : LE TEMPS

PENSEE ET GRILLE DE LECTURE : 23/10/09 GABRIEL MARCEL

[1] Article « paix »de l’Encyclopédie de Diderot et d’Alembert (1765), in Emmanuel Kant, Pour la paix perpétuelle, Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1985, p. 119.

[2] Alasdair MacIntyre, Quelle justice ? Quelle rationalité ?, trad. Michèle Vignaux d’Hollande, PUF, 1993, p.111.

[3] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997(1987).

[4] Johan Michel, Une philosophie de l’agir humain, collection « Passages », Paris, Cerf, 2006, p. 407.

[5] Bruno Bernardi, La démocratie, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1999, p. 128-129.

[6] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 11.

[7] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 29.

[8] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 91.

[9] John Rawls, libéralisme politique, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, PUF, 1995, p. 5-6.

[10] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 157.

[11] Jacques Bidet, John Rawls et la théorie de la justice, Paris, PUF, 1995, p. 11.

[12] Jacques Bidet, John Rawls et la théorie de la justice, Paris, PUF, 1995, p. 11.

[13] John Rawls, Justice et démocratie, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1993, p.121.

[14] Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, I, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1981, p. 112.

[15] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 168-169

[16] Johan Michel, une philosophie de l’agir humain, collection « Passages », Paris, Cerf, 2006, p. 384.

[17] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 151.

[18] Bruno Bernardi, La démocratie, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1999, p. 128.

[19] John Rawls, Justice et démocratie, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1993, p.123.

[20] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 49.

[21] Bertrand Guillarme, La justice comme équité. Une reformulation de la théorie de la justice, Paris, Editions La Découverte, 2003, p. 171.

[22] John Rawls, Théorie de la Justice, trad. Catherine Audard, Paris, Seuil, 1997, p. 168

[23] Bertrand Guillarme, La justice comme équité. Une reformulation de la théorie de la justice, Paris, Editions La Découverte, 2003, p. 22.

[24] Bertrand Guillarme, La justice comme équité. Une reformulation de la théorie de la justice, Paris, Editions La Découverte, 2003, p. 23-24.

There is no such thing as paranoia in a Panopticon

“There was of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given moment. How often, or on what system, the Thought Police plugged in on any individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire whenever they wanted to. You had to live — did live, from habit that became instinct — in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized.”

George Orwell. 1984

In 1785, English philosopher Jeremy Bentham proposed a design for a prison called the Panopticon. The prison had a central point from which prison warders were able to watch all the prisoners simultaneously, whilst themselves remaining unobserved.

There were two key advantages to this design, Bentham claimed. Firstly, as prisoners would not know whether they were being watched or not, warders would not have to be on duty all the time, thereby reducing costs. Secondly the prisoners, aware of the constant scrutiny, would behave better.

Why? It has become something of a well known trope that observation affects outcome; under observation (of this kind), we often tend to internalise the observer’s desire for discipline in their subject and begin self-policing. And as Bentham put it:

The greater chance there is, of a given person’s being at a given time actually under inspection, the more strong will be the persuasion – the more intense, if I may say so, the feeling, he has of his being so…

… who would expose themselves even to the slightest punishment, or even to the mortification of the disappointment, without so much as a tolerable chance of escaping instantaneous detection?

For Bentham, therefore, the prison was not only a mechanism for confinement or punishment but through its very design, a machine for the reformation of its inmates’ morals. While his intentions were humane and his concerns broad –from costs to hygiene; education to security – his concern was primarily with discipline and its attendant benefits:

…the inspector may have the satisfaction of knowing, that the discipline actually has the effect which it is designed to have: and it is more particularly material in such cases where the inspector… has more or less frequent occasion to give them such transient and incidental directions as will require to be given and enforced, at the commencement at least of every course of industry.

But what is moral reformation systematically imposed by the powerful on the powerless but a straightjacket? As French philosopher Michel Foucault put it in his 1975 word Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison

The major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.

In such an environment the undisciplined outbursts of spontaneity that make for an unpredictable but creative environment are stifled and the human faculties that allow for them begin in some sense to ossify. But as Albert Einstein once said, “Everything that is really great and inspiring is created by the individual who can labour in freedom.”

It takes the strength few of us have to labour in freedom whilst under constant surveillance; the art we create under such circumstances – and I mean art in its broadest sense – becomes grimly homogenous Soviet-realism at the service, finally, of those in the watchtower. *

In a country that has 1% of the world’s population but 20% of its CCTV cameras and in which the number of such cameras is expected to double by 2018, the contemporary parallels are not hard to draw.

(It is of course clear that such surveillance serves those in power. Where abuse by authorities of their power occurs, CCTV footage invariable goes missing, is corrupted, or the cameras are found not to have been recording; footage that does emerge of crime by authorities tends to be shot by members of the public…)

When Dame Stella Rimington, the former head of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency MI5 said in February of this year that the UK risks becoming a police state, it sounded like hyperbole to most; a few months later — amid the scenes seen at the G20 in London – her use of verb and tense look more startling than her actual statement and she looks not so much prescient as the rest of us utterly parviscient.

Police Forward Intelligence Team. A common sight at any demonstration now.

Most of us have mixed feelings about the police and mixed experiences in dealing with them too. Going purely on personal history, I’ve always come away from my dealings with cops in the U.K. with none-too-bad a feeling.

Granted, I’m not actually much of a protestor; in the past when something has raised my hackles enough for me to actually want to join the banner-waving brigade, I tend to have been in overseas, as I am now. So the last time I came face-to-face with the fluoride-jacketed-and-jack-booted was when I was caught speeding down some wee country lanes without a valid tax disk on my car. “Shite”, I thought, panicking as the sirens wailed. “I’m so fucked.” The copper strolled over and said (verbatim):

“Excuse me sir, are you aware that you were speeding? We could barely keep up with you… You know these roads pretty well don’t you?” He strolled round my car: “Are you aware that your tax is out of date sir? We’re currently conducting a crackdown on drivers without tax and you risk having your car being impounded and crushed…”

I winced. He peered in what looked like idle curiosity through the window of my little Toyota: detritus, CDs and Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass… I was suddenly off the hook, I could feel it in my bones. (I’m sure it’s the poetry that did it. All speeding tax delinquents should bung some transcendental poetry on their passenger seat: I mean, hardened criminals don’t read verse by a hirsute and long-dead American extolling the virtues of Mother Nature do they?)

This cop relaxed as if I’d sung out “Oh Captain My Captain” to him and turned back to his motor.  ”Well, you better get this taxed pronto hadn’t you sir; and easy on the pedal eh?” And off he went on his law abiding way. Legend that the good officer was.

Anyway, cops: they aren’t all power-hungry sadists ready to backhand you across the face like a bitch. But the one’s that do answer to the above description are increasingly prevalent and this is symptomatic of something much more disturbing than the obvious character flaws in those who actually pursue or condone such activity.

Canterbury Tales... "Will nobody rid me of these troublesome protestors?"

I’d long had my reservations about the state of democracy in the country. An electoral system that at times appears to almost actively conspire against the electorate; massive centralization; a “spineless, supine” legislature; abuse of power by the executive; excessive amounts of poorly written legislation being churned out yearly to further bolster a growing authoritarianism: all these are accepted by most people with an interest in politics as among the major concerns of the day.

But the extent to which these problems (which I’d previously looked at with a certain academic detachment) were sweeping a town near me first struck viscerally in 2oo3. Home in Canterbury – a small, conservative and picturesque cathedral city – after a spell overseas, I was taking a walk down the high street among the tourist hordes when I came across a small anti-Iraq-war protest.

It’s the kind of  city where you’d feel a touch embarrassed to register your dissent and the demo was, in short, about as far from a riot as you can get. Just a clutch of students mutedly shouting “Stop the War.” And holding “Bliar” placards.  So far, so tame… But the police. The frigging police! Phalanxes of them ten-thick. Many of them with handheld digital video cameras, right up in the faces of those protesting, getting the best footage and taking verbal notes.

The atmosphere was intimidating and oppressive, but even more startling was the incongruity. What on earth were they doing conducting intensive surveillance of such a small bunch of people holding a peaceful protest?

It was suddenly very clear: if you dared raise so much as a voice against government policy you were going to be monitored, categorised, added to a database. It wouldn’t even remotely surreptitious: they’ll just stick a fuck-off big camera right in your face and take verbal notes whilst you stuttered on your cheesy chant.

This was my introduction to police Forward Intelligence Teams (FIT). Any protest, any meeting, any Greenpeace gathering of vaguely activist types, FIT will be there, snapping and videoing and spying away. Nobody even knows what the fuck they do with all their footage, which agencies and departments it’s shared with etc. But they’ve started harrassing journalists too. As The Journalist (the magazine of the national union of journalists) reported in August of last year

Photojournalist Marc Vallée was unable to work for a month after police threw him to the curb at a demonstration he was covering. Milton Keynes staff photographer Andy Handley was detained for eight hours when he refused to stop taking pictures in a public area.

And police tactics seem to be becoming more menacing. Photographers have complained that the Metropolitan Police’s Forward Intelligence Team (FIT) — set up to target public disorder and anti-social behaviour by having high-visibility police officers use camera and video footage to gather intelligence — has started surveillance of press-card carrying journalists. They say that images of them are given a four-figure “photographic reference number” and held on a database.

All journalists covering a demonstration against restrictions in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act in March were catalogued by the FIT team. Photographers say they were even recorded while waiting outside a London hospital when Prince Philip was admitted for treatment of a chest infection in April. NUJ General Secretary Jeremy Dear wrote to Home Secretary Jacqui Smith in May, complaining of “intimidatory policing”. He cited examples of police officers who know journalists by name, follow them and film them all the time they are working.

Regular, low-level intimidation of photographers often goes unreported. David Hoffman, a freelance with more than 30 years experience, told the Journalist: “If you’re just walking down the street and taking a picture of police on the beat, when you’re well away from any problem and not causing an obstruction, they come over and interfere. “It happens constantly. In May I was taking pictures of the party on the London tube — the last day people could drink alcohol — from a good distance when two police officers started pushing me around and put a hand over my lens. There was no reason at all. I was simply recording the event and they stopped me because they thought they could. That’s a very typical incident. That will happen to me once a week if I’m out working.”

"The Mother of Democracies"

“If you have ten thousand regulations, you destroy all respect for the law” Winston Churchill

The British government has introduced 3,023 new criminal offences since 1997, figures released in 2006 showed

Given this kind of behaviour, the police sometimes seem like a law unto themselves. It’s simply not true: they may be a powerful interest group in their own right; they may have stacked the Independent Police Complaints Commission with pliant proxies and they may manage to oversee the deaths of more than 600 people in custody annually without too much political interference, but at the end of the day, they can only arrest protestors on anti-terrorism charges, detain people without trial for obscene periods of time and rough-up journalists if they have been given a great deal of legislative sanction to do so.

This is where the broader issue of we, the people – and our failure to push for the renewal of a political system ill-disposed towards us – come in. It is some irony that unelected members of the House of Lords have been the most vocal defenders of  civil liberties and a properly functioning legislature:

In July 2006, Lord Andrew Phillips of Sudbury, a City solicitor and philanthropist resigned from the House of Lords after having failed in his battle to prevent an ID cards bill passing. Parliament is producing a “ludicrous excess of legislative effluent” Phillips said, pointing out that 13,000 pages a year is far beyond what most parliaments pass.

Yet it’s not like ideas are thin on the ground: solid proposals for a better functioning, more transparent parliament have been knocking around for ages. The Better Government Initiative, a crusty group of elderly former civil servants  came up with a few commendable suggestions in a paper called Governing Well that they put out in 2006. Here’s a few of their recommendations:

R1: The capacity of Parliament to scrutinise the proposals of the Executive and to hold it to account for its decisions should be strengthened. Parliament should provide for more rigorous initial analysis of policy proposals; and retrospective review, after a suitable period of time has elapsed, of the costs and outcomes of policy and legislation actually achieved against those in the initial proposals.

R2: Before policy decisions are taken by the Government, proposals should be  thoroughly tested by objective analysis, by drawing on the experience of politicians in Parliament and in Government and of officials (including people familiar with delivery), and by wider consultation.

R3: The Government should establish a better balance between the strategic role of the Centre of Government in determining the overall policy framework and the operational role of departments in framing policies and delivering services in their specialist areas or responsibility.

R4:  Service deliverers – such as executive agencies, non departmental public bodies the NHS and local authorities – should be set clear objectives against which their performance will be monitored, but they should not be micro-managed by Departments or by the Centre of Government. Stability of structures and instructions from the Government is clearly desirable.

R5: Pressures from the media should be handled consistently in a way that avoids responses, let alone policy commitments, before the Government is ready. This intention should be explained to the public and to the media themselves.

R17: The volume of legislation should be reduced, and the quality of scrutiny (especially in the Commons) thereby increased, through stronger pre-introduction tests.

R18: the numbers and range of skills of staff supporting Select Committees should be increased so as to improve the speed, depth and range of their investigations

Whilst such language meet appear a touch arcane or dry as dust to some, it points to some massive failings in how our legislature is run and offers some substantial pointers in terms of how to rectify them.

Politicians like to complain about political apathy and cynicism amongst the electorate. Given the pathetic turnout rates in recent general elections, they have a point of course. But as Bertrand Russell once said (and I paraphrase because I can’t dig up the exact quote), “apathy is a combination of powerlessness and comfort: the powerlessness causes unrest and the comfort vitiates the desire to do anything about it; the result is apathy.”

We might appear powerless but we are also increasingly losing our comforts: will this be enough to shake off the above? It’s clear that whichever ideological viewpoint you look from, Britain is in urgent need of a massive political enema.

Some standing politicians have made promising suggestions, such as Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg’s call for a freedom bill to roll back excessive legislation. But as councils spy massively on citizen’s emails, police beat the crap out of people at peaceful protests and an unelected prime minister has his way with an almost bankrupt country, GK Chesterton’s words echo like a call to arms. A shame that so many seem to have concurred that beer is, indeed, best.

They have given us into the hands of the new unhappy lords,
Lords without anger and honour, who dare not carry their swords.
They fight by shuffling papers; they have bright dead alien eyes;
They look at our labour and laughter as a tired man looks at flies.
And the load of their loveless pity is worse than the ancient wrongs,
Their doors are shut in the evenings; and they know no songs.

We hear men speaking for us of new laws strong and sweet,
Yet is there no man speaketh as we speak in the street.
It may be we shall rise the last as Frenchmen rose the first,
Our wrath come after Russia’s wrath and our wrath be the worst.
It may be we are meant to mark with our riot and our rest
God’s scorn for all men governing. It may be beer is best.
But we are the people of England; and we have not spoken yet.
Smile at us, pay us, pass us. But do not quite forget.

__________________________________

*It’s interesting to note that this disciplining is in a sense the direct opposite of the resolution proposed by Friedrich Schiller for the conflict between two competing drives; that associated with law and reason and that “sensuous drive” associated with the personal appetite of individuals.

Where in the Panopticon the infringement of the latter on the former is what has landed inmates in the machine to start with and hence one of the key drives of the soul — for want of a better word – that must be disciplined and sterilised, Schiller in contrast argues for a resolution of the two drives through play. Creative play brings abstract form to sensual life, he wrote in his Letters on The Aesthetic Education of Man, and the result is beauty, harmony as “living form”.

***

I initially published this post in early April. It was written in a rush, lacked a lot of hyperlinks, had no paragraphing and was generally a bit of a mess. In the six months that I’ve been blogging it’s nonetheless been the post that consistently gets most hits…

So to save me some ongoing embarrassment at its flaws I decided to update it, patch the more obvious lacunae and “reprint” it, for it remains germane to the situation in England I think. Apologies for the repetition to those who’ve already read it; I hope it was of interest for those who haven’t.

by Mario Rizzo  

I admit upfront that I did not find David Brooks’s New York Times column on Mr. Bentham and Mr. Hume as updated characters at all amusing, funny or informative. I am sure I am in the minority. It is no comfort to me that Brooks seems to favor “Mr. Hume.” I leave it to Jeremy Bentham’s partisans to evaluate his portrayal.  

I think David Hume was one of the greatest political philosophers of all time.  

The first thing that annoys me is the “humorous” depiction of Hume as “at his desk with his head in his hands,”  “in the fetal position,” and “weeping.” All this because somebody asked him policy questions. I think it is more likely Hume would have patiently explained the errors involved in the proposed policies and then offered the individual a glass of wine.  

On Hume’s personality I turn to E.C. Mossner’s classic biography The Life of David Hume, 2^nd edition (Oxford, 1980):  

“The French learned to call him le bon David, but the epithet cannot be readily translated into one English word. To call Hume good would be misleading, for he was certainly no saint. In many ways, however, he was good: he was humane, charitable, pacific, tolerant, and encouraging of others, morally sincere and intellectually honest. He was always a loyal friend. He was, however, somewhat inclined to be jealous – jealous of his own reputation, jealous of the integrity of friendship, jealous of the prestige of his native country. Intellectually a citizen of the world, he was emotionally a Scot of Scots. He was, moreover, a worldly man who thoroughly enjoyed the good things of life – food and drink, wit, conversation, rational discourse. (p.4)  

…If he was ultimately acclaimed in France as Britain’s leading man of letters, not even there was his philosophy completely understood. Society is wont to deal unkindly with those it does not fully comprehend. Hume’s life was a constant struggle against odds – against financial straitness, poor health, family ambitions; against the power of names, the inertia of ideas, the forces of superstition and intolerance.” (p.5)  

On the more important point of Hume’s political philosophy, it is updated and adapted to the current medical care debate by David Brooks in this way:  

“The people on Mr. Hume’s side believe that government should actively tilt the playing field to promote social goods and set off decentralized networks of reform, but they don’t think government knows enough to intimately organize dynamic innovation.” (Emphasis added)  

So the contemporary Mr. Hume is a neo-conservative or a compassionate conservative or some such welfare-state accommodationist. 

I think it more accurate to say that Hume would favor an undoing of all the interventions in the healthcare industry that have created most of the mess in which we live today. He never would have advocated the wage-price controls that during World War II “tilted the playing field” toward employer-provided non-portable health insurance. Hume was not afraid to discuss history.  

Yes, Hume had conservative instincts but the society that welfare statists have built would have put stress on that. Hume as classical liberal – the values he held dear – would have no doubt been activated.

Hume idea of “tilting the playing field” was quite simple. He advocated:  

“… the stability of possession,…its transference by consent, and…the performance of promises. ‘Tis on the strict observance of these three laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor is there any possibility of establishing a good correspondence among men, where these are neglected. Society is absolutely necessary for the well-being of men; and these are as necessary to the support of society.”  (A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III).  

If this is the Humean “tilt” David Brooks means, I’ll accept it.

UPDATE: The usually good Greg Mankiw says this is “David Brooks at His Best.” I hope not.

FURTHER UPDATE: See Sheldon Richman’s excellent response to David Brooks.

LAST UPDATE: Greg Mankiw redeems his humor judgment (on another issue).

Sul NY Times, David Brooks parla della politica statunitense mettendo a confronto due personaggi che si chiamano, ma è un caso, Bentham e Hume. Mentre Hume è abbastanza sprovveduto, uno che non ha molte conoscenze tecniche e che non sa che decisioni prendere, lasciando che l’iniziativa privata faccia il suo corso, Bentham è invece un tizio che si informa costantemente e sa gestire la mole di informazioni, che prende decisioni, che fa in modo, per dirne una, che tutti ricevano in un modo o in un altro una copertura sanitaria completa.

David Hume (da Wikipedia)

Jeremy Bentham

(Questo è un post per studenti di Filosofia e Scienze Politiche)

Você já teve a impressão de estar sendo observado?

[...] consequencialismo, cujos grandes defensores incluem Jeremy Bentham e John Stuart Mill. Basicamente, eles dizem que não existem princípios externos abstratos como a ideia de Justiça que possam validar ou invalidar nossos atos. A única forma de julgá-los é através das consequências que acarretam. Vale dizer que são boas as ações que engendram bons resultados. No caso específico de Bentham (conhecido como pai do utilitarismo), o que importa é o princípio de utilidade, que pode ser traduzido na fórmula: “o maior bem para o maior número de pessoas”. [Hélio Schwartsman, 20/08/09]

O título do segundo episódio de Lie To Me meio que entrega de bandeja o destino da trama, mas tudo bem, tem algumas coisas interessantes pelo caminho.

Para começar, ele demonstra que a série não vai se apoiar na tecnologia para resolver os casos e sim na análise humana com o apoio da tecnologia, que pode ser mais influenciável e portanto passível de falha porém é o que apreende melhor a complexidade das ações e reações. E com humor.

A cena inicial mostra o Dr. Lightman e o representante de uma agência a testarem a eficácia de um novo modelo de polígrafo portátil. O polígrafo analisa a resposta corporal às perguntas [aumento da transpiração, pressão arterial, batimentos cardíacos, etc.]. Alguns especialistas dizem que o detetor de mentiras tem de 90 a 95% de acuidade, mas os psicológos reduzem essa margem de acerto para 60%.

O problema desse tipo de mecanismo é que ele deteta as variações corporais mas não o contexto em que essas variações acontecem. Quem tem hipertensão sabe que a pressão pode subir na hora de medir só pela presença do médico ou enfermeiro, por causa da ansiedade. Tem até um nome técnico pra isso: Síndrome do Jaleco Branco.

Por isso nem todos os sistemas judiciais aceitam o resultado do teste do polígrafo como prova comprobatória [eita nóis!]. No Brasil não se aceita, se não me engano, e mesmo nos EUA tem Estado que também não.

Isso não foi dito na série, eu que pesquisei. Por cima. E eu tenho a SJB.

A partir deste ponto há spoilers.

Como argumento para rejeitar a proposta de compra do tal polígrafo portátil modernoso o Dr. Lightman usa de truques simples e eficazes: refaz o interrogatório substituindo o pesquisador por uma moça vistosa em roupa justa. O resultado, que antes apontava “verdade”, agora declara que as mesmas respostas que o interrogado deu são “mentira” graças aos efeitos corporais que a entrada da moça vistosa provocou no… no… bom, no estado de espírito do cara.

Quando o mandachuva questiona o defensor da compra se ele investiu muito dinheiro da agência no projeto, outro truque do Dr. Lightman: ele tinha deixado um ovo nas mãos do cara, explicando que era um detetor de mentiras primitivo usado em julgamentos no oeste da África. O ovo é passado de mão em mão e aquele que o quebrar é considerado culpado. Não é invenção da série, é verdade.

Desdém, desprezo.

Isso tudo acima não significa que ele é contra a tecnologia, apenas contra a dependência total. É outro ponto a favor da série, pra mim. Eles usam o trequinho lá que identifica o stress na voz e câmeras para rever os interrogatórios nos dois casos da noite, uma soldado que denuncia o sargento por estupro e um jogador de basquete universitário acusado de aceitar suborno.

Aí entra a questão do utilitarismo mencionado na citação de abertura deste post, do nosso amiguinho Schwartsman. O leitor de Harry Potter talvez se lembre também da história da amizade entre Albus Dumbledore e Gellert Grindelwald no volume Relíquias da Morte, do ideal do Bem Maior. É o utilitarismo levado ao extremo, mas é. Mesmo assim, o enredo continua a não manipular o julgamento ético do espectador, o que é coisa difícil de fazer e rara de ver.

A construção dos personagens fixos começa a se definir bem aos pouquinhos. Desta vez a interação Lightman/Torres foi a que me atraiu mais – só que por enquanto serviu apenas para conformar a personalidade do Lightman.

Ayjizuis. Perdão pelo “conformar”. Tou coa cabeça nos trabalhos acadêmicos, esse trem gruda.

Dr. Cal Lightman: Sabe, eu queria…
Ria Torres: É, seu sei.
Dr. Cal Lightman: O que?
Ria Torres: Você teve um pequeno sorriso de gratidão. O que, está surpreso? Sério? Sabe, apenas porque eu não conheço a sua ciência não significa que eu não saiba das coisas.
Dr. Cal Lightman: Quando você NÃO sabe a ciência, você não vê o quadro todo. As pessos se ferem.
Ria Torres: O que foi isso? O que aconteceu?
Dr. Cal Lightman: O que?
Ria Torres: Vergonha. Quando disse que as pessoas se ferem, você se mostrou envergonhado.
Dr. Cal Lightman: Não sei do que você está falando.
Ria Torres: Você está mentindo.
Dr. Cal Lightman: Acostume-se com isso.

Post relacionado
[LieToMe] Pilot
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Verdade ou mentira, Alex Rodrigues?

O site da ESPN norte-americana brincou de Lie To Me em fevereiro de 2009, depois que A-Rod [o ex da Madonna, lembra] foi flagrado sob influência de esteroides. Na matéria do site tem o vídeo da declaração pública dele, a magem encontrei no blog TV by the numbers.

Theory of Surveillance: The PANOPTICON

The PANOPTICON was proposed as a model prison by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), a Utilitarian philosopher and theorist of British legal reform.

The Panopticon (“all-seeing”) functioned as a round-the-clock surveillance machine. Its design ensured that no prisoner could ever see the ‘inspector’ who conducted surveillance from the privileged central location within the radial configuration. The prisoner could never know when he was being surveilled — mental uncertainty that in itself would prove to be a crucial instrument of discipline.

French philosopher Michel Foucault described the implications of ‘Panopticism’ in his 1975 work Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison —

“Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. To achieve this, it is at once too much and too little that the prisoner should be constantly observed by an inspector: too little, for what matters is that he knows himself to be observed; too much, because he has no need in fact of being so. In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. In order to make the presence or absence of the inspector unverifiable, so that the prisoners, in their cells, cannot even see a shadow, Bentham envisaged not only Venetian blinds on the windows of the central observation hall, but, on the inside, partitions that intersected the hall at right angles and, in order to pass from one quarter to the other, not doors but zig-zag openings; for the slightest noise, a gleam of light, a brightness in a half-opened door would betray the presence of the guardian. The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheric ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen.”

excerpt from ‘Panopticism’ in Foucault, Michel Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison
(NY: Vintage Books 1995) pp. 195-228 translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (translation, 1977)

The New York Times has been covering the trial of former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin (and others) in what has become known as the Clearstream trial.  Basically, the accusation is that de Villepin faked a list of bank accounts, linked them to arms dealers, and then put Sarkozy’s name on it to try to ruin his political career and gain the presidency for himself.  If you remember, de Villepin was the guy who won the hearts of many on the American left when he denounced the U.S. war in Iraq at the UN.  He at one point was also the main political rival of the up-and-coming Sarkozy.

Anyway, something jumped out at me from today’s article that seems really important:

The trial itself has become a spectacle, given the Sarkozy-de Villepin rivalry, which also has elements of social and class prejudice. Mr. Sarkozy is a lawyer, while Mr. de Villepin went to elite schools, served as a diplomat, writes poetry but was never elected to any national post.

In 2004, for example, according to the magazine Le Point, Mr. de Villepin said, “Nicolas doesn’t have the makings of a man of state, because he has no interior labyrinth.” Mr. Sarkozy, he said, lacks “the mystery that is the strength of great men.” With Mr. Sarkozy, he added, “all is there, on the table, for the taking.”

“Some take this for arrogance, aggression,” he added. “In reality, it is weakness.”

via Bitter Political Trial Grips France – NYTimes.com.

There’s something there–about the role of language, both as an ethos and as a politics–that I think is very important, that I’ve been trying to capture in my own work, and that I think–if one properly understands the stakes of the problem–is very perplexing.

I’m all for poetry.  I’m all for beauty.  But labyrinthine politicians make me nervous, mostly because I’m a liberal in the classic sense of the term.  Jeremy Bentham, for example, equated metaphor with despotism in that it was a type of non-reasoning and therefore ultimately, as a politics, shear imposition of will.

The question I think is how to make sense of, and forge, a poetics for a post neoliberalism…

Illumination: The Secret Religion, September 18, 2009
Published here: Sunday, September 20, 2009 at 9:19 AM

[Jeremy] Bentham thought he had created the perfect prison design since, in theory, it would function just as well whether or not guards were actually present, and save a fortune on staffing costs, he believed. Prisoners, never knowing whether or not they were being watched, would be compelled to behave as if surveillance were constant and never ending. They would become their own guards. This is the precursor of Orwell’s Big Brother society where every citizen believes himself to be constantly monitored by the authorities via “telescreens”.

The Panopticon was never built during Bentham’s lifetime, but a number of buildings have been based on his concept.

Philosopher Michel Foucault used the Panopticon as a metaphor for “disciplinary” societies, and their desire to observe everyone and regulate everyone’s behaviour according to “acceptable norms”. Open-plan offices are a version of the Panopticon – everyone in the office can see and monitor everyone else. There are no hiding places. “CCTV society”, where cameras are positioned on every street corner, are part of the Panopticon tradition. If CCTV had been available to Bentham, he would undoubtedly have replaced guards with cameras and saved even more money. Vast, soulless, open-plan call centres where every member of staff is monitored at all times (by technology rather than by people) are almost perfect Panopticons. Bentham described the Panopticon as “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example.” It would be hard to imagine a more sinister statement: an early declaration of mind control by the authorities.

Foucault said that all hierarchical organisations such as the army, offices, factories, banks, businesses, hospitals, schools, police, the media, the government, have a Panopticon mind-set. All of the lower ranks are watching each other, and believe they are being watched by the higher ranks. They are self-policing, self-regulating, self-censoring. Conformity is absolute. Mavericks are never tolerated.

The power of a disciplinary society is maximised when people police themselves in relation to sexual, moral, social, religious, intellectual and psychological standards. Prisons, schools and offices are not there to rehabilitate, educate and provide a creative working environment, but to control and dominate, to produce conformity, to restrict freedom.

Read more >>>

Ada hal menarik dalam perdebatan RUU Rahasia Negara dan menjadi perhatian insan pers serta masyarakat sipil.

RUU Rahasia Negara memiliki landasan yaitu melindungi penggunaan informasi yang kelak akan digunakan pejabat publik. Landasannya sederhana, RUU Rahasia Negara merupakan pembatasan informasi yang berpengaruh terhadap  keamanan dan kepentingan publik.

Logikanya, jika informasi cukup “spesial”, informasi itu tidak dapat diakses cuma-cuma. Bagaimana jika, misalnya, rakyat menggunakan akses itu untuk kepentingan akademik ? Jika pejabat publik tidak dapat menggunakannya, bukankah rakyat juga mengalami hal serupa ? Hal ini akan menimbulkan polemik jika akses rakyat disamakan dengan pejabat. Menjadi lebih pelik lagi jika informasi yang digunakan rakyat, misalnya, juga dapat digunakan pejabat bersangkutan.

Dalam beberapa pasal dinyatakan, RUU Rahasia Negara melegalkan negara memonitor hampir seluruh informasi tentang aspek sosial, hukum, ekonomi, dan pertahanan yang termasuk peliputan gerak barang, informasi, dan aktifitas di dalamnya. Ini adalah anomali rezim demokratis yang seharusnya melegalkan prinsip dasar kebebasan dan keterbukaan.

Konsep “panopticion”

Pada dekade 1880-an, Jeremy Bentham mengeluarkan panopticion, konsep penjara untuk mengontrol manusia dalam penjara. Panopticion didesain dengan membatasi kesadaran narapidana dalam beraktifitas dan memberi kemudahan akses bagi sipir penjara untuk mengintai penuh kegiatan narapidana tanpa sepengetahuan narapidana.

Kontrol dilakukan dengan kaca khusus, membuat sipir leluasa mengawasi narapidana. Meski demikian, narapidana tidak menyadari bahwa kegiatannya diobservasi sipir (Bentham :1882).

Dalam analogi tipe pemerintahan, konsep panopticion menjadi ideal dengan ulah pemerintah atau institusi demokratis yang tidak meberi transparansi atau keterbukaan bagi rakyat untuk menikmati proses pemerintahan yang berjalan.

Dalam RUU Rahasia Negara terlihat upaya negara memonitor rakyat dalam keterbatasan akses dalam dimensi sosial atau ekonomi yang dianggap rahasia. Penerapannya memang tidak seekstrem konsep Bentham, tetapi tidak juga menjauhi konsep Bentham karena pembatasannya membuat negara menjadi katalisator bagi arus informasi yang berkembang biak. Dengan kata lain, memberi peluang bagi terciptanya ruang kebebasan dan keterbukaan untuk dimonopoli “sipir” berkedok negara.

Demokrasi Indonesia

Prospek kebebasan dan keterbukaan di Indonesia masih berkutat pada masalah kualitas institusi demokrasi dan komitmen mekanisme demokrasi. YB Mangunwijaya pernah mengingatkan, unsur komunisme dapat berada dalam sistem demokrasi saat kontrol negara menjadi ketat dan tidak memungkinkan masyarakat “menikmati” proses politik, sosial, dan ekonomi secara bebas (Mangunwijaya : 1997).

Setali tiga uang dengan Fareed Zakaria dalam The Future of Freedom : Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (2003) yang mengatakan, dilema antara korelasi kesuksesan instutusi demokrasi dan demokratisasi adalah saat sejumlah instutusi demokrasi dengan legitimasinya justru tidak menghadirkan prospek keterbukaan dan kebebasan yang positif.

Artinya, sejumlah partai politik, institusi, dan lembaga demokrasi kebanyakan tidak menjamin prospek kebebasan dan keterbukaan dalam berdemokrasi karena dalam beberapa kasus, tujuan ideal demokrasi menjadi tumpul saat berhadapan dengan negara monopolistik meski berstruktur demokratis.

India memberi contoh baik. Sebagai negara berkasta yang memberlakukan kebebasan informasi bagi rakyatnya dengan Right to Information Act, India tak saja menjamin rakyatnya untuk mengelola informasi, tetapi juga menanyakan masalah kritis mengenai kinerja tata pemerintahan (Newsweek, 15.06.2009).

Bagaimana Indonesia ? Sejak masa kemerdekaan, beragam gerakan muncul silih berganti dari zaman Petisi 50, masyarakat reformasi, masyarakat korban lumpur Lapindo hingga masyarakat korban pemilu, serta sejumlah kelompok lain, yang muncul sebagai repons atas kezaliman penguasa terhadap kebebasan dan keterbukaan. Namun, hasilnya masih jauh dari harapan.

Di balik umur proses transisi demokrasi yang mulai matang, muncul keresahan dalam perkembangan kebebasan dan keterbukaan. Salah satunya  adalah kemunculan RUU Rahasia Negara yang tidak saja bersifat politis, tetapi menjadi masalah serius ketika pada saat yang sama rakyat menghasilkan banyak pertanyaan terkait isu penegakan hukum, politik, keamanan, ekonomi serta transparansi birokrasi yang kian menghangat dan pada saat yang sama negara menghasilkan produk RUU yang berpotensi mengaburkan kondisi nyata yang ada.

Sumber :

Rahasia Negara dan Kebebasan, Arif Wicaksono | Analis Sosial-Politik ; Peminat Studi Demokrasi di Jurusan Ilmu Politik FISIP UI

In my second-latest post I mentioned Andre Breton’s Glass house.  The concept refers to a desire to take away the border between the public and the private. The glass house is a very contemporary concept,  being reflected among other things in popular culture and architecture.

Look around you, -what has been built in your city lately? Maybe you immediately think of a major glass box. The contemporary glass boxes are like giant Big brother houses. The border between inside and outside is becoming less clear, as is the border between public and private. Everybody can look into each others’ lives. We sacrifice our privacy but in return, we get fifteen minutes of fame. We feel the eyes of others on us.

Transparency can also be a positive concept, enabling “lies” and falsehoods to be exposed better. Sounds fine, but the trick is, who gets access to the exposed information? Transparency can act as a means for social control. The glass houses are not far from Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.

I have been wanting to do a post on Cass Sunstein for a while now, but I kept hoping that he would not be approved. Sadly, he was approved by the Senate as President Obama’s newly confirmed administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. Technically he is not what the White House would refer to as a czar because he actually had to be approved unlike the others such as Mark Lloyd, John Holdren, and Van Jones (now resigned). But he holds by far the most outlandish, unbelievably ridiculous ideas I have ever seen come across our government. This guy may need real professional help, or he just might be the biggest tree hugging animal rights kook ever!

Cass Sunstein believes that animals think, feel, and deserve equal rights and treatment as human beings. He has many times quoted authors who compare animals to slaves and say that a dog is more rational than a human baby. One of these quotes that Sunstein quoted was directly from a late 18th century social reformer by the name of Jeremy Bentham having said, “The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny.” And then he goes on to quote more. Can’t believe it? See it for your self here http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OoiHIbwRhSo.

Cass Sunstein also believes that animals should be able to have an attorney and bring lawsuits against humans. He wants to ban hunting all together, which of course you can see how this would in a very huge way affect the 2nd amendment. Cass is a major supporter of gun control. Sunstein thinks we should not be allowed to eat meat, we should not be allowed to remove rodents from our home if it causes them pain, AND restrictions on FARMING to prevent unnecessary animal suffering. This man also believes that ALL human beings should be organ donors, in other words, we should not have a choice. And the list goes on. His opinions really are far from that of any democrat, republican, or independent that I know. He does not reflect the will of the people, maybe the animals, but certainly not the people.

Now, here we are one day after Cass Sunstein’s approval by the Senate and he is already trying to push a new interpretation to The Bill of Rights. And although this is a surprise to most of us just learning of Cass Sunstein, it is no surprise to those who nominated and approved him into office. He has written a book in 2004 called “The Second Bill of Rights: FDR’S Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More than Ever” which comes from President Roosevelt’s proposal for a completely new set of bill of rights in 1944. And as published on www.wnd.com, in 2005 at Yale Law School, Sunstein opened a conference titled “The Constitution in 2020,” which spoke about changing the nature of the Constitution by 2020. We have to let Washington know that we do not approve of this right away! This is not acceptable and we will not stand for them changing our Bill of Rights or our Constitution. They knew who they were approving into office with the partisan vote of 57-40, and with it they gave this man way too much power. Read more about him and his proposed mandates here: Obama’s Regulatory Chief Pushes New ‘Bill of Rights’.

Resources:

http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=109529

http://gunowners.org/a090809.htm