The HANDSOME (Adjective) DICTATOR (Noun) sat in his AWESOME (Adjective) chair, as he COMPLETED (Verb) the BLANKS (Noun) to his own MADLIBS (Noun).

(Josef Stalin)

He’s a very silly man, isn’t he?

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A recent Facebook poll asked “Was George Bush the worst president ever?”  Whatever the shortcomings of Bush 43, it would be hard to imagine any rational standard by which the answer could be “Yes”.

By any yardstick, “the worst president ever” is a photo finish between Joe Stalin and Adolf Hitler, with, Nicolae Ceausescu in third place, and Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Papa Doc, and Saddam Hussein as also rans.  Compared to this horse race, there is little in the history of republican governments around the world that could ever really be called bad.

But perhaps the question was really “Was George Bush the worst US president ever?”  Even so, even focusing on the massive public debt he left to his successor, or on his socialistic  “no child left behind” initiative, it would be extreme hyperbole to label him as “the worst ever.”

My personal candidate for that title has to be “Honest Abe”Lincoln – the man who set in motion a four year orgy of killing during which over 1.1 million Americans were killed or maimed by American arms, and the 10th amendment to the US consititution perished in the flames of Richmond, never to be resurrected.  Let us never forget that Lincoln’s motivation for opposing the expansion of slavery to the West of the Mississippi was to prevent the importation of negroes into lands he wanted to keep for the white race; nor that the emancipation of the slaves was a cynical political ploy intended to bring about a slave uprising in the Confederacy and undermine the South’s war effort.  I’m not making this up.  It’s all there in the government records and the newspapers of the time.

A close second, by a hair’s breadth, would be Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  FDR took what was really no more than a minor bump in the road for the US stock market and manipulated it into a disaster that brought 15 years of economic misery for millions of Americans, with fall-out for the economies of the rest of the world that gave rise to WWII as a direct result.  The manufactured crisis of 1927 was another cynical political ploy, this time intended to finish the destruction of the United States constitution begun by Lincoln in 1861.  Roosevelt drove home every advantage he derived from the people’s woes to sieze more and more power for the presidency and the federal government, in a deliberate and carefully orchestrated program to put a final end to the limited government that the founding fathers had so carefully established.

Lincoln killed the sovereignty of the states, Roosevelt that of the individual.  It would be hard to find two more evil acts, in the history of this nation, perpetrated by those charged with preserving it.  Next to these enormities, anything any other president has done, or allowed by inaction to occur, is pretty small potatoes.  But beware.  A new candidate has emerged, and is bent on drawing the last vestiges of freedom in the world into his own hands, using the time honored ploy of acclaiming crises that the government must address – a “crisis” in real estate lending, a “crisis” in the automotive industry, a “crisis” in health care, a swine flu “crisis”,  a “crisis” in banking  an unemployment “crisis”, a climate change “crisis”, an energy “crisis”; and at every turn, the White House has a solution which requires the federal government to dip deeper in our pockets, to burden our lives with more restrictions, to (reluctantly) assume more emergency powers.

The wolf of despotism is at our doorstep.  What will you do to keep it at bay?

Hitler and Mussolini, the Axis Leaders Never Developed a Grand Strategy

All modern war is predicated on the full potential of a nation or alliance to fight a war.  This includes what is known in today’s parlance the DIME, or the Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic factors of national power. During the war the Axis powers almost exclusively fixated on the military dimension, especially at the operational and tactical level never coordinating a national or alliance grand strategy.  On the other hand the Allies were successful in doing so despite competing national interests of the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Early German Success in France Changed the Face of Warfare

The Germans and Japanese were victorious in the early years of the World War Two due to their application of the most modern forms of warfare and ability to exploit weaknesses in their opponents.  For the Germans this entailed the use of the “Blitzkrieg” or lightening war which used the combined arms team of tanks, artillery, and mechanized infantry with close air support coordinated by commanders in mobile command posts who were able to adapt to tactical considerations on the ground and exploit enemy’s weaknesses.  This involved the classic forms of applied mass, speed and firepower to overwhelm enemy defenses at critical points and the encouragement of initiative by commanders, the Auftragstaktik. Led by men such as Heinz Guderian, Erich Von Manstein and Erwin Rommel to name but a few, the German commanders overcame allied opposition as well as the occasional hesitancy of their own senior leaders to defeat Allied forces throughout Europe.  The blitzkrieg involved risk, but the Germans for the most part, with key exceptions such as at Dunkirk during the French campaign took risks and exploited weaknesses in Allied political goals, military coordination and operational art. The Allies were hampered by weak political leadership, an aversion to risk, an outmoded strategy and poor coordination of a force which outnumbered the Germans and included more tanks than the Germans could field.  The German armaments were not necessarily superior to the Allies, but were better used for the most part.

German skill at the operational level was exemplified in Poland, France and the Low Countries, a daring Norwegian operation, which could be described as one of the first joint operations in military history, the Balkans and North Africa as well as the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa.  Each of these operations had flaws, the most glaring being at the strategic level and lack of a Grand Strategy.  The operations also exposed weaknesses in logistics and limits to what the mechanized and tactical air forces could do when stretched too far, North Africa and Russia as cases in point.  The Germans would always be outnumbered and fighting a multi-front war because of their limited naval capability, both in surface units and U-Boats, as well as the lack of a strategic air capability which kept them from eliminating Britain from the war.  Hitler’s desire for German domination in Europe excluded a true coalition effort to make allies with powers in Europe such as Vichy France which shared an aversion to the British especially after the attack of the British Navy on the French fleet in North Africa.  Likewise Germany’s alliance with Mussolini’s Italy was more of a strategic liability than a true partner. Hitler’s aversion to the Soviet State prevented any more than a brief cooperation with the USSR which was ended by the German invasion of the USSR. The Germans also failed in their war strategy by not going to a total war effort until 1943 after the ascension of Albert Speer as the Armaments Minister.  Thus German forces had to fight war “on the cheap” so to speak for the first part of the war, especially in North Africa and in Russia. In Russia the vast expanse of the front forced the Germans to thin out their forces to dangerous levels and whose pathetic road and rail network limited the already limited ability of the Wehrmacht to supply its forces as they advanced deep into Russia.

Admiral Yamamoto One of the Few Japanese Leaders to Understand what the Japanese Faced in Going to War with the United States

In the Pacific the Japanese used fast carrier task forces and naval air power coupled with superior surface warfare groups of fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers operating in conjunction with land based Army and Naval air units to isolate and destroy allied naval forces and outposts throughout the Pacific.   The Japanese exploited their superiority to conduct their own form of blitzkrieg.

Despite Inflicting Crushing Defeats on the Allies in late 1941 and early 1942 the Japanese period of Conquest would be Short Lived

At the same time the Japanese, even more so than the Germans lacked the ability to fight a long war; something that the best and most realistic of the Japanese strategists, Admiral Yamamoto understood and warned his government about before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Likewise they like the Germans failed to develop a cohesive Grand Strategy in their war effort.  Competing priorities and inter-service rivalries between the Army and the Navy over resources, manufacturing priorities and war aims crippled Japanese efforts.  Despite this the Japanese used superior tactical application of forces, exploited Allied command and control weaknesses, numerical and qualitative superiority over dispersed and often obsolete Allied forces. The Allies in the opening phase of the war were often led by officers who had little respect for the Japanese and underestimated the Japanese skill at the tactical and operational level of warfare as well as the individual Japanese soldier and sailor, with tragic results.

USS Pope Being Blown out of the Water at the Battle of the Java Sea

The Japanese were constrained by limited resources and intense competition between the Army and Navy for those resources as well as a long term war in China which drew off the larger part of the Japanese Army and Army Air Forces.  The Japanese effort stalled after they lost much of their carrier fleet and experienced naval aviators at Coral Sea, Midway and the Guadalcanal Campaign.  The Americans, who assumed the mantle of the Pacific Theater after the initial Japanese success and weakness of British and Dutch forces in the Pacific and demands of the war in Europe began an aggressive defense and opened an offensive against the Japanese long before the Japanese believed that they would at Guadalcanal.

At the heart of the early German and Japanese success lay their superior application of the techniques and weapons of modern warfare on the land, sea and air against opponents who were initially ill-prepared to meet their onslaught.  They both had glaring weaknesses but their weaknesses in the early years of the war were masked by Allied ineptitude at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic.   Thus they were successful and at times wildly so, but in their success lay the seeds of their defeat.

Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill overcame Significant Conflicts of Interest to Build a Grand Strategy

The defeat of the Axis powers was in large part a combination of superior Allied strategy at the “grand strategy” level and lack of a corresponding Axis Grand Strategy; as well as the Axis powers inherent weaknesses in natural resources, manpower and industrial capabilities to fight multi-front wars, coupled with poor transportation and logistics capabilities for distant operations.

The US Navy Breaking of the Japanese Naval and Diplomatic Codes as well as the Cracking of the German Ultra Code and Capture of the Enigma Machine Greatly Enhanced Allied Intelligence

The cracking of Japanese Naval and diplomatic codes and the capture of the German Enigma code machine and code books aided Allied strategic planning, none or the Axis intelligence services rose to the challenges of the war. The Allied victory and Axis defeat was in fact a combination of what is called the DIME, the Diplomatic Intelligence Military and Economic factors which caused the Axis defeat.  While it is in part due to Allied strategy, Axis deficiencies in each of these areas played a part in their ultimate defeat.

Massive US Industrial Capacity Drove the Allied War Effort

On the Grand Strategic level there was no comparison. The Allies, even factoring in often conflicting national goals were able to coordinate a strategy to first defeat Germany and then Japan.  The Americans, British and Russians began such cooperation even prior to the American entry into the war through the Lend Lease, followed by the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which helped coordinate often disparate British and American strategies in Europe and Asia. Murray and Millett assert and I agree with the thesis that the British and Americans “came closest to designing a global strategy that accommodated their war aims.” (War to Be Won p.584) While close coordination with the Russians was illusory at best, the Western Allies were able to help keep the Russians in war the by helping to supply them (War to Be Won p.388), and on occasion launching operations which assisted the Russians, such as the invasion of Italy. The Italian invasion, though the pipe dream of Churchill to crack the “soft underbelly” of Europe was a key factor in the German decision to quit the Kursk offensive and redeploy Panzer Divisions, including SS formations to Italy and the West. This weakened the Germans in the face of the Russian counter offensive following Kursk which aided Russian success. The Axis powers knew no such coordinated strategic thinking.

Poor Italian Technology, Training and Organization Made them More of  a Burden to Germany than a Help

The Japanese, Germans and Italians ran separate wars based on their perceived national considerations at times which often ran contrary to the common needs of their coalition.  Italian actions in the Mediterranean caused a diversion in German efforts at key times, such as in Greece where the Germans had to save the Italians and delay the opening of Operation Barbarossa.  Italian incompetence forced the Germans to commit forces to North Africa, Greece, the Balkans and Italy upon its collapse which could have been used to great effect in Europe or Russia. The Japanese and Germans never coordinated their efforts to defeat either the western Allies or the Soviets.  The lack of a coherent Grand Strategy on the part of the Axis powers, especially in the early part of the war when Allied fortunes were at lowest ebb, was every bit as much a part of their ultimate defeat as was a coordinated or “superior” Allied strategy.

The lack of a coordinated Axis Grand Strategy was reflected in the way each fought its war, the Japanese were hindered by lack of natural resources, especially those most important in maintaining a war economy, fuels, metals, rubber and even foodstuffs for which they were dependant on foreign suppliers such as the United States.  They were also hindered by a war in China which consumed troops and supplies without a corresponding benefit.  (See Barnhart’s “Japan Prepares for Total War and Toland’s “Rising Sun.) Their inability to produce the machines of war in sufficient numbers to replace losses due to combat operations and their failure to keep up with advances in technology negated their initial success and superiority at sea and in the air.

US Naval Forces Would Dominate the Pacific

The Germans failed to mobilize their economy to a total war footing until after Stalingrad and the accession of Albert Speer to head Reich war production.   They also attempted to fight a multi-front war and were dependant on weak and unenthusiastic satellite states such as Romania and Hungary to hold what they deemed to be less important areas in order free up German units.  Likewise the Germans had not adequately prepared for the war at sea with sufficient surface, naval air or U-boat strength to win the battle of the Atlantic, nor had the Luftwaffe developed a strategic bombing capability with long range fighter escorts to win the Battle of Britain. German industrial efforts, even the great strides made after Speer took over war production were unable to keep pace with the massive production of the Americans and the Soviet Union.  The Red Army ground the Wehrmacht to dust on the Steppes of Russia, a key factor in that helped the American and British successfully invade Western Europe.

B-17s Over Europe

The preponderance of western Air, Naval, war production and natural resources enabled them to field Fleets, Armies and Air Forces which were unmatched in size or technical sophistication for their time in history.  The Japanese and the Germans had no way to win by 1944, short of developing and deploying Atomic weapons and delivery systems before the Americans and British did could defeat.  Murray and Millett note this in regard to Germany which had the Wehrmacht held out longer would have been the first target of the Atomic bombs. (War to Be Won p.483)

Atomic Bomb at Hiroshima, It could Have Been Berlin Instead

In summary the Axis powers were defeated by their own weaknesses in the diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic arenas as much as they were by superior Allied strategy.  This in no way negates the superior way in which the Allies marshaled their resources and coordinated a coherent Grand Strategy.  But even so the Allies by were running out of troops by the end of the European war.  Russian formations while still formidable were operating at greatly diminished strength by the end of the war and their losses “carried political and social consequences that were to burden the Soviet Union to its demise.” (War to Be Won p.483)  The British were bled dry and unable to keep up with losses suffered after Normandy. The Americans too suffered from a shortage of manpower, particularly in Army infantry forces, and had limited their Army to a mere 90 divisions of all types to fight a world war. They had diverted manpower to the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine Corps leaving the Army chronically short infantry. The Americans were forced into emergency drafts of troops from the Air Corps and other ancillary formations and support units to fill out infantry formations during the winter of 1944-45.  (See Russell Weigley’s book Eisenhower’s Lieutenants.” and Max Hasting’s “Armageddon” for a good treatment of the manpower situation in 1944-45) This is one point were the Americans took a risk that almost backfired on them and could have cost them victory.

Amendment II

A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.

Faksimile aus der GEO Epoche mit dem Stalin Special

NATO’nun İtalya’daki biriminin ismi Latince’de ‘kısa kılıç’ anlamına gelen Gladyo olarak nitelenirken, bu isim daha sonra NATO’nun cephe gerisi operasyonlarının genel ismi olarak anıldı. Suikast ve sabotaj düzenleme, kaos çıkarma, düşman ülkelerdeki Komünizm karşıtı ya da ayrılıkçı hareketleri örgütleyerek düşmanı zayıflatma gibi amaçlarla kurulan Gladyo doğrudan Amerikan istihbarat örgütü CIA tarafından finanse edilip eğitildi. İşte Gladyo’nun bilinmeyenleri:

HAZIRLAYAN: MEHMET NEDİM ASLAN

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında Hitler’e karşı ittifak kuran Sovyetlerin başını çektiği Doğu Bloku ve kendisini ‘Özgür Dünya’ olarak nitelendiren ve başını ABD’nin çektiği Batı dünyası Yalta’da bir araya geldiğinde çok az kişi aslında bir araya gelenlerin düşmanlar olduğunu düşünüyordu. Savaş sona ermişti ancak teamüller gereği galip devletler ile mağlupların oturup anlaşması yerine, galipler, ABD, SSCB ve İngiltere, bir araya gelerek dünyanın paylaşımını görüştü. İngiltere Başbakanı Winston Churchill’in de hazır bulunduğu Yalta adasında ABD Başkanı Franklin Roosevelt ve SSCB lideri Josef Stalin dünyayı paylaşırken, birbirlerinin alanlarına müdahale etmeme üzerine de anlaştı.

DÜŞMANLAR YENİ BİR SAVAŞ İÇİN ANLAŞTI

İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesinden hemen sonra yapılan Yalta Konferansı’nda dünyanın paylaşılması kararı, bir anlamda yeni bir savaş anlamına geliyordu. Milyonlarca insanın hayatını kaybettiği ve Avrupa’nın neredeyse yerle bir olduğu İkinci Dünya Savaşı Almanya ve müttefiklerinin yenilgisiyle sona ererken, Nazi tehdidinin ortadan kaldırılmasıyla geleceği umut edilen barış yerini bir kez daha 45 yıl sürecek bir ‘savaşa’ bıraktı. Adına Soğuk Savaş denilen ve 1990 yılına kadar süren ‘gerilim siyaseti’, hem Sovyetler’in himayesindeki Doğu Bloku’nu hem de ABD’nin himayesindeki adına ‘Özgür Dünya’ denilen ülkeleri birbirlerine karşı savunmaya itti.

NATO’YA KARŞI VARŞOVA KURULDU

Batı Avrupa ülkeleri Belçika, Hollanda, Lüksemburg, Fransa ve İngiltere’nin1948 yılında imzaladığı Brüksel Anlaşması ile olası bir Sovyet işgaline karşı ortak hareket etme kararı alırken, böyle bir ortaklığa ABD’nin de dahil edilmesinin Avrupa’yı daha da güçlendireceği görüşü benimsendi. Brüksel Anlaşması’na imza atan ülkeler Amerika’da bir araya gelerek ABD’nin katılımıyla 1949 yılında NATO’yu kurdu. NATO’nun kurulması, Sovyetler’in başını çektiği Doğu Bloku ülkelerini de harekete geçirdi ve Batı Almanya’nın NATO’ya katılmasını fırsat bilen Doğu Bloku, Polonya’nın başkenti Varşova’da bir araya gelerek 1955′te Varşov Paktı’nı (Dostluk, İşbirliği ve Karşılıklı Yardım Anlaşması) kurdu.

NATO’NUN CEHPE GERİSİNDEKİ GÜÇLERİ

Savaş (İkinci Dünya Savaşı) sonrası ortaya çıkan ‘her an savaş olabilir’ durumunun teyakkuze geçirdiği taraflar tam 45 yıl boyunca perde arkasında büyük bir mücadele yürüttü. Batı Avrupa’da Komünist ve diğer sol partilerin güçlenmesi, Sovyet tehdidi olarak algılanırken NATO bu tehdidi bertaraf etmek için kendi bünyesinde her ülkede özel birimler oluşturdu. Sovyet işgaline karşı cehpe gerisinde bir direniş başlatmak amacıyla ABD ve İngiltere tarafından kurulan adına ‘Stay-Behind’ denilen kontrgerilla yapılanması NATO’ya üye ülkelerin hepsinde farklı isimler altında yeniden organize edildi.

SUİKAST, KAOS ÇIKARMA, CEHPE GERİSİNİ ÖRGÜTLEME

Örgütün İtalya’daki biriminin ismi Latince’de ‘çift başlı kılıç’ anlamına gelen Gladyo olarak nitelenirken, bu isim daha sonra NATO’nun cephe gerisi operasyonlarının genel ismi olarak anıldı. Suikast ve sabotaj düzenleme, kaos çıkarma, düşman ülkelerdeki Komünizm karşıtı ya da ayrılıkçı hareketleri örgütleyerek düşmanı zayıflatma gibi amaçlarla kurulan Gladyo doğrudan Amerikan istihbarat örgütü CIA tarafından finanse edilip eğitildi.

GRAMSCİLERİN MUSSOLİNİ’DEN İNTİKAMI

Tüm NATO ülkelerinde başta içerideki düşmana yakınlık gösterebilecek unsurları (Komünist partiler ve sol dernekler)kontrol eden ve NATO bünyesinde CIA tarafından yönetilen bu örgütlerin en çok konuşulanı İtalya’daki Gladyo örgütü. İkinci Dünya Savaşı öncesind Duçe lakaplı Benito Mussolini, İtalya’da aralarında Antonio Gramsci’nin de bulunduğu Komünist Parti yöneticileri ve üyelerini sert bir şekilde bastırırken, Komünistler bu sefer savaş sırasında kaçan Mussolini’yi idam ederek intikamlarını almıştı. Sol-sağ ayrışmasının en keskin olarak görüldüğüülkelerden biri olan İtalya’da İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra yıkılan Fazişm’den sonra güçlenen Komünist partiler, ABD tarafından SSCB’nin İtalya’daki uzantıları olarak değerlendirildi. İtalya’da kurulan Gladyo, bu sebeple sadece olası Sovyet işgaline karşı cephe gerisindeki faaliyetlerinin dışında, içerideki ‘düşmanın’ güçlenmesini önlemek için iç politikada büyük bir rol oynadı.

‘28 ŞUBAT STRATEJİSİ’ OLUŞTURULDU

İlk defa 1953 yılında İtalyan Savunma Bakanlığı bünyesinde oluşturulan NATO’ya bağlı Gladyo, 1970′lı yıllarda Komünistlerin yükselen desteğiyle İtalyan siyasetine yön vermek amacıyla Türkiye’deki 28 Şubat ve 2007 Temmuz seçimleri öncesi üretilen “Gerilim Stratejisi” planı benzeri planlar devreye sokuldu. 1920′li yıllarda Mussolini’nin 1937 yılında ölene kadar hapiste tuttuğu Komünist Parti lideri Antonio Gramsci’nin “Hegemonya” kavramıyla ortaya koyduğu toplum mühendisliği çalışmaları ekonomiden, siyasete, sivil toplum örgütlerine kadar tüm kurumlar üzerinde Gladyo eliyle gerçekleştirildi.

BAŞBAKAN, GLADYO’NUN VARLIĞINI KABUL ETTİ

İtalya’da 1970′li yıllarda meydana gelen bombalama olayları, Başbakan Aldo Moro’nun Kızıl Tugaylar isimli sol bir örgüt tarafından kaçırılıp öldürülmesi olayı (1978), Bologna tren istasyonundaki bombalama olayı (1980) hep Gladyo ile irtibatlandırıldı. İtalya’da siyaset-mafya ve faili meçhul cinayetleri araştıran Yargıç Felice Casson’un Roma’daki askeri istihbarat arşivinde elde ettiği belgelerde varlığı resmileştirilen Gladyo, 24 Ekim 1990 yılında dönemin Başbakanı Giulio Adreotti tarafından da kabul edildi. 7 defa İtalyan Başbakanlığı yaparak bu alandaki rekoru Süleyman Demirel ile paylaşan Andreotti, parlamentoda yaptığı açıklamada İtalya’nın NATO’nun cehpe gerisindeki ‘Stay Behind’ ordusuna sahip tek ülke olmadığını itiraf etti. Andreotti aynı zamanda İtalya’da hükümet olan herkesin Gladyo’nun varlığı konusunda bilgilendirildiğini de söyledi.

OLAĞANÜSTÜ HAL İLAN ETMEK İÇİN BOMBALI SALDIRI DÜZENLEDİLER

Andreotti’nin açıklamalarıyla ilk defa devlet tarafından varlığı kabul edilen Gladyo, İtalya’da 1990′lara kadar işlenen birçok siyasi cinayet ve bombalama olayıyla irtibatlandırıldı. Gladyo’nun İtalya’da Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca izlediği “Gerilim Stratejisi” ilk defa 1964′te “Operation Solo” ismi verilen sessiz bir darbeyle General Giovanni de Lorenzo Sosyalist bakanların hükümetten ayrılmak zorunda bırakmasıyla uygulamaya konuldu. 1969 yılında Milan’ın Piazza Fontana bölgesindeki Milli Tarım Bankası’na yönelik faşist grupların gerçekletirdiği bombalama eyleminin CIA destekli bir Gladyo operasyonu olduğu belirlendi. Bombalama olayında 17 kişi hayatını kaybederken, 88 kişi yaralanmıştı. Bombalama olayından çok daha sonra itiraflarda bulunan dönemin Avanguardia Nazionale isimli neo-faşist hareketin üyelerinden Vincenzo Vinciguerra, bombalamanın amacının siyasi ve askeri otoriteyi olağanüstü hal ilan etmeye zorlamak amaçlı olduğunu söyleyecekti.

P2 MASON LOCASI DEVREYE GİRİYOR

Piazza Fontana olayından bir yıl sonra İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda İtalyan ordusunda komutanlık yapmış olan ve Mussolini taraftarlarınca ‘kahraman’ olarak görülen Junio Velrio Borghese başarısız bir darbe girişiminde bulundu. Darbenin başarısız olmasından sonra Borghese İspanya’ya kaçarken, olayla ilgili olarak tanıkların ifadelerinde Borghese’nin darbe planı için P2 Mason Locası lideri Licio Gelli ve Sicilya mafyası ile işbirliği yaptığı öne sürüldü. 1972 yılında Peteano köyü yakınlarındaki bir bombalama olayında 3 polis hayatını kaybetti ve bu olayı olayda kullanılan patlayıcılar dikkate alındığında Kızıl Tugaylar isimli örgütün yaptığı açıklandı. Ancak olayı araştıran Savcı Felice Casson 1984′te bombalama olayından sonra polisin olayın üzerini örttüğünü ve Kızıl Tugaylar’ın kullandığı patlayıcılar kulllandığına dair açıklamaların gerçek dışı olduğunu ortaya çıkardı.

İSTİHBARAT SERVİSİ YARDIM ETTİ

Olayı gerçekleştiren Komünizm karşıtı faşist bir örgütlenme olan Avanguardia Nazionale’nin üyesi Vincenzo Vinciguerra tarafından gerçekleştirildiği ve olaydan hemen sonra Vinciguerra’nın İspanya’ya kaçmasında İtalyan gizli servisinin yardım ettiği belirlendi. 1984′teki duruşmasında Vinciguerra, Peteano katliamının nasıl gerçekleştirildiğini ve olayın devletin içindeki Gladyo yapılanmasının nasıl organize ettiğini detaylarıyla anlattı.

P2 MASON LOCASI ÜYESİ TUTUKLANDI

“Gerilim Stratejisi”nin en yoğun yaşandığı İtalya’da Peteano saldırısından iki yıl sonra gerçekleştirilen katliamda Gladyo’nun P2 locası ayağını deşifre etti. 1974′te Italicus Express treninde 12 kişinin öldüğü bombalama olayı ile Brescia kentinde gerçekleştirilen ve 8 kişinin öldüğü Piazza della Loggia bombalama olayları, askeri istihbarat lideri ve P2 Mason locası üyesi Vito Miceli’nin tutuklanmasına sebep oldu. Miceli, devlete karşı komplo kurma suçlamasıyla tutuklandı.

BAŞBAKAN ALDO MORO’NUN ÖLDÜRÜLMESİ

Bombalama olayları ve suikastlerle çalkalanan İtalya belki de en dramatik olaylarından birini 1978 yılında yaşadı. 1976 yılı seçimlerinde yüzde 34 oranında oy alarak büyük başarı elde eden İtalyan Komünist Partisi ile adına ‘Tarihi Uzlaşma’ adı verilen uzlaşmayı sağlayan Hıristiyan Demokrasi Partisi lideri Başbakan Aldo Moro, 16 Mart 1978 yılında Kızıl Tugaylar örgütü tarafından kaçırıldı. Kaçırıldıktan sonra süren görüşmelerde serbest bırakılacağı düşünülen Moro, Mayıs 1978′de öldürüldü ve cesedi bir arabanın bagajında partisinin Roma’daki merkezi yakınlarında bulundu.

GLADYONUN BAŞINDA BİR MASON

İtalyan askeri istihbaratı, Moro’nun öldürülmemesi karşılığında 16 arkadaşlarının serbest bırakılmasını isteyen Kızıl Tugaylar’ı dinlemedi ve aksine örgüte yönelik baskınlar düzenledi. Moro’nun öldürülmesinden sonra P2 Mason Locası’nın üyesi olan İtalyan gizli servisinin lideri ihmalkarlıkla suçlandı. Moro’nun öldürülmesiyle ilgili araştırma yapan Gazeteci Mino Pecorelli, Aldo Moro’nun kaçırılmasının devlet için gizli örgütün izin verdiğini söyledi.

BAĞLANTILARI ORTAYA ÇIKARAN GAZETECİ ÖLDÜRÜLDÜ

Moro’nun kaçırılıp öldürülmesi ile Gladyo arasında bağlantılar ortaya çıkaran Gazeteci Pecorelli de bir yıl sonra öldürüldü. Dönemin Başbakanı Giulio Andreotti’nin emriyle öldürüldüğü iddia edilen Pecorelli ismi P2 Mason Locası’nın eski liderlerinden Licio Gelli’nin listesinde bulundu. Pecorelli suikastinin emrini verdiği gerekçesiyle 2002 yılında 20 yıl hapse mahkum edilen eski Başbakan Giulio Andreotti’nin cezası yüksek mahkeme tarafından temyiz edildi ve Andreotti hapis yatmaktan kurtuldu.

BOLOGNA TREN İSTASYONU KATLİAMI VE P2 LİDERİNİN TUTUKLANMASI

İtalya, Aldo Moro’nun öldürülmesinin şokunu yaşarken iki yol sonra bu sefer Bologna tren istasyonuna konulan bombanın infilak etmesi sonucu 85 kişi hayatını kaybetti. Parlamentoda terör üzerine kurulan komisyonu, yaptığı araştırmada kanlı olayın Gladyo’ya uzandığı sonucunu ortaya koydu. 1995 yılında Nuclei Armati Revoluzionari isimli neo-faşist bir örgütün üyeleri Valerio Fioravanti ve Francesca Mambro ömür boyu hapse mahkum edildi. Olayla ilgili olarak P2 Mason Locası’nın lideri Lici Gelli de soruşturmayı başka tarafa yönlendirdiği gerekçesiyle hapis cezası aldı.

MORO’NUN MEKTUPLARINI BULAN GENERAL ÖLDÜRÜLDÜ

Aldo Moro suikasti ve Bologna bombalamalarıyla çalkalan İtalya 1982 yılında da Aldo Moro’nun Gladyo’ya ilişkin mektuplarını bulan ve 1979′da öldürülen Gazeteci Mino Pecorelli’nin öldürüleceği iddiasında bulunduğu General Alberto Dalla Chiesa da bir suikaste kurban gitti. 1990 yılında dönemin Başbakanı Giulio Andreotti’nin varlığını kabul ettiği ve NATO üyesi tüm ülkelerde benzeri yapılanmaların olduğunu itiraf ettiği Gladyo, diğer ülkelerde farklı isimler adı altında örgütlendi.

DİĞER AVRUPA ÜLKELERİNDEKİ GLADYO TİPİ YAPILANMALAR

Gladyo’nun İtalya’da deşifre olmasıyla birlikte diğer Avrupa ülkelerindeki benzeri yapılanmalar da hükümetler eliyle sessiz bir şekilde dağıtıldı. Belçika’da askeri istihbarat servisi SGR, Yunanistan’ta Operation Sheepskin, Fransa’da Rainbow (Plan Pleu olarak başlamıştı), Danimarka’da Absalon isimleriyle örgütlenen NATO’nun cephe gerisi yapılanmaları İngiltere, Almanya, İspanya, Portekiz, Avusturya, Norveç’te istiharat örgütleri bünyesinde çalıştı. NATO’nun Türkiye’deki Gladyo benzeri örgütlenmesinin Özel Harp İdaresi olduğu iddia edilirken, örgütün kod isminin Ergenekon olduğu belirtiliyor.

AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSUNUN GLADYO KARARI

İtalya ve diğer Avrupa ülkelerinde deşifre olan Gladyo 22 Kasım 1990 yılında Avrupa Parlamentosu’nda alınan bir kararla kınandı ve tam bir soruşturma yapılması istendi. Kararda, 40 yıl boyunca mevcut istihbarat örgütlerine paralel olarak Avrupa Topluluğu üyesi ülkelerde gizli örgütlenmelerin olduğu ve bu örgütlerin demokratik kontrolden kaçtığı belirtilerek, bu örgütlerin ABD ve NATO tarafından kontrol edildiği kaydedildi. Tüm üye ülkelerdeki bu illegal yapılanmaların ortadan kaldırılması çağrısı yapılan kararda, NATO, ABD ve Avrupa Topluluğu üyesi ülkeler nezdinde soruşturma yapılması çağrısı yapıldı. Avrupa Parlamentosu’nun 19 yıl önce almış olduğu bu karar tam olarak yerine getirilmiş değil.

GLADYO VE MASON LOCASI İLİŞKİSİ

İtalya’daki Gladyo itiraflarından sonra diğer Avrupa ülkelerindeki benzeri örgütlerin varlığı kabul edildi ve bu örgütler Sovyetler’in yıkılmasından sonra sessiz bir şekilde dağıtıldı. Gladyo üzerine birçok kitap yazmış ve araştırma yapmış olan İngiliz Gazeteci Philip Willan’a göre 1990′lardan sonra Gladyo’nun ortadan kalktı. P2 Mason Locası ve Gladyo arasındaki ilişkiyi sorduğumuz ünlü Gazeteci Willan, her iki örgütün de gizli olduğunu ve Gladyo’nun başındaki asker ve istihbarat yöneticilerinin Mason olduğunu ifade ediyor.

MASON LOCASININ EN ETKİLİ GAZETEYİ KONTROLÜ

Gladyo’nun gün ışığına çıkarılması konusunda medyanın İtalya’da önemli bir rol oynadığına işaret eden Willan, aynı şekilde Gladyo’nun gün yüzüne çıkarılmaması için de başka medya gruplarının çalışmasına dikkat çekiyor: “Medya, birkaç dürüst ve zeki savcıyla birlikte İtalya’daki Soğuk Savaş döneminin komplolarını gün ışığına çıkarma konusunda önemli bir rol oynadı. La Unita, Paese Sera, La Republica ve L’Espresso gibi gazete ve dergiler, işlenen birçok suçun kamuoyunun gündemine taşınmasında önemli rol oynadı. Aynı şekilde medyanın bu konudaki önemi P2 Mason locası tarafından da kavrandı ve loca İtalya’nın en etkili gazetesi olan Corriera della Sera’nın kontrolünü ele aldılar. Medyada kendilerine yakın bir gazeteciler ağı kurdular. P2 Locası’nın medya ve yargı üzerindeki kontrolü nedeniyle gerçeklerin ortaya çıkmasını geciktirdi ve bu yüzden hala tam olarak ne olduğu konusunu tam olarak bilmiyoruz” dedi.

GLADYO VE P2 MASON LOCASI: GÖRÜNMEZ BİRER ORDU

P2 Mason Locası ile Gladyo arasındaki ilişkiye dair olarak Willan, her ikisinin gizli bir yapılanmaya sahip olduğunu ve bu ikisi arasındaki ilişkinin tam olarak açığa çıkarılmadığını kaydediyor: “Her iki organizasyon da Komünizm karşıtıydı. P2 Locası’nın Gladyo üzerinde büyük etkisi olduğu büyük bir ihtimal. Çünkü, askeri ve istihbarat örgütünün yöneticileri locanın üyesiydiler. P2 Locası’nın başındaki eski isim Licio Gelli ile röportaj yaptığımda bana, ‘Her ikisi de görülmez birer ordu’ demişti. Yine aynı şekilde Gladyo’da görevli bulunanlardan bazılarının Benito Mussolini’nin destekçileri ve İspanya İç Savaşı’nda General Franco için gönüllü savaşmış kimseler olduğunu söylemişti.”
ERGENEKON: MASONLUĞUN KILINCI-TIKLAYINIZ
HABERVAKTİM/ÖZEL

Today is not just Constitution Day in Azerbaijan.  It will not merely be remembered as the day that Voyager I flew by Saturn.  Hopefully it will not only be remembered as the day Charles Manson was born!  It’s a monumental day for so many reasons.  Follow me down this brief November 12th timeline:

0607: Boniface III ends his reign as Catholic Pope (Thank God!)

1859: Jules Leotard performs 1st Flying Trapeze circus act (Paris) He also designed garment that bears his name

1897: Karl Marx was born

1927: Josef Stalin became the undisputed ruler of the Soviet Union as Leon Trotsky was expelled from the Communist Party.

1936: Oakland Bay Bridge opens

1954: Ellis Island closed after processing more than 20 million immigrants since opening in New York Harbor in 1892

1955: Date Martin Seamus McFly returned to in “Back to the Future” and “Back to the Future II”

1983: A beautiful, wide-eyed baby boy (destined for greatness) was born to Tina L. Gonzales and Kyle B. Owens

1997: Ramzi Yousef was found guilty of masterminding the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.

2004: Resignation of Colin Powell as Secretary of State

2006: Gerald R. Ford surpassed Ronald Reagan as the longest-lived U.S. president at 93 years and 121 days (And then promptly died the following month.)

2008: Same-sex marriages began in Connecticut, a month after the state Supreme Court ruled that gays had the right to wed.

Happy Birthday: Maximilian von Weichs (1881), Karl Marx (1897), Charles Manson (1934), Al Michaels (1944), Sammy Sosa (1968), Tonya Harding (1970), Anne Hathaway (1982), Omarion (1984)

Alexander Kefeli

Alexander Kefeli  hat ein Leben hinter sich, wie es nur das 20. Jahrhundert schreiben konnte. 93 Jahre ist er jetzt alt, versorgt sich selbst, kauft einmal in der Woche ein. Nur sein Fahrrad schiebt er mittlerweile lieber, als im Sattel zu sitzen. Er gehört dem fast vergessenen und im Westen so gut wie unbekanntem Volksstamm der Chasaren an, die vor dem Aufstieg der Kiewer Rus vom siebten bis neunten Jahrhundert den ganzen Kaukasus beherrschten und in Toponymen noch immer präsent sind. Das Kaspische Meer ist im Arabischen, Türkischen und Farsi nach den Chasaren, einem Turkvolk, benannt, aber auch Charkow geht auf eine chasarische Siedlung zurück, die einst Scharukan hieß. 1943 verließ Alexander Kefeli dieses Charkow in den Wirren des Krieges. In zwei Lazaretten hatte er verwundete deutsche Soldaten versorgt. eine gefährliche Vita, wenn man noch dazu einem Volk angehörte, das in der Blüte seiner Macht zum Judentum konvertiert war. Die “Juden des Nordens” hatten denn auch besonders unter dem tyrannischen “Vater aller Völker”, Josef Stalin zu leiden.

 ”Ich danke Gott, daß mein Bruder damals in Prag saß und uns herausholen konnte”, erinnert sich Alexander Kefeli. “Man hätte mich sonst bestimmt an die Wand gestellt oder in den Gulag geschickt.” Der Vater verstarb noch in Charkow, der heutigen Partnerstadt von Nürnberg, die Mutter konnte nachkommen. Bis zum Ende des Krieges fand sich immer wieder Unterkunft und Arbeit in Böhmen, bis dann im Mai 1945 die Gefahr zu groß wurde, den vorrückenden „Genossen“ in die Hände zu fallen. Mit viel Glück gelang es ihm, sich nach Sachsen durchzuschlagen, bevor es die Amerikaner an die Sowjets abgaben. Von da zogen sie weiter nach München und schließlich nach Erlangen Als die Brüder schon in Franken waren, ging über einen Kurier, der die Anschrift auswendig lernte und die Sendung erst jenseits der Grenze abschickte, damit der Brief nicht geöffnet wird, eine Nachricht an die in Prag zurückgebliebene Mutter. Wie durch ein Wunder erreichte sie die Botschaft der Söhne, und es gelang ihr, ihnen nachzukommen. Die Kontrollen hatten damals noch nicht den Charakter des Eisernen Vorhangs, offenbarten noch menschliche Züge, wie eine Episode zeigt: Der Bruder wurde bei der Flucht vom Grenzschutz gestellt. Doch als er sagte, er wolle in ein freies Land, wo er selbst bestimmen könne, ob er seine Kinder in die Kirche schicke oder nicht, erwiderten die Beamten: “Stimmt, diese Freiheit hast du hier nicht mehr. Mach, daß du weiterkommst.”

Die ganze Verwandtschaft Alexander Kefelis emigrierte später in die USA. Er blieb in Erlangen, weil er hier sein Ingenieursstudium abschließen konnte. Deutsch hatte er schon in der Schule und später in den Lazaretten gelernt. Nun profitierte er davon, daß Fachkräfte gebraucht wurden und man auch all die schon älteren Semester der Heimkehrer aus den Kriegsgefangenenlagern integrieren mußte. So war es damals möglich, mit 40 Jahren bei Siemens Arbeit zu finden, Arbeit, die Alexander Kefeli in Erlangen hielt.

In die alte Heimat wollte er nie mehr zurück. Nicht als die Kommunisten noch herrschten. “Die hätten mich sofort eingesperrt oder noch viel schlimmere Sachen mit mir gemacht. Für die war ich doch ein Kollaborateur und Vaterlandsverräter.” Auch später nicht: “Ich will nicht die ganze Armut dort sehen, und eine richtige Demokratie gibt es da ja auch noch nicht.” Lieber schickt Alexander Kefeli via Rathaus und Erlangen-Haus huckepack mit einigen Tafeln Schokolade Geldscheine an seine Wladimirer Brieffreundinnen. “Bevor ich das Geld für Reisen ausgebe, schicke ich es lieber nach Wladimir. Die können es besser brauchen.” Die Teuerung dort, drohende Arbeitslosigkeit… Alexander Kefeli verfolgt die soziale und politische Entwicklung genau.

Die Freundschaften entstanden schon Anfang der 90er Jahre, als die ersten Erzieherinnen aus Wladimir in der Partnerstadt das ABC der Waldorfpädagogik erlernten. Immer wieder kamen sie zu Hospitationen, vermittelt von Helge Köhler, bauten einen Waldorfkindergarten in Wladimir auf und fanden in Erlangen viele Freunde. Alexander Kefeli, immer auf der Suche nach Gelegenheiten für russische Konversation, sprach die Besucherinnen eines Tages einfach auf der Straße an, fragte nach dem Woher und Wohin, und so entstand eine Freundschaft, die bis heute Bestand hat. Die Frequenz der Korrespondenz übertrifft jedenfalls alle übrigen aktenkundigen Briefwechsel zwischen Erlangen und Wladimir. Alexander Kefeli freut sich besonders, daß eine seiner Briefpartnerinnen, Natalia Tarakanowa, mittlerweile im “Blauen Himmel” mitarbeitet. Nun hofft er, daß sie bald einmal wieder nach Erlangen kommt. Vielleicht schon im nächsten Jahr? 

Bis dahin vertieft sich Alexander Kefeli – ohne Brille! – weiter in seine Bibliothek mit Werken von Nikolaj Nekrassow, Alexander Puschkin, Michail Lermontow. “Die russische Lyrik muß man im Original lesen. Die Wärme und Geschmeidigkeit der russischen Sprache läßt sich nicht übersetzen. Eine Übersetzung mag noch so richtig sein, sie trifft doch nie den Zauber des Russischen.”

Die Sprache der chasarischen Vorfahren ist im Russischen aufgegangen. Anklänge an deren Geschichte findet man noch in dem Poem “Ruslan und Ludmila” von Alexander Puschkin, zur Oper verarbeitet von Michail Glinka, wo ein chasarischer Fürst mit einem warägischen Rivalen um die schöne Ludmila eifert. Derselbe Alexander Puschkin schildert in seinem “Lied vom Wahrsager Oleg”, wie der sich anschickt, an den unverständigen Chasaren Rache zu nehmen. “Как ныне сбирается вещий Олег отомстить неразумным хазарам”, zitiert Alexander Kefeli aus dem Gedächtnis. Er mußte das Zitat schon in der Schule dauernd hören, wenn man ihn foppen wollte. “Die meinten es nicht böse.” Mit Unverständnis und Unkenntnis begegnet man ja bis heute diesem Volk. Sogar der große Arthur Koestler hat ihm mit seinem letzten Werk “Der dreizehnte Stamm” eher einen Bärendienst erwiesen, wenn er behauptete, das Ostjudentum stamme von den Chasaren.

So interessant die Geschichte des Volkes sein mag, Alexander Kefeli freut sich auf seinen nächsten Besuch, eine Dame, die an Krebs erkrankt ist, und die er mit einigen Witzen erheitern will. “Die kann so herzhaft lachen!” Da wollen wir nicht zurückstehen:

In einem Frauenkloster wird renoviert. Die Oberin schickt eine Schwester mit dem Essen zu den Bauarbeitern. Die will aber zuerst feststellen, ob es sich um gläubige Menschen handelt und fragt den Polier, ob er wissen, wer Pontius Pilatus sei. Statt zu antworten ruft der zum Gerüst hinauf: “Wer von euch heißt Pontius Pilatus? Hier ist eine Alte, die ihm das Essen bringen will.”

Sarah zu Mosche: “Ich habe gar keine Lust, die Einladung von Liebermanns anzunehmen.” Mosche: “Was fällt dir ein! Was glaubst du, wie die sich ärgern, wenn wir kommen!”

Zwei Russen und ein Jude bei der Musterung. Der erste Russe klagt über Magenschmerzen. Der Arzt schreibt ihn tauglich mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß Michail Frunse die sowjetischen Truppen trotz seines Magengeschwürs siegreich geführt habe. Der zweite Russe verweist auf sein schwaches Herz. Auch er wird tauglich geschrieben, schließlich habe sich Felix Dserschinskij auch nicht geschont und habe mitten in einer Rede seinen tödlichen Herzanfall bekommen. Darauf dreht sich der Jude um und will gehen. “Was fällt dir ein?” ruft ihm der Arzt nach. Darauf der Jude: ”Wenn ich jetzt sage, ich sei verrückt, bekomme ich ja doch nur zu Antwort, Genosse Stalin sei das auch und arbeite dennoch unermüdlich weiter zum Wohle aller Völker…”

Den Witz, so Alexander Kefeli, durfte man seinerzeit nicht in der Straßenbahn erzählen. Und hier in Deutschland kennen viele die historischen Bezüge nicht. Er aber könnte geistreich und mit Witz noch vieles erzählen. Nicht nur Witze.

Michail Kalaschnikow hat ein berühmtes Gewehr erfunden – Präsident Medwedjew überreichte ihm dafür den Dank des Vaterlandes. Er hat aber auch Gedichte geschrieben. “In meiner Jugend erwartete man, daß ich Dichter werden würde”, sagt er heute. “Aber ich wurde keiner. Es gibt auch ohne mich genug schlechte Dichter”. Das ist vielleicht einen Orden wert. Andererseits – schlechte Gedichte töten vielleicht Nerven, aber keine Menschen, oder? Was wär der Menschheit erspart geblieben, wäre Stalin ein romantischer Dichter geworden, Schwarm der Damenwelt. Und Hitler Schinkenmaler.

Bericht in BBC, 11.11.

*) “Ich will – meine Feder ins Waffenverzeichnis” – Wladimir Majakowski

Det femte och sista avsnittet i min serie artiklar på temat “Det judiska Polen” kommer att handla om den kommunistiska antisemitismen efter Andra världskrigets slut, kulminerande i en kampanj 1967-70 som tvingade merparten av Polens omkring 25 000 judar att lämna landet. Läs i sammanhanget gärna vad Judiska muséet har att anföra:

http://www.judiska-museet.a.se/utstallningar/1968_pl.stm

Åren 1948-53 kom i Sovjetunionen och Östblocket att präglas av stort upplagda antisemitiska och antisionistiska kampanjer, något som givit upphov till beteckningen “de svarta åren” när det gäller den judiska befolkningen i dessa områden. “Inom Sovjetunionens gränser förde man efter kriget två kampanjer av ideologisk och politisk natur”, heter det i Judehatets svarta bok av Eriksen, Harket, Lorenz (Albert Bonniers förlag, 2008). Dessa båda kampanjer benämndes den “antinationalistiska” respektive den “antikosmopolitiska” kampanjen och riktade sig alltså direkt mot judarna.

Dessa kampanjer hade sitt ursprung i sovjetdiktatorn Josef Stalins grundläggande antisemitism. Det började med våldsamma angrepp på judisk nationalism i slutet av 1947 och fortsatte med mordet på Judiska antifascistiska kommitténs (JAK)  ledare Solomon Mikhoels i januari 1948 och den därpå följande arresteringen av nästan hela JAK-ledningen. Sedan rullade det på i allt vildare fart. I Judehatets svarta bok läser vi:

“Från 1950 och framåt vidtogs hårdare åtgärder mot judarna. De åtalades och avrättades för att vilja förvandla Krim till en judisk republik och ett ‘brohuvud för den amerikanska imperialismen’…Den antisemitiska politiken kulminerade då flera hundra läkare arresterades mellan oktober 1952 och februari 1953, samt med den efterföljande processen mot framstående läkare som ägde rum i Moskva 1953.”

Av 37 åtalade läkare var 17 judar. Åtalspunkterna gällde att man redan mördat två ledande sovjetpolitiker, planerade en sammansvärjning mot staten och ville mörda Stalin samt sålt sig till amerikanerna. En pogromstämning mot Sovjetunionens judar byggdes upp inför vad som, av allt att döma, var planerat att bli en kommunistisk förintelse mindre än ett decennium efter den nazistiska. Till all lycka hann dock Stalin avlida innan någonting sådant kunde iscensättas, och efter Stalins död förklarades den judiska “sammansvärjningen” ha varit ett fabrikat av myndigheterna. De fängslade läkare som fortfarande var i livet frisläpptes.

De antisemitiska excesserna i Stalins rike spred sig som ringar på vattnet i det sovjetdominerade Östeuropa. Judehatets svarta bok igen:

“Den sovjetiska kampanjen mot kosmopoliter, internationalister och spioner tog upp klichéer liknande dem som tidigare använts mot judarna. Kampanjen fortplantade sig Tjeckoslovakien, Ungern, Bulgarien, Polen och Östtyskland (DDR). Processerna hade tydliga antisemitiska, antisionistiska och antiisraeliska drag. Internationellt mest känd blev rättsprocessen mot den judiske tjeckiske kommunistledaren Rudolf Slánský – en process där antisemitismen förklädd till antisionism blev den bärande beståndsdelen. Förhören och processerna genomfördes under sovjetisk ledning.”

 Rudolf Slánský avrättades 1952.

Slánský arresterades i november 1951 och dömdes året därpå till döden. Han gavs den övergripande skulden för Tjeckoslovakiens ekonomiska förfall och påstods ha lett en “titoistisk-sionistisk-kosmopolitisk” sammansvärjning. Bland 14 åtalade var elva judar. Åtta dömdes till döden, de övriga till livstids fängelse. Slánskýprocessen följdes av flera liknande skådespel fram till 1954. 233 dödsdomar, varav 178 verkställdes, utfärdades, och drygt 35 000 personer ådömdes långvariga fängelsestraff; 22 000 spärrades in i arbetsläger utan dom. Alla dessa var inte judar, men alla processer hade en rabiat antisemitisk ton.

I Polen användes landets traditionella antisemitism som redskap av det styrande kommunistpartiet vid två tillfällen: 1956 och 1968. Vid båda tillfällena lämnade många judar landet. Antisemitismen i mitten av 1950-talet hade sitt ursprung i att en fraktion inom kommunistpartiet gav “de stalinistiska judarna” skulden för övergreppen under den polska stalinistepoken, då Boleslaw Bierut haft makten. Eftersom det inte var alldeles enkelt att efter judeförintelsen under Andra världskriget helt oförblommerat angripa “judarna”, tvingades man sätta in antisemitismen i ett inte helt orimligt politiskt sammanhang. I en rad polska städer skedde, särskilt år 1957, grova antijudiska övergrepp samt skändning av judiska begravningsplatser. Gamla konspirationsteorier återupplivades.

Mellan 1956 och 1959 beräknas så många som 50 000 judar ha lämnat Polen, och två tredjedelar av de polska judar som valde att återvända till hemlandet från Sovjetunionen under senare delen av 1950-talet emigrerade vidare. Strax före ingången av år 1960 fanns cirka 30 000 judar kvar i Polen.

Så kom Sexdagarskriget 1967, då Israel sopade golvet med de arabiska aggressorerna och erövrade bland annat Sinai, östra Jerusalem, den så kallade Västbanken och Golanhöjderna. Resultatet blev en “antisionistisk” – det vill säga som alltid i realiteten en antisemitisk – våg i Östblocket. Den polske kommunistledaren Wladyslaw Gomulka gav den antisemitiska kampanjen en symbolisk start genom att i ett tal den 19 juni 1967 tala om polska judar som “femtekolonnare”, det vill säga anhängare av staten Israel vilken bekämpades av Östblockets arabiska allierade.

Gomulka talade om polska judar som “femtekolonnare”.

Snart nog beskylldes Polens judiska befolkning för allt möjligt ont, särskilt sedan stora studentdemonstrationer 1968 - liksom på andra håll i Europa – krävt yttrandefrihet och demokrati. Judar angavs vara pådrivande i “den amerikanska imperialismens, den västtyska revanschismens och världssionismens gemensamma antipolska konspiration.” Judarnas patriotiska lojalitet ifrågasattes, judiska medlemmar sparkades ut ur det regerande kommunistpartiet, judar anklagades för förtal mot staten, judar mobbades på arbeten och i skolor. Till slut uppmanades Polens judar att helt enkelt lämna landet, eftersom de ju var “främlingar”, “kosmopoliter” och “sionister.”

De pogromstämningar som skapats under åren 1967-70 ledde till att större delen av landets omkring 25 000 judar emigrerade. Bland dem som hamnade i Sverige kan nämnas publicisterna Dorotea Bromberg, Jackie Jakubowski och Maciej Zaremba.

Gomulka tvingades slutligen, efter en minst sagt växlingsrik karriär, avgå i december 1970 för att ersättas av Edward Gierek som högsta kommunisthönset i Polen. Några av läsarna har kanske hört följande historia om Gomulka och hur fort den politiska vindkantringen kunde gå i kommunismens Polen, men jag drar den ändå:

En ny fängelseintern leds in i en cell i Polen någon gång under det kommunistiska styret. I cellen sitter redan tre modstulna herrar mot en av gallerväggarna. Vår nykomling presenterar sig och frågar sedan mannen närmast honom: “Nå, min vän, hur har du hamnat här?” Mannen tittar missmodigt ner i golvet innan han svarar: “Jag skrek ‘Död åt Gomulka!’ vid en demonstration.” Samma fråga till näste man i ordningen som knappast är gladare han. Svaret blir: “Jag ropade ‘Leve Gomulka!’” Nykomlingen vänder sig sedan till den dystre gamle mannen med kal hjässa som sitter ihopkurad längst bort från honom. “Och hur är det med dig?” blir frågan. Gamlingen tittar upp med plågad blick och svarar: “Jag ÄR Gomulka.”

Dmitrij Medwedjew auf dem Roten Platz

Bemerkenswert, was Präsident Dmitrij Medwedjew am 30. Oktober, dem Tag des Gedenkens an die Opfer politischer Verfolgung, in seinem Blog geschrieben hat. Solch deutliche Worte hat sein Vorgänger Wladimir Putin nie gefunden: so ermutigend, so tröstend, so selbstkritisch und ehrlich. Worte, die Hoffnung auf eine Besinnung machen, die eine gerade in den letzten Jahren wiedererblühte Mythologisierung Josef Stalins mit der nach wie vor notwendigen kritischen Auseinandersetzung kontrastiert. Die Worte Dmitrij Medwedjews verdienen es, übersetzt und der deutschen Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt zu werden. Da dies in den großen Medien leider nicht geschieht, übernimmt der Blog diese vornehme Aufgabe.  

Alexander Newskij - Szene aus dem Film von Sergej Eisenstein

Der Beginn jeder Diktatur liegt in der Geschichtsfälschung, in der Lüge. Dieses Fach beherrschte Josef Stalin meisterhaft. Eines der schlimmsten Beispiele hierfür ist die Stilisierung und Glorifizierung des Fürsten Alexander Newskij (1220 – 1263). Um die Sowjetmenschen für den ideologischen und militärischen Kampf gegen den Faschismus zu wappnen, mußte ein Prototyp des russischen Heldenkriegers geschaffen werden. Als Verteidiger der Heimat gegen die Bedrohung aus dem Westen hob man ausgerechnet Alexander Newskij aus der mythologischen Taufe. Um der Geschichtsklitterung zumindest den Hauch von Glaubwürdigkeit zu verleihen, stückelte man einige Berichte über kleinere Scharmützel im Baltikum, damals noch von heidnischen Stämmen besiedelt, zusammen und blähte diese Episoden zu Auseinandersetzungen europäischer, wenn nicht gar weltgeschichtlicher Bedeutung auf. Es war denn auch der Film von Sergej Eisenstein “Alexander Newskij” (1938) - so  innovativ in seiner Montagetechnik, so ideologisch in seiner “Botschaft” -, der bis heute den historischen Unfug von der Schlacht auf dem Pejpus-See und an der Newa im kollektiven Bewußtsein prägt.

Nachgerade lachhaft, wenn man den Chroniken folgt, wonach in der Schlacht an der Newa keine 20 russischen Krieger fielen. Noch kläglicher sieht die Wahrheit vom Pejpus-See aus: Die sowjetischen Historiker übten sich erfolgreich in der Trickbetrügerei, wenn sie behaupteten, hier habe das größte Schlachtfeld des frühen Mittelalters gelegen. Anders als von ihnen dargestellt waren es nicht die Deutschen, die auf russisches Gebiet vordrangen, sondern Alexander war es, der immer wieder deutsche Garnisonen angriff und marodierend durch die Siedlungen der heidnischen Esten zog. Erst da taten sich die Deutschherren-Ritter und Esten zusammen und jagten dem russischen Fürsten nach. Man stellte Alexander dann tatsächlich auf dem Eis des Pejpus-Sees, aber die Verfolger Alexanders brachten gerade einmal um die hundert Kämpfer auf, von denen 20 ums Leben kamen und sechs in Gefangenschaft gerieten. Und am Rande bemerkt: Die westlichen Gebiete, die im Unterschied zum Herrschaftsbereich Alexanders nicht Schutz und Heil bei den Mongolen suchten, schlossen sich mit der Zeit zum Großfürstentum Litauen zusammen, ein Staatsgebilde, das einen Zweifrontenkrieg gegen die Tataren und den Deutschherren-Orden führte und Bestand hatte. Man mußte sich also nicht bedingungslos den Eroberern aus dem Osten unterwerfen, wie das Alexander tat!

Heute würde man Alexander Newskij als Pragmatiker bezeichnen, als Zyniker der Macht. Er wählte den für sich persönlich geeignetsten Weg. Die Union mit den Mongolen half ihm, die widerspenstigen russischen Städte mit einer Wetsche, einer Standesversammlung und vorparlamentarischen Verfassung, zu unterwerfen. Ein Bündnis mit dem Westen hätte diese Regierungsformen gestärkt, hätte dem Feudalsystem mit der Zeit den Garaus gemacht. Alexander hingegen begeisterte sich für das despotische Herrschaftssystem mongolischer Prägung mit einer strengen Vertikale der Macht und verbreitete diese Regierungsform gemeinsam mit weiteren Fürsten in der ganzen Rus. Begriffe von heute wie “gelenkte Demokratie” gewinnen vor diesem Hintergrund auch eine historische Dimension.

Der Historiker Michail Sokolskij kommt denn auch zu dem vernichtenden Urteil: “Die Schande des russischen Geschichtsbewußtseins, des russischen Kollektivgedächtnisses besteht darin, daß Alexander Newskij zum unantastbaren Begriff des Nationalstolzes wurde. Man machte aus ihm einen Fetisch, den Bannerträger nicht einer Sekte oder Partei, sondern des ganzen Volkes, dessen historisches Schicksla er grausam verstümmelt hat.”

Alexander Newskij, Bildhauer Igor Tschernoglasow

In Wladimir, der Hauptstadt der Rus, deren Großfürst er die letzten elf Jahre seines Lebens war, erinnern zwei Denkmäler an den Heiligen. Das eine wurde erst jüngst von seinem Namensvetter, Oberbürgermeister Alexander Rybakow, in Auftrag gegeben und steht im Zentrum der Stadt, unweit vom Kathedralenplatz, das andere, in Form einer Büste, befindet sich im Hof des Juristischen Instituts. Beide Standorte haben Gegenwartsbezug. Zu Füßen des “neuen” Alexanders wird an die Opfer aktueller Kampfhandlungen – u.a. in Tschetschenien – aus den Reihen von Polizei und Armee erinnert, im Schatten der “alten” Lichtgestalt leisten die Absolventen ihren Treueschwur auf die Russische Föderation.

Denkmäler sind mehr als Kunst, mehr als bearbeitetes Material. Denkmäler sind sichtbare Erinnerung, manifest gewordenes Gedächtnis, kollektive Verehrung, bildhaftes Symbol – ebenso wie Fahne und Wappen, Sterne, Adler, Hammer, Sichel und Zirkel oder Hakenkreuz… – und gewinnen damit große Bedeutung für das Bewußtsein. Ob sich die Wladimirer bewußt sind, wem sie da in ihrer Mitte die Ehre erweisen? Nochmals zusammengefaßt: Alexander Jaroslawowitsch hat folgende “Großtaten” vollbracht:

- Unterwerfung unter die Herrschaft der mongolischen Angreifer;
- Verrat am eigenen Bruder und an seinen Mitfürsten;
- Zerstörung russischer Städte und der Ständevertretungen (Wetsche);
- Einführung eines despotischen asiatischen Herrschaftssystems anstelle eines europäischen Musters;
- Bruch der christlichen Union mit der Westkirche.

Alexander Newskij war es, der die Grundlage für alle späteren Despoten Rußlands über Iwan den Schrecklichen, Peter den Großen bis hin zu Wladimir Lenin und Josef Stalin schuf. Gerade letzterer spürte das mit seinem diabolischen Machtinstinkt. Als Ahnherr und Schutzpatron eines demokratischen Rußlands taugt der Großfürst jedenfalls nicht. Es sei denn… Handelt es sich gar um eine bewußte Rückwendung? Dafür spräche, daß im vergangenen Jahr bei einer Fernsehumfrage Alexander Newskij zum größten Russen aller Zeiten gekürt wurde. Ausdruck allgemeiner Ahnungslosigkeit, wenn man den Historikern folgt. Und Zeichen einer historischen Tragödie: So sehr man sich im postsowjetischen Rußland von den Idolen und Chimären der kommunistischen Machthaber befreien will und nach Vorbildern in der ferneren Vergangenheit sucht, die Identität stiften könnten, desto mehr verfängt man sich in dem noch immer über allem gespannten Spinnennetz der Ideologen der KPdSU, die ja gerade die Geschichte in ihrem Sinne – und nur in ihrem Sinne! – deuten ließen. 

     Charles Krauthammer recently penned this column about the “three Envelopes” the Josef Stalin left to Nikita Kruschhev during the Cold War:

Old Soviet joke:

    
Moscow, 1953. Stalin calls in Khrushchev.
    
“Niki, I’m dying. Don’t have much to leave you. Just three envelopes. Open them, one at a time, when you get into big trouble.”

A few years later, first crisis. Khrushchev opens envelope 1: “Blame everything on me. Uncle Joe.”
    
A few years later, a really big crisis. Opens envelope 2: “Blame everything on me. Again. Good luck, Uncle Joe.”
    
Third crisis. Opens envelope 3: “Prepare three envelopes.”

For full article: http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=34209

I look away from the news for a bit while I try and get to grips with work piling up around me, and what happens?

A Nobel Peace Prize has been given to a US President just because in two weeks he hadn’t blown anyone new up.   Or had he?  John Pilger is even more cynical about Obama’s prize than I am.  But even Pilger doesn’t mention that previous Nobel Peace Prize nominees include Adolf Hitler in 1939 and Josef Stalin in 1945 and 1948.

There’s been talk that Obama’s prize is for the good work he will do.  If that’s true, it’s in direct contradiction of the intention of Alfred Nobel, whose will states he has set up:

…. a fund, the interest on which shall be annually awarded as prizes to those who, during the preceding year, shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind………………one part to the person who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between the nations and the abolition or reduction of standing armies and the formation and spreading of peace congresses.

Obama could have turned it down.  Like Le Duc Tho, the Vietnamese Communist who turned down the award in 1973, pointing out that Vietnam was far from peaceful.

Then there is the revelation that Barbie’s ankles are in fact, too fat to wear sexy shoes, according to shoe designer Christian Louboutin:

Barbie needs to wear great shoes because every girl needs to wear great shoes. I guess I always had a little ‘girlie side’ who liked Barbie.

You put this thing on then, you sadist, and spend the day stomping around in it.  Why on earth men who make millions out of women’s fashion don’t make the stuff they “always dreamed of” for themselves is a great unanswered question.

Or could it be because high heels cause spinal problems, hammer toes, bunions and nerve problems in women’s feet?  Perhaps fashion boys are happy giving women the opportunity to deform our bodies. 

But anyway, back to Christian’s comments on Barbie’s fat ankles.  He’s helping redesign a new, thinner, Barbie.

According to research, if Barbie was real, she would be unable to menstruate because her fat percentage would be too low.  This is the doll that makes young girls want to be thinner, even when they are a healthy size already.

If Barbie was life-size, this is what she’d look like, according to the BBC, with a real woman thrown in there just for kicks:

To be allowed her real waist size, Libby would have to be 7 foot 6 if she was Barbie-proportioned.  Can’t wait to see what we’ll be trying to look like post-Christian.

Nej, den rubriken lär vi aldrig få se. Att hacka på en döing som inte kan försvara sig (Josef Stalin) är ju tvärmodigt i vår press. Men att påpeka i spekulationerna kring den kommande “EU-presidenten” att Tony Blair är en krigsförbrytare som vid upprepade tillfällen brutit mot den annars så omhuldade internationella rätten verkar inte existera i journalisterna sinne. Att medvetet bomba civila mål som tevehuset i Belgrad 1999 är rekorderligt på varje statsmans cv antar jag.

Journalisterna måste lida av någon sjukdom. Underdånighet? Tunnelseende? Förträngning? Själv blir man bara trött.

Note: This is the first of a series of four articles dealing with the campaign in France and Germany in 1944-1945.  The second installment “Mortain to Market-Garden” was posted a couple of months back. The link to that article is here: http://padresteve.wordpress.com/2009/09/17/mortain-to-market-garden-a-study-in-how-armies-improvise-in-rapidly-changing-situations/

The others should be posted in the coming weeks.

Introduction

Eisenhower and 101st Airborne

The American landings on Omaha Beach were critical to the success of the Allied invasion northwestern Europe in the overall Overlord plan.  Without success at Omaha there would have been a strong chance that the German 7^th Army and Panzer Group West could have isolated the remaining beachheads, and even if unsuccessful at throwing the Allies into the sea could have produced a stalemate that would have bled the Allies white.  This quite possibly could have led to a political and military debacle for the western allies which would have certainly changed the course of World War II and maybe the course of history.[i] This is not to say the Germans would have won the war, but merely to state that a defeat on Omaha could have changed the outcomes of the war significantly.   Subsequent to the successful landing there were opportunities both for the Allies and the Germans to change the way that the campaign unfolded, thus the battles leading up to the breakout at Avranches are critical to its development and the subsequent campaign in France.

OVERLORD: The Preparations

The planning for the Normandy invasion began in earnest after the QUADRANT conference in Quebec in August 1943.  The timetable for the operation was established at the Tehran conference where Stalin sided with the Americans on the need for an invasion of France in the spring of 1944.[ii] Prior to this there had been some planning by both the British and Americans for the eventual invasion initially named ROUNDUP.  These preparations and plans included a large scale raid at Dieppe in 1942 which ended in disaster but which provided needed experience in what not to do in an amphibious assault on a heavily defended beach.        The failure at Dieppe also darkened the mood of the Allies, the British in particular to the success of such operations, bringing to mind the failed Gallipoli campaign of 1915 as well as the opposed landings at Salerno and the USMC experience at Tarawa.[iii] Despite this the Americans led by General Marshall pushed for an early invasion of northwest Europe. Churchill and the British due to their weakness in land power pushed for land operations in the Mediterranean, and even in Norway as an option to the assault in France. The conflicted mindset of the Allies left them in the position of planning almost exclusively for the success of the initial landings and build up to the near exclusion of planning for the subsequent campaign once they landed. This especially included what one writer described as “the maze of troubles awaiting behind the French shore.”[iv]

LST-325 at Normandy, Specialized Landing Ships and Craft were in High Demand and Short Supply in June 1944

Despite conflicts between the Americans and British political and military leadership the planning for the Normandy landings detailed in NEPTUNE and OVERLORD moved ahead.  General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed as the commander of SHAEF with his major subordinates for Land, Air and Sea which caused consternation on both sides of the Atlantic.[v] [vi] The planned operation was expanded from the initial 3 division assault on a narrow front to a minimum 5 division assault on a broad front across Normandy[vii] supplemented by a strong airborne force.[viii] Overall the plan as it developed reflected a distinctly “American willingness to confront the enemy head-on in a collision which Britain’s leaders had sought for so long to defer.”[ix] It is ironic in a sense that the British avoidance of the head on attack was based on their known lack of manpower.  Britain had few infantry reserves to sustain the war effort and the Americans only late recognized their own deficiency in both quantity and quality of infantry forces on which their strategy depended.  That the western allies, so rich in material and natural resources would be so deficient in infantry manpower was a key constraint on the subsequent campaign in France and Germany.  The shortage of infantry forces would cause great consternation among the Allies as the campaign in France wore on. The Germans too faced manpower shortages due to the immense losses sustained on the Eastern front, those lost in Africa and those tied down in Italy, the Balkans and Norway as well as the drain caused by Luftwaffe Field Divisions and troops diverted into the Waffen-SS.   The German Army resorted to smaller divisions and the created many “static” divisions manned by elderly or invalid Germans to plug the gaps along the Atlantic wall. The Germans were also forced to recruit “Volksdeutsch” and foreign “volunteers” to fill out both Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS formations.

Omaha Beach

Prior to the final decision to mount an invasion the Allied planners had contended with the location of the assault in northwestern France.  The Pas de Calais provided a direct route was rejected because it was where the Germans would expect the strike to occur and because it was where the German defenses were strongest.  The fiasco at Dieppe had provided ample proof of what could happen when making an assault into a heavily fortified port.  Likewise the mouth of the Seine near Le Harve was rejected because of the few beaches suitable for landing and because the forces would be split on both sides of the river.  Brittany was excluded due to its distance from the campaigns objectives in Germany.[x] This left Normandy which offered access to a sufficient number of ports and offered some protection from the weather. Normandy offered options to advance the campaign toward the “Breton ports or Le Harve as might be convenient.”[xi] Omaha beach, situated on the center right of the strike would be crucial to the success of the assault situated to the left of UTAH and the right of the British beaches.

Outnumbered Paratroops of II Fallschirmjaeger Corps Delayed US Forces Considerably in Normandy

Once Normandy was selected as the location for the strike by the Allies, the planning sessions remained contentious.  This was especially true when the Allies debated the amount and type of amphibious lift that could be provided for the landings, particularly the larger types of landing ships and craft to support the Normandy invasion and the planned invasion of southern France, Operation ANVIL.  The increase in OVERLORD requirements for landing craft had an impact in the Mediterranean and resulted in ANVIL being postponed until later in the summer.

As part of their preparations the Allies launched a massive deception campaign, Operation FORTITUDE.  This operation utilized the fictitious First Army Group under the “command” of General George Patton. Patton was still smarting from his relief of command of 7^th Army following slapping commanded an “Army Group” which incorporated the use of dummy camp sites, dummy tanks, aircraft and vehicles, falsified orders of battle and communications to deceive German intelligence.[xii] The success of this effort was heightened by the fact that all German intelligence agents in the U.K. had been neutralized or turned by the British secret service.  Additionally the Luftwaffe’s limited air reconnaissance could only confirm the pre-invasion build ups throughout England without determining the target of the invasion.[xiii] The German intelligence chief in the west, Colonel Baron von Roenne “was deceived by FORTITUDE’s fantasy invasion force for the Pas de Calais.”[xiv] Despite this Commander of the 7^th Army recognized by 1943 that Normandy was a likely Allied target and efforts were made to shift 7^th Army’s center of gravity from Brittany to Normandy.  The one potential German success in getting wind of when the Allied landings would occur was lost when German intelligence discovered two lines of Verlaine’s “Chason d’ Automme” in June 1944 which were to alert the French Resistance of the invasion.  The security section of 15^th Army heard them transmitted on the afternoon of 5 June and notified General Jodl at OKW, but no action was taken to alert forces on the coast.[xv] Allied intelligence was aided by ULTRA intercepts of coded German wireless transmissions. However this was less of a factor than during the African and Italian campaigns as more German communications were sent via secure telephone and telegraph lines vice wireless.[xvi] Allied deception efforts were for the most part successful in identifying German forces deployed in Normandy. However they were uncertain about the location of the 352^nd Infantry Division which had been deployed along OMAHA and taken units of the 709^th Infantry Division under its command when it moved to the coast.[xvii]

8th Air Force Bombers Helped Hit German Oil Production Facilities and caused the Luftwaffe to spend its fighter squadrons over Germany than France

The Allied air campaign leading up to the invasion was based on attempting to isolate the invasion site from German reinforcements. Leigh-Mallory the Air Chief developed the “TRANSPORTATION PLAN” which focused efforts on destroying the French railroad infrastructure.[xviii] A more effective effort was led by General Brereton and his Ninth Air Force which was composed of medium bombers and fighters.  Brereton’s aircraft attacked bridges and rapidly achieved success in crippling German efforts to reinforce Normandy.[xix] Max Hastings gives more credit to the American bombing campaign in Germany to crippling the German defense in the west. General Spaatz and the 8^th Air Force destroyed German production capacity in oil and petroleum as well as the degraded the German fighter force.  The American daylight raids so seriously degraded the German fighter force that it could not mount effective resistance to the invasion.[xx] Russell Weigley also notes that Albert Speer the Reich Armaments Minister said that “it was the oil raids of 1944 that decided the war.”[xxi]

Landing craft passing USS Augusta

Planning and preparations for OMAHA were based around getting the 1^st and 29^th Infantry Divisions ashore and them securing a beachhead “twenty-five kilometers wide and eight or nine kilometers deep.”[xxii] American preparations were thorough and ambitious, but the American assault would go through the most heavily defended sector of German defenses in Normandy.  The landing beaches were wide and bordered by dunes which were nearly impassable to vehicles and “scrub covered bluffs thirty to fifty meters high…rough and impassable to vehicles even to tracked vehicles except at a few places.  The exits were unimproved roads running through four or five draws that cut the bluffs.”[xxiii] Dug in along those bluffs was the better part of the 352^nd Division. The Americans compounded their selection of a difficult and heavily defended landing zone the Americans failed to take advantage of many of the “gadgets” that were offered by the British which in hindsight could have aided the Americans greatly.  The Americans made use of two battalions of DD (Dual Drive) tanks but turned down the offer of flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, and engineer tanks, the “funnies” developed by General Hobart and the British 79^th Armored Division.[xxiv] Weigley believes that the American view of “tanks as instruments of mobility rather than of breakthrough power.” Likewise the Americans victories in the First World War were won by infantry with little tank support.[xxv] In this aspect the Americans were less receptive to utilizing all available technology to support their landings, something that when considering the fact that Americans were great lovers of gadgets and technology. The British use of the Armor, including the “Funnies” on the beaches to provide direct fire into German strong points lessened their infantry casualties on D-Day. Due to this lack of armor support on the beach American forces on OMAHA had little opportunity to exercise true combined arms operations during the initial landings.[xxvi]

Dual Drive or DD Tanks took heavy Losses at Omaha

German preparations for an Allied landing in Normandy were less advanced than the Pas de Calais.  However they had made great strides since late 1943. Field Marshal Rommel greatly increased defensive preparations along the front, including the Normandy beaches.  One of Rommel’s initiatives was to deploy Panzer Divisions near the coast where they could rapidly respond to an invasion.  However Rommel did not get everything that he wanted.  The OKW only allotted him two Panzer Divisions to be deployed near the Normandy beaches.  Only one of these the 21^st Panzer Division was deployed near Caen in the British sector.  One wonders the result had the 12^th SS Panzer Division been deployed behind OMAHA. [xxvii]

OMAHA: The Landings

Like the rest of the Allied invasion forces the 1^st and 29^th U.S. Infantry Divisions set sail from their embarkation ports with the intent of landing on June 5^th.  General Bradley, commanding the First Army until the American XII Army Group would be activated accompanied the invasion force.  The OMAHA landing was under the command of General Gerow and his V Corps while VII Corps led by the 4^th Infantry Division landed at Utah supported by airdrops of the 82^nd and 101^st Airborne Divisions inland.  American command and control during the invasion was exercised from sea as in the Pacific, although General Officers were to go ashore with each of the American divisions.  A severe channel storm disrupted the plan to land on the 5^th and Eisenhower delayed the invasion one day catching a break in the weather and electing to go on the 6th.[xxviii] This delay while uncomfortable for the embarked troops caused the Germans to believe that no invasion would take place until the next favorable tide and moon cycle later in the month.[xxix] The assumption that no invasion was possible ensured that a number of key senior German leaders, including Rommel were absent from the invasion front when the Allies landed.[xxx]

1st Infantry Divison Troops at the Omaha Beach Sea Wall

The landing beaches at OMAHA stretched about 6500 meters from Colleville-Sur-Mer to Vierville-Sur-Mere in the west.  The beaches are wide with bluffs overlooking them and a seawall between the beaches and the bluffs.  Additionally several small towns dot the beach. To the west of the town of Vierville, a prominent height overlooked the entire beachhead.  Named Pont du Hoc, it was believed to house a 150mm battery sighted where it could enfilade the OMAHA landing zones.  The Americans assigned to the 2^nd Ranger Battalion to make a seaborne assault to land, scale the cliffs and take the battery.  Companies from this battalion made a heroic landing and scaled the cliffs to capture the strongpoint only to discover that the guns had not been emplaced.  The Rangers took heavy casualties and held their isolated beachhead against German counterattacks until relieved by the 29^th Division on the morning of June 8^th.[xxxi]

H-Hour for OMAHA was 0630.  Unfortunately the assault troops were transferred to their LCVP landing craft 16-20 kilometers from the beach.  The result was a long and dangerous ride in the small craft for the infantry.  Most of the infantry were completely soaked in sea spay and seasick before going ashore and they carried loads far above what they normally would carry into battle.[xxxii] The Armor support was one battalion of DD tanks, the 741^st Armored Battalion, supporting the 16^th Infantry Refiment of 1^st Infantry Division. These were also launched too far out and nearly all of the tanks were swamped and lost before firing a shot in anger.[xxxiii] Other American support units needed to provide firepower on the beach were equally unfortunate. Weigley notes that at OMAHA “at least 10 of the LCVPs sank” as did “the craft carrying almost all of the 105mm howitzers that were to be the first artillery ashore after the tanks.”[xxxiv] The losses would cripple the assault on OMAHA and nearly cause its abandonment.

Panzers and Grenadiers in Normandy

As the soldiers of the American divisions on OMAHA came ashore they faced German defenders of the 352^nd, 716^th and a regiment of the 709th Infantry Division, the latter under the tactical command of the 352^nd.   Without the bulk of their tanks artillery and lacking close air support the Americans struggled across the beaches and were cut down in large numbers before being pinned down behind the sea wall.[xxxv] With the Americans pinned down on the beach unable to advance, the time tables for the reinforcing waves became snarled amid the German beach obstacles which had not been cleared.  This was in large part due to 40% casualties among the Combat Engineers and the loss of all but five bulldozers.[xxxvi] Naval officers were frustrated in their attempts to provide naval gunfire support by the lack of identifiable targets on the beaches.  Yet German strongpoint’s were “knocked out by either by superbly directed vigorous gunfire from destroyers steaming as close as 800 yards offshore, or by determined action from Rangers or infantry.[xxxvii]

Soldiers ashore discovered that they were not facing the static 716^th Division but the veteran 352^nd Division as well.[xxxviii] Only the leadership and actions of Brigadier General Norman Cota the 29^th Division’s Deputy Commander and Colonel Charles Canham of the 116^th Infantry kept the situation from complete collapse.  They were able to rally their troops. Under their leadership small units from the 116^th which had its linage back to the “Stonewall Brigade” as well as elements of the 16^th and 18^th Infantry Regiments began to move forward.  Surviving junior leaders began to lead survivors through the dunes and up the bluffs to attack German defenders of the roads leading up from the beach from the flank and rear.  A mid-day break in the weather allowed some close tactical air support giving the troops badly needed support.

With the situation desperate General Bradley considered the evacuation of OMAHA.  At sea events were as confused as Bradley and his staff attempted to make sense of what was going on.  Even later in the evening there was discussion of diverting all further reinforcements from OMAHA to the British beaches.[xxxix]At 1330 hours “Gerow signaled Bradley: “Troops formerly pinned down on beaches…advancing up heights behind beaches.”[xl] By the end of the day Bradley’s aid Major Hansen noted Bradley’s comments to Collins: “They are digging in on Omaha beach with their fingernails. I hope they can push in and get some stuff ashore.”  And Montgomery: “Someday I’ll tell Gen[eral] Eisenhower just how close it was for a few hours.”[xli]

The Author Teaching at Point du Hoc in 2004

The landings at OMAHA succeeded at a cost of over 2000 casualties.  Critical to the success of the landings were the German inability to reinforce their defending troops on the beach.  Likewise the weakness of the units available to mount the standard counterattack that was critical to German defensive plans on D-Day itself kept the Germans from driving the Americans back into the Channel. The 352^nd Division fought superbly under the full weight of V Corps and the British XXX Corps on its right suffering heavy casualties as they contested every inch of ground.  The 716^th Division composed of second rate troops melted under the onslaught.  Allied air supremacy played a key role as sorties by the 8^th and 9^th Air Forces helped keep German reinforcements from arriving and interdicted counter attacks inland.  Weigley credits the Allied air superiority with the success of the landings and with limiting casualties.[xlii] Von Rundstedt and other German commanders in France were limited by the delay and refusal of Hitler and OKW to release Panzer reserves when needed most early on June 6^th.  By the close of D-Day allied forces had secured the five invasion beaches but not achieved their objectives of taking Caen and Bayuex.  Since the forces on the various beachheads had not linked up the beaches would have been extremely vulnerable had the Germans been able to mount a rapid counterattack by Panzers and strong infantry formations as they had at Salerno.

Major Battles to the Breakout at Avranches

Securing the Beachheads:

It took the V and VII Corps nearly a week to secure the beachheads. German forces including the stalwart 352^nd Division resisted stubbornly and mounted sharp local counterattacks which kept the Americans off balance.  Elements of the 29^th Division and the 90^th Division began to push inland and to expand the beachhead toward UTAH. Opposed by the 352^nd Division and elements of the 91^st Airlanding Division and other non-divisional units the fighting revealed the inexperience of the American infantry formations and the uneven quality of their leadership.  As the Americans tackled the Germans in the labyrinth of the Bocage country the defensive skill of the Germans cost many American lives and delayed the joining of the beachheads. On the 13^th the link up was solid enough to enabling the Americans to conduct the follow up operations needed to expand the beachhead, secure Cherbourg and clear the Cotentin.

Tiger Tank and Crew in Normandy

In some American divisions the hard fighting triggered a leadership crisis.  The lack of success of the 90^th Division led General “Lightening Joe” Collins of VII Corps relieve the division commander and two regimental commanders of command, a portent of things to come with other American units.[xliii] As the V and VII corps pushed into the “Bocage” they were followed by a massive build up of troops and equipment delivered to the beaches and to the artificial “Mulberry” harbors.  Despite their numeric superiority, air supremacy and massive Naval gunfire support and facing the weakened 352^nd, 91^st and the 6^th Parachute Regiment and other less than quality formations, survivors of the static divisions, the Americans made painfully slow progress as they moved off the beachhead and into the Bocage.[xliv]

The Capture of Cherbourg

Once the beachheads had been consolidated the Americans turned their attention toward Cherbourg. Cherbourg was the major naval port at the far northwest tip of the Cotentin.  D-Day planners counted on its swift capture and rehabilitation to serve as a supply port for the Allied forces. The 9^th Division drove south to the coast near Barneville on the 18^th of June cutting off the German forces covering the approaches to Cherbourg.[xlv] This put the Germans in a bind as the 7^th Army “had to split its forces in the peninsula in order to hold the fortress a little longer and thus to gain time for the establishment of the southern front on the Cotentin peninsula.[xlvi] The German forces arrayed before Cherbourg waged a desperate defense centered around the 243^rd Infantry Division and other assorted battle groups of LXXXIV Corps, whose commander General Marcks one of the best German Generals was killed in action on 12 June.[xlvii] The U.S. VII Corps under Collins with the 9^th, 4^th and 79^th Divisions pushed up the peninsula capturing Cherbourg on June 29^th.  Bradley pushed hard for the capture of the port as the Mulberries had been ravaged by a severe Channel storm the week prior. The port of Cherbourg was thoroughly demolished by German engineers and would not be fully operational for months. The loss of the Mulberries and delay in Cherbourg’s availability meant that few supplies were landed on the beaches would “hinder the escape from the constricting land of the hedgerows into which the Americans had come in search of a port.[xlviii]

The Battle of Caumont Gap

V Corps under Gerow made a cautious advance by phase lines toward Caumont, St Lo and Carentan.  The deliberate advance by the Corps toward a line weakly held by the Reconnaissance battalion of the 17^th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was directed by Bradley who did not want to divert attention from the effort against Cherbourg.   After capturing Caumont V Corps halted and continued aggressive patrolling to deceive the Germans while digging in.[xlix] The possibility existed that a strong push against the weak German line could have led to an opportunity to envelope the German line west of Caen. This was a missed opportunity that in part led to the bloody and controversial campaign to capture Caen.[l]

British efforts around Caen

Montgomery had ambitious plans to break out of Normandy by capturing Caen on D-Day and driving toward Falaise and Argentan.  The British plans for this were frustrated by the rapid reinforcement of the sector by the Germans and the activities of 21^st Panzer, Panzer Lehr, and the 12^th SS Panzer Divisions.  A flanking maneuver at Villers-Bocage was frustrated by a few Tiger tanks led by the legendary Waffen SS Panzer commander Captain Michael Wittman whose tanks devastated a British Armored battalion.[li] A series of disastrous attacks toward Caen (EPSOM, CHARNWOOD and GOODWOOD) strongly supported by air strikes and Naval gunfire finally succeeded in taking that unfortunate city on July 18^th but failed to take the heights beyond the town.[lii] Against crack well dug in German forces the British took heavy casualties in tanks and infantry seriously straining their ability to conduct high intensity combat operations in the future.[liii] The one benefit, which Montgomery would claim after the war as his original plan was that German forces were fixed before Caen and ground down so they could not be used against Bradley’s breakout in the west at St Lo.[liv]

Panzer Ace Captain Michael Wittmann on His Tiger Tank

Clearing the Bocage: The Battle of the Cotentin Plain

Other German forces arrived, and reinforced the Caumont gap which no longer “yawned invitingly in front of V Corps.” [lv] Bradley wished to push forward rapidly to achieve a breakthrough in the American sector.[lvi] Facing the most difficult terrain in France amid the Bocage and swamps that limited avenues of approach to the American divisions committed to the offensive.  The Americans now faced their old foe the 352^nd division as well various elements of II Parachute Corps, the 17^th SS Panzer Grenadier and Panzer Lehr Divisions.  American tanks and infantry made slow progress and incurred high losses as they dueled the Germans at close range.  In the VIII Corps sector alone the attack “consumed twelve days and 10,000 casualties to cross eleven kilometers of the Bocage…the achievements of the VII and XIX Corps were no better than comparable.[lvii]

St. Lo

St. Lo was a key to Bradley’s breakout efforts.  His Army had to capture it and the roads leading out of it to launch Operation COBRA along the coast.  The task of capturing St. Lo was assigned to GEROW’S V Corps and Corlett’s XIX Corps.  They faced opposition from the tough paratroops of the German 3^rd Parachute Division of II Parachute Corps.  The 2^nd, 29^th, 30^th and 83^rd Divisions fought a tough battle advancing eleven kilometers again with high numbers of casualties especially among the infantry to secure St. Lo on 18 July.[lviii] They finally had cleared the hedgerows.  St Lo epitomized the struggle that the American Army had to overcome in the Bocage.  Hard fighting but outnumbered German troops in excellent defensive country exacted a terrible price in American blood despite the Allied control of the skies.[lix]

US Tanks and German Prisoners at St Lo

Operation COBRA

With the Bocage behind him Bradley desired to push the Germans hard.  COBRA was his plan to break out of Normandy.  Bradley ably assisted by Collins they realized that the better terrain, road networks favored a breakout.  American preparations included a technical advance that allowed tanks to plow through hedgerows. This was the “Rhino” device fashioned by American troops which was installed on 3 of every 5 First Army Tanks for the operation.[lx] VII Corps was to lead the attack which was to begin on July 24^th. American planning was more advanced than in past operations.  Collins and Bradley planned for exploitation operations once the breakthrough had been made. A massive air bombardment would precede the attack along with an artillery barrage by Collins corps artillery which was reinforced by additional battalions.   A mistake by the heavy bombers in the 24^th resulted in the American troops being hit with heavy casualties and a postponement of the attack until the 25th.[lxi] The following day the attack commenced.  Another mistake by the bombers led to more American casualties[lxii] but VII Corps units pressed forward against the determined resistance of the survivors of Panzer Lehr and the remnants of units that had fought the Americans since the invasion began.  Although it was a “slow go” on the 25^th Bradley and his commanders were already planning for and beginning to execute the breakout before the Germans could move up reinforcements.  The 26^th of June brought renewed attacks accompanied by massive air strikes.  While not much progress was made on the 26^th, the Americans discovered on the 27^th that the German forces were retreating.  The capture of Marigny allowed VIII Corps to begin exploitation down the coastal highway to Coutances.  On the 27^th General Patton was authorized to take immediate command of VIII Corps a precursor to the activation of his 3^rd Army.  COBRA ripped a hole in the German line and inflicted such heavy casualties on the German 7^th Army that it could do little to stop the American push.[lxiii] As the American forces pushed forward they reinforced their left flank absorbing the local German counterattacks which were hampered by the Allied close air support.

Avranches and Beyond

As the breakthrough was exploited the command of the forces leading it shifted to Patton and the newly activated 3^rd Army. By the 28^th VIII Corps led by the 4^th and 6^th Armored Divisions had reached Avranches and established bridgeheads over the See River with additional bridges being captured intact on the 30^th.[lxiv] The capture of Avranches allowed the Americans to begin exploitation operations into Brittany and east toward the Seine. Weigley notes that for the first time in the campaign that in Patton the Americans finally had a commander who understood strategic maneuver and would use it to great effect.[lxv]

Conclusion

The American campaign in Normandy cost the U.S. Army a great deal. It revealed weaknesses in the infantry, the inferiority of the M4 Sherman tank to most German types, problems in tank-infantry cooperation and also deficiencies in leadership at senior, mid-grade and junior levels. Heavy casualties among infantry formations would lead to problems later in the campaign. Numerous officers were relieved including Division and Regimental commanders.  Nonetheless during the campaign the Americans grew in their ability to coordinate air and ground forces and adapt to the conditions imposed on them by their placement in the Cotentin.  The deficiencies would show up in later battles but the American Army learned its trade even impressing some German commanders on the ground in Normandy.[lxvi]

[ii] Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN, 1981 p.33

[iii] Ibid pp. 34-35

[iv] Ibid p.35

[v] General Montgomery 21^st Army group and Land Forces, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey as Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Air Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Weigley p.43

[vi] Max Hastings in Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984, comments that many in Britain wondered if Eisenhower with the lack of actual battle experience could be a effective commander and that Eisenhower was disappointed in the appointment of Leigh-Mallory and Ramsey, and had preferred Alexander over Montgomery, pp. 28-29.

[vii] Ibid. Weigley p.40.  Montgomery was the first to object to the 3 division narrow front invasion rightly recognizing that seizing Caen with its road junctions could provide a springboard for the campaign into open country.

[viii] Ibid. p.37

[ix] Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984 p.29  Hastings finds the irony in the selection of the British officers to execute the plan that reflected the American way of thinking.

[x] The Germans agreed with this in their planning leaving Brittany very lightly defended.  See  Isby, David C. Ed. “The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion.” p.27 The report of General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff OB West noted that only 3 divisions were assigned to Brittany.

[xi] Ibid. Weigley, pp. 39-40

[xii] Ibid. p.73

[xiii] See Isby p. 69.  General Max Pemsel of 7^th Army noted that “During  the spring of 1944, Seventh Army received only tow good photographs of British southern ports, which showed large concentrations of landing craft.”

[xiv] Ibid. Hastings p.63.  Hastings comments also about the success of using the turned Abwehr agents.

[xv] Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Pp.422-423

[xvi] Ibid. Weigley pp. 53-54

[xvii] Ibid. p. 67

[xviii] Ibid. pp.57-64  Weigley spends a great deal of time on the wrangling between Eisenhower, Leigh Mallory and Spaatz on the nature of the plan, the allocation of forces both strategic and tactical assigned to carry it out and its success, or in the light of postwar analysis the lack of effect that it had on German operations.

[xix] Ibid. p.67-68.

[xx] Ibid. Hastings pp. 43-44 In large part due to the long range P-51 Mustang which accompanied the American bombing raids beginning in 1943.  Another comment is that the campaign drew the German fighters home to defend Germany proper and prevented their use in any appreciable numbers over the invasion beaches.

[xxi] Ibid. Weigley p.69

[xxii] Ibid. p.89

[xxiii] Ibid. pp. 88-89

[xxiv] Ibid. p.87

[xxv] Ibid. Weigley also talks about the rejection of General Corlett’s ideas to use Amtracks used by the Marines in the Pacific to land on less desirable, but less defended beaches to lessen casualties on the beaches and the need for additional support equipment even on smooth beaches.  One of Corlett’s criticisms was that too little ammunition was allotted to supporting the landings and not enough supporting equipment was provided. pp. 46-47

[xxvi] Hastings notes that with the strength and firepower of the German forces on OMAHA that many of these vehicles had they been employed would like have ended up destroyed further cluttering the beachhead. “Overlord” p.102

[xxvii] The battle over the deployment of the Panzer Divisions is covered by numerous historians.  The source of the conflict was between Rommel who desired to place the Panzer Divisions on the Coast under his command due to the fear that Allied air superiority would prevent the traditional Panzer counterthrust, General Gyer von Schweppenburg commander of Panzer Group West (Later the 5^th Panzer Army) and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt who desired to deploy the divisions order the command of Rundstedt for a counter attack once the invasion had been launched, a strategy which was standard on the Eastern Front, and Hitler who held most of the Panzer reserve including the SS Panzer Divisions under his control at OKW.  Hitler would negotiate a compromise that gave Rommel the satisfaction of having three Panzer Divisions deployed behind coast areas in the Army Group B area of responsibility.  21^st Panzer had those duties in Normandy.

[xxviii] Ibid. p.74-75

[xxix] Von Luck, Hans.  “Panzer Commander“ Dell Publishing, New York, 1989 pp. 169-170.  Von Luck a regiment commander in 21^st Panzer noted that General Marcks of 84^th Corps had predicted a 5 June invasion at a conference May 30^th.

[xxx] Almost every D-Day historian talks about the weather factor and its effect on the German high command’s reaction to the invasion.  Rommel was visiting his wife for her birthday and planned to make a call on Hitler. Others including commanders of key divisions such as the 91^st Airlanding Division were off to a war game in Rennes and the 21^st Panzer Division to Paris.

[xxxi] Ibid. Weigley p. 96

[xxxii] See Cornelius Ryan, “The Longest Day” Popular Library Edition, New York 1959. pp. 189-193 for a vivid description of the challenges faced by soldiers going from ship to landing craft and their ride in to the beaches.

[xxxiii] Ibid. Weigley. p.78 Weigley talks about the order for the tanks to be carried ashore on their LCTs that did not get transmitted to the 741^st.

[xxxiv] Ibid.

[xxxv] Ibid. Weigley  p. 87 The weather prevented the aerial bombardment from being effective. Because the bombers could not see their targets they dropped their bomb loads further inland, depriving the infantry of support that they were expecting.  Naval gunfire support had some effect but had to be lifted as the troops hit the beach leaving much of that support to come from Destroyers and specially equipped landing craft which mounted rockets and guns.

[xxxvi] Ibid. Hastings. pp. 90-91.

[xxxvii] Ibid. p.99

[xxxviii] Ibid. Weigley p.80

[xxxix] Ibid. p.101  Also see Weigley p.80

[xl] Ibid. p.99

[xli] Ibid. Weigley. p.95

[xlii] Ibid. p.94

[xliii] Ibid. p.99 Both Weigley and Hastings make note of the failure of both the Americans and British to train their troops to fight in the bocage once they had left the beaches.

[xliv] Ibid. Hastings. pp.152-153

[xlv] Ibid. Weigley p.101

[xlvi] Isby, David C., Ed. “Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage.” Greenhill Books, London,  2001.  p.143

[xlvii] Ibid. Hastings p.173 Allied fighter bombers exacted a fearful toll among German commanders. The Commanders of the 243^rd and 77^th Divisions fighting in the Cotentin were also killed by air attacks on the 17^th and 18^th.   Further east facing the British the commander of the 12^th SS Panzer Division, Fritz Witt on the 17^th.

[xlviii] Ibid. Weigley. p.108

[xlix] Ibid. p.111-112.

[l] Ibid.

[li] The efforts of the 51^st Highland Division and 7^th Armored Division were turned aside by the Germans in the area and were dramatized by the destruction of  a British armored battalion by SS Captain Michael Wittman and his platoon of Tiger tanks.  See Hastings pp.131-135.

[lii] The British 8^th Corps under General O’Connor lost 270 tanks and 1,500 men on 18 July attempting to crack the German gun line on the ridge beyond Caen. Weigley, pp.145-146.

[liii] Hastings comments about the critical British manpower shortage and the pressures on Montgomery to not take heavy casualties that could not be replaced. Overlord. pp.241-242.

[liv] Ibid. Weigley pp.116-120

[lv] Ibid. p.122

[lvi] Ibid. p121 Bradley told Eisenhower “when we hit the enemy this time we will hit him with such power that we can keep going and cause a major disaster.”

[lvii] Ibid. 134

[lviii] Ibid. Weigley. pp. 138-143.  Weigley notes of 40,000 U.S. casualties in Normandy up to the capture of St. Lo that 90% were concentrated among the infantry.

[lix] Weigley quotes the 329^th Regiment, 83^rd Division historian “We won the battle of Normandy, [but] considering the high price in American lives we lost. P.143. This is actually a provocative statement that reflects America’s aversion to massive casualties in any war.

[lx] Ibid. p.149

[lxi] Ibid. p. 152

[lxii] Ibid. pp. 152-153.  Among the casualties were the command group of the 9^th Division’s 3^rd Battalion 47^th Infantry and General Leslie McNair who had come to observe the assault.

[lxiii] Ibid. pp.161-169. Weigley notes the advances in U.S. tactical air support, the employment of massive numbers of U.S. divisions against the depleted German LXXXIV Corps, and the advantage that the “Rhino” device gave to American tanks by giving them the ability to maneuver off the roads for the first time.

[lxiv] Ibid. pp.172-173.

[lxv] Ibid. p.172

[lxvi] Ibid. Isby, David C. “Fighting in Normandy,” p.184, an officer of the 352^nd Division referred to the American soldier “was to prove himself a in this terrain an agile and superior fighter.”

Bibliography

Carell, Paul. “Invasion: They’re Coming!” Translated from the German by E. Osers, Bantam, New York 1964.

Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984

Isby, David C. Ed. “The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion.” Greenhill Books, London 2004

Isby, David C., Ed. “Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage.” Greenhill Books, London, 2001.

Ryan, Cornelius, “The Longest Day” Popular Library Edition, New York 1959

Tsouras, Peter. “Disaster at D-Day: The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944,” Greenhill Books, London 1994.

Von Luck, Hans.  “Panzer Commander“ Dell Publishing, New York, 1989

Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd.

Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN, 1981

So says Yevgeny Dzhugashvili, grandson of the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin. At least he says it isn’t at all fair to call his grandfather a tyrant who murdered millions. Therefore, when the Novaya Gazeta newspaper published an article that called Stalin a “bloodthirsty cannibal,” Dzhugashvili took it upon himself to sue the paper for libel. Yes, libel of a man who died in 1953 and was, it is widely agreed, a bit of dictator. Of course, cannibal might be a bit strong but maybe it lost something in translation.

In any case, along with Novaya Gazeta, Dzhugashvili also sued Memorial, a rights group that has documented as many as 724,000 deaths during the Stalinist purges of the 1930s.

The court just decided that Dzhugashvili has no case but announced its reasons would be revealed at a later date. He had demanded a retraction, a public apology, and even a monetary award.

Seems cut and dry, doesn’t it?

But it is most assuredly not. Earlier this year, Stalin, as in Josef Stalin, was voted the third greatest Russian of all time. Beating Stalin were Alexander Nevsky and Pyotr Stolypin.

It is also easy, though it makes one uneasy, to see that Stalin is seen by many Russians as the man who saved them from the Nazis. And there is no arguing that he created a superpower on par with America. Remember the Cold War?

Dzhugashvili’s lawyer predicts an appeal based on the idea that the judge had decided the case before hearing any evidence.

We shall see.

Court rules against Stalin grandson in libel suit
Stalin voted third most popular Russian

All this got me thinking, just who is Yevgeny Dzhugashvili?

He is the son of Yakov Dzughasvili who was the Georgian born first son Josef Stalin. Yakov had rather a love/hate relationship with his father though not to the extent of prohibiting him from serving as an artillery lieutenant in the Soviet Army during World War II. Unfortuntely for little Yevgeny, and his sister Galina, Yakov was caught by the Germans at the Battle of Smolensk. (Galina refused to believe until her death in 2007.) At Sachsenhausen concentration camp, Yakov either committed suicide by running into an electric fence or was shot by guards. The reason for the suicide is widely believed to be that Yakov was ashamed of the Katyn massacre of more than 15,000 Poles.

It is clear that Stalin saw Soviet prisoners of war as traitors alone. According to some accounts he refused Nazi offers to trade Yakov for Field Marshal Paulus (saying that a lieutenant was not worth a Field Marshal) and Hitler’s nephew. Though it is now generally agreed that Stalin mounted at least two rescue attempts.

Yakov Dzhugashvili
Revealed: how Stalin’s brutal massacre at Katyn shamed his PoW son into suicide

But back to Yevgeny. He is a historical revisionist who questions the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and claims that the Katyn Forest massacre documents are fakes that Russia continues to uphold. He is a member of the Communist Party along with a Neo-Stalinist and, obviously, a Stalin apologist.

Yevgeny Dzhugashvili

Court Rules Against Stalin Kin

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091014/ap_on_re_eu/eu_russia_stalin_s_grandson_lawsuit;_ylt=Ah_sfy2g.2wAly1youP6U4knHL8C;_ylu=X3oDMTM2dTRza3BwBGFzc2V0A2FwLzIwMDkxMDE0L2V1X3J1c3NpYV9zdGFsaW5fc19ncmFuZHNvbl9sYXdzdWl0BGNwb3MDNgRwb3MDNgRzZWMDeW5fdG9wX3N0b3JpZXMEc2xrA2NvdXJ0cnVsZXNhZw–

Under måndagen den 12:e oktober, alltså igår så att säga, så var det exakt 10 år sedan som syndikalisten Björn Söderberg mördades av nazister utanför sitt hem, och på flera håll i Sverige bl a i Göteborg och Karlstad så anordnades det manifestationer för att hedra hans minne.

Men vad, eller rättare sagt vem, var det egentligen som man hyllade? Jo, en antidemokrat som hade förstört och raserat en annan människas liv.

Alltså var hela budskapet i manifestationerna så falskt som det kunde bli, de som deltog i dessa kunde lika gärna ha hyllat Björn Söderbergs mördare.

Jag försvarar inte mordet på denne man, ja, han var ju faktiskt det, nej, de som mördade honom gjorde lika fel som han själv gjorde. För både han och hans mördare hade en sak gemensamt: De raserade en annan människas liv.

För det var ju så här att denne Söderberg såg till att en person på hans arbetsplats blev av med sitt förtroendeuppdrag på jobbet och fick sparken från sin arbetsplats, vilket också gjorde att han blev utesluten ur sitt fackförbund.

Allt detta var Björn Söderbergs verk, och för det hyllas han.

Snacka om manifestationer som går ut på att hylla förstörande av människors liv, de som anordnade manifestationerna och de som deltog i dem har mer gemensamt med den borgeliga regeringen än de har med vänstern.

Dessa typer verkar vara borgarbrackor i vänsterkläder, så syndikalister och syndikalistsympatisörer många av dem är.

Björn Söderberg var ju syndikalist.

Ja, som ni säkert förstår så tycker jag inte att han är värd att varesig hedras eller minnas, (utom möjligen för hans anhöriga och hans vänner då), de som anser motsatsen kan ju lika gärna hylla Adolf Hitler eller Saddam Hussein.

Men vem vet, det kanske de gör i smyg samtidigt som dessa syndikalister och andra vänsterextremister gastar och skriker sig hesa om smygrasism så det skriker om det.

För det är ju de som är de riktiga smygrasisterna, eller rättare sagt smygfascisterna. Med andra ord så är de emot sig själva, eftersom de skanderar slagord som t ex “Krossa fascismen, krossa rasismen”.

Jag vet precis hur syndikalister resonerar, jag har nämligen haft en kompis som var syndikalist och vad jag vet så är han det fortfarande. Vi hade känt varandra länge när han på ett “bananskal” halkade snett och handlöst trillade rakt in i “syndikalistträsket”.

Men vi fortsatte att umgås, orsaken till att det gick var att vi aldrig diskuterade politik och invandring. Men till slut så gick det inte längre, och det slutade med att vi gick skilda vägar.

Vi kom helt enkelt inte överens, vilket inte var så konstigt. Han var ingen antidemokrat innan han halkade in i den där fascistiska smörjan, men han blev det sedan mer och mer.

Så jag vet mycket väl hur och vad en syndikalist tänker och har för åsikter. Han prenumerade bl a på den syndikalistiska skvallertidningen Röd Press (har för mig att den hette det, om inte så hette den Röd Front eller något liknande), och den var allt annat än demokratisk.

Om man hade vänt på det hela och sett tidningen och dess artiklar ur en hets-mot-folkgruppssynvinkel så hade tidningen och dess medarbetare blivit fälld för hets mot folkgrupp flera gånger om.

Som sagt, Syndikalisterna är ingen demokratisk organisation, men med tanke på vad deras ungdomsförbund sysslar med för “trevligheter” så är det inte så konstigt.

Äpplet faller inte långt från trädet, heter det ju, eller ännu bättre: Terrorister som terrorister.

Syndikalistiska Ungdomsförbundet, alltså SUF, samarbetar ju på många håll i landet med grupperingar som t ex AFA, (Antifascistisk Aktion) och hur “demokratiska” de är vet ju de flesta.

Eller vad sägs om mordbränder, grov misshandel, mordförsök m.m? Ja, det här är bara några utav t ex Antifascistisk Aktions “meriter”.

Men nu till Björn Söderberg och det som gör att han igår hyllades och hedrades av många människor.

Han såg alltså till att en arbetskollega till honom fick sitt liv raserat och förstört, detta genom att springa och skvallra för chefen eller cheferna om vad det var för en person som fanns på jobbet.

Vad var orsaken till Söderbergs agerande då? Jo, arbetskollegan lyssnade på s k vit makt-musik.

Men vad var problemet egentligen?

Hade det inte varit betydligt enklare för herr Söderberg att ta ett snack med killen öga mot öga och säga någonting i stil med följande?: -Du, jag gillar inte att du spelar sån här musik här, jag tar illa upp. Kan du sluta med det så vore det bra.

Eller var Björn Söderberg för feg för det? Hade han dåligt ordförråd, eller vad var det frågan om?

Nehej, istället sprang han iväg och lekte Mr Fascist. Lekte och lekte förresten, han var ju fascist.

Och vad är det som säger att killen som fick sitt liv raserat var nazist?

Dessutom var Söderberg ju inte chef på denna arbetsplats, hade han varit det så hade det varit en annan sak.

Men det här ställer ju verkligen en sak på sin spets ännu en gång, nämligen självaste demokratin och allt vad den innehåller, t ex ens musiksmak.

Har man inte rätt att lyssna på vilken musik som man vill? Eller har man inte rätt att lyssna på musik på sitt jobb?

Vad jag minns så jobbade både Söderberg och killen ifråga på någon form av industriarbetsplats, och hur Söderberg kunde höra någon musik över huvudtaget där är verkligen en gåta.

Jag är själv gammal industriarbetare, så jag vet vilket oljud det oftast är på sådana arbetsplatser.

Det skulle också ha varit intressant att få reda på vad som sjöngs, för det är få wp-band som sjunger saker och ting rakt ut. De som gör det blir knappast långvariga, istället dyker de upp som en sol och ner som en pannkaka.

Men vad det var som sjöngs framkom ju aldrig. Var det ens vit makt-musik som det var frågan om?

Eller var Björn Söderberg som många andra, alltså de som inte kan skilja på Oi! och vit makt-musik?

Ja, fördomsfullheten fick i och med hans agerande ett nytt ljus, för höjden av fördomsfullhet när det gäller musik måste ju ändå vara att döma en person efter någonting som man inte ens hör.

Det är ju som sagt gott om höga oljud på industriarbetsplatser.

Samtidigt innebär ju också detta att man inte ska kunna höra på musik på jobbet, beroende på om det är tillåtet att lyssna på musik på det jobb man har, utan att få sparken.

Om jag skulle lyssna på progg på mitt jobb, ska jag då klassas som en nerknarkad kommunist och få sparken med dunder och brak bara för att någon idiot har fått för sig att jag är råkommunist och tycker att det var skitbra att det dödades minst 42,7 miljoner människor under Josef Stalins tid vid makten i Ryssland på grund utav t ex etnicitet?

(Ni som nu tror att jag gillar progg tar dock gruvligt misste.)

Vi kan även se det hela på ett annat sätt:

Om en person har en cd-spelare på sitt kontor där det på samtliga skivor enbart finns hiphop, har han eller hon då i samma ögonblick som personen ifråga för första gången i samma sekund som han eller hon sätter på en sådan skiva helt plötsligt blivit en svart amerikan per automatik?

Om nu inte personen ifråga var svart redan innan förstås, för då är det ju ännu värre.

För då är det säkert någon tokstolle som ringer till organisationen Centrum mot rasism (CMR), och vips så har det helt plötsligt ännu en gång “hittats” rasism där sådan inte finns.

Alla vet ju att en svart person är rasist mot sig själv, personen är ju svart. Och sådant får ju absolut inte förekomma.

Eller får det det?

Introduction

After Stalingrad the Soviets followed up on their success and attempted to entrap the rest of Army Group South. Field Marshall von Manstein attempted to save the Army Group and perhaps prevent the Soviets from collapsing the entire German front.

Manstein planning at the front

Chaos and Peril in the South

As 6^th Army died at Stalingrad field Marshall von Manstein was faced with one of the most challenging situations faced by any commander in modern times.  He faced strategic and operational “problems of a magnitude and complexity seldom paralleled in history.”[i] Manstein had to deal with a complex military situation where he had minimal forces to counter the moves of a superior enemy force that was threatening to entrap all German forces in southern Russia. Additionally Manstein had to deal with the “Hitler’s obstinate opposition to a maneuver defense and a Red Army flushed with the victory of Stalingrad.”[ii] Facing him were the six Russian armies of the Voronezh and Southwestern Front’s led by Mobile Group Popov[iii]. These Armies had broken through the Hungarian and Italian armies “making a breach 200 miles wide between the Donetz and Voronezh, and were sweeping westward past Manstein’s flank.”[iv]

The most dangerous threat that Manstein faced was to Army Group A in the Caucasus. This Army Group “found itself in danger of being cut off, forcing an immediate withdraw.”[v] Disaster was averted by the desperate holding actions of Manstein’s meager forces, Army detachment’s Fretter-Pico and Hollidt, and winter conditions that made “offensive operations extraordinarily difficult, even for the hardiest Soviet troops.”[vi] A smart withdraw executed by General von Kleist managed to extricate the Army group “just as the Stalingrad forces collapsed.”[vii] To parry the Soviet thrusts the Germans lacked forces to “establish a deeply echeloned defense” and “instead combined maneuver… with stubborn positional defense to give artificial depth to the battlefield.  In this way the Germans were able to break major Soviet attacks, preventing catastrophic breakthroughs….”[viii] The timely introduction of a battalion of Tiger tanks prevented the Russians from breaking through to Rostov and “cutting the rail and road lines on which First Panzer Army’s retreat depended.”[ix] Even so the escape of the Army Group was narrow. “In terms of time, space, force, and weather conditions it was an astonishing performance-for which Kleist was made a field-marshal.”[x] With the Russians only 70 kilometers from Rostov and his own forces 650 kilometers from that city Kleist executed a withdraw “which had appeared hardly possible to achieve.”[xi] The divisions extricated by Kleist would be instrumental in the coming weeks as Manstein moved to counter the Soviet offensive.

Hitler and Manstein

Despite the successful withdraw the situation was still precarious in early February, Manstein had no effective contact with his left wing, the bulk of which was tied to Kharkov, The Russians had “virtually complete freedom of action across a fifty-mile stretch of the Donetz on either side of Izyum.”[xii] Manstein was hard pressed to “halt the raids of Mobile Group Popov and other exploiting Soviet tank corps in Operation Gallop.”[xiii] Manstein’s forces in the eastern sector had been divided by Russian penetrations, which threatened 1^st Panzer Army’s western flank and blocked the Army Group’s main railway line.[xiv] On 15 February “the SS Panzer Corps withdrew from Kharkov-in spite of orders from Hitler…that the city was to be held to the last.”[xv] SS General Paul Hausser, the corps commander realized that the order to hold Kharkov was impossible and requested permission to withdraw. This was was refused by General Lanz. Under pressure from encircling Russian forces outside and from partisans inside the city, Hausser disobeyed the order and extricated his troops,[xvi] thereby saving thousands of German soldiers and preserved the SS Panzer Corps as a fighting unit.[xvii] Lanz was relieved by Hitler for the loss of Kharkov and although Hausser would escape immediate censure, “Hitler did see it as a black mark against his name.”[xviii] With Kharkov in Soviet hands the gap between Manstein’s army group and Field Marshal von Kluge’s Army Group Center increased to over 100 miles.[xix] It appeared that the entire German southern flank was disintegrating.  Manstein estimated the ratio of German to Soviet forces in his area at 1:8.[xx] He believed that the Soviets could advance and subsequently “block the approaches to the Crimea and the Dnieper crossing at Kherson” which would “result in the encirclement of the entire German southern wing.”[xxi] Popov’s Mobile Group crossed the Donets and reached Krasnoarmeiskaia by 12 February. Vatutin committed two additional fresh tank corps toward Zaporozhe, a critical transport node which was also the location of Manstein’s headquarters.[xxii]

Tiger Tanks assigned to 1st SS Panzer Division

Hitler arrived to consult with Manstein on 17 February and remained for three days with Soviet forces perilously close.  Manstein only had some flak units and the Army Group Headquarters Company between him and Popov’s advanced elements. On Hitler’s last day “some T-34’s approached to within gun range of the airfield.”[xxiii]

The conference of Hitler with Manstein at Zaporozhe as well as a previous conference at the Wolfsschanze on 6 February was critical to the development of Manstein’s plan to restore the front. Manstein had now gotten both the 1^st and 4^th Panzer Armies across the Don, and “with this striking force, he felt confident of smashing the Russian offensive if he was given a free hand to withdraw from the line of the Donetz, evacuate Rostov and take up a much shorter front along the Mius river.”[xxiv] The conference on the 6^th was one of the “rare moments in the war where Hitler authorized a strategic withdraw on a major scale.”[xxv] Yet as the Russians continued to advance Hitler became concerned and came to Zaporozhe.  At first Hitler would not concede to Manstein, as he wanted to assemble the SS Panzer Corps for an attack to recapture Kharkov.[xxvi] Manstein explained the need for a counter stroke and through much explanation was able to convince Hitler that the capture of Kharkov was not possible unless “we first removed the danger of the Army Group being cut off from its rear communications.”[xxvii]

Soviet formations advance

The Russian aim was now obvious[xxviii] and Manstein had correctly discerned their strategy.  Manstein knew that his Army Group had to hold the line on the Mius and then quickly defeat the enemy between 1^st Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf[xxix] in “order to prevent its own isolation from the Dnieper crossings.”[xxx] The Soviets had outrun their logistics support and had suffered heavy losses of their own and had serious equipment shortages.[xxxi] Manstein explained to Hitler the opportunity offered as it was now the Russians who “were worn out” and far from their supply dumps as the Germans had been in November 1942.  Manstein “foresaw an opportunity to seize the operational initiative with a counter offensive of his own.  Manstein’s target was the Soviet armored spearheads, still careening southwestward between Kharkov and Stalino.”[xxxii] Manstein believed that when the Russian “spearhead lunged, as it must toward the crossings on the upper Dnieper,” then Hoth’s Army would be let loose again.  The three SS Panzer divisions could then “play their rightful role as avengers, and strike southeast to meet 4^th Panzer Army, catching the Russian armour in a noose.”[xxxiii] Hitler agreed to Manstein’s plan and Manstein shifted 4^th Panzer Army to assume control of the SS Panzer Corps, now reinforced by 3^rd SS Panzergrenadier Division “Totenkopf.” Hitler reinforced Manstein and released 7 battle worn Panzer and motorized divisions for his attack.[xxxiv]

Soviet Miscalculation

It was now Stalin’s time to miscalculate. He and his subordinates “continued to believe that they were on the verge of a great victory. German defenses in southern Russia appeared to be crumbling and the Stavka sought to expand that victory to include Army Group Center.”[xxxv] To this end they diverted armies to the north and launched attacks in that direction.  However German defenses were stiff and the plan was “predicated on the assumption of continued offensive success further south.”[xxxvi] Reinforcements from Stalingrad failed to deploy and “Army Group Center’s defenses, prepared for the past year and a half proved formidable.”[xxxvii]

In the south Stalin saw the Dnieper and almost “heedlessly drove his armies towards what he thought would be the decisive victory on the banks of this huge Russian river,”[xxxviii] but, Soviet “ambitions exceeded their available resources and the skill of their commanders.”[xxxix] The SS Panzer Corps withdraw from Kharkov “further heightened the Soviet’s intoxication with victory”[xl] and confirmed their beliefs that the Germans were withdrawing.  Stalin believed that “it was inconceivable that Hitler’s Praetorian Guard would abandon Kharkov except as part of a general order to retreat.”[xli] He believed that the encirclement of Army Group South would lead to a chain reaction and quick way to victory over German forces in the east.  Believing that there was no way for the Germans to recover and establish a solid front on the Mius,[xlii] Stalin continued to drive his forces to attack, yet the Russian offensive in the south had reached what Clausewitz had called the “culminating point” and Stalin’s armies were now extremely vulnerable. “The weather, the devastated communications, and their own inexperience in maintaining the traffic density required to support a deep penetration on a narrow front had combined to force a dangerous dispersal of effort on the Russian advance which had broken down into four separate groups.”[xliii]

Panzers assembling to attack

The Soviet forces were now in a dangerous predicament being spread out across the entire south of Russia.  One group, composed of the 69^th Army and 3^rd Tank Army pushed against Army detachment Kempf west of Kharkov.  To the south the badly depleted 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army were now “strung out down a long corridor they had opened between Izyum and Pavlograd,”[xliv] Mobile Group Popov was lagging further east near Krasnoarmeiskaia.   Additional units were isolated behind the front of Army Detachment Fretter-Pico and near Matveyev.  Soviet commanders believed that the Germans were in worse shape and that “the risks of dispersal were justified.”[xlv] They had not anticipated or made allowance for Manstein’s coolness under pressure and actions to preserve his armor while thinning his front “well past the accepted danger limit.”[xlvi] Likewise the Soviets did not know that the Germans had cracked the code used by the Southwest front and from 12 February on “were now privy to Popov’s and Vatutin’s thoughts,” now knowing precisely where the Russians would attack.[xlvii] Manstein had withstood temptation and Hitler’s pressure to use his reserves “for a direct defense of the Dnieper line.”[xlviii] As such he was prepared to launch a devastating counter-stroke against the dispersed and weakened Russian armies which were still advancing into the trap he planned for them. He had managed to “save his counteroffensive plan from Hitler’s shrill demands that the new reserves be thrown into battle piecemeal to prevent further territorial losses.”[xlix] The stage was now set for a two classic mobile operations.[l]

The Destruction of Mobile Group Popov, 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army

Manstein launched his counter-stroke on 21 February against Popov’s Mobile Group using XL Panzer Corps under the command of General Henrici composed of the 7^th and 11^th Panzer Divisions and SS Motorized Division Viking. Popov’s Group was exposed. Popov had “succeed in cutting the railway from Dnepropetrovsk to Stalino and was itching to push further south to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.”[li] The Soviets once again had failed to discern German intentions, believing that the Germans were retreating.[lii] Likewise the Soviet high command did not fully understand Popov’s situation. His force was weak in tanks and low on fuel and his Mobile Group was defeated in detail by the German Corps.  Popov’s immobilized tank and motorized rifle formations resisted desperately but were bypassed by the panzers.  The 330^th Infantry Division mopped up the remnants of these formations.[liii] The key battles took place around the town of Krasnoarmeiskaia and the battle became a running battle between that town and the Donets River.[liv] Popov requested permission to retreat, but still believing the Germans to be retreating Vatutin gave a categorical “no.” The terrain in the area was “almost completely open”[lv] and “Popov’s proud Armoured Group was cut up like a cake.”[lvi] Popov extricated some of his units but “only after serious losses in manpower and equipment.”[lvii] Despite this it would not be until the 24^th that Vatutin would order a halt to offensive operations.[lviii]

SS Panzers in Kharkov

As Popov sought to get his units out of the German scythe Manstein set his sights on 6^th Army, 1^st Guards Army and 25^th Tank Corps which was approaching Zaporozhe.[lix] He assigned the task to Hoth’s 4^th Panzer Army and its XLVIII Panzer Corps under General Knobelsdorf composed of the 6^th and 17^th Panzer Divisions and the SS Panzer Corps comprising SS Divisions Liebstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf.[lx] Manstein gave Hoth a brief but explicit order: “The Soviet Sixth Army, now racing towards Dnepropetrovsk through the gap between First Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, is to be eliminated.”[lxi] The XLVIII Panzer Corps and SS Panzer Corps were unleashed against the exposed flank of the 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army.   XLVIII Panzer Corps quickly “seized bridgeheads over the Samara River, and prepared to move north into the rear of the exhausted Soviet Sixth Army.”[lxii] The two Panzer Corps then made a coordinated concentric attack northwest which “came as a complete surprise to the Russians.”[lxiii] Das Reich thrust deep into the flank of 6^th Army supported by Stukas from Richthofen’s 4^th Air Fleet.  This attack dislodged one Soviet Rifle Corps and destroyed another allowing the division to capture Pavlograd while XLVIII Panzer Corps led by 17^th Panzer Division pushed from the south linking up with the SS Corps. This cut off the Soviet 25^th Tank Corps and threatened 6^th Army.[lxiv] What followed was a disaster for the Russians.        Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary the Stavka and Front commanders still believed that the Germans were retreating.  6^th Army was ordered to continue its advance by the front commander who believed that the two German Panzer Corps were withdrawing.[lxv] In a few days the 17^th Panzer Division “gained the Izyum-Protoponovka sector on the Donetz River, while the SS Panzer Corps took Losovaya and established contact with Army Detachment Kempf, which had joined the attack from the west.”[lxvi] XL Panzer Corps with the 3^rd and 7^th Panzer Divisions and 333^rd Infantry Division joined in the attack on Popov’s remaining forces completing their destruction.[lxvii] As Hoth and Hausser converged on Pavlograd, Das Reich and Totenkopf “swung left to the east and then wheeled back north again running parallel to the Russian divisions fleeing from Forty-eighth Panzer Corps. What ensured was a turkey shoot.”[lxviii] Fleeing Russian forces on the open steppe were visible and engaged at long range.[lxix] Leibstandarte helped by holding the left flank against Russian counter attacks from the units now isolated in the west,[lxx] and Totenkopf’s grenadiers fanned out supported by Stukas to “kill or capture as many Russians as possible.”[lxxi] By 1 March the Russian penetrations had been eliminated. Popov’s Mobile Group was smashed, 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army badly mauled. 25^th Tank Corps and three Rifle divisions had to be completely written off and numerous other corps and divisions took heavy casualties.  Two additional corps, encircled before the offensive began were eliminated by German forces.[lxxii] The Germans counted 23,000 Russian dead on the battlefield, and Manstein noted that “the booty included 615 tanks, 354 field pieces, 69 anti-aircraft guns and large numbers of machine guns and mortars.”[lxxiii] The Germans only took 9,000 prisoners as they were too weak, especially in infantry to seal off the encircled Soviet forces.[lxxiv] Yet the forces that escaped they were in no condition to “block the continued progress of the Panzers and SS.”[lxxv] Now there was a 100 mile gap in the Russian lines with nothing no troops to fill it and only “General Mud” could stop the Germans.[lxxvi] Manstein was not yet finished and the next phase of his operation against the Soviet formations west of Kharkov and that city were about to commence.

The Destruction of 3^rd Tank Army

With the immediate threat to his Army Group eliminated and having regained the initiative, Manstein and Army Group South now “proceeded to deliver the stroke against the ‘Voronezh Front’- i.e. the forces located in the Kharkov area.”[lxxvii] But the Russians had not been idle. In order to attempt to assist 6^th Army 3^rd Tank Army moved two tank corps and three Rifle divisions south and these ran into Manstein’s advancing panzers.[lxxviii] Manstein’ noted his objective now was “not the possession of Kharkov but the defeat-and if possible the destruction of the enemy units located there.”[lxxix] Between March 1^st and 5^th his forces advanced on Kharkov. Not knowing the Germans dispositions[lxxx] 3^rd Tank Army made the mistake of moving between the Leibstandarte’s defensive positions and the attacking divisions of the SS Panzer Corps. Hausser wheeled Totenkopf around and completed an encirclement of these units near Bereka on 3 March.[lxxxi] The Russians made futile attempts to break out but the SS Divisions tightened the noose around them and they were eliminated by the SS Panzer Corps which “engaged in concentric attacks during the three days of hard fighting.”[lxxxii] Even Regimental commanders like Heinz Harmel of Das Reich’s Der Fuhrer regiment became engaged in close combat with the Russians.[lxxxiii] The battle was fought in “snowstorms whose intensity caused the SS severe privations.”[lxxxiv] Totenkopf and Das Reich slammed the Russians “back against the Tiger tanks and assault guns of the Leibstandarte.”[lxxxv] The elimination of these units netted another 12,000 Russians killed,[lxxxvi] knocking “out the last remaining obstacle between the Germans and Kharkov.”[lxxxvii]

Return to Kharkov and Controversy

Manstein turned his attention to Kharkov, supported by Richthofen’s 4^th Air Fleet which for the last time in Russia “provided undisputed air superiority for a major German mechanized operation.”[lxxxviii] He decided to “roll up the enemy from the flank and force him away from Kharkov in the process.”[lxxxix] He ordered a “pincer on the town, sending Grossdeutschland around to the north with a reinforced Kempf detachment and the combined force of Hoth and the SS to attack the town from the south and rear.”[xc] Manstein planned to make a wide envelopment to avoid embroiling his panzers in costly urban combat stating “that at all costs the Army Group wished to avoid Kharkov’s becoming a second Stalingrad in which our assault forces might become irretrievably committed.”[xci] To this end he sent Das Reich and Totenkopf approaching from the south to west of the city[xcii] while XLVIII Panzer Corps swung east toward the Donetz.[xciii] As Hoth’s forces came up from the south to envelope the city, Grossdeutschland and the XI and LI Corps fought the Russians to the north and west,[xciv] eventually moving up to Belgorod.  By 8 March lead elements of the SS Panzer Corps were on the outskirts of the city.

At this point there is some controversy as to German actions. As noted Manstein wished to avoid urban combat and desired to surround the city and force its surrender.  According to one writer Hoth ordered Hausser “to seal off the city from the west and north and to take any opportunity to seize it.”[xcv] Others including Glantz and House and Murray and Millett state that Hausser “ignored a direct order” and attacked into the city.[xcvi] Manstein does not explicitly say that there was a direct order but notes that the Army Group “had to intervene vigorously on more than one occasion to ensure that the corps did not launch a frontal attack on Kharkov.”[xcvii] Sydnor states that Hausser ignored a direct order by Hoth on the 11^th by detailing a battalion of Totenkopf to assist Das Reich and Leibstandarte in retaking Kharkov by direct assault. The order entailed pulling Das Reich out of the city and taking it to the east.[xcviii] Lucas adds that this order came in the midst of hard fighting in the city and could not be carried out by the division.[xcix]Carell notes that on 9 March Hoth instructed Hausser that “opportunities to seize the city by a coup are to be utilized,”[c] and goes into detail regarding how Hoth’s 11 March order applied to Das Reich. It was to be pulled out of action and brought east, but division was heavily engaged and in the process of breaking through Soviet defenses “quicker in fact than if he had pulled “Das Reich” out of the operation and led it all the way round the city along those terrible muddy and time wasting roads.”[ci] In the end the SS took Kharkov, Manstein said that the city “fell without difficulty”[cii] while others note the difficulty of the action and the casualties suffered by the SS.  Kharkov’s capture; the defeat of Rokossovsky’s campaign against Orel and the beginning of the spring Rasutitsa ended the winter campaign and stabilized the front.

Analysis

The Russian winter offensive following Stalingrad had great potential.  Manstein said: “the successes attained on the Soviet side, the magnitude of which is incontestable.”[ciii] The greatest Soviet shortcomings were inexperience in conducting deep mobile operations and the inability of their logistics system to keep up with their advance.  Clark notes that this was their “first experience of an offensive war of movement on a large scale.[civ] Glantz and House are not alone in noting that the “Stavka continued to undertake operations that were beyond its resources.”[cv] Murray and Millett state that they “lacked the operational focus that had marked the Stalingrad offensive.”[cvi] Had they had the resources and ability to execute their plans they might have destroyed all German forces in the south.  They misread German intentions based on their own over-optimistic expectations opened their forces to Manstein’s devastating counter stroke.  Von Mellenthin, possibly showing some prejudice commented that the Russian soldier “when confronted by surprise and unforeseen situations he is an easy prey to panic.”[cvii]

The Germans snatched victory out of what appeared to be certain defeat aided by Russian mistakes and operational shortcomings.  Manstein refused to panic and conserved his forces for his counterattack.[cviii] Kleist brought his Army Group out of what might have been encirclement worse than Stalingrad.  Hitler for the most part gave Manstein operational freedom which he had not provided other commanders.  German Panzer forces conducted mobile operations against superior enemy armored forces and bested them.  Landsers held their own in at critical junctures, especially on the Mius and gave Manstein the opportunity to employ the panzers in the mobile defense.[cix] The Luftwaffe recovered its balance and the coordinated operations between it and German ground forces gave them an edge at a point where the Red Air Force was unable to support the Red Army.[cx] Above all the Germans still maintained the edge in both overall quality of generalship, especially that of Manstein and Kleist, but not to exclude Hoth, Hausser and lower level commanders.  Additionally the average German soldier still maintained an edge over his Soviet adversary in the confusion of mobile operations in open terrain.   Manstein and his forces gave Hitler breathing room on the eastern front.[cxi] As Clark notes: “few periods in World War II show a more complete and dramatic reversal of fortune than the fortnight in February and the first in March 1943…it repaired its front, shattered the hopes of the Allies, nipped the Russian spearhead. Above all it recovered its moral ascendancy.”[cxii]

[ii] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995. p.143

[iii] Ibid. Glantz. P.143. These units include 3^rd Tank Army, 1^st and 3^rd Guards Armies and the 6^th, 40^th and 69^th Armies.

[iv] Liddell-Hart. B.H. Strategy.  A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY 1974, first published by Faber and Faber Ltd. London, 1954 and 1967. p.253

[v] Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operation: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003. p.185

[vi] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 2000. pp.291-292

[vii] Liddell-Hart, B.H. History of the Second World War. G.P. Putnam’s Son’s, New York, NY. 1970  p.478

[viii] Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front in World War II, Prewar to March 1943. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1986. p.161

[ix] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[x] Ibid. Liddell-Hart, Second World War. p.479

[xi] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart. pp.211-212.

[xii] Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45. Perennial, an Imprint of Harper Collins Books, New York, NY 2002. Originally published by William Morrow, New York, NY 1965. pp.299-300

[xiii] Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999. p.11

[xiv] Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Translated by Anthony G. Powell, Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing Company, St Paul, MN. 2004. First Published as Verlorene Siege Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn, GE 1955, English edition Methuen & Company Ltd. 1958  p.417

[xv] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xvi] Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company. pp.196-199

[xvii] Lucas, James. Das Reich: The Military History of the 2^nd SS Division. Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, UK, 1999. First published by Arms and Armour, 1991. p.91  Glantz and House criticize Hausser saying that the SS Panzer Corps Staff lacked the experience to perform its mission.  (Titans Clashed p.144) Most other commentators agree with the necessity of his withdraw.

[xviii] Messenger, Charles. Sepp Dietrich: Hitler’s Gladiator. Brassey’s Defence Publishers, London, 1988. p.113

[xix] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xx] Ibid. Manstein. p.419

[xxi] Ibid. Manstein. pp.418-419

[xxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.144

[xxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xxiv] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.251

[xxv] Ibid. Carell. p.191

[xxvi] Ibid. Manstein. p.424.

[xxvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.428

[xxviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. Second World War. p.481

[xxix] This had previously been Army Detachment Lanz, but Lanz had bee relieved over the loss of Kharkov.

[xxx] Ibid. Manstein. p.429

[xxxi] Ibid. Murray and Millet. p.292

[xxxii] Ibid. Wray. p.162

[xxxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.302.

[xxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.145

[xxxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed . pp.144-145

[xxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.146

[xxxvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[xxxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.191

[xxxix] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[xl] Ibid. Carell. p.199

[xli] Ibid. Carell. p.199

[xlii] Ibid. Carell. p.193

[xliii] Ibid. Clark. p.303

[xliv] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlv] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlvi] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlvii] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[xlviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. Strategy p.253

[xlix] Ibid. Wray. p.163

[l] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147. Note comments by Glantz and House in footnote 31 on relative strengths of forces involved, especially the weakness of German forces.

[li] Butler, Rupert. SS Wiking: The History of the Fifth SS Division 1941-45. Casemate, Havertown, PA. 2002. p.93

[lii] Ibid. Carell. p.211

[liii] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[liv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lv] Ibid. von Mellenthin. p.253

[lvi] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[lvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[lviii] Ibid. Carell. p.213

[lix] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lx] There is difference in various accounts as to which units composed these Panzer Corps. Von Mellenthin adds 11^th Panzer to the XLVIII Panzer Corps and some accounts do not list the Liebstandarte as part of the SS Panzer Corps.

[lxi] Ibid. Carell. p.211

[lxii] Sydnor, Charles W. Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division 1933-1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 1977. p.268

[lxiii] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.252

[lxiv] Ibid. Carell. p.212

[lxv] Ibid. Carell. p.212

[lxvi] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.252

[lxvii] Ibid. Carell. p.213

[lxviii] Ibid. Sydnor. pp.268-269

[lxix] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.253

[lxx] Meyer, Kurt. Grenadiers. Translated by Michael Mende and Robert J. Edwards. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. Winnipeg, Manitoba. Canada. 2001. pp.180-181

[lxxi] Ibid. Sydnor. p.269

[lxxii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxiii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433. Sydnor lists an addition 600 anti-tank guns and notes that the tanks were almost all T-34s. (Sydnor. p.269)

[lxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lxxv] Ibid. Clark. p.306

[lxxvi] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[lxxvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.187

[lxxix] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxx] Ibid. Meyer. p.181

[lxxxi] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[lxxxii] Ibid. Meyer. pp.181-182

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Lucas. p.95

[lxxxiv] Ibid. Lucas. p.95

[lxxxv] Ibid. Sydnor. p.277

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Manstein. p.434

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.277

[lxxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.13

[lxxxix] Ibid. Manstein. p.435

[xc] Ibid. Clark. p.306

[xci] Ibid. Manstein. p.435

[xcii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.278

[xciii] Weingartner, James. J. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933-45. Battery Press, Nashville, TN.(no publication date listed)  p.75

[xciv] Ibid. Raus. pp.189-192

[xcv] Ibid. Messenger. p.114

[xcvi] See Glantz and House p.187 and Murray and Millett p.293

[xcvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.436

[xcviii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.278

[xcix] Ibid. Lucas. p.96

[c] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[ci] Ibid. Carell. p.219

[cii] Ibid. Manstein. p.436

[ciii] Ibid. Manstein. p.437

[civ] Ibid. Clark. p.303

[cv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.143

[cvi] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[cvii] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.254

[cviii] A comment by Von Mellenthin commenting on Manstein’s coolness in the conduct of his operations compares him to Robert E. Lee. “To find another example of defensive strategy of this caliber we must go back to Lee’s campaign in Virginia in the summer of 1864. (Von Mellenthin. p.245)

[cix] For some additional comments along these lines see vn Mellenthin who notes four points in regard to the counter stroke: 1. High level commanders did not restrict the moves of armored formations, but gave them long range tasks. 2. Armored formations had no worries about their flanks because the High Command had a moderate infantry force available for counterattacks. 3. All commanders of armored formations, including corps, conducted operations not from the rear, but from the front. 4. The attack came as a surprise regarding the time and place. (Von Mellenthin p.254)

[cx] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[cxi] Despite his success Hitler was not happy with Manstein in regard to giving up ground for operational purposes and Manstein would lose much of the freedom that he enjoyed by March. Wray has a discussion of this.  See Wray. pp.162-163.  The Nazi hierarchy actively promoted the exploits of the SS Panzer Corps and its leaders, especially the commander of the Leibstandarte Sepp Dietrich. (see Weingartner pp. 76-77) The recognition of Hausser would be delayed, some speculate as a result of his disobedience in giving up Kharkov in February.

[cxii] Ibid. Clark. p.306

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