But these aren’t too expensive, so I’m pretty sure I’ll be able to afford them someday. I’m not a huge fashion nut, but I appreciate cool clothes when I see them.

Kursk Cordura Black: $70.00

Hitler and Mussolini, the Axis Leaders Never Developed a Grand Strategy

All modern war is predicated on the full potential of a nation or alliance to fight a war.  This includes what is known in today’s parlance the DIME, or the Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military and Economic factors of national power. During the war the Axis powers almost exclusively fixated on the military dimension, especially at the operational and tactical level never coordinating a national or alliance grand strategy.  On the other hand the Allies were successful in doing so despite competing national interests of the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States.

Early German Success in France Changed the Face of Warfare

The Germans and Japanese were victorious in the early years of the World War Two due to their application of the most modern forms of warfare and ability to exploit weaknesses in their opponents.  For the Germans this entailed the use of the “Blitzkrieg” or lightening war which used the combined arms team of tanks, artillery, and mechanized infantry with close air support coordinated by commanders in mobile command posts who were able to adapt to tactical considerations on the ground and exploit enemy’s weaknesses.  This involved the classic forms of applied mass, speed and firepower to overwhelm enemy defenses at critical points and the encouragement of initiative by commanders, the Auftragstaktik. Led by men such as Heinz Guderian, Erich Von Manstein and Erwin Rommel to name but a few, the German commanders overcame allied opposition as well as the occasional hesitancy of their own senior leaders to defeat Allied forces throughout Europe.  The blitzkrieg involved risk, but the Germans for the most part, with key exceptions such as at Dunkirk during the French campaign took risks and exploited weaknesses in Allied political goals, military coordination and operational art. The Allies were hampered by weak political leadership, an aversion to risk, an outmoded strategy and poor coordination of a force which outnumbered the Germans and included more tanks than the Germans could field.  The German armaments were not necessarily superior to the Allies, but were better used for the most part.

German skill at the operational level was exemplified in Poland, France and the Low Countries, a daring Norwegian operation, which could be described as one of the first joint operations in military history, the Balkans and North Africa as well as the initial phases of Operation Barbarossa.  Each of these operations had flaws, the most glaring being at the strategic level and lack of a Grand Strategy.  The operations also exposed weaknesses in logistics and limits to what the mechanized and tactical air forces could do when stretched too far, North Africa and Russia as cases in point.  The Germans would always be outnumbered and fighting a multi-front war because of their limited naval capability, both in surface units and U-Boats, as well as the lack of a strategic air capability which kept them from eliminating Britain from the war.  Hitler’s desire for German domination in Europe excluded a true coalition effort to make allies with powers in Europe such as Vichy France which shared an aversion to the British especially after the attack of the British Navy on the French fleet in North Africa.  Likewise Germany’s alliance with Mussolini’s Italy was more of a strategic liability than a true partner. Hitler’s aversion to the Soviet State prevented any more than a brief cooperation with the USSR which was ended by the German invasion of the USSR. The Germans also failed in their war strategy by not going to a total war effort until 1943 after the ascension of Albert Speer as the Armaments Minister.  Thus German forces had to fight war “on the cheap” so to speak for the first part of the war, especially in North Africa and in Russia. In Russia the vast expanse of the front forced the Germans to thin out their forces to dangerous levels and whose pathetic road and rail network limited the already limited ability of the Wehrmacht to supply its forces as they advanced deep into Russia.

Admiral Yamamoto One of the Few Japanese Leaders to Understand what the Japanese Faced in Going to War with the United States

In the Pacific the Japanese used fast carrier task forces and naval air power coupled with superior surface warfare groups of fast battleships, cruisers and destroyers operating in conjunction with land based Army and Naval air units to isolate and destroy allied naval forces and outposts throughout the Pacific.   The Japanese exploited their superiority to conduct their own form of blitzkrieg.

Despite Inflicting Crushing Defeats on the Allies in late 1941 and early 1942 the Japanese period of Conquest would be Short Lived

At the same time the Japanese, even more so than the Germans lacked the ability to fight a long war; something that the best and most realistic of the Japanese strategists, Admiral Yamamoto understood and warned his government about before the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Likewise they like the Germans failed to develop a cohesive Grand Strategy in their war effort.  Competing priorities and inter-service rivalries between the Army and the Navy over resources, manufacturing priorities and war aims crippled Japanese efforts.  Despite this the Japanese used superior tactical application of forces, exploited Allied command and control weaknesses, numerical and qualitative superiority over dispersed and often obsolete Allied forces. The Allies in the opening phase of the war were often led by officers who had little respect for the Japanese and underestimated the Japanese skill at the tactical and operational level of warfare as well as the individual Japanese soldier and sailor, with tragic results.

USS Pope Being Blown out of the Water at the Battle of the Java Sea

The Japanese were constrained by limited resources and intense competition between the Army and Navy for those resources as well as a long term war in China which drew off the larger part of the Japanese Army and Army Air Forces.  The Japanese effort stalled after they lost much of their carrier fleet and experienced naval aviators at Coral Sea, Midway and the Guadalcanal Campaign.  The Americans, who assumed the mantle of the Pacific Theater after the initial Japanese success and weakness of British and Dutch forces in the Pacific and demands of the war in Europe began an aggressive defense and opened an offensive against the Japanese long before the Japanese believed that they would at Guadalcanal.

At the heart of the early German and Japanese success lay their superior application of the techniques and weapons of modern warfare on the land, sea and air against opponents who were initially ill-prepared to meet their onslaught.  They both had glaring weaknesses but their weaknesses in the early years of the war were masked by Allied ineptitude at all levels, tactical, operational and strategic.   Thus they were successful and at times wildly so, but in their success lay the seeds of their defeat.

Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill overcame Significant Conflicts of Interest to Build a Grand Strategy

The defeat of the Axis powers was in large part a combination of superior Allied strategy at the “grand strategy” level and lack of a corresponding Axis Grand Strategy; as well as the Axis powers inherent weaknesses in natural resources, manpower and industrial capabilities to fight multi-front wars, coupled with poor transportation and logistics capabilities for distant operations.

The US Navy Breaking of the Japanese Naval and Diplomatic Codes as well as the Cracking of the German Ultra Code and Capture of the Enigma Machine Greatly Enhanced Allied Intelligence

The cracking of Japanese Naval and diplomatic codes and the capture of the German Enigma code machine and code books aided Allied strategic planning, none or the Axis intelligence services rose to the challenges of the war. The Allied victory and Axis defeat was in fact a combination of what is called the DIME, the Diplomatic Intelligence Military and Economic factors which caused the Axis defeat.  While it is in part due to Allied strategy, Axis deficiencies in each of these areas played a part in their ultimate defeat.

Massive US Industrial Capacity Drove the Allied War Effort

On the Grand Strategic level there was no comparison. The Allies, even factoring in often conflicting national goals were able to coordinate a strategy to first defeat Germany and then Japan.  The Americans, British and Russians began such cooperation even prior to the American entry into the war through the Lend Lease, followed by the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which helped coordinate often disparate British and American strategies in Europe and Asia. Murray and Millett assert and I agree with the thesis that the British and Americans “came closest to designing a global strategy that accommodated their war aims.” (War to Be Won p.584) While close coordination with the Russians was illusory at best, the Western Allies were able to help keep the Russians in war the by helping to supply them (War to Be Won p.388), and on occasion launching operations which assisted the Russians, such as the invasion of Italy. The Italian invasion, though the pipe dream of Churchill to crack the “soft underbelly” of Europe was a key factor in the German decision to quit the Kursk offensive and redeploy Panzer Divisions, including SS formations to Italy and the West. This weakened the Germans in the face of the Russian counter offensive following Kursk which aided Russian success. The Axis powers knew no such coordinated strategic thinking.

Poor Italian Technology, Training and Organization Made them More of  a Burden to Germany than a Help

The Japanese, Germans and Italians ran separate wars based on their perceived national considerations at times which often ran contrary to the common needs of their coalition.  Italian actions in the Mediterranean caused a diversion in German efforts at key times, such as in Greece where the Germans had to save the Italians and delay the opening of Operation Barbarossa.  Italian incompetence forced the Germans to commit forces to North Africa, Greece, the Balkans and Italy upon its collapse which could have been used to great effect in Europe or Russia. The Japanese and Germans never coordinated their efforts to defeat either the western Allies or the Soviets.  The lack of a coherent Grand Strategy on the part of the Axis powers, especially in the early part of the war when Allied fortunes were at lowest ebb, was every bit as much a part of their ultimate defeat as was a coordinated or “superior” Allied strategy.

The lack of a coordinated Axis Grand Strategy was reflected in the way each fought its war, the Japanese were hindered by lack of natural resources, especially those most important in maintaining a war economy, fuels, metals, rubber and even foodstuffs for which they were dependant on foreign suppliers such as the United States.  They were also hindered by a war in China which consumed troops and supplies without a corresponding benefit.  (See Barnhart’s “Japan Prepares for Total War and Toland’s “Rising Sun.) Their inability to produce the machines of war in sufficient numbers to replace losses due to combat operations and their failure to keep up with advances in technology negated their initial success and superiority at sea and in the air.

US Naval Forces Would Dominate the Pacific

The Germans failed to mobilize their economy to a total war footing until after Stalingrad and the accession of Albert Speer to head Reich war production.   They also attempted to fight a multi-front war and were dependant on weak and unenthusiastic satellite states such as Romania and Hungary to hold what they deemed to be less important areas in order free up German units.  Likewise the Germans had not adequately prepared for the war at sea with sufficient surface, naval air or U-boat strength to win the battle of the Atlantic, nor had the Luftwaffe developed a strategic bombing capability with long range fighter escorts to win the Battle of Britain. German industrial efforts, even the great strides made after Speer took over war production were unable to keep pace with the massive production of the Americans and the Soviet Union.  The Red Army ground the Wehrmacht to dust on the Steppes of Russia, a key factor in that helped the American and British successfully invade Western Europe.

B-17s Over Europe

The preponderance of western Air, Naval, war production and natural resources enabled them to field Fleets, Armies and Air Forces which were unmatched in size or technical sophistication for their time in history.  The Japanese and the Germans had no way to win by 1944, short of developing and deploying Atomic weapons and delivery systems before the Americans and British did could defeat.  Murray and Millett note this in regard to Germany which had the Wehrmacht held out longer would have been the first target of the Atomic bombs. (War to Be Won p.483)

Atomic Bomb at Hiroshima, It could Have Been Berlin Instead

In summary the Axis powers were defeated by their own weaknesses in the diplomatic, intelligence, military and economic arenas as much as they were by superior Allied strategy.  This in no way negates the superior way in which the Allies marshaled their resources and coordinated a coherent Grand Strategy.  But even so the Allies by were running out of troops by the end of the European war.  Russian formations while still formidable were operating at greatly diminished strength by the end of the war and their losses “carried political and social consequences that were to burden the Soviet Union to its demise.” (War to Be Won p.483)  The British were bled dry and unable to keep up with losses suffered after Normandy. The Americans too suffered from a shortage of manpower, particularly in Army infantry forces, and had limited their Army to a mere 90 divisions of all types to fight a world war. They had diverted manpower to the Army Air Corps, Naval and Marine Corps leaving the Army chronically short infantry. The Americans were forced into emergency drafts of troops from the Air Corps and other ancillary formations and support units to fill out infantry formations during the winter of 1944-45.  (See Russell Weigley’s book Eisenhower’s Lieutenants.” and Max Hasting’s “Armageddon” for a good treatment of the manpower situation in 1944-45) This is one point were the Americans took a risk that almost backfired on them and could have cost them victory.

Kiev’de üniversiteli genç kızlar bugüne kadar görülmemiş bir protestoya imza attılar.

Genç kızlar her yılın belli dönemlerinde bakım ve tamirat amacıyla kesilen sıcak suyu ve buna karar veren yerel yöneticileri protesto amacıyla halkı çamaşırlarını kentin sokak çeşmeleriyle, havuzlarda yıkamaya davet ettiler.

Protesto eyleminin başlangıcını da kendileri yapan genç kızlar, kentin ana meydanlarında bulunan havuzlarda iç çamaşırlarını ve bikinilerini yıkayarak, yetkililerin dikkatini çekemeye çalıştılar.

Polis bu ilginç protestoya herhangi bir müdahalede bulunmadı.Elemi dışardan izleyenler, bunun ses getirmesinin beklendiğini ve fakat sıcak su kesintisini önlemeye yetmeyeceğini, sıcak su kesintilerinin yılların sorunu olduğunu söylediler.

Moskova’da yetkililer sürekli olarak, sıcak su kesintisinin artık olmayacağını, olumlu önlemler alındığını söylemelerine karşın, günlük yaşamda bu konuda olumlu bir gelişme henüz yaşama geçirilmiş değil.

Bundan bir süre önce Moskova’da doğal gaz boru hattında meydana gelen yangının suçluları belirlendi.

Mosgaz yetkililerinin verdikleri bilgilere göre 10 Mayıs gecesi Ozereya Ulitsa’da meydana gelen doğal gaz boru hattında ki yangında ihmali bulunanların 7 kişi olduğu açıklandı. Yangında ihmali bulunan 3 kişinin Mosgaz elemanı oldukları ve üçünü de işten çıkarıldığı belirtildi.

Yangının dikkatsizlik, tamirat ve bakım sırasında kalitesiz malzeme kullanımı ile gerekli teknik bakım ve onarımların zamanında yapılmadığından kaynaklandığı belirlendi.Geri kalan üç kişinin de yangının çıkış noktasında bakım ve tamirat yapan kuruluşun üç personeli olduğu, onların da kuruluşlarınca işlerine son verildiği belirlendi.

Moskova’da ikinci dünya savaşından sonra ortaya çıkan en büyük yangın olarak kabul edilen bu yangında alevler 200 metre yüksekliğe kadar yükselmiş ve yangın 16 saat devam etmişti.Suçlu bulunan 7’ci kişi ise yangın sırasında söndürme çalışmaları için canını dişine takan ve yardım ekiplerine olayı ilk haber veren personel olduğu ve üstün gayretleri nedeniyle affedilip, işine devam ettirildiği duyuruldu.

Bu yıl okulu bitiren Moskovalı öğrenciler Kızıl Meydan’da kutlama yaptılar.

Kutlamalar Moskova’nın 12 farklı meydanında, ayrıca Lujniki Spor Salonu ve çeşitli eğlence klüplerinde gerçekleşti. Bu yıl aynı zamanda bir ilke imza atıldı. İlk olarak bu yıl Mezuniyet Balosu Kızıl Meydan’da gerçekleştirildi. Polislerin yoğun güvenlik önlemleri aldığı Kızıl Meydan’daki kutlamalarda meydana alkollü içki sokulmadı. Büyük bir eğlence havasında geçen, mezun öğrencilerin katıldığı Mezuniyet Balosu havai fişek gösterisiyle sona erdi.

Diğer taraftan okullarını takdir ve teşekkür alarak bitiren öğrencilerin resmi kutlama töreni 26 Haziran cuma günü Kızıl Meydan yakınındaki Gostinir Dvor’da gerçekleştirilecek ve bu baloya Moskova’da bu sene okulu bitirip takdir veya teşekkür almış olan yaklaşık 4 bin mezun öğrenci katılacak.

Agosto de 2000 – A mãe de um dos tripulantes do submarino Kursk, interrompeu o discurso de um ministro de Putin criticando o atraso das equipas de resgate. Todo o mundo viu como uma mulher se aproximou e lhe injectou um sedativo.

Outubro de 2002 – Um comando checheno sequestrou 700 pessoas num teatro. A polícia assaltou o edifício matando 50 sequestradores e 117 sequestrados pela inalação de gás paralisante em doses mortais.

Setembro de 2004 – O principal líder ucraniano, opositor aos interesses de Moscovo, Víctor Yushenko, foi envenenado entre 5 e 10 de Setembro, pelos serviços secretos, herdeiros do KGB.

Setembro de 2004 – As forças armadas russas libertaram um colégio sequestrado, em Beslán, por um comando pró-checheno provocando a morte de 155 crianças e centenas de feridos.

Outubro de 2006 –  Foi assassinada no elevador do seu apartamento, Anna Politkóvskaya, jornalista russa e activista dos direitos humanos.

Novembro de 2006 – Litvinenko morre envenenado com polónio 210. O Kremlin eliminou-o por ter acusado os serviços secretos de causar uma série de explosões num edificio de Moscovo, em 1999, para ajudar Putin a chegar à presidência.

Janeiro de 2009 – Anastasia Baburova foi a quarta jornalista de Novaya Gazeta assassinada desde que Putin assumiu o poder. No mesmo ataque morreu Stanislav Markelov, activista de direitos humanos.

Últimas mortes – Em Julho de 2009, na Checehénia, era assassinada a defensora de direitos humanos Natalya Estemirova. Em Agosto, o activista de direitos humanos, Maksharip Aushev, foi encontrado morto na Ingushetia com 60 balas no corpo.

Amerika’nın Washington kentinde metroda kazasından sonra Moskova’da yaşayan ve metro ile seyahat eden insanları “Moskova Metrosunda da buna benzer bir olay yaşanır mı” korkusu sardı.

Bunun üzerine konuya hakim uzmanlar tarafından bir açıklama geldi. Yapılan açıklamada, Moskova Metrosunda iki farklı yönden gelen trenlerin çarpışmasının fiziki olarak mümkün olmadığı, Moskova Metrosunda sinyal sistemi, otomatik olarak hızın ayarlanması sistemi ve acil fren sisteminin bulunduğu belirtildi. Ayrıca, konu ile ilgili olarak Moskova Metrosu Yönetimi tarafından yapılan açıklamada da, Moskova Metrosunda çarpışma meydana gelmesinin mümkün olmadığı ve böyle bir olayın imkansız olduğu bildirildi.

Moskova’nın tüm hatlarında sinyal sistemi olduğu ve bu sistemin metroyu süren makiniste mümkün olan hız sınırını gösterdiği, gerektiği zaman da hızın azaltılması uyarısı yaptığını ve makinistin buna göre yoluna devam ettiği, makinistin buna uymaması durumunda ise hızın otomatik olarak düşürülüp metronun frenlendiği kaydedildi.

Diğer taraftan, Moskova Metrosu tarihinde bir defa dahi bu gibi bir olayla karşılaşılmadığının altı çizildi.

Bundan 9 yıl önce 2000 yılında Barensk denizinde batan ve batışı ile o dönem dünyanın gündemine oturan Rus nükleer denizaltısı Kursk’un başından geçenler bir tiyatro eserine konu oldu.

Kendisi de aslında eski bir denizaltıcı olan İngiliz Bryıny Lavory, Kursk’un batışını konu alan tiyatro eserinde, olayın tüm canlılığıyla yansıtılması için elinden geleni yaptı.Londra’nın Young Vic Thetare salonlarında sahnelenen eserde oynayan oyuncuların da büyük bölümü eski denizaltıcılardan seçildi.Oyun esnasında seyircilerin kendilerini tam bir denizaltı ortamında hissedebilmeleri için her türlü dekor, ses ve efektler aslına uygun olarak hazırlandı.

Eser ağırlıklı olarak Kursk’un batışı sırasında gizlice onu izleyen bir İngiliz denizaltısının gözünden yansıtılıyor.İngiliz denizaltısı o civarda gizlice bulunduğu için Rus nükleer denizaltısı Kursk’a yardım mı etsin yoksa olayı gizlice izleyerek olanı biteni dünyaya mı aktarsın ikilemi içinde bocalıyor.Nükleer denizaltı Kursk’ta batma sırasında içinde bulunan 118 personelin tümü yaşamını yitirmişti.Ruslar başka ülkelerden gelen yardım tekliflerini geri çevirdikleri için o dönemin yöneticileri daha sonra kamu oyu tarafından acımasızca eleştirilmişlerdi.

The Battle of Kursk was the climactic battle on the Eastern Front from which the Germans never recovered. It was a battle that should not have been fought, at least at the time that it was fought. It was high risk operation with minimal payoff should it succeed. A while back I posted an “alternative history” of this entitled “Operation DACHS.” I have also posted articles on events leading up to Kursk, one on Stalingrad and the other on Manstein’s counter-stroke.  In a sense this is a trilogy with an alternative scenario included.

The German Situation and Dilemma in April 1943

The Germans faced a dilemma in April 1943.  Manstein’s brilliant counter-stroke had turned what could have been disaster into an opportunity to salvage prospects for the Eastern Front. The German action had “repaired its front, shattered the hopes of the Allies, and nipped the Russian spearhead.”[i] Unfortunately for the Germans the spring thaw meant that Manstein could not continue immediately and eliminate the Kursk bulge which had been formed by Rokossovky’s offensive and Manstein’s own counter-stroke.  With the Germans stalled by the weather Stavka cancelled “other significant planned offensives to dispatch reinforcements to the Kursk region.”[ii] Despite the weather Manstein pushed Kluge for an immediate attack on both sides of the bulge but was rebuffed by Kluge who “insisted that his troops needed to rest and refit.”[iii] This rebuff combined with the onset of the Russian mud meant that in “March 1943 the war on the ground came to an end….The front was immobilized.”[iv]

Manstein with Panther Tanks

Manstein’s offensive had “enabled the Germans to consolidate a firm position in the East, and build up strength afresh- not to its former level, but sufficient to provide a good prospect of holding the Russians at bay.”[v] As a result German armies in the south “held again nearly the same positions from which the Blau offensive had begun the previous spring.”[vi] Now the Kursk bulge some 250 Kilometers wide and 160 Kilometers deep[vii] protruded menacingly into the German lines and drew the attention of both sides, to the Germans it appeared to be designed for an encirclement battle.[viii] Thus it appeared that the Kursk bulge was the obvious place for the Germans to resume the offensive and maintain the initiative on the Eastern Front.

But was the Kursk necessary?  Was Operation ZITADELLE as obvious as it seemed to be to Hitler, Zeitzler and others?  The battle is the subject of many books and articles which often focus on tactical and operational details of the German offensive, particularly the battle on the southern side of the bulge and the clash of armor at Prokhorovka.  This essay will focus less on the battle and more on the strategic situation faced by the Germans in the spring of 1943. Key to this are the arguments for and against the operation, the operations timing and the option that the Germans had to conduct a mobile defense.   It is the strategic situation that must be looked at to determine whether Operation ZITADELLE was necessary at all. Manstein believed that had the offensive been launched early enough that it might have succeeded provided it “we launched it early enough we could hope to catch them in a state of unpreparedness.”[ix] Williamson Murray and Allan Millett agree with Manstein’s assessment but note that an early offensive was “riskier…but greater the prospect for a major success.”[x] Guderian on the other hand saw that nothing good could come of ZITADELLE and opposed it from the beginning.[xi] Glantz and House in their detailed study argue that “there is absolutely no basis for assuming that Citadel would have succeeded had it been launched in spring 1943.”[xii]

The Soviets Reinforced and Fortified the Kursk Salient

The Germans faced a number of major problems in early 1943.  First, among them was manpower.  The armed forces had been mauled on the Eastern Front, “after continuous operations from June 1942 to March 1943, most German units were worn out.”[xiii] Many infantry divisions “were reduced to two thirds of their original strength, with declining mobility and anti-tank defenses.”[xiv] Had the Germans only faced the Russians this might have been overcome, however they not only faced a rejuvenated Red Army, but challenges brought about by multi-theater operations and their weak, ineffective and reluctant allies.  The Allied air offensive which though it “did not decisively effect German arms production it nevertheless prevented a great deal of work from being carried on and had profound moral effects which communicated themselves to all the fronts.”[xv] Likewise the U-Boat campaign had been effectively defeated by May 1943 allowing for increasing numbers of American troops and supplies to reach Europe, including significant Lend-Lease aide for the Soviet Union.  Manpower became a major issue for the the German Army and industry.  Both the military and industryhad difficulty in getting the required number of personnel to meet their personnel needs, in January 1943 the German High Command “demanded 800,000 men-but even the most ruthless call-up was able to produce only 400,000” who were lost to the civilian war economy.[xvi] Even the “belated industrial mobilization of Germany, fueled by slave labor and directed by the organizational genius of men like Speer and Guderian, could do little beyond patching together existing units.”[xvii]

General Heinz Guderian, Inspector of Panzer Troops was one of Few Senior German Officers to Oppose ZITADELLE from the Beginning

There were other challenges. The German and Italian armies in North Africa had surrendered, and about 330,000 Axis soldiers entered captivity.[xviii] Added to the heavy losses on the Eastern Front, the disasters in North Africa and Stalingrad had “effectively destroyed the Axis military alliance, such as it was.”[xix] Italy, Hungary and Romania all began to pull their forces out of the Eastern front after having them shattered by the Soviet Winter offensive.[xx] Italy, shaken by its losses in North Africa and the Russian front was wavering in its support for Germany; Mussolini’s government itself was on the verge of falling.  Likewise the Hungarian government sought contact with the Allies;[xxi] as did the Romanians.[xxii] Finland too was looking for a way out and limiting its participation in German offensive operations.[xxiii] As her allies looked for a way out, the British and Americans were about to open a new front in Southern Europe, while another had effectively been opened by partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece.[xxiv] The crisis in the south was great enough that OKW under General Jodl began to look at ways of shoring up those fronts in case Italy withdrew from the war including the use of units that would have to be withdrawn from the Eastern Front.[xxv] The Balkans drained German reserves such that the number of German divisions deployed there increased from 5 to 15 between July 1942 and July 1943.[xxvi] Additionally many units had to be created by the Replacement Army to build up the Western Front knowing that an Allied strike there would eventually take place, further depriving the Eastern Front of badly needed infantry replacements and divisions.

Hitler Felt Regaining the Initiative in the East was Critical to Keeping his Allies in the War

The German Options and Decision

The question for the Germans now was whether they “had any strategic options that would allow them to avoid defeat.”[xxvii] It is from this perspective that the necessity of Kursk must be examined. Most in the German High Command now realized that strategy in the east could no longer be “based on the illusion of conquering the vast Soviet Union.”[xxviii] As such the discussion turned to what direction the new strategy should take.  Political considerations came into play: Since the German allies were looking for ways to exit the war it was felt that “it was politically impossible for Germany to surrender the initiative on the Eastern Front.”[xxix] Realistically there were two options available: Wait and counterattack or launch a limited attack on the Kursk salient. The general impression among many German commanders in the East was that they had ended the last campaign “with a relative advantage over the Reds, an advantage that should be exploited as soon as the rasputitsa ended in April or early May.”[xxx] But the only strategy that looked feasible balancing the political and military goal of maintaining the initiative was what Manstein originally had in mind after Kharkov, to continue on, pinch out the Kursk bulge with the cooperation of Kluge’s Army Group Center.  As noted the opportunity to do so was lost with Kluge’s refusal and the onset of the spring thaw.  Yet this idea captured Zeitzler at OKH and Kluge at Army Group Center, though by April and May Manstein was more inclined toward “the ‘backhand’ stroke, which involved giving up the whole Donetz basin and staging a major Panzer offensive southeast from Kharkov.”[xxxi] However, this was too bold for Hitler who was “unwilling to give up the Donetz Basin with its industrial and mineral resources.”[xxxii]

The New Tiger Tanks Were to Play a Critical Role in the Attack

Manstein felt that the “moment of opportunity had passed, but his counterpart at Army Group Center…Kluge, was enthusiastic about the proposal.”[xxxiii] Zeitzler believed that an “attack at Kursk would be less risky”[xxxiv] than Manstein’s “backhand” and pushed the plan to Hitler.  There were advantages to this strategy if it could be carried out successfully. The Germans would encircle and destroy Russian forces in the salient and “shorten their own defensive lines after such an encirclement.”[xxxv] Yet the plan was opposed by others. Jodl at OKW argued against ZITADELLE “because he believed that it was dangerous to empty the strategic reserve when so many new crises threatened to develop in the Mediterranean.”[xxxvi] Zeitzler countered that because of German weakness in the east that they could not “wait to be hit.”[xxxvii] Guderian did not believe that either Army Group could be ready to mount the offensive that Zeitzler envisioned and “declared that the attack was pointless…if we attacked according to the plan of the Chief of the General Staff, we were certain to suffer heavy tank casualties, which we would not be in position to replace in 1943.”[xxxviii] Guderian asked Hitler at a separate conference “why he wanted to attack at all in the East in 1943.” When Keitel expressed that the reasons were political, Guderian asked Hitler “How many people do you think even know where Kursk is? It’s a matter of profound indifference to the world whether we hold Kursk or not…”[xxxix] Guderian and Speer both pointed out technical problems in producing the Tigers and Panthers but were overruled.[xl] Hitler himself reportedly had misgivings about the attack at one point reportedly stating that “the thought of the Zitadelle operation ‘made [his] stomach turn over’”[xli] In spite of Jodl and Guderian’s warnings, his own misgivings and those of Manstein and Model in April and May, Hitler “allowed himself to be tempted once more into taking the offensive. The Kursk salient…lured him into mounting his great pincer operation known as Citadel.”[xlii] Glantz and House maintain that he could “see no alternative politically and agreed to the plan.”[xliii]

The Facts on the Ground

Soviet Forces Expected the Attack and Were well Prepared to Meet it

Once the decision to attack was made the question that remained was the timing of the attack. Manstein had preferred an early attack in May, but the operation was postponed to mid-June and then to July due to the request of Model who believed that his forces were too weak and needed reinforcements.[xliv] The attack was to be one of several “limited offensives designed to consolidate the German defenses while inflicting sufficient damage on the Red Army to delay any Soviet offensive.”[xlv] But the delays insisted on by Model and agreed to by Hitler were a fatal error.  The Germans failed to “factor into their decision was the unpalatable reality that Soviet strength in the Kursk salient was growing much faster than the Wehrmacht could muster forces to attack it.”[xlvi] Not only were the Soviet forces growing they knew about the German plans and could deploy their forces to counter them and for their own offensive.[xlvii] Stalin’s generals were able to convince him not to launch an attack and instead wait on the Germans so they could attack as the Germans exhausted their strength.[xlviii] They knew of it since April and reinforced the flanks of the salient with guns and armor at a faster pace than the Germans opposite them.[xlix] At Kursk “improved intelligence collection and analysis permitted the Red Army to predict almost exactly the strategic focal point of a major German offensive.”[l] Into the bulge “Vatutin and Rokossovsky crammed seven armies.”[li] The Russians deployed in depth in heavy fortified zones and minefields along the very sectors of the bulge that the Germans intended to attack, successfully masking their preparations from the Germans. It was “a measure of Soviet self-confidence that the senior commanders were looking beyond the German attack, beyond its failure, to the first major Soviet summer offensive.”[lii] Had the Germans succeeded in pinching off the salient “they would have faced several additional defensive belts constructed to the east of the salient.”[liii]

Typically when one launches an offensive it is desirable to have numeric advantage over the defender, 3:1 is normally assumed to be sufficient. At Kursk the Germans were outnumbered by the Russians 2.3:1 in men and 1.6:1 in tanks[liv] yet somehow the offensive had now morphed from a spoiling attack into a strategic offensive, albeit with more limited objectives attacking one of the strongest points in the Russian line.  General Raus, commanding a corps in Army Detachment Kempf noted: “Considering Russian dispositions, defenses and terrain, German strength could be considered only minimally sufficient for the assigned mission.”[lv] The Chief of Staff of XLVIII Panzer Corps called Kursk “the strongest fortress in the world.”[lvi]

Danger Signs: Requests for Cancellation

General Alfred Jodl at OKW Protested the Offensive Verbally and in Writing

As more delays occurred Manstein “came out in the open and protested that the operation was no longer feasible and must be abandoned, but it was too late.  The united stand of orthodox General Staff opinion, Keitel, Zeitzler, Kluge, had persuaded the Führer, whose mind, once made up, was never altered.”[lvii] Manstein felt that the idea had been to “attack the enemy before the enemy had replenished his forces and got over the reverses of the winter.”[lviii] He felt there was great danger to the Mius line and to the northern Orel bulge with each delay; and the felt the threat of an attack by the Allies in Western Europe.[lix] On 18 June Jodl and the OKW Operations Staff “recommended to Hitler that he abandon Operation Citadel in order to free strategic reserves for defense in both East and West.”[lx] Warlimont writes that Jodl “raised empathic objection to the premature commitment of the central reserves to the East; he pointed out both verbally and in writing that a local success was all that could be hoped from Operation Citadel and that it could have no strategic significance for the overall situation.”[lxi] Hitler again refused the request.  “The doubts of certain Chiefs of Staff of the attacking armies were disregarded, and in the case of Colonel von Schleinitz, answered with dismissal.”[lxii]

The Battle

Tigers Advancing

The attacking forces for ZITADELLE involved units of Army Group Center and Army Group South.  Spearheading the assault for Army Group Center was Model’s 9^th Army.  2^nd Army from the same Army Group took a defensive role in the center of the bulge while Army Group South’s 4^th Panzer Army under Hoth and Army Detachment Kempf composed the Southern attack force.  Von Mellenthin noted that to muster the necessary divisions for the attacking armies “neighboring fronts were to be thinned out beyond the limits of prudence” and from a strategic point of view likened Citadel “to be a veritable ‘death ride.’”[lxiii] Manstein worried about stripping the Mius-Donetz salient which “had to hand over all their available forces.”[lxiv] The Germans sent 17 panzer divisions against Kursk including the elite 2^nd Panzer, Grossdeutschland, Leibstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf. Hoth’s army was the “strongest force ever put under a single commander in the German Army.”[lxv] While the Germans assembled the Russians waited, and beginning on 1 July the “Red Army defenders were on constant alert, waiting in their bunkers for the first sign of attack.”[lxvi]

Panzers on the Advance

ZITADELLE began on 4 July with a reconnaissance in force, the main blow scheduled for 0300 5 July. The Russians learned of the timing from a prisoner and quickly launched an artillery counter-preparation an hour prior to the German attack, disrupting it while air strikes were ordered against Luftwaffe airfields.[lxvii] Model’s 9^th Army on the northern flank attacked the Russian “13^th and 70^th Armies on a frontage of 50 kilometers”[lxviii] with the focus being a 16 kilometer front where he concentrated 6 infantry divisions, a panzer division and all his Tiger and Ferdinand units.[lxix] He intended to break the Soviet defensive system “by constantly feeding in new units to grind down the defenses.”[lxx] The attack stalled by the 9 July making minimal progress of “8 to 12 kilometers into the massive Soviet defenses.”[lxxi] A good deal of his problem was due to limited infantry strength which was  “far below established strength….moreover, the Ninth Army’s infantry- even the veterans- lacked experience in conducting set-piece attacks against prepared positions.”[lxxii] The Russians defined the battleground and forced Model into a battle determined by superior firepower on a constricted battlefield, “a game that the Wehrmacht could not win.”[lxxiii] This nullified any advantage the Germans might have had in mobility for their panzer divisions.  In savage battles to take the high ground at Ponyri station and Ol’khovatka Model’s assaults faltered.  9^th Army sacrificed about 50,000 men and 400 tanks to the god of war.”[lxxiv] Model continued to attack until 12 July when the Russians launched their offensive against the Orel bulge forcing him to redeploy to counter the Russian advance.  The battle in the north became “a savage defensive battle in which considerable parts of the offensive wing of Ninth Army were involved.”[lxxv] Model’s defeat made Hoth’s task “much more challenging.”[lxxvi]

T-34’s and Infantry

The Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf made better progress, nearly breaking through the Russian defenses after hard fighting. They penetrated “into the third Soviet defensive belt, a depth of 35 kilometers, but were stopped by Katukov’s 1^st Tank Army.”[lxxvii] The critical point was reached on 11 and 12 July at Prokhorovka station when 5^th Tank Army collided with 4^th Panzer Army. “Over 1200 tanks from both sides were engaged in this struggle.”[lxxviii] It was the largest tank engagement of the war, over 700 tanks were destroyed and “German losses were too great to allow a decisive breakthrough.”[lxxix] Both sides took heavy casualties but the Germans could not replace theirs while the Russians still had formidable uncommitted reserves.  On 13 July the battle in the south drifted into a stalemate as XLVIII Panzer Corps and Hausser’s II SS Panzer Corps failed to break the Soviet line[lxxx] as the Russians “kept on throwing in fresh troops, and their reserves seemed inexhaustible.”[lxxxi] Manstein desired to continue the offensive as he believed that for his Army Group “the battle was now at its culminating point, that to break it off at this moment would be tantamount to throwing victory away.”[lxxxii] Although Manstein and Hoth felt that they could continue on and break the Russian line, they were now not in a position to do so. Model’s forces were in no shape to assist in the north and Manstein and Kluge were called to the Wolfsschanze by Hitler who, now preoccupied with the Allied invasion of Sicily necessitating withdraws of strong panzer forces from the east to face the threat in the west.[lxxxiii] Hitler rejected Manstein’s counsel to continue and ordered him to withdraw II SS Panzer Corps,[lxxxiv] effectively ending the ZITADELLE as the Russians launched their offensive on 17 July.

Destroyed Panzers

Analysis of the Decision: Zitadelle Was Not Obvious, Necessary nor Well Executed

To Hitler and the supporters of ZITADELLE the operation seemed obvious.  In the two previous years the Germans had dealt punishing blows against the Red Army and the belief of Zeitzler and others was that the Wehrmacht was still qualitatively superior to the Soviets and that even a limited offensive would succeed in its objectives.  But the conditions on the ground had changed and the Germans failed to take the change into account.  The German Army did not have the resources for an offensive of the scope of Barbarossa or Blau. However this lack of resources did not lessen the optimism of some for ZITADELLE; particularly Zeitzler and Kluge. From their perspective the offensive to pinch out the Kursk salient seemed likely to succeed.  Yet as Clark notes the offensive was defined by a “lack of imagination and adaptability….Where the old Blitzkrieg formula….was fed into the computer, with little regard for the changed conditions….” [lxxxv] Von Mellenthin comments that by attacking Kursk, the “German Army threw away all their advantages in mobile tactics, and met the Russians on ground of their own choosing.”[lxxxvi] Glantz and House attribute this to the fact that the Germans “clung to outmoded assumptions about their own superiority over their opponents” due to their previous success. They point out that the Red Army had systematically reviewed its performance after every failure,” so that “Soviet doctrine, organization, and expectations were closer to battlefield reality than were those of the senior German leadership.”[lxxxvii] The German intelligence services failed them[lxxxviii] as they failed to detect the large strategic sized force that the Soviets had concentrated in the spring of 1943.  This was a force that Glantz and House believe would have caused ZITADELLE to fail even had it occurred in May, particularly in regard to the comparatively weak German forces fielded by Manstein.[lxxxix]

An offensive with what appeared to be reasonable objectives that were believed to be within the capabilities of the Wehrmacht failed.  Hitler according to Carell “gambled away not only victory but all hope of a draw.”[xc] Manstein categorized the offensive as a “fiasco.”[xci] Guderian called it “a decisive defeat” that made it “problematical” whether the armored formations could be “rehabilitated in time to defend the Eastern Front.”[xcii] Warlimont who served at OKW commented: “Operation Citadel was more than a battle lost; it handed the Russians the initiative and we never recovered it again right up to the end of the war.”[xciii] Guderian’s biographer Kenneth Macksey wrote that “the failure at Kursk was due to the employment of a faulty plan which lacked the element of strategic as well as tactical surprise.”[xciv] Raus lists several factors for this.  However, his argument is summarized: “once we learned in May and June that this was the area in which the Russians were prepared to offer their stiffest resistance, we should have modified our plans.  Either we should have refrained from attacking at all, or the operation should have been carried out to strike the enemy not at his strongest, but at his weakest point.”[xcv]

Hitler felt that a decisive victory was needed for political and propaganda reasons, yet even a significant victory was unlikely to keep Italy in the war, even if it swayed the lesser allies to stay the course.  ZITADELLE was conducted too late to save the Italians, success in May might have given German supporters in Italy some leverage but the invasion of Sicily and the failure at Kursk emboldened Mussolini’s opponents. The Fascist Grand Council “voted to have Mussolini removed as prime minister” and King Vittorio Emmanuaele “dismissed Mussolini” who was then placed under arrest.[xcvi] Finland refused to take offensive action that might have cut the Murmansk railway[xcvii] and engaged the Americans in a round of “abortive negotiation”[xcviii] while the Hungarians and Romanians provided little assistance to the Germans, partially due to the German reluctance to assist in modernizing and rebuilding their armies.[xcix]

Of the German Generals involved it was only Guderian as Inspector of Armored Troops and Jodl at OKW who consistently opposed ZITADELLE, citing realistic assessments of strengths, risks and dangers in other theaters.  Manstein opposed it when he felt the opportunity had passed, though it was unlikely to succeed had it been launched in May as he desired.  Guderian and Jodl’s arguments proved correct in every respect. ZITADELLE engaged German the preponderance of German forces in a battle that had at best chances of local success. The offensive itself weakened and endangered the German position on all fronts.  In the end, despite the belief and decision of Hitler, Zeitzler Kluge and others in the High Command, Operation ZITADELLE was neither obvious nor necessary and played out with the disastrous results expected by those who opposed it.

[ii] Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999. p.14

[iii] Ibid. Glantz and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  p.14

[iv] Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company. p. 335

[v] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart. p.212

[vi] Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front in World War II, Prewar to March 1943. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1986. p.163

[vii] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995. p.157

[viii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.157

[ix] Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Translated by Anthony G. Powell, Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing Company, St Paul, MN. 2004. First Published as Verlorene Siege Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn, GE 1955, English edition Methuen & Company Ltd. 1958  p.447

[x] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War.  The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. 2000. p.295

[xi] Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg. Stein and Day Publishing, New York, NY 1975 p.206

[xii] Ibid. Glantz and House. The Battle of Kursk. p.261

[xiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. The Battle of Kursk. p.14

[xiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Clash of Titans. p.174

[xv] Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff 1657-1945. Translated by Brian Battershaw. Westview Press. Boulder CO and London. 1985 Originally published as Der Deutsche Generalstab, Verlag der Fankfurter Hefte, Frankfurt am Main.  First U.S. publication in 1953 by Preager Publishers. p.441

[xvi] Ibid. Carell. p.336

[xvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Clash of Titans. p.174

[xviii] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964. p.312

[xix] DiNardo, Richard L. Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 2005. p.174

[xx] Ibid. DiNardo. p.174. By the summer all Italians units had been withdrawn, all but two Hungarian divisions which were used in anti-partisan operations and nine Romanian divisions.

[xxi] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.441

[xxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.21

[xxiii] Ibid. DiNardo. p.180

[xxiv] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.441

[xxv] Ibid. Warlimont. pp.317-318

[xxvi] Dunn, Walter S. Jr. Heroes or Traitors: The German Replacement Arm, the July Plot, and Adolf Hitler. Praeger Publishers, Westport CT and London, 2003. p.53

[xxvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.294

[xxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.339

[xxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.21

[xxx] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.21

[xxxi] Ibid. Clark. p.322

[xxxii] Liddell-Hart, B.H. Strategy. A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY. 1974, Originally Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1954 & 1967. p.280

[xxxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.157

[xxxiv] Ibid. Clark. p.322

[xxxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.157

[xxxvi] Ibid. Clark. p.323

[xxxvii] Ibid. Clark. p.323

[xxxviii] Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (abridged) Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon, Ballantine Books, New York 1957. pp.245-246

[xxxix] Ibid. Clark. p.325.

[xl] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.157.

[xli] Ibid. Clark. p.325

[xlii] Ibid. Carell. p.341

[xliii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.158

[xliv]Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General. DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005. pp.218-219

[xlv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.21

[xlvi] Ibid. Newton. p.219

[xlvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.295

[xlviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.158

[xlix] Ibid. Clark. p.326

[l] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.63

[li] Overy, Richard. Russia’s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945. Penguin Books, New York NY and London, 1997. pp.200-201

[lii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.159

[liii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.64

[liv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.65 This reference contains a listing of each sector and the force ratios of men, tanks and guns in each sector.

[lv] Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operation: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003. p.197

[lvi] Weingartner, James. J. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933-45. Battery Press, Nashville, TN.(no publication date listed)  p.81

[lvii] Ibid. Clark. p.327

[lviii] Ibid. Manstein. p.447

[lix] Ibid. Manstein. pp.447-448

[lx] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.55

[lxi] Ibid. Warlimont. p.334

[lxii] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.445

[lxiii] Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated by H. Betzler, Ballantine Books, New York, NY, 1971. Originally Published University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. p.262

[lxiv] Ibid. Manstein. p.448

[lxv] Ibid. Clark. p.328

[lxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.78

[lxvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. pp.81-84

[lxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.166

[lxix] Ibid. Erickson. P.99

[lxx] Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Cassel Military Paperbacks, London, 2003. First Published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983. p.99

[lxxi] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.166

[lxxii] Ibid. Newton. p.222

[lxxiii] Ibid. Newton. 234

[lxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.121

[lxxv] Ibid. Carell. p.342

[lxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.121

[lxxvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.166

[lxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.166

[lxxix] Ibid. Overy. p.209

[lxxx] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. pp.215-217

[lxxxi] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.274

[lxxxii] Ibid. Manstein. p.449

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. pp.217-218.

[lxxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.167

[lxxxv] Ibid. Clark. pp.329-330

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.264

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.269

[lxxxviii] Macksey, Kenneth. Why the Germans Lose at War. Greenhill Books 1996, Barnes and Noble, New York,  2006. p.227

[lxxxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p. 261

[xc] Ibid. Carell. p.342

[xci] Ibid. Manstein. p.449

[xcii] Ibid. Guderian. p.251

[xciii] Ibid. Warlimont. p.334

[xciv] Ibid. Macksey. Guderian p.206

[xcv] Ibid. Raus. p.211

[xcvi] Ibid. DiNardo. p.178

[xcvii] Ibid. DiNardo. p.181

[xcviii] Ibid. Erickson. p.91

[xcix] Ibid. DiNardo. pp.182-188

Bibliography

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Clark, Allan. Barbarossa:  The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45. Perennial, an Imprint of Harper Collins Books, New York, NY 2002. Originally published by William Morrow, New York, NY 1965

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Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (abridged) Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon, Ballantine Books, New York 1957

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Obecny stan floty należącej do Federacji Rosyjskiej jest delikatnie mówiąc opłakany. Jednostki, które w dniu dzisiejszym znajdują się w czynnej służbie, wolnym lecz stanowczym dryfem zmierzają ku dawno zasłużonej emeryturze. Podczas ostatnich, rosyjsko – białoruskich manewrów o dwuznacznym kryptonimie ZAPAD 2009 (zachód 2009) prezydent Rosji – Dmitrij Miedwiediew uroczyście oświadczył, iż w ciągu najbliższej dekady zamierza odbudować potęgę morską Federacji. Nasuwa się pytanie czy jest to projekt realny, czy raczej jedynie kolejne z pobożnych życzeń prezydenta Miedwiediewa.

Rosja w swej, tu i ówdzie, chwalebnej historii nigdy nie była prawdziwą  potęgą morską. Wiązało i wiąże się to przede wszystkim z geografią tego ogromnego państwa. Z uwagi na rozmiar lądowych granic, brak naturalnych barier oraz ograniczone zasoby, Moskwa zwykle utrzymywała ogromną armię, bo tylko taka zdolna była zapewnić jej względne bezpieczeństwo. Flota natomiast, była automatycznie tym na czym się oszczędzało, co schodziło na dalszy plan. Właśnie dlatego były premier Wielkiej Brytanii, Winston Churchill podczas rozmów ze Stalinem używał swych wysoce obrazowych porównań, określając Wielką Brytanię jako stworzenie morskie, Rosję natomiast jako lądowe.

Czym jest flota w współczesnym świecie oraz jak ważną odgrywa rolę nie należy chyba wyjaśniać.
Obecnie, największą potęgą morską są Stany Zjednoczone, których dominacji na morzach i oceanach nikt nie jest w stanie zagrozić. Natomiast reszta, obecnych bądź przyszłych, światowych mocarstw próbuje dogonić Amerykę, by podważyć jej, względnie łatwo utrzymywany, prymat. Moskwa nie jest tu wyjątkiem, decydenci kremla doskonale wiedzą, że w przypadku Rosji, różnica miedzy silną a słabą flotą sprowadza się do hamletowego “być, albo nie być”.

Dzieje się tak z uwagi na wspomnianą już specyfikę rosyjskiej geografii. W bardzo dużym skrócie, najważniejsze rosyjskie porty znajdują się nad Bałtykiem oraz nad Morzem Czarnym. Jeżeli spojrzymy na mapę polityczną północnej półkuli, widzimy, że szlaki morskie wiodące do portów nad wymienionymi wcześniej wodami, można w bardzo łatwy sposób zablokować. Używając przy tym relatywnie niewielkich zasobów. Szczególnie, że są to cieśniny, będące wąskim gardłem dla ruchu morskiego, ponadto w przypadku obu akwenów znajdują się w rękach NATO (Turcja, Dania). Czyli sojuszu, który do tej pory postrzegany jest przez Moskwę przez pryzmat rywalizacji.

Oczywiście Moskwa nie może sobie pozwolić na zachowanie obecnego stanu rzeczy, z bardzo prostej przyczyny; w przypadku ewentualnego konfliktu, zachód mógłby bardzo łatwo, angażując relatywnie niewielkie zasoby, skutecznie zablokować zarówno flotę czarnomorska, jak również bałtycką. Nie wspominając o łatwości w egzekwowaniu np embarga czy innego rodzaju sankcji, związanych z dostępem do globalnych szlaków handlowych. Właśnie dlatego prezydent Miedwiediew oświadczył, że silna zmodernizowana flota jest istotnym czynnikiem w przyszłej strategii Kremla. Nie tylko jako gwarant bezpieczeństwa, ale również jako narzędzie realizacji bardziej asertywnych planów.

Jeżeli ufać naszym naukowcom, to w niezbyt odległej przyszłości, lody Arktyki ulegną rozpuszczeniu a bogactwa naturalne pod nimi ukryte będą czekały na śmiałka, który nie tylko głośno wyrazi swe względem ich roszczenia, ale też będzie zdolny do tego aby poprzeć swe argumenty silną i dobrze wyposażoną armią. Wprawdzie Moskwa, w dość widowiskowy sposób, zaprezentowaqła swoje ambicje wzglendem  (jeszcze nie wartej by się o nią zabijać) Arktyki. Jednak aby skutecznie zapewnić sobie realne szanse w wyścigu po ogromne bogactwa, Kreml zmuszony jest zmodernizować swe siły zbrojne. W największym stopniu marynarkę, tak aby wyeliminować wspomniane, stważane przez współczesną geopolitykę zagrożenia.

W dobie ogólnoświatowego kryzysu wpływy z eksportu rosyjskich surowców znacznie uszczupliły budżet federacji. Zdawać by się mogło, że adekwatnie zmniejszono wydatki na zapoczątkowaną przez Władymira Putina, modernizację sił zbrojnych. Prawda jest jednak zupełnie inna. Pieniądze, które rząd przeznaczył na zbrojenia, szczególnie na marynarkę, nie zostały cofnięte. Owszem, do pewnych cięć doszło, jednak konstrukcja nowej floty jest nadal finansowana bez większych opóźnień ( Pomijając modernizację przeznaczonego dla Indii, lotniskowca Admirał Gorszkow, ale to zupełnie inna bajka).

Stratedzy i decydenci kremla mają bardzo jasno sprecyzowane cele, do realizacji których podchodzą z chłodnym pragmatyzmem i żelazną konsekwencją. Pomijając sferę społeczną, której tragizm sytuacji nie rokuje szybkich, i spektakularnych osiągnięć, armia jest miejscem gdzie rządowe inwestycje mają szansę zwrócić się z dużym zyskiem. Wizja silnej, dobrze wyszkolonej i wyposarzonej armii, zaspokaja równierz w pewien sposób tęsnotę za dawną świetnością. Problem w tym, że przyjemna świadomość własnej siły, bardzo szybko rodzi przekonanie o słuszności własnych, wyłącznie, argumentów.

Prezydent Miedwiediew twierdzi, że w momencie, kiedy globalny kryzys uda się przezwyciężyć (wg. Prezydenta nastąpi to w 2011 roku) wydatki na marynarkę i nie tylko na nią znacznie wzrosną. Oczywiście, Moskwa nie będzie w stanie zafundować sobie floty równej bądź zbliżonej do amerykańskiej i to zarówno pod względem ilości jak i jakości. Na pewno nie w ciągu jednej czy nawet dwóch dekad, prawdopodobnie nigdy. Niemniej, zakładając, że wszystko pójdzie zgodnie z planem, Moskwa uzyska narzędzie, dzięki któremu będzie mogła z większą niż dotychczas skutecznością, dbać o zabezpieczenie własnych interesów w najdalszych nawet zakątkach globu.  Oczywiście nie jest powiedziane, że wyłącznie na płaszczyźnie dyplomatycznej.

rossija.

PS. Znalazłem jeszcze to. Wygląda na to, że  ktoś wyciął z całości dokumentu kawałki, które w samych superlatywach malują obraz rosyjskiej floty i zaprezentował je w tym krótkim filmiku.

IL MONDO SEDUTO SU UNA BOMBA NUCLEARE A OROLOGERIA | Tutto Gambatesa .net.

di Monica Centofante

A Celjabinsk, provincia russa degli Urali meridionali, dove alcune città sono dimenticate perfino dalle mappe geografiche, l’aria è carica di morte. Una morte silenziosa e invisibile che ha già trascinato con sé centinaia di migliaia di uomini, donne e bambini.
Di queste zone, fino al 1991 inaccessibili agli stranieri, quasi nessuno conosce l’esistenza. Eppure è qui che sorge, ed è ancora abitato, il luogo più contaminato della Terra da rifiuti radioattivi.
Si chiama Celyabinsk-40, più noto come Mayak, e insieme a Celyabinsk-65 e Celyabinsk-70 è uno dei centri segreti russi che dopo la seconda guerra mondiale ospitarono i maggiori complessi nucleari dell’Unione Sovietica.
Dal 1949 al 1967 Mayak è stata una pattumiera di rifiuti radioattivi. Sversati in particolare nel fiume Techa e nel lago Karachy, che ora non presentano più forme di vita. Mentre tumori e malformazioni congenite – spiega Franco Valentini di rinnovabili.it – colpiscono da anni la popolazione locale formata per la maggior parte da contadini che vivono in condizioni di estrema povertà e ignoranza e che sono stati esposti ad una quantità di radiazioni pari a quella ricevuta dai superstiti di Hiroshima e Nagasaki.
Quante Mayak ci siano nel mondo nessuno può dirlo con certezza. Ma le informazioni che si raccolgono delineano un quadro tutt’altro che rassicurante.
In tutta la Russia, in quarant’anni di guerra fredda, decine di milioni di metri cubi tra rifiuti solidi e liquidi sono stati disseminati nell’ambiente e molto simile è la situazione degli altri Paesi che hanno sviluppato attività e programmi nucleari. A partire dagli Stati Uniti, dalla Francia, dalla Gran Bretagna o dalla nostra Italia, dove di recente si è tornato a discutere della concreta possibilità di un ritorno all’atomo, nonostante non sia ancora stato risolto il problema delle scorie accumulate in passato.
Secondo l’INSC (International Nuclear Societes Council), l’industria nucleare mondiale produce all’anno qualcosa come 270.000 metri cubi di scorie, tra media, bassa e alta radioattività. Una quantità che paragonata ai rifiuti di centrali a fonti fossili tradizionali non è eccessiva, ma che rappresenta un problema ancora insormontabile per la comunità scientifica mondiale nel lungo termine. Il combustibile spento e scaricato di reattori ad uranio mantiene infatti una pericolosità elevata per un milione di anni. Mentre le terre e le acque che ne vengono in contatto diventano esse stesse radioattive mantenendosi in questo stato per centinaia di migliaia di anni. E provocando effetti devastanti su qualsiasi forma di vita circostante.
Uno studio del Dipartimento della Salute degli Stati Uniti – per citare un solo esempio – ha provato che i due terzi delle morti causate da tumore al seno tra il 1985 e il 1989, in America, si sono verificate in un raggio di circa 160 chilometri dai reattori nucleari. E considerato che negli Usa le centrali sono più di cento e le scorie prodotte circa 37 milioni di metri cubi stipate in depositi di fortuna sparsi per il Paese, si può solo intuire quale sia l’entità del rischio in termini di vite umane solo in territorio americano.
Nel resto del mondo la situazione, seppur ridimensionata, non è differente.
In Europa – dove i rifiuti radioattivi provengono perlopiù dal settore civile – si parla di circa 40.000 metri cubi di scorie l’anno. Dei quali Francia e Gran Bretagna detengono il primato sia a causa del numero di reattori attivi presenti sui loro territori sia per gli importanti programmi militari svolti. E per avere un’idea più precisa basti pensare che solo la Francia ne produce annualmente una quantità pari a quelle presenti nel nostro Paese dal 1987, anno in cui con un referendum seguito all’incidente di Chernobyl abbiamo scelto di rinunciare al nucleare. Da allora il problema dei rifiuti speciali non è mai stato risolto e, sebbene non se ne parli, rappresenta una delle principali cause di morte in alcune zone del nostro Paese.
A distanza di oltre 20 anni da quella decisione, infatti, le scorie – circa 30mila metri cubi destinati a crescere – sono custoditi in condizioni di sicurezza precaria e gli impianti non ancora completamente smantellati.
Il caso Italia
Nella centrale nucleare più grande d’Italia – quella di Caorso, vicino a Piacenza – vi sono ancora 700 barre di combustibile con 1.300 Kg di plutonio: materiale recuperabile per il 97%, perché ancora utile per produrre energia elettrica, ma che per questo sarà consegnato ai francesi. Mentre a noi torneranno le scorie.
Dove le metteremo è la grande incognita. Soprattutto perché quello della centrale di Caorso non è di certo un caso isolato.
Il problema dello smaltimento delle scorie nucleari, in Italia, è tanto sconosciuto quanto attuale e non raramente si intreccia con i lucrosi interessi gestiti dalla criminalità organizzata, che in questo campo non agisce solo per proprio conto. L’ultima delle tante prove è nelle recenti cronache sul ritrovamento di una nave contenente rifiuti speciali, scoperta sui fondali del Mediterraneo al largo della costa di Cetraro, nel Tirreno Cosentino. Ad indicarne la presenza, un pentito della ‘Ndrangheta, che avrebbe parlato di una serie di imbarcazioni, forse una trentina, contenenti grandi quantità di scorie radioattive e fatte affondare negli anni Ottanta e Novanta in diversi tratti di mare nel quadro di un accordo siglato tra le cosche e oscuri faccendieri.
Qualcosa di simile, ma sulla terraferma, sarebbe avvenuto a Pasquasia, una cittadina in provincia di Enna, un tempo conosciuta per la sua miniera di Sali alcalini misti ed in particolare Kainite per la produzione di solfato di potassio. Un sito che dagli anni Sessanta fino al 1992 ha dato lavoro a migliaia di persone e che da allora, a quanto pare, semina morte.
Le prove ufficiali non ci sono, ma voci di popolo e una serie di indagini sempre ostacolate hanno sollevato il dubbio che all’interno della miniera siano stoccati rifiuti nucleari: scorie di medio livello radioattivo delle quali la popolazione non deve sapere nulla.
Nel 1996 aveva provato a rompere il silenzio l’allora onorevole Giuseppe Scozzari, seguito dall’onorevole Ugo Maria Grimaldi, all’epoca assessore al Territorio e Ambiente alla Regione Sicilia. Entrambi furono isolati e non riuscirono ad approdare ad alcun risultato concreto, ma le loro personali inchieste avevano portato alla luce una realtà inquietante: i casi di tumore e leucemia erano aumentati nel solo biennio 1995/96, nella zona di Enna, del 20% mentre Pasquasia e “l’intera Sicilia rischiava di essere trasformata in una pattumiera dell’Europa”. Grimaldi aveva denunciato la presenza di amianto in tutto il territorio provinciale, nelle cave abbandonate ed in altri siti. Scozzari aveva chiesto un’interrogazione parlamentare e tentato l’ingresso nella miniera, convinto che fosse gestita da organizzazioni criminali senza nessun consenso formale da parte dello Stato.
E invece, se è vero che parte di quei terreni appartenevano (e apparterrebbero) a persone in odore di mafia vero è anche che erano state proprio le istituzioni italiane – e internazionali – a negargli l’accesso. Allo stesso modo in cui, ancora oggi, negano la presenza delle scorie mentre le analisi effettuate dall’Usl già nel 1997 rivelavano l’esistenza in quella zona di Cesio 137 in concentrazione ben superiore alla norma. Il che poteva significare che non solo i rifiuti nucleari c’erano – e quindi ci sono – ma che si era addirittura verificato un inaspettato incidente nucleare, con relativa fuga di radioattività, probabilmente durante una sperimentazione atta ad appurare la consistenza del sottosuolo della miniera su eventuali dispersioni di radiazioni.
Una tragedia, per la popolazione circostante, tenuta sotto totale silenzio.
Anche il pentito di mafia Leonardo Messina, già membro della cupola di Cosa Nostra, aveva parlato di Pasquasia e della presenza di rifiuti radioattivi nella miniera all’interno della quale aveva lavorato come caposquadra. Secondo il suo racconto – sul punto considerato attendibile dal Procuratore nazionale antimafia Pierluigi Vigna – le attività illegali, in quella zona, proseguivano dal 1984: quando l’Enea (all’epoca Ente nazionale per l’energia atomica) aveva avviato uno studio geologico, geochimico e microbiologico sulla formazione argillosa e sulla sua resistenza alle scorie nucleari. E quando funzionari del Sisde avrebbero contattato l’amministrazione comunale per richiedere il nulla osta a seppellire in loco materiale militare di non meglio specificata natura. Cosa che proverebbe l’utilizzo della miniera come deposito di scorie ancora prima della sua dismissione e che spiegherebbe il motivo per cui dopo il 1992 il Corpo regionale delle miniere ha interrotto l’attività di vigilanza e di manutenzione degli impianti e la Regione ha affidato il controllo degli accessi alle miniere a quattro società di sicurezza privata, attualmente rimosse dall’incarico.
Nel 1997 la procura di Caltanissetta aveva disposto un’ispezione su una galleria profonda 50 metri costruita all’interno della miniera proprio dall’Enea e aveva rilevato la presenza di alcune centraline di rilevamento rilasciate dall’Ente, ma che non si riuscì a chiarire che cosa esattamente dovessero misurare. Forse la radioattività?

Scorie immortali
Negli annuali rapporti di Legambiente sulle cosiddette Ecomafie il riferimento al traffico di rifiuti radioattivi è una costante. Ammassati in improbabili cave, si legge, gettati in mare o seppelliti senza particolari misure di sicurezza possono penetrare il suolo e contaminare terre e falde acquifere, oltre a causare danni irreparabili alla flora e alla fauna marina di cui ci cibiamo.
In gioco, insomma, c’è la salute e la vita di tanti cittadini mentre la dimensione del problema appare decisamente fuori controllo.
Le mafie che si occupano di questi traffici, infatti, sono molteplici e non sono solo italiane. Mentre scandali come quelli di Pasquasia si registrano in ogni parte del mondo e hanno spesso coperture di alto livello.
A febbraio di quest’anno, per citare uno degli esempi più recenti, è venuto alla luce uno dei segreti più pericolosi sullo smaltimento dei rifiuti radioattivi che le guerre balcaniche e lo stesso Trattato di Dayton hanno occultato negli anni. Ne parla Fulvia Novellino su Rinascita Balcanica, ricostruendo un vero e proprio traffico di scorie e materiali radioattivi verso la Bosnia organizzato, secondo indiscrezioni provenienti dall’interno dei servizi segreti locali, “dalla stessa missione di pace Nato in Bosnia-Erzegovina, attraverso la quale la Francia ‘esportava’ grandi quantità di rifiuti radioattivi, che venivano poi gettati nei laghi della Erzegovina”. Una “comoda soluzione”, per lo stato francese, per risolvere l’annoso problema dello smaltimento dei rifiuti tossici che accomuna tutti i governi che si servono dell’energia nucleare.
Il problema dello stoccaggio e della messa in sicurezza delle scorie appare infatti insormontabile e distante anni luce da una possibile soluzione. Mentre anno dopo anno i rifiuti si accumulano in maniera vertiginosa.
Fino ad oggi si è tentato di neutralizzare soltanto le scorie meno pericolose, quelle che mantengono la radioattività per circa 300 anni e lo si è fatto utilizzando perlopiù depositi di superficie e quasi mai cavità sotterranee o depositi geologici profondi. Per i rifiuti ad alta radioattività non si è riusciti a fare assolutamente nulla, spiega invece Marco Cedolin su Terranauta, perché “tutto il gotha della tecnologia mondiale ha dimostrato di non avere assolutamente né i mezzi né tanto meno le conoscenze tecnico/scientifiche per affrontare un problema che travalica di gran lunga le capacità operative degli esseri umani”.
Per il momento, solamente gli Stati Uniti hanno tentato l’impresa, che si sta rivelando ardua e scarsamente risolutiva.
Il Dipartimento dell’Energia statunitense ha infatti pensato alla creazione di un grande sito di stoccaggio definitivo nel quale trasportare il materiale radioattivo raccolto nelle aree maggiormente inquinate del Paese: sito che potrà essere costruito nel giro di 70 – 100 anni, con una spesa complessiva che varierà dai 200 ai 1000 miliardi di dollari. In poche parole: il progetto più costoso e complesso che la storia ricordi.
La meta prescelta per l’ardita operazione è il Monte Yucca, situato nel Nevada meridionale a circa 160 Km a nord ovest di Las Vegas , in una zona collocata all’interno della cosiddetta Area 51. Il luogo migliore, secondo i progettisti, per scavare una serie di tunnel sotterranei della lunghezza di 80 Km che correranno e a una profondità di 300 metri, saranno rivestiti di acciaio inossidabile e titanio e una volta terminati potranno contenere 77.000 tonnellate di scorie radioattive attualmente in giacenza in 131 depositi dislocati all’interno di 39 differenti stati.
Un’opera titanica quanto quella del trasporto, che prevede l’utilizzo di 4600 fra treni e autocarri che per giungere a destinazione dovranno attraversare, con il loro pericolosissimo materiale, ben 44 stati con tutti i rischi del caso.
Secondo gli esperti che stanno lavorando al progetto – e che hanno già speso circa 8 miliardi di dollari soltanto per gli studi preliminari del terreno – una volta terminati i lavori di scavo e di preparazione del sito (previsti inizialmente per il 2010, ma già slittati al 2017) il deposito rimarrebbe in attività per qualche decina di anni prima di essere riempito completamente. E una volta chiuso dovrebbe impedire la fuoriuscita delle scorie dell’ambiente per i successivi 10.000 anni.
Il che in parole povere significa che la gigantesca opera non servirà a nulla.
La National Academy of Sciences e il National Research Council hanno infatti ricordato che il materiale radioattivo rimarrà tale per centinaia di migliaia di anni e che il lasso di tempo previsto dal progetto non può quindi essere definito una “messa in sicurezza”. Tanto più che sussistono innumerevoli dubbi sulla reale capacità del sito di preservare il materiale radioattivo anche nel corso di quei 10.000 anni visto che l’umidità presente nell’area, seppur modesta, avrebbe tutto il tempo di corrodere i contenitori delle scorie riversando il materiale nelle falde acquifere e nei pozzi circostanti causando seri problemi alle popolazioni circostanti (1.400.000 persone); mentre il calore connaturato nei rifiuti nucleari rinchiusi all’interno di una montagna priva di sistemi di raffreddamento potrebbe avere gravi conseguenze.
A questa e a numerose altre perplessità che hanno aperto un ampio dibattito nel mondo scientifico e politico americano si aggiunge infine un particolare di non poco conto: il Dipartimento dell’Energia ha denunciato presunte omissioni e irregolarità dei tecnici del servizio geologico, che avrebbero costruito in maniera fraudolenta “elementi che confermassero la sicurezza del sito di Yucca Mountain”.

Senza via d’uscita
Il problema, ancora una volta, sembra quindi rimanere irrisolto. E se a quanto sin qui detto si aggiunge l’inquinamento provocato dall’utilizzo dell’uranio impoverito, sia per scopi bellici che civili, o i vari incidenti nucleari che si sono verificati nel corso degli ultimi decenni si può solo intuire l’entità del dramma.
Nel 1957 a Windscale, oggi Sellafield, nel West Cumberland, in Gran Bretagna un piccolo reattore adibito alla produzione di uranio e di plutonio per usi militari prese fuoco provocando la parziale fusione del nocciolo e la fuoriuscita di gas e materiali radioattivi che contaminarono una vastissima area intorno all’impianto. La popolazione non fu avvertita fino a che l’incendio non fu quasi completamente domato.
Il 1986 è l’anno della sciagura di Chernobyl;
Dal 1987, nella centrale di Ignalina, in Lituania, sono stati registrati due incidenti;
nel 2006 un sottomarino nucleare della marina russa, nel mar di Barents, ha fatto i conti con un incendio scoppiato nei locali tecnici del reattore nella prua rischiando di ripetere la tragedia del Kursk di sei anni prima e, più recentemente, la centrale francese di Tricastin ha disperso una soluzione di uranio nei fiumi circostanti;
mentre la centrale di Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, in Giappone, la più grande del mondo, ha subito gravi danni a causa di un terremoto con conseguente serie di fughe radioattive dall’impianto.
La lista potrebbe continuare, perché gli incidenti finora conosciuti sono almeno una settantina.
E mentre la situazione peggiora di ora in ora e la follia umana non si placa il mondo è seduto su una bomba nucleare a orologeria.

¿Une un hilo el caso “Arctic Sea”, el “accidente” en la base militar rusa de Tambov y el viaje secreto de Netanyahu a Moscú?
   

Es posible que algo muy importante haya ocurrido y siga ocurriendo “bajo la alfombra” relacionado (tal vez para anticiparla e impedirla) con la clamorosa decisión de Obama de renunciar al sistema misilístico en Europa (con radar en la República Checa). Esta decisión no sólo es crucial sino, sobre todo, devastadora para los planes israelíes. La motivación aducida por Obama, de hecho, se basa en la valoración conjunta de las varias agencias americanas, y de los servicios secretos de que Irán ni cuenta ni podrá contar en un futuro previsible con el arma atómica ni podrá construir vectores capaces de lanzarla hasta los Estados Unidos.
En cambio, se sabe que Israel considera esta eventualidad no sólo posible sino cercana, por lo que se dice intencionado a acabar con ella cueste lo que cueste, sea como sea.

La decisión de Obama supone, por tanto, un duro distanciamiento del liderazgo de Israel. Un cambio sin precedentes para los Estados Unidos de América. Ésta es la premisa en la que se enmarca lo que contaré basándome en la información disponible y tratando de limpiarla de la contaminación que la altera, lo que no es de extrañar, pues es un asunto candente en todos los sentidos.

La misteriosa historia del buque Arctic Sea, nave con bandera maltesa y tripulación rusa de 13 personas, desaparecida el pasado 28 de julio, asaltada por extraños “piratas” frente a las costas portuguesas, tal vez tenga que ver también con esta historia.

Comencemos por los últimos sucesos e intentemos ir componiendo este difícil mosaico.

El 14 de septiembre todos los medios de comunicación rusos y el New York Times informan de un gravísimo accidente en la base militar de Tambov, a unos 400 kilómetros al sureste de Moscú. Citando a la Reuters, que, a su vez, citaba la agencia RIA-Novosti, que a su vez citaba una fuente de alto nivel de los servicios secretos rusos, el New York Times escribe que “documentos secretos cruciales pueden haber sido pasto de las llamas” en un accidente en el que perdieron la vida cinco oficiales de guardia. El edificio pertenece a los “servicios secretos” y alberga “documentos secretos de importancia especial” para la seguridad nacional rusa. “El incendio -continuaba el despacho de Reuters- dañó gravemente la zona secreta del edificio”, y afectó a “unos 400 metros cuadrados”. El viceministro de Defensa, Coronel General Aleksander Kolmakov, acudió al lugar junto con altos oficiales de los servicios secretos. Todo había sucedido a las 10 de la mañana de la víspera, domingo 13 de septiembre.

Hasta aquí llegan las noticias oficiales y aquí comienzan las oficiosas, que no dejan de ser interesantes incluso después de depurarlas. Hay un sitio web, bastante conocido, que dispone de contactos discretos y probados con fuentes rusas que quieren que se sepa “más”. Se llama  http://www.whatdoesitmean.com/index1275.htm y en él se recogen a menudo análisis firmados con un nombre femenino, Sorcha Faal. No sé quién será, pero del contexto y del contenido se deducen dos cosas: hay cosas ciertas en lo que dice, aunque el conjunto debe tomarse con cautela.

En este análisis se recogen afirmaciones desconcertantes. El incendio no fue accidental. Se pudo tratar de un ataque de tropas especiales contra los “búnker donde se aloja la Dirección General de la Inteligencia rusa”. ¿Qué tropas de élite? No se dice, pero se entiende que se trata de un trabajo altamente especializado. Uno o más grupos armados que “en menos de 15 minutos” habrían sido capaces de “penetrar en el perímetro de seguridad, desactivar los sistemas anti-incendio y atacar el búnker de documentos con armas incendiarias”.

Se plantean enseguida muchas preguntas. ¿Quién envió esas tropas? ¿Eran rusos? Y, si no eran rusos, ¿cómo pudieron llegar hasta el corazón de Rusia recorriendo -se supone que por aire- varios cientos de kilómetros sin que los detectaran y los detuvieran? En Rusia todo es posible, pero tampoco en Rusia existen los milagros.

¿Existe un nexo entre este episodio y los otros hechos acaecidos en las últimas semanas? Acaso se podría intentar relacionar algunos de ellos. Demos un salto atrás de varios días. El 8 de septiembre el Jerusalem Post escribe que el primer ministro Netanyahu se ha marchado con rumbo desconocido. El día 9 otro periódico israelí da con precisión una noticia sensacional: Netanyahu voló en secreto a Moscú a bordo de un avión privado. ¿Por qué? ¿Cómo? El sitio anteriormente citado aporta detalles importantes que parecen proceder de una fuente de los servicios secretos rusos. Sigamos la narración de Sorcha Faal.

Según ella, Netanyahu se precipitó a Moscú, sin advertir de antemano al gobierno ruso, para pedir la “inmediata restitución” de “todos los documentos, del equipamiento y de los agentes del Mossad capturados por las tropas de élite rusas y estadounidenses” que habían recuperado el control del buque Arctic Sea después de que un comando compuesto por israelíes y agentes fuera de control (“rogue agents”, dice Sorcha Faal) de la CIA hubiera asaltado la nave, y se hubiera adueñado de ella durante horas, tal vez días. Aquí las preguntas ya se agolpan. También las dudas.

Sin embargo, es bien probable que no sea una invención peregrina. La fuente de la FSB que narra el asunto añade detalles extraordinariamente interesantes a la vez que precisos. De acuerdo con esta fuente, en la Dirección General del FSB de Tambov se hallaban “todos los archivos operativos” recogidos por el FSB relativos a la famosa Blackwater, la corporación privada a la que Bush y Cheney confiaron importantes encargos de seguridad en Irak, pero no sólo, y a la que la CIA (tal y como resulta ahora de la investigación abierta en Estados Unidos) encargó asesinatos selectivos para liquidar a líderes y militantes relevantes en Al Qaeda. Que los servicios secretos rusos tuvieran o tengan bajo observación esta actividad es totalmente lógico. Lo ilógico sería pensar lo contrario. Lo que queda por saber es qué habían descubierto y cómo lo hicieron. Entonces, ¿qué tiene que ver con esto Netanyahu?

Volvamos, pues, a su viaje secreto a Moscú. El 10 de septiembre, por la tarde, junto con otros miembros del club de discusión Valdai (1), del que formo parte, veo al ministro de Exteriores ruso, Sergej Lavrov. En Moscú circulan sin cesar rumores sobre ese viaje y la pregunta es inevitable. Lavrov no confirma, pero tampoco desmiente la noticia. Por supuesto no dice quién ha visto a Netanyahu y el porqué, pero declara que Moscú no ha violado ninguna de las reglas internacionales del comercio de armas y que en el pasado ha abastecido a Irán de “armas rigurosamente defensivas”. Entre tanto, fuentes israelíes, inmediatamente recogidas en varios periódicos occidentales y también rusos, difunden la información de que, a bordo del Arctic Sea no había un cargamento de maderas preciosas sino de misiles S-300 destinados a Irán. Los S-300 son misiles anti-misil, o sea, armas defensivas.

Noticia extraña. De modo que Rusia mandó por ahí, por una ruta larguísima (del océano Ártico al Atlántico pasando por el canal de la Mancha hasta las Canarias, ¿para ir adónde?) un cargamento delicadísimo exponiendo su mercancía a todo tipo de riesgos (como ocurrió luego), sin poder tenerlo bajo control. Basta con mirar un mapa para entender que Moscú puede enviar a Irán lo que quiere a través del mar Caspio, que baña tanto los puertos rusos como los iraníes. Noticia improbable por tanto. Seguro que el cargamento del Arctic Sea era muy importante, pero no era el que dicen los israelíes. Y no se dirigía a Irán -he aquí la novedad de Sorcha Faal- sino “a Estados Unidos”.

Así se explica por qué intervino Estados Unidos -con tropas e información sobre la localización de la nave- en la operación de rescate del Arctic Sea.

Según la reconstrucción mencionada, la Marina militar rusa ayudada por unidades de apoyo de la marina finlandesa y de los servicios estadounidenses recuperó tres misiles dotados de cabeza nuclear del submarino nuclear Kursk, que se hundió en 2001 en misteriosas circunstancias en el Ártico. En esa tragedia perdieron la vida 118 marineros y oficiales rusos. Los rusos encargaron la recuperación de los cadáveres del Kursk a dos compañías danesas, la Mammoet y la Smit International, pero sin el permiso de tocar los misiles. Se trataba de misiles nucleares tácticos P-700 Granit capaces de hundir naves de gran tamaño, por ejemplo, portaaviones.

Según fuentes de la inteligencia militar rusa, el GRU, se cargaron los misiles en el Arctic Sea y la nave emprendió rumbo a Estados Unidos, donde los confiarían a la US Nuclear Security Administration, que debía ocuparse de su desmantelamiento en la instalación Pantex, en Texas. Todo ello siguiendo los acuerdo de desarme START-2.

El Arctic Sea, con su cargamento harto más importante que la madera, se ve atacado por “tropas de élite no identificadas”. Es obvio que no se trata de simples piratas. Aquí entran en juego servicios secretos potentes, capaces de entrometerse nada menos que en una operación conjunta ruso-estadounidense. Moscú reacciona con vehemencia inusitada. El comandante en jefe de la marina, Vladimir Visotskij, declara públicamente que “se han enviado todas las naves y unidades de la Marina rusa en el Atlántico en busca de la nave desaparecida”. El 18 de agosto, el ministro de Defensa ruso, Anatolij Serdiukov, anuncia que las fuerzas navales rusas, “en cooperación con el Comando Espacial de la Marina de EEUU”, han “recuperado el control” del Arctic Sea. Fuentes anónimas de los servicios rusos hablan de “terroristas de la CIA con pasaportes falsos estonios, letones y rusos”. Hay otra fuente no anónima, rusa, que cuenta otra versión. Se trata de Mijail Voitenko, director de una revista especializada en accidentes marítimos, la Sovfracht. Voitenko hace presente que el Arctic Sea no es una nave cualquiera de transporte, sino que está dotada de los medios más modernos de localización y comunicación. Por añadidura, en el momento del asalto de los “piratas”, la nave se encontraba en aguas donde “incluso los teléfonos celulares funcionaban”. ¿Por qué no se lanzó una alarma enseguida? El misterio se espesa. Mijail Voitenko, después de haber hablado demasiado, escapa a Turquía y declara que su vida corre grave peligro.

Volvamos ahora a Netanyahu, ya que el sitio anteriormente citado relaciona directamente a los servicios secretos israelíes con el asunto del Arctic Sea. Fuentes esta vez del ministerio de Exteriores ruso revelan que el avión privado en el que viajaba Netanyahu tenía un plan de vuelo que preveía el aterrizaje en Tblisi, Georgia, pero que -el episodio debió de suceder entre el 8 y el 9 de septiembre-, de pronto, en proximidad del espacio aéreo ruso, el piloto solicita “urgentemente” poder aterrizar en Moscú, especificando que lleva a bordo al primer ministro israelí, Netanyahu. Se concede el permiso y el avión aterriza en la base militar de Kubinka, no lejos de la capital.

Siempre según lo que cuenta Sorcha Faal, el presidente ruso Dmitri Medvedev llega deprisa al aeropuerto de Kubinka, donde encuentra no sólo a Netanyahu furibundo, sino a una completa delegación israelí, compuesta por el general Meir Kalifi, ministro para los Asuntos Militares y Uzi Arad, consejero de Seguridad Nacional de Israel. La petición perentoria a Medvedev es la “inmediata restitución de todos los documentos, del equipaje y de los agentes del Mossad” capturados por los rusos y los estadounidenses a bordo del Arctic Sea. Por lo visto, Medvedev, ya enojado por la falta de aviso, por el procedimiento insólito y por el tono empleado por sus huéspedes, replica que “la investigación está en marcha” y que “Rusia no está dispuesta a rendir cuentas a nadie”. Con toda probabilidad, se habló de más cosas, y aquí la versión de Sorcha Faal se vuelve completamente imposible de comprobar. Uno de los asuntos cuestionados, con probabilidad, habría sido una petición a Rusia para que aclare con qué armas estaría abasteciendo a Irán. Todo ello ligado al posible ataque israelí a las instalaciones nucleares iraníes. Sorcha Faal entrecomilla frases de Netanyahu de gravedad increíble, como por ejemplo: “Que Rusia se cubra el culo” y no se sorprenda cuando “nubes con forma de hongo empiecen a aparecer sobre Teherán”.

No se recoge la reacción de Medvedev. Pero tanto Medvedev como Putin, en los encuentros con miembros del Club Valdai, repitieron varias veces que toda acción de fuerza contra Irán era inaceptable y que había que desarrollar la vía de las negociaciones.

No está de más recordar aquí quién era uno de los dos acompañantes de Netanyahu en Moscú, Uri Arad. El actual Secretario de Seguridad Nacional de Israel es persona non grata en los Estados Unidos. Lo es desde que resultó en 2006 que estaba directamente implicado en el escándalo de espionaje AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affair Commitee). En ese proceso, cubierto ampliamente por la prensa estadounidense, salió a la luz que se filtraban importantes documentos de la política estadounidense respecto a Irán a través del AIPAC, y personalmente a Uri Arad, a través de un funcionario del Departamento de Defensa, Lawrence Franklin. Este fue condenado a 13 años por espionaje a favor de un Estado extranjero; condena que luego pasó a ser de 10 meses de arresto domiciliario. Pues bien, cuentan que Uri Arad fue protagonista de un escándalo añadido cuando Hillary Clinton vio a Netanyahu en Jerusalén. Hillary y sus consejeros se quedaron desconcertados al ver a Arad al lado de Netanyahu y, para evitar un incidente diplomático, propusieron que participaran sólo tres personas por parte al encuentro. Netanyahu no se inmutó y pidió al embajador israelí en Washington, Sallai Meridor, que se apartara, y se quedó con Uri Arad. Meridos dimitió días después y un portavoz de Netanyahu explicó seguidamente que la presencia de Arad era “indispensable en la cuestión iraní”. Lo indispensable que era su presencia lo demuestra la posición de Arad al respecto: “máxima disuasión”, en el sentido de que Israel “debe amenazar o atacar todo aquello que tenga importancia al respecto”, empezando “por los líderes”, y terminando con “los lugares sagrados”. (Editorial de Paul Woodward, 18 de marzo de 2009).

Cuánto hay de verdad en las revelaciones (conducidas por los servicios secretos militares rusos) según las cuales entre los archivos destruidos en Tambov figuraban también los que “confirmaban” las acusaciones contra los servicios secretos de EEUU e israelíes, formuladas por el general Mirza Aslam Beg, ex-jefe de estado mayor del ejército pakistaní, según las cuales “mercenarios privados” de la Blackwater (ahora rebautizada como “Xe”) fueron “los organizadores de los atentados contra el ex-primer ministro libanés Rafik Hariri y contra Benazir Bhutto”.

En cualquier caso, y para concluir, se puede decir con certeza que hubo un viaje de Netanyahu a Moscú, y que una cuestión semejante sólo ocurre si hay en juego acontecimientos dramáticos.

Se entiende que Netanyahu tenía una prisa extraordinaria, una semana antes de que Obama anunciase que Irán no constituye, por el momento, una amenaza para la seguridad de Estados Unidos. Lo que queda por saber es cuál era el objetivo del asalto al Arctic Sea y cómo fue que los servicios secretos israelíes se expusieron de modo tan abierto a una operación hostil contra Estados Unidos y Rusia. Queda también por investigar, como es obvio, el asalto (en el caso de que lo fuera) a la base secreta rusa de Tambov, sólo cinco días después del encuentro tempestuoso en Kubinka.

Nota:

(1): El Fórum Valdai es un grupo de discusión que existe desde hace algunos años y que permite a un cierto número de expertos internacionales, de “sovietólogos” de antaño, politólogos y periodistas, tomar contacto directo con los mayores líderes de Rusia con un intercambio de ideas muy franco (garantizado por las condiciones “off the record”).

Giulietto Chiesa
Megachip

Recogido de Rebelion

Fuente: http://www.megachipdue.info/component/content/article/42-in-evidenza/668-intrigo-internazionale-e-funghi-atomici-su-teheran-alta-tensione.html
Traducido para Rebelión por Gorka Larrabeiti

Alô amigos,

Mais um trecho da Volta ao Mundo foi completado. Fui obrigado a fazer uma pequena escala técnica em Odessa na Ucrânia. Não, o problema não foi com meu avião. Foi, mais uma vez com o provedor de serviços de internet que eu utilizo. Uma lástima. Por isso, a viagem foi dividida em duas pernas, como verão a seguir. Mas mesmo este contratempo não retirou o brilho do Estreito de Bósforo.

Diário de Bordo: decolagem de Kursk (Russia) – UUOK no dia 16/09/2009, às 17hs30min (hora local: +6hs em relação a Brasília – DF), HDG: 200, distância aproximada percorrida: 370 nm. Tempo de vôo 1h50min. Decolagem de Odesa (Ucrânia) – UKOO – belíssimo aeroporto, por sinal, dia 17/09/2009, às 18hs (hora local), HDG: 190, distância percorrida até Istambul (Turquia) 338 nm. Tempo de vôo: 1h49min. O tempo manteve-se firme e sem maiores problemas nos dois dias do vôo: wind 190/070 direção: 04/12mag, sem alterações bruscas. Fiz uma alteração no aeroporto de destino em Istambul. No planejamento inicial, a aterrizagem seria em LTBX (Samandira Airport). Porém, preferi utilizar a pista de Ataturk (LTBA) pela sua proximidade com o Estreito de Bósforo. Valeu a pena: as fotos estão logo abaixo para provar.

 Alexander Zerebryakov é um empresário russo morando em Phuket Island, na Tailândia há dois anos. Seu callsign é SBI1025. Disse que já viu vários documentários sobre o Brasil na televisão russa. Quando lhe perguntei qual a imagem que lhe vem a mente quando pensa no Brasil, Alexander não teve dúvidas ao responder: garotas legais e dança. Diz que tem muita vontade de conhecer o Brasil, mas acha que está muito longe de sua casa.

E quem me chamou para uma conversa durante a perna do vôo de ontem foi o ucraniano Ruslan Kulish. Aquele mesmo que enviou uma mensagem em ucraniano no alfabeto cirílico para o Blog. Detalhe: foi o item mais acessado do blog nos últimos dias. Se você quiser conferir como é o alfabeto cirílico, o comentário de Ruslan está no final do post Trecho 15, ou então na seção Comentários abaixo dos links, à direita. E satisfiz uma curiosidade que eu tinha: como é o teclado naquela parte do mundo? Afinal, no ATC Ruslan falava comigo em inglês – alfabeto romano -, mas sua mensagem foi grafada em cirílico. Ruslan enviou-me uma fotografia do teclado. As teclas tem impressas em cada uma o alfabeto romano e o alfabeto cirílico, com um botão especial de conversão, para o usuário escolher qual alfabeto utilizará. Para encerrar, Ruslan desejou-me Dosvidaniy, que significa bons vôos em russo.

Registrei ainda as presenças de Kadir Akkaya, turco de LTAC – Ancara (callsing: CDX066), 43 anos de idade, que estava em procedimento de pouso em Istambul. Registrei a presença deste turco simpático nas duas pernas do vôo. Soritis Makriyiannis com base em LCLK (callsign CYD332), Besim Agargun, base em LTBA (Ataturk, aeroporto de Istambul) e Cosku Çakmak (callsign: THY132) foram outros pilotos identificados. Cosku estava em seu primeiro vôo online pela Vatsim.

Decolando de Kursk: não havia controladores no aeroporto e nem em todo o percurso.

Céu multicolorido: imagens que valem uma viagem

O T-29 sobrevoa o rio que delimita a fronteira da Russia com a Ucrania

Uma grata surpresa: o moderno e bonito aeroporto de Odesa (UKOO)

Tapete de luzes: o Super Tucano sobrevoa área densamente povoada da Ucrânia

Chegando a Istambul: o Estreito de Bósforo une o Mar de Mármara e o Mar Negro

O T-29 já na aproximação final de LTBA: observar o trem de pouso baixado e travado

Sobrevoar o Estreito de Bósforo é sempre emocionante, ainda que no Flight Simulator

Apesar de alguns percalços, o T-29 pôde finalmente chegar a Istambul

A Turquia é um país euroasiático, constituído por pequena parte européia, a Trácia, e grande parte asiática, a Anatólia. É banhada pelo Mar Negro ao norte, pelo Mar Egeu e Mar de Mármara a oeste e pelo Mar Mediterrâneo ao Sul. Possui cerca de 70 milhões de habitantes (censo de 2007). Sua forma de governo é a República Parlamentarista. A língua oficial da Turquia é o turco, mas as emissoras de televisão e rádio fazem transmissões em árabe, bósnio, circassiano (povos do norte do Cáucaso) e curdo.

Mapa da Turquia: A Trácia fica na Europa e a Anatólia na Ásia

A Turquia transpira história: segundo arqueólogos, estas são as ruínas das Muralhas de Tróia

Monte Ararat: ponto culminante da Turquia

Istambul é a maior cidade da Turquia e uma das maiores da Europa e da Ásia possuindo em sua região metropolitana mais de 11 milhões de habitantes. A maioria esmagadora de sua população é mulçulmana, com grande número de laicos, apenas poucas dezenas de milhares de cristãos e judeus. Ao contrário do que muitos pensam, Istambul não é a capital da Turquia (Ancara ocupa este posto), mas, já foi sucessivamente capital do Império Romano do Oriente, do Império Otomano e da República da Turquia até 1923. Permanece porém como o principal pólo industrial, cultural, comercial e universitário do país.

Vista parcial de Istambul: Palácio Topkapi, Igreja de Santa Sofia e Mesquita Azul

Istambul vista de um satélite: Mar de Mármara ao sul, Estreito de Bósforo e o Mar Negro ao norte

Bem amigos, por hoje é só. A próxima etapa da Volta ao Mundo nos levará à Terra Santa: Israel, especificamente ao movimentado Porto de Haifa.

Até lá.

Robson

English Version

Olá amigos,

 Um longo vôo mas recheado de boas conversas. Desta vez mantive contato com um policial sueco, um tenente da Defesa Aérea da Russia, um jovem estudante lituano e um Controlador de Tráfego Aéreo (na vida real) da Ucrania. Todos muito, muito simpáticos. E bastante interessados no Brasil.

Diário de Bordo: a decolagem de Hanko – EFHN (Finlândia) ocorreu no dia 14/09/2009, às 17hs40min (+6hs em relação a Brasilia – DF), distância percorrida: 657,4 nm, velocidade média 230 kias, pouso após 2hs55min de vôo, em Kursk – UUOK(Russia). O tempo manteve-se bom durante todo o percurso, com algumas nuvens em trechos específicos. Wind variou entre 020 na primeira hora de vôo até 354 no restante; direção: 04/00mag.

Não havia controladores de vôo na Finlândia. O primeiro contato radar ocorreu às 18hs05min, quando foi registrada a aeronave BAW39, em FL353 a 297kias.

O primeiro controlador a marcar presença no Squawbox foi Magnus Gustafsson (ESOS_CTR, em 118,40), 41 anos, que é oficial de polícia, trabalhando na unidade K-9 (cães policiais). Magnus mora na Aalands Islands, pequeno arquipélago localizado entre a Suécia e a Finlândia. Quando lhe perguntei como ele estava, ele respondeu bem humorado: muito bem, uma garrafa de vinho tinto e uma pizza fazem maravilhas a um homem. Claro, que eu concordei com Magnus. Perguntei-lhe qual era a sua impressão sobre o Brasil, e ele respondeu: praias legais, mulheres maravilhosas, Copacabana, Senna, Barrichelo e Massa. E confessou logo em seguida: é fã da Fórmula Um. Comentei que Senna morreu muito jovem. Ele concordou e decretou que  Michael Schumacher não chega nem perto dele.

Maxim Gvozdev é tenente da Força de Defesa Aérea da Russia (S-300). Pela Vatsim ele ocupa a posição UUWV_CTR (127,50). Tem 25 anos. Fiquei impressionado com o volume de tráfego nas imediações de Moscou quando sintonizei a frequência de Maxim. Apesar de estar visivelmente ocupado, Maxim encontrou tempo para conversar comigo. Disse que lamenta não ter praias em Moscou, cidade onde mora. Eu lhe expliquei que minha cidade fica a 800 km da praia mais próxima. Assim como a Russia, o Brasil também é um país continental. A imagem mais marcante do Brasil para Maxim é o carnaval no Rio de Janeiro. Mas admitiu que sabe muito pouco sobre nosso país. 

O mais jovem membro da comunidade de vôo online com o qual me encontrei até agora é Algis Radziunas, lituano, morador de Vilnius (EYVL_CTR). Algis tem apenas 16 anos e é estudante. Demonstrou muito interesse sobre o clima no Brasil. Expliquei-lhe as diferenças entre a região norte onde predomina o calor e o sul onde o inverno é rigoroso. Algis disse que na Lituânia a temperatura normal no inverno é em torno de -10ºC, podendo chegar a -30ºC. Para Algis, o Brasil é sinônimo de muita selva e calor intenso. Expliquei-lhe que não é bem assim: a floresta amazônica ocupa apenas parte de nossa região norte. No final, Algis afirmou que nunca se esquecerá de nossa conversa e que eu serei sempre bem vindo aos céus da Lituânia. Obrigado, Algis. Também gostaria que você visitasse o Brasil.

Finalmente, poucos minutos antes de pousar no aeroporto de Kursk, conversei com o piloto ucraniano Ruslan Kulish (callsing: MSI6212), que tem 29 anos e é controlador de vôo na vida real em UKDD (Dnipropetrovski). Pena que não tivemos muito tempo. Ruslan é muito educado e simpático. Quando lhe contei do Blog ele imediatamente fez uma visita. Já havíamos nos despedido e Ruslan voltou para perguntar qual era o idioma que falamos no Brasil. Achava que era espanhol. Expliquei que falamos o português. Ele disse que gostaria de mandar um comentário na minha língua, porém, logo em seguida tivemos a mesma idéia: por que não em Ucraniano? O comentário já está disponível no final do post sobre o Trecho 15, ou à direita abaixo dos links. Em seu comentário Ruslan manda um alô da Ucrania, e convida para que eu passe mais alguns dias sobre os céus da sua pátria. E, parece ter dito também que gostaria de vir ao Brasil – não se esqueçam: para compreender a mensagem usei o Google Translator. Ele me enviou também o endereço da Aviação Virtual na Ucrania, um interessante site parte em inglês e parte em ucraniano. O link já está disponível, na seção Para FS2004. Obrigado pela atenção, amigo Ruslan. Venha ao Brasil nos visitar. Você será sempre bem vindo.

Decolando de Hanko, na Finlândia: pista simples, mas, suficiente para um avião pequeno

O belo Sol da Europa Oriental enfeitou mais uma vez a jornada do T-29

O belo litoral da Finlândia: muitas ilhas, enseadas e fiordes

O T-29 instantes antes de tocar o solo russo em Kursk

O T-29 já com motores desligados em Kursk: no chat, canto inferior esquerdo, a conversa com Ruslan Kulish

Quando se fala na Rússia, superlativos vem sempre a mente. É o maior país do mundo por extensão territorial  possuindo mais da oitava parte das terras firmes do planeta. Seu território se estende por todo o norte da Ásia e 40% da Europa, ou seja, é um dos poucos países transcontinentais do planeta. Atravessa 11 zonas horárias, o que significa que quando em sua parte leste é dia, na parte oeste o sol já se pôs. Possui as maiores reservas minerais e energéticas do mundo, mas, não as exporta. É dona ainda da quarta parte de toda a água doce do mundo. A Rússia era o maior país integrante da extinta União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas. Entretanto, a comunidade internacional considera a Federação Russa como herdeira da personalidade legal da União Soviética.

Mapa da Russia com sua divisão linguistica: russo é o idioma oficial, mas outras 31 línguas também são faladas

Praça Vermelha em Moscou: o nome é herança da Revolução Comunista de 1917

A Revolução Russa de 1917, que acabou com dinastia dos Romanovs, marcou profundamente a história do século XX, tendo como conseqüência direta o embate de duas ideologias antagônicas à partir do fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial:  comunismo X capitalismo, conhecido como Guerra Fria, que só acabou com o fim da União Soviética.

Kurks em dia de neve: à esquerda o principal hospital da cidade

A bonita Catedral de Kursk: a religião cristã ortodoxa predomina

Kusrk é a capital do Orblast de Kusrk e tem cerca de 410 mil habitantes. Várias universidades movimentam o setor cultural da cidade. Nas suas imediações aconteceu a maior batalha de cavalaria blindada durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial, com a destruição de várias divisões alemãs. Entretanto, o nome da cidade ficou internacionalmente conhecida com o naufrágio do submarino homônino, no ano 2000, quando todos os marinheiros que estavam a bordo morreram.

Bem amigos, por hoje é só. No próximo Trecho da Volta ao Mundo iremos a uma cidade que mistura magia, sedução, história e mistério: Istambul, principal cidade da Turquia. Um abraço, e até lá.

English Version

Hello friends, 

A long flight but full of good conversations. This time I have had contact with a Swedish police officer, a lieutenant in the Air Defense of Russia, a young Lithuanian student and an Air Traffic Controller (in real life) of Ukraine. All very, very nice. And very interested in Brazil.

Diary: the takeoff of Hanko – EFHN (Finland) on 09/14/2009, at 17hs40min (+6 hs for Brasilia – DF), distance traveled: 657.4 nm, average speed 230 Kias, after landing 2hs55min flight in Kursk – UUOK (Russia). The weather remained good throughout the race, with some clouds in specific stretches. Wind ranged from 020 in the first hour of flight to 354 in the rest; direction: 04/00mag.

There was no air traffic controllers in Finland. The first radar contact occurred at 18hs05min, when the aircraft was registered BAW39 in 297kias to FL353.

The first controller to have a presence in Squawbox was Magnus Gustafsson (ESOS_CTR in 118.40), 41, who is a police officer, working in K-9 unit (police dogs). Magnus lives in Aalands Islands, small island located between Sweden and Finland. When I asked him “how are you today?”, he replied with sense of humor: very well, a red wine and a pizza do wonders to a man. Of course, I agree with Magnus. I asked him what was your impression of Brazil, and he said, nices beaches, beautiful women, Copacabana, Senna, Barrichello and Massa. And he confessed right away: it is a fan of F1. I spoked that Senna died very young. He agreed and ordered that Michael Schumacher is not even close to it.

Maxim Gvozdev’s lieutenant Air Defense Force of Russia (S-300). For Vatsim he occupies the position UUWV_CTR (127.50). I was impressed with the lot of traffic on the outskirts of Moscow when tuned into the frequency of Maxim. Despite being obviously busy, Miller found time to talk with me. He said he regrets not having beaches in Moscow, city of his residence. I explained: my city is 800 km from the nearest beach. Just as Russia, Brazil also is a continental country. The most striking image of Brazil for Maxim is the carnival in Rio de Janeiro. But he admitted he knows very little about our country.

The youngest member of the flight online with which I found so far is Algis Radziunas, Lithuanian, who lives in Vilnius (EYVL_CTR). Algis is only 16 years old and he is a student. Shown much concern about the climate in Brazil. I explained the differences between the northern dominated the heat and the south where the winter is rigorous. Algis said that in Lithuania the normal temperature in winter is around -10 º C, reaching -30 ° C. To Algis, Brazil is synonymous with the lot of jungle and intense heat. I explained that it is not so: the Amazon (rainforest) occupies only part of our northern region. In the end, Algis said never forget our conversation and I’ll always be welcome to the skies of Lithuania. Thanks, Algis. I would also like you to visit Brazil.

Finally, a few minutes before landing at the airport of Kursk, I talked with pilot ukrainian Ruslan Kulish (call sign: MSI6212), who is 29 years and he is air traffic controller in real life UKDD (Dnipropetrovsk). Too bad it did not have much time. Ruslan is very polite and friendly. When I told the blog, he immediately made a visit. We had parted and Ruslan came to ask what was the language we speak in Brazil. He think it was Spanish. I explained that we speak in Portuguese. He said he would like to send a comment on my language, but soon after we had the same idea: why not in Ukrainian? The comment is available at the end of the post on the Trecho 15, or right below the links. In his commentary Ruslan sends a hello from Ukraine, and calls for me to spend a few more days over the skies of their homeland. And seems to have said that she wanted to come to Brazil – do not forget to understand the message I used the Google Translator. He also sent me the address of the Virtual Aviation in Ukraine, an interesting site partly in English and partly in Ukrainian. The link is now available in the section Para FS2004. Thank you for your attention, friend Ruslan. Come to Brazil to visit us. You are always welcome.

When speaking in Russia, a superlative is always the mind. It is the largest country in the world by having more territorial extension of the eighth part of the mainland of the world. Its territory stretches across northern Asia and 40% of Europe, that is, one of the few transcontinental planet. Crosses 11 time zones, which means that when in its eastern part is a day in the west the sun has set. It has the largest mineral and energy reserves in the world, but not the export. It also owns one-fourth of all the world’s fresh water. Russia was the largest member country of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, the international community considers the Russian Federation as heir to the legal personality of the Soviet Union.

The Russian Revolution of 1917, which ended the dynasty of the Romanovs has deeply marked the history of the twentieth century, with the direct consequence of the clash of two ideologies antagonistic to from the end of World War II: capitalism and communism, known as the Cold War, only ended with the demise of the Soviet Union.

Kusrk is the capital of Orblast of Kusrk and has about 410.000 inhabitants. Several universities move the cultural sector of the city. In its vicinity came the biggest battle of armored cavalry during World War II, with the destruction of several German divisions. However, the city’s name became internationally known with the sinking of the sumarine Kursk in 2000, when all the sailors on board were killed.

Well friends, for the day. Next leg from Around the World I will go to a city that mixes magic, charm, history and mystery: Istanbul, most important city of Turkey.

A hug, and there.

Tada! i am at Kursk , for my final countdown, Insyallah.

KL to dubai = 6 hours.
Transit in Dubai = 4 hours
Dubai to Moscow = 7 hours
Ground transportation to Kursk = 7 hours.

Total = 24 hours. Whoa! 1 whole day to get from KL to Kursk. Imagine that. And ive been through it for 6 years now.

Upon arriving, it was already 1a.m so, as usual, the lift wasn’t working at night and I had to carry my luggage all the way to 9th floor. Luckily, it was like less than 10 kgs. But still!.

On my first day in Kursk, i spent the whole day CLEANING!. The room was an ultimate mess. And the dust, my my, it was a disaster. So, there i was alone, cleaning like an old maid. Btw, I havent still got a room mate. I hope no one new will come so that I will have the room all to myself. Nyaha. Or, if anyone new, it should be my cousin Ira. Senang sikit kan. Ehem, nak bully. Hehehe.

Tomorrow, I will be starting 6th year with Obstetrics cycle. Class at hospital bcem peh. Meaning, its not Angleva (phew). Can relax a bit on Obs and focus on internal med exam. Yeah you know, the one which I skipped last sem.

Im so hungry. Yesterday I only ate instant noodles. Hungry hungry.

They said the price of goods has gone up. Lets see what I bought for 124.50 rubles.

1. Toothbrush
2. Tooth paste
3. 2 Mentols
4. Panty liners 20 pieces/pack
5. Prawn instant noodle
6. Dishwasher
7. Sponge for dishwasher

Quite a lot eh for RM15 ringgit. In Malaysia, 15 ringgit can get = 10pieces of otak otak, 5 tau foo fah and 1 nasi kerabu. Oh I miss bazaar Ramadhan.

I am publishing this through wordpress.com. Too busy to update and tweak sarahism.com for the moment.

With a lawsuite against R-71 at this time is just a delay tactic and expense tactic by the opposition.  The controversy is not over the signatures or the number of signatures but rather that the signature of the signature gatherers were not included on a vast majority of the R-71 petitions.

http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/initiativesReferenda/Documents/2009/R-71/Litigation-State/Complaint.pdf

http://wei.secstate.wa.gov/osos/en/initiativesReferenda/Pages/R71_Litigation_State.aspx

All of the ones which I submitted did have a signature on the back of the form however.  I did not get paid for gathering signatures on R-71 like everyone else.  No one got paid for gathering signatures for R-71.  I did notice Larry Stickney and his son got paid for their effort in coordinating this effort however.  

The Washington Secretary of State demanded to have included on inititatives and referndums a section for the signature and printed name of  ”paid” signature gatherers. 

Since there were no “paid” signature gatherers the lawsuite/litigation is a waste of time and effort but only if not for the delay and expense factor.  The opposition to R-71 are spending money in an effort to get attention for their cause.  This is extremely common with political maneuvering and only in that context commendable. 

In other contexts this could be extremely dangerous.  Publicity by the opponents could counter-swing and backfire.  Attention to this matter could stimulate the R-71 base and accentuate the need to the “NO” vote supported by R-71 supporters.  I would have left the issue silent instead of stirring the “hornets nest”.  But as a supporting I am proud of getting the FREE  PR on behalf of my opponents. 

It does look like the number of signatures needed to pass R-71 (120,577) will be concluded on Monday afternoon.  With 7693 left to count and 5994 left for needing to be passed that would leave a margin of 1699 which could be still rejected and thus a rejection possibility rate of  22.0851%.  The average reject rate to dte is 11.86% for the other signatures which are already counted.  Also, with a possibility of 54 being added because of previously being rejected due to the Signature Image being Pending due to various county images being difficulty to read by the State auditors.

The intermediate news should come on Monday for passage.

What part of the Russian submarine Kursk is not known here.  “Damn the torpedoes – full speed ahead.”  In this case who holds the gold and are the nuclear weapons armed.  But unlike the Kursk the prayers of the various Churches will have a different type of emergency to them.  How will God perceive their prayers.  All civilized citizens of the world had their prayers united for the crew of the Kursk though.  But this time I know that both sides will be praying for their outcome.   

http://englishrussia.com/?p=845

http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/topics/Russian_submarine_Kursk_explosion

For a change of pace I have pulled up something that one of my professors allowed me to do in my Military History Masters Program.  This was my first foray into historical fiction, or as it is known sometimes as “Alternate History.”  This is actually a growing genre among military writers and others who have vivid imaginations as to what might have happened if….

I hope you enjoy.  Peace, Steve+

This is an alternative history of how the Germans might have avoided the disaster at Kursk. It looks at what might have happened if an actual assassination attempt on Hitler had succeeded in March 1943 and how Manstein might have been able to execute the “backhand” strategy that he favored using a mobile defense.  This is predicated by Hitler’s death, based on Hitler’s actions and control of operational decisions Manstein would never have been allowed the freedom to conduct operations in this manner.  In eliminating Hitler I have also included personnel changes and the overall strategy for the German High Command, and the probable response of Stalin to Hitler’s death had it occurred in the spring of 1943. I have tried to be faithful to known historical opinions and actions of the participants and likely reactions to such a situation although one cannot predict precisely what people would have done.  Thus I have documented the article with footnotes as if it were an actual history. It would have been interesting to be able to lengthen this and included sections on tactical actions based on memoirs of German and Russian soldiers.

Hitler’s FW-200 Prior to his Ill-fated vist to Army Group Center

Background: The Strategic Situation Spring 1943

In April 1943 the German High Command faced a decision on which the fate of Nazi Germany would hinge, but for the first time in the war it was not under the thumb of Adolf Hitler. Following Manstein’s counter-stroke following the Stalingrad disaster there was considerable pressure to follow up with that success with a continued offensive. Manstein himself had proposed this but Field Marshal Von Kluge refused to agree to an immediate offensive because he felt his troops needed rest and refitting. On March 13^th Hitler flew out to meet with Von Kluge at Army Group Center HQ at Smolensk.  On the flight back Hitler’s FW-200 was racked by an explosion crash landing near Minsk, taken down by a bomb planted on the plane by Colonel Henning Von Trescow of Kluge’s staff.[i] While Hitler survived, he remained in critical condition, barely alive at a SS hospital until his death on 20 April 1943, his 54^th birthday. The crash landing was reported by the escorting ME-109s of JG-53, and a Alarm Company from a Security Division at Minsk rescued Hitler but were driven off the crash site by a large force of Soviet Partisans who destroyed the aircraft and any evidence to the cause which the escorting fighters attributed to mechanical problems.  There were no other survivors. Von Kluge, expecting to be implicated the Fuhrer’s death committed suicide after visiting troops on the front line, and was succeeded at Army Group Center by Field Marshal Model the commander of 9^th Army. The other conspirators were frozen into inaction when Hitler survived the crash and made no attempt to take over the government, realizing that “our plans for seizing power in Berlin and other large cities were still not adequate to the task.”[ii] In the absence of Hitler Reichsmarschall Goering, Hitler’s designated successor, took action to secure his power and using contacts in the GESTAPO accused Himmler of treason for making contact with Neutral intermediaries in Sweden[iii] and replaced him with SS General Kurt Wolfe, and reappointed Rudolf Diels, the former head of the GESTAPO when it was still under his control[iv], to head it again.  Himmler attempted to flee and was caught near Luneburg when he committed suicide with a cyanide capsule before he could be interrogated. Other potential rivals were eliminated; Martin Bormann, who Goering hated, was arrested on charges of exceeding his authority, embezzlement, and harming the war effort and was executed.[v] Joseph Goebbels swore his loyalty to Goering even before Hitler’s death.  He and Albert Speer were directed to arrange the state funeral for the late Fuhrer. Berlin Radio announced the Fuhrer’s death on the 21 April, Hitler’s body was prepared and lay in state at the Chancellery.   A period of mourning was declared 21 April to 1 May on which the State Funeral took place. On 2 May Goering announced that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was the new Chief of OKW and would coordinate strategy on all fronts. The next day Goering called together a meeting of the heads of OKH, OKW, the Inspector General of Panzer Troops, and the commanders of the Eastern Front Army Groups, Western Europe and Africa as well as Reichsfuhrer Karl Wolff, Admiral Donitz and Field Marshal Von Richthofen[vi] representing the Luftwaffe to decide on a course of action for the summer. It was the first time that all had been called together to discuss the overall situation since Barbarossa began in 1941, and the first true attempt to formulate a grand strategy during the war.

Options and Decision: The Zossen Conference 3 May 1943[vii]

Goering meeting Diplomats following Hitler’s State Funeral

Herman Goering looked up from the maps spread out on the conference table.  He looked surprisingly fit, somehow between the crash of Hitler’s aircraft and his death he had pulled himself together and out of his drug induced malaise.  It was as if he again had a purpose. Field Marshal Von Rundstedt now Chief of OKW following Goering’s relief of Field Marshal Keitel, and General Jodl had just finished briefing the situation in western and southern Europe, following briefings by Colonel General Zeitzler of OKH, the Inspector General of Armored Troops, General Guderian and Field Marshal Von Manstein of Army Group South.  Albert Speer briefed tank and aircraft production numbers while the Chief of the Army personnel office noted the requirement for 800,000 replacements “but even the most ruthless call-up was able to produce only 400,000.”[viii] Looking from the table he spoke: “Gentlemen, the situation is critical and I have to admit that I have thought so for a number of months but have been unable to speak out.   Our political situation is perilous, the Italians are ready to abandon our cause. Our forces in North Africa will soon be unable to hold out as our Italian friends have let us down again.[ix] I expect that if Jodl and Kesselring are right about Allied intentions that we will have our hands full in the west shortly.  Kesselring and Arnim, you need to evacuate as many German soldiers from Africa as possible,[x] use all air and naval forces that you can, I know it will be difficult, especially with the heavy losses we have taken in transport aircraft and the pathetic Italian Navy.”  Goering paused, his gaze passing around the room.  “In the west we need to assume that the Allies will invade and the ‘very real danger that the enemy may turn against Brittany and Normandy,’ Field Marshal Rommel will take command of OB West to build up the Atlantic Wall in these sectors.”[xi] “Zeitzler, Manstein, we need to shore up the eastern front.”

“Herr Reichsmarschall, the Fuhrer had approved the plan called ZITADELLE, to attack the Russians here in the Kursk salient.” responded Zeitzler.[xii] “We should be ready to begin the offensive this month.”  Goering raised his hand stopping Zeitzler.  “I know, but I have considered that plan and I cannot support it. Richthofen briefed me on it prior to the Fuhrer’s death and general, we must have another plan, and an attack on Kursk is so obvious the Russians will be ready to meet it.  I have considered what the General Guderian and Minister Speer said regarding tank production and the state of the Panzer arm.  I cannot approve Zitadelle, but we must find a way to deal the Russians a defeat without squandering our strength attacking such an obvious target. Model too is dubious of the prospects; he believes that the Russians know our intentions and has requested a delay to strengthen his forces.”[xiii] “Reichsmarshall.” chimed in Jodl. “You are correct, the premature commitment of central reserves in such an offensive will not help our cause, in fact only local success is what can be expected from Zitadelle.”[xiv]

“But Reichsmarshall, we must recapture the initiative in the east, we must take the offensive!” retorted Zeitzler. “Our new units of Panthers and Tigers will give us a decisive technical advantage.”[xv] Guderian now joined in. “But the Panthers still have many technical problems, it would be better to wait until they are worked out before we commit them to a major offensive, and besides, how many people do you think even know where Kursk is?”[xvi]

“Zeitzler, I appreciate your zeal.” Interrupted Goering, “But Jodl and Guderian are correct, even a successful attack at Kursk will not alter the strategic situation. We must work to stave off defeat.  Manstein has a plan that may help, there is some risk, but I see no other way. An offensive at Kursk would require tanks and aircraft that must be used to combat the Allied bombing of the Reich and to safeguard withdraw of our units from Africa, it would force us to commit everything with little gain.” Goering paused and said to Manstein, “Go ahead Manstein.”

“Reichsmarshall, Gentlemen.  Our situation in the east is not hopeless, in March I felt that an immediate offensive would succeed in pinching off the Kursk bulge, but I think now that the moment of opportunity has passed for such an attack.  Instead we should fight a defensive battle of maneuver as called for by Truppenführung that we have developed from the days of the Reichswehr.  We should build up our forces; give ground where we can, and when we have the chance strike the enemy on the backhand, as we did at Kharkov.”[xvii]

Zeitzler jumped in. “But how can we do that? If we don’t strike now while we have the opportunity the Russians will grow stronger, and how can we know where they will strike?”[xviii]

“General Zeitzler, the Russians are already building up heavy armored forces in the area of Kursk, and diverting forces from other sectors of the front to that area.  The south offers them the best opportunity to finish what they started in the winter.  They will come and it will be in the south, they will want Kharkov and they will again attempt to envelop our forces in the south. If they succeed they will follow up and rapidly move into the Balkans, Romania and Hungary will turn on us and it will be a disaster, we cannot afford that.”  Manstein looked up, Jodl nodded and Model said “Once that is done they will push to Kiev and Poland.” Goering interjected “Thank you Model, you are right, Field Marshal Manstein; please go on with your plan.”

Erich Von Manstein at the Front

Motioning to the map Manstein continued. “We will concentrate the majority of our Panzer forces here, just west of Kharkov and another group here west of Orel.  We will also build fall back positions for our infantry forces here along the Dnieper.  We should be ready to withdraw from the Crimea should the need arise, we cannot afford another encirclement.  When the Russians attack we will give ground, even Kharkov if needed. Our infantry divisions will fight a delaying action supported by Jagdpanzer and Sturmgeschutzen, the Luftwaffe will need to give us good close air support from Stukas and as the Russians outrun their supply depots and their offensive loses momentum we will attack, like a badger defending itself.  Our Panzers will cut off their spearheads west of Kharkov while we bleed them dry in the north; we will then roll them up, stabilize the line and prepare for the winter.”  Manstein sounded confident; those in the room began to sense that his plan could work.  Rundstedt spoke up: “That will give us the chance to transfer forces to other fronts and, maybe, since Hitler is dead there might be a chance for Reichsmarschall to negotiate a settlement,[xix] otherwise gentlemen the Allies will destroy our cities from the air and grind our armies down until we have no recourse but surrender.”

“Right” added Goering, making eye contact with each man in the room. “We must have success in the defense, we must buy time and we must work to end this war before Germany is destroyed. ‘We will have reason to be glad if Germany can keep the boundaries of 1933 after the war.”[xx] He paused and said “General Zeitzler, you are relieved of your duties at OKH, General Guderian, you are now the Chief of OKH.[xxi] Manstein, you will command the East, General Hoth will take your Army Group. You will work with Guderian and Model to flesh out this plan.  We must get the Panther, Tiger and Ferdinand units operational as soon as possible.  I believe that the Russians will attack by June. Richthofen, I need you to look to the Luftwaffe. We have not had a good year and we have to succeed in defending the Reich from Allied bombers and provide support to the ground forces. Of course flak needs to be built up. The Luftwaffe Field Divisions with the exception of the Fallschirmjaeger and Herman Goering Panzer Division need to be transferred to Army control.”  He looked at Speer: “Herr Speer, the Fuhrer entrusted you with our war production program, you must increase production of tanks and aircraft. Speed the production of the ME-262 and cancel all programs that take away from the panzers, fighters and ground support aircraft that we need now.” He put his hands on his hips and took a deep breathe. He looked at Wolfe, Himmler’s successor.  Wolff, the Reich needs the Waffen SS, the Panzer troops are exceptional, but I want all Waffen SS Formations, with including the Panzers turned over to Army control, we cannot keep dividing our resources. With the personnel from the Luftwaffe Field Divisions we should be able to provide the Army with excellent troops to rebuild experienced formations.”  Goering looked around the room; “Are there any questions Gentlemen?” Putting his arm across Manstein’s soldier and said: “I think that Badger is a fitting name for your plan. Our little Dachs will tear them to pieces.”   Later, Goering met with Foreign Ministry officials emphasizing the need to strengthen German Allies and seek peace with the west. He “admitted that he was worried about the future. ‘It’s not quite clear to me how we are going to end this war.’”[xxii] Those present could not believe how Goering had conducted himself, and all left the meeting thinking that it might be possible to stave off defeat.  It was an incredible performance. After Hitler’s crash he had secretly undergone a “systematic withdraw cure which had ended his drug addiction.”[xxiii] The change was marked.

STAVKA Headquarters Moscow: 7 May 1943

Josef Stalin was ecstatic.  His agents reported that Hitler was dead even before the announcement from Berlin.  Partisans had confirmed that it was Hitler’s aircraft that they found and recovered some of Hitler’s personal belongings, including his cap, which they presented to Stalin.  Intelligence reported that Goering had taken power, and Stalin was sure that his position was weak and many believed that Goering, was not up to the task, and that a renewed offensive could bring down the Nazi regime.  Now was the time to bring the Nazi terror to an end and Stalin called his key leaders together.  While Stalin wanted an immediate offensive his generals wanted to wait just in case the Germans attacked Kursk.  “Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and various General Staff officers urged caution and recommended that the Red Army remain on the defensive until the Germans expended their offensive strength.”[xxiv] Stalin supported by commanders, like Vatutin, “argued for a resumption of offensive action in early summer to preempt German action and regain the momentum lost in March 1943.”[xxv] In the end a compromise was reached and despite the temporary defensive stand “Russian strategic planning in the summer of 1943 was inherently offensive in nature.”[xxvi] The new offensive would be launched on 15 June if the Germans had not attacked before.  It would be named Operation Kutuzov[xxvii] and be aimed at the Orel salient and Kharkov.  The northern prong under Rokossovsky’s Central Front would destroy the Germans around Orel and drive west while Vatutin’s Voronezh and Konev’s Steppe Front would take Kharkov and drive toward the Dnieper.[xxviii] The Southwest Front and South Fronts would attack and destroy the German forces along the Mius, the goal: “collapse of the German defenses and an advance to the line of the Dnieper River from Smolensk in the north southward to the Black Sea.”[xxix]

German Preparations

Sturmgechuten and SdKfw 251 APCs moving into position

Manstein met with Model, Hoth and Guderian to develop DACHS. They had  to play for time and deceive the Russians as to their true intent so they could build up their forces.  Deception operations were mounted on both sides of the Kursk bulge to give the impression of attack preparations.  1^st Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf  were to launch a diversion called Operations HABICHT and PANTHER southeast of Kursk  “designed to push the Soviets back from the industrial area of the Donets River.”[xxx] The defensive plan called for the infantry supported by tank destroyers, assault guns the heavy Ferdinands as well as mobile Pioneer units to conduct a withdraw to delay and disrupt the Russian attack.  Bridges were prepared for demolition, defensive positions constructed at choke points which would be defended and then abandoned when no longer defensible, and minefields laid to slow the Russian advance.  This was critical for 9^th Army now commanded by General Henrici in the Orel salient north of Kursk.  Henrici, a defensive master constructed a series of defensive belts to allow his army to withdraw from the bulge without being cut off and inflict heavy casualties on the Russians through skillful deployment of anti-tank weapons, especially self propelled guns.[xxxi] In the south 4^th Panzer Army, now commanded by SS General Paul Hausser[xxxii] and Army detachment Kempf made preparations to allow the Russians to advance past Kharkov using the same defend and delay tactics and then counterattack. As the armies prepared, Speer and Guderian’s efforts to rebuild the Panzer force were bearing fruit.  By 15 May the first brigade of Panther tanks was activated and began training west of Kharkov.[xxxiii] Two battalions of Ferdinands, one for 9^th Army and one for 4^th Panzer Army were activated.[xxxiv] Sturmgeschutz battalions were assigned to each infantry corps. Panzer divisions built up so that all had an average of 130 tanks, with the SS Divisions and Gross Deutschland receiving more.  Tiger battalions were assigned to each Panzer Corps.

The Summer Campaign

On 1 June Operations PANTHER and HABICHT hit the unfortunate Soviet 6^th Army, which had been victimized by Manstein’s counter-stroke in March.  III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf supported by Corps Raus (IX Corps) linked up with 1^st Panzer Army at Kupiansk on 3 June.  The Russian counterattacked with 8^th Guards Army and the 2^nd and 23^rd Tank Corps. The battle of Kupiansk resulted in the destruction of 6^th Army and the 23^rd Tank Corps which was surprised by the 503^rd Panzer Detachment’s Tigers. 2^nd Tank Corps received a similar mauling at the hands of the 6^th Panzer Division.  On 9 June the Germans returned to their start positions.

Soviet Tanks and AT Guns at Kupiansk

The attack at Kupiansk surprised STAVKA which had been deceived by the build up of Panzers around the Kursk salient.  Stalin continued to hound his generals to begin Kutuzov on time, but the generals were “chastened” by the defeat at Kupiansk and “earlier experiences”[xxxv] and wanted to delay. Stalin forced them to begin Kutuzov on 22 June, the 2^nd Anniversary of Barbarossa.  Manstein and his Eastern Front commanders held their breath.  Teams of Brandenburger commandos operating in the Soviet rear and Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft reported Russian units moving to advanced positions to the north and south of Kursk.  Vatutin commanding the Voronezh Front was ambushed and killed by a Brandenburger detachment supporting Ukrainian irregulars[xxxvi] as he returned from visiting 69^th Army near Prokhorovka station on 19 June and was replaced by Lieutenant General Katukov of 1^st Tank Army.  Katukov “was one of the Red Army’s most accomplished and experienced armor officers.”[xxxvii]

Mk IV Panzers

In the north Rokossovsky’s Central Front and Popov’s Bryansk Front supported by 11^th Guards Army[xxxviii] began concentric attacks on the German 9^th and 2^nd Panzer Armies and ran into Henrici’s labyrinth on 22 June.  They hit the first line they found it empty, the Germans having repaired to secondary positions,[xxxix] German 88’s and self propelled guns took a heavy toll on the tanks of 2^nd Tank Army.  The 3^rd Tank Army under General Rybalko’s army committed after the initial assault “attempted a fresh penetration instead of exploiting the earlier efforts of the 3^rd and 63^rd Armies… Rybalko’s force included 698 serviceable tanks…but lacked the artillery and engineers for such a deliberate assault.”[xl] Popov telephoned Stalin at noon on 25 June “to report that Rybalko was practically stalled and suffering heavy losses in tanks.”[xli] The Germans committed the 5^th and 8^th Panzer divisions[xlii] against 3^rd Tank Army. The fresh Panzers inflicted painful losses on Rybalko.  On 27 June Stalin called to complain about the handling of the army, demanding a direct assault.[xliii] The battle turned into a “grinding battle of armored attrition.”[xliv] After “a few bloody days bereft of any success, Rybalko’s tank formations had to be pulled out of the line into reserve.”[xlv] The “battle for the Orel salient ended three weeks later with a German defensive victory, as Army Group Center extricated its two armies from the box prepared for them while inflicting heavy casualties on three Soviet Fronts.”[xlvi] The Soviets lost over 629,000 men and 3,500 tanks.[xlvii] In comparison German losses were light and by falling back they shortened their line freeing units for other operations.  Stalin had Orel but failed to destroy the Germans and lost heavily in the attempt.

In the south Konev’s Steppe and Katukov’s Voronezh Fronts prepared their assault on Kharkov.  They attempted to deceive the Germans by simulating the massing of a “notional tank and combined-arms army” in the western side of the Kursk bulge.[xlviii] The deception was unsuccessful as reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft and Brandenburgers failed to uncover any troop concentrations and Russian deserters, talked of a strike at Kharkov. The offensive “Rumiantsev” was opened by the 5^th and 6^th Guards armies supported by 53^rd and 69^th Armies on 21 June; a day later 7^th Guards Army jumped off, two additional armies supported the west flank of the offensive.[xlix] The Russians in the two fronts began the operation with 980,000 men and 2,500 tanks.[l] Opposing them were 4^th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf’s 350,000 men and 1,750 tanks and assault guns including 100 Tigers and 192 Panthers.[li]

T-34 towing disabled T-34 near Orel

STAVKA “chose to strike the strongest portion of Hoth’s defense head-on, to engage and defeat the German force and avoid the problems of flank threats.”[lii] Unfortunately they complicated the attack by focusing it at “precisely the boundary between the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts, causing increased coordination problems from the start of the operation.”[liii] The Germans used Ferdinands, Jagdpanzers and Sturmgeschutz in a mobile defensive role, as infantry fought delaying actions as they withdrew to successive defensive lines, inflicting brutal losses on the Russians.  Aided by massive artillery preparation the Russians broke through the weakened Army Detachment Kempf near Belgorad[liv] taking the city on 24 June.  Corps Raus’ 167^th Infantry Division was taken on its exposed left flank forcing Raus to “fight a delaying action…until the withdraw reached Kharkov.” [lv] The Germans reacted to the threat by committing the “veteran 5^th SS Panzer Grenadier Division Wiking” to reinforce Army Detachment Kempf.[lvi] Despite the success “the German defenses proved so tenacious that the leading brigades of the two tank armies had to enter the fray.”[lvii]

As the Russians advanced the German fell back.  Hoth directed Hausser to wait before counterattacking with XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps.  Katukov pushed the 1^st and 5^th Tank Armies into the hole in the German lines and moved toward Kharkov which was liberated by the 89^th and 183^rd Guards Divisions[lviii] on 2 July.  The liberation of Kharkov and Belgorad while exhilarating had cost Katukov over 250,000 casualties.  Skillful employment of mobile defense and local counterattacks by mixed Panzer battlegroups, such as one by Grossdeutschland on the flank of 5^th Tank Army caused panic and some units withdrew “leaving behind masses of equipment of every description.”[lix] The tank armies had lost upwards of 50 percent of their tanks, infantry divisions were now down to half strength, some down to 3000 men.[lx] Yet the Soviets attempted to drive south to trap the Germans.  They were hit by XLVIII Panzer Corps and II SS Panzer Corps, both of which had seen little action thanks to Hoth’s conservation of strength. XLVIII Panzer Corps hit the 1^st Tank Army at the “key road junction of Bogodukhov, 30 kilometers northwest” of Kharkov “severely mauling the leading three brigades”[lxi] forcing 1^st Tank Army to withdraw towards Kursk. 5^th Tank army moved to support but was taken in the flank by II SS Panzer Corps.  The SS Corps encircled the remainder of 5^th Tank Army. Hunted by the SS on the open steppe the survivors slipped through gaps in the encirclement but both armies were ravaged.  By 15 June 1^st Tank Army was down to 120 tanks and 5^th Tank Army had “50 of its original 503 tanks and self-propelled guns serviceable.”[lxii] XLVII Panzer Corps took Kharkov on 18 July.

SS Panzer Troops and Tigers prepping for battle

The victory paid dividends for the Germans. The Front held and the Russians had taken nearly a million casualties and lost almost 6000 tanks and self-propelled guns.  Three Tank Armies had been smashed, 5^th Tank Army would not be fit for field duty for two months.[lxiii] 3rd Tank Army earned a Guards designation but was withdrawn from combat.[lxiv] 6^th Army, victimized by PANTHER was destroyed while the 5^th, 6^th and 7th Guards Armies were shattered. Additionally, the Germans decimated two independent tank corps.  Stalin reacted by halting operations, cancelling follow on offensives and rebuilding the Red Army’s tank armies and mechanized forces.  He realized that his Generals had been right in not wanting to undertake offensive operations until the Germans had been weakened, but the German insistence on not going on the offensive caused him to ignore their arguments. He decided to wait until winter to launch his next offensive, but that offensive would never be launched as by the time he was ready the war was over.

German Tank Commader as Panzers mop up

The elimination of the Russian threat enabled Italy to be reinforced as well as the reinforcement of the Atlantic Wall.  The Salerno landings were a disaster, the Allies driven into the sea by Panzer Divisions released from the Eastern Front.  The disasters at Salerno and the Russian debacle brought overwhelming domestic political pressure on Roosevelt and Churchill to end the war. Clandestine talks began in Switzerland between Avery Dulles and Karl Wolff[lxv] while Walter Schellenberg met with Count Bernadotte.[lxvi] Despite the previous demand for unconditional surrender the Allies decided to negotiate with the new German leadership might end the war in Europe.  Goering surrendered power to General Beck and gave himself and other accused war criminals up to the Allies. Beck took power, withdrew to 1939 borders, dismantled the death camps and disbanded the Nazi Party, and its police apparatus.[lxvii] Peace came to Europe on 9 November 1943, 25 years after Kaiser Wilhelm’s abdicated his throne.

Goering Surrenders himself

[ii] Galante, Pierre. Operation Valkyrie: The German Generals’ Plot Against Hitler. Translated by Mark Howson and Cary Ryan. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, NY 1981. Originally published as Hitler est il Mort? Librairie Plon-Paris-Match, France. 1981. p.167 

[iii] Padfield, Peter. Himmler. MJF Books, New York. 1990. p.474.  Himmler had a number of contacts and intermediaries who he used to attempt contact with the Allies as early as 1943.

[iv] Höhne, Heinze. The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS. Translated by Richard Barry. Penguin Books, New York and London, 2000. First English edition published by Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd. London 1969. Originally published as Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf, Verlag Der Spiegel, Hamburg 1966.  Diels remained an ally of Goering even marrying his sister in 1943.

[v] Von Lang, Jochen. The Secretary: Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler. Translated by Christa Armstrong and Peter White. Random House Inc. 1979. Originally published as Der Secretär. Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. 1977 p.9.  At his trial Goering remarked to other defendants. “If Hitler had died sooner, I as his successor would not have had to worry about Bormann. He would have been killed by his own staff even before I could have given the order to bump him off.”

[vi] Irving, David. Göring: A Biography. William Morrow and Company, New York, NY 1989. Richthofen had succeeded Jeschonnek in March when Goering relieved him. Goering believed that Jeschonnek “was too pliable at the Wolf’s Lair.” Goering had actually considered this a number of times but postponed it several times. p.388

[vii] Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (abridged) Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon, Ballantine Books, New York 1957. pp.244  Hitler conducted a similar conference involving many of the same people in Munich.

[viii] Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company. p. 336

[ix] Ibid. Irving. pp. 377-379.

[x] Ibid. Guderian. p.243

[xi] Ibid. Irving. p.378

[xii] Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999. pp.21-25.  Operations order 5 had been approved by Hitler on and issued by OKH on 13 March. It was followed by Operations Order 6 on 15 April.

[xiii] Ibid. Clark. p.324.

[xiv] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964. p.334 These objections of Jodl were from June, but indicate the feeling of Jodl for the Zitadelle as planned and when would have likely been his response in such a situation.

[xv]Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995. p.157 Zeitzler had been a consistent advocate for Zitadelle since he heard Manstein’s initial proposal in March.

[xvi]Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg. Stein and Day Publishing, New York, NY 1975 p.206

[xvii] Ibid. Clark. p.322

[xviii] Ibid. Clark. p.323.  Zeitzler made this argument with Jodl during a briefing in April 1943.

[xix] Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960. p.1115.  Hitler had told Keitel and Jodl that “When it comes to negotiating [for peace]…Goering can do much better than I. Goering is much better at those things.”

[xx] Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970. p.245.  From a conversation with Speer in late 1942.

[xxi] Ibid. Glantz and House. Clash of Titans. pp. 216-217. Hitler would replace Zeitzler with Guderian in June 1944.

[xxii] Ibid. Irving. p.379 From a conversation with State Secretary Ernst von Weizäcker 11 February 1943.

[xxiii] Ibid. Speer.  p.512. The ending of the addiction took place at Nurnberg and Goering surprised many of his co-defendants with his “remarkable energy.”

[xxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.28

[xxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.28.

[xxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.264

[xxvii] Overy, Richard. Russia’s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945. Penguin Books, New York NY and London, 1997. pp.211

[xxviii] Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Cassel Military Paperbacks, London, 2003. First Published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983. p.76

[xxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.265

[xxx] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.23.

[xxxi] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart. p.215  Henrici describes the methods that he used in 1944 as Commander of 1^st Panzer Army and as Commander of Army Group Vistula during the defense of Berlin.

[xxxii] Hausser would actually command 7^th Army in Normandy in 1944.

[xxxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House Kursk. p.53 This was the 10^th Panzer Brigade assigned to XLVIII Panzer Corps.  Additionally Clark notes production figures for Panthers from Speer that indicate that 324 Panthers would be available by 31 May. (Clark. p.325)

[xxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.52.  At Kursk the two Ferdinand detachments were both assigned to 9^th Army.

[xxxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.28.

[xxxvi] Ibid. Carell. p.510.  Vatutin was killed by Ukrainian irregulars in April 1944.

[xxxvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.62

[xxxviii] Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General. DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005. p. 256

[xxxix] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.215.

[xl] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.236

[xli] Ibid. Erickson. p.113. At Kursk the call took place on 20 July when Rybalko was in this situation.

[xlii] Ibid. Newton. p.256

[xliii] Ibid. Erickson. p.114

[xliv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.236

[xlv] Ibid. Erickson. p.114

[xlvi] Ibid. Newton. p.256

[xlvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.345. The actual losses were 429,000 men and 2,500 tanks against a German force significantly weakened by Zitadelle.  Had the Russians attacked the Germans rather than receiving the German attack first their losses in men and machines would have been far higher.  I have reflected that in the alternative numbers.

[xlviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.168  The Soviets did try this in their counter offensive following Zitadelle.

[xlix] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.169

[l] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.344. Actual figures for beginning of offensive.

[li] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.338.  Figures from beginning of Zitadelle.

[lii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.244 The actual text reads “Manstein’s defense” not Hoth’s.

[liii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.244

[liv] Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated by H. Betzler, Ballantine Books, New York, NY, 1971. Originally Published University of Oklahoma Press, 1956. p.286

[lv] Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003. p.214

[lvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.247

[lvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.169

[lviii] Ibid. Erickson. p.121  These were the actual divisions that liberated Kharkov.

[lix] Ibid.  Von Mellenthin . p.287

[lx] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.252

[lxi] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.170

[lxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.252

[lxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.252

[lxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.237

[lxv] Ibid. Hohne. p.572

[lxvi] Ibid.  Hohne. p.570

[lxvii] Ibid. Galante. pp 69 and 207

Bibliography

Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian German Conflict, 1941-45. Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY 1965

Erickson, John. The Road to Berlin. Cassel Military Paperbacks, London, 2003. First Published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983

Galante, Pierre. Operation Valkyrie: The German Generals’ Plot Against Hitler. Translated by Mark Howson and Cary Ryan. Harper and Row Publishers, New York, NY 1981. Originally published as Hitler est il Mort? Librairie Plon-Paris-Match, France. 1981.

Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999.

Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995

Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. (abridged) Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon, Ballantine Books, New York 1957

Höhne, Heinze. The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS. Translated by Richard Barry. Penguin Books, New York and London, 2000. First English edition published by Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd. London 1969. Originally published as Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf, Verlag Der Spiegel, Hamburg 1966.

Irving, David. Göring: A Biography. William Morrow and Company, New York, NY 1989

Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart

Macksey, Kenneth. Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg. Stein and Day Publishing, New York, NY

Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General. DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005

Overy, Richard. Russia’s War: A History of the Soviet War Effort: 1941-1945. Penguin Books, New York NY and London, 1997

Padfield, Peter. Himmler. MJF Books, New York. 1990

Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960.

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970.

Von Lang, Jochen. The Secretary: Martin Bormann: The Man Who Manipulated Hitler. Translated by Christa Armstrong and Peter White. Random House Inc. 1979. Originally published as Der Secretär. Deutsche-Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart. 1977

Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated by H. Betzler, Ballantine Books, New York, NY, 1971. Originally Published University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964.

It wouldn’t right to have talked about the Battle of Kursk without at least mentioning its final, and most memorable, engagement.  If you recall, Operation Citadel (as the Germans called it) had begun the previous week, and was Germany’s attempt to straighten out the westward loop in its front lines.

The Russian strategy was to layer its defenses, so that as the Germans broke through a line, the defeated forces would simply retreat to reinforce the next line situated a couple miles further back.  This tactic had a distinct effect on German morale as the days passed.  With each breakthrough, the Germans would be excited at the prospect of an upcoming flanking move that would complete the encirclement of the Kursk salient.  And then they’d run smack dab into another line, and the process would begin anew.  It was frustrating to say the least.

But on July 12, 1943, both sides engaged the offensive in what has come to be known as the largest single tank battle in history.  South of the Kursk lies the town of Prokhorovka.  At 7:00am, the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps (with some help from the 48th Panzer Corps) launched to the north towards Prokhorovka.  Two hours later, the Russians began one of their first offensive actions, sending the 69th Guards Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army south.  I know this kind of sounds like a “2 versus 2″ battle, but each group mentioned was actually a multi-division force…these were big groups.  This single battle involved nearly 2,000 tanks.

Initial attacks were blunted (on both sides) by tenacious close air support, but the Russians got the worst of it.  Their aircraft were so busy attacking German tanks that they pretty much ignored incoming German aircraft.  Those planes, armed with 37mm flak cannons, wreaked havoc among the Russian tank formations.  And German artillery was devastating.  As the morning ended, hundreds of Russian tanks were smouldering wrecks.

Had the Russians not committed to a massive attack, but rather held to a defensive posture, their losses would have been greatly minimized.  But anyone that studies the Soviet side of World War II knows that keeping losses at a minimum was low on the priority list.

At any rate, the Germans didn’t accomplish their goals either.  So the Battle of Prokhorovka pretty much ended in a draw, with the Russians sustaining far heavier casualties and losses in equipment.  The outcome also convinced Hitler that this battle wasn’t worth continuing, so he called off Citadel the next day.

Furthermore, the Allied invasion of Sicily just two days before had caused Hitler to make another rash decision, pulling a couple crack Panzer Divisions out of the Kursk battle and sending them south towards Italy.

At full strength, the Germans may have had a little chance to break through the Russians, but we’ll never know for sure.  Operation Citadel was really the last major German offensive in Russia, which makes the Battle of Prokhorovka one of the last offensive battles.  From here on out, it was pretty much a retreat.

Recommended Reading: The Eastern Front – Day By Day, 1941-45

I came across the story of Alexander Gorovets some time ago in a book I was reading.  But of course, I didn’t write down which book, so when it came time to talk about him, I had lost my main reference.  I figured an Internet search would turn up all the info I needed.  I was wrong…and when I started reading what itty-bitty crumbs were available, some of the facts were different from what I had remembered.

Then I got frustrated and did some more digging through the books I’ve recently had open…nothing.  I looked through some magazines…not a word.  So…what to do?  I’ve decided to tell you the basic story, because it’s constant, then let you decide on the details…or point me to the proper answers.  It’s a two-way version of Today’s History Lesson.

We mentioned the Battle of Kursk yesterday and its heavy concentration of ground-based firepower.  Kursk is best known for its tank warfare, and that’s good, because it was easily the largest tank battle in warfare’s long history.  But there were nearly as many planes in the air as there were tanks on the ground.  And that’s where our subject comes into the picture.

On July 6, 1943, the Lieutenant was flying over the battle when he spotted 20 Junkers Ju-87 Stukas.  The Stuka was, in WWII, just about the closest thing to a “precision” bomber in existance.  Though by 1943, it was clearly outdated as any kind of fighter, it was deadly in its ”tank plinking” role.  Carrying a single 500-pound bomb under the fuselage, it was devastating to armor.  Gorovets knew that 20 of them could easily destroy 20 tanks.  And so he attacked.

And on the ground, Russian infantry were able to watch in amazement as Alexander slashed through the Stukas, downing one, then a second, then two more, and then another.  The Stukas simply couldn’t fight with the additional bomb weight.  And so they jettisoned their bombs and scattered for safer territory.  But before they could escape, Lt. Alexander Gorovets had single-handedly destroyed 9 of them…and then his guns ran dry.

But while his fame was just beginning (he would be named a Hero of the Soviet Union), Alexander’s life was nearly over.  Returning to base, he was jumped by a 4-ship of Focke-Wulf Fw-190’s.  Low on fuel and with no ammunition for defense, the hunter became easy prey, and Gorovets was shot down and killed.

None of that is disputed.

Here’s my confusion.  My notes indicated that our hero was flying a Bell P-39 Airacobra.  The Airacobra (shown on the left) was a U.S. mark, sent to Russia as part of Lend-Lease.  It was a capable (though not outstanding) fighter that probably achieved its greatest success in the hands of Russian pilots.  But all other sources state that Gorovets was flying a Russian-made Lavochkin La-5 (shown on the right), a very capable aircraft on par with the Focke-Wulfs that shot him down.

Anyways, Gorovets’ achievements were remarkable, regardless of which plane he was flying.  I just wish I could find that reference to him flying a P-39.  If any of you ever come across it…

The spring of 1943 saw a growing disquiet among Germany’s Generals and Field Marshals.  North Africa had been lost, and an invasion of Italy via Sicily was looking more and more like a possibility.

In the east, Stalingrad, after nearly being captured, had been lost, together with nearly a million men and massive amounts of equipment.  The tactics of Blitzkrieg, so successful against smaller countries, were vastly more difficult to execute in a country the size of Russia, where there was lots of “room for error” and plenty of time for the opposition to learn and adapt.

But in spite of all this, there was still reason for Teutonic optimism.  The Germans still had a solid front that ran from Leningrad and the Baltic Sea in the north to Rostov and the Black Sea in the south.  If you can find those two points on a map and draw a line between them, you essentially have the line of demarcation.

But towards the south, there was a curious depression in the line that looped to the west around the city of Kursk.  It became even more pronounced when Field Marshal Erich von Manstein recaptured Kharkov in March.  It was quickly decided to straighten the line, capture Kursk (and a bunch more Russians), and then make a concerted move toward the Don River.

The offensive, originally set for early May, was postponed numerous times and the reasons were all legitimate.  First, there were newer, more powerful tanks just starting to roll off the assembly line.  The Tiger and the Panther, both serious upgrades over the current marks, would clearly make a difference around Kursk, where the flat terrain was ideally suited for mechanized warfare.  And then the fall of Africa caused attention to be diverted as it was assumed that Italy would be invaded.

By the time all was said and done, March (when Kharkov was lost) had become early July.  This was particularly good news for the Russians, because they had access to the same maps as their counterparts.  And they could see the same salient around Kursk.  And they could pretty much guess the next target.  And espionage groups were giving them lots of good information.  And they were now experienced in Blitzkrieg warfare.  And they knew how to respond.

The area around Kursk became one of the most heavily defended places on the planet.  The Russians placed 1.3 million men in the salient, along with 3,600 tanks and nearly 3,000 aircraft.  Civilians helped bury a million anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.  Artillery pieces were everywhere.  The Russian plan was to give ground slowly, avoid the Blitzkrieg “pincer and encirclement” tactics, and simply grind down their German opponents before striking.

And on July 5, 1942, the Germans got an unpleasant 2:00am “wake up call” as the Russians unleashed a massive artillery bombardment (though they didn’t move forward).  The Germans now knew that the Russians knew what was coming…and that was probably a pretty bad feeling.  At 5:30am, the Germans (after collecting their wits), launched Operation Citadel with nearly a million men, more than 3,000 tanks, and aircraft numbering more than 2,000.  The area of dispute, a circle roughly 90 miles by 100 miles, would contain more firepower per square mile than nearly any battle in history.

The battle for the Kursk salient was on, and it would be one for the ages.

Recommended Reading:  Kursk 1943 – These Osprey books are small, but pack a great informative punch.