One question that gets asked only occasionally is if there are not better, more urgent uses for the treasure being poured into Iraq. Almost everyone agrees there are, although Republicans who support the war are less likely to enumerate them, since they presumably believe the cost is worth it.

Some of the starkness of alternative needs struck me last week, when my wife and I motored up the eastern coast from our home on Hilton Head Island to Boston for the American Political Science Association meeting. The mischosen route we traversed was I-95, the vital ribbon of concrete and asphalt from Maine to the tip of Florida. If there is any piece of the American infrastructure that cries out for some (arguably all) of that $10 billion a month, it is I-95.

For those who have not made the error of travelling I-95 for a substantial distance recently, it is a mess. Most of it is still four lane, except around the major cities, where it occasionally widens. The volume of traffic is clearly excessive to the road’s capacity. When all conditions are absolutely ideal (weather, number of cars, etc.), it is barely adequate. When anything happens (road construction, accidents, or just more cars and trucks than it can handle), the road breaks down into gridlock. My best guess is that I lost about 10 percent of gas mileage on I-95 simply sitting and idling in gridlocked traffic jams. It would take one of two solutions to bring back some sensible level of stasis to this road: massive reconstruction to widen and improve it, or a massive reduction in traffic. Anyone want to bet on the latter?

I-95 illustrates, in my mind, the perversion of priorities that the Iraq War and similar initiatives represent. The administration announced today plans to send $1 billion to Georgia, a drop in the bucket, but not when one adds up all the foreign bills being incurred while the infrastructure here literally crumbles.

I have never thought of myself as an isolationist, but rather as a liberal internationalist. The United States should be active in the world, but does that necessarily mean responding to crises everywhere (including the ones we create, like Iraq) with expensive military solutions?

It has been a consequence of the unilateralism of the last eight years that the United States has attempted to exorcise foreign demons at the price of bridges, highways, and other elements of the American infrastructure. Is that what we want from the next President? The state of I-95 seems to me a pretty good metaphor for why the United States should get out of Iraq.

The kicker, of course, is whether conditions on the ground are right. General David Petraeus said earlier this week that progress has been made, but that it is “fragile” and “reversible.” The situation is, and will be in 2011, one or the other, and the assessment is likely to depend critically on who is making the judgment. Will they see the glass as half-full (an optimistic judgment about the situation “on the ground”) or half-empty (fragility likely to shatter if we leave)?

The answer is probably partisan. General Petraeus, as a military person, is trained to look at things critically, which in this case means skeptically. If there is any real possibility things could go amok, he is professionally predisposed to say don’t do it! John McCain, who has promised troops out by 2013 after we have “won,” will also likely look at 2011 as too premature for fragility to have been replaced by stability. Both are almost certainly ”glass half-empty”ers (I realize that is probably not a word). Barack Obama, on the other hand, has already declared the ground will be ripe for withdrawal a year earlier than 2011, and thus is likely to make the glass half-full judgment that we can indeed leave. The situation on the ground is likely to be sufficiently ambiguous that with position can be sustained while the judgment is being made. Only in the aftermath and amid the consequences of the decision can one really know the conditions of the glass. Half full? Half empty?

The Iraqis, who are increasingly anxious to have the Americans out of their country, may torpedo this whole thing by refusing to ratify the agreement and insist on negotiating a more concrete, less conditional, and earlier withdrawal “time horizon,” at which point the glass will be half full by definition, whether it is or not in fact. In some ways, getting the bum’s rush from the Iraqis would solve everybody’s problem, because regardless of how things turn out, the Iraqis can be blamed for that outcome.

There is, of course, one other aspect of this. The glass analogy generally connotes that the liquid is water; in the case of Iraq, it is arguable that the fluid is actually oil. Does that change the calculation of half-empty or half-full? Just a thought.

What the lull means, of course, depends on why is has happened. Phil Myers, who comments from time to time on these postings, and I have discussed several possibilities. By way of context, Phil is a history PhD, I am a political scientist, and we were classmates, roommates, and fraternity brothers at the University of Colorado a few years ago, to put it kindly.

I suggested four possible explanations, to which Phil has responded.

1. The surge has worked. That, of course, is what surge apologists argue, using reductions in casualties as their evidence. Viewed this way, the surge was a tactic rather than a strategy, unless one argues it has also contributed to the strategic goal of a stable post-American Iraq. Phil’s opinion is that “when we leave the fighting will start all over again.” My view is that if it is a tactic aimed at suppressing violence levels, it has succeeded. If it is a strategic element, we have no way to know yet. I also tend to agree with Phil’s assessment.

2. Most of the ethnic cleansing, which is what the “civil war” was actually about, has been completed, and there are few people who need killing left. The gist here is that all major groups have carved out their enclaves around which to rally after the war is over by kicking out or killing members of other major groups. The only remaining place where the process is incomplete is in the oil-rich regions around Kirkuk where, non-coincidentally, there is still fighting. Phil’s comment is that “there is always someone left to kill.” True enough, but what may be left is Afghan-style tribal killing after the war.

3. The Iraqis want us to leave, and have collectively decided the best way to do so is to convince us we are no longer needed by dropping the level of violence. Certainly, a continuing appearance of peace makes it harder for the Bush administration to keep troops there and would strengthen the hand of the Iraqis, who really do want us to leave. Phil doubts that the fractious groups could ever get together to coordinate such an effort. While that may be true, cooperation may be tacit or based on the one thing about which all groups agree: they want the Americans out of their country.

4. We have won! Setting aside what “winning” means, the reduction in violence is evidence that the overall American plan has worked, and that we are on the road to victory. Phil dismisses this argument as “obvious nonsense,” arguing that as soon as we leave, they will be back at it.

Another possibility, of course, is that much of this is Iraqification smoke and mirrors, not unlike the arguments the Americans made in 1972 and early 1973 that the South Vietnamese were ready to defend themselves. By the time that assessment proved untrue, we were basically gone and looked back at the consequences with a high level of indifference. The difference between then and now, of course, was that the Vietnamese did not possess the world’s fourth largest oil reserves.

Have any reactions to these categories of explanations? Any of your own?

There were really three dynamics to Vietnamization that have been transplanted to Iraq:

1, A recduction in acceptable outcomes from the American vantage point. In Vietnam, that meant backing down from a guarantee of Soth Vietnamese independence to the “reasonable chance” of that outcome.

2. The training and preparation of South Vietnamese forces to be robust enough to withstand a North Vietnamese onslaught.

3. The creation of conditions in surrounding countries to maximize the likelihood of South Vietnamese survival (notably sealing off Cambodia and Laos as infiltration routes).

Obviously, all this did not work out as planned in Vietnam, but it is clearly the basis of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The United States has backed away from the absolute goal of Iraqi democracy to the more measured standard of a stable government survival in which a democratic outcome is possible. The Iraqi armed forces have been recruited and trained, although that process is ongoing. Some efforts have been undertaken to neutralize influence from Syria and Iran, although those could hardly be called glowing successes (but then, neither were Cambodia and Laos successes).

Something like Iraqification is, after all, the only possible outcome. The United States will leave, and it requires some semblance of success behind it as it lowers the flag and departs. Although what will happen after we leave is still debatable, it is at least arguable that the situation will be stable. Sounds like Vietnamization to me!

The major forces seem to be aligning behind this outcome. Obama and McCain are, as argued in previous posts, “schlepping” their way toward the goal of full or large-scale withdrawal by 2010, and the al-Maliki government has embraced that outcome as well. Will it come as any surprise if the SOFA that is negotiated after January 2009 does not move in this direction as well?

Does the movement toward Iraqification favor one side or the other in the November election? No one, of course, uses the term, even if both have embraced its dynamics. Getting the U.S. out of Iraq certainly favors the Obama position, but McCain’s support for the surge will be trumpeted as having moved the situation to the point that Iraqification can be implemented. Sounds like a wash, although both candidates will doubtless take credit. If there is an advantage, it will be the direction the reasidual debate about Iraq will go. If it goes toward “how we won the war,” it will redound to McCain’s advantage (proof he knows how to “win wars”–despite never having won one); if it goes back to what we were doing there in the first place, the advantage goes to Obama.

In the end, Iraqification helps out everyone, by putting Iraq behind us. Then, the question will be how we treat Iraq once we’re gone. We forgot (arguably abandoned) Vietnam as fast as we could, and hardly noted it when the “reasonable chance” of success failed. Will we do the same things if events work out poorly after we leave Iraq?

But then the Bushies were outsmarted (hardly the first time that has happened). Their plans, of course, assumed the Iraqis would, Uncle Tom-like, accept what was clearly a much better deal if you are an American neo-con than if you are an Iraqi, To the absolute chagrin and apparent surprise of Americans from Bush to smiley Condy Rice, the Iraqis have said, “no thanks.” Since the agreement the U.S. seeks to extend is based in the expiration of a UN mandate, it is kind of hard to ignore. And al-Maliki and company know it. And so the administration is frantically backing and filling, acquiescing to the new realities while denying anything is new at all. Nice try guys!

What is rather clearly emerging from all this is a compromise that will affect the fall election. There will be no long-term SOFA on Bush’s watch; rather, there will be some sort of interim agreement that allows the Americans to remain beyond December 31 and for the new administration to get into the mix. The Iraqis have clearly learned about American lame ducks and would prefer to talk to the folks who will be in charge for the next four years rather than today’s caretakers. Now, the discussion has turned to timetables for American withdrawal. The Bush neo-cons, of course, refuse to use that particular “t-word”, so they are “time horizons,” but everyone knows what that means. But as if to twist the knife in George Bush’s back a little, al-Maliki said yesterday, as he was getting ready to go to the airport (figuratively, at least) to greet Obama landing in Baghdad, that he thought the Obama 16-month timetable sounded pretty good to him. John McCain cannot be happy with this turn of events.

Something like an agreement on the terms of the SOFA could turn the Iraq issue in the campaign. If al-Maliki embraces the Obama position during his visit, it is a tacit endorsement of Obama and rejection of McCain. Do the Iraqis have their own pollsters in the United States? If he continues to say that 16 months sounds like a pretty good timetable–er, time horizon–where does that leave McCain? Does he declare he thinks victory will be achieved in 16 months? By that time, Bush will be off cutting brush in Crawford and will probably not care. Obama, on the other hand, will have a hard time wipig the smile off his face.

Things can, of course, change. The SOFA problem will not go away, however, and the Bush administration has clearly shown it has no juice left to force, maybe even influence, the outcome. And so maybe the Iraqis will get to frame the major foreign policy issue of an American presidential campaign. The occupied dictating to the occupiers? Wow.

This ia a curious charge and response. People make policy judgments all the time on matters with which they have little if any direct, experiential connection. Legislators cannot possibly immerse themselves in everything about which they will make judgments, and presidents are the same. So why does Obama need to go to Iraq? And even when he does, what is he going to learn? Is he going to see the situation as it actually exists, or as the US command wants it to look? And are the Iraqis (who, according to today’s New York Times story, pretty much like Obama) going to get to know Obama, who will be well surrounded by security people to keep those Iraqis away from him? What is takeaway supposed to be? Am I the only one who does not really get it about this trip?

The trip to Iraq is mostly fluff, but this week’s announcements from the Obama camp on Afghanistan (mirroring McCain) are not. Obama said that a main reason for getting the troops out of Iraq is so more will be available for Afghanistan (he has suggested an extra 10,000). The stated reason is better to track down bin Laden. Does this make sense?

There are currently 36,000 American troops in Afghanistan, plus assorted NATO forces. They are fighting, primarily at least, Taliban who melted away after 2001 but never really went away. What is now transpiring in Afghanistan is an Afghan reaction to yet another foreign invader, who happens to support a government in Kabul that it helped install. The connection, of course, is that the Taliban and Al Qaeda have close links; thus, a Taliban victory means a resurgent Al Qaeda, and a defeated Taliban leave Al Qaeda more vulnerable. Thus, an increased U.S. effort against the Taliban translates into progress against bin Laden and Company.

Will this all work? It depends on how the Afghanis see our presence. If they view the Taliban (who come from the largest tribe in the country, the Pashtun) as the enemy, they may support the US and its allies. If, on the other hand, they come to view our presence (especially if it becomes larger) as just the most recent foreign occupation, we are in trouble. Any reading of Afghan history does not offer solace to the invaders/occupiers. The British learned this a century and more ago; the Soviets nearly 30 years ago. Must we reinvent the wheel here? Or, might it be a better idea to adopt much more specific, limited goals to achieve in Affghanistan that can be accomplished without major US military presence on the ground. Or, are we going to drift into another open-ended military commitment that we do not understand, and can neither win nor figure out how to get extricated from?

As Senator Obama is flying to Iraq, I hope someone will give him a copy of the collected works of Rudyard Kipling. If they do, Senator, please turn to his poem “The Young British Soldier.” The last verse reads in part:

“When you’re wounded and left of Afghanistan’s plains,

And the women come out to cut up what remains,

Just roll to your rifle and blow out your brains,

And go to your Gawd like a soldier.”

Enough said.

Source: Sabrina Tavernise and Richard A. Oppel Jr. “In Iraq, Mixed Feeling About Obama and His Troop Proposal.” New York Times (online), July 17, 2008.

As reported in this space, the Bush administration has hoped to negotiate and sign a long-term presence in Iraq that would tie the hands of the next administration–much more of a bind for Obama than McCain. The Iraqis have been resisting these advances (much to the surprise and consternation of the Bush “brain” trust), and yesterday the hammer went down. As described in the Washington Post Sunday edition, there will be no long-term agreement between now and the new administration. Instead, negotiations will continue for a “bridge agreement” that will avoid the U.S. being unceremoniously thrown out as the ball drops in Times Square. The United States calls what is being sought a “temporary operating protocol”; the Iraqis call it a “memorandum of agreement” (MOU); the rest of us can call it a ringing defeat for the Bush administration.

As noted in earlier postings, the Iraqis have been troubled by various aspects of an extension of the occupation, and apparently the immunity of US troops from prosecution for alleged crimes has proven the sticking point; moreover, provincial elections are scheduled for the fall in Iraq, and no Iraqi politician wants to be associated with having expedited an open-ended US stay. So, they said “no deal; we’ll talk to the new adminstration.”

The bridge over troubled waters being discussed would likely carry through 2009, allowing the Obama or McCain administration to negotiate either a complete pullout or some more limited form of continued stay. At any rate, this is one instance where kicking the can down the road is usefully empowering for the recipient, since the new administration will not be stuck with a long-term albatross from which it can only extricate itself indelicately.

The administration has, of course, slapped lipstick on the pig as best it can. The Post quotes an unnamed adminstration official rationalizing the situation with a curiously mixed metaphor; the US will now negotiate “a bridge to have the authority in place so we don’t turn into a pumpkin on December 31.” George W. Bush himself could hardly have said it better!

Two pronouncements by the Iraqis in the last two days demonstrate their ability to master the schlepping game. In a widely reported statement on July 8, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mouwaffak al-Rubaie repeated Iraq’s reluctance to enter into a new open-ended Status of Forces Agreement with the United States. “We will not accept any memorandum of understanding that does not have specific dates to withdraw foreign forces from Iraq.” Sounds like they are going to force the US to leave at the end of the year, doesn’t it? Score one for Obama?

Not so fast. They may want the US to leave, but maybe not right away. In a statement released July 9, 2008, “Iraqi spokesman” Ali al-Dabbagh issued a clarifying schlep that moved the Iraqis back toward the McCain move to the center: The pullout, he said, “could be 2011 or 2012, We don’t have a specific date in mind, but we do need to agree on setting a deadline.”

The United States was quick to pick up on this Iraqi move toward the American center. Lt. General James Dubik, US Army commander in charge of training the Iraqi army, announced that training could be completed in 2009 “as early as April. Could be as late as August.” Once that army is trained to its projected strength of about 565,000, it presumably can take over responsibility for more and more Iraqi provinces’ security, which in turn triggers the withdrawal process Obama advertises. It does not, however, mean everyone can come home (or move one country over to Iran, or two countries over to Afghanistan), because there will be residual needs such as intelligence provision, air cover, and special forces missions by the Americans (which sounds remarkably like US actions in Vietnam in 1972 in Vietnam under the policy of Vietnamization).

The net result of all this, of course, is mostly to show the Iraqis are learning thedir American electoral politics. Simply refusing to negotiate some form of new SOFA would undercut the McCain position of staying until there is victory. Since McCain might win, that’s bad American politics for the Iraqis. At the same time, negotiating a long-term presence for the Americans in a new SOFA is bad politics two ways. First, it antaonizes the vast majority of Iraqis who want the US to leave. Second, since Obama may win (possibly probably will win), such an agreement would leave the appearance of tying the hands of the new administration, which would not endear the Iraqis to that regime.

How do the Iraqis solve their problem? They join the schlepping toward the middle. And it could well work. As Andrew Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is quoted in todays’s Washington Post, “If they can establish a clar schedule for withdrawal, it is probably a schedule the next president will accept.” That schedule, of course, could be dateless, with figures to be added later.

Source: Tyson, Ann Scott, and Dan Eggen. “U.S. General: Iraq Forces to Be Ready in ’09.” Washington Post, July 9, 2008, Aii.

As noted in the most recent posting, there are really three positions one can take about what to do about Iraq after inauguration day in January 2009. The candidates have occupied the extremes. Obama has favored getting out rapidly on a fixed timetable of withdrawal. This position speaks to the public desire for American withdrawal and is based on the presumption that the United States had no good reason to be there in the first place and that a protracted continuation will do little good and might even do more harm. McCain has adopted the other extreme, which is that the United States must remain in Iraq until victory is achieved, and that the surge is working to achieve that end. The elusive term victory has gone from producing a democratic Iraq to a stable Iraq. 

The two extremes share a common problem: both raise objections from the public. Leaving raises hackles because a growing portion of the population now thinks that “progress” is now being made and that pulling up stakes will throw away that effort and progress. An open-ended commitment to victory, on the other hand, violates the public desire to see the war end.

How to deal with this dilemma? The answer seems to be to head from the extremes toward the center, a third position that can be thought of as Don’t Leave So Fast/Stay Just a Little Bit Longer. Obama is moving toward the former: he is now scheduled to visit Iraq, where he will be regaled with signs of progress. He has already said that withdrawal will be conditioned by what the military tells him, and they are not going to tell him to leave instantly. McCain, on the other hand, has been backtracking from his assessment of being there ”as long as it takes” by suggesting that progress is greater than expected, and thus we may not have to stay as long as once feared. Obama says the timetables are flexible, McCain that success may come sooner rather than later. Is it only a matter of time until these two positions converge on a common point in time for American extraction from Iraq?

These changes reflect changes in the public mood, in two ways. One is that American assessment of the war’s progress has change. Fewer Americans see Iraq as a inevitably lost cause and have softened their opposition to the war. At the same time, the abyssmal performance of the American economy has shoved Iraq out of the electoral limelight (a not uncommon phenomenon). If Obama wants to reenergize the Iraq issue, he might be well advised to tie economic performance to the effects of Iraq (for instance, the impact of borrowing for Iraq on the strength of the dollar and consequently the higher number of dollars needed to buy a barrel of oil). McCain, of course, wants to get as far away as he can from the Bush economy and as close as he can toward a national security election, at which he feels he is advantaged. In the meantime, both are quietly schlepping their way toward a closer ground on the Iraq War.

Friedman suggests there are three cogent variables in the current mix. The first is public opposition to continuing the war that makes an indefinite continuing commitment politically untenable. The base of this observation is the unbearable costs both to the military and the economy of continuing the war. The second is the evidence of progress in the field. Things are better in Iraq, Friedman offers, but adds, “It is still not clear that Iraq is a country that can be held together by anything other than an iron fist.” Linear projections of progress, in other words, are suspicious. The third observation is that a precipitous withdrawal would be injurious, because the country has not reached a point where its “stability is self-sustaining.”

Like most of what Friedman has to say, there are no revelations here, but rather a summation of that part of public opinion that wants to see an end to American involvement but fears the consequences of withdrawal–a fairly sizable part of the population. A quick look at his assumptions, however, is useful to clarify the bad options the U.S. has in ending the imbroglio.

The first comment is that the observations are of varying empirical content. That the American people are tired of Iraq and want out is unassailable–there is lots of factual evidence to support it. The other two oservations, however, are less grounded in observed reality. There are indeed measures that suggest things are better (if less violence against Americans is the main criterion of better), but not why this is the case or whether it will continue. That Iraq would deteriorate without an American “referee” to monitor progress is an extrapolation into the future without clearly compelling empirical base. It might be true, and it might be false, but an argument can be made in either direction.

What, then, are the lousy choices among which to choose? There are three. One (call it the Obama option) is to set a reasonably short timetable for leaving and adhere to it. That option is clearly politically popular in the United States, but it comes with drawbacks. Once the United States withdraws (exactly what that means depends on the outcome of the SOFA negotiations), it will lose influence in Iraq, with three possible consequences. The result could be internal Iraqi chaos the United States would not be in a position to reverse. A new government in Iraq lacking American troops looking over its shoulder might reverse the oil leasing negotiations noted here last week and admit other oil interests or, at worst, kick the U.S. out again. If either of these things happen, the result could be a negative political backlash in the United States. Of course, the American people may also be so grateful to get out that they simply do not care what happens when the U.S. is gone, but that is a chance.

The second possibility (the McCain option) is to stay until something like “victory” (currently defined as a stable, self-sufficient Iraq) is achieved. This option also has problems. It would be unpopular virtually everywhere–in the United States, in Iraq, and among American allies. It would also mean the continuation of ruinous economic and human costs as the goal is pursued. That pursuit is made more difficult because there are no certainties that it can be achieved. If the option is pursued and fails, there are high political costs as well.

The third possibility is to let things slide. This option (the stay/leave option) suggests that the United States should neither commit to a long-term involvement nor set a short timetable for withdrawal. Rather, it would suggest, Iraqification-style, that the United States is committed to leaving but only when the time is “right” (purposely left vague). That is pretty much what is happening today, and is a compromise that seeks minimally to avoid antagoniing either side, at least until the election is over. Whether it is viable depends on whether a point of departure that turns out to be more satisfactory than its parallel in Vietnam is attainable. If the U.S. stays awhile longer and still fails, supporters of this option will have to answer the ire of those who say the U.S. could have pulled out much earlier and gotten the same result. If it succeeds, supporters can say “we told you so.” The problem is not knowing which result the option will yield. 

All the options are lousy, because each has potentially negative political consequences, and the future of Iraq is sufficiently opaque that one cannot confidently predict which option will hold. Pick your posion! 

What is going on here? The U.N. mandate under which the U.S. has operated its occupation in Iraq ends at the end of this year, as noted in an earlier posting. The only way the United States can legally remain in Iraq into 2009 is through a new UN mandate (which is not going to happen) or through Iraqi permission in the form of a SOFA wherein the two governments agree to an extension. The U.S. proposal calls for a long-term continued presence on a series of bases throughout Iraq. The pretensive reason is to protect the Iraqis (and Americans) from terrorists operating out of Iraq. The Iraqis, encouraged by the Iranians, increasingly view the SOFA as a ploy for the Americans to maintain effective control of Iraq more or less indefinitely. The Americans deny this; most Iraqis, who want the Americans to leave, do not believe us.

How is this all going to work out? Earlier in the year, the Bush administration apparently felt negotiation of the SOFA would be easy, assumed it would be signed and sealed well before the November election and would bind a new administration to honor commitments to stay. That hope not only no longer seems very likely, it now seems unlikely. Iraqi agreement to a new SOFA on American terms before November remains a possibility, but it is increasingly unlikely: the Iraqis and Iranians do not want it, and signing an agreement with a lame duck Bush administration that may be opposed by its successor is not a good deal for Iraqis who will have to deal with that new administration.

If the Bush deal is unlikely, then the next possibility is that nothing happens until the election, at which point a new arrangement is negotiated with the new administration’s blessing. If the incoming regime is headed by Obama, the new SOFA will likely be restrictive, calling for rapid removal of most U.S. forces and a small residual force to deal with AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq) and to provide security for Americans remaining in the country. If the incoming adminstration is led by McCain, there will be prickly negotiations because McCain will essentially adopt the Bush position of a long, high manpower presence that could lead to the third outcome.

The third outcome is that the Iraqis simply refuse to sign any SOFA with the United States, a possibility hat seemed highly unlikely six months ago but not today. It is increasingly obvious that al-Maliki, or any other Iraqi leader who signs the SOFA the Bush administration wants, would be labeled a collaborator and besubject to retaliation after the Americans leave. If they reuse to allow the U.S. to stay, that would leave the United Statdes with two unpalatable options: obey international law, leave, and lose influence in Iraq; or brak the law, stay, and run the risk of international approbrium. The Bush administration would have no trouble with this dilemma, since they hold international law in disdain. But what about an Obama or a McCain administration? We will look at these possibilities in the future.   

The Iraq War may have its own Trojan horse in the form of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) currently being proposed by the Bush administration to the al-Maliki government. The SOFA is necessary because the UN mandate justifying the occupation expires at the end of this year, and if it is not renewed, the continued American presence after December 31, 2008 will be illegal. The question of legality may or may not be overriding, but it would certainly look better if the Iraqis can be convinced to invite the Americans to stay (a major role of the SOFA).

The terms of the SOFA determine the shape of the Trojan horse. Three elements stand out. First, how many Americans will be allowed to stay, and where (on how many bases where) will they be allowed to stay? Second, how long will they be permitted to stay? Will it be for a short time during which the withdrawal occurs, or a long, even indefinite period? Third, what will the status of the Americans be? Will they have the right to detain Iraqis without Iraqi government permission (as they do now)? Will they be immune from prosecution under Iraqi law (as they are now)? Will they be permitted to pursue what they consider terrorists without consulting the Iraqi government (as hey do now)? All these are critical questions that are under negotiation.

The Trojan SOFA affects both American and Iraqi politics. If a generous SOFA one that gives the Americans what the Bush administration wants) is negotiated, it will prejudice the ability of the next president to initiate withdrawal (obviously more of a problem for Obama than McCain). If the al-Maliki government negotiates such an agreement in the face of increasing sentiment across the spectrum of Iraqi opinion that the Americans should leave altogether, his government and anyone who supports it will be endangered–especially in post-American Iraq.

Will the Iraqis fall for the new version of the Trojan horse ploy, or will they be clever enough to see it as a way for the Americans to insert themseles for the duration? The answer will affect the Iraq War for years to come.

(For a summary of the issues, see Greg Bruno, “Iraq Splinters on Security”. June 11, 2008, on the Council on Foreign Relations web site at www.cfr.org).      

In that light, how is the United States doing in Iraq? Given the American military tradition, it is an unremarkable question, but it is not one often asked about Iraq. Instead, such discussions focus on the purely military dimension: is the surge succeeding, for instance? The answer to these questions tend to be framed in battlefield terms: the absence or reduction in casualties, and especially American deaths in measuring the surge.

But that is the wrong answer. The right answer is framed in terms of whether the United States is getting closer to achieving the postwar Iraq it wanted when fighting began. The neoconservatives said they wanted a democratic Iraq that would be a regional beacon and begin the stabilization of the region (and, not coincidentally, make the environment less hostile for Israel). No one talks about that goal much lately, because what democracy there is in Iraq turns out to be a lot more fractious than originally conceived. Now, the talk is about stabilizing the country, hopefully allowing democracy to take hold.

What if democracy and stability in Iraq is an either/or proposition: you can have one or the other, but not both? Given the divided nature of Iraqi society, this kind of dichotomy is not really unlikely. For instance, place the alternatives in terms of criteria for the war from an August 20, 2007 John McCain speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention and features in the Iraq section of his home page. “To concede defeat would srengthen al Qaeda, empower Iran and other hostile powers in the Middle East, unleash a large scale civil war in Iraq that could quite possible provoke genocide there, and destabilize the entire region as neighboring states come to the aid of their favored factions.” It should be pointed out that none of these conditions were problems before the U.S. invaded and conquered Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was not democratic, but neither was it unstable. At the same time, is it clear that a democratic outcome in Iraq would solve these problems? A new Iraqi dictatorship might serve the goal of pfreventing these destabilizing outcomes better than a democratic outcome. If so, which do you prefer, Senator McCain?

McCain does not seem interested in what Sir Basil Liddel-Hart called the “better state of the peace” after the war than in describing the consequences of leaving before our conituing military presence contributes to “a  measure of stability in the region” (from a speech to the California GOP convention on September 8, 2007). Rather, “our defeat in Iraq would constitute a defeat in the war against terrorism and extremism and would make the world a much more dangerous place” (speech at Virginia Military Institute (April 11, 2007).

Is avoiding a negative consequence the political objective in Iraq? If it is, it certainly is not a very lofty goal, or one that inspires one to sacrifice in its name. While McCain does suggest that “there must be a political agreement that allows all groups to participate in the building of their nation” in the VMI speech, he does not relate that to the military outcome in any direct way.

I cannot believe that John McCain did not have to read Clausewitz when he was at Annapolis, so he must know the Clausewitzian dictum and its entreaty. Why does he not relate the war to its objectives? Could it be that he realizes that democracy and stability are indeed mutually exclusive outcomes, that stability attached to a less than democratic Iraq is about the best that can be hoped for, and that he does not want the American public to realize this? Meanwhile, the Prussian strategist spins in his grave. 

General David Petraeus and Lt. General Raymond Odierno were in Washington this past week going through the motions of their promotions to commander of CENTCOM and commanding general of American forces in Iraq. Petreaus in particular suggested that things are really going better in Iraq than they have and that he believed that troop reductions would be possible this year. He and Odierno did not specify how many troops could be mustered out or when, nor did they invoke any Vietnam-style “light at the end of the tunnel.” But things are, they assert, improving. Improving from what and to what?

The futility of an occupation that is five years old and counting drew me back to one of twentieth century’s harshest opponents of military occupations (as part of imperialism), George Orwell. Born Eric Blair, Orwell grew up in the British Raj and became a member of the colonial police in Burma during the 1920s. In 1934, he published his scathing critique of colonial practice, Burmese Days. In 1936, he followed that work up with an essay/short story, “Shooting an Elephant.” (http://www.online-literature.com/orwell/887).  Its thesis remains a useful reminder of the narcissistic folly of military occupation.

The story line of “Shooting an Elephant” is simple and familiar. Summoned by reports of a rogue elephant in a Burmese neighborhood, a British colonial policeman (presumably Orwell/Blair) responds and is entreated to shoot the elephant, who has broken loose and has terrorized the town. By the time Orwell catches up to it, the animal is peacefully eating grass in a soggy field. The policeman understands he should not shoot the elephant, because it is valuable and poses no threat. He also realizes the townspeople who have followed him on his pursuit of the beast expect him to kill it. Ultimately, he complies, and the elephant dies.

Rereading the essay, two observations stood out. One was about the erosive effects of being an occupier. “When the white man turns tyrant,” Orwell wrote, “it is his own freedom that he destroys.” One can hardly avoid allusions to the restrictions on civil liberties that Iraq has spawned. The other observation struck me with particular vigor on Memorial Day: “I had done it,” Orwell said of shooting the elephant, “solely to avoid looking the fool.”

Since it is certainly not clear what Iraqi progress means or whether a continued American presence is contributing positively toward improvement however defined, is it possible that Petraeus and Odierno, and the rest of us, are marching forward in Iraq “solely to avoid looking the fool”? Or is it better to admit shooting the elephant is a bad idea and act on that insight? If we did, there might be a few less fallen to honor next Memorial Day. 

According to the article, there are currently over five million Iraqi refugees (about one-fifth of the total population) in either internal or external exile. Those in external exile are located in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, all countries with abundant problems of their own who do not need the added pressures of an indigent exile population. Iraqis who have collaborated with the United States and fled retribution by their fellow countrymen are part of this mass, but they are by no means all of it. Although the story concentrates on the paucity of international support for the refugees rather than their composition, most of them are Sunnis who fear retribution from the Shiite majority whose power is being implicitly supported by the American insistence on democratic governance (one man, one vote) in Iraq.

Given the deep rifts within Iraqi society, a large refugee outpouring was a predictable outcome of an effort to redo the Iraqi polity but, one more time, it appears to be a problem the Bush administration either did not anticipate or has chosen to ignore. Bruno, for instance, quotes Philadelphia Inquirer columnist Trudy Rubin on their response. “On the subject of Iraqi refugees,” she writes, “there is a deafening silence from the White House.”

In a sense, the American presence in Iraq has just traded one refugee problem for another. Under Sunni-dominated Baathist rule (Saddam Hussein), Shiites were regularly suppressed, and their leaders sought refuge wherever they could find it. Most went east to Iran to be with their co-religionists, just as Sunnis have fled to Sunni-dominated countries. There are, however, two differences worth noting. One is the sheer volume of refugees this time. I do not know the size of the Shiite refugee population under Hussein (does anyone out there?), but it was smaller. Second, the Sunni exodus also represents both a brain drain and loss of financial resources, since Sunnis occupied a disporportionate place in the upper reaches of Iraqi society and particularly were overrepresented in the professional classes. Their exodus is not entirely unlike the flight of the Palestinians after 1948 out of Palestine into bordering countries.

There is essentially no short-term positive prognosis for the refugee problem. Akin to the problem of those who assisted the American occupation, Uncle Sam does not appear forthcoming with either sizable financial or other assistance. If the refugees go home, they face the wrath of a Shiite government supported by the United States. If they try to stay where they are, the United States will be of limited assistance, particularly with the Syrians, with whom the United States refuses to talk at high levels of intergovernmental interchange. Presumably, the hope is that the problem will remain below the public radar until the administration leaves office (thereby kicking the can down the road to its successor). As well, the administration may be trying to help Senator McCain by not bringing attention to an embarassing aspect of a continuing presence in Iraq.

In the meantime, displaced Iraqis suffer, and no one seems to care much. But then, the war was supposed to have been over almost five years ago and, as I recall, the word “refugees” never appeared in the pre-war scenarios. 

Every war that involves an invasion, conquest, and subsequent occupation of a country creates its collaborators with the occupiers. Collaborationists are necessary for an occupation when the occupying power does not know much about the country it occupies or how it works, and especially when there is a shortage of people among the occupiers who speak the local language. The United States’ occupation of Iraq qualifies as needy for all those reasons, and as a result, the Americans have recruited and hired literally thousands of Iraqis to aid in their administration of the occupation.

Those employees look like classic quislings to much of the Iraqi population that opposes the occupation. Even if the Iraqi who serves as a translator in a U.S. Green Zone office did not collaborate in facilitating the invasion, he or she is aiding the occupation and is, by virtue of that action, a traitor. When the United States leaves Iraq, those quislings left behind face a very grim, and probably short future.

The Iraqis who have served the United States understand this problem, and their fate was described in a “60 Minutes” segment that aired on May 18, 2008. Those who remain in Iraq working for the Americans hide their identity and particularly their occupations for fear of being killed if their true lives are exposed. Many others (over a million) have fled to Jordan and Syria, where they live in the most tentative exile. They are, for instance, not allowed to work, because the local labor markets cannot absorb them; as a result, they exist on whatever savings they may have brought with them. When that runs out, they are set adrift. They cannot return to Iraq for fear of being killed. Most want to come to the United States, but the U.S. government refuses to admit most of them (only a trickle of those who have applied have been allowed to enter the country).

This creates a very real moral quisling problem for the United States. It happened before in Vietnam.When the United States evacuated that country, thousands of Vietnamese tried to flee with their American “benefactors” (remember the scenes of Vietnamese being literally kicked off the struts of American helicopters evacuating the U.S. Embassy in Saigon). All the major candidates for the presidency in 2008 have said the U.S. must do better by our Iraqi allies than we did by our Vietnamese allies. But we aren’t. Why not?

The U.S. government is, of course, the Bush administration for this purpose, an it has set the policies the State Department is enforcing on Iraqi immigrants seeking entrance in to the United States. Officials of the administration presumably have ordered (or at least encouraged) the ponderous processing of Iraqi immigration requests. Partly, the reason must be that admitting a lot of Iraqis who fear returning home is an admission that the U.S. mission of creating an idyllic, moderate democracy has failed, which the administration refuses to do. Partly as well (and ironically), the U.S. government no doubt fears that some of those applying are really terrorists (whom the action in Iraq was supposed to help eliminate): in this case, the problem is that we do not really trust those whom we recruited to help do our dirty work. Partly, it probably also reflects the nativism and anti-immigrant sentiment surrounding the illegal immigrant question.

Regardless of why it is happening, the result is a national disgrace. Iraq may have a quisling problem, but the United States created it by imposing the occupation, and if the United States retains a shard of honor toward those it befriends, it will take care of those quislings it has created. The Nazis lost and were in no position to save Vidkun Quisling. What is our excuse? 

But there may be more to it than that. The conditions that have allowed the suspension of inter-Shiite fighting in Sadr City may have deeper signiicance for the future of Iraq and may even offer a parable of sorts for the question of American withdrawal from Iraq.

Spokesmaen for al-Sadr have stated their condition for ceasing their campaign to control Sadr City (which, not coincidentally, has been the launching point for artillery–mortar and rocket–attacks on the Green Zone in Baghdad, headquarters for the American presence). Their condition, very simply, is that the Mahdi army will restrain its forces in Sadr City if order there is enforced by Iraqi government forces, but not if the Americans do the patrolling, since the American presence is a symbol of the occupation they oppose.

Despite this pronouncement, there is still some residual fighting in Sadr City, but it centers around the wall being built by the American to partition the suburb into two parts, including a free and secure zone in the part of the city from which the attacks on the Green Zone are launched. Since the wall is another reminder of the occupation, opposing that is consistent with al-Sadr’s position on Sadr City per se.

Does this mean that the American military is the source of, rather than the solution to, Shiite-on-Shiite violence? Is it possible to extrapolate this example to what will transpire, at least within the Shiite community, when the United States packs its bags and leaves altogether? And would an American withdrawal have the same effect elsewhere? In Sunni areas, after all, support for Al Qaeda in Iraq seems to linked to anti-Americanism; remove the irritant, and the sore may heal.

The real question, of course, is whether the limited Sadr City example is a true parable for the broader future or a false analogy. Literally, of course, it is limite to the relations within one of the contending groups in the country and may have no predictive value for the deeper divisions between Shiites,Sunnis, and Kurds. Still, it is a refreshing alternative to dire predictions that the removal of American forces from Iraq will inexorably trigger a descent into uncontrollable chaos. 

The gist of the report was that a delegation of Iraqi parliamentarians dispatched to Tehran to pressure the Iranian government to stop supplying Iraqi militias with weapons used against Americans and Iraqis instead negotiated a deal with the Iranians to broker a truce in inter-Shiite fighting in Sadr City, a Shiite-dominated suburb of Baghdad, between Iraqi government forces and elements loyal to Muktada al-Sadr. The result was a ceasefire “brokered with the help from Iran” that has, at least temporarily, brought a stop to violence in one of the most troubling hot spots in Iraq. And it was all done without apparent American advice or assistance and even, indeed, in the face of American opposition to dealing with Iran in anything but a hostile manner.

How did the “Iran factor” work in this case? As noted in the most recent posting of this blog on May 5, Iran has been providing assistance to all major Shiite parties in Iraq, including the government and al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. The Iraqi and Mahdi armies have been the major contestants in the battle for control of Sadr City, meaning the Iranians have both an interest in and leverage over boh contending parties. In this case, they apparently sent word to al-Sadr (with whom they have a mixed relationship, since he is both a strict Shiite and an Arab nationalist) that he either negotiate a cease fire or they would cut off supplies to him. And it has worked, although no one is predicting how long it will hold. The Iranians have apparently accomplished a goal that has eluded the American occupiers.

What does this tell us? Maybe a lot, maybe very little. It certainly suggests that Tehran can, when it wants to, exercise influence over what happens in Iraq, in this case for the betterment of peace in that country. Their actions are undoubtedly self-interested in ways that will almost certainly be interpreted darkly by the Bush administration, but it is undeniable that they can be movers and shakers in determining what happens in Iraq. Does this mean the United States would be well advised to try to befriend (or at least start talking to) the Iranians and see if Tehran and Washington may have some common interests that can be pursued in the interest of Iraqi stability and American withdrawal? Maybe, maybe not, but the Iranians have demonstrated that they cannot be ignored altogether if the objective is to influence events in Iraq.

This scenario is not played out if the American departure is accompanied by reasonable stability and tranquility that can plausibly be called peace (notice all the qualifying adjectives, the intepretation of which are subjective). It will not matter much whether the cause of peace is because of the U.S. presence (the good we have done) or the American departure (relief the occupation is over) . If the U.S. is “out of there” with reasonable cover, war supporters will feel triumphant, and opponents will be relieved. It is the closest possiIble thing to a win-win outcome.

How does one maximize the prospect of a successful outcome (a peaceful Iraq)? There are, to reiterate, no guarantees. Having said that, one possible way–certainly not the only one–is to avoid destabilizing outside influences. Enter Iran. If the Iranians approve of the outcome and support it, there is at last a chance it will work. If, on the other hand, they oppose the post-war agreement, they can (and may well) commit destabilizing interference that will endanger the peace. Iran is that important to the overall outcome.

Iranian interest in post-occupation Iraq is arguably greater than that of any other regional actor. Iran is the physically largest, most populous and powerful state in the region, and it shares a long land border with Iraq. It is the Persian Gulf region’s pivotal state, meaning its interests cannot be ignored because of its regional importance (the pivotal state concept is discussed in Chapter 4 of my forthcoming fourth edition of Cases in International Relations). Moreover, Iran is already heavily involved in Iraq, providing support for essentially all important Shiite factions, many of whose leaders have lived in exile in Iran at one time or another. Iraq is also important to Iran bcause the holiest shrines of shiism (after those in Saudi Arabia) are in Iraqi cities, notably an-Najaf and Karbala. For all these reasons, a post-occupation Iraq the Iranians cannot accept is likely not to be a very stable place. (One they do approve of also might not be very stable.)

If Iranian cooperation were perceived as important to an American government committed to a peaceful Iraq after the U.S. departs, it would stand to reason that the United States would be actively discussing mutually acceptable outcomes with the Iranians (presumably the Iraqis would also be present). Even if these must be held privately because of publicly expressed U.S. disdain over Iran, clearly getting on board should activate U.S. diplomacy.

The Bush administration, of course, is doing nothing of the sort, at least not as far as the public knows. Why not? The Bush administration does not like Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadenijad, and as is typically the case with Bush, he refuses to talk to someone he dislikes. Only Senator Obama has expressed any willingness to engage in conversations with the Iranian president. At the same time, such attention as there is toward Iran is directed is aimed at their nascent nuclear weapons program and what nasty things the United States will do a) if Iran acquires the weapons, and b) if threaten to or actually use them against Israel. The surrounding rhetoric may play well in Tel Aviv–for instance, “Hillary the Obliterator”, but it hardly resonates in Tehran.

Iranian nuclear weapons prospects are a future prospect that can be dealt with primarily by improving relations between Tehran and Washington (a major reason for the Iranian program is to deter American attacks against them); starting a dialogue over Iran might even help jumpstart that process. Iran’s interest in and acquiescence to a settlement of the Iraq War is here and now. Can the Iran factor be ignored as planning for an acceptable outcome in Iraq proceeds? The Bush administration acts as if Iran does not matter–implicily arguing they will have to accept whatever outcome the U.S. comes up with. Is that a viable assumption that can be translated into a workable strategy? Not if the Iranians have anything to say about it–and they do.

All the predictions made at the time (and chronicled in What After Iraq?–WAI) have been proven to be palpably false, and especially those that projected a short, decisive, and inexpensive operation. Remember when it was prophecied that the war would be essentially over in less than six months (that U.S. combat troops would have left 129 days after the invasion)? That prediction sounds reminiscent of Kaiser Wilhelm exhorting his troops in 1914 that they would be home before the first leaves of Autumn fell. And then there was the cost: no more than $50 billion, with Iraqi oil revenues picking up the rest of the tab. By now, Iraqi democracy presumably would be blooming like flowers in a desert oasis.

Five years later, it is worthwhile ruminating how people could have made such egregiously wrong predictions. As argued in WAI, most of what has happened was predictable ans predicted, but those who made and endorsed the decisions chose not to listen. Why not?

The title of this entry suggests one perspective: that the decisionmakers were either blackguards or fools. If they were blackguards (scoundrels), that would suggest they knew and understood the probable–as opposed to stated–consequences of the war but acted anyway. Their motivations could have been either willful arrogance, purposeful deception, or an overriding belief in the messianic virtue of the endavor that made it necessary quite apart from the costs. If they were scoundrels, they may have simply believed that their superior grasp of the situation was sufficient that any means, including knowing prevarication, were justifiable to further their beliefs in necessary outcomes. If anyone would seem a stereotype for this possible explanation, it would be Vice President Cheney, with Scooter Libby, Douglas Feith, and Richard Perle forming his Greek chorus.

The other possibility was that those who made the decision were simply ignorant of what they were doing, and especially of its ramifications. The White House, of course, can be a terribly insular, insulated place, and the voices of dissent simply may never have permeated into the Oval Office (whose resident, of course, is notorious for not tolerating dissent). Could it be that good advice simply never reached key decision makers, or that those who endorsed the decisions (the Congress, for instance) simply acted out of a foolish blindnessto the facts? The President himself certainly has showed a resilient ignorance of Iraq over time, and his lack of intellectual curiosity is legendary. Advisors like Paul Wolfowitz and some of his fellow neocons have been described as being brilliant but not wise true believers who could easily have ignored the truth.

There is, of course, plenty of blame to be apportioned for deciding to go into Iraq and acquiescing in the decision. Part of the postwar “lessons learned” exercise will almost certainly center on why decision makers decided what they did, and why the followers followed, just as was done after Vietnam. Hopefully, as the blackguards and fools are sorted out, there will be a more effective accounting of what can be done to keep either group on the sidelines in the future. But don’t hold your breath.   

Al-Sadr’s basic message is that Shiites have nothing to fight about. What they have, instead, is a common enemy at which both (or all) groups should be concentrating their attention. And guess who that is? The United States, of course. In al-Sadr’s own words, “If we have threatened an open war until liberation, we meant a war against the ocupier,” he says (emphasis added). To the government, he exhorts, “I call upon my brothers in the police, army and Mahdi Army to stop the bloodshed” among them. “We should be one hand in achieving justice, security and in supporting the resistance in all of its forms. This is a war between us and the occupier, so do not interfere in favor of the occupier.”

That sounds petty clear, and the message has been received by the troops. As one of his militia commanders is quoted by the Associated ress as saying, “Al-Sadr has made it clear that the open war is directed against the Americans. We will continue to fight the Americans and if the Iraqi soldiers attack us, we will fight back.”

This is not exactly the way proponents of “staying the course” in Iraq are portraying the ongoing American role. If al-Sadr is to be believed (admittedly a big “if”), withdrawing the Americans would seem to remove the major impediment to inter-Shiite relations. Of course, Sunnis and Kurds probably prefer a splintered rather than united Shiite front, but can one have it all ways?

“Should I stay or should I go?” a popular song entreats in an entirely different context. Muqtada al-Sadr and David Petraeus seem to have two different ideas. Who’s right? 

The bare bones are clear. Admiral William Fallon, who allowed himself to be rransferred from command of the Pacific Command (PACCOM) in 2007 to head CENTCOM, was pushed out the door about a year into his three-year tour, apparently because the “Fox” (his fighter-pilot nickname) came at odds with the White House over Iran (he, quite reasonably, opposed ratcheting up the rhetoric, since we could not back up threats); the Bush administration, of course, is famous for its intolerance of internal dissent. Push came to shove, and Fallon will be gone. That is certainly a shame.

With Fallon heading out the door, reenter Petraeus and Lt. Gen. Ray Ordieno. The paint was hardly dry on his door plate in the Pentagon as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and he is on his way back to Baghdad to replace his former boss as commander of U.S. (officialy coalition) forces in Iraq. The mantle of overall military coordination of U.S. military coordination in the Middle East now passes to Petraeus.

Two questions arise. The first is why the change at this point, six months before the November election. Fallon’s recognition he had displeased the powers that be must have entered in here, but presumably he could have been convinced to stay through the election–possibly with a sock stuffed down his throat to prevent further heterodoxy on his part. Since the CENTCOM leadership position is traditionally a three-year posting, Petraeus, assuming he is confirmed, will be in place for the first two-and-a-half years of a new administration. Since he is a known supporter of the present course, he thus serves as a source of continuity or as a millstone for the next president, depending on who it is and what he/she wants to do about Iraq. The effect is to lock in a powerful source of inertial drag against quick disengagement, that much is for sure.

The second question is why Petraeus agreed to this timing. There are three possibilities. He may have done so because he is a “good soldier” who, when his commander calls, salutes briskly and marches on in the Army tradition. He may have done so because he is convinced that the current course is the proper one and that his elevation will make it harder to change away from the right policy which, from his new position, from which he will be  better able to direct that course. Or, it may all be political, with Petraeus and McCain (who has, hyperbolically, called Petraeus “one of the greatest generals in American history”). Or, of course, it could have been all of the above. Could the general, his strong denials notwithstanding, be looking at 2012?

The confirmation process for Petraeus and Ordieno, likely in the early summer, will be ugly. Democrats are in a dilemma: do they oppose what most Americans believe is a genuine war hero? Or do they support him and thus indirectly support a continuation of a war to which they are opposed. It is a lose-lose proposition, the prospect of which must warm the cockles of Karl Rove’s heart. Doubtless Obama and Clinton (and other Democrats) will grill Petraeus on his willingness to support an altered policy, but will that be too subtle if they vote for confirmation in the end?

This whole episode smells familiarly like another ploy to ensure that American disengagement from Iraq is as difficult as possible. As such, it is another refrain of the same theme raised in the most recent posting. Do we really want four more years in Iraq? If not, what do we think about Petraeus and Ordieno allowing themselves to be willing pawns in the political drama of ending or continuing the war? 

The United States clearly Iraqi oil, although it rarely admits that oil had anything with invading Iraq, a questionable position. American oil companies, and Iraqi “entrepreneurs” like Achmed Chalabi, have been active in  trying to gain American access to oil rights after the war is over, and they are not alone in this desire. Whether a new Iraqi government will grant concessions to American oil companies (a questionable prospect, since, according to a recent Mother Jones article be Joshua Kurlantzick, only about 10 percent is now controlled this way) is a matter of policy concern for the United States. Setting aside the American motive to control Iraqi energy and turn a profit, the stated reason is that oil revenues will help stabilize Iraq.  But is hat true? Is oil a blessing or a curse?

In the ramp-up to the war, the Bush administration painted a rosy picture of the role oil would play. When asked how the United States would pay for the post-war rehabilitation of Iraq, it was explained that Iraqi oil revenues would provide the cash, thereby obviating the need for American investment (this was part of the fanciful projection that the entire war would cost the American taxpayer no more than $50 billion). Oops!

The real crux of the matter is the role oil will play in post-occupation Iraq . The optimistic answer is that it will provide revenue that can be distributed and thus help underpin Iraqi prosperity and stability: oil as a blessing. But is that really the likely outcome?

Two recent articles cast doubt on this proposition. Both take New York Times correspondent Thomas L. Friedman’s critique of the oil rich, yet corrupt “petrolist” states as a benchmark. Using states like Venezuela and Russia as “models,” Friedman argues that oil revenue corrupts, and to paraphrase Edmund Burke, absolute oil dependency corrupts absolutely.

Michael L. Ross lays the case out starkly in the May/June 2008 edition of Foreign Affairs. In “Blood Barrels, he states that “oil wealth often wreaks havoc on a country’s economy and politics, makes it easier for insurgents to fund their rebellions, and aggravates ethnic grievances.” Sound like Iraq? Ross argues this havoc triggers “conflict in tghree ways. First, it can cause economic instability. Second, oil wealth often helps support insurgencies. Third, oil wealth encourages separatism.” How do you spell “Kurdistan?” Kurlantzick adds that “many oil -richcountries have become increasingly authoritarian and corrupt.” Iraq, of course, already ranks among the world’s most corrupt regimes on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. Is oil a curse?

No one is projecting that the road to Iraqi freedom will be other than a bumpy one, regardless of when the United States disengages. But almost everyone assumes, at least implicitly, that oil will lubricate that transition and make it easier. Should we rethink that assumption.

Sources:

Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Put a Tyrant in Your Tank.” Mother Jones 33, 3 (May/June 2008), 38-42, 88-89. (http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2008/05/put-a-tyrant-in-your-tank.html)

Ross, Michael L. “Blood Barrels: Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict.” Foreign Affairs 87, 3 (May/June 2008), 2-8. 

This is not only the most consequential question, it is also the most difficult to answer, for two reasons. The first is that the conditions that need betterment in Iraq are largely our fault. Granted that some Iraqis suffered under Saddam Hussein, most of the current suffering is the direct result of the American invasion and is suffering that would not have occurred had we not invaded and occupied the country. Under Saddam Hussein, for instance, there was electricity and it was safe to walk the streets at night. The moral question is thus burdened with the recognition that whatever the United States does in the future is partly to repair suffering we have caused. It is hard to argue this does not create some moral imperative behind future American action. Colin Powell was right: we did break Iraq, and the question now is whether it would be immoral not to try to fix what we have broken.

The second difficulty is that it is impossible to know for certain which course of action–leaving or staying–will alleviate the suffering we have created. John McCain says it would be immoral not to stay and ease the burden; Senators Obama and Clinton argue that only the Iraqis themselves can solve their problems and that the sooner the U.S. departs, the sooner the process will begin (and that the process will be accelerated by the U.S. departure). One of these assessments is closer to correct than the other one. Unfortunately, there is no way to know definitively which is more correct in advance of the action.

The morally correct solution to Iraq thus boils down to what assessment will best relieve Iraqi suffering. Providing a better life for Iraqis and their country was the implicit moral basis for invading and has been the moral rationale for occupying the country. As noted in the previous entries, both these arguments in application are arguably flawed, a judgment that can be made because they have produced outcomes that can be judged: the invasion was a good or bad idea, and the occupation has been successful or has been botched. Each has moral implications that can be judged on the record.

The moral basis for judgment surrounding when and how to leave is easy to define: what action will provide a better life for Iraq. The problem is there is no record on which to assess what is the “right” course of action. What makes the moral problem all the knottier is that the wrong decision–one that leaves Iraqis worse off–will be hard to reverse. If staying produces bad results, time is lost. If leaving is wrong (and is irreversible in that the U.S. will almost certainly not return once it has left), then the result cannot be changed. One course is right and moral in its effects, and the other is not. The problem is: which is which?

I think rather than trying to sound scholarly about this difficult issue, I’ll just let my writing mind shut up for a bit and say what needs to be done for the next president to exit Iraq.

First off, even though I’m a bit of a Obamanut, I need to say that I agree with those who say if America pulls out immediately, it will be a disaster. If you can imagine a giant cherry bomb filled with a bunch of people igniting, spreading their limbs all over the place, you can only begin to imagine what will happen when we leave. The American invasion created a cherry bomb that makes Yugoslavia look like a picnic among friends.

First thing we need to do is just admit to ourselves, all of us, that we RE-ELECTED the dude who got us into this mess.

We also might want to think about how Belgrade could have been a different city if Bill Clinton had thought more like Obama.

You can argue with me that Bush didn’t win either of his elections. But it’s not like you rose up and overthrew him, so the argument is, now, bogus.

The responsibility, therefore, is among us all. And even if it’s not, even if you won’t admit to ANY responsibility, you have to deal with facts.

Since the invasion, there are conservative estimates that say at least 80,000 Iraqis have died. But that’s, like, the lowest end of lowest ends. Most reasonable estimates are that the American invasion has cost many, many more lives than the evil dictator did. And their lives were lost in the most horrific way. You step out of your house to go shopping, and you don’t know if you’ll be killed. At least under Saddam, pretty much, if you kept your mouth shut, you were okay.

So, like it or not, we have a moral obligation to at least make a reasonable effort to help these people survive the American policy that, we, the American people, created.

So you look at Iraq, and my argument, and you’ve got to say, “Whoah, McCain is right, another hundred years.”

Not so.

I honestly think we could “win the war” if we spend twice the amount we spend in military spending on education in Iraq (and if we have to, the rest of the Middle Eastern poor areas) .

By that I mean, for every dollar we spend on military dollars, we spend two on education in the country we are occupying (be it Iraq or Afghanistan).

Actually, that should be a bill of Congress. Sure, a lot of good, righteous, rural people would complain on the domestic front, saying, “what about us?” but the war would be over in about a year. And those good people would be taken care of by the simple fact that the war is over. A good man on the pulpit would explain that to the American people, much in the same way that the American people have been bled to believe in Iraq and other futilities.

Look. We have to pull out anyway. Why not leave gifts behind us, at the very least. And I’m not talking about Bibles, or books on Thomas Jefferson. Let’s create libraries in Iraq, full of books written by people of that region.

You know what? I bet most literary types in Iraq or anywhere else in the Middle East are NOT into suicide bombings. Have you read any Middle Eastern literature? I have. Writers tend to be peace mongers. Why not help their own intellectuals spread the word?

Why is this such a difficult concept for Americans and their politicians?

It’s never been hard for the Saudis, who spread their own fear, via Wahabbism.

How stupid will we continue to be?

We reap what we sow.

http://thegoreyears.wordpress.com/iraq-during-the-gore-years/