Hey Guys,

This will be the last update on my end for a while as I fulfill the final commitments of my travel schedule and take the necessary steps to make this the most amazing December of my life. As I prepare for another Masterclass weekend tomorrow, I thought I’d write a post for everyone out there.

Challenging Assumptions

“Maybe she’s with her boyfriend.”

“Maybe she has better things to do.”

“Maybe she’s busy.”

“Maybe she doesn’t want to talk.”

Sound familiar? It most certainly does to me. These were the excuses that I gave myself again and again when I hesitated upon making an approach. I am not going to lie : there is no denying that the Asian culture here is not as used to dealing with interactions from complete strangers and as a young man living within the Singaporean society, all the more these excuses actually seem like valid reasons for me to not approach a woman.

Back when I was still starting to make sense of the dynamics between men and women, I found myself giving lots of excuses. Like one of my early mentors, Val, would tell you, I would go out for 4-5 hours on some days and not do a single approach. I was always waiting for the right moment.  My inexperience was what caused my mind to wander and make me nervous. The truth is, in those seemingly “perfect” moments, there was a very real chance that things were not as perfect as I thought they were. It was very possible that a girl who was alone and bored (2 positive requisites for a successful interaction) was actually having some alone time and does not want to be disturbed.

In my experience thus far, I’ll strongly believe : There is no perfect moment.

So what should I do?

There are many ways in which a person can solve this problem (drink alcohol, getting someone to push them, drug abuse etc.). But I want to share with you my personal and most favorite solution.

Challenge your assumptions. Developing a good understanding of the dynamics between men and women (which is what TDD specializes in) will help immensely. The more knowledge I had, the clearer things became and the more confident I was. With this new found knowledge and confidence, it was a lot easier to approach a woman despite these assumptions I had in my head.

Be comfortable with success and failure. There is no such thing as PERFECTION. If you have been thinking that there will be a magic pill out there that will bring you instant success with women, let me smash that belief for you right now : There isn’t. As rare as they are, I am not ashamed to admit it : there are times where I did not have a successful interaction. These times are usually due to logistics and matters I can not control. What I do is this : Celebrate from the successes, learn the lessons from the failures and move on.

And here’s where it gets better…

The more I actually approached women successfully, the more it cemented the lesson in my head that all these assumptions were just my mind’s way of protecting my ego. I realised that most of the time, all these assumptions turn out to be false. In fact, as I practiced further, I realised that even if my assumptions proved to be right, by the law of X=X, it turned out that my undeniable good-vibe made the woman commit to an interaction with me. With the addition of my high-level awareness, I was more than capable of continuing the interaction very smoothly because I knew the dynamics of a good Macro Plan thus enabling me to make spontaneous decisions and enable me to give the women what they wanted : DIRECTION.

I adopt this same belief to all aspects of my life. Challenging assumptions also helps your life become less complicated. Most of the time, we already know whether or not we want to escalate things with women or with a task at hand. It is all these assumptions that cause unnecessary worry and hold us back. Knowing that there is not perfect moment and that failure and success are all very realistic possibilities no matter what, I choose to act. It is better to take a chance and gain a learning lesson from it than to not take one at all and regret.

You know what you want. Now push aside all these assumptions and just take action to make it yours!

Live and Love,

Xavier

xav@troydizondating.com

http://alife2love.com

For PC giant, parts recovered from returned computers have become a source of profit.

By Susan K. Lacefield http://www.dcvelocity.com

When companies significantly alter their sales strategy, it’s clear they also have to rethink how they deliver their products to market. What may not be as obvious is that the shift in strategy could affect their reverse logistics operations as well.

Consider Dell Inc., the country’s second-largest PC maker and the company that made supply chain management an art form in the personal computing world. In the mid-1990s, Dell abandoned retail stores as a sales channel and focused exclusively on selling its products direct to customers. The remarkable results that ensued are the stuff of business legend.

Two years ago, however, Dell resumed selling into the retail channel in an effort to beef up sales and fend off arch-rival Hewlett-Packard Co., which has since surpassed Dell as the leading PC maker. Dell’s return to the retail space changed how it managed its supply chain. The change was most keenly felt in its reverse logistics operations.

Under the direct-to-customer model, managing reverse logistics was a relatively straightforward process. Because all of Dell’s computers were built to order, there was little excess inventory in the supply chain. When a customer returned a product, Dell’s policy was to refurbish and sell the unit.

The return to the retail channel introduced some complications. For one thing, Dell soon found itself saddled with excess inventory. The company quickly discovered that, in some cases, the parts were more valuable than the assembled unit itself. “In reality, a good portion of [those refurbished units] were not economically valuable,” Matt Snyder, senior manager of reverse logistics for Dell, said at the annual conference of the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals in September.

Recognizing this, Dell created a parts channel. Now, when a computer is returned, the company must decide whether to refurbish it or break it down for parts. Refurbished computers are sold either through a Dell outlet or through a broker. Parts are either sold externally or transferred internally.

Refurbished parts have created a new profit source for the company, and reverse logistics is no longer considered a cost center at Dell, Snyder said. Today, the company’s reverse logistics mission is to “increase revenue-generating opportunities while decreasing operating expenses,” he said.

http://www.prweb.com/releases/Bryant/University/prweb3233594.htm

“Empirical Evidence of RFID Impacts on Supply Chain Performance,” offers the first extensive review of quantitative data on how RFID technology has improved the performance of a variety of businesses.

Smithfield, R.I. (Vocus/PRWEB ) November 20, 2009 — Anecdotally, radio-frequency identification (RFID) has a reputation as a technology that has failed to live up to expectations. But in fact, RFID delivers a strong return on investment in several key areas of supply chain performance.

Those are the findings of two Bryant University professors whose paper, “Empirical Evidence of RFID Impacts on Supply Chain Performance,” offers the first extensive review of quantitative data on how RFID technology has improved the performance of a variety of businesses.

The paper, co-written by Bryant University’s John K. Visich, associate professor of management, and Suhong Li, associate professor of computer information systems, appears in the latest issue (Vol. 29, Issue 12) of International Journal of Operations and Production Management. Basheer M. Khumawala of the University of Houston and Pedro Reyes of Baylor University also contributed to the article.

Though confidentiality clauses make the collection of empirical evidence difficult, the authors identified a number of areas in business operations and management in which the addition of RFID technology led to a variety of measurable improvements. These include reductions in labor costs, inventory costs and waste, and increases in efficiency, reliability, quality, responsiveness, operational flexibility and throughput.

“This study will be especially useful for organizations proposing to introduce RFID technology into the supply chain,” said Visich. “For managers, the empirical evidence presented can help them identify implementation areas where RFID can have the greatest impact. The data can be used to build the business case for RFID and therefore better estimate ROI and the payback period.”

EDITORS and REPORTERS: Li and Visich are available for interviews. Electronic copies of their paper are available through Tracie Sweeney, Bryant University’s director of public relations. Send email to tsweeney(at)bryant(dot)edu.

Contact
Tracie Sweeney
Bryant University director of public relations
401-232-6183
Online: http://blogs.bryant.edu/newsroom/?p=333

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สยามธุรกิจ หน้าแรก > คมนาคม/ลอจิสติกส์ > ข่าวคมนาคม-ลอจิสติกส์ [ ฉบับที่ 1048 ประจำวันที่ 11-11-2009 ถึง 13-11-2009 ]

เผยลอจิสติกส์ไทยขยับขึ้นอันดับ 10 จาก 55

นายธานีรัตน์ ศิริปะชะนะ รองปลัดกระทรวงเทคโนโลยีสารสนเทศและการสื่อสาร หรือ ไอซีที กล่าวว่า กระทรวงฯ ได้รับงบปี 2550 ประมาณ 160 ล้านบาท เพื่อดำเนินการเกี่ยวกับกระบวนการนำเข้า-ส่งออก และลอจิสติกส์ของประเทศไทย ภายใต้โครงการบริหารจัดการและประสานงานการพัฒนาระบบ e-Logistics ของหน่วยงานภาครัฐ เนื่องจากปัจจุบันแนวโน้มการแข่งขันมีความเข้มข้นขึ้น เปิดเสรีทางการค้า ทำให้ภาคธุรกิจต้องยกระดับความสามารถในการดำเนินธุรกิจ ในทุกวิถีทางที่เป็นไปได้ ทั้งการลดต้นทุนธุรกิจ และสร้างมูลค่าเพิ่มใหม่ๆ เสนอลูกค้า การบริหารจัดการกระบวนการนำส่งสินค้าจากผู้ผลิตถึงผู้บริโภคหรือลอจิสติกส์ จึงกลายเป็นเป้าหมายสำคัญที่ผู้ประกอบการใช้เป็นกลไกสำคัญในการสร้างความได้เปรียบในการแข่งขัน ทั้งในระดับธุรกิจ และระดับประเทศ

ทั้งนี้ กระทรวงไอซีที ร่วมกับคณะวิศวกรรมศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์ ทำแผนเสนอผลการศึกษาทั้งหมด และประชาสัมพันธ์โครงการสร้างความเข้าใจในแนวทางการดำเนินงานเกี่ยวกับกระบวนการนำเข้า-ส่งออก และลอจิสติกส์ของประเทศไทย โดยเบื้องต้นพบว่า การนำระบบ e-Logistics มาใช้เป็นกระบวนการขนส่งสามารถลดการใช้จ่ายไปแล้วกว่า 4 หมื่นล้านบาท ทั้งนี้ตั้งเป้าว่าจะลดลงได้อีก 5% ถือว่าตรงตามเป้าหมายที่วางไว้ นอกจากนี้การจัดการอบรม สัมมนาโครงการดังกล่าวที่ผ่านมา พบว่าประเทศไทยพัฒนาระบบขนส่งจนสามารถ ก้าวขึ้นมาอยู่ที่อันดับ 10 จากเดิมที่เคยอยู่ที่อันดับ 55 ของโลก

“ที่ผ่านมาหน่วยงานทั้งภาครัฐ เอกชน และองค์กรต่างๆ ของไทย เห็นถึงความสำคัญต่อการพัฒนาระบบลอจิสติกส์ของประเทศ เนื่องจากเป็นหนึ่งในยุทธศาสตร์ของการเพิ่มขีดความสามารถ ในการแข่งขันของประเทศในเวทีโลก ขณะที่คณะรัฐมนตรีมอบหมายให้กระทรวงฯ เป็นหน่วยงานหลักเพื่อประสานงานกับหน่วยงานภาครัฐเร่งรัดการดำเนิน โครงการเพื่อพัฒนาระบบการเชื่อมโยงเครือข่ายข้อมูล และบริการภาครัฐ เพื่อการนำเข้า ส่งออก และลอจิสติกส์ โดยเฉพาะในส่วนของการพัฒนารายการข้อมูลมาตรฐาน การพัฒนาระบบเชื่อมต่อระหว่างหน่วยงาน และการพัฒนาระบบสนับสนุน หรือ Back Office ให้มีประสิทธิภาพมากยิ่งขึ้น”

What a brilliant idea: taking care of my health.  I felt so pro-active writing the times of my appointments on the calendar.  Two activities just for me; okay, so they weren’t exactly the best appointments to have – a physical and a follow-up for an ovarian cyst that stuck around my last pregnancy – but they were just for me, all the same.

As the appointments drew near, I started thinking about logistics.  Ug, logistics, you never escape them when you have children.

Usually, I travel with an entourage – my husband and two girls; either he has both or I have both or he has one and I have the other, depending on the activity.  However, when the activity involves doctor’s offices in cold and flu season, I begin to re-think the entourage option.

The first appointment went smoothly.  Granny stayed with Miss Q and my husband hung with Miss S.   He multi-tasked by taking her to Super Store for diapers, I multitasked by deaking across the road for a haircut, when my appointment ended 1/2 hour early.

The choice to sneak in a haircut wasn’t taken lightly.  Visions of my husband grring from the minivan, with a wailing baby in the back, when he returned and I wasn’t waiting, raced through my head.  But having an un-shaggy, non-mum-cut was worth the pangs of guilt.  And, it saved us a haircut outing later in the week.  In the end, it was a non-issue as he only waited 2-minutes with a sleeping baby.

The second appointment was a little more of a dance.  My husband had a course to go to and this left me without my Number One; in waltzed his pitch-hitter, my brother, Uncle M.

While Granny and Miss Q watched ‘Cars’, Uncle M earned his uncle stripes.  He wore Miss S in the Ergo (baby carrier) and all was well until Miss S started to cry.  When she’s tired, she likes to be walked up and down stairs.  So Uncle M hoofed up and down the stairwell.  (My appointment was on the third floor.)

Of course it was Murphy’s Law that the stairwell trick wouldn’t work, so he took her outside, to minimal success, but lots of opinion on the fact Miss S wasn’t wearing her hood.  Welcome to the world of judgment, Uncle M.

Finally, I rocked her to sleep, had my 15 minute appointment – that was 45 minutes late – and we went home to have lunch with Granny and Miss Q.

Could I have taken Miss Q and Miss S to the appointments without any help?  Of course.  It would have taken lots of prep, hand sanitizer and rocking, but it was doable.  However, sometimes it’s good to include the village.  My children were well taken care of, and I was able to concentrate on me, if only for an hour.

Defense Acquisition University – Research Paper Competition

Edward Hirsch Award

The Edward Hirsch "Acquisition Research and Writing" Award was established by the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) Alumni Association in conjunction with the DAU Research Department in August 2007 in commemoration of Brigadier General Edward Hirsch’s contributions to DAU and the DoD Acquisition Community.

The purpose of the award is to recognize outstanding research efforts within the acquisition community and to facilitate knowledge sharing and dissemination of research findings. First, second, and third place awards are conferred upon winners of the DAUAA/DAU annual research paper competition, consistent with the theme of the DAUAA Acquisition Community Symposium. All DoD acquisition stakeholders from the public and private sectors are eligible for this award.

RIL See Retail Sector as an Major Value Creator : Ambani

Reliance Industries has identified retail sector as an important component of its five-platform roadmap for value creation.

The other value creators include conventional and renewable energy space, innovation and rural transformation, RIL chairman Mukesh Ambani said.

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Reliance’s efforts would be on expanding the edifice created by Reliance Retail at the customer end and reinforcing supply chain and logistics,” the chairman said.

Ambani added that Reliance Retail would expand to new cities, markets and form strategic alliances.

This would be done through nearly 1,000 stores, while it has 900 stores across 86 cities.

The retail company has run up losses over Rs 450 crore in last fiscal.

Ambani said RIL would diversity its conventional energy space with new accumulations in three years.

RIL proposes to accelerate their campaign in the Krishna-Godavari basin,as per the chairman.

Meanwhile, the gas production levels have crossed six billion cubic metres and the D6 field is slated for plateau production by the second half of the year 2010.

Oil production from the D26 field has 2.8 million barrels with daily peak production expected by the end of the year.

With current cash balance of nearly Rs 19,420 crore, the company expects to be debt free in 21 months, Ambani said.

Even in difficult economic environment, RIL’s capital expenditure was Rs 24,713 crore ($4.9 billion).

However, the stock market was not enthused.

On the BSE, RIL stock saw a marginal drop of 0.65 per cent to close at Rs 2,133.75 per share.

“Whatever Mr Ambani has said is old. There is nothing to cheer investors.However, overall sentiment is positive.”

Jagannadham Thunuguntla, head, SMC Capital, and other market analysts feels so.

Picture this, a familiar scenario: John plans a dinner party and goes to the market to pick up a 6-pack of diet cola in aluminum cans, a couple plastic bottles of water, and some Styrofoam cups and plates, all carried out in a few plastic bags. After the party, a few of the bags fly away. A few cans get forgotten on the street. A few plates fall from the trashcan. What’s the big deal? Well, if these items are not recycled it could take hundreds of years for these items to safely breakdown and not have negative effects on our environment. As part of their preparation for “America Recycles Day” on November 15th, the International Trade Education Program (ITEP) and San Pedro Earth Alert Academy (SPEA) worked with the Cabrillo Aquarium to present an eye-opening demonstration of “Beach Trash” on Thursday, November 5th. <a href=”http://www.itepinc.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=55&amp;Itemid=1″>Read more…</a>

Logistics, CSS, Sustainment: Evolving Definitions of Support

by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey C. Brlecic

George C. Thorpe, in his 1917 book Pure Logistics: The Science of War Preparation, wrote, “There is something more than academic interest in correctly defining Logistics, for the purpose of the definition is to establish a division of labor, and if two divisions are properly drawn while the third is not, there will be either duplication of effort or some functions will be overlooked entirely, with the result that certain preparations for war will not be made.” As our Army transforms from the legacy force Army of Excellence to the full-spectrum, brigade-centric modular force, we must ensure that we heed Thorpe’s counsel and define our future sustainment organizations and concepts for the most effective division of labor.

During much of the 20th century, the definitions and concepts for the terms “logistics,” “combat service support (CSS),” and “sustainment” found in the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual for operations did not match the definitions and concepts for the same terms found in the keystone manual for support. This doctrinal disagreement left the definitions and concepts underlying support of Army forces open to interpretation and allowed anyone with a vested interest to selectively manipulate them in an effort to garner resources and power within the Army. The term “logistics,” after decades of skewed interpretation and misapplication, and despite possessing a vaguely distinct official definition, became conceptually synonymous with the terms “CSS” and “sustainment.” As a result, many non-logistics support functions, such as personnel support, were commonly lumped under the concept of logistics and did not receive adequate attention during the design of organizations or the development of war plans. Logistics, CSS, and sustainment actually are relatively recent additions to the official Army lexicon. Although the concept of providing support to armies is hardly new, the terminology currently used by the U.S. Army emerged only in the mid-20th century. Through the first half of the century, Soldiers in the field used the terms “administration” or “administrative support” to describe any military activity outside the realms of tactics and strategy. Before the term “logistics” was introduced to the field in 1949 (in the keystone manual for support, Field Manual [FM] 100–10, Field Service Regulations, Administration), use of logistics was fashionable primarily in academic and Department of War General Staff circles. Likewise, the term “CSS” received attention in General Staff circles but was not commonly used by ordinary Soldiers until it was introduced to the field in 1962. “Sustainment” first appeared in doctrine in 1986.

Since their introduction to the whole Army, the terms have become basically synonymous—distinguishable only slightly in definition but not at all in application. Fortunately, recent doctrine may put an end to this misunderstanding.

The Rise of “Logistics”

Before World War II, the Army narrowly defined logistics as the art of planning and carrying out military movement, evacuation, and supply. By war’s end, Army-wide acceptance of the term resulted in an expansion of the concept. This expanded usage was reflected in the 1949 version of FM 100–10, which defined logistics as “that branch of administration which embraces the management and provision of supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and services.” (FM 100–10 was renamed “Combat Service Support” in 1968 and was superseded by FM 4–0 in 2003.)

The last word in the definition, “services,” opened the door to applying the term “logistics” to all noncombatant military activities. Officially, “logistics services” activities were limited primarily to maintenance, labor, and construction; in practice, the whole concept of logistics, under the guise of “logistics services,” took on whatever meaning was convenient to a particular user. James A. Huston, in his instructive survey The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953, expressed his consternation with this expansion of the concept of logistics when he wrote, “From that point [1944] various people, like Humpty Dumpty, began making it [logistics] mean whatever they wanted it to mean.” Huston saw in this expansion of the definition of logistics the usurping of the administrative support field, of which logistics was only a branch.

The movement toward defining all noncombatant military activity as logistics provided a pragmatic approach to managing the exponential growth of the Army support system during World War II but also an opportunity for those with ambition to build an empire. This trend reached its zenith with the consolidation of all administrative, personnel, and logistics functions under the command of one organization, the Army Service Forces (ASF), during the middle years of the war. The ASF became an unwieldy organization unable to provide efficient support across the entire spectrum of support functions and was disbanded shortly after the war ended. Although the ASF failed, its final report defined logistics largely in terms of its own functions; these were in essence the same functions assigned to the term “administrative support”, of which logistics was actually a subordinate activity. This report gave unwarranted credibility to the idea that all support activities could be organized and managed in the same manner as logistics.

The disbanding of the colossal ASF did not curtail the expansion of the concept of logistics. Although the Army in 1946 reorganized the former ASF’s “administrative services” under the Adjutant General’s Department and the ASF’s “personnel services” under the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–1 (both of these organizations being supervised by the Director of Personnel and Administration on the War Department General Staff), this action did little to clear up actual lines of control and coordination. The reorganization proved to be only an interim solution at best since most of the ASF’s business practices were carried over, for over a decade, to the War Department General Staff.

In 1956, the Army, in yet another effort to clearly separate personnel support from logistics, created the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG) and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER) and provided them with a mandate to not only develop policy and conduct planning within their respective spheres but also to operate and direct activities to ensure that orders were issued and carried out as intended.

Unfortunately, due to an institutional inability to break old habits, the idea that personnel support was a component of logistics was not completely expunged from the minds of many Soldiers. By 1962, the new ODCSLOG became so involved in directing all administrative support activities that it neglected its real mission of planning and directing only logistics support. The ODCSLOG justified its adherence to the old ways by pointing to the 1954 version of FM 100–10, which defined logistics as follows:

In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with:

(1) Design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel;

(2) Movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel;

(3) Acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and

(4) Acquisition or furnishing of services.

It comprises both planning, including determination of requirements, and implementation.

Although, by definition, the acquisition or furnishing of services was limited in scope, in practice the phrase permitted the term logistics to be applied indiscriminately, and the meaning of logistics lost what little stability it had possessed before entering the common language of the Soldier. The ODCSLOG’s impulse to crowd all support activities under “logistics” implied a unity that did not exist, resulting in an unclear division of labor for Soldiers who had to organize and administer support in the field.

The Birth of CSS

To reduce this confusion, the Army in 1962 undertook a major reorganization of its support activities. Labeled COSTAR (Combat Support to the Army), the reorganization aimed to reestablish the pre-World War II distinction between logistics and personnel support by severely restricting the activities of the ODCSLOG and giving greater importance to the ODCSPER. Under this new structure, the ODCSLOG concentrated on logistics planning while the ODCSPER focused on personnel planning. Unfortunately, this department-level mandate was contradicted by the simultaneous creation of a Combat Development Command (CDC), which was under the command of and staffed mostly with logistics officers. CDC took up the old ASF mission of developing concepts and doctrine in the areas of logistics and administration. Although the implementation of COSTAR at the department level clearly betrayed the widespread myth that all support functions, particularly personnel support, could be technically and practically administered in the same fashion and in the same organization as logistics activities, the creation and staffing of the CDC continued to foster, albeit not necessarily intentionally, the myth that logistics trumped all support activities.

The Army, again attempting to clearly delineate support activities, introduced CSS as the overarching term to describe all assistance given troops outside the areas of tactics and strategy. Published in the same year that COSTAR was implemented and the CDC was established, the 1962 version of FM 54–1, Logistics Command, introduced CSS as follows:

[As] used in this manual the term “Combat Service Support” embraces the assistance given to troops in the management and execution of military matters not included in tactics and strategy. Such assistance consists of personnel management, interior management of units, logistics, and civil affairs.

Officially, this definition was aimed at subordinating all support activities to the broader field of CSS. In reality, this was the same definition given to the term “administrative support”—the one used by the Army for the first half of the 20th century. Use of CSS fell victim to a semantic shell game and had little impact on dispelling the one-size-fitsall use of logistics.

Underscoring the new term’s lack of impact, new versions of the Army’s manuals did nothing to establish CSS as a new overarching support concept. FM 100–5—the manual for operations, published in 1962—and FM 100– 10, published in 1963, did not define, let alone recognize, CSS. (FM 100–5 originally was named Field Service Regulations, Operations, and became Operations of Army Forces in the Field in 1968 and Operations in 1976.) FM 100–5 grouped all support activities, including personnel services, as “functions of logistics” but did not define logistics. FM 100–10 grouped all support activities under the old term “administrative support.” While it did at least divide that term into “logistics” and “personnel,” it maintained the definition of logistics introduced in the 1954 manual.

The failure of both doctrinal manuals to recognize CSS as introduced in FM 54–1, coupled with contradictions between the two manuals in how they defined logistics and grouped support activities, laid the groundwork for half a decade of confusion within the sustainment community and the Army at large.

Logistics and CSS: Doctrinal Confusion

After experiencing initial resistance, CSS did gain in popularity after the 1968 versions of FM 100–5 and FM 100–10 concurrently introduced the term to the Army at large. However, the two manuals differed in their definitions and in fundamental concepts of support. FM 100–10 described CSS as one of the three major subdivisions of military activity—combat, combat support, and combat service support—and defined it as “the assistance provided operating forces primarily in the fields of personnel and administrative services, civil affairs, construction, labor, maintenance, supply, transportation, and other logistical services.” FM 100–5 did not specifically define CSS, but it did provide a list of CSS activities different from that found in FM 100–10. While omitting personnel activities, FM 100–5 added chaplain, food, finance, legal, medical, and military police support.

The 1968 manuals also differed in their divisions of labor. Continuing in the tradition of its 1963 version, FM 100–10 divided the subordinate activities within CSS between logistics and personnel functions. By contrast, FM 100–5, following its 1962 version, grouped all support functions under the single heading of CSS, explaining the concept of CSS under the title “Concept for Modern Logistics.” This was the first indication that CSS and logistics would become synonymous in future operations manuals. Adding to the confusion of defining CSS, the manuals did not agree on a definition of logistics. FM 100–10 again carried forward its 1954 definition of logistics; FM 100–5 used the term abundantly but, as in previous versions, failed to define it. The two manuals’ contradictory definitions of CSS and logistics overshadowed their simultaneous introduction of the term CSS. Repeating the lack of impact of its 1962 debut, the use of CSS in 1968 again did little to end the tendency to treat all support activities as logistics. Instead of clarifying the Army’s support concept, the two terms became embroiled in a long running semantic dispute, with the operations and support manuals providing incoherent support doctrine and little concrete guidance on how to organize and administer CSS. This was just the thing Thorpe warned against in 1917.

As the disagreements unfolded, FM 100–10 stood fast through four versions over 20 years (1968 to 1988) in both its overarching concept of CSS with the subordinate activities of logistics and personnel and its long-standing definition of logistics. During the same period, FM 100–5 renamed and redefined its concept of support four times in as many versions. During the renaming in FM 100–5, two trends emerged. First, the 1976 manual inconspicuously began to use CSS and logistics interchangeably. Second, the 1976 manual introduced a system of separating support activities that by 1986 evolved into what became known as the “sustainment functions” of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting. The overwhelming acceptance of the revised Air Land Battle doctrine’s innovative operational concepts in the 1986 version of FM 100–5 led to the unquestioned acceptance, by association, of the manual’s newly introduced “sustainment” concepts.

In an unprecedented move, the authors of the 1988 version of FM 100–10 abandoned their 20-year history of separating CSS activities between logistics and personnel and adopted the 1986 operations manual’s “sustainment functions” (although FM 100–10 did rename them “CSS tasks”). And after having done so for 34 years, the 1988 support manual no longer provided a definition for logistics. Ostensibly, these moves were an effort at building consensus; in reality, they provided the final impetus for the operations manual to elevate logistics over CSS. Moreover, after 34 years of doing so, FM 100–10’s failure to define logistics created a void that the next version of FM 100–5 filled, to the detriment of CSS.

Ongoing Doctrinal Conflict

Capitalizing on FM 100–10’s acquiescence, it seemed that the authors of the Army’s 1993 version of FM 100–5 attempted to deliver CSS a coup de grace. The 1993 operations manual stressed that logistics was an overarching function embracing all support activities across the full range of military operations, defining logistics as.

. . the process of planning and executing the sustainment of forces in support of military operations. It includes the design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, equipping, distribution, and evacuation functions of supply, field services, maintenance, health service support, personnel, and facilities. Accordingly, it is an overarching function that occurs across the range of military operations. At the tactical level it focuses on the traditional CSS functions of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his equipment.

FM 100–5 described CSS as nothing more than the tactical application of logistics, in essence inverting the traditional support roles and making CSS subordinate to logistics. Undergirding this, the operations manual changed its label for support activities from “sustainment functions” to “tactical logistics functions,” thus reinforcing the notion that all support activities, including personnel support, fell within the purview of logistics. As had occurred with the 1986 version, the overwhelming acceptance of the full-spectrum operational concepts in the 1993 FM 100–5 led to the widespread, unquestioned acceptance of that manual’s new logistics support concepts.

In an attempt to reassert the supremacy of CSS over logistics, the authors of the 1995 version of FM 100–10 defined CSS as the overarching function of support, encompassing all activities that sustain forces across all levels of war (the same definition used in Joint Publication 4–0). However, their effort was fruitless; the concepts of FM 100–5 prevailed, and the paradigm that logistics encompassed all support activities, including personnel, was well established in the minds of most Soldiers. Adding credence to this thinking, the new FM 100– 10 used nearly the same language to describe CSS as FM 100–5 used to describe logistics, thus sinking the terms and concepts of logistics and CSS into an indistinguishable quagmire. The continued inability of the doctrinal manuals to agree on a conceptual framework for organizing the Army’s support functions created a doctrinal defect that precluded a clear understanding of how the Army would organize and administer its sustainment functions.

Clarification at Last

The Army attempted to rectify the doctrinal defect by bringing both the 2001 FM 3–0, Operations (the old FM 100–5), and the 2003 FM 4–0, Combat Service Support (the old FM 100–10), into complete agreement on definitions and concepts. Setting aside nearly a half-century of disagreement, the authors of the new manuals endeavored to establish the supremacy of CSS over logistics by presenting a unified front that restored logistics to its subordinate role in support doctrine. FM 3–0 changed the name of its support chapter from “Logistics Support” to “Combat Service Support,” reflecting the same title given to the Army’s keystone support manual for over 30 years. Both manuals also agreed on support definitions.

More important than titles and definitions, both manuals agreed on division of labor, organization for support, and general orchestration of the CSS effort. The manuals divided CSS into various subordinate support functions, including logistics and personnel, thus presenting CSS as an umbrella concept embracing all aspects of all support functions from the industrial base to the Soldier in the foxhole. This new agreement between the two manuals returned logistics to its correct position as subordinate to CSS and equal with personnel support.

Solidifying this cooperative effort at defining operational support, the 2008 version of FM 3–0 reintroduced the 1993 term “sustainment” as a war fighting function and defined it as “the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.” This latest version of FM 3–0 subdivides the sustainment war fighting function into three distinct sub functions of logistics, personnel services, and health service support. The draft version of the new FM 4–0 echoes the definition and subdivisions found in the new operations manual, leaving no room for misinterpretation. (In the draft FM 4–0, logistics is further categorized as supply, field services, maintenance, transportation, operational contract support, and general engineering support, while a personnel service is categorized as human resources support, religious support, financial management operations, and legal support. Health service support is not further defined.)

This survey of the evolution of doctrinal terms reveals how a half-century of incoherent support doctrine led to the widespread and ill-conceived notion that personnel and human resources support are sub functions of logistics. The latest versions of FM 3–0 and FM 4–0 provide hope that the newly introduced sustainment war fighting function finally will provide an umbrella concept under which logistics and personnel services will operate as equally important functions on the battlefield.

It is important to the success of sustainment as a synchronized war fighting function that the organizations developed to execute sustainment do not repeat the empire-building antics of the failed ASF and the original ODCSLOG. Clearly, certain areas of personnel services (such as postal operations and human resources) will benefit from being part of the command and control hierarchy of the operational sustainment community, but other areas (such as casualty operations, personnel accounting, strength reporting, and personnel management) will not benefit from being forced into a sustainment hierarchy. These latter functions must remain unencumbered by hierarchical organizational structures so they do not become mired in unresponsive bureaucracy; caution must be exercised to ensure that unity is not forced where unity does not in fact exist. On the other hand, human resources professionals, as members of the operational sustainment community, must exercise mental flexibility and truly explore with confidence, competence, trust, and well-built relationships the possibilities opened by this new environment. This is particularly important at the Army service component command, corps, and division levels, where a synchronized sustainment effort is paramount to achieving agility in full-spectrum operations. This is a time of unprecedented change, and as professionals we owe our best effort to giving the emerging sustainment operations doctrine a chance for success.

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey C. Brlecic is an Adjutant General Officer. He is currently a student at the Air War College and will assume a Brigade-level command in Maryland upon graduation. He holds an MA Degree in Organizational Leadership from Chapman University and is a graduate of the Army Command And General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

On behalf of the Ministry of Advertising (Wendy Kirkup, Sally Shahzad, Ofita Purwani, and Damien McCaffery), and with very special thanks to Martine Pugh and Ofita, and Ofita’s husband (who designed the site) the PGRM Conference website is now open for business: http://pgrm09.eca.ac.uk/

There you’ll find all the relevant information about when and where to find the conference, as well as links to a map to St Celia’s Hall, and a timetable of the day’s talks and poster sessions.

Most important, however, the site links to an email address:
pgrmconf09adv@googlemail.com
This address is the sole means by which guests—be they friends or family of students, PhD supervisors, or other interested parties—may register to attend.

Unfortunately, because of space limitations in the Concert Hall and Laigh Room, the number of attendees will need to be monitored closely; students are allotted one guest each. If you forward the link to your own guests please emphasize that they will need to send an email to pgrmconf09adv@googlemail.com in order to gain admission. We’re not exactly throwing a free JLS concert here, but it would be a shame to send people away for want of an email message.

Also: For anyone wishing to correct an error regarding the conference schedule, please do so via a comment to this post. You’ll have until Wednesday night to reply, as the schedule on the site will be updated on Thursday morning.

Many thanks!
the MoA

In 1917, the British launched an attack in Cambrai that actually managed to capture a part of the German trench line. This success was in no small measure due to the use of the primitive tanks.

This is purportedly an actual combat picture of a Mark V tank attacking German infantry in WWI.

Tanks were not the panacea for the stalemate of trench warfare, and they were not the only new weapon to make their combat debut in World War I. However, tanks would be the key component of German and Russian military strategy in subsequent years, and they would play a crucial role in World War II.

First off, what is a tank, anyway? Technically speaking, a tank is an armored vehicle whose main role is to use its main gun in front line combat: which can either be mobile offensive or defensive operations. Tanks are tracked vehicles and mount their main weapons on a rotating turret– there are exceptions, but they are exactly that, exceptions. Tanks are theoretically armored enough to withstand heavy direct fire (usually defined as gunfire from another tank) and, conversely, use their weapons in direct (as opposed to indirect) fire.

This sounds straightforward enough, but lots of armored vehicles are mis-identified as tanks. Self-propelled artillery pieces may have tracks, armor, a big gun and a turret, but they are not tanks. They are not primarily used in front line combat, their armor is not thick enough to withstand direct fire, their main gun is not used in direct fire, and their main role is bombardment.

The M-109 Paladin is NOT a tank. This does not detract from the fact that artillery still accounts for the majority of casualties in most land campaigns, however.

Infantry Fighting Vehicles or armored personnel carriers are not tanks either. Their armor isn’t usually thick enough to stop attacks from tanks, their main guns tend to be smaller than the standard calibre for tanks, and their main role is to transport infantry and support them. They may be used as tanks (sort of) but they’re not tanks.

This is the BMP-3 IFV, which is also NOT a tank. It does, however, mount an unusually large main gun for an IFV. The BMP is one of the latest in a line of vehicles that pioneered the whole concept of "infantry fighting vehicle."

Finally tank-destroyers or assault guns weren’t tanks either, but they occupy something of a fuzzy area. Tank destroyers or assault guns can have very tank-like features. The may have a similar (or even greater) level of armored protection. In World War II, tank destroyers or assault guns also mounted some of the largest and most powerful guns to be used in a direct-fire role. What doesn’t make them tanks is usually a combination of factors. First, most were not turreted. German and Russian tank destroyers or assault guns had their main guns fixed forward, requiring the driver to point the vehicle towards its target. The gun had just enough movement so the gunner could then fine tune his aim once the entire vehicle had been pointed at the enemy. Some of these turretless tank destroyers were very heavily armored but many were not. Some also mounted huge guns, like the Jagdtiger’s 128mm gun or the ISU-152’s 152mm gun-howitzer. American tank destroyers were very different, mainly because they mounted turrets. But they had very light armor (all had open-topped turrets). Generally speaking, therefore, tank destroyers or assault guns were not tanks because they lacked one or two key features of tanks (turrets, heavy armor) or were not specifically designed to be tanks. They are tank-like vehicles, however, and often substituted for tanks when the need arose.

An ISU-152 assault gun, generally used in an infantry support role but capable of destroying tanks. It earned the nickname Zveroboy or "Beast Hunter" for its ability to destroy German armored vehicles (which had animal names like Tiger or Panther).

Tanks had their debut in World War I, but their heyday was in the war that came after, the Second World War. The story of the tank in World War II begins after the first War, as theorists saw the promise of the tank in breaking the stalemate of the trenches. This was because of certain innate characteristics of tanks:

Tanks– like all tracked vehicles– essentially lay their own road, which means that they can bridge trenches and gaps in the ground. If suitably powered, they can also surmount most obstacles, keeping up a higher average pace of movement for much longer than infantry. Their treads can also crush barbed wire– wire that stopped or channeled many infantry attacks. They also theoretically have a lower footprint pressure per square inch than wheeled vehicles or infantry, but this can be negated by their sheer weight, bad terrain, or lack of engine power. Tanks therefore have great mobility in a tactical sense and it would be realized that with the right support, they had great mobility in a strategic sense.

A French FT-17 light tank climbing up a trench in World War I.

Tanks also have the armor to withstand the two main threats of the World War I battlefield: small arms fire from rifles and machine guns, and shrapnel from artillery bursts. World War I tanks did not have the ability to withstand direct fire from artillery, and everyone later developed bullets that could pierce tank armor, but all this did not negate the fact that tanks were mostly proof against the greatest dangers on the battlefield. Artillery and machine guns stopped most infantry attacks cold– especially since infantry tactics tended to rely still on “human wave” style runs towards the enemy trench line. Tanks gave the promise of returning the advantage to the offensive.

This Mauser rifle was one the first dedicated anti-tank weapons to be deployed. Tank armor got thicker in response, and so anti-tank weapons became more powerful. Tank designers therefore responded by increasing tank protection once again. This created a cycle that continues to this day.

Finally, tanks carried more firepower than even a squad of infantry. The early tanks were given machineguns and tanks would eventually mount light artillery pieces. The British “Mark” series of World War I tanks had machinegun armed variants which were called “Female” tanks and cannon armed tanks that were called “Male” tanks. The idea of mounting cannons on tanks was not widespread, however. Since the main target of tanks was infantry, machine guns were not just more adequate, they were often even the more preferable weapon, and many tanks used machine guns as their main armament until the early years of WWII.

The M-1 "Combat Car" was the primary US tank in the 1930's-- its main armament was a .50 caliber machine gun. This gun would have been more than capable of piercing the armor of many of the M-1s contemporaries.

The tank’s ability to support an infantry attack strongly suggested to many militaries that this would be its most important use. This was also tied into the belief that any war in Europe would strongly resemble the trenches of World War I. This was not an unreasonable belief: the singular nature of the Great War, its massive and profound effect on the European mind, and the persistent memory of the trenches all meant that many commanders and military theorists (veterans of the war) were unable to escape the mental paradigm that it had created.

What this meant for tanks was that many future tanks were developed with the trench-crossing, no-man’s land traversing, enemy-fortification assaulting role in mind. In this role, armor above all else would be the main requirement, followed next by anti-infantry firepower and with mobility coming in last. The result were tanks that had the large tracks to either side of the vehicle characteristic of World War I tanks, along with thick armor and weapons optimized to engage enemy infantry and fortifications– this usually meant multiple machine guns and a cannon firing high explosive rounds. These kinds of tanks were known in English service as “infantry tanks” and they were designed to go no faster than the walking pace of an infantryman. Doctrine-wise, therefore, tanks were thought to be supporting weapons, rather like a mortar or a machine gun, with infantry still being the main component in the battlefield.

A typical "infantry" or assault tank, the French Char B1 (bis). It had all the hallmarks of the type: heavy armor, treads designed to cross trenches, anti-infantry firepower, and a low top speed.

However, what the layman now remembers of World War II tank employment is the so-called Blitzkrieg or a mobile kind of warfare that uses tanks. The exact nature of the so-called Blitzkrieg has been the subject of a lot of scholarly debate, with the modern consensus now being that a doctrine of Blitzkrieg never really existed. The Germans never really had a systematized, doctrinaire and established principle of “Blitzkrieg” but had more of an operational commitment and a series of loosely related tactical or operational “practices” that were geared towards finding a key point (perhaps a weak point) in the enemy line, assaulting this in force, and then exploiting the breach in the enemy defenses– using mobility to surround the enemy, prevent or destroy reinforcements before they are deployed, and destroy or disrupt his rear (his command system, his logistics, and his artillery).

Neither were the Germans the first or only people to come up with this kind of “maneuver warfare” theory. The Russians came up with their own theory the so-called “Deep Operations” method of warmaking, which resembled what we now think of as Blitzkrieg. The British and the French also had some theorists who advocated mobile warfare: J.F.C. Fuller and the much-maligned but rather self-serving Basil Lidell Hart for the British and (yes) Charles de Gaulle for the French. There were some hints of this already in World War I: the British and the French developed so-called “light” or “cavalry” tanks whose main role was to use their superior mobility to exploit holes in the enemy line.

Because tanks offered a combination of firepower, protection and mobility, they were seen as the keys to mobile warfare. German commanders like Heinz Guderian (whose influence was profound– but rather overstated) advocated freeing tanks from the doctrinaire constraints of infantry– and this perhaps was the problem of the whole concept of an “infantry tank.” An “infantry tank” is tied to the pace of the infantryman, and while it might be capable of breaking open the enemy line, it cannot do more afterward. What World War I showed was that railroads and modern communications enabled the defender to more quickly rush reinforcements to a threatened point than an attacker bound by the pace of infantry. This was what lead to failure in Cambrai: the British were unable to exploit the hole they had made. What men like Guderian proposed was that tanks be the primary weapon, they were to be made faster than infantry (even at the expense of some armor) so these tanks could immediately race to the enemy rear and disrupt the enemy’s ability to reinforce a threatened point and also disrupt its cohesion by attacking those things I mentioned earlier: command and communications nets, supply depots, etc… Tanks were eminently suited to do this precisely because they could use their mobility to race around the enemy rear, bring superior firepower to bear on rear line troops or unprepared troops and were immune to the fire of these rear echelon personnel.

Another important component of this kind of mobile warfare is that tanks need to be massed so they can operate more or less together. The other problem with “infantry tank” tactics was tanks were generally spread out among infantry divisions.

The British Cromwell "cruiser" tank doing what it was meant to do: exploiting a breakthrough, perhaps to encircle an enemy. Here it's driving past a knocked out Pak 43 88mm anti-tank gun.

What most people don’t appreciate is that Guderian, de Gaulle, Fuller and all the rest advocated a total mobilization of the striking force. For tanks to be able to wreak their havoc, they needed support. At the very least, they’ll need to be resupplied somehow, and horse or rail-borne supplies simply will not do. They’ll also need infantry and artillery support– as I shall explain later, there are obstacles tanks still can’t tackle on their own. What these new theorists advocated was an entirely mechanized army. Trucks to bring up resupply and reinforcements, infantry mounted in carriers that can keep pace with tanks, artillery that can move quickly without having to be emplaced, etc… Aircraft played a role here too, and the Germans showed their “tactical” bias here: they subordinated their air power to the needs of the ground campaign, using fighters to maintain local air superiority and bombers to support the ground troops (through direct close air support or through interdiction)– but they did not particularly favor strategic bombing of targets beyond the immediate battlefield.

The Russians and their "Deep Operations" fought in a similarly mobile fashion as the Germans and they too stressed combined-arms cooperation of tanks and infantry. However, they never developed dedicated troop carriers in World War II, relying instead on the very simple expedient of welding handrails onto their tanks for infantry to hold on to.

The prestige and the good press of mobile warfare has often meant that people do not realize that the enemy still has to be attacked for these mobile operations to take place. In a real sense, there still was a role for infantry tanks or similar types. Conversely, it was still possible to create a static defensive line that was (at the very least) resilient against enemy tank attack. The Russians, for instance, were able to create a tough and powerful defensive system in the Kursk salient that managed to absorb and slow the German attacks. The defenses were not invincible– tanks had a role to play in defensive operations (usually, intercepting penetrations or attacking their flanks)– but breaching these defenses were tough missions for tanks. This problem only became more acute as people responded to these new tank tactics: anti-tank weapons proliferated, as did new anti-tank tactics.

Breaching these defenses still required tanks to operate in combined arms cooperation with infantry, artillery, and airpower.

Artillery and airpower provided fire support, they could be used to suppress or destroy enemy defenses. Air power could also be used for reconnaissance. Both could be used to disrupt enemy reinforcements. And at the very least, both artillery and air power could be used to destroy their enemy counterparts. This was why radios proved to be so crucial to tanks: they could be used to call for either.

The JU-87 Stuka dive bomber is probably the most famous example of a "Blitzkrieg" aircraft. The Germans used these to support their attacks, a kind of flying artillery.

However, despite the disdain traditionally heaped upon infantry warfare, tanks still needed infantry. This is because infantry had better spotting capacity than tanks and infantry could do what tanks could not: infiltrate enemy defenses. Infiltration tactics dated back from World War I: first used by the Germans, but later used by everybody else. This involved using small groups of heavily-armed but mobile infantry to find weak points in the enemy line, exploit these gaps, and then surround the enemy to hit them from the flank and rear. We’re talking about the very tactical level here, not strategic. Tanks could support the infantry by pinning down the enemy with their firepower while the infantry team worked around them, or perhaps they could even accompany the infantry team of terrain permitted.

All the major warring powers of World War I saw the need for a tank or some kind of armored vehicle to cooperate with infantry in assaulting the fortified line. While most tanks can perform this role, the best suited for it were vehicles that had many of the qualities of World War I infantry tanks  (heavy armor, slow speed, anti-infantry firepower, etc…): the Germans had their big Tigers, although production problems meant they more commonly used their Stugs (Sturmegeschutz or “assault guns”), the Russians had the JS-2 and 3 Stalin tanks or the ISU or SU series of assault guns, and the British had the Churchills. The Americans were lacking in this respect but they had enough production capacity to manufacture enough M-4 Shermans to fill in this role (for which it proved adequate– just read Zaloga’s book Armored Thunderbolt).

The difference with this kind of armor-infantry team with the old style of “infantry tank” tactics is that the centerpiece of an operation (on the greater strategic level) is still the tank. The goal of the penetration of the line is to give tanks units the chance to do their thing, rather than relying on a slow and broad advance with infantry. Armored divisions in World War II (and today) are therefore designed to operate independently– they cooperate with infantry to breach a line but then race off on their own. They will bypass positions too strong to be taken quickly, like cities or forts, leaving it to follow-on infantry formations. The goal is to keep up the momentum of the attack, thereby throwing the enemy off-balance. In modern US Army parlance, the goal is to break the enemy command’s decision-making cycle, leaving them unable to do more than react to your initiatives. Once again, this works best if large numbers of tank formations are massed behind the penetration, so they can immediately exploit it and hit the enemy rear with one terrific blow.

SS troops from the Totenkopf division. Here they're cooperating with Tiger tanks during the Battle of Kursk.

What perhaps should be apparent is that tanks are weapons of industrialization and mechanization. You can’t just have a handful of tanks and hope for success. For tanks to succeed you first need quite a lot of them: you need enough to equip some maneuver formations to exploit a breach, but you also need enough to equip the infantry units that will create this breach for you (and this portion of the battle is the most wasteful in tanks). Secondly, you also need to mechanize the infantry, the artillery, the engineers, the supply corps– almost everybody.

It is possible to do this on the cheap: for all that people speak of the Germans as being masters of mobile warfare in World War II, it was actually a fact that only a small percentage of their forces were in any way mechanized. The panzer divisions were the armored tip of the spear, but the great mass of the German divisions were infantry divisions not much better equipped than their World War I forebears: they still relied on horses for their logistics and their artillery was still horse-drawn. Later in the war, a German infantry division could count itself luck if it had a handful of Stug assault guns attached to it.

These kinds of carts performed the bulk of German logistical support in World War II.

Yet the Germans would pay for this lack of mechanization and industrialization heavily later in the war. Once the shock of the German tactics wore off, her enemies found ways of coping, thereby negating many of the German advantages. Mobile warfare had never been invincible: terrain could stop or slow a successful mobile tank operation. Rough terrain could hamper tanks (the Germans never managed to use tanks much in the Pripet Marshes) but even flat terrain could be a bar… if there was too much of it. The Germans never quite caught the Russian army as it retreated across the steppe, and since the bulk of the German army was still foot-bound, the tank spearheads inevitably had to stop their advance as the rest of the army caught up. Even the highly mechanized Allies were hamstrung by distance during their dash across France– Patton outran his supplies and was famously forced to stop his advance towards Germany.

But a lack of mechanization and industrialization was what truly proved crippling for the Germans. As their enemies adapted, the Germans faced more and more tanks, tank destroyers, anti-tank guns and the like. The German panzers had to do more, and were spread out thinly. Those units without armored support had a difficult time holding their line, and it must have been frustrating for the Germans to face enemy tanks everywhere–while theirs were nowhere in sight. As has been noted repeatedly, German commanders recounting the War afterwards speak with some bitterness of the “unfairness” of their enemies, swamping the gallant Germans with materiel. They try to comfort themselves with the idea that at least they fought bravely and intelligently while their enemies used the crude, (implicitly) cowardly and unchivalric expedient of throwing machines at the poor German Landser.

Be that as it may, the mechanization and industrialization of warfare in World War II pointed the way to the future, and it was Germany’s enemies that proved they could fight in the mobile manner best. The Americans were fantastically well-equipped in an absolute sense: every American unit had a plethora of trucks and vehicles. The Americans produced enough vehicles to equip their allies, and Russian mobility owed a great deal to the output of Detroit. The Americans and the Russians may not have had tanks as powerful as the German ones, but since mobile warfare is a combined-arms endeavor, this technological advantage was nullified. The Allies learnt the ways of modern warfare at great cost, but the point is that they did learn. And they had the industrial capacity and culture to make full use of the lessons they learned. By the end of the war, the Russians and the Americans simply had better systems of operation to support their tanks.

The Arsenal of Democracy. Row upon row of Sherman tanks.

After being around different systems, process, models, process tools, etc, etc   I wanted to try and see if I could design a model that would illustrate how it all fits together.

I have done a draft in Powerpoint,  this gives a good starting point  but I would love to get some feedback or other input – I will probably need to change from Powerpoint to another, more appropriate media soon.   The model is based around retail/distribution with a small amount of production.

Regards
Mark

Click here to see PPT Slide – >   Business Modelling

In this paper I will discuss how standard accounting practice does not account for the cost of customer service.  How a new model is required to show the true cost of customer service, and how Superior Customer Service can add to revenue and improve the bottom line.
Accounting systems, by design, track product costs not customer costs or customer value.    Expenses are assigned to various cost centers within the corporation according to the various accounts set up by the accounting group.  Costs are tracked as the product moves through the manufacturing cycle and as value is added to the raw material, through goods in process and to the warehouse.  Certain overhead costs are allocated based on some history or averages and are measured based on that history.  Are we over or under budget?
Each customer and each order has a different cost.  Each customer will order a different mix of products each with a different margin.  Each customer will require a different amount of effort from sales, from order entry, credit check, pick pack and ship and collection effort.  Different sales channels have different cost associated.  All of these costs are allocated to different departments and profit, loss, margin, cost of goods sold, G&A, etc are calculated on the accumulation of these costs.  This does not yield a true cost, nor does it yield a true profit for that customer, for that channel, for that market, for that promotion. Think about the variables in each order… cost of the product, commissions, cost of the sales call, management time, bonuses, and discounts to the customer, order processing cost, promotional costs, merchandising costs, non-standard packing, inventory holding costs, warehouse space, returns and refusals, cost of credit.
Traditional cost accounting and budgeting puts expense in accounts.  Budgeting for these costs is a guess at best, historical data plus or minus.  So various aspects of superior customers are rolled into other departments and accounts.   Allocating these costs by department can have cross purpose for serving the customer.
Logistics and customer service add costs, but they also add revenue and market appeal.  Return on investment is more than:

So in order to improve margin companies either improve sales or cut costs.  In today’s economy, it is cut costs!  But return on investment there is also based on capital efficiency

So, increased sales with the same capital expenditure or investment also improve the ROI!

Changes in logistics, and customer delivery processes are slow to be implemented because they defy common cost accounting processes.  Logistics is flow oriented and so difficult to allocate cost.  If a logistics program increases total cost yet provides greater service to the customer and as a result increases revenue. How can this be measured?  If the increase in revenue is greater than increase in cost it can lead to greater cost effectiveness, and greater return on investment, ROI.

A new accounting process needs to be established that accounts for the cost of each customer, for each market and for each channel.   Costs should allocated based on the cost to do business with a particular customer.  Let’s call each customer or channel a mission and see the grid below

It is only when all the costs, sales, marketing, transportation, warehousing , etc  are analyzed for each mission can the true cost and the effectiveness be discerned.  Only after all the associated costs are captured can the true cost per unit be determined.  The attributed cost for each program is the cost per unit that could be avoided if the function were discontinued without any other change to the organization.  At this point we can analyze the effectiveness of the customer.  We can compare of cost of the mission to the revenue loss for abandoning the customer.  What costs would I avoid and what revenue would be missed if I lost this mission, customer or channel.  If the revenue generated is greater than the cost, than we have an effective mission.
In my next entry I will discuss how eliminating fixed cost and overhead can improve the cost structure for the supplier and the customer.

I’ll start this post by pointing out that I am a Nokia fanboy. I love Nokia devices. I’ve only ever owned Nokia phones, and it is no secret how much I love my Nokia internet tablets.

But boy are Nokia frustrating.

I am currently awaiting my N900…still. I pre-ordered several weeks ago. Such is my geekiness and general devotion to Nokia devices that I’ve been following the progress of the N900 pretty much all year. And the red-hot second it got announced and was available for pre-order I did so.

Unfortunately this has exposed me to how poor Nokia’s logistics operation is. They make great devices, but they just don’t seem to have a clue when it comes to communicating with customers, or having a firm idea of their ability to deliver.

Originally it was widely expected the N900 would be available by October, in time for the Maemo developer conference. Now maybe Nokia never planned this to be the case, and maybe they had to change their plans. But it was not ready. Instead they gave the 300 attendees, pre-production models (just on loan though).

A few weeks later and it was expected that the N900 would be ready for late October. But eventually Nokia stated that they were taking feedback from the 300 developers and fixing important issues. I can accept that. Hell that’s even a *good* thing. It might have been nice if they had stated up front that this was the plan. But I’ll give them credit, and assume it was.

So they announced the device in late August. With nothing more than a very vague suggestion of when it would ship. And apparently no fixed plan.

This is pretty poor in itself, I appreciate their openness, and that many of their competitors would not even indicate a device existed until they knew exactly a ship date. However, I believe it’s possibly to be open, whilst still giving specific expectation of time frames. For example, give a date for a date, eg we will take a check point on ‘nth of October’ and at that point we will announce the ship date.

But no, just vagueness and handwaving. In early November (10th?) Nokia announced that they had started ’shipping’. This apparently meant units were leaving their factories, because it certainly didn’t seem to mean anyone, anywhere, was getting one.

The thing which started to annoy me was that, at no point, did I as a customer with a pre-order, have any e-mails sent to me to keep me informed. Everything I know was because I went looking on line for information.

A couple of weeks ago I e-mailed customer support to ask them what was happening. Nokia have announced they’re shipping…so where is my device?

The response I got, on the 12 of November, was that the ‘tentative’ date for delivery was the 19th

Great, but why tentative? That’s a really short window, and any logistics operation worth its salt should be working to a firm date on that scale. I’ve only just stated working on a project, and one of the first things I learned about it was the date we must be finished. Because the amount of time it takes to go through manufacturing, etc. is a known quantity, and the date that we will be ready is fixed. So my team has to tune content to fit in the time we have been given. That’s just good business.

So I guess it came as little surprise when the 19th arrived, and no word was received about my device being shipped. Though I was surprised that I didn’t get an update from Nokia.
But just to rub salt in the wounds, I did get an e-mail from Nokia, first thing on the 19th…’you contacted customer support last week, please fill in this survey’… So some part of the business is capable of realising I’ve interacted with Nokia, and automatically following up. Why can’t you apply that to – ‘Nokia told you your order would be with you by now, but we’re sorry to tell you that there has been a delay’?
I e-mailed them again, and on the 20th I got a response. Sorry, the delivery date is now ‘tentatively’ the 23rd.

I responded asking, what do you mean by ‘delivery date’ is that to me? Or to you, then you’ll ship them out?. After all, if on Friday the 20th, there is any chance in hell of you delivering to me on Monday the 23rd, then you know for sure, none of this ‘tentative’ nonsense.

They said delivery date, did mean delivered to me. But they couldn’t even tell me what had caused the shift in dates. Whoever is answering the e-mails simply hasn’t been told why the date is moving. Surely someone at Nokia knows? Surely someone, somewhere should have a pretty good idea exactly how long it takes to get physical units from a factory to distribution centres, from there to local warehouses, and finally into the hands of delivery companies. If this was my business, I’d expect to know from the moment the design for a device is final, from the moment I deliver the software. Exactly how long before they are ready to hand to a courier to fulfill an order.
Factories run at known speeds. Trucks run to schedules. Someone should know the date they can hit, with risks calculated for random out of control issues (driver strikes etc.)

But here I am on Sunday the 22nd, and I’ve had no e-mail to indicate shipment. My order status still simply says ‘this order has not shipped’ Maybe it will ship out on Monday, but Nokia customer services apparently have no clue. And they aren’t making any effort to keep me updated, if I want to know what’s going on I have to go ask nicely for an update.

Of course the reason all this is so frustrating, is that I do love these devices, I am sold, I was sold a year ago on the rumours alone. If I was less of a geek, less taken by the openness of Maemo, less of a Nokia fanboy, then I could just walk away, order myself something that is available right now, from a company that knows how to do customer service.

But I am a geek, and I won’t walk away. I’ll just sit and wait and endure the pain of interacting with a company that just doesn’t have a clue. Because I know ultimately what they lack in logistics capability, they make up for in an R&D department that churns out some fantastic devices. With an openness policy that puts everyone else to shame.

But Nokia, please, for your sake as much as mine, fire whoever is responsible for taking the output of your r&d, and putting it in the hands of paying customers. And get someone with a clue.
Nothing infuriates customers more than no information. You could have gone though the same set of steps, even the same set of date push-backs, with much less bad feeling, just by pro-actively informing me of what’s happening. Rather than making me chase to be told when I get to give you money.

But really, you should not have had to do any of that. Because you should have control of your distribution. If you have to give ‘tentative’ dates, then you are already expecting to fail.

206462     การออกแบบและจัดการระบบลอจิสติกส์     Logistics System Design and Management

การวิเคราะห์การไหลเชิงกายภาพและไม่เชิงกายภาพสํ าหรับลูกโซ่ผู้ส่งมอบ- ผู้ผลิตลูกค้า และสํ าหรับหน่วยงานในองค์กรการผลิต การเข้าใจวงจรชีวิตของระบบ บทบาทและความสํ าคัญของลอจิสติกส์ การออกแบบและการวางแผนสํ าหรับการทํ าให้เกิดผล ความสามารถในการวิเคราะห์ปัญหาลอจิสติกส์เพื่อการตัดสินใจในเชิงแก้ไขและป้องกัน

(Analysis of the physical and non-physical flows for the supplier – producer – customer chain and for the functional units in a producer organization, understanding of system life-cycle, roles and importance of logistics, design and planning for implementing a logistic, ability to analyze logistic problems for corrective and preventive decision making.)

(206462 มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์)

http://www.domain-b.com/environment/20091118_us_china.html

Hi guys, check out this link on agreements between the US and China regarding climate change.

In other news, I just came back from a meeting at the Canadian Embassy on the cultures, economies, climate change questions and policy/security issues of the high Arctic.  It was vvveeeeerrry interesting!  Of particular interest to you as business students was the panel discussion on energy resource development in the high Arctic.  Prof. Dag Harald Claes, energy/geopolitical analyst at the University of Oslo, pointed out two interesting questions:  the melting of the Arctic ice opens up short sea-ways between Asia, Europe and North America – cutting out the long route through the Mediterranean.  What might this do to Mediterranean logistics service industries?  As well, he stated in no uncertain terms that Arctic oil has little commercial potential – most of the development interest is political.  My question to you is this: do the Arctic basin economies complement or compete with Mediterranean basin economies, particularly given the political motives for creating more unity in both these areas?

Think about it – I expect your report on my desk tomorrow morning! (just joking!)

Have a great day!

Pete