Es gibt nicht nur – wie Luhmann schreibt – keine Beobachtung, die nicht ihrerseits beobachtbar wäre, sondern er scheint außerdem anzunehmen, dass es keine Beobachtung gibt, die nicht empirischen Charakter besitzt. Luhmanns eigene Erkenntnistheorie ist daher auch nicht aufgrund besonderer Vorkehrungen, bestimmter einzuhaltender Kriterien nicht
Transzendentaltheorie, sie ist sozusagen automatisch.
Dazu passt auch Luhmanns immer wieder wiederholte Beteuerung, der radikale Konstruktivismus sei keine nicht-empirische Theorie – was immer dessen Vertreter wie z.B. von Glasersfeld auch sagen mögen: “Selbstverständlich ist der Konstruktivismus eine realistische Erkenntnistheorie, die empirische Argumente benutzt.” (Soziologische Aufklärung, 5.)
Dann aber fragt sich, was denn die Qualifikation einer Erkenntnistheorie
als empirisch oder als “naturale Epistemologie” noch bedeutet, wenn es gar
keine andere Möglichkeit gibt, wenn “empirisch” nicht mehr eine Seite einer Unterscheidung bezeichnet.

Kant unterscheidet zwischen Erfahrung und den Formen der Erfahrung, die ihrerseits nicht empirisch zugänglich sind, sondern in der Reflexion auf ihre Vorbedingungen erschlossen werden. Die Erfahrung als solche ist der Erfahrung nicht zugänglich. Dem entgegen ist Luhmann zufolge Beobachtung immer eine empirisch beobachtbare Operation.
Entsprechend unterscheidet Luhmann nicht zwischen einer empirischen und einer transzendentalen Ebene. Beobachtung im Sinn von “Unterscheiden und Bezeichnen” umfasst nicht nur Kants Erfahrung, sondern auch die Überlegungen über ihre Vorbedingungen. Diese Begriffsfassung führt aber dazu, dass die Transzendentaltheorie nicht mehr als alternativer theoretischer Ansatz, sondern eher als Missverständnis erscheint: Kant meinte zwar, er betrachte nicht-empirische Vorbedingungen der Erfahrung, aber diese Betrachtung war selbst eine Beobachtung, und das heißt Empirie.

Pinchando aquí podéis acceder a un sitio externo donde se aloja el libro La Sociedad de la Sociedad, de Niklas Luhmann, que no es un encargo inmediato pero sobre el que trabajaremos próximamente en Principios de la Sociedad del Conocimiento. Esperamos que para tod@s sea de utilidad y que le saquemos el máximo provecho

Wer etwas intensiver die Debatte um Systemtheorie und auch Netzwerktheorie verfolgt, dem fällt sicherlich auf, dass es zunehmend Versuche gibt, eine Annäherung dieser beiden Theorien zu erreichen.

Die Fragen sind unter anderem, ob die Netzwerktheorie dort weiterhelfen kann, wo Luhmann seine Theorie eventuell noch nicht so intensiv ausgearbeitet hat, wie bspw. beim Theoriestück der strukturellen Kopplung.

Ich möchte die Diskussion an dieser Stelle gar nicht weiter kommentieren, sondern ein “Fundstück” zeigen, dass ich kürzlich per E-Mail erhalten habe. Es geht um zwei Zitate, eines von Stephan Fuchs, ein anderes aus einer englischen Übersetzung eines Luhmann-Werkes:

Networks are systems of relations (Stephan Fuchs)

Systems are networks of relations (Luhmann)

So einfach ist das.

Theodor M. Bardmann, Soziale Arbeit im Lichte der Systemtheorie Niklas Luhmanns, in: Helga Gripp-Hagelstange (Hrsg.), Niklas Luhmanns Denken. Interdisziplinäre Einflüsse und Wirkungen, S. 75-104:
S.89: Inklusion/Exklusion: Wie werden Menschen an bestimmten Kommunikationen beteiligt und ausgeschlossen. Hier Kritik von Kronauer: „Der Tatbestand der Massenhaften Exklusion, deren Elend „sich jeder Beschreibung entzieht“ (Luhmann), zunächst einmal nur für jene „Wohlgesinnten“ etwas Neues
S.92 „Die Luhmannsche Systemtheorie hatte funktionale Differenzierungen lange Zeit als ein „Erfolgskonzept der Moderne“ vorgestellt (um nicht zu sagen „gefeiert“), doch seit Mitte der 80er Jahre scheinen sich auch bei Luhmann gravierende Bedenken durczusetzten“
S.94: Kumulative Exklusionen als „Konstruktionsfehler des Ganzen“!
S.94: Funktionsspezifische Höchstleistungen lassen innerhalb der Inklusion nur einen niedrigen Grat der Integration zu
S.95:Millieus sind segmentäre Intergrationsformen des Exklusionsbereichs
S.96 „Im Exklusionsbereich können die Abstimmungsverzichte der modernen Gesellschaft als Defizite – statt als Evolutionäre Errungenschaften – registriert werden. Von hier aus können die Versprechen als Versagen attackiert werden. Im Exklusionsbereich wird die Lebbarkeit eines auf den Menschen (womöglich auf seinen Körper) zugeschnittenen Lebensarrangements unter Beweis gestellt und mit alledem wird die Unwarscheinlichkeit und Künstlichkeit einer funktional differenzierten Welt durchschau- und ablehnbar.“
-Der moderne Mensch muß nach Auskunft der Systemtheorie in der modernen Gesellschaft „sozial ortlos“, „strukturell desintigriert“ sein, um seine Inklusionschancen nutzen zu können.
-Inklusion/Integration sind womöglich nur auf Kosten des anderen zu steigern(!)
S.96: „Funktionale Differenzierung ist auf Menschen angewiesen, die sich als einzigartige Individuen verstehen und ihr Identitäts-, Rollen- und Karrieremanagement selbst verantworten.“
-“Zumutung […] an die Adresse des einzelnen“, „Mithin dient das Konstrukt des einzigartigen, unverwechselbaren und freien Individuums nur dazu, ins Unwahrscheinliche getriebene Sinnzumutungen adressierbar zu halten.
S.98f: „In den Entwicklungs – und Schwellenländern und zunehmend auch in den Ballungszentren der Industrienationen kommt es aber zu einer Exklusion aus der Eklusion, zu einer ‘Exklusion zweiter Ordnung’, zu wahrhaft ‘vergessenen Existenzen’.“

Infelizmente o Prof. De Giorgi não virá mais ao Brasil em razão de falecimento de familiar na Itália. Fui informado ontem pelo Prof. Eduardo Rabenhorst. A palestra será reagendada para o próximo ano

CONVITE

O Centro de Ciências Jurídicas da UFPB tem a honra de convidar Vossa Senhoria para a Conferência que o Prof. Dr. Raffaele De Giorgi, da Universidade de Salento (Itália), pronunciará no dia 24 de novembro de 2009, às 9:00 horas, no Auditório do CCJ – Campus Universitário, sobre o tema:

Teoria da Sociedade

 

(Direito, Risco e Crime no Século XXI)

“… a sociedade não tolera verticalidade e nem tampouco hierarquias, não tolera mais ideias normativas e nem tampouco limites externos. O limite da sociedade é o mundo e o mundo é o horizonte das possibilidades, o horizonte entre o qual isto que é possível pode sempre ser atualizado. E o mundo se expande com a expansão da sociedade, isto é, com a expansão da comunicação social. E depois que esta sociedade é a única sociedade que exista, podemos chamá-la sociedade do mundo. “Sociedade do mundo, escreveu Luhmann, é o produzir-se do mundo nas comunicações”.

Raffaele De Giorgi

Diretor e Professor Titular de Teoria Geral do Direito e Sociologia do Direito da Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dellʾUniversitá degli Studi del Salento, Lecce, Itália. Diretor do Centro di Studi sul Rischio fundado em parceria com o sociológo alemão Niklas Luhmann. Professor visitante em diversas instituições de ensino superior no Brasil (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande Sul,Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Universidade de São Paulo, Pontíficia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, etc.). México (Universidad de Guadalajara, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana Istapalapa, Benemerita Universidad de Puebla, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Puebla,Universidad Autonoma de Tlaxcala). Argentina (Universidad Federal de Buenos Aires, Universidad Belgrano de Buenos Aires). Professor visitante no Max Planck Institut für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland (2004), Wilhelms Universität Münster, Humboldt Stiftung, Deutschland (2000, 1996 e 1991), Universität Saarland – Institut für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, Saarbrücken, Deutschland (1999). Secretário Geral da “Europäische Akademie der Wissenschaften und Philosophie des Rechts”, Bonn, R.F.T. (1987). Diretor do Departamento de Sociologia e Ciência da Política na Università di Salerno, Itália (1986). Professor di Sociologia na Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dellʾIstituto Orientale di Napoli, Itália (1984). Professor Extraordinário de Sociologia do Direito na Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dellʾUniversitá di Salerno, Itália (1981). Professor de Sociologia do Direito na Facoltà di Giurisprudenza dellʾUniversitá di Bologna, Itália (1980 e 1981). Professor de Filosofia do Direito na Facoltà di Giuriprudenza dellʾUniversitá di Camerino, Itália (1979, 1980 e 1981).

The last post about ‘Systems thinking’ again showed differences in understanding of the subject. Mainly when systems thinking is compared to organizations. Can we make use of systems thinking when looking at organizations? Some think we can. Some think we can’t. That’s no surprise, as it is precarious to directly compare an organization with a system. It is very much a matter of definitions. I’m not after a discussion for definitions or understanding of a concept. My assumption (due to the earlier fruitful discussions) is that an organization is not a system, but at least it can help to apply systems thinking on organizations, as it helps to apply other thinking on organizations. The complexity and uniqueness of organizations just makes it impossible to always apply one way of thinking.

What about self-organization? It is not an organization, nor a complex adaptive system, rather, it is a process where organization spontaneously increases. Recently I was pointed to the work of the Japanese professor Iba (thanks Margaret). He’s definitely a systems thinker, especially complex systems and autopoiesis. He explains that there are many differences in theories when people are referring to systems theory. I make the mistake myself, when talking about systems thinking and systems theory. Prof. Iba gives a brief history of systems theory, that developed from 1st generation systems theory to 3rd generation.

The most interesting shift is from the 2nd to the 3rd, from self-organizing systems to autopoietic systems. Iba notes that there is a clear distinction between “self-organization” and “autopoiesis” after the revolution caused by third generation. In this context, self-organization is focused on structural formation, but autopoiesis is focused on system formation. This is where Luhmann comes in. Iba quotes him:

Autopoietic systems, then, are not only self-organizing systems, they not only produce and eventually change their own structures; their self-reference applies to the production of other components as well. This is the decisive conceptual innovation. […] Thus, everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced as a unit by the system itself. This applies to elements, processes, boundaries, and other structures and, last but not least, to the unity of the system itself.

Interesting to notice is that in the thinking of Iba (and Luhmann), self-organization and autopoiesis are concepts of a system. I thought that Luhmann couldn’t help me very much, but now I have my second thoughts on that. By applying his thinking, I conclude what is important is that organization is defined by the interplay between the elements of the system (or organization). The elements (or people) itself are not important for the system (or organization) to work, but the events and as a result the change in the elements and the system (again, or organization) due to the events are what matters.

Unfortunately, I have to compare systems and organizations once more. However, I keep struggling with it, it is not very satisfying. But if we are to understand social behavior in relation to an organization a bit more, I think self-organization or even autopoiesis can be of help. That brings back systems thinking or systems theory, at least for now, because I’m not in the process of developing a new theory here.

To conclude this post, self-organization (or autopoiesis) can apparently be seen as a concept of a system. The constant processes that come into play during self-organization makes organizations (or systems) change constantly. That is, the processes, the actors, and the whole (the organization or system). That makes an organization an almost fluid ‘thing’, like a Barbapapa. Food for thought. If that is true, how can we have an online collaborative space that functions like a fluid, as it acts as an environment (or system)?

Aber Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung ist ja nicht nur Beobachtung erster Ordnung. Sie ist weniger und sie ist mehr. Sie ist weniger, weil sie nur Beobachter beobachtet und nichts anderes. Sie ist mehr, weil sie nicht nur diesen ihren Gegenstand sieht (=unterscheidet), sondern auch noch sieht, was er sieht und wie er sieht, was er sieht; und eventuell sogar sieht, was er nicht sieht, und sieht, daß er nicht sieht, daß er nicht sieht, was er nicht sieht. Auf der Ebene der Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung kann man also alles sehen: das, was der beobachtete Beobachter sieht, und das, was der beobachtete Beobachter nicht sieht. Die Beobachtung zweiter Ordnung vermittelt einen universalen Weltzugang.

Ciò che sappiamo della scienza, lo sappiamo dai media. E’ infatti attraverso la comunicazione che i progressi del mondo scientifico vengono riportati alla società civile. L’Eurobarometro, rapporto della Commissione Europea su media e ricerca scientifica del 2007, indica che l’interesse per la scienza è più alto rispetto a politica ed economia, e che scienziati e medici sono molto più stimati di politici e giornalisti. Ma il mondo dell’informazione riporta correttamente ciò che la ricerca produce?

I fatti scientifici divengono temi di comunicazione in molti modi. Non solo attraverso l’informazione specializzata, ma anche attraverso quella generalista. “Occorre distinguere almeno tre tipi di comunicazione della scienza” dice Mario Menichella, scrittore scientifico free lance, autore di Professione divulgatore: “C’è la divulgazione propriamente detta, attraverso cui vengono spiegate le scoperte della scienza; poi c’è l’attività di informazione, la cronaca delle novità del mondo scientifico, compiuta dai giornalisti specializzati; infine l’infotainment, commistione fra informazione e intrattenimento”. In questo panorama, se internet ha creato nuovi spazi (come gruppi di discussioni e blog) dove, oltre all’informazione e alla didattica,anche chi non è del settore può occuparsi di hobby scientifici, “la televisione – prosegue – gode del vantaggio di poter trattare alcune materie, come l’astronomia, che si prestano ad essere messe in immagini”. Ed è proprio la tv – sempre secondo l’Eurobarometro – il mezzo preferito a cui attingere informazioni scientifiche, specie con i documentari. Poi vengono giornali, radio, internet e magazine. Gli argomenti più trattati sono la biomedicina e l’ambiente (dati Sissa, Scuola Internazione Superiore di Studi Avanzati), che sono quelli poi ritenuti più interessanti dal pubblico (Eurobarometro). Determinati ambiti scientifici allargano la discussione all’intera società, finendo sulle prime pagine dei quotidiani e dei telegiornali, basti pensare alle emergenze alimentari e ambientali, al dibattito sulla bioetica e alle catastrofi naturali.

Ma la comunicazione scientifica aiuta i cittadini ad acquisire consapevolezza? Secondo Giovanni Spataro, redattore di LeScienze, mensile, edizione italiana di Scientific American, questo per lo più avviene, perchè “anche quando l’informazione non è troppo precisa, incuriosisce e spinge a saperne di più”. D’altronde, si può fare il confronto con altri settori: “Chi ha capito tutto riguardo alla crisi finanziaria, o alle questioni di politica internazionale?”. Il giudizio sull’informazione scientifica può essere dunque positivo. Ci sono progressi rispetto al passato: “Oggi finalmente anche i caporedattori cominciano ad occuparsi di scienza, prima non era così”. Proprio a voler trovare un difetto “forse, con la popolarizzazione delle scienze, è che spesso si vanno a cercare argomenti troppo pop”. Il compito é delicato. Occorre sempre verificare che le ricerche scientifiche di cui si sta parlando siano già state pubblicate su riviste riconosciute nel mondo scientifico. Gli stessi criteri che rendono notiziabile un evento scientifico, a volte non coincidono con quelli classici della cronaca giornalistica. Non é sempre facile “trovare la giusta misura fra la necessità dei giornalisti di raccontare in tempo utile e quella degli scienziati di essere precisi”, come dice il professor Stefano Santini, che insegna Sismologia ad Urbino, riferendosi alla cronaca del terremoto in Abruzzo. In fondo il rischio del sensazionalismo è sempre presente. “Spesso basta un titolo sbagliato per rovinare un ottimo articolo”, avverte Edoardo Rosati, medico e caposervizio delle pagine della salute di Oggi. “Perciò è bene interagire fino all’ultimo con i caporedattori ed evitare eccessiva enfasi”. Nel settore della salute il pubblico è molto esigente, anche perché in questo ambito così delicato “ogni lettore è un potenziale paziente”. E da pazienti, spesso, si affidano alla testata. Trascurando magari il medico generico. In molti casi infatti la comunicazione medico-paziente latita, e i redattori si ritrovano di fronte a domande molto specifiche. “Noi però invitiamo sempre a far riferimento al medico di base, perché si rischia una sovrapposizione dei ruoli molto pericolosa”, precisa Rosati. Nonostante i settimanali permettano poi un maggiore approfondimento rispetto ai quotidiani, gli ambiti che più interessano i lettori sono quelli più prossimi alle loro condizioni di salute. In cima: l’osteoporosi, l’oculistica, la sessuologia e la stitichezza. “Sono i problemi più concreti a generare più domande”.

“Negli ultimi anni è cambiata la comunicazione della scienza. C’é la divulgazione, ma anche l’intrattenimento, l’educazione, la partecipazione pubblica, e sempre più importanti sono l’interazione delle imprese e le pubbliche relazioni, e richiedono strategie diverse” dice Nico Pitrelli, ricercatore in Comunicazione della scienza alla Sissa di Trieste. “Non c’é solo bisogno di ‘traduttori’, ma anche di produttori di contenuti, e diversi sono anche i pubblici, talvolta molto competenti, che sono in grado di orientare la ricerca. Il medico e lo scienziato da soli non possono risolvere tutte le questioni che hanno a che fare con la conoscenza e la società: i media più che uno specchio della realtà scientifica sono un luogo dove costruire la realtà”.

——

La scienza e la società: evoluzioni e cambiamenti

“Negli ultimi anni è cambiata la comunicazione della scienza. C’è la divulgazione, ma anche l’intrattenimento, l’educazione, la partecipazione pubblica, e sempre più importanti sono l’interazione delle imprese e le pubbliche relazioni, e richiedono strategie diverse” dice Nico Pitrelli, ricercatore in Comunicazione della scienza alla Sissa di Trieste. “Non c’è solo bisogno di‘traduttori’, ma anche di produttori di contenuti, e diversi sono anche i pub-blici, talvolta molto competenti, che sono in grado di orientare la ricerca. Il medico e lo scienziato da soli non possono risolvere tutte le questioni che hanno a che fare con la conoscenza e la società: i media più che uno specchio della realtà scientifica sono un luogo dove costruire la realtà”.

[articolo apparso originariamente su Il Ducato, numero 7, aprile 2009, p. 8]

Mu!

Die japanische Antwort auf alles.

Eine erkenntnistheoretische Annäherung

von Fynn Jödicke

Mu ist eine berühmte Antwort in Zen-Rätsel, sog. Koans, und anderen Fragen des Zen-Buddhismus und verweist den Fragenden auf die Natur seines eigenen Geistes, dem die Frage entsprungen ist.

[http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mu_(Philosophie) (22.10.09)]

Frage: Hat  ein Hund die Buddha-Natur?

Antwort: Mu!

Nach den Ausführungen des Zen-Meisters Daisetz Suzuki, ist das mu, das im obigen Zen-Rätsel bzw. Koan als Antwort gegeben wird, nicht in seiner wörtlichen Bedeutung, nämlich “nein“ zu verstehen. Derjenige, der sich dem Koan stellt, soll sich vielmehr “auf den bedeutungslosen Laut mu konzentrieren, gleichgültig, ob er nun ja oder nein […] bedeutet“ [von Fromm et al. S.64]. Das mu ist somit als Aufforderung zu verstehen, von einer Wirklichkeit Abstand zu nehmen, die wir als aristotelisch oder auch dualistisch geprägt bezeichnen wollen. Die aristotelische Logik beruht auf dem Prinzip der Zweiwertigkeit, das besagt, dass eine Aussage genau eine von zwei Wahrheitswerten hat, meistens als wahr und falsch bezeichnet [vgl. von Fromm et al. S.130f].

Die Aufforderung des Koans sich von diesem dualistischen Weltbild zu lösen, ist nicht überraschend, wenn man sich des kulturellen Kontextes bewusst wird. Grundlegende philosophische Konzepte des Buddhismus entstammen dem indischen und chinesichen Denken – Kulturkreisen, in denen wiederum eine Logik vorherrscht, die wir als paradox bezeichnen wollen [vgl. von Fromm et al. S.131]. Die paradoxe Logik nimmt an, dass wahr und falsch einander als Prädikate einer selben Aussage nicht ausschließen. Dieses nicht-duale Weltbild wurde von einem buddhistischen Philosophen Namens Nagarjuna im zweiten Jahrhundert in Form der sog. catuskoti-Argumentation entwickelt [vgl. Li S.87f].

Um das mu zu verstehen, das auf die Natur des Geistes des Fragenden verweist, wollen wir dem catuskoti folgen. Wir werden sehen, dass wir eine (schrittweise) Abstraktion der (beobachteten) Wirklichkeit und damit des Beobachters dieser Wirklichkeit vollziehen werden. Die Einführung eines Beobachters, nämlich in der Person des Fragenden, erscheint deshalb sinnvoll, da die buddhistische Erkenntnistheorie die Wirklichkeit einzig im Bezug zur Beobachtung sieht [von Egidy S9]. Als Theoriegebäude wählen wir die zirkuläre Beobachtungstheorie nach G. Spencer-Brown, F.J. Varela und N. Luhmann um nur einige bedeutende  Vertreter dieser Theorie zu nennen. Begründet liegt diese Wahl in der Tatsache, dass die zirkuläre Beobachtungstheorie die paradoxe Logik anhand der aristotelischen Logik auflöst. Um das nicht-duale mu zu verstehen, ist es somit nicht notwendig auf unser dual geprägtes Denken zu verzichten.

Wie bereits dargelegt, unterscheidet sich die catuskoti-Argumentation fundamental von unserer klassischen ja-oder-nein-Form bzw. der dualistischen Weltsicht und ist in buddhistischen Texten häufig anzutreffen. Sie enthält vier Argumentationsschichten, die hier am Beispiel des Koans “Hat ein Hund die Buddha-Natur? “ eingeführt werden. Unter Buddha-Natur ist, das vom Zen-Buddhismus angenommene Potenzial zu verstehen, das es einem erlaubt, selbst zum Buddha zu werden. Vor dem Hintergrund des erwähnten Koans sind die vier Argumentationsschichten:

1. Der Hund hat die Buddha-Natur. A ist [B]
2. Der Hund hat keine Buddha-Natur. A ist [nicht B]
3. Der Hund hat die Buddha-Natur und hat keine Buddha-Natur. A ist [B] und [nicht B].
4. Der Hund hat weder die Buddha-Natur, noch hat er keine. A ist [nicht B] und nicht [nicht B]

Zu Punkt 1 und 2: Die ersten zwei Punkte entsprechen unserem dualistischen Denken. Etwas ist wahr [These] oder etwas ist unwahr [Antithese]. Aber es ist nicht beides zugleich.

Zu Punkt 3: Nehmen wir die dritte Position ein, dann diskutieren wir über das Paradox “die Buddha-Natur ist zugleich keine Buddha-Natur“ (Dies ergibt sich dadurch, dass der Hund zugleich beides hat). Die Beobachtungstheorie bietet uns die Lösung dieses Paradoxes. Zentraler Lösungsansatz ist die Einführung der nächst höheren Beobachtungsebene, d.h. die Beobachtung der Beobachtung, auch  Beobachtung 2. Ordnung genannt. Nachstehende Erklärungen a und b sind gleichwertig, setzen aber jeweils an anderer Stelle an.

Luhmann abriu-me os olhos para uma tragédia: é o sistema operacionalmente fechado que decide se permite ou não a irritação do ambiente. Ele que define o seu código binário. De que adianta o ambiente querer irritar, se o sistema não se abre à irritação – por questão autorreferencial nem sempre compreensível?

Logo, menina, larga de se culpar! Mas se te consola, há a possibilidade da reconstrução do sistema pela autopoiesis. Ahh! Esquece logo, seja feliz!

Over at the blog err…whateverz. snugglebus I has posted a couple of nice posts on Speculative Realism. Before getting to the actual content of the posts, I’d first like to note that I love it that here in the blogosphere making interesting and thoughtful remarks with names like “snugglebus”. Moving on to the content, snugglebug defends speculative realism against some criticisms by Giuseppe in his second post. As snugglebus writes:

Responding in the comments however, Giuseppe thinks I kind missed the point entirely. As he put it:

what is it that lures intellectuals into the comfort of “reality” in the rather consolidated turn that so many social sciences are experiencing towards some form of “ontology” (another way, very academic indeed, to name the interest in the “real” nature of things)?… I suspect it has something to do with a very precise insecurity and a certain modesty that affects social scientists when they are compared to solid scientists: the former would talk about real, solid, things, the first would just babble away about the sex of angels.

Ok – I’ll take the bait! I’m not an SR scholar, just an interested, but uninvested, spectator, so I might not be the most effective spokesperson, but this will help me start to work out my own thoughts on a group of thinkers who I have been following for a while now.

I think there is a lot more to the success of SR than a reactionary response to the fact that ‘physical’ science is saying ever more concrete things about areas that were once the preserve of social scientists. Just anecdotally SR people (see for example Larval subjects here) seem to be intensely interested in hard science and thinking its consequences (though SR is concerned above all with metaphysics, not philosophy of science). In fact I think it would be more productive to turn Giuseppe’s view on its head: isn’t it actually crude idealism that expresses the insecurity (in a very different, less modest form than Giuseppe meant) of social science? Doesn’t idealism sometimes seem to shut scientific ‘reality’ away, seeing science somewhere between a naïve enterprise at one end of the spectrum (whereas we know that ‘truth’ is a function of consciousness, power, signs etc.), or just a separate field that is at best interesting, but not our concern as social scientists…?

Obviously I cannot speak for all the speculative realists and, in fact, it is impossible to do so as our positions tend to be radically different. For example, beyond a rejection of the centrality of the human, my own thought shares almost nothing in common with that of Brassier’s. Brassier advocates a sort of eliminative materialism that leans heavily on the hard sciences, whereas I advocate a realism. While there is a robust place for the sciences in my ontology, I do not see the sciences as delivering us to “true reality” whereas all the other disciplines investigate things that are epiphenomenal or mere illusions. In this I follow Bruno Latour in his rejection of the nature/culture distinction, the division of the world into two distinct ontological domains– the domain of nature and the domain of the subject –and instead replace this division with collectives of human and non-human actors. This is quite a difference.

read on!

Giuseppe raises a question that the speculative realists, and especially the object-oriented ontologists, have had to address again and again. We’ve made some headway in addressing these assumptions, but I suspect we’ll have to do so many times again in the future as OOO continues to develop. Certain intellectual categories are deeply sedimented in our culture, and this is above all the case with the distinction between nature and culture, nature and society, or object and subject. As a result of this, whenever the term “realism” is evoked there is a tendency to immediately arrive at the conclusion that one is siding with the nature side of this binary and disavowing the “distortions” of culture, society, perception, mind, and thought. In other words, the real is implicitly treated as falling on the nature side of the equation and the non-real on the social-cultural-mental side of the equation.

This, however, is not the move that OOO is making. OOO is not drawing a distinction between two ontological orders, nature and culture, and then seeking to reduce one to the other or escape the illusions of the latter, but rather is abolishing the distinction altogether. This point can be elucidated through reference to the diagram to the right. Let line AB refer to Nature and line CD refer to Culture-Society-Mind-Language (etc). Within the modernist framework, we have two distinct ontological realms that never touch one another. Within the game of modernist ontology you are thus required to choose one or the other of these lines and show how the other is derivative from that line. Thus, for example, the neurologist or sociobiologist has chosen the Nature line, CD, and sets about attempting to show how all of the formations of Culture are really fetishes and illusions produced as a result of natural causal processes.

If one chooses the AB or Culture-Society-Mind-Language line, we get the inversion of the “naturalists” gesture. Rather than showing how mind and the social are products of natural causal processes, the anti-realist instead shows how Nature is constructed by perception, society, culture, mind, or language. In other words, with the anti-realisms we get the inverse gesture of naturalistic materialism. The conclusion to be drawn is that both naturalistic materialism and anti-realism share the same “meta-ontology” or framework of thought. When I evoke the concept of a “meta-ontology” I am not speaking of the specific ontologies that philosophers such as Spinoza, Hume, or Kant might formulate. A meta-ontology is not attached to any specific thinker, but rather consists of the broad ontological assumptions inhabiting a particular milieu. Meta-ontology is ontologically and epistemologically neutral in that it embodies and houuses contradictory positions while nonetheless remaining the same. What a meta-ontology does is delineate the philosophical possibilities within a particular historical milieu. Despite the fact that Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant, and Hume all have opposed philosophies, their philosophies nonetheless inhabit the same meta-ontology. In this respect, a meta-ontology is a bit like a Foucaultian episteme. It will be recalled that the epistemes haunting the historical sequences investigated by Foucault in his magnificent Order of Things allow for a plurality of different positions in the social sciences.

When Giuseppe suggests that the speculative realists have turned to ontology and advocated realism on the grounds that we are insecure about the hard sciences, he reveals the meta-ontology within which he is working: That the only possible realism is one in which the philosopher turns towards nature as the real and explains culture in terms of nature or simply ignores the cultural-social-mental-linguistic altogether. But this is not what OOO is doing. In many respects it could be said that OOO is fed up with modernist reductivisms of all sorts, whether they be in the form of eliminative idealist reductions or eliminative materialist reductions. Where the modernist imperative is to reduce something to something else whether we are reducing objects to fields of the subject or the field of the subject to the material, OOO acknowledges dependency relations while vigorously reduction of one entity to another. As I have put it in another context, OOO is a slutty or promiscuous ontology. It does not aim at fewer but rather more entities. Moreover, it places entities of all sorts, whether social or natural, on equal ontological footing. This is not to say that all entities equally make a difference, but that all entities, whether cultural or natural are equally real.

Where the modernist constitution demands that we either choose line AB, or the Nature line, or line CD, the Culture line, reducing one line to the other, OOO draws a transversal line, SP, across both lines, abolishing the idea of two separate ontological domains that somehow have to be brought into contact and reduced to one or the other. In other words, instead of society on the one hand and nature on the other hand, we get collectives of social and natural object that interact with one another.

This brings me to the issue of the human or social sciences. One of the reasons I find OOO powerfully attractive is not because I want to escape the “softness” of the social sciences to the “hardness” of the natural sciences, but precisely because I want good social and political theory. In its obsession with a single gap between humans and world and the question of how these two domains can be related to one another, I believe that social and political theory has been led to a number of unfortunate theoretical decisions that lead to distorted analyses of the social sphere. Treating objects as mere receptacles for social forces, language, ideas, perceptions, etc., that contribute no differences of their own, social and political theory comes to focus almost exclusively on the discursive, the linguistic, texts, norms, social forces, and so on. As a result, it is led to ignore the role played by nonhuman objects the form or pattern that social fields come to embody. For example, as far as I can tell, contemporary sociology and social theory has a very difficult time discussing the role that a particular layout of public transit plays in the social organization of Chicago. Likewise, contemporary social and political thought has a very difficult time discussing the role that rice cultivation, the fact that it could yield three harvests a year, and how those crops had to be planted and harvested played in the social configurations of 16th Century China. Similarly, it has a difficult time discussing the role played by grain production in Europe between the 15th and 18th century and its fluctuations (and there were many) played in the form social relations took. And again, ignoring the rise of the city during this same time period, it has a difficult time explaining the rise of the incredibly strange idea of selling one’s labor as a commodity, because it tends to ignore the fact that city dwellers were no longer self-sufficient like peasants, but rather required money to pay for food, clothing, and housing to live in the city. In all these cases, a focus on mind, culture, society, language, and so on tends to render these other actors, these nonhuman actors, invisible to analysis. As a result we find ourselves resorting, in an almost knee jerk fashion, to “false consciousness” explanations of social relations.

Let me be clear because the modernist that sorts the world into two distinct ontological domains that are autonomous from one another has, I think, a very difficult time hearing what I’m saying when I make these points. The point here is not that we should abandon talk of norms, beliefs, ideologies, texts, and so on, so as to exclusively discuss techniques of grain production, distributions of roads, highways, trains, and flight paths between cities, factories, etc. Such a move would remain within the modernist orbit, asking us to forsake the culture-mind-society-language line in favor of the “nature” line or nonhuman actors. No. What I am calling for is analytic tools broad enough to embrace in its social analysis a variety of heterogeneous actors ranging from the technological, to practices of food production, the availability of food, the layout of roads and trains, the role of mountains, lakes, and oceans, texts, ideologies, narratives, norms, humans, networks of human relations, etc.

The anthropologist Arjun Appadurai– and generally ethnographers are very good on these points, weaving together the semiotic, the “natural”, the technological, the legal, the amorous, etc –makes this point nicely in his book Modernity at Large. There Appadurai proposes the notion of “scapes” that are something like fields of consistency presiding over relations between humans and nonhumans. In this connection, Appadurai proposes ethnoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, and ideoscapes all interacting in the production of cultural phenomena. To this we could add “naturescapes” and “weather” or “meteoroscapes”. The point is that we must become clear about the role played by these different fields in the formation of planes of consistency or collectives and how these different scapes interact with one another. We must overcome the illusion of thinking that the slice of the real we are investigating– for example ideology –exhausts the field out of which it is drawn. As Luhmann observes, an environment is always more complex than the system that relates to that environment. Theory, I believe, perpetually suffers from confusing system and environment, treating the distinctions operative in the system as exhaustive of the environment and thereby rendering entire fields of factors invisible. Is it our fault that the world is complicated and flat?

In this connection snugglebus, in his first post, already provides a simple object-oriented social analysis of how object-oriented ontology came to be. As snugglebus writes:

What is it about SR that has lent itself to this kind of blogosphere success? Obviously the fact that it had some prolific and well-known practitioners who blog helped, but generally I think it is also possible to perceive at least 3 superficial features which I would say have helped. SR benefits from being a (relatively) clear intellectual project (and therefore gives some key rallying points for prospective adherents), timely, and for want of a better word ‘sexy’ (the idea of a “turn”, i.e. rejection of predominant trends in favour of something ‘new’, has a particular appeal). Apart from perhaps ‘timeliness’, the other two are replicable.

In the same post snugglebus later goes on to write:

So the what conclusions to draw?

* SR would not have existed if it was grounded in mainstream academia, though now exists symbiotically with academia.

* The key elements of SR that have made it successful in the blogosphere have been a clear, attractive, but broad identity, around which people can rally, and the willingness of proponents to engage in dialogue with people from different disciplines, and with people who have no prior reputation, itself applying a certain genoristy in exchange.

* The blogosphere itself has added speed, and breadth, as well as contributing to this sense of openness.

There is probably an interesting question to pose about how this has then shaped the ideas of SR itself, but that’s beyond my both my-grade and concern here I think.

Let me note that this is only a thumbnail or brief example of what an object-oriented social analysis might look like. However, look at the motley army of actors snugglebus refers to in his discussion of the formation of speculative realism (and his whole analysis is well worth reading). Rather than a single obsession with the relation between humans and the world, snugglebus simultaneously treats the internet or technology as an actor in this movement, a particular electronic community (the theory blogosphere), contingent or chance encounters between different humans such as the encounter between Graham, Nick, Ben, Reid, Shaviro, Jodi, N.Pepperell, Jon Cogburn, Mel, Protevi, Mikhail, Nikki, Peter, Kvond, etc., and many others, the ideational, the amorous or libidinal, speeds of communication and exchange, the universities, and so on. None of these actors can be said to overdetermine the other. The internet, for example, did not make speculative realism or cause speculative realism, but in many respects speculative realism would not exist as it now does without the theory blogosphere or the internet. However, while it’s unlikely that speculative realism could have taken place in its current form in the halls of the academy alone, it is now feeding back on that “scape”. Increasingly papers are getting published in this area, various texts by speculative realist thinkers such as myself and Harman are being taught both inside and outside of philosophy courses, graduate students are taking these trends seriously and organizing their dissertation work and conference presentations around these subjects, and so on. Even the dissenting voices serve a role in bringing SR into the walls of the academy.

And not only do technologies, human encounters, ideoscapic features such as “timeliness”, and affective dimensions such as “sexiness” play a role in these developments, but even simple signifiers or signs have been actors playing a significant role in the development of this thought. Thus, for example, the term “Speculative Realism” was more or less an accident. The four philosophers that participated in the legendary Goldsmith’s conference back in 2007, sharing little in common beyond advocating some form of realism and a rejection of correlationism, anti-realisms, or philosophies of access, needed a name for the event and settled on the title “Speculative Realism”. Yet the signifier “Speculative Realism” created the phantom of an entity that has itself played a role in both shaping the reception of these thinkers and the movement itself. The signifier here was an actor.

Likewise, norms have been actors in this movement as well. Back in the day of the notorious “correlationism or Kant wars” that took place on this blog around February, much of the discussion revolved around norms of interpretation, argumentation, and how people ought to engage with one another in philosophical discourse. Here the norms did not precede these encounters– except in perhaps a virtual or potential fashion –but were more or less emergent from the encounter. As Latour observes so beautifully in The Politics of Nature, discussions of normativity tend to arise only when a new actor, a surprising actor, appears within a collective and struggle ensues as to where it is to be placed, how hierarchies need to be re-ordered, and so on. This was certainly the case in the “Kant wars”. In some cases, pre-existing norms were evoked and applied to the appearance of this strange new actor, calling into question both protocols or norms of standard continental argumentation and philosophical engagement. In most of the other cases, norms were being built, enginnering new relations among actors. One of the things that I find most remarkable in these discussions is that where blog posts were previously devoted to exposition over some philosopher’s text, participants began to existentially avow and argue for certain philosophical positions rather than simply engaging in explication de texte. While texts were still endlessly discussed, it was no longer possible to simply “talk about” a philosopher or text, but it now became necessary to elaborate arguments and positions, to take stands. What really shocks me is the rapidity with which this shift took place. Where before we were all simply “referencing out”, evoking this or that philosopher in a discussion, now suddenly we were engaged in tooth and nail debate making claims not about philosophers, but about being, norms, reality, and so on. Semantically the evocation of a philosopher changed markedly. It was no longer a question of elaborating the philosopher, but of evoking a sequence of argument in an existentially committed debate. It’s been remarkable to behold.

Nor would speculative realism exist as it now does without the cross fertilizations of textual backgrounds between the different people that came to participate in these exchanges. Graham, of course, has had a decisive impact on my thought and has led me to read figures such as Zubiri, Bhaskar, and Latour. Mel introduced me to Latour, Kittler, Ong, Bogost, and a whole host of other thinkers. Shaviro got me back into Whitehead. And so on. And to snugglebus’ merit, while he doesn’t execute the analysis himself, he does node to the parity or reciprocity of interactions between these different human and nonhuman actors, wondering how the medium of the blogosphere itself, of the internet itself, might play a role in moulding or influencing the content of speculative realist thought. In other words, we don’t have unilateral determination between human actors or objects and nonhuman actors and objects, but rather have bilateral relations where influence moves in both directions.

Enough for now. Read snugglebus’ posts.

Vores venner på Skandinavisk Luhmann Forum og seje Jesper Tække har spammet os og vi sender straks spammen videre:

Luhmann og medierne

Endagsseminar fredag d. 11 december Århus, Danmark

Niklas Luhmann har skabt en mange facetteret og ikke deterministisk kommunikationssociologisk teori om medier, der åbner for analyser på højde med de nuværende interaktioner, organisationer og samfund.

I sit hovedværk fra 1984 Sociale systemer arbejder Luhmann med tre forskellige typer medier, der evolutionært udviklede sandsynliggør at kommunikation lykkes. I Luhmanns hovedværk fra 1997 Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, samt i en lang række artikler og andre værker, arbejder Luhmann også med et helt rent og abstrakt mediebegreb, som udover logisk og teoretisk at kunne forklare de tre tidligere medietyper, også kan anvendes til at analysere en lang række andre fænomener i det nuværende samfund. På dette seminar stilles der skarpt på Luhmann og medierne. Det koster 200 kr. at deltage, men så er der også fuld forplejning. Se program med mere og meld dig til på denne side:

http://www.imv.au.dk/luhmann/forside

Oplægsholdere: Lotte Hansen (DK), Gorm Harste (DK), Jan Inge Jönhil (SV), Lars Clausen (DK), Helle Mathisen (DK), Peter Kåhre (SV), Heike Graf (SV).

Ordstyrer: Michael Paulsen
Vært og ordstyrer:  Jesper Tække (imvjet@hum.au.dk)

Hold dig orienteret på seminarets website:
http://www.imv.au.dk/luhmann/forside

Samt på Skandinavisk Luhmann Forum:
http://uk.groups.yahoo.com/group/luhmann_danish/

Mange hilsner
Jesper

Jesper Tække
Assistant Professor, PhD
Information and Media Studies
Aarhus University

http://www.jespertaekke.dk
imvjet@hum.au.dk

Dois sistemas operacionalmente fechados: humanos.

Irritações mútuas: encantamento.

Diferenciação funcional: mudança.

Um acoplamento estrutural: amor.

Estabelecimento de um código único: amo você.

In the previous post I mentioned Luhmann for the first time. As his systems theory was of initial inspiration for starting this quest, I will try to elaborate on that now. Niklas Luhmann was a German sociologist, or, more striking, a social theorist, and his systems theory is very interesting to say the least, but also very difficult to grasp, not only because he has written all of his work in German.

Model of autopoiesis according to Maturana and Varela (1)

So how can his theories help me in my quest? Luhmann’s core element in his theories is communication, not people, which is fundamentally different from traditional social sciences. Communicative actions of people are constituted (but not defined) by society, and society is constituted (but not defined) by the communicative actions of people. Therefore, society is people’s environment, and people are society’s environment. His theory also states that systems evolve from their environment by chance and have no understanding of how other systems perceive their environment. This process is also known as autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela, see model on the image¹), which literally means self-creation, and is closely related to self-organization but also has some recursive elements. Now his theories are not only too theoretical and abstract for now, but also tend to be too comprehensive and raises new questions such as the double contingency problem. Therefore I will try to focus on how his theories or parts of his theories can help me.

I think the concept of communication as a core element can help me. By focusing on communicative action of people and their societies, we’re talking really about an open system. An open system is a black box that itself changes its internal organization as a response to changes in its environment. When these changes in turn have an effect on the environment, a positive feedback loop is established.

To answer the question in the title, Luhmann can partly help me. By seeing the society as Luhmann states it as the environment, it helps me to give direction to cope with self-organization. It helps to see the communicative actions of people and their changing environment as an open system, which reinforce and influence each other. I think I have to focus more on this reinforcement or influence. Basically this is a continuously ongoing negotiation of meaning. Negotiation of meaning is based on the tension (or duality) between reification and participation (Wenger). That makes things less abstract because it enables me to take the context of this research into account. Probably more about the negotiation of meaning in the next post.

¹) This model of autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela) covers the complete spectrum of living systems – from the smallest organisms and animals through to communities such as social insects right through to advanced human societies.

Weiß ich auch, dass ich gestern meine Blumen gegossen habe aus den Medien? Wohl nicht. Ansonsten schreibt Luhmann den Massenmedien die Funktion zu über Themen Verbindung zwischen einzelnen gesellschaftlichen Teilsystemen herzustellen. Für Tokio Hotel gilt wohl, dass sie Erfahrungen aus Interaktionssystemen nicht mehr verarbeiten können. Bei der geringen Größe eines Tourbusses fragt man sich dann doch, wie es um den Drogenkonsum steht. Bill sucht ja auch per Bild nach einer neuen Knutsch-Freundin. Mehr liefert Bild wohl nicht, hätte er mal die Bravo gefragt.

Eine interessante Aufsatzsammlung.

Wenn ich mal groß bin und felsenfest davon überzeugt, anderen die Welt, wenn schon nicht erklären, dann wenigstens näherbringen zu können – vielleicht schlimmer noch: zu müssen – dann würde ich bestimmt Sätze schreiben, in denen ich Niklas Luhmann als den ‘Theoretiker mit dem über die Jahre indifferenten Sakko’ bezeichnen würde. Dafür müsste ich natürlich erstmal differenzieren, die einen ins Töpfchen, die anderen ins Kröpfchen, hier der Habermas, da der Antihumanist, was sich auch auf Antichrist reimt. Man sieht, einer wertenden Kategorisierung ist dabei kaum zu entkommen.

Zum Glück. Denn was sollten wir fragen, wenn es Antworten schon gäbe?

Post
Warum wir dauernd Post-Kategorien bilden müssen, von Post-Folk, bis Post-Moderne: Weil wir uns das prozessuale Denken so angewöhnt haben. Liegt natürlich auch an der fehlenden historischen Distanz: Wer mittendrin ist, ist dabei. Und kann nicht raus – und traut sich schon gar nicht eine wirklich auch begrifflich trennscharfe, eine sich zunächst über die Zustände und Prozesse, deren Teil man ganz logischerweise ist, erhebende Analyse zu schaffen.

Stand on your hands
Wenn dieser Standpunkt überhaupt möglich ist. Andererseits muss ja dann gelten, dass je mehr im Detail, je konkreter Beobachtungen sind desto besser kann man sie gerade eben jetzt machen. Weil niemand später so dabei sein wird, wie wir jetzt. Wir haben dagegen Schwierigkeiten uns selbst zu abstrahieren.

Oder aber auch:
Dadurch, dass wir zuviel über das vor uns wissen und die Kontinuitäten sehen, gelingt es uns nicht die Spezifitäten der eigenen Zeit zu erkennen.

Mutmaßung
Vielleicht ist das aber auch ganz individuell, dieses Zuwenig an Wissen. Und ich muss nur alles weiter lesen, sammeln und zusammenfügen – vielleicht ist aber gerade das ZUSAMMENFÜGEN die falsche Taktik –, nein sammeln und inkohärent nebeneinanderstehen lassen, dann sehen, wo es nicht zusammenpasst. Neue Begriffe finden. Und beginnen zu sprechen.

For the last few days I’ve been a bit remiss in responding to comments and email due to being swamped with other things. I apologize for this. Today, in response to my post on Orientalism, Jerry the Anthropologist writes:

Allow me to wonder how this post might look to someone reading it at Universitas Kebangsaan Malayu or at Gadjah Mada or at San Carlos. Its not that I don’t appreciate (or that they might not appreciate) the elegance of the argument.

Put another way, somewhat over 50 years ago, after having examined somewhat over 300 definitions of culture, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn wondered whether its not so important what culture is as what culture does.

Hopefully my friend Jerry will say a bit more about his distinction between “culture being” and “culture doing”. For my own part, I have become suspicious of concepts like “society”, “culture”, “economy”, “language”, etc., because I think all too often these concepts tend to hypostatize phenomena that are really complex networks of interactions. South Park recently had an uncharacteristically good episode on precisely this issue with respect to the economy that is well worth watching. We treat the economy as if it itself were doing something, as if it were an entity– the episode is all about how we have “angered” the economy and must repent –when, in fact, the economy is us. The thesis of this post is that we tend to hypostatize things like “culture” and “society”, turning them into entities when, in fact, they’re processes. In developing this line of thought, I am not denying phenomena like orientalism, but raising ontological questions about the conditions under which it is possible.

This, I think, is part of the importance of the concept of “assemblage” or “network”, as opposed to that of “system” or “structure”. By system or structure I understand a form of organization where the elements are inseparable from one another such that their being is purely a function of their relations within that organization. For example, in structural linguistics the phoneme p is nothing apart its differential relation to the phoneme b. Indeed, according to this account we already speak poorly by referring to “b” and “p” as phonemes as there is only b-p or the differential relation defining the two terms. This sort of concept then gets applied to social phenomena as well, such that no element in the social exists apart from the other elements, or rather, all of the elements are what they are by virtue of belonging to the organization. From a system theoretical perspective, the analogy is generally to biology where all the elements are understood to have a functional role and set of interdependencies within the social system. From the structural perspective the analogy is to structural linguistics where the elements are inseparable and only take on identity differentially.

read on!

While I think both of these approaches can be fruitful research models, I also think they make for bad social ontology. That is, if we hypostatize the model and treat it as an entity in its own right– speaking of “culture” as doing something, for example –we’re led to all sorts of poorly posed questions and problems. The notion of an assemblage or network is at once cruder than that of structure or system and more fluid and open. Like the concepts of system and structure, the concept of network or assemblage recognizes the importance of relation. Unlike the notion of system or structure, the concept of network or assemblage rejects the thesis that the elements participating in a network or assemblage are constituted by that network or assemblage. The elements of a network or assemblage, unlike a structure or a system, can and do withdraw from their social relations and can enter into new social relations. In other words, relations in a network based approach are not internal to their terms but are always external to their terms.

Moreover, unlike the notion of structure (matters are more complicated with the systems theoretical perspective in the social sciences), assemblages or networks sustain themselves through ongoing interactions among their elements. Although Gregory Bateson does not himself formulate a concept of network or assemblage, his essay “Morale and National Character” in Steps to An Ecology of Mind provides a nice example of what a network based analysis of social phenomena might look like. If Bateson is relevant in this connection, then this is because he emphasizes the genesis of patterned forms of organization, rather than treating these forms of organization as transcendent and sedentary organizing structures. In other words, for Bateson pattern or organization is a product or result– which, of course, the scientist is free to examine as a snapshot of becoming just as a scientist might study a caterpillar for its own sake, ignoring how it becomes a butterfly –and is not a cause or a condition.

If there is a “cash-value” to the concept of network or assemblage, then it lies in the manner in which it draws our attention to the manner in which social relations must be made and re-made over time through the ongoing activities of their elements. It was this that I tried to get at in my post Entropy and Locality, where I attempted to make the case that the concept of entropy should play a central role in our understanding of social phenomena. In other words, 1) under what conditions do we move from a state of high social entropy or a low degree of organization to conditions of mid-level and low-level social entropy or high coefficients of organization, and 2) what are the processes by which these low and mid-level degrees of social entropy are produced and maintained?

In my view the shift from a system based or structural based model of social relations to an assemblage based model of social relations significantly changes the nature of the questions we ask with respect to phenomena like Orientalism. In both system based and structural based models, relations are understood as being internal to their terms such that terms do not exist independent of their relations. For the systems theorist, say Niklas Luhmann, there will be an emphasis on operational closure where information is constituted by a code belonging to the system. Insofar as any social system is held to be a totality organized around its own codes, any portrayal of the “other” as in another culture will be akin to the essentializing phenomena of Orientalism. Similarly, a structural approach, also endorsing the thesis that relations are always internal to their terms, will examine the way in which relations between one social organization and another social organization are diacritically constituted. In both cases the researcher begins with an idealized model of the social that is transcendent and determinative of interactions and then proceeds to interpret phenomena in terms of that transcendent model.

By contrast, insofar as an assemblage based approach begins with the thesis that relations are external to their terms, it begins with the question “to what sorts of assemblages do phenomena such as Orientalism belong?” Here the emphasis is on elements of an assemblage and interactions among those elements. The assemblage based theorist will be happy to concede that texts like Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, and Lectures on History, and Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation are characterized by a high coefficient of Orientalism. However, the reason for this is not to be located in the legibility of their texts per se, but rather in the assemblages to which these texts belong. Crudely put, these are assemblages where the East is present more or less only as a signifier and thus where all the construction of pattern, social relations, and identity comes from within the assemblage. Just as speciation can take place through geographical isolation, social assemblages can shore up their relative identity through a relative lack of interaction with other elements from other assemblages. In short, in these situations there is no inter-assemblic communication.

The situation changes significantly when we do have inter-assemblic communication or interaction. Since elements are external to their terms, the encounter of new elements forming a new assembly also sets socio-genesis in action such that all elements in the assemblage become bricoleurs. Here you get not re-production of a particular assemblic organization, but you get new forms of socio-genesis and psycho-genesis where new identities and forms of organization are produced. If the bricoleur differs from the engineer, then this is because while both draw on local materials, the former has no fixed or sedentary rules to draw upon. This is the case with inter-assemblic interactions where there are indeed pre-existent customs, traditions, history, etc., to draw on, but where the heterogeneity of the relations sets all participants involved in becoming-other, inventing something new out of the amalgam of these materials. Due to the profound migrational shifts that characterize our own age, coupled with the unprecedented developments of information and communications technology, our world is increasingly characterized by these inter-assemblic relations.

In listening to the daily flood of new documented insights about the former Bush Administration’s “Enhanced Interrogation Technique” practices, one of the most frustrating elements of the whole discussion is that it has been pitched in terms of the question “does torture work or not?” Although it strikes me as obvious that torture does not work– one need only read the first volume of Aleksander Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago to get this –the truly frustrating thing about the whole debate is that it shouldn’t be a debate at all. Why don’t we see more people standing up and saying “It doesn’t fucking matter whether or not it works! It’s wrong!” Not only are there countless utilitarian reasons as to why this is bad policy, there is the, above all, the simple point of our own dignity and the dignity of other humans. However, perhaps part of the reason such a debate is so upsetting has to do with the very nature of topics and how they function in the social field. All of this brought me to reflect on a passage from Niklas Luhmann’s wonderful Reality of the Mass Media today. Luhmann writes:

Topics… serve the structural coupling of the mass media with other social domains; and in doing this they are so elastic, and so diversifiable that the mass media are able to use their topics to reach every part of society, whereas the systems in the inner social environment of the mass media, such as politics, the economy or law, often have difficulty presenting their topics to the mass media and having them taken up in an appropriate way. The success of the mass media throughout society is based on making sure that topics are accepted, regardless of whether there is a positive or a negative response to information, proposals for meaning-making or recognizable judgments. Interest in a topic is frequently based precisely on the fact that both positions are possible [my emphasis]. (12 – 13)

It’s a real pity that Luhmann’s sociological theory has not gotten more attention, though not a surprise given the difficulty of some of his work. In works like his monumental Social Systems, Luhmann following the work of Maturana and Varela in biology and cognitive science, sought to understand the social field as a dynamic, autopoietic system composed of nothing but events that both produce and reproduce the system in time. Luhmann’s heretical sociological thesis was that the social is composed of nothing but communications. In other words, in the parlance of autopoietic systems theory, individuals and persons do not belong to social systems, but rather belong to the environment of social systems. They are, as it were, entirely outside social systems. As a result, communications are not, according to Luhmann, the product of persons, but rather communications are the product of other communications. Persons can irritate social systems– Luhmann’s technical word for “stimulate” –but persons as such never provide information– difference that make a difference –for social systems. This is because what counts as information is always based on a code that is self-referential in character. If the codes determining whether or not something counts as information (an event) is self-referential in character, that is because information does not belong to the environment of the system– it is not in the “things themselves” –but is rather constituted by the system itself. Put otherwise, there must be an “ontogeny” of information that is system specific. In short, systems are “organizationally closed”. Just as the elements of a biological cell both are a product of and reproduce the cell itself, and just as the cell is only selectively open to an environment or other cells about it, social systems are characterized by an organizational closure that renders them only selectively open to the world about them.

read on!

If Luhmann is right, then one of the prime questions of social and political theory becomes that of how it is possible to engage with this organizational closure of systems. Given that social systems are only selectively open to their environment based on a code that the system itself dictates (self-referentiality), the question becomes one of how it is possible to modify that code and engage that code so that it might become possible to generate new forms of information (new events capable of participating in the ongoing autopoiesis or re/production of the organization of the system).

And this, ultimately, is what is so important about topics as described by Luhmann. The thing to notice about Luhmann’s understanding of topics as they function in the ongoing autopoiesis of media systems is their bi-valence. Like Deleuze’s sterile sense in The Logic of Sense that is indifferent to whether or not it is affirmed or denied, rejected or accepted, Luhmann’s topics are indifferent to whether or not one is for or against the issue at hand. Indeed, the more disagreement there is over a topic, the more effectively the topic functions in promoting the ongoing autopoiesis of the social system by generating further communicative events that allow the system to re/produce itself as is (this identity, of course, being a dynamic process oriented identity like that of a cell, not a static structural identity) the better. There is thus something prior to (in the transcendental sense) propositions or judgments and arguments, that functions, as Deleuze had it, as the true generative transcendental condition of manifestation (the indexical from which a proposition is enunciated: “yesterday”, “tomorrow”, “I”, “you”, “we”, “the government”, “the party”, etc), denotation (the referent), and signification (the proposition) and from which these other three terms flower. This fourth generative dimension would be the sense or what Luhmann calls a “topic” (here I’m obviously squishing Deleuze’s and Luhmann’s terms together, though I think with some fidelity to both).

The upshot of all this is that rhetorical victory consists not in presenting the argument that has greater persuasive force either through its affective power or its logical rigor. We would like to think that this is the case, and indeed we sometimes score rhetorical victories on these grounds. However, while triumphing in debate either through marshaling all the embodied force of affectivity in an audience or through logical and deductive rigor, we still remain shackled to the topic or sense of the debate itself, in much the same way that Foucault argued that knowledge in the human sciences is governed by an episteme that exceeds whatever position one might take within the field of this episteme. The truly winning move– and here Deleuze’s meditations on the nature of games in The Logic of Sense is of the utmost relevance –is to escape the game altogether and create either an entirely new game or a game with rules that perpetually change. Zizek expresses this point with the utmost clarity in his short introduction to Mao’s “On Practice and Contradiction”.

The true victory (the true ‘negation of negation’) occurs when the enemy talks your language. In this sense, a true victory is a victory in defeat: it occurs when one’s specific message is accepted as a universal ground, even by the enemy. (Say, in the case of rational science versus belief, the true victory of science takes place when the church starts to defend itself in the language of science.) Or, in the contemporary politics of the United Kingdom, as many a perspicuous commentator observed, the Thatcher revolution was in itself chaotic, impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies, and it was only the ‘Third Way’ Blairite government which was able to instituionalize it, to stablize it into new institutionalized forms, or, to put it in Hegelese, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. (17)

Something similar took place in the United States in the transition from Reagan to Clinton. All things being equal, privatization and de-regulation proceeded at a pace that Reagan and his followers could have only dreamed of during the Reagan administration. The crucial point, however, was that by the time we reached the Clinton administration Reagan’s policies had become the “transcendental” sense of any and all political discussions, defining the vector or coordinate field for any possible position one might take. Reagan triumphed even though under a Democratic president. And likewise in the case of the church. Zizek’s point isn’t that in accepting the language of science the church suddenly gives up on transcendence, salvation, etc., but rather that it gets imbricated in a logic that exceeds it and that delimits its possibilities in advance. There’s a very real sense in which the shift from Creationism to Intelligent Design, despite all of the rhetorical subterfuge of the latter position, defines a genuine triumph for the evolutionary perspective because, at least implicitly, the Intelligent Design position is now opening itself up to the mechanisms of immanent critique as defined by scientific methodology. The real triumph to be aimed at, then, is the triumph of topics or sense, not the triumph of a particular position. In other words, prior to asking whether or not we advocate a particular position our first question should be to ask whether or not it is the topics, the sense, that are themselves the problem. Like the denunciation of a “false dilemma fallacy”, we should ask whether or not escape is not the better option.

And this, perhaps, is why the framing of the debate over rendition, indefinite detention without legal recourse, torture, etc., is so distressing. Ultimately it is not a debate over whether or not torture works, but rather over the meaning of the law. In framing the debate over these issues, whether one is for or against, in terms of whether or not it works one is ultimately claiming that the law itself is shackled to a set of utilitarian considerations that, in effect, mark the erasure of any and all law. It entails, as it were, that we are all homo sacer should expediency and circumstance demand it.

Die Angst vor der Schweinegrippe bestimmt den Alltag in Mexiko. Ansteckende Krankheiten sind in einer immer offeneren Welt ein wichtiges Thema. (CC auf Flickr.com / © Eneas de Troya 2009)

von Stefan Spiess (3.Update Medien, Blogschau & Nachtrag)

Krankheiten sind ein wichtiger Bestandteil des menschlichen Zusammenlebens – nicht erst seit der Schweinegrippe. Das fängt schon bei Kleinigkeiten an, beispielsweise wenn Bekannte und Freunde einem sagen, dass sie einen lieber nicht besuchen kommen, wenn man eine schlimme Erkältung hat. Sie könnten sich anstecken, und das ist den meisten Menschen wohl unangenehm.

Für manche Menschen wird eine Krankheit zum lebensbestimmenden Faktor – chronische Krankheit kann einen arbeitsunfähig machen, unheilbare Krankheiten können als ein persönlicher Prüfstein verstanden werden. Und schließlich gibt es Krankheiten, die nicht nur unheilbar oder unangenehm sind. HIV und andere Erreger gelten bis heute als tödlich – die Konsequenzen für den einzelnen wie auch die Gesellschaft, in der er lebt, sind gravierend.

Aus medizinischer Perspektive kann man recht objektive Risiken dafür angeben, wie wahrscheinlich man sich in bestimmten Situationen mit einer Krankheit ansteckt. Man kann aus Erfahrungswerten mit der selben oder ähnlichen Krankheiten Heilungschancen, Therapieerfolge und Einflüsse auf die Lebensqualität von Patienten schätzen. Soziologisch interessant werden diese Ergebnisse, wenn Menschen darauf reagieren, sie interpretieren und in ihre Handlungen und Planung mit einbeziehen.

All diese Informationen sind ausgesprochen kompliziert. Wissenschaftler unterschiedlicher Fachrichtungen können oftmals schon nicht mehr beurteilen, wie richtig die Arbeit des jeweils anderen ist. Allerspätestens bei Laien sind manche Informationen ähnlich mysteriös wie früher “Magie” oder “das Göttliche” – undurchschaubar und fremd. Soziologisch bezeichnet man das auch als “Kontingenzerfahrung“.  Ereignisse scheinen zufallsbestimmt, der Einzelne sieht sich einem unabänderlichen Schicksal gegenüber. Ärzte werden zu modernen Propheten und Wunderheilern. Medikamente, Religiöse Rituale sowie eine Vielzahl an Handlungen, Prozessen und Heilmittel werden zu einer letzten Hoffnung. Nur so kann der einzelne die Unüberschauberkeit ordnen und geplant handeln.

Die Schweinegrippe – die seit kurzem bedroht, sagt man – hat ihren Ursprung wohl in Mexiko. Ich kann nun als  Soziologe nicht beurteilen, wie schlimm diese Krankheit ist, wie gefährdet ich bin, eines Tages daran zu erkranken oder sogar daran zu sterben. Ich bin ebenso Laie und Mensch wie die meisten anderen Leute, wenn es um Medizin oder viele andere Wunderwelten des modernen Lebens geht – Atomkraft und -waffen; Kriege, die von Maschinen geführt werden; unsichtbare Giftstoffe in Lebensmitteln und Spielzeug für Kinder… Die Liste ist lang.

Was man aber als soziologischer Betrachter beobachten kann, ist die Konstruktion von subjektiven Risiken. Die Auswirkungen einer Epi- oder Pandemie auf eine Stadt oder ein ganzes Land.  Den Weg, den eine Krankheit über die Welt nimmt. Und wie sie die Gesellschaften, die mit ihr real oder nur als Bedrohung in Kontakt kommen, verändert. Bis hin in unseren eigenen Mikrokosmos: Muss ich Angst vor der Krankheit haben ?

Eine mexikanische Amateurfotografin beschreibt dieses Bild: "Die Sicherheitskräfte schützen unsere Gesundheit, indem sie ihre Münder bedecken. Dadurch stellen sie sicher, dass der Virus nicht auf andere Personen übertragen wird." Eine von vielen Maßnahmen, die Sicherheit symbolisieren, wenn wir keine mehr empfinden. (CC auf Flickr.com / © Sarihuella 2009)

Das ist eigentlich etwas sehr abstraktes. Eine Bedrohung, die wir nur in Worten wie “hoch infektiös” oder in Prozentzahlen beschreiben können, um das eigentlich unbegreifliche für uns greifbar zu machen. In gesellschaftlichen Prozessen finden solche Ereignisse einen sehr wirklichen Niederschlag. Flughäfen, Diskotheken, Schulen und Einkaufszentren werden zu unkontrollierbaren Risikofaktoren – nur ihre Schliessung verspricht Hoffnung. Menschen werden isoliert, also aus der Menge der gesunden auch räumlich ausgeschlossen, um eine saubere Trennung zwischen Gefahr und Sicherheit heraufzubeschwören.

Die Medien berichten uns davon, was auf der Welt geschieht, über Zeitschriften, das Fernsehen, Radio und eine Vielzahl an Medientypen im Internet dringt die entfernte Gefahr aus Mexiko in unsere Lebenswelt ein.

Im Guardian heisst es beispielsweise:

Dr Jason Eberhart-Phillips, Kansas’s state health officer, said: “Fortunately, the man and woman understand the gravity of the situation and are very willing to isolate themselves.”

Das ist eine harte Strafe und Prüfung für ein soziales Wesen: weggesperrt werden von den eigenen Artgenossen. Krankheit kann als Teil der Person empfunden werden – bin ich nun aussätzig oder gefährlich? Wie lange stelle ich ein Risiko dar? Wann bin ich wirklich gesund? Wo habe ich mich angesteckt? Hätte ich es vermeiden können? Solche Fragen und viele andere können einen Menschen lange Zeit verfolgen. Umso mehr, wenn ein Risiko der Ansteckung besteht. Und, wie so oft, beschliesst man das alles nicht alleine: Wann jemand wieder ein “zumutbares Risiko” ist, wann jemand wieder genauso gefährlich oder ungefährlich ist, wie eben das alltäglich in Kauf genommene Risiko einer Autofahrt, das bestimmen andere mit.

Nun habe ich außergewöhnlich viel geschrieben für einen soziologischen Sonntagsfilm. Das musste aber sein, denn ein solches “gesellschaftliches Experiment” wie eine drohende Epidemie oder gar Pandemie ereignet sich nicht alle Tage. So tragisch die Ereignisse auch sind, sie zeigen auf, wie Menschen Bedrohungen erfahren und konstruieren, wie eine Welt in Angst versucht, um jeden Preis Grenzen zu ziehen in einer Realität, in der es klare Grenzen zwischen “Epidemie” und “Pandemie” nur auf dem Papier gibt. In der “Gefahr” und “Risiko” erst einmal eingekreist werden müssen und teilweise sogar tatsächlich weggesperrt, wie die oben genannten Menschen in Quarantäne. Schliesslich kann man davon ausgehend eine relative Sicherheit empfinden. Durch Prozesse der Abgrenzung versuchen wir, Ordnung in diese Welt zu bringen: Wir schließen Flughäfen, um damit die Welt der Krankheit aus unserer eigenen Welt der Gesundheit herauszuhalten.

Mit Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann, 2009) könnte man sagen:

Tatsächlich arbeiten alle internen Prozesse – und gerade darin besteht der Sinn der Differenz zwischen “innen” und “außen” mit verminderter Komplexität und weisen dadurch weniger Möglichkeiten, also mehr Ordnung auf als ihre Umwelt.

Nun aber: Zum Film. Er ist in Englisch, ca. eine halbe Stunde lang und im Research Channel von Youtube erschienen. Das Thema ist die Evaluation und Reaktion auf natürliche und menschengemachte Epidemien. Wer soziologisch denkt, bemerkt bestimmt gleich die beiden Begriffe “natürlich” und “menschengemacht”. Und wieder eine Grenzziehung mehr…

Ich wünsche viel Spaß beim Schauen und hoffe, dass sich unsere Leser bei diesem Aprilwetter nicht mit irgendwelchen Krankheiten anstecken. Man könnte es auch Sauwetter nennen, aber irgendwie will ich das heute nicht so richtig zu Ende denken… Ein schönes Wochenende wünscht im Namen des gesamten Teams

Stefan Spiess

Nachtrag (26.04.09 um 16:00)

Mittlerweile dürfte ein ebenfalls hochinteressanter Wettbewerb in der Pharmabranche entbrannt sein. Wer hat ein Heilmittel? Hilft es auch? Es wird interessant zu sehen, ob ein Run auf bestimmte Medikamente stattfindet.

Eine weitere Branche, die traditionell von Epidemie- und Pandemieangst profitiert, ist die der gesundheitlichen Schutzprodukte. Bereits bei der letzten Panik wegen des H5N1-Virus (Vogelgrippe) gab es eine Unmenge an nützlichen ebenso wie sinnlosen Produkten, die ein wenig an den kalten Krieg erinnert haben. Darunter: Atombombensichere Betten mit eingebauter Lebenserhaltung, Nahrung und Filteranlagen für den eigenen Bunker im Garten, Atemschutzmasken…

Solche Entwicklungen geben natürlich Verschwörungstheoretikern reichlich Zündstoff. Und so behaupten dann auch manche Leute im Internet, dass die “Panikmache” der Regierungen dazu diene, die Menschen darauf einzustimmen, zu gegebener Zeit bereitwillig der Bildung und “Machtergreifung” einer Weltregierung zuzustimmen. Verglichen mit dem  Wahnsinn, den H1N1 berreits bei gesunden Menschen auslöst,  scheint BSE geradezu harmlos gewesen zu sein…

Ein diskursanalytisches Eldorado – nur wer hat genug Zeit, diese Fülle an Material auszuwerten?

Quellen

Niklas Luhmann: Vertrauen. 4te Auflage. Lucius&Lucius, Suttgart 2009.

Mehr zum Thema in Zeitungen und Onlinemagazinen…

• Sueddeutsche.de – Schweinegrippe breitet sich immer weiter aus
• Zeit.de – Angst vor einer weltweiten Epidemie wächst
• (Update) FTD.de – Schweinegrippe fordert über 80 Tote
  
• (Update) NZZ.de – WHO wegen Schweinegrippe sehr besorgt
• (Update) NZZ.de – Schweiz verzichtet vorerst auf Maßnahmen gegen die Schweinegrippe
• (Update) Telepolis.de – Kommt die globale Grippe-Pandemie?
• (Update) Taz.de – WHO warnt vor weltweiter Ausbreitung
• (Update 2) AZ-online.de – Verdachtsfälle in Neuseeland
• (Update 2) dernewsticker.de – WHO wendet sich um 17 Uhr an die Weltpresse
• (Update 2) HNA.de – Deutschland rüstet sich gegen die Schweinegrippe
• (Update 2) Tagesschau.de – Zahl der Toten in Mexiko steigt
• (Update 2) latimes.com – 11 more suspected swine flu cases in U.S.
• (Update 2) bbc.co.uk – Mexican Flu sparks worldwide fear
• (Update 2) guardian.co.uk – Swine flu: panic spreads worldwide

… und Blogs.

• Manche Leute sind der Meinung, eine Pandemie würde die viel zu große Weltbevölkerung mal ordentlich dezimieren. [Kriegspostille]
• Pandemie oder Epidemie? [landarzt]
• Die Angst vor der Grippe lässt Aktienkurste von Roche steigen [Analyse&Aktion; SideEffects]
• Kommt die Schweinegrippe auch nach Europa und Deutschland? [die-newsblogger; actarias]
• Medikamentenversorgung in Mexiko [Analyse&Aktion]
• Hilft eine Impfung? Was hilft? [Marie's]
• Entstehung und Verbreitung der Schweinegrippe [Nachrichten vom anderen Ende der Medizin]
• (Update) Wie gefährlich ist das Schweinegrippe-Virus? [theolounge]
• (Update) Schweinegrippe in Spanien, England, Israel, Frankreich – USA erklären Katastrophenfall [Analyse&Aktion]

Ciò che sappiamo della scienza, lo sappiamo dai media. E’ infatti attraverso la comunicazione che i progressi del mondo scientifico vengono riportati alla società civile. L’Eurobarometro, rapporto della Commissione Europea su media e ricerca scientifica del 2007, indica che l’interesse per la scienza è più alto rispetto a politica ed economia, e che scienziati e medici sono molto più stimati di politici e giornalisti. Ma il mondo dell’informazione riporta correttamente ciò che la ricerca produce?

I fatti scientifici divengono temi di comunicazione in molti modi. Non solo attraverso l’informazione specializzata, ma anche attraverso quella generalista. “Occorre distinguere almeno tre tipi di comunicazione della scienza” dice Mario Menichella, scrittore scientifico free lance, autore di Professione divulgatore: “C’è la divulgazione propriamente detta, attraverso cui vengono spiegate le scoperte della scienza; poi c’è l’attività di informazione, la cronaca delle novità del mondo scientifico, compiuta dai giornalisti specializzati; infine l’infotainment, commistione fra informazione e intrattenimento”. In questo panorama, se internet ha creato nuovi spazi (come gruppi di discussioni e blog) dove, oltre all’informazione e alla didattica,anche chi non è del settore può occuparsi di hobby scientifici, “la televisione – prosegue – gode del vantaggio di poter trattare alcune materie, come l’astronomia, che si prestano ad essere messe in immagini”. Ed è proprio la tv – sempre secondo l’Eurobarometro – il mezzo preferito a cui attingere informazioni scientifiche, specie con i documentari. Poi vengono giornali, radio, internet e magazine. Gli argomenti più trattati sono la biomedicina e l’ambiente (dati Sissa, Scuola Internazione Superiore di Studi Avanzati), che sono quelli poi ritenuti più interessanti dal pubblico (Eurobarometro). Determinati ambiti scientifici allargano la discussione all’intera società, finendo sulle prime pagine dei quotidiani e dei telegiornali, basti pensare alle emergenze alimentari e ambientali, al dibattito sulla bioetica e alle catastrofi naturali.

Ma la comunicazione scientifica aiuta i cittadini ad acquisire consapevolezza? Secondo Giovanni Spataro, redattore di LeScienze, mensile, edizione italiana di Scientific American, questo per lo più avviene, perchè “anche quando l’informazione non è troppo precisa, incuriosisce e spinge a saperne di più”. D’altronde, si può fare il confronto con altri settori: “Chi ha capito tutto riguardo alla crisi finanziaria, o alle questioni di politica internazionale?”. Il giudizio sull’informazione scientifica può essere dunque positivo. Ci sono progressi rispetto al passato: “Oggi finalmente anche i caporedattori cominciano ad occuparsi di scienza, prima non era così”. Proprio a voler trovare un difetto “forse, con la popolarizzazione delle scienze, è che spesso si vanno a cercare argomenti troppo pop”. Il compito é delicato. Occorre sempre verificare che le ricerche scientifiche di cui si sta parlando siano già state pubblicate su riviste riconosciute nel mondo scientifico. Gli stessi criteri che rendono notiziabile un evento scientifico, a volte non coincidono con quelli classici della cronaca giornalistica. Non é sempre facile “trovare la giusta misura fra la necessità dei giornalisti di raccontare in tempo utile e quella degli scienziati di essere precisi”, come dice il professor Stefano Santini, che insegna Sismologia ad Urbino, riferendosi alla cronaca del terremoto in Abruzzo. In fondo il rischio del sensazionalismo è sempre presente. “Spesso basta un titolo sbagliato per rovinare un ottimo articolo”, avverte Edoardo Rosati, medico e caposervizio delle pagine della salute di Oggi. “Perciò è bene interagire fino all’ultimo con i caporedattori ed evitare eccessiva enfasi”. Nel settore della salute il pubblico è molto esigente, anche perché in questo ambito così delicato “ogni lettore è un potenziale paziente”. E da pazienti, spesso, si affidano alla testata. Trascurando magari il medico generico. In molti casi infatti la comunicazione medico-paziente latita, e i redattori si ritrovano di fronte a domande molto specifiche. “Noi però invitiamo sempre a far riferimento al medico di base, perché si rischia una sovrapposizione dei ruoli molto pericolosa”, precisa Rosati. Nonostante i settimanali permettano poi un maggiore approfondimento rispetto ai quotidiani, gli ambiti che più interessano i lettori sono quelli più prossimi alle loro condizioni di salute. In cima: l’osteoporosi, l’oculistica, la sessuologia e la stitichezza. “Sono i problemi più concreti a generare più domande”.

“Negli ultimi anni è cambiata la comunicazione della scienza. C’é la divulgazione, ma anche l’intrattenimento, l’educazione, la partecipazione pubblica, e sempre più importanti sono l’interazione delle imprese e le pubbliche relazioni, e richiedono strategie diverse” dice Nico Pitrelli, ricercatore in Comunicazione della scienza alla Sissa di Trieste. “Non c’é solo bisogno di ‘traduttori’, ma anche di produttori di contenuti, e diversi sono anche i pubblici, talvolta molto competenti, che sono in grado di orientare la ricerca. Il medico e lo scienziato da soli non possono risolvere tutte le questioni che hanno a che fare con la conoscenza e la società: i media più che uno specchio della realtà scientifica sono un luogo dove costruire la realtà”.