I have in front of me my Today’s History Lesson spreadsheet.  In it are a series of pages…one page per year, one event (occasionally two) per day.  Some days have events running out to 2016, which still surprises me.  History is big.

But today is Christmas Eve, and a quick look at the spreadsheet (which shows topics, for this day, through 2011) , doesn’t really include anything that conveys the spirit of this season.  So, I think I’ll ditch those on the list (actually, I’ll just push them all out another year), and talk briefly about something I read just this afternoon.

I’m just about finished with Charles Whiting’s book Ardennes: The Secret War.  His story of the Battle of the Bulge is told largely from the German perspective, and it makes for interesting reading.  In describing the last Christmas Eve of the war, he writes, “As night descended upon war-torn Europe, it brought with it a strange kind of respite from the bloody struggles of the day and the new ones of the morrow.”

The town of Malmedy enjoyed, relatively speaking, a “sleep in heavenly peace” from the ravages of war.  Just a week before, nearly 100 captured American soldiers had been slaughtered in one of the more infamous atrocities of the war.  In the ensuing days, it had been recaptured by the Americans as the German advance reached its zenith, far short of its intended goals.

And then disaster struck Malmedy again, this time courtesy of the U.S Ninth Air Force.  Unable to find their primary target on December 23rd, the B-29 Superfortresses of the 322nd Bombardment Group headed for their secondary target, the town of Lommersum.  Still lost, they inadvertantly bombed Malmedy instead.  To make matters worse, they didn’t just bomb the town once, but three times.

Malmedy was a shambles, with dozens of American soldiers and hundreds of civilians killed.  The following evening, December 24, 1944, Red Cross trucks showed up at the hospital with gifts for the injured children.  The nuns tending the children stopped their work and sang Silent Night to the soldiers bringing the gifts.

They may not have realized it (and I’m digressing a bit), but the nuns were celebrating the anniversary of one of the most famous Christmas carols ever written.  On December 24, 1818, Josef Mohr (a German priest and the carol’s lyricist) sat down with Franz Gruber (an organist who composed the music) in Gruber’s apartment and, for the first time, put words and music together.  They would introduce it at Midnight Mass as evening turned to morning that night.

Back in Malmedy, however, another drama was unfolding.  Two German soldiers volunteered to sneak into town and bring back their dead comrades lying about.  Moving as quietly as possible, they took each dead soldier to their jeep, working ever closer to the American positions.

Whiting then continues…

“Suddenly, just as they had freed yet another body…, there was the crunch of a boot on the hard snow.  They froze.  The noise came closer.  Dark shapes appeared out of the night.  The two men found themselves staring into the faces of an American patrol, waiting for the first angry challenge to be followed by the shots that would surely kill them.

Nothing happened.  The Americans took another look at the two Germans, then proceeded silently on their way, like neighbors passing each other in the night.”

It’s a shame all differences aren’t handled like that.

Sleep in heavenly peace.

Recommended Reading: Ardennes: The Secret War

The Battle of the Bulge was an offensive born of desperation.  As its creator, Adolf Hitler may have, in the back of his mind, suspected it was a gamble.  But his subordinate generals, closer to reality than their weakening leader, knew without question that it was a last gasp.  Field Marshal Walter Model asked one of his commanders, tasked with a parachute drop, if he believed his chances of success were at least 10 percent.  The commander, completely honest, replied between 10 and 20 percent.  “I wish the whole offensive had the same kind of chance,” said Model. “Then it is necessary to make the attempt, since the entire offensive is the last remaining chance we have of concluding the war favorably.  If we don’t make the most of that ten percent chance, Germany will be faced by certain defeat.”

The German offensive was really a race…a race to reach Antwerp and Brussels before the fuel ran out.  All those divisions that lined up and shoved off against the Allies?  Many of them didn’t have enough fuel to reach their goals unless they could somehow capture it.  That meant overwhelming the British and Americans and destroying their ability to fight without actually destroying the fuel dumps and depots along the way.  It also meant capturing them before the Allies figured out the German weakness.

And so, on the surface, these factors may have helped explain the events at Malmedy, which occurred on December 17, 1944, just one day into the offensive.  It was here that the American 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion had an unplanned meeting with Kampfgruppe Peiper.  Peiper’s forces were part of Dietrich’s Sixth SS Panzer Army we mentioned yesterday, and they were already behind schedule in their efforts to reach the Meuse River.  Late in the morning, they came ripping into Malmedy…and the 285th.

These American troops were about as unseasoned as could be, and had little time to react before Peiper’s lead armor began turning their convoy trucks to burning hulks.  Armed with rifles and a machine gun or two, there was no hope of a successful fight or even retreat, so the 100+ men surrendered.  Peiper himself (and his lead elements) drove through Malmedy.  He wanted to capture an American general, and rumor had one located up the road in Ligneuville.

The remaining Germans marched the captured men of the 285th into a field and summarily executed them.  When the Germans left the scene, a handful of survivors (those who had played dead or fell under dead comrades), made their escapes, returning to safety with a terrible story to tell.  Between 80 and 90 men remained, their bodies turning white and cold under the falling snow.

I said before, desperation may have been a cause for this.  But the facts seem to show otherwise.  First, this wasn’t the first such action in Operation Watch on the Rhine, in just its second day.  There were numerous reports of captured soldiers and civilians being murdered.  Furthermore, Kampfgruppe Peiper had been in Poland, Russia, Italy, and now the regions of Normandy…these men had a fearsome reputation.  Everywhere they went, stories like this followed them.  There were the executions of intellectuals in Poland, Jews in Russia, and Jews in Italy.  Now, it was American soldiers.

And while it would take nearly two months for the site of the massacre to be uncovered, it took just hours for word of the Massacre at Malmedy to make its way through the Allied ranks.  President Roosevelt was quoted as saying, “Well now the average GI will hate the Germans just as much as do the Jews.”  The President was at least partly right.  Numerous soldiers (some instructed by their superiors) enacted a policy of not taking members of the SS alive (Pieper’s men were part of an SS Division), so they simply killed those who surrendered.

It was still early, and the British and Americans were reeling on the Ghost Front, but retribution for Malmedy would become one of the battle cries that winter.

Recommended Reading: The Longest Winter

The Decision 

            Adolf Hitler gathered with the Chiefs of Oberkommando des Wehrmacht on September 16^th 1944 at his “Wolf’s Lair” headquarters in East Prussia.  The situation was critical; he had recently survived an assassination attempt by Army officers led by Colonel Klaus Von Staufenberg at his Wolf’s Lair headquarters in East Prussia.  When the assassination attempt took place the German situation in Normandy was critical. The Americans broke out of the Bocage at St. Lo and spread out across Brittany and the interior of France with Patton’s 3^rd Army leading the way.  Even as his commanders in the West pleaded for permission to withdraw to the Seine Hitler forbade withdraw and ordered a counter attack at Mortain to try to close the gap in the German line and isolate American forces. When the German offensive failed the German front collapsed. 40,000 troops, hundreds of tanks and thousands of vehicles were eliminated when the Americans and Canadians closed the Falaise pocket. Despite this cadres of decimated divisions including SS Panzer, Army Panzer and elite Paratroops made their way out of Normandy.  With the Germans in full retreat the Allies advanced to the border of the Reich itself. On the Eastern Front as well disaster threatened when the Red Army launched an offensive which annihilated Army Group Center and advanced to the border of Poland before outrunning supply lines and stalling on the Vistula.  

Tiger II Advancing in the Ardennes

            Since Normandy Hitler had wanted to counter attack but had neither the forces nor the opportunity to strike the Allied armies. As the Allied offensive ground to a halt due to combat losses, lack of supplies and stiffening German resistance Hitler maintained a close eye on the situation in the West.  He believed that despite their success that the Americans and British alliance was weak and that a decisive blow could cause one or both to drop out of the war. During a briefing an officer noted the events of the day on the Western Front including a minor counterattack by kampfgrüppen of the 2^nd SS Panzer and the 2^nd Panzer Divisions which had made minor gains in the Ardennes, Hitler rose from his seat ““Stop!” He exclaimed. “I have come to a momentous decision. I shall go over to the counterattack….Out of the Ardennes, with the objective Antwerp.””[i]

            Thus began the planning for the last great German offensive of WWII.  Hitler “believed that sufficient damage could be inflicted to fracture the Anglo-American alliance, buy time to strike anew against the Soviets, and allow his swelling arsenal of V-weapons to change the course of the war.”[ii]  It was a course of born of desperation, even admitted by Hitler in his briefings to assembled commanders in the week prior to the offensive, one officer noted his remarks: “Gentlemen, if our breakthrough via Liege to Antwerp is not successful, we will be approaching an end to the war which will be extremely bloody. Time is not working for us, but against us. This is really the last opportunity to turn the war in our favor.”[iii]

US Soldiers manhandling a 57mm Anti-Tank Gun into Position

            Despite shortages of men and equipment, continuous Allied assaults and over the objections of General Guderian who argued to reinforce the Eastern Front[iv], the OKW staff secretly developed detailed plans. The planning was so secretive that the “Commander in Chief West and the other senior commanders destined to carry out the attack were not informed.”[v] The plans were submitted to Hitler on October 9^th [vi] and presented to Field Marshalls Von Rundstedt and Model at the End of October. General Hasso Von Manteuffel, commander of 5th Panzer Army commented that: “The plan for the Ardennes offensive…drawn up completely by O.K.W. and sent to us as a cut and dried “Führer order.”[vii]  Likewise Model and Von Rundstedt objected to the scope of the attack. Von Rundstedt stated: “I was staggered…It was obvious to me that the available forces were way too small for such an extremely ambitious plan. Model took the same view of it as I did….”[viii]  Model reportedly said to General Hans Krebs: “This plan hasn’t got a damned leg to stand on.”[ix] And “you can tell your Führer from me, that Model won’t have any part of it.”[x] Sepp Dietrich, the old SS fighter and commander of 6^th Panzer Army expressed similar sentiments.[xi]  Despite the objections by so many senior commanders Hitler scorned Model’s attempt to float a less ambitious plan to reduce the Allied salient at Aachen. Likewise Von Rundstedt’s desire to remain of the defense and wait for the Allies to attack using the armored forces to launch against any breakthrough was rejected.[xii] Hitler’s mind was set and the preparations moved forward.  The plan was complete down to the timing of the artillery bombardment and axes of advance, and “endorsed in the Führer’s own handwriting “not to be altered.””[xiii] Such a plan flew in the face of the well established doctrine of the Auftragstaktik which gave commanders at all levels the freedom of action to develop the battle as the situation allowed and opportunities arose.  

SS General Sepp Dietrich Commander of the 6th SS Panzer Army           

          The Germans who the Allies presumed to be at the brink of collapse made a miraculous  recovery following their ghastly losses in Normandy. Kampfgrüppen and remnants of divisions bled the Americans White at the Huertgen Forrest and blunted the British attempt to leapfrog the Northern Rhine at Arnhem decimating the British First Airborne division and causing heavy casualties among other British and American units. The German 15^th Army avoided disaster when the British failed to close their escape route from Walchern island allowing 60,000 troops and much equipment to escape.   The Germans re-formed and reorganized the front.  They pulled back many units of the 5^th and 6^th Panzer Armies for re-fitting and diverted nearly all tank, armored fighting vehicle and artillery production to the West at the expense of the Eastern Front.  The Germans called up 17 year olds and transferred young fit personnel from the Navy and Luftwaffe to the Army and Waffen SS.  Here they were trained by experienced NCOs and officers and brought into veteran units alongside hardened veterans who showed taught them the lessons of 5 years of war.[xiv]  However the rapid influx of new personnel meant that they could not be assimilated as quickly as needed and thus many were not as well trained as they might have been with more time.[xv] Many infantry and Parachute units had received inexperienced officers, taken from garrison duty to fill key positions a problem that would show up during the offensive.[xvi]

Panzer IV Ausf H of an SS Panzer Divsion in the Bulge

            The Germans were aided by the caution displayed by the Allies throughout the campaign in France which allowed the Germans to reconstitute formations around veteran headquarters staffs.[xvii]  The Germans built up the 5^th and 6^th Panzer Armies as the Schwerpunkt of the offensive giving them the lion’s share of reinforcements and pulling them out of the line during the fall battles along the Seigfried line and in the Alsace and Lorraine.  The plan was for the two Panzer armies and 7^th Army to punch through the Ardennes, cross the Meuse, drive across Belgium, capture Antwerp and severe the link between the British and the Americans. 

             The spearhead of the assault was 6^th Panzer Army Commanded by SS General Sepp Dietrich. It was composed of 1^st and 2^nd SS Panzer Corps and Army’s LXVII Corps.  The 6^th SS Panzer Army included some of the best formations available to the German Army at this late stage of the war including the 1^st  SS Panzer Division, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, the 2^nd  SS Panzer Division Das Reich, the 9^th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen and the12^th  SS Panzer Division Hitler Jügend. It’s ranks were filled out by the 3^rd Parachute Division, the 501^st SS Heavy Tank Battalion (attached to 1^st SS), the 3^rd Panzer Grenadier Division and the 12^th, 246^th, 272^nd, 277^th and 326^th Volksgrenadier or Infantry divisions. The 6^th Panzer Army would be the northern thrust of the offensive and its ultimate objective was Antwerp.  The 6th Panzer Army would be aided by a hastily organized parachute battalion under Colonel Von Der Heydte[xviii] and the 150^th Panzer Brigade under SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny which included teams of American dialect speaking soldiers in American uniforms and equipment that were to spread confusion and panic in American rear areas.[xix]

Bradley, Eisenhower and Patton at Bastogne   

       To the south was the 5^th Panzer Army commanded by General Hasso Von Manteuffel.  The 5^th Panzer Army was to advance alongside of the 6^th Panzer Army with Brussels as its objective.  Composed of the XLVII and LVIII Panzer Corps and LXVI Corps the major subordinate commands included the best of the Army Panzer divisions including the 2^nd Panzer, Panzer Lehr, 9^th and the16^th Panzer division. It also had the elite Führer Begleit Brigade composed of troops from Panzer Corps Grossdeutschland and commanded by Otto Remer who had help crush the coup against Hitler in July.  The 5^th Panzer Army also included the 18^th, 26^th, 62^nd, 560^th and later the 167^th Volksgrenadier divisions. 

             The south flank was guarded by 7^th Army commanded by General Erich Brandenburger composed of LIII, LXXX and LXXXV Corps.  It included the Führer Grenadier Brigade and later the 15^th Panzergrenadier division.  It was the weakest of the three armies but eventually included 6 Volksgrenadier divisions of varying quality and strength[xx] and the veteran 5^th Parachute division.[xxi]  However with only 4 divisions at the start of the offensive the 7th Army was the equivalent of a reinforced corps.

             While this force seemed formidable it had a number of weaknesses beginning with tank strength.  The 1^st and 12^th SS Panzer divisions were only at approximately half their established tank strengths and faced severe shortages in other vehicles.[xxii]  2^nd SS and 9^th SS of II SS Panzer Corps reported similar shortages.[xxiii]The shortage of other motorized vehicles, even in Panzer divisions was acute.  “Even the best equipped divisions had no more than 80 percent of the vehicles called for under their tables of equipment, and one Panzergrenadier division had sixty different types of motor vehicles, a logistician’s nightmare.[xxiv] Panzer Lehr was so short in armored half tracks that only one battalion of its Panzer Grenadiers could be transported in them while others had to use “trucks or bicycles.”[xxv]

             Limitations on equipment as well as fuel were not the only challenges that the Germans faced. The US V Corps launched an attack on the Roer River Dams just before the offensive making it necessary for the Germans to divert 6^th SS Panzer Army infantry divisions and Jagdpanzer units to be used by 6^th SS Panzer Army.  One regiment of 3^rd Parachute Division and over half of a second division could not take part in the initial 6^th Panzer Army attack. Likewise some Jagdpanzer and Sturmgeschutzen units did not arrive until three days after the offensive began.[xxvi]

Allied Response: Before the Battle

            While the German commanders sought to implement Hitler’s plan Allied commanders looked only to completing the destruction of Germany not believing the Germans capable of any major operation.  The Allied commanders with the exception of Patton did not believe the Germans capable of any more than local counter attacks.  Patton’s 3^rd Army G-2 Colonel Koch was the only intelligence officer to credit the Germans with the ability to attack.[xxvii]  Most allied commanders and intelligence officers discounted the German ability to recover from disastrous losses, something that they should have learned in Holland or learned from the Soviet experiences on the Eastern front.  Bradley noted in his memoirs hat “I had greatly underestimated the enemy’s offensive capabilities.”[xxviii]  Carlo D’Este noted that “there was another basic reason why the Allies were about to be caught with their pants down: “Everyone at SHAEF was thinking offensively, about what they could do to the enemy, and never about what the enemy might do to them.””[xxix]   This mindset was amazing due to the amount of intelligence from Ultra and reports from frontline units that major German forces were no longer in the line.[xxx] Additionally nearly all commentators note that American units in the Ardennes did not conduct aggressive patrols to keep the enemy off balance and obtain intelligence.[xxxi]  One describes the efforts of 106^th Division as “lackadaisical” and notes that enemy before the offensive was not the Germans but the cold.[xxxii] Max Hastings noted that: “the Allies’ failure to anticipate Hitler’s assault was the most notorious intelligence disaster of the war.”[xxxiii]

            The Allies also were in the midst of a manpower crisis. Eisenhower did not have enough divisions to establish a clear manpower advantage as “there were not enough Anglo-American divisions, or enough replacements for casualties in the existing divisions.”[xxxiv]  No more American Infantry divisions were available as the Army had been capped at 90 divisions and infantry replacements were in short supply.  This shortage meant that Eisenhower could not pull divisions out of line to rest and refit. He could only transfer divisions such as the 4^th and 28^th Infantry divisions to the relative quiet of the Ardennes. He had no ability to “create a strategic reserve unless he abandoned the broad front strategy.”[xxxv] The Germans knew of the allied weakness and believed that they could achieve local superiority even if they did not believe they could reach Antwerp. Model believed that “he was sure that he would reach the Meuse in strength before the Americans could move sufficient reserves to halt his armies or even head them off.”[xxxvi] 

American Response: The Breakthrough

            The German assault began on December 16^th. Some breakthroughs were made especially in the vicinity of the Losheim Gap and the Schnee Eifel by the southern elements of 6^th Panzer Army and Manteuffel’s 5^th Panzer Army. However the Germans could not break through around Monschau and Elsenborn Ridge held by the inexperienced but well trained 99^th Infantry division and elements of the veteran 2^nd “Indianhead” Division.  In the far south near Diekirch the 4^th Infantry Division held stubbornly against the attacks of 7^th Army’s Volksgrenadiers. The Germans achieved their greatest success at Losheim where SS Colonel Josef Peiper and his 1^st SS Panzer Regiment had driven off the US 14^th Cavalry Group and penetrated 6 miles into the American front.  5^th Panzer Army made several breakthroughs and isolated two regiments of newly arrived 106^th Infantry Division in the Schnee Eifel. Manteufel also pressed the 28^th Division hard along the Clerf River, Skyline Ridge and Clairvaux.  Yet at ‘no point on that first day did the Germans gain all of their objectives.”[xxxvii]  The credit goes to US units that stubbornly held on, but also to the poor performance of many German infantry units.  German commanders were frustrated by their infantry’s failure even as the panzers broke through the American lines.  Manteuffel noted his infantry was “incapable of carrying out the attack with the necessary violence.”[xxxviii]

US Airborne Commanders James Gavin (R) and Matthew Ridgeway (L)

            The initial Allied command response to the attack by senior commanders varied.  Bradley believed it was a spoiling attack “to try and force a shift of Patton’s troops from the Saar offensive back to the Ardennes.”[xxxix] Courtney Hodges of 1^st Army agreed with Bradley and refused to allow General Gerow, commander of V Corps to call off 2^nd Infantry Division’s attack against the Roer dams on the 16^th in order to face the German offensive.[xl]  Gerow was one of the first American commanders to recognize the scope of the German attack but Hodges, perhaps the least competent senior American commander in Europe failed to heed Gerow’s advice. Soon after making this decision Hodges “panicked” and evacuated his headquarters at Spa fearing that it would be overrun by the advancing Germans.[xli] Eisenhower when informed of the news realized that something major was occurring and ordered the 7^th Armored Division from the 9^th Army and 10^th Armored Division from 3^rd Army into the Ardennes. On the 17^th he made other dispositions and released the 82^nd and 101^st Airborne Divisions from SHAEF reserve at Rheims to the Ardennes under the command of XVIII Airborne Corps.[xlii]  However during this short amount of time Mantueffel’s panzers had advanced 20 miles. 

SS Colonel Joachim Peiper leading his Kampfgruppe 

            At the command level Eisenhower made a controversial, but correct decsion to divide the command of the Bulge placing on a temporary basis all forces in the northern sector under Montgomery and leaving those to the south under Bradley.  Montgomery according to one commentary initially “had been astonishingly tactful in handing his American subordinates.”[xliii] However he quickly made himself obnoxious to many American commanders.[xliv] Following the battle Montgomery made the situation worse by claiming to have saved the Americans and giving credit to British units which scarcely engaged during the battle.[xlv]  Eisenhower also ordered Patton to launch a counter-attack along the southern flank of the German advance.  However Patton was already working on such an eventuality and promised to be able to launch a counterattack with three divisions by the 22^nd.[xlvi]  Bradley praised Patton highly in his memoirs noting: “Patton’s brilliant shift of 3^rd Army from its bridgehead in the Saar to the snow-covered Ardennes front became one of the most astonishing feats of generalship of our campaign in the West.”[xlvii]

American Response: the Shoulder’s Hold

                The 99^th Division’s position was precarious, its right flank was subject to being turned and it was suffering severely at the hands of 12 SS Panzer and several Volksgrenadier divisions.  Gerow reinforced the 99^th with elements of the 2^nd Infantry division even before he had the final authorization to end its attack.  The two divisions stubbornly held Elsenborn Ridge and the villages of Rockerath, Krinkelt and Büllingen. By the 20^th the 9^th and 1^st Infantry divisions arrived to strengthen the defense and lengthen the line to prevent it from being rolled up by the Germans.  The stubborn resistance of the Americans and arrival of reinforcements meant line was proof “against anything Sepp Dietrich might hurl against it”[xlviii]  By the 23^rd Dietrich and 6^th SS Panzer Army conceded defeat at Elsenborn and “turned its offensive attentions to other sectors.”[xlix]  German commanders like General Priess the commander of 1^st SS Panzer Corps believed that terrain and road network in this sector was unfavorable to the German offensive and had proposed moving the attack further south.[l]  The Panzers could not deploy properly and the German infantry was not up to the task of driving the Americans out of their positions before the reinforcements arrived. 

            In the south the 4^th Infantry Division held the line though heavily pressed by Brandenburger’s 7^th Army.  The division was reinforced by elements of both 9^th and 10^th Armored divisions on the 17^th and generally held its line along the Sauer River around Echternach “largely because the left flank of the enemy assault lacked the power-and particularly the armor-of the thrust farther north.”[li]

Turning Point: The Destruction of Kampfgruppe Peiper

            While V Corps fought the 6^th Panzer Army to a standstill, to the south 1^st SS Panzer Division led by Kampfgrüppe Peiper split the seam between V Corps and VIII Corps. The Kampfgrüppe moved west leaving a brutal path of destruction in its wake, including massacres of American POWs and Belgian civilians.[lii]  However its advance was marked with difficulty. On the night of the 17^th it failed to take Stavelot. After clearing the American defenders from the town after a hard fight on the 19^th it failed to capture a major American fuel dump a few miles beyond the town.  When the Germans approached the American commander ordered his troops to pour 124,000 gallons down the road leading to the dump and set it on fire, depriving the Germans of badly needed fuel.[liii]  Combat Engineers from the 291^st Engineer Battalion blew a key bridge across the Ambleve at Trois Ponts and another bridge across the Lienne Creek which left the Germans bottled up in the Ambleve River valley.  This bought time for the 30^th Infantry Division to set up positions barring Peiper from the Meuse.  The 30^th would be joined by Combat Command B of 3^rd Armored Division and elements of 82^nd Airborne. These units eventually forced Peiper to abandon his equipment and extricate some 800 troops by foot by the 23^rd after a hard fight with the Americans who had barred his every effort to break through to the Meuse.

Turning Point: The Crossroads: St Vith & Bastogne

            The battle rapidly became focused on key roads and junctions, in particular St. Vith in the north and Bastogne in the south.  At St. Vith the 7^th Armored Division under General Hasbrouck, who Chester Wilmont calls one of the “great men of the Ardennes”[liv] completed a fifty mile road march from Aachen to St. Vith.  On his arrival he deployed his combat commands around the town which was the key to the road network in the north and also to the only rail line running west through the Ardennes.[lv]  Hasbrouck gathered in Colonel Hoge’s Combat Command B of 9^th Armored Division and the 424^th Infantry Regiment of the 106^th Division into his defensive scheme as well as the survivors of the 112^th Infantry Regiment of the 28^th Infantry Division which had escaped the German onslaught after holding as long as possible along the Clerf River and Skyline Drive.[lvi]  With these units Hasbrouck conducted “an eight-day stand that was as critical and courageous, as the defense of Bastogne.”[lvii]  After holding the Germans at St. Vith the units were withdrawn to another defensive position along the Salm and Ourthe Rivers and the village of Viesalm.  This was done at the behest of Montgomery and General Ridgeway of XVII Airborne Corps whose 82^nd Airborne had moved into that area on the 19^th.  The arrival of the 82^nd greatly assisted Hasbrouck’s force holding St. Vith whose defenders had lost an estimated 5000 casualties.[lviii]

            The stand at St. Vith confined the “confined the Sixth Panzer Army’s penetration to a chokingly narrow corridor.”[lix]  It also posed a problem for German command and control which because it was out of the 6^th Panzer Army’s area of operations Dietrich was unable to lend his weight into the fight.  “Hitler himself had strictly prohibited deviations from the zonal boundaries”[lx] which left the fight for St. Vith in the hands of 5^th Panzer Army who felt the impact of the stand as the Americans “also choked off one of the Fifth Panzer Army’s best routes to Bastogne, almost nullifying the significance of the captured road junction at Houffalize.”[lxi]

            To the south of St. Vith lay Bastogne, another key road junction needed by 5^th Panzer Army for its advance.  On the night of the18^th Panzer Lehr division came within two miles of the town before being checked by resistance by units of the 10^th Armored division, remnants of 28^th Division and misdirection by “friendly” Belgian guides onto a muddy path that helped halt their advance.[lxii]  This gave the 101^st Airborne just enough time to get to the town and prevent its capture. The siege of Bastogne and its defense by the 101^st elements of 9^th and 10^th Armored Divisions and 28^th Division became an epic stand against Manteuffel’s Panzers which had surged around the town.  Wilmont comments that “had the Germans won the race for Bastogne, Manteuffel’s armor would have had a clear run to Dinant and Namur on December 19^th and 20^th” [lxiii] when there were only scattered American units between them and the Meuse. Manteuffel b bypassed Bastonge after the failure to capture it and masked it with 26^th Volksgrenadier Division and a regiment of Panzer Lehr.  The remainder of Panzer Lehr and the 2^nd Panzer Division moved to the west. [lxiv]  The garrison endured numerous attacks and on the 22^nd one of the most celebrated incidents of the war took place when Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe responded to a demand for the surrender of the town with the reply; “Nuts.”  The town would continue to hold until relieved by 3^rd Army on the afternoon of December 26^th.[lxv]

Allied Response: The Counterattack

            The Allied counterattack began with 3^rd Army in the south on 21 December.  Patton’s initially proposed to attack toward the base of the Bulge in order to cut off the largest number of Germans possible.  Eisenhower dictated an attack further west with the goal of relieving Bastogne.  Eisenhower wanted to delay the attack to concentrate combat power while Patton wanted to attack sooner in order to ensure surprise. Patton got his way but attacked on a wide front.  The attack lost its impetus and bogged down into a slugging match with 7^th Army’s infantry and paratroops along the southern flank. [lxvi]  Patton’s failure to concentrate his forc forces for the advance to the north diminished his combat power.[lxvii] While Patton attacked from the south the 1^st Army dealt with the advanced spearhead of 2^nd Panzer Division which had reached the town of Celles and ran out of gas just four miles from Dinant and the Meuse. The 84^th Infantry Division stopped the 116^th Panzer division from being able to effect a relief of the 2^nd Panzer the US 2^nd Armored Division and allied fighter bombers chopped up the virtually immobile 2^nd Panzer division completing that task by the 26^th.[lxviii]

            To the north Montgomery launched a cautious counterattack which slowly and methodically took back lost ground but allowed many Germans to escape. While Montgomery moved south Patton faced heavy German resistance from elements of 5^th Panzer Army, reinforced by 1^st SS Panzer Corps and 7^th Army.  The rupture in the American front was not repaired until 17 January when the American forces met at Houffalize.[lxix] Bradley took over for Montgomery and the Americans pushed the Germans slowly back across the Clerf River by the 23^rd.  The advance was hampered by tough German resistance and terrible weather which forced much of the attack to be made by dismounted troops as the roads had completely frozen over.[lxx] 

            The Allied counter attack has been criticized for allowing too many Germans to escape what could have been a major encirclement.  Patton recognized the incompleteness of the victory in the Ardennes stating: ““We want to catch as many Germans as possible, but he is pulling out.” The “but” clause, the note of regret, the awareness of the imperfection of his victories typified Patton.””[lxxi]  Patton in his memoirs notes: “In making the attack we were wholly ignorant of what was ahead of us, but we were determined to strike through to Bastogne.”[lxxii] Max Hastings simply said: “the Allies were content with success.”[lxxiii]  Murray and Millett place blame on Bradley and Hodges for choosing “merely to drive the enemy out of the Ardennes rather than destroy him.”[lxxiv]

Analysis: Could Wacht Am Rhein Have Worked?

          Could Wacht am Rhein worked?  If much was different, yes.  If the German had been stronger in tanks and vehicles and had adequate stocks of fuel; if their infantry was better trained, and had the Americans not resisted so stubbornly it might have at least got to the Meuse.  Perhaps if the the bad weather held keeping Allied air forces away from the Germans, or had St. Vith and Bastogne been taken by the 18^th or 19^th, they might have reached the Meuse.  Had the Germans executed their plan and coordinated their assault better[lxxv] in the 6^th Panzer Army sector and had the 7^th Army enough strength to conduct offensive operations in depth and secure the left flank the attack might have succeeded.  Because the Americans held the shoulders and road junctions, Manteuffel’s 5^th Panzer Army, the only force besides the regimental sized Kampfgrüppe Peiper to actually threaten the Meuse was forced to advance while attempting to take Bastogne and defeat 3^rd Army’s counterattack. Whether they could have made Antwerp is another matter.  Nearly all German commanders felt the offensive could not take Antwerp but did believe that they could inflict a defeat on the Allies and destroy a significant amount of allied combat power. 

            The German offense was a desperate gamble.  Too few divisions, scant supplies of petrol, formations that had recently been rebuilt and not given enough time to train to the standard needed for offensive operations coupled with Hitler’s insistence on an unalterable plan kept them from success.  At the same time the Allies were weak in troops as Eisenhower had no strategic reserve save the two American Airborne Divisions.  All reinforcements to the threatened sector had to come from the flanks and by the middle of the battle the 9^th Army was drawn down to two divisions. Russell Weigley notes the constraints imposed by the 90 division Army, and of the limited stocks of artillery ammunition.[lxxvi] If the Germans had more forces they might have inflicted a significant defeat on the Allies had they been able to reinforce their success in depth.  Despite this they still inflicted punishing losses on the Americans though suffering greatly themselves.  Hastings notes that the real beneficiaries of the Ardennes offensive were the Russians.[lxxvii]  It is unlikely that the offensive could have ever achieved Hitler’s goals of taking Antwerp and fracturing the British-American alliance. 

A Note About other Parts of the Campaign in France

The Riviera and Rhone

            The campaign in south France was strategically wise although opposed by the British to the last minute because they felt it would take away from Overlord.[lxxviii] Though delayed the campaign was well executed by 7^th Army, particularly Lt. General Lucian Truscott’s VI Corps of 3 American divisions. Truscott believed “destroying the enemy army was the goal”[lxxix] managed the battle well and skillfully maneuvered his small forces against Blaskowitz’s 19^th Army inflicting heavy losses, though some German commanders noted the caution of American infantry in the attack.[lxxx]  Only Blaskowitz’s tactical skills and the weakness of the American force prevented the Germans from disaster. The seizure of Marseilles and Toulon provided the allies with sorely needed ports that were invaluable to sustain the campaign.[lxxxi]

The Lorraine Campaign

            Patton attacked in the Lorraine with the goal of crossing the Moselle and attempting to break into Germany. He doing so he ran into some of the strongest German forces on the front and bogged down in the poor terrain and mud of the region.[lxxxii]  Patton was delayed in making his assault due to his place “at the far end of the logistics queue.”[lxxxiii] German forces skillfully defended the ancient fortress of city Metz forcing the Americans into a protracted campaign to clear the area with the last strongpoint surrendering on 13 December.  Patton is criticized for his failure to concentrate his forces[lxxxiv] but American tactics were less to blame than the weather, German resistance and shortages of infantry.[lxxxv] In some cases American infantry units performed admirably, particularly 80^th Division’s assault on the Falkenburg Stellung.[lxxxvi]Liddell Hart criticized the Allies for failing to attack through the then weakly defended Ardennes, commenting: “By taking what appeared to be the easier paths into Germany the Allies met greater difficulties.”[lxxxvii]

The Huertgen Forrest

            The Huertgen Forrest was the worst managed American fight Western European campaign. [lxxxviii] General Courtney Hodges leadership was poor.[lxxxix] In the Huertgen he fed division after division into a battle that made no strategic sense.  American infantry performed poorly and took extremely heavy casualties leaving four divisions shattered.[xc]  Poor American tactics demonstrated by attacking into a forest in poor weather without concentration negated all of Hodges’ advantages in tanks, artillery and airpower. The forest contained no significant German forces capable of threatening any American advance[xci] and its gain offered little advantage.[xcii] Hastings noted that the gains the only saving grace was that it made it easier for the northern shoulder of the Bulge to hold[xciii]   General Model and his subordinates expertly handled their handful of excellent but weary divisions in this battle using terrain, weather and prepared defensive positions to contest nearly every yard of the Forrest.[xciv]

Conclusions

            The lessons of the Bulge and the other campaigns on the German-French border are many and can be gleaned from Allied and German mistakes. On the Allied side the most glaring mistakes were assumptions prior to the German attack that the Germans were incapable of any serious offensive and ignoring the fact that the Germans had attacked through the Ardennes in 1940.  Likewise the self limitation of the American Army to 90 divisions for world-wide service meant that there were no more divisions in the pipeline and that worn out divisions would have to be reinforced with inexperienced troops while in the front line which ensured a lack of cohesiveness in many divisions, especially the infantry.  Allied intelligence failures as well as their reliance of forces much smaller than they should have had for such a campaign ensured that they would suffer heavy losses in the Bulge while poor planning and execution by Hodges wasted many good troops in a senseless battle.  The Germans were hamstrung by Hitler’s fantasy that the Western Allies could be forced out of the war or the Alliance split by a defeat in the Ardennes.  Likewise German forces, even those so quickly reconstituted were often short troops, tanks and vehicles.  German commanders were forced by Hitler’s rigid insistence on not altering the plan to not be as flexible as they might have been in earlier offensives to adjust according to the situation on the ground.  

[ii] Hastings, Max. Armageddon:  The Battle for Germany 1944-1945 Alfred A Knopf, New York NY 2004 p.197.

[iii] Reynolds, Michael. Sons of the Reich: II SS Panzer Corps; Normandy, Arnhem, Ardennes, and on the Eastern Front.  Casemate Publishing, Havertown PA 2002 p.186

[iv] Ibid. p.198

[v] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-1945 translated by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, San Francisco, CA 1964. p. 480

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Liddell Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Originally published 1948, Quill Publishers Edition, New York 1979 p.274.

[viii] Liddell Hart, B.H. The History of the Second World War G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York NY 1970. p.646.

[ix] MacDonald, Charles B. A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge William Morrow and Company, New York, NY 1985 p.35.

[x] [x] Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model, Hitler’s Favorite General.DeCapo Press, Cambridge MA 2005. p.329

[xi] Ibid. Hastings p.198.  Hastings quotes Dietrich: “All Hitler wants me to do is cross a river, capture Brussels, then go on and take Antwerp. And all this at the worst time of year through the Ardennes when the snow is waist-deep and there isn’t enough room to deploy four tanks abreast let alone armored divisions. When it doesn’t get light until eight and it’s dark again by four and with re-formed divisions made up chiefly of kids and sick old men-and at Christmas.”

[xii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart The German Generals Talk p.276

[xiii] Wilmont, Chester. The Struggle for Europe Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, NY 1952 p.576

[xiv] Ibid. p.557.

[xv] Ibid. Hastings. p.199. Hastings notes that Manteuffel said: “It was not that his soldiers now lacked determination of drive; what they lacked were weapons and equipment of every sort. Von Manteuffel also considered the German infantry ill trained.”

[xvi] Ibid. Dupay.p.47  Dupay notes that in 3^rd Parachute Division that most of the regimental commanders had no combat experience.

[xvii] Weigley, Russell  F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign in France and Germany 1944-1945. Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN 1981 p.432.  Weigley speaks of Allied caution and predictable strategy, caution in logistical planning which did not allow the Allies to provide the fuel needs for a rapid drive into Germany and caution of operational commanders. 

[xviii] Liddell Hart discusses the issue of paratroops at length in discussions with Manteuffel and General Kurt Student. At the time of the operation there were very few jump trained paratroops available for the operation as most of the 6 organized Parachute Divisions were committed to battle as infantry during the 1944 battles in the East, Italy and in the West. German Generals Talk pp.282-285.  Although Liddell Hart makes note of the employment of these troops and talked with Model and student about why they were not used to seize bridges and other critical terrain featured ahead of the Panzers instead of the use as a blocking force, I have found no one who questioned why the Germans did not use small glider detachments for the same purpose.  The Germans had demonstrated with Skorzeny when they rescued Mussolini from his mountain prison that they still retained this capability.  The use of the SS Paratroop battalion which could have been assigned to Skorzeny as a glider borne force could have been decisive in capturing the key bridges and terrain ahead of 6^th Panzer Army.

[xix] Skorzeny’s operation was Operation Greif designed to sow confusion in the Allied Ranks.  His brigade numbered about 3500 men and had a good number of captured US vehicles including some tanks and tank-destroyers on hand to confuse American units that they came in contact with. 

[xx] Ibid. Hastings.  p. 199.  Hastings quotes the Adjutant of 18^th Volksgrenadier Division who “felt confident of his unit’s officers, but not of the men “some were very inexperienced and paid the price.”  MacDonald notes that the division had many Navy and Air Force replacements but was at full strength. p.646.

[xxi] See MacDonland pp. 644-655 for a detailed commentary on the German Order of Battle.

[xxii] Reynolds, Michael. Men of Steel: 1^st SS Panzer Corps;  The Ardennes and Eastern Front 1944-1945 Sarpendon Publishers, Rockville Center NY, 1999. pp.36-37.  Reynolds notes that the 1^st SS Panzer Regiment only had 36 Panthers and 34 Mark IV Panzers to begin the operation (excluding the attached 501^st SS Heavy Tank Battalion).  He also notes that many of the tank crew replacements had no more than 6 weeks of military training and some of the tank crews had never been in a tank.  Similar problems were found in all the Panzer Divisions.  Severe shortages of armored half tracks, reconnaissance vehicles and other vehicles meant that Panzer Grenadier and Motorized battalions lacked the lift needed and some went on foot or on bicycles.

[xxiii] Ibid. Reynolds. Sons of the Reich. P.183

[xxiv] Ibid. MacDonald. p.44.

[xxv] Ibid.

[xxvi] Ibid. Dupay pp. 27-28.

[xxvii] Ibid. MacDonald. p.52.  MacDonald notes that Koch warned that the Germans were not finished, that “his withdraw, though continuing has not been a rout or mass collapse.” He calls Koch a “lone voice” in the Allied intelligence world.

[xxviii] Bradley, Omar  N. A Soldier’s Story Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 1951. p.459.  Weigley makes some poignant calling Bradley’s comments  “contradictory” and states that: “his apologia is hardly a model of coherence. (p.461)

[xxix]  D’Este, Carlo. Eisenhower: A Soldier’s Life Owl Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York NY 2002. p.638

[xxx] Dupay and others talk about this in detail. See Dupay pp. 35-44. 

[xxxi] Ibid. p.38. 

[xxxii] Ibid. Hastings. p.201

[xxxiii] Ibid. Hastings. p.199

[xxxiv] Ibid. Weigley. p.464

[xxxv] Ibid.

[xxxvi] Ibid. Wilmont. P.581.

[xxxvii] Ibid. p.583

[xxxviii] Ibid. Hastings. p.223

[xxxix] Ibid. Weigley. P.457

[xl] Ibid. p.471

[xli] Ibid. Hastings. pp.205-206

[xlii] Ibid. Wilmont. pp.583-584

[xliii] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts and London England, 2000 p.470 The authors must base their conclusion on the fact that Montgomery who mentioned to Eisenhower that Hodges might have to be relieved, did not do so and by the next day told Eisenhower that the action was not needed.  A  few other American commanders in the north were favorable to Montgomery but this appears to be a minority view.

[xliv] Ibid. Weigley. pp.504-506.  Weigley and Wilmont both note the comment of a British Staff Officer the Montgomery “strode into Hodges HQ like Christ come to cleanse the temple.” (Wilmont p.592)

[xlv] Ibid. Hastings. pp.230-232.  Hastings is especially critical of Montgomery.  Weigley, equally critical notes regarding  the January 7^th press conference, Montgomery’s “inability to be self critical at any point.” p.566.

[xlvi] Ibid. Weigley. p.500.

[xlvii] Ibid. Bradley. p.472  Other commentators differ in their view of Patton’s movement.  Wilmont notes that Patton had no “equal in the on the Allied side in the rapid deployment of troops. (p.589) Weigley urges readers that “it should be kept in appropriate perspective; it was not a unique stroke of genius.” And he compares it to Guderians disengagement with Panzer Group 4 and 90 degree change of direction and assault against the Kiev pocket in the 1941 Russian campaign (p.500)  Hastings notes that “Patton had shown himself skilled in driving his forces into action and gaining credit for their successes. But he proved less effective in managing a tough, tight battle on the southern flank.” (p.230)  Regardless of the perspective and criticism Patton’s movement was unequaled by any Allied commander in the war and had he not moved so quickly the 101^st Airborne might not have held Bastogne. Admittedly his attack north was dispersed along a wide front but part of the blame for this must be assigned to Eisenhower who dictated the attack toward the west vice the base of the Bulge where Patton desired to make it.  A note I would make is that being a cavalryman Patton thought like one and when faced with the tight battles in close quarters was not at his best.  Similar comparisons could be made to J.E.B. Stuart at Chancellorsville when he had to take command of Jackson’s Corps. 

[xlviii] Ibid. Weigley. p.475

[xlix] Ibid. p.474

[l] Ibid. Reynolds Men of Steel pp.51-52.

[li] Ibid. Weigley. p.470

[lii] The worst of these took place at the village of Malmedy where Battery B 285^th Field Artillery Observation Battalion of 7^th Armored Division was captured and about 150 soldiers were rounded up and machined gunned in a field with survivors killed with pistol shots in the head.

[liii] Ibid. Weigley. pp.478-479.

[liv] Ibid. Wilmont. p.584

[lv] Ibid. Weigley. p.487

[lvi] Ibid. Weigley. pp.486-487

[lvii] Ibid. Hastings. p.215. Hastings gives most of the credit to Brigadier General Bruce Clarke of CCB 7^th Armored Division for the stand.

[lviii] Ibid. MacDonald. 481-487.  MacDonald notes that following the war that the commanders of the units involved “would be grateful to Field Marshal Montgomery for getting them out of what they saw as a deathtrap for their commands. (p.487) 

[lix] Ibid. Weigley. p.487

[lx] Ibid.

[lxi] Ibid.

[lxii] Ibid. Hastings. p.217 Also  MacDonald. p.289 who talks of the confused situation east of Bastogne both for the Americans and Germans.

[lxiii] Ibid. Wilmont. p.598

[lxiv] Ibid. Liddel Hart. The German Generals Talk. p.288

[lxv] The defense of Bastogne would continue until after the 1^st of January as Hitler renewed the attempts to secure the town in order to push on to the Meuse. Other German formations including units of 1^st SS Panzer Corps shifted south from their original attack would make determined efforts to dislodge the stubborn American defenders.

[lxvi] Ibid. Weigley. pp.500-501.  Bradley gives Patton more credit than later commentators. Wilmont notes that the Germans though “amazed at the speed with which Patton had disengaged from the Saar and wheeled them northward…they received due warning of his movement by monitoring the radio net which controlled American traffic, and they were braced to meet his assault. (p.599).  

[lxvii] Ibid. Weigely. Pp.520-521

[lxviii] Ibid.  pp.535-537

[lxix] Ibid. pp. 558-561

[lxx] Ibid. pp.563-564

[lxxi] Ibid. p.566.

[lxxii] Patton, George S. War as I Knew It  Originally published by Houghton Mifflin Company NY 1947, Bantam Paperback Edition,  Bantam Books, New York, NY 1980 p.364

[lxxiii] Ibid. Hastings. p.230

[lxxiv] Ibid. Murray and Millett p.471.

[lxxv] Hastings notes that “Tactically, the Ardennes was one of the worst-conducted German battles of the war, perhaps reflecting that none of the generals giving the orders saw any prospect of success. (p.236)

[lxxvi] Ibid. Weigley. pp.567-572

[lxxvii] Ibid. Hastings. p.236-237.  Hastings believes that the employment of the 5^th and 6^th Panzer Armies in the East “made the task of Zhukov and his colleagues much harder.”

[lxxviii] Ibid. Weigley. p.236. I find it interesting that neither Hastings nor Liddell Hart mention the Riviera and Rhone campaign.

[lxxix] Ibid. Weigley. p.236

[lxxx] Giziowski, Richard. The Enigma of General Blaskowitz  Hippocrene Books Inc. New York NY, 1997. p.328

[lxxxi] Ibid.  Weigley comments on how much the overall supply situation was aided by the operation and capture of the ports and notes that the pace of the Cobra breakout had created a crisis in supply and “without the southern French ports the crisis would have been insurmountable.” (p.237)

[lxxxii] Ibid. p.397.  Weigley notes: “The immobilizing mud and the enemy’s recalcitrant resistance had fragmented the battle into affairs of squads, platoons, companies and battalions….and Patton’s juniors more than he controlled the course of action, to the extent that control was possible.”

[lxxxiii] Ibid. p.384

[lxxxiv] Ibid. p.390 Weigley states: “The American disinclination to concentrate power was rarely more apparent.” comparing the frontages of 1^st, 9^th and 3^rd Armies and notes that Patton attacked along his entire front.”

[lxxxv] Ibid. Weigley. pp.400-401.  Weigley spends a fair amount of time on American infantry shortages in 3^rd Army.

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Weigly. P.400.  Weigley notes a German General Wellm attributed part of that victory to the “prowess of the American infantry.”

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Liddell Hart. The History of the Second World War p.560

[lxxxviii] Hastings and Weigley both note how many American division and regimental commanders were relieved of command for their failures in the Huertgen.

[lxxxix] Ibid. Hastings. p.179.  Hastings notes that “instead of recognizing the folly of attacking on terrain that suited the Germans so well, Courtney Hodges reinforced failure.”

[xc] Ibid. Weigley. p.420.  Weigley notes the high numbers of ballet and non battle casualties in the 4^th, 8^th, 9^th and 28^th Divisions as well as CCR of 5^th Armored and 2^nd Ranger Battalion.

[xci] Ibid. Hastings. p.275.  Hastings notes that defending 275^th Division “were poor grade troops who-like the garrison of Aachen posed no plausible threat to the flanks of an American advance to the Roer.”

[xcii] Weigley compares the battle in its effect on the American army to Grants “destruction of the Confederate army in the Wilderness-Spotsylvania-Cold Harbor campaign expended many proud old Union army formations…” (p.438)

[xciii] Ibid. Hastings. p.215

[xciv] Ibid. Newton. p.324

Van donderdag tot gisteren zat ik in de Ardennen (in Robertville, niet zo ver van Malmedy), met mijn pas aangeschafte mountainbike. Lesley’s familie gaat daar al jaren heen met de herfstvakantie. Voor mij een goede mogelijkheid om mij uit te leven. Donderdag 24 kilometer gefietst, vrijdag 50 met een gemiddelde van ruim 19 per uur (en dat is in die omgeving best aardig), zaterdag nog eens 51 kilometer. Toen ook met mijn Zoetermeerse kornuiten Berry en Joël erbij.
Zondag volgde de apotheose, een hardlooptocht in etappes langs het Chateau de Reinhardstein en langs de riviertjes de Warche en de Bayehon. Door het kaartlezen en uitrusten tussendoor hebben we er 3,5 uur over gedaan, maar we hebben netto in anderhalf uur 15 kilometer hardgelopen. Zeker omdat ik dit jaar geen meerkamp heb gedaan voelt dat erg prettig. Dit is namelijk zo anders als wat ik normaal in training doe dat ik echt tot het uiterste moest gaan. En zo af en toe moet ik gewoon al mijn reserves uitputten. Dat geeft een enorme kick. Maar nu heb ik spierpijn.

Het huisje in Robertville

Robertville

De opkomende zon

Chateau de Reinhardstein

My trip  took me through France, Belgium, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Monaco, and Italy.  I stayed in mostly hostels and some hotels.  I saw grandeur, experienced other cultures and met wonderful people; I had great times and some problems along the way and I wrote about it all.

Hard copy is $55 + 4.95 for shipping; PDF file is $18. If you would like to have a copy, just click the donate button to the right and make a donation from your paypal account or your credit card, of at least $18 for the pdf file or $59.95 or more for the hard copy book. Please be sure to include your email address and your mailing address and I will send the book to you right away.

Na weer een selectie gemaakt te hebben, kan ik hier een postje vullen met mijn selectiefoto’s van de Raid Des Hautes Fagnes 2009.
Deze keer was het moeilijk om op de interessante plaatsen te komen… de chrono liep immers door het natuurpark de Hoge Venen. ‘k heb dan ook wel wat km’s te voet moeten afleggen, maar dit ter zijde…

Qua weer viel het nogal mee. Af en toe bewolkt, en soms volle zon (‘t was te zien aan sommige foto’s ;o) ) Moest je graag een foto hebben dan mag je dat gerust vragen om deze door te sturen. Als je hem op je blog wil, vraag ik wel om een link te plaatsen naar deze blog.

Enjoy!

De RDHF-gallerij:

MTB Marathons en nog eens MTB marathons… na de Ardennes Trophy en de Hagelandse Chrono was er vandaag de Raid Des Hautes Fagnes (www.rdhf.be). Voor mij welliswaar om foto’s te trekken maar voor 1000-den andere om de bergen/ heuvels te bedwingen rond de streek van Malmedy.

Hier alvast een sneak preview want om al mijn foto’s te bekijken en af en toe wat bij te werken is er wel wat tijd nodig… en morgen zal het weer vroeg dag zijn.

Maggie’s awesome mid-life up and quit her job went to Europe for two months road trip

Last summer I up and quit my job, probably not the brightest thing I’ve ever done considering the current economic climate, but I really needed a break, so I’m taking the rest of ‘08 off.

The first thing I did was take a solo two month road trip through Europe, something I’d wanted to do for a long time and I figured this is the time.

I flew into Paris, where I picked up my car and visited the places listed below.  Staying mostly in hostels, I shared wonderful times with people I had just met, had some neat adventures, explored beautiful places, got exercise, and rejuvenated my soul.

Scroll down to see the links to each day’s post. I hope you enjoy, please feel free to leave comments or questions.

Cheers, Maggie

My stops along the way:

Daily Journal entries and pictures:

Some places I stayed, some things I did, some places I saw:

Berggasthaus Äescher, the cliff house on Eben Alp near Appenzell Switzerland

Champ du Renard B & B in Vernon, France

Esther’s Guest House in Gimmelwald, Switzerland

Gasthof Simony in Hallstatt, Austria

Gästehaus Raidel (hotel) in Rothenburg ob der Tauber, Germany

Hotel Marina Piccola in Manarola, Italy (Cinque Terre)

The Nightwatchman of Rothenburg

Jungfraujoch – Top of Europe

Vatican Museum

Chateau de Versailles

The Louvre

Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial

Claude Monet’s House and gardens in Giverny, France

Neuschwanstein Castle in Bavaria

Berggasthaus Aescher in the Swiss Alps

The Zugspitze in Bavaria

Ballenberg, a Swiss open air museum

The Shilthorn, above Mürren, Switzerland

Pont du Gard, the ancient Roman aqueduct in southern France

Hiking The Cinque Terre

American Cemetery at St. Mihiel, France

Disneyland Paris

« ought to be a real page turner         My 2008 European Road Trip »

On Monday, I had booked an appointment to return my car at Charles de Gaulle Airport for  9:00am.  I got up a little earlier than usual this morning, showered, ate and packed and got on the road for the airport.   I arrived exactly at 9:00am to my surprise.  It only took about 10 minutes to sign all the papers releasing the car back to Renault and they provided a driver to take me to my terminal at the airport.  Pretty darn good service from Renault Eurodrive I must say.  If you ever go to Europe for more than a month or so and need a car, this is the way to go.

I boarded my flight and was off at 12:50 local time.  My coach seat was surprisingly spacious and comfortable.  I spent the first hour or so just starring at nothing really, just dwelling on the adventure I’d just had.  Couldn’t sleep really.  I was feeling anxious to get home, back to the land of milk and honey.  I landed in Minneapolis where I’d get a connecting flight to Seattle.  Wow, I was definitely back in the USA.  I saw gobs of soldiers and marines in their fatigues, campaign workers and other travelers of all sorts.  I had a typical flight to Seattle and managed to catch an earlier shuttle bus by about 5 seconds.  The bus was pulling away and I yelled at someone next to the bus to signal the driver to stop and he did.  So, I was on the way home to Lynden at 7:00 instead of having to wait till 9:00.  Awesome.

I was the last stop for the shuttle as we arrived at the Lynden WTA station at 10:30pm, I grabbed my pack and just as I did when I started this journey, I hiked home.  Couple of differences though.  No blisters and I didn’t even break a sweat or raise the heart rate much, how about that?  It was such a peasant hike on a cool quiet evening.  I was surprised that the trees are still full of leaves and there are plenty of summer flowers still in full bloom.  Home smelled great, it felt great.  I got to my apartment and everything was just as I left it.  I went to bed and got up about 7:00am on Friday.  Hopefully I’m all adjusted time wise.

I’m home.  The trip is over.  The journey is just beginning though.

Final Thoughts:

I was so looking forward to this trip and I was excited come departure day.  After my hike to the WTA station that morning, I thought to myself, what have I done?  I was out of breath, I knew blisters were starting and I really didn’t know what I was doing.  Frankly, I didn’t think I’d last the two months and I’d come home early.  By the time I got to France, I was certainly a fish out of water.  For crying out loud, it took me half a day to figure out how to get to my hostel.  Oh man, no way was I going to last.

But I did last.  I learned a few things along the way like:

• Be patient, just take things slow.
• Watch others and imitate.
• The basics in the French, German and Italian languages.
• It’s OK to make mistakes and look silly from time to time, just go with it.
• In addition to its many other uses, the sun is pretty handy to navigate by.
• The European road system isn’t so bad once you get use to it and realize it’s no big deal if you miss a turn or exit.  You can get to everywhere from anywhere.  You just have to know the cities along your path.
• I’m not going to have things the way I’m use to while I’m here, so just chill and try it their way for a while.
• Kurt really is incorrigible.

The two highlighted locations for me, Hallstatt and the Cinque Terre didn’t disappoint.  They were so awesome and I had the best times there.  But so many other places were great surprises like Dinan and Cherbourg, Bruges, The Rhineland, Lake Como, Venice, Colmar, Baden Baden.

Surprisingly, I had no car accidents and other than a minor ankle sprain and a bunch of blisters (which I think will leave scars) in the first three days of the trip, I haven’t gotten sick, thrown my back out or pulled anything.  Actually, I’ve been suffering from this hip thing for over a year now and it seems to be gone.  I’m feeling pretty good, I’ve built up my stamina a bit and I enjoy hiking; who knew?

Things I did:

• Ate waffles in Belgium
• Watched the movie “In Bruges”, in Bruges
• Took pictures of the people who took pictures of the people who pretended to hold up the Eiffel tower
• Hiked a treacherous trail on the Mediterranean coast and somehow escaped certain death.
• Drove in Rome which is madness
• Hiked in the Black Forrest
• Drank more on this trip than I have in the last ten years combined, of course that’s not saying much about the last ten years
• Stopped and smelled the roses, quite a few times, I even took pictures
• Met a lot of really neat people, and only a couple of not so neat people
• Went to Rome and didn’t see the Coliseum or the Forum; I’ll be kicking myself over that one for a while
• Beat the Monte Carlo, and the Baden Baden Speilbank Casinos
• Never ate at a McDonald’s or Burger King or KFC or any other American incarnation
• Slept in a castle
• Accidentally walked into the middle of a funeral taking pictures
• Drove the Autobahn
• Fell off an Alp
• Got to shake the hand of an American World War II vet in France and hear his stories
• Inadvertently tried to bribe a Swiss customs agent
• Drove 9,997 kilometers, it’s a shame I didn’t muster up three more
• Rejuvenated myself and got a new lease on life

I don’t like to generalize and that doesn’t justify or really explain why I’m going to do it here and now.  Be that as it may, of all the people I met and encountered, generally:

• Europeans as a lot are very patient; way beyond that of most Americans I think
• The Germans and Belgians and Austrians were the kindest most welcoming and helpful people. The Swiss and surprisingly the French came in a close second; sorry Italy, you guys need to work on your people skills a little
• Germans drive fast.  Italians drive fast and crazy; the French are pretty reasonable
• Europeans sure seem to like bread
• Most places, where you may be alone, whether it be at dinner or sitting in a park, many people will strike up a conversation with you, or they are easy to strike up a conversation with

Things I missed:

• My own bed
• Boston Legal
• Milk
• Diet Pepsi in a glass with lots of ice
• A good Pizza; yeah, who knew you can’t get a good pizza in Italy?  What’s up with that?
• A bath tub
• My buds

I like Europe, I like the people, I like their customs and culture.  Europe is modernizing rapidly and I’m grateful I got a chance to see some of the old world before its overrun.  Those Europeans are on to a few things, but, there’s no place like home and I’m happy to be home.

« Well, that’s no dog An easy evening at the castle »

Rough night sleep here at the Malmedy – Hautes Fagnes Hostel.  First uncomfortable bed I’ve had on this trip.  Guess I’ve been lucky thus far.  After leaving the hostel, got fueled up.  The gas price in town was 1.26 euros per litre, that’s the best I’ve seen yet.  I have paid up to 1.56 euros per litre for diesel.  You think you’ve got it tough back home?  I’ve been paying $7.50 – $9.25 USD per gallon for diesel, which by the way, is less expensive than gasoline here.  I think the government subsidizes it.  Use the Google Calculator to see what the USD price per gallon is (go to google.com and type in “1.4 EUR per litre in USD per gallon” without the quotes).

I also had to get some cash.  ATMs are not as plentiful here as they are back home so it took a while to hunt one down.  I left Malmedy and headed for Germany.  Just before the border, I stopped for a bathroom break.  Honestly, I’m not getting so familiar or senile that I want to tell you when I have to go, it’s just that it’s a little unusual in Belgium.  There is an attendant at public water closets and you have to pay 30 cents to use the facilities.  Sometimes they are right in there with you, to help, I guess.  It’s a little weird; no, it’s a lot weird.  On the other hand, it’s nice to always have a nice clean toilet to use and one of the sinks usually has flowers in it.

So, I drove into Germany and the way the roads are marked is a little different.  I had my route all planned out and at the first opportunity, I got headed off in as wrong a direction as is possible.  I pulled over and studied the new Via Micheline map of Germany I just purchased and compared it with the road signs I just encountered.  After the light bulb came on, I was on my way.

Had a nice drive via country roads from one small village to another.  Got stuck behind a wedding procession.  After the wedding, apparently the couple gets in their car and drives slowly all through town with their family and friends behind them in their cars, all honking their horns.  When they are through with their town, they drive to another town, slowly, and do the same thing there.  Oh well, I tolerated it.

I’ve noticed one thing about Europeans.  They sure tend to be patient.  I was waiting in line at the Versailles train station, what seems like months ago, and it was oh so hot.  The lady at the front of the line at the ticket window already had her ticket and was trying to do other business and asking a lot questions and there was a long line.  The lady behind the window helped her with whatever she needed and everyone in line was patient and didn’t seem to mind… except me of course.  I guarantee you, this just wouldn’t do at home.

At my first encounter at a toll road, I wound up in the wrong lane and when I pulled up to the booth, no coin basket was to be found.  It required some sort of card, some special toll booth card is all I could think.  It showed a picture of a white card with a mag strip.  I thought maybe you have to buy those in advance or something.  Luckily there was a button to push for help, but no one answered.  And of course, lots of cars were piling up in back of me.  The gate is down, what do you do?  I’m freaking cause I’m holding up all these people that are probably in a hurry.  Finally an attendant walked over and said I needed a carte, I told her I didn’t have one.  She took my coins and did something to the machine to make the gate open and I was on my way.  It dawned on me, not one single person behind me honked their horn.  Patient people I tell ya, it kind of freaks me out.  Then something else dawned on me, it was a credit card.  That’s all the they wanted, a credit card.  Boy howdy, I felt like an idiot.  I tried a credit card at the next booth and it worked just fine; duh.

Back to the drive.  I passed two or three nuclear plants and four windmill farms.  I wonder how much energy those windmills produce.  They sure are big.  There’s a big nodule that sticks off the back of the center point of the propeller; it looks big enough to be an apartment or office.  Although I didn’t see any nuclear plants in France, I’m told they get approximately ¾ of their energy from nuclear.  I passed by lots of farmland and vineyards as well.

I eventually made it to the Rhine River for the final leg to Bacharach where I would stay the night.  Oh my, what a sight.  Every few miles, a castle and a postcard village on one side of the river or the other.  Just beautiful.  It was a pretty day as well.  My head was moving rapidly from one position to another, I was trying to take it all in and not miss anything, and take pictures at the same time, and try to keep the car on the road.  I know mom, I’ll stop doing that.

I made a note of each village I’ll go back to tomorrow to explore.  Each place seemed cooler than the last.  Then I came to St. Goar (Gwar).  Wow.  Then I came to Bacharach and I could see my hostel way up on the hill above town, the Hostel Castle Stahleck.  To get into town, you turn off the main river road and go through a tiny tunnel (under the train  tracks), only wide enough for one car.  “No way, you’ve got to be kidding me” I said out loud.

Streets of Bacharach

I’ll never be able to drive, take pictures, keep an eye on the road, and not hit someone.  I was in the middle of the most gorgeous little classic fairy tale German town square, it was a whole other world.  The cobblestone roads were so small, I thought I wasn’t supposed to be there.  There were a couple other cars, so I guess it was OK and I proceeded, very slowly.  Some of the roads were so narrow, the pedestrians had to put their backs against the walls of the buildings so I could pass.

I made it through town OK and up the hill to the Stahleck Castle.  Wow, this is a hostel?  A big castle, great facilities, magnificent view of the Rhine and Bacharach and a couple other towns up river.

I got checked in and went exploring.  The castle itself is fun to investigate; lots of nooks and crannies.  There are trails all around and adjacent to us on the other side of a large ravine are vineyards aligned vertically.  So big that if you look straight at them, they fill your peripheral vision.  They run up and down the hill which is probably at least 700 feet in altitude from bottom to top.  I found a chair by a window that overlooked the river and the town and the most excellent cool breeze was coming in.  It had just rained hard for about 20 minutes.  The sun was coming out again and so I sat in that chair by the window with the cool breeze and read for a spell and admired the view, and read, and admired the view…  It was just another one of those perfect moments.

I met Donna and her son Ian and his best friend Jared from the bay area California.  We chatted a bit and had dinner together.  They’re here for a couple three weeks as a graduation present for Ian.  They came in from Köln (Cologne) today.  Real nice folks and I enjoyed their company.

I headed back to the room to get my book and met a roomie named Sarah who was up reading.  She’s from Toronto and is on summer break from her teaching job.  She teaches Geography and Science and is on this trip “preparing” materials for the coming year for her kids.  Uh huh.  It was really nice to talk with folks this evening with familiar accents and from familiar worlds.

I think I’ll go out in the castle courtyard overlooking the river and read some more till it gets dark.  Oh yeah, and I might admire the view too.

« As luck would have it, today is Wednesday         $9.25 USD per gallon »

Slept in today and awoke to thunder and pouring rain.  Loved it, loved it, loved it.  Took my time getting out of Brugge and headed for Bruxelles (Brussels).  It should have only been an hour long drive but it took me almost three.  I drove around in this big city for a bit trying to decide if it was worth parking and exploring.

Brussels was the original capital of the union formed by Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg (BeNeLux) and that led to the formation of the European Union of which Brussels is also the capital.  So, it’s big, and it was rainy and the traffic was heavy.  The place didn’t seem very attractive, not sure if that was just because of the rain and dark skies or not.  I found out later that most Brusseliers think their city is ugly though and they’re OK with that.  I don’t know, I’d like to check it out again someday.

So, I moved on.  Well, I decided to move on anyway.  Another of those cities I couldn’t figure out how to get out of.  I hate that.  It took over an hour, then it took another hour to get to the road I wanted to head east.  It’s all part of the adventure I reckon.

I headed east to Malmedy.  Once I was past Brussels, the weather took a turn for the better.  Blue skies, big white puffy clouds and the terrain started looking a little more appealing.  I chose to stay in Malmedy simply because of location; it was a good halfway point on my way to the Rhineland of Germany.  Well, I was pleasantly surprised, again.  Gorgeous little town.  I found the Malmedy – Hautes Fagnes hostel and checked in, did a little reading, had supper and sat down to write.  Just before dinner, the sky turned black and the rains came with thunder and lighting and heavy wind which lasted a half hour and then it cleared up again.

I was just looking out my window toward the hills and just outside the window is a dog house, which is up high on four stilts.  It has a ramp for the dog to get up in there and two of the sides have windows.  I thought that was kind of odd.  Pretty nice digs for a dog.

I was enjoying that cool air and fresh smell that you only get just after a heavy rain when the trees are still dripping and the drops still make a little noise as they fall from one leaf to another, and congratulating myself that I’m actually noticing things like this.

Then something inside the doghouse stirred.  It had horns.  Well, that’s no dog.  It was a goat.  The things I find interesting these days.  Cool, ain’t it?  Pretty nice digs for a goat though.

I thought I was all through with French for a few weeks, but in the eastern half of Belgium, the primary language is French.  I had dinner here at the hostel with Christian, another single traveler who is from Brussels.  He speaks a little English and between that and my limited French, we did OK.  I asked him why French is spoken here, especially since we’re so close to Germany.

He said that in about 300AD when Rome ruled, apparently their empire stopped at Brugge.  And he said something about the Vikings pushing the Romans back to some point and I kind of lost it there, nodding and saying Ah a lot.  I still don’t know why French is spoken here and not Flemish.  I did catch something about how today, many Belgians want to split the country up in to two countries.  Oh, can’t we all just get along?

Do site UOL Celebridades:

As estrelas de Hollywood Jennifer Aniston e Mary-Kate Olsen obrigaram neste final de semana a suspensão de uma festa de bairro na cidade de Malmedy, no leste da Bélgica, para poderem fazer seus exercícios de meditação sem serem atrapalhadas pelo barulho, informa a imprensa belga.

Aniston, a Rachel de “Friends”, e Olsen, que ficou famosa com sua irmã gêmea Ashley no seriado “Três é demais”, estavam indo para Colônia para visitarem a família da segunda e passaram a noite de sábado no luxuoso hotel Hostellerie Trôs Marets, perto de uma praça onde a festa com música estava sendo organizada.

Quando as duas amigas tentavam meditar no jardim do hotel disseram que o barulho da festa estava perturbando a calma de que precisavam e não hesitaram em chamar a Polícia.

Os policiais constataram que o barulho alterava o ritual de concentração, por isto decidiram acabar com a festa.

Leia mais clicando aqui.

« My European Road Trip         Just Getting Here »

General proposed route

Not all of you are up to date with me.  I recently quit my job and am taking the rest of the year off for a much needed break.  I’ve taken four weeks vacation in the last seven years and there’s something inherently wrong with that.  I need to explore beautiful places, I need grandeur, I need to rejuvenate the soul and get in shape and so I’m kicking it off with a two month road trip in Europe.  I fly to Paris on July 28 and then I’m off to the coast of France (Brittany and Normandy), north to Belgium, then to Germany’s Rhineland and Bavaria, Austria (Salzburg and the Salzkamergut Lakes District), the Berner Oberland region of Switzerland, the south of France, the French Riviera, Northern Italy, Southern Italy and the Amalfi Coast, Greece (if I have time), Rome, and finally back to Paris to fly home late September.

I’m almost ready; I’ve got my bills all paid ahead, I have my general route and timeline planned out with plenty of flexibility built in as well as some down days to just relax and enjoy wherever I am, and I have my car all lined up.  I just finalized my car lease (Renault Eurodrive); technically I bought a brand new Renault Modus Long, 85 hp diesel and Renault promised to buy it back after a couple of months.  I get a brand new car, unlimited mileage, roadside assistance in 43 countries, and they pay all the insurance with a $0 deductible.  It’s not a bad deal; it’s cheaper than renting a car.

My only baggage - one carry on

As my buddy Rick Steves says, “there’s two kinds of people in the world, those that pack light and those that wish they had”, so I’ve been practicing that and I’ve gotten everything to fit into one carry-on size bag that also has shoulder straps so I can wear it on my back.  Yep, that’s right.  Five changes of clothes, a pair of shoes, toiletries, camera & tripod, computer, guide book, maps… In that bag I also have a wadded up day pack that I can use when out and about.

My ASUS 900

You’re probably wondering how I got all that and a computer in one bag.  I have to tell you about my little computer I just got.  It’s an ASUS 900 netbook, it weighs two pounds and falls into the ultra portable notebook class.  I got this one with Linux OS and it has a wi-fi radio and an Ethernet connection so I can get on-line just about anywhere.  I can browse the web, do my emails, make phone calls with it, manage my pictures, etc.  I really like it.

• *******Update on the ASUS – It did great while I was on the trip, but about a month after I returned home, it no longer booted.  ASUS was quick to replace it and the new one failed after one day, same exact problem.  They replaced it again and it failed after four days.  And, they replaced it again.  I now have the 4th PC after I sent the 3rd in two weeks ago; I’m gonna sell it.  This whole fiasco took over six weeks and throughout it all, no one at ASUS seemed interested in getting at the root cause of the problem.  It was very difficult dealing with ASUS and I felt like I was talking with a bunch of children who had not developed interpersonal skills yet.  No one showed initiative, I got different stories from different people inside their organization, my phone calls and emails went unanswered, and no matter how much I asked and then demanded, I was never allowed to speak to a supervisor or manager.  I eventually got the names and email addresses of two managers and sent them an email, but I’ve never gotten a repsonse from either.  I DO NOT recommend the ASUS computers and I’ve had an absolutly miserable experience with them.  I’m now using a Sylvania g meso netbook and I like it even better than I initially liked the ASUS. ********

I’ll be staying at hostels about half of the nights and B&Bs, small hotels and farms the other half.  I have several nights booked already and many are still open. We’ll just see where I wind up.  I’m trying not to over think or over plan it all.  Feel free to post comments, questions or make suggestions about places to visit along the way.  I’ll make my next post from Paris I reckon. Cheers for now.