Vinerea trecută, pe 20 noiembrie, la Chişinău s-a aflat cunoscutul jurnalist rus, scriitorul, publicistul şi redactorul-şef al Agenţiei informativ-analitice de investigaţii jurnalistice, Andrei Konstantinov (Sankt-Petersburg).

Andrei Konstantinov, cunoscut în tagma profesională drept unul dintre campionii jurnalismului la extrem, are o bună faimă şi în rândurile publicului telespectator din Republica Moldova, datorită faptului că a semnat scenariile mai multor filme din genul detectiv, care au fost difuzate la postul rus public de televiziune. Totodată, Konstantinov este cunoscut la Chişinău şi ca autorul cărţilor „Avocatul”, „Jurnalistul”, „Scriitorul”, „Petersburgul interlop”, „Lumea interlopă din Rusia” şi alte titluri, apărute în Federaţia Rusă, cu un tiraj cumulat de peste 20 de milioane de exemplare. Un succes la care autorii moldoveni nu pot nici măcar să viseze.Ar mai fi de spus că Andrei Konstantinov şi-a început cariera în calitate de translator militar. El şi-a găsit însă adevărata vocaţie în practicarea jurnalismului la extrem. A înfiinţat secţia de investigaţii criminalistice în cadrul redacţiei ziarului „Smena”, în perioada 1994-1996, a fost corespondent al ziarului „Komsomolskaia pravda” pentru Sankt-Petersburg şi nord-vestul Rusiei. Din februarie 1998 până în prezent, conduce, în calitate de director general şi redactor-şef, Agenţia informativ-analitică de investigaţii jurnalistice.

Acestea sunt doar câteva repere din biografia lui Konstantinov. Vroiam să spun însă, altceva. Prin voia întâmplării, am participat şi eu la seara de creaţie pe care a avut-o Konstantinov la Chişinău, care a fost organizată de Clubul „Format A-3”. M-au invitat nişte colege de la „Komsomolskaia pravda”, care m-au întrebat dacă nu mi se pare straniu faptul că jurnaliştii de limba română şi cei de limba rusă de la Chişinău aproape că nu comunică între ei, mai că nici nu se cunosc reciproc, chiar dacă fac parte din aceeaşi breaslă, iar în multe cazuri au fost chiar colegi de facultate (aici este necesară o precizare: nu toţi jurnaliştii moldoveni care scriu în ruseşte sunt ruşi, mulţi dintre ei sunt români, aşa cum nu toţi jurnaliştii de limba română sunt neapărat români). Le-am dat dreptate celor de la „Komsomolskaia pravda” şi am zis că voi merge să mă întreţin cu colegii mei vorbitori de rusă la seara de creaţie a lui Konstantinov, mai ales că acesta este un mare profesionist.

Andrei Konstantinov este, cu adevărat, o personalitate strălucită, un intelectual rafinat, dar, totodată, un om modest, prietenos şi sincer. Pe parcursul discuţiei au fost abordate mai multe teme ce ţin de relaţia dintre jurnalişti, pe de o parte, şi politicieni, oligarhi, bandiţi, guvernanţi, oameni de afaceri, pe de altă parte. M-am plâns şi eu pe guvernanţii şi oligarhii moldoveni care, umăr la umăr cu anumite elemente criminale, ne tot fac şicane nouă, celor de la FLUX. La un moment dat, o puştoaică de la un post de televiziune i-a cerut lui Konstantinov să dea o apreciere evenimentelor din 7 aprilie 2009. Eram aproape sigur că jurnalistul din Sankt-Petersburg, fiind un tip galant, nu va dezamăgi aşteptările audienţei rusofone şi va condamna şi el, fie într-o formă mai alegorică, „tentativele Bucureştiului de a alipi Republica Moldova la România”. Am fost însă surprins să-l aud pe Konstantinov spunând că, deşi deţine unele informaţii privind evenimentele de la 7 aprilie 2009 de la Chişinău, el nu este persoana indicată să se pronunţe pe acest caz, deoarece se află la o distanţă prea mare de realităţile moldoveneşti şi că lucrul acesta îl pot face cu mult mai mult succes observatorii şi analiştii de la Chişinău.

Atunci mi-am zis că Rusia nu se reduce doar la numele unora ca Zatulin, Ziuganov, Jirinovski, Kozak, Lavrov, Medvedev, Putin, pe care ne-am obişnuit să-i tot auzim dojenind Republica Moldova care, iată, nu-i mai iubeşte ca altădată pe ruşi. În acel moment, am înţeles că există şi o altă Rusie, care trebuie descoperită.

Sergiu PRAPORŞCIC, FLUX

Foştii preşedinţi de parlament au constatat că au aceeaşi viziune asupra rezolvării conflictului transnistrean, comunică „Komsomolskaia Pravda Moldova”.Liderul Partidului Democrat, Marian Lupu şi Evghenii Şevciuk, liderul Partidului „Obnovlenie”, din regiunea separatistă din stânga Nistrului au avut o întrevedere bilaterală în cadrul congresului partidului „Edinaia Rossia”, la Sankt Petersburg. În cadrul acestui dialog, ambii au constatat că „împărtăşesc aceeaşi viziune asupra rezolvării diferendului transnistrean”.

Ambele părţi s-au pronunţat pentru continuarea dialogului şi apropierea celor două maluri ale Nistrului.

La 20 noiembrie Marian Lupu a participat la lucrările congresului partidului „Edinaia Rossia”, condus de Vladimir Putin. În cadrul acestei reuniuni, partidul lui Marian Lupu a încheiat un acord de colaborare cu partidul puterii din Federaţia Rusă.

Octavian RACU, FLUX

Georgian mass media report again about facts of attacks on Georgian villages in Galsk district of Abkhazia. According to GHN, this time Russian invaders looted local residents of villages, Saberio, Chuburhindzhe and Dihazurga taking herds of cows belong to them. “Furthermore, a winter products were also taken away from residents, loaded onto URAL army truck and driven off to occupation checkpoint”, told in the report.

Similar cases are well known in Georgia, as Georgian Media is repeatedly reporting such cases. According to their data, in October Russian invaders broke into school of Tagilon village, Galsk district of Abkhazia, found Georgian books and had beaten teachers.

Sometime later, the invaders on APCs attacked a bus with Georgians on, and took all the crops of peanuts and other products away from civilians. Just recently a TV channel “Rustavi 2″ came out with news that state Russian invaders broke into a school, in village of Nabakevi, located in Galsk district of Abkhazia, where they took few of transports and computerized machinery, books with Georgian writing were also seized off the teachers.

Other than that, according to the same information source, in villages of Sida and Nabakevi, 5 of Georgians families have also been victims of Russian looting and robbery. Russian troops had broke into house in middle of night and started searching form gold jewelry, on the way the also broke into back of the gardens and picked all the products, that families had collected for the winter. Loaded onto truck and driven off in unknown direction. The looting did not end up without casualties, as a result all members of families were tighten to chairs.

The families of the four Georgian minor, kidnaped by the Pro-Russian regime of “South-Ossetia” and the Russian occupiers for alleged crossing of so-called borders of “South Ossetia”, complain they are blackmailed.  Reportedly, they receive phone calls from the Russian backed Ossetian terrorsits, who urge them to swap their children on the criminals arrested by Georgian law enforcers.
Thomas Hammarberg, the EU Commissioner for Human Rights plans to arrive in Tskhinvali tomorrow to meet with the minor hostages and join the negotiations.
Aleko Sabadze, Viktor Buchukuri, Levan Khmiadashvili and Giorgi Romelashvili were arrested on November 4 by Russian occupants and taken to Tskhinvali. The Pro-Kremlin regime  have charged the teenagers with illegal crossing of border and carrying explosives.

Kiev’de üniversiteli genç kızlar bugüne kadar görülmemiş bir protestoya imza attılar.

Genç kızlar her yılın belli dönemlerinde bakım ve tamirat amacıyla kesilen sıcak suyu ve buna karar veren yerel yöneticileri protesto amacıyla halkı çamaşırlarını kentin sokak çeşmeleriyle, havuzlarda yıkamaya davet ettiler.

Protesto eyleminin başlangıcını da kendileri yapan genç kızlar, kentin ana meydanlarında bulunan havuzlarda iç çamaşırlarını ve bikinilerini yıkayarak, yetkililerin dikkatini çekemeye çalıştılar.

Polis bu ilginç protestoya herhangi bir müdahalede bulunmadı.Elemi dışardan izleyenler, bunun ses getirmesinin beklendiğini ve fakat sıcak su kesintisini önlemeye yetmeyeceğini, sıcak su kesintilerinin yılların sorunu olduğunu söylediler.

Moskova’da yetkililer sürekli olarak, sıcak su kesintisinin artık olmayacağını, olumlu önlemler alındığını söylemelerine karşın, günlük yaşamda bu konuda olumlu bir gelişme henüz yaşama geçirilmiş değil.

Bundan bir süre önce Moskova’da doğal gaz boru hattında meydana gelen yangının suçluları belirlendi.

Mosgaz yetkililerinin verdikleri bilgilere göre 10 Mayıs gecesi Ozereya Ulitsa’da meydana gelen doğal gaz boru hattında ki yangında ihmali bulunanların 7 kişi olduğu açıklandı. Yangında ihmali bulunan 3 kişinin Mosgaz elemanı oldukları ve üçünü de işten çıkarıldığı belirtildi.

Yangının dikkatsizlik, tamirat ve bakım sırasında kalitesiz malzeme kullanımı ile gerekli teknik bakım ve onarımların zamanında yapılmadığından kaynaklandığı belirlendi.Geri kalan üç kişinin de yangının çıkış noktasında bakım ve tamirat yapan kuruluşun üç personeli olduğu, onların da kuruluşlarınca işlerine son verildiği belirlendi.

Moskova’da ikinci dünya savaşından sonra ortaya çıkan en büyük yangın olarak kabul edilen bu yangında alevler 200 metre yüksekliğe kadar yükselmiş ve yangın 16 saat devam etmişti.Suçlu bulunan 7’ci kişi ise yangın sırasında söndürme çalışmaları için canını dişine takan ve yardım ekiplerine olayı ilk haber veren personel olduğu ve üstün gayretleri nedeniyle affedilip, işine devam ettirildiği duyuruldu.

By Andrea Peters
25 November 2009

http://wsws.org/articles/2009/nov2009/russ-n25.shtml

The impact of the global financial crisis on the Russian economy is fueling conflicts within the country’s ruling elite over the administration of state resources. In recent weeks there have been a series of events pointing to tactical differences between competing layers of the state bureaucracy and business oligarchy grouped around President Dmitri Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

Since 2008, Russia’s economy has been driven into severe recession. In early November of this year, the State Statistics Service reported that Russian gross domestic product (GDP) shrank 8.9 percent in the third quarter as compared to a year earlier. Since October of last year, industrial production in the country has fallen 11.2 percent, significantly more than the 8.1 percent anticipated by experts.

While improvement is expected next year, with forecasters predicting GDP growth of between 1 and 3 percent, this is a far cry from the high levels of economic expansion experienced in the early years of the decade. At that time, growth rates averaged 7 percent per year. Russia’s economy is not expected to return to its pre-crisis performance level until 2012.

The economic decline is having a destabilizing impact on Russian society. Official unemployment―which significantly underestimates real joblessness because of the large numbers of people who work outside the official economy―stood at 7.7 percent in October. Wage arrears have risen since the onset of crisis.

The falloff in industrial production has had a particularly severe impact on the country’s so-called “mono-towns,” urban centers in which the local economy is entirely dependent on a handful of enterprises. Over the course of the summer and into the fall, popular protests erupted in mono-towns across the country. These were inspired by the actions of residents of Pikalevo earlier in the year, when protesters blocked roads to demand an improvement in their living standards and a revival of production at local plants.

The social position of the small, but significant, middle class that developed in Russia as a result of oil wealth filtering its way through the economy has been undermined over the past year. The economic gains of this layer, which formed a significant portion of the pro-Putin constituency within the broader population, have eroded. This phenomenon has manifested itself in, for example, widespread defaults on mortgage payments.

The primary source of Russia’s economic decline is the sharp falloff in world oil prices, which has come alongside a tightening of credit and capital flight.

Under these conditions, it appears that disagreements have emerged within the ruling elite over how the country’s wealth should be managed and divided up among sections of the state bureaucracy and big business. At issue, in particular, is the operation of Russia’s so-called “state corporations.”

On November 12, in his annual State of the State address, President Medvedev called for the “comprehensive modernization” of the country and criticized Russia’s “chronic backwardness,” “primitive economic structure,” “humiliating dependence on raw materials,” and “corruption.”

“The global financial crisis has affected everyone,” observed Medvedev, “but Russia has experienced an even more severe economic downturn than most countries.” He added, “We should not lay the blame on the outside world alone.”

In addition to arguing that the country had to develop a more diversified economy by becoming a leader in the fields of medical technology, nuclear energy and telecommunications, he also insisted that Russia’s seven state corporations, which were established under Putin’s initiative, had to be fundamentally transformed.

The state corporations are essentially large private enterprises set up with government finances. Despite the fact that they have unique access to state resources, receive special tax breaks, and play a major role in the Russian economy, their financial and administrative operations are extremely opaque.

They are not actually owned by the government and are not legally subject to government oversight or obligated to report back to the state about their activities. While few details are publicly available about their holdings or internal structure, it is widely known that Prime Minister Putin appointed cronies to leading positions within these enterprises during his tenure as president.

In short, the state corporations are a significant source of both political power and wealth for Putin’s clan. They are a means by which large amounts of public wealth are funneled into the hands of Putin’s backers.

The state corporations have been the recipients of massive government bailouts. For example, Rostekhnologii, which owns the near-bankrupt AvtoVaz carmaker in Togliatti, got a 50 billion ruble ($1.72 billion) infusion from the government this summer. This money was squandered without any improvement in the auto plant’s fortunes, after which plans were announced for the potential layoff of 27,600 people.

A few days before Medvedev gave his State of the State address, the attorney general announced the results of an investigation into the affairs of these enterprises. According to a November 11 article by RIA-Novosti, the government discovered an array of criminal affairs, including the “frittering away of money on bonuses.”

In his address, Medvedev stated, “I think that this legal form of enterprise has no future overall in the modern world.”

He called for the transformation of state corporations into either regular, privately owned firms―which, by implication, would be subject to laws governing such enterprises–or “joint stock companies under government control.”

He further advocated the introduction of “modern corporate governance models” in enterprises with significant state participation, as well as a system of independent auditing.

The president is expected to issue concrete proposals for the reform of Russia’s state corporations on March 1, 2010.

Medvedev’s critical attitude towards the way in which Russia’s state corporations operate has not been a secret. In September, he published an article entitled “Go Russia!” which outlined many of the points he raised in his State of the State address.

Just prior to this, two scholars with close ties to the president issued a major report entitled Post-Pikalevo Russia, which documented in some detail the mechanisms used by leading oligarchs, who are known to have close ties to Putin, to effect a large-scale transfer of government wealth into their own hands under the cover of bailouts for corporations hit by the economic crisis. The report linked their activities to the growth of social unrest.

News of the report, which was authored by Vladislav Inozemtsev, director of the Center for the Study of Postindustrial Society, and Nikita Krichevskii, scientific leader of the Institute of National Strategy, had been leaked to the press over the course of the summer. Its contents were widely understood to be a lurid exposure of the manipulation of the Russian economy by Russia’s powerful oligarchy, in which sections of the Kremlin bureaucracy were clearly implicated. The report suggested strongly that the health of the country’s economy and state treasury was being endangered by the fact that there are no checks on the depredations of such forces, which are closely associated with the state corporations.

Medvedev’s dissatisfaction with the way state corporations operate and the concerns among his backers over the activities of the Kremlin’s oligarchs are not rooted in any fundamental opposition to the fact that Russia is dominated by a criminal gang of bureaucrats, siloviki (people with ties to the security services and military), and Mafioso businessmen. Rather, this section of the ruling elite feels that it has been denied its share of the spoils allotted to the clans grouped around Putin at the federal level. It is also worried about the long-term effects of the policies and methods utilized by Putin’s clique to secure its wealth on the Russian economy and the country’s national interests.

Particularly under conditions in which the global economic crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the Russian economy―its excessive dependence on oil wealth and the lag in the country’s technological base―these layers feel that a certain adjustment needs to be made in the way the economy is governed.

The most egregious excesses of Russia’s oligarchs need to be reigned in somewhat, corporations funded through state assets need to be made subject to some form of government oversight, and an effort must be made to secure transnational investment in Russia’s industrial sector so as to bring it up-to-date and make it competitive on the world market.

On November 11, Aleksandr Shokhin, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and a supporter of Medvedev’s critique of the state corporations, gave an interview to Rossiskaia Gazeta, the official state newspaper. In it, he made clear that his central concern was ensuring the health of Russian capitalism by making certain that state corporations were also subject to the rules of the market.

He said, “Essentially, the state is encroaching on private businesses’ ‘turf’ through the state corporations. And in the process, is creating preferential conditions for itself. The competitive environment is being distorted, the business climate is deteriorating, and private initiative is being stifled.”

For the moment, it appears that Putin has agreed to some sort of reform of the state corporations, although it remains to be seen how this process will play out and how far the disagreements within the Russian ruling elite will evolve.

While constitutionally Medvedev’s position as president gives him the authority to push ahead with significant changes in government economic and political policy, Putin continues to wield enormous power. Medvedev is aware of the fact that any attempt on his part to seriously reign in the prime minister and those forces around him would likely unleash a full-scale civil war within the ruling elite that could fundamentally destabilize the Russian political system. As the killings and assassinations of critics of the Kremlin in recent years have demonstrated, politics in contemporary Russia is often resolved at the point of a gun.

Those within the halls of power are wary of any possibility that disagreements between Medvedev and Putin might develop into a full-blown crisis. The use of electoral fraud by United Russia during the regional elections held in October to secure a decisive victory―despite the fact that this party, at the head of which Putin stands, would have handily won without resorting to such measures―was bound up with an effort by a section of the ruling elite to give the appearance of overwhelming political unity within the country.

While some in the Western media have argued that the apparent disagreements between Medvedev and Putin are an expression of a real split within the “ruling tandem”―perhaps in an effort to encourage the president, who is generally viewed as more sympathetic to US interests―Medvedev’s criticisms thus far have been relatively cautious and lacking in concrete details.

Medvedev has the same social base as Putin. Furthermore, he presides over a country in which social discontent is widespread over corruption, low living standards, and the disappearance of opportunities for advancement into the middle class. A recently released report by Transparency International, for example, rated Russia 146th out of 180 countries on a corruption index, noting that bribe-taking of various forms is a $300 billion-a-year industry and is worth almost one-fifth of the country’s economy.

While a real campaign against corruption and the unchecked power of the oligarchy and state bureaucracy would likely be supported by the broader population, in his criticisms of the state of Russian society Medvedev is careful not to make any serious appeal to such sentiments, which could easily spin out of his control.

Min far har nyligen börjat twittra, likaså min mor. Vad min mamma twittrar om vet jag inte riktigt, men pappa twittrar i alla fall om Ryssland.

I och med att han är lärare i ryska och har ett intresse av Ryssland håller han sig lite uppdaterad om vad som händer (läser tidningar och nyhetssajter) – därmed länkar han till tidningsartiklar från sin twitter. Tanken är att hans studenter ska kunna få i sig lite realia på det här sättet.

Häromdagen kom han springande och sa:
“Gissa vem som följer mig på twitter‽”
“Ingen aning”, sa jag.
“Medvedev!” utbrast han.

Rysslands president följer alltså min fars twitter. Det pappa funderade på var hur han skulle hantera detta. Förmodligen är det ju någon i Medvedevs stab som sitter och har hand om hans twitter, det känns ju ytterst otroligt att Dmitri Medvedev själv har tid att sitta och twittra.

Ska man bli orolig? Eller tycka det är kul att folk som twittrar om Ryssland i utlandet blir uppmärksammade? Helt enkelt, är det bra eller dåligt att märka ut sig på internet för att man twittrar om någonting potentiellt känsligt… Kartläggning, övervakning, personlig integritet är ord som direkt dyker upp i huvudet… Men samtidigt, har man valt att ha en del av sitt liv på internet får man faktiskt tåla att folk läser och tycker och vet om det.

Själv har jag inte twitter. Jag hinner inte, helt krasst. Men jag undrar hur jag skulle reagera om Medvedev eller någon annan “overklig” person plötsligt skulle börja läsa det jag skrev.

Läs även andra bloggares åsikter om twitter, ryssland, medvedev, kartläggning, övervakning, personlig integritet, privatliv, uppmärksamhet, internationalitet, internet, verklighet, politik

The Russia-EU summit in Stockholm last week was hailed by commentators on both sides as friendly beyond expectations and the most successful in the long series of tense and content-free summits. A few months back, Moscow –irritated by the strong Swedish condemnation of the Georgian war– had proposed holding the event in Brussels, but Foreign Minister Carl Bildt duly toned down his criticism and the long-expected decision on granting Gazprom permission to build the Nord Stream pipeline across the Swedish economic zone in the Baltic Sea created the warmest possible atmosphere for the summit (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 19).

This “thaw,” however, does not signify a “reset” in the Russian-European pseudo-partnership, and non-stop smiles have hardly made a significant contribution to rebuilding eroded trust. In an express-poll conducted by Ekho Moskvy on November 18, more than 70 percent of its liberal audience defined relations between Russia and the E.U. as “confrontation” and only 20 percent –as “cooperation.” The outgoing E.U. leadership had opted for a problem-free summit on the eve of the crucial vote for the first ever President of the European Council as well as a new High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (www.gazeta.ru, November 19). At the next summit, scheduled for June 2010 in Rostov-on-Don, Catherine Ashton, who has taken the latter job with a newly strengthened mandate, might disillusion Medvedev who assumes that “things are progressing quite nicely” towards a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

One of the stumbling blocks is Russia’s ambivalent course on acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Medvedev’s claim that he had instructed the cabinet to take the “shortest path” offered only a modicum of clarity. The most alarming divergence of interests, however, is happening exactly in the most developed “space for cooperation” –energy trade and investment, and Medvedev’s smiles did little to restore Russia’s reputation as a reliable exporter (Vedomosti, November 19). A far more important event in this respect occurred the next day in Yalta, where Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a late night meeting with his Ukrainian counterpart Yulia Tymoshenko. They agreed to a deal on prices and volumes for the supply and transit of Russian gas, which would have been great news for European consumers, were this bargain not so directly aimed at influencing the presidential elections in Ukraine next January. Putin saw no reason to deny himself the pleasure of making rude jokes concerning Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, and Tymoshenko was only too happy to play along (Kommersant, November 21).

The quality of this humor would not surprise European leaders (except, perhaps, Lady Ashton who has not savored it before), but the fact that Putin again seeks to harvest political dividends from the gas business is alarming. That this time he finds it beneficial not to punish Ukraine for violating contract agreements (Tymoshenko has received a multi-million dollar gift, as Putin confirmed a waiver on Gazprom’s trademark “take-or-pay” provision) which may lift some concerns about another “gas war.” The intrigue, however, is certain to take many new turns after the Ukrainian elections, and the E.U. Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs knows perfectly well that the newly-signed memorandum on setting an early warning mechanism provides no guarantee against sudden disruptions (Kommersant, November 17).

The “gas-for-promises” deal with Tymoshenko may not be that profitable for Russia (particularly since her promises are known to be less than rock-solid), but it has reaffirmed Putin’s role as the “decider.” Medvedev, therefore, is left with the public relations functions of beautifying Russia’s image abroad and making rousing speeches that mix patriotism and liberalism in healthy doses. He is trying to push these boundaries by issuing instructions to the government, but Russian bureaucracy is adept at sabotaging orders and reporting on their impeccable implementation. The real power of the presidential office is in hiring-and-firing, but Medvedev remains extra-cautious in using it. His advisor Mikhail Lesin, the former media minister and a key manipulator in Putin’s propaganda machine, was sacked with the stamp “abuse of office” last week, but this scandal remains an exception that proves the rule (Kommersant, November 19).

Medvedev focuses on the message that the pre-crisis prosperity amounted to a “humiliating dependence on raw materials” and that “the habit of living off export earnings” must be broken. Putin is clearly not comfortable with this denunciation of his achievements, and he has launched an ideological counter-offensive exploiting the pronounced disappointment in various political quarters about Medvedev’s lackluster address to the Federal Assembly on November 12 (www.gazeta.ru, November 18). The first salvo was delivered in a speech to the Russian Geographic Society (which Putin has benevolently taken under his trusteeship), which opened with a reassertion of Russia’s greatness derived not only from political stability and economic competitiveness (both, in fact, rather problematic) but from its sheer size (Vremya Novostei, November 19). The forceful follow-up was Putin’s speech at the congress of the United Russia party, which politely applauded Medvedev’s short address, but rallied to close ranks around its true leader. Putin elaborated on the ideology of “Russian conservatism,” which implicitly, but unmistakably, opposes Medvedev’s discourse on “innovations.”

In a show of unity, the two co-rulers had dinner in a cozy St. Petersburg restaurant, but the diverging course of leadership is dividing their odd “tandem” (www.grani.ru, November 19). Medvedev is trying to connect with the loose but powerful idea of “change” and argues that Russia cannot continue prospering as a petro-state, but Putin counters with the affirmative “Yes, we can.” Indeed, for the vast state bureaucracy, which constitutes a natural base for United Russia, Medvedev’s diatribes against “an archaic society in which the leaders think and decide for everyone” are positively alien, and the vast majority of the populace suspect that change can only be for the worse. Putin has prevailed over a feeble effort to gather a coalition of “modernizers” by using the most efficient tactics –allowing Medvedev to prove his uselessness as a leader of such a coalition. This predictable bureaucratic triumph leaves him in the position of a boy who plugged a hole in the dam with his finger, while the tide of change is about to overflow.

Bu yıl okulu bitiren Moskovalı öğrenciler Kızıl Meydan’da kutlama yaptılar.

Kutlamalar Moskova’nın 12 farklı meydanında, ayrıca Lujniki Spor Salonu ve çeşitli eğlence klüplerinde gerçekleşti. Bu yıl aynı zamanda bir ilke imza atıldı. İlk olarak bu yıl Mezuniyet Balosu Kızıl Meydan’da gerçekleştirildi. Polislerin yoğun güvenlik önlemleri aldığı Kızıl Meydan’daki kutlamalarda meydana alkollü içki sokulmadı. Büyük bir eğlence havasında geçen, mezun öğrencilerin katıldığı Mezuniyet Balosu havai fişek gösterisiyle sona erdi.

Diğer taraftan okullarını takdir ve teşekkür alarak bitiren öğrencilerin resmi kutlama töreni 26 Haziran cuma günü Kızıl Meydan yakınındaki Gostinir Dvor’da gerçekleştirilecek ve bu baloya Moskova’da bu sene okulu bitirip takdir veya teşekkür almış olan yaklaşık 4 bin mezun öğrenci katılacak.

Fokus hade förra veckan ett reportage om Ramzan Kadyrov och hans styre av Tjetjenien. Väl värd läsning! Eller hur man nu ska uttrycka det…

Kreml är än så länge nöjda med hans regim, men jag undrar om det inte börjar bli lite väl magstarkt även för en rysk och alltmer auktoritär ledning som åtminstonde är måna om att ge SKEN av att vara en demokrati. Hur länge kommer det att dröja innan Putin och Medvedev stoppar vansinnet i palatset i Groznyj?

300 namn på sin dödslista och en milis som finkammar byar och städer i en skonings- och urskillningslös jakt på presumtiva terrorister. Ett palats format som ett S med lyxbilar i garaget och en förmodad tortyrkammare i källaren.

Läs artikeln. Där står mycket, mycket mer.

moar funny pictures

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Haha Sarkozy’s face!

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So THAT’S how Ahmadinejad won.

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Look at the cat carving!

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Apple? I KNEW IT.

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ARGHHHHH

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From Photobomb:

DEATH IS IMMINENT.

There’s Wally!

I love the Sarah Palin and Russia jokes. I never get tired of them:

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This is really quietly one of the most informative websites ever. It’s how ai know about people like Dmitry Medvedev (how DO you pronounce his name?), Muhammad Gaddafi,  Rahm Emanuel and Ahmadinejad. Much better than any school!

Amerika’nın Washington kentinde metroda kazasından sonra Moskova’da yaşayan ve metro ile seyahat eden insanları “Moskova Metrosunda da buna benzer bir olay yaşanır mı” korkusu sardı.

Bunun üzerine konuya hakim uzmanlar tarafından bir açıklama geldi. Yapılan açıklamada, Moskova Metrosunda iki farklı yönden gelen trenlerin çarpışmasının fiziki olarak mümkün olmadığı, Moskova Metrosunda sinyal sistemi, otomatik olarak hızın ayarlanması sistemi ve acil fren sisteminin bulunduğu belirtildi. Ayrıca, konu ile ilgili olarak Moskova Metrosu Yönetimi tarafından yapılan açıklamada da, Moskova Metrosunda çarpışma meydana gelmesinin mümkün olmadığı ve böyle bir olayın imkansız olduğu bildirildi.

Moskova’nın tüm hatlarında sinyal sistemi olduğu ve bu sistemin metroyu süren makiniste mümkün olan hız sınırını gösterdiği, gerektiği zaman da hızın azaltılması uyarısı yaptığını ve makinistin buna göre yoluna devam ettiği, makinistin buna uymaması durumunda ise hızın otomatik olarak düşürülüp metronun frenlendiği kaydedildi.

Diğer taraftan, Moskova Metrosu tarihinde bir defa dahi bu gibi bir olayla karşılaşılmadığının altı çizildi.

The US will soon be retiring their space shuttles to replace them with a new vehicle, scheduled for 2013. Until then, the Americans will be riding on Russian Soyuz capsules. But the Soyuz itself, a 40 year old technology with many modernizations, is on its way out, to be replaced with bigger better platforms.

The replacement for the will be the Kliper, a ship carrying 6 crew and a half ton of cargo. It is scheduled to fly its maiden voyage some time in 2010. The ship is about twice the size of the Soyuz and will require much larger rockets, most likely the Zenit class of booster rockets, in order to make orbit. It will return to earth by extending wings and gliding down, for a soft landing.

Interestingly enough, if things go according to plant, the new, larger Kliper, will actually save money. The present Soyuz missions run between $20 to $30 million each (compared to the American space shuttles at around $300 million each). Kliper flights are supposed to move more equipment and people for less money, but even it the costs stay the same, with more room on the ship, there will be room for more space tourists and at $20 million per pop, the ships will earn a profit, with just one added passenger.

Development of the Kliper is also priced at the low cost of $1 billion, compare that to the $10 billion for the American Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which is still on the drawing board.

But the Kliper is only the first modern step in a new plan by the Russian space agency to conquer the inner sphere of our solar system. Next on the development board is a manned spacecraft powered by a nuclear electric engine. For decades, Russia and the Soviet Union have developed nuclear powered satellites, which did not have to rely upon easily damaged solar arrays, for power. Of course those put out only kilowatts of power, while this ships engines will have to run on the megawatt range.

The ship’s design is scheduled to be complete by 2012 and a finished by 2021, at an estimated cost of 17 billion rubles, or $580 million. More realistic estimates put the price tag at $1 to $1.5 billion, over the next decade.

“Naturalmente ho tifato, sofferto e ho sperato che la nostra squadra potesse cambiare l’andamento della gara – ha detto il leader del Cremlino – Lo sport tuttavia non è solo bravura ma anche fortuna.

Che Mourinho risponda “Allora Pato è interista” poco fa ridere, ecco perchè ha fatto bene a precisare di intendere l’Inter…Nacional, che a Tokyo c’è stato e ci ha vinto (con Pato in campo): in quel caso nulla da…

Quello tra Giuseppe Mascara e Ramona Taiani è stato un vero e proprio colpo di fulmine.

La ripresa del campionato di serie A coincide con una giornata interessantissima che pur non presentando i cosidetti big-match ha in palinsesto…

Fonte:
http://www.tuttomercatoweb.com/?action=read&id=180128

Will Dimitrij Medvedev be to fulfill his promises or not? What do you think? Is he really going to battle corruption which is what he stated among other things when he meet the Swedish Prime Minister Reinfeldt. Furthermore he is positive and support more Swedish companies possible establishment in Russia. He also supported the new criticized gas line   as well as the planned gas line in the Baltic sea (cutting through the Swedish economic zone). What are your personal opinion regarding Medvedev?

We all know that Russia after all is still unofficially governed by Putin so it will be interesting to see what the future will hold for Russia…

Bundan 9 yıl önce 2000 yılında Barensk denizinde batan ve batışı ile o dönem dünyanın gündemine oturan Rus nükleer denizaltısı Kursk’un başından geçenler bir tiyatro eserine konu oldu.

Kendisi de aslında eski bir denizaltıcı olan İngiliz Bryıny Lavory, Kursk’un batışını konu alan tiyatro eserinde, olayın tüm canlılığıyla yansıtılması için elinden geleni yaptı.Londra’nın Young Vic Thetare salonlarında sahnelenen eserde oynayan oyuncuların da büyük bölümü eski denizaltıcılardan seçildi.Oyun esnasında seyircilerin kendilerini tam bir denizaltı ortamında hissedebilmeleri için her türlü dekor, ses ve efektler aslına uygun olarak hazırlandı.

Eser ağırlıklı olarak Kursk’un batışı sırasında gizlice onu izleyen bir İngiliz denizaltısının gözünden yansıtılıyor.İngiliz denizaltısı o civarda gizlice bulunduğu için Rus nükleer denizaltısı Kursk’a yardım mı etsin yoksa olayı gizlice izleyerek olanı biteni dünyaya mı aktarsın ikilemi içinde bocalıyor.Nükleer denizaltı Kursk’ta batma sırasında içinde bulunan 118 personelin tümü yaşamını yitirmişti.Ruslar başka ülkelerden gelen yardım tekliflerini geri çevirdikleri için o dönemin yöneticileri daha sonra kamu oyu tarafından acımasızca eleştirilmişlerdi.

Russian occupiers are forcing the local Georgian population to participate in constructing of military bases in Georgia`s breakaway region of Abkhazia.

On Sunday morning, the Russian aggressors took locals by Ural truck from Gali district to the territories, where the construction is underway. Furthermore, the occupants advise the locals living in the vicinity of the military bases to move to some other places to live, because as they assert, the territories should be declared a closed zone.

Along with this, the occupants have dug trenches and bunkers right in the towns of Sokhumi, Ochamchire and Tkvarcheli. They have installed anti-aircraft missiles there and name prevention of possible provocations as a reason for all their actions.

NATO is concerned over the recent Russian-Belarusian large-scale military drills “Zapad (West) 2009″, said on Wednesday NATO spokesman James Appathurai.

As he said, the NATO Council at the ambassadorial level of 28 member countries of the Alliance at a meeting in Brussels on Thursday, in particular, has expressed a concern about the extent of the exercises, which “were the largest since the end of the “Cold War”, as well as the fact that Russia did not invite observers to the maneuvers which is being seen by NATO as a violation of the Vienna obligations”.

Vienna Document (“On measures to reduce the military danger and confidence building in Europe”), to which Appathurai referred, in 1999, signed by 55 state-participants of OSCE. This document provides for exchange of information on conducting large-scale military exercises.

In addition, Appathurai said that the NATO allies have also expressed concern regarding the fact that the scenario of Russian-Belarusian doctrines anticipated the attack on Russia from the West.

NATO will continue to discuss these exercises and their possible impact on NATO-Russia relations, which are at an improvement stage, said Appathurai. He did not rule out that the Alliance may seek additional clarification on the doctrines from Russia’s side.

We would like to recall that the exercises have raised concerns of a number of neighboring countries of Russia and Belarus. Thus, the Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski urged NATO to draw attention to the military exercises of Belarus and Russia near the Polish border. Sikorski has also said that he wrote about this in a letter to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

In addition, Sikorski urged the US to deploy US armed forces in Poland for protection against “Russian aggression”.

Latvian Minister of Defense told reporters that Russia and Belarus has staged an attack on the Baltic States, that is on the states that are members of NATO.

In the summer of next year, Latvia will hold on its territory a large scale military exercises, which will be a response to Russan-Belarusian doctrines Zapad-2009 took place in September of this year, said Republican television channel TV3, with reference to the Minister of Defense of the Baltic republics Imants Legis.

In turn, the Estonian President Hendrik Ilves urged the West to be careful with respect to the actions of Russia. He proposed to conduct a ground exercise of NATO troops in the same region.

At Prague Watchdog, Andrei Babitsky and German Sadulayev comment on President Medvedev’s new North Caucasus policy, announced in his recent address to the Federal Assembly, and his appointment of an “overseer” for the region, which is now for the first time being perceived by the Kremlin as a political entity. Also, a new Reuters report quotes ChRI leader Akhmed Zakayev as saying that Russia intends to significantly increase the numbers of its troops in the North Caucasus, as part of a planned surge.