One defining characteristics of a crisis is a violation of constituent expectations.  In other words, things do not happen like they should.  For example, your flight departs then arrives, roughly on time.  We expect there can be some delays.  However, we do not expect to be held in a small airplane overnight for seven hours on the tarmac just 50 yards from the terminal.  Continental Express Flight 2816 for Continental Airlines left Houston at 9:23pm and did not arrive in Minneapolis until 11am the next day.  Thunderstorms caused the plane and its 47 passengers to be diverted to Rochester, MN.  Upon landing, the crew was told they could not deplane that evening.  The next morning, passengers were deplaned and then sent to Minneapolis after a 2 ½ hour wait. The US Department of Transportation has launched an investigation.  Here is a summary of initial actions and comments:

“The Transportation Department has sent Continental Airlines a letter asking who was responsible for the well-being of the passengers ‒ Continental or ExpressJet, the regional air carrier that operated the flight for Continental ‒ and why the flight remained on the ground as long as it did. Officials also want to know what procedures the two airlines have in place for deplaning of passengers on diverted flights if airport security personnel aren’t present.

Continental spokeswoman Julie King said the airline is cooperating with the Transportation Department’s investigation. She said the Houston-based air carrier adopted a policy earlier this year that no passenger should be subjected to a tarmac delay of three hours or more without being offered an opportunity to get off the aircraft provided that can be done safely.

A spokeswoman for ExpressJet, also based in Houston, didn’t respond to a request for comment.” http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/aug/12/government-asking-why-airline-passengers-were-stra/

Here are some additional crisis responses:

“Continental is apologizing to passengers who were stuck on the tarmac for six hours when a Houston-to-Minneapolis flight was diverted because of bad weather.  Continental says the incident was ‘completely unacceptable.’
The airline is also offering refunds and vouchers. Continental Express 2816 was operated by ExpressJet Airlines,
which handles regional flights for Continental. It was diverted toRochester, Minn., and landed about midnight.
Passengers weren’t allowed to leave the plane until 6 a.m. Saturday.

ExpressJet says passengers couldn’t get off because security screeners had gone off duty. But officials at the Rochester airport say the passengers could have stayed on the secure side of the
terminal, and it was Continental’s decision to keep them on the plane.”

Continental referred calls to Express.Jet as part of its response. 

A preliminary investigation has assigned responsibility:

” Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said a preliminary investigation by his department found that ExpressJet, the regional carrier which operated Continental Express Flight 2816 for Continental Airlines, wasn’t at fault in the tarmac stranding.

Instead, blame for the incident, which has revived calls for greater consumer protections for airline passengers, belongs with Mesaba Airlines, whose representative incorrectly told ExpressJet that the passengers couldn’t be allowed inside the terminal because Transportation Security Administration personnel had left for the day, LaHood said.

Actually, security regulations allow for deplaning passengers to be kept in a separate ‘sterile’ area until they are ready to board, he said.

‘We have determined that the Express Jet crew was not at fault. In fact, the flight crew repeatedly tried to get permission to deplane the passengers at the airport or obtain a bus for them,’ LaHood said Friday in a statement.

‘There was a complete lack of common sense here,’ the secretary said. ‘It’s no wonder the flying public is so angry and frustrated.’

Mesaba was the only airline with staff still at the Rochester, Minn., airport that Friday night.” http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090821/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_nightmare_flight

Questions to Consider

1.  If you were managing the crisis for Continental, what type of crisis would you label this event and why?
2. If you were managing the crisis for Mesaba, what type of crisis would you label this event and why?
3. How did Secretary LaHood’s comments change the crisis for Continental? For Express.Jet? for Mesaba?
4. What role did the airport as an organization play in the crisis?
5. How effective was Continental’s crisis response?  Justify your answer.
6. How effective was the Express.Jet response?  Justify your answer.

DL 427 LGA-ATL 1255A-327P 757-200 4B First Class
DL 5086 ATL-TRI 415P-519P CRJ-200 Seat 8B exit changed to DL 5762 ATL-TRI 5:18P-6:45P Saab 340 Seat 6C Exit

This was another relatively uneventful trip on Delta.  I’ve been really impressed with Delta’s consistency and upgraded service in first class.

We departed the gate on time at LGA, but took an ATC delay departing LGA into ATL.  We took off around 1:30 pm. Service in first class consisted of a pre-departure beverage, hot towels before the meal, and a meal choice of a turkey sandwich or a chef’s salad.  I selected the salad and it was accompanied by a bowl of fresh fruit, breadsticks, and a brownie.  I skipped the brownie.  This was an older 752 with overhead IFE, so I did not watch any of the television-like programming.  Although we departed later than expected, we still arrived on time.

I deplaned and hurried to my connection.  We boarded, then the crew discovered a maintenance issue.  We sat on the plane at the gate about 45 minutes before they allowed us to deplane.  At that point, I figured I needed a backup plan just in case the flight canceled, so I proceeded to the nearest Delta Sky Club for assistance.  The club agent didn’t just back me up, but immediately put me on the next flight to TRI in seat 2A, which was listed as on time.  I hurried to that gate and discovered that the aircraft was a Northwest/Mesaba Saab 340 operating as a Delta Connection flight, my least favorite aircraft of any I have flown.  We boarded and when my boarding pass was scanned, I had been reassigned an exit row seat, which was a pleasant surprise.  Once we were aboard, I noticed that this Saab seemed to be in much better condition and more comfortable than the two previous Saabs I had flown, so I was slightly relieved.  We took off a few minutes past scheduled departure around 5:30 pm and the flight was one hour en route.  The flight attendant provided a full beverage service with Pepsi beverages as per Northwest’s contract, but Delta snacks, peanuts or Biscoffs.  The plastic drink cups were also Delta/Coca-Cola branded.  The flight turned out to be much better than I expected and we landed about 15 minutes early, around 6:30 pm and earlier than my original flight.

In a recent release from Delta and an article from MSNBC news, Delta is planning to merger the ticket counter representatives, gate agents and baggage handlers of three of it’s regional feeders from Comair, Mesaba and Compass . This again is part of their merging process and will be even better for Delta’s efficiency and general sense of unity for the airlines. However I do have a problem with the name ,Regional Handeling Services, could it be Delta Regional. Just a suggestion, anyway I don’t know how much of a difference it will make down bellow I have a map of where their major services are and were the greatest effects may be seen. 

This merger could be telling, if they have merged the ground staff the next step would naturally be to merger these small airlines, however they are pretty independent these days. If this was done it would be even better but I don’t know if is possible. They might just go for making NWA Airlink and Delta Connection, Delta Airlink highly symbolic move and a good one. So far Delta has been doing a job in this merger and the greater unity is better, the more the merrier.  The art of Merger is to not seem like one airline is disappearing, but two are becoming one. I have an Ad under the maps that does a good job of this something Delta might consider. But they are going to be name the new  Delta Connection, oh Delta how you bore people. 

Nel 1887 Thomas Edison, uno dei più grandi geni industriali della storia, inventore del fonografo e della lampadina, e in quel momento uomo ricchissimo, investì la sua fortuna in un progetto pericoloso.

Gli Stati Uniti erano nel pieno di un boom economico e la domanda di ferro, destinato ad alimentare le acciaierie, era in crescita continua. In natura, il ferro si trova nella magnetite, nell’ematite e in altri cristalli, che di solito sono mescolati a rocce. I giacimenti migliori, ovviamente, sono quelli concentrati, dove il minerale è molto e la roccia è poca. Negli Stati Uniti, i maggiori giacimenti di questo tipo erano in profondità, e per sfruttarli bisognava scavare costose miniere sotterranee. Ciò nonostante, questi giacimenti erano molto più redditizi di quelli di superficie, poco concentrati, dove gli scavi erano rapidi ma troppo lavoro andava sprecato rompendo rocce che non contenevano minerale.

Edison si chiese se non si potesse meccanizzare l’estrazione di superficie, risparmiando lavoro, così che anche questi giacimenti diventassero convenienti. Tempo cinque minuti, Edison aveva disegnato uno schizzo. Tempo qualche mese, aveva comprato un vasto giacimento superficiale a Ogdensburg, nel New Jersey, e dava inizio alla costruzione di un impianto rivoluzionario.

Il processo di estrazione si divideva in queste fasi:

1. gli ingegneri staccavano blocchi di rocce dalle colline con la dinamite, senza curarsi più di tanto di quanto minerale contenessero;
2. gli operai caricavano le rocce su rulli meccanici che le trasportavano all’impianto;
3. all’impianto, due giganteschi cilindri d’acciaio schiacciavano le rocce, riducendole in frammenti minuti;
4. una cremagliera faceva salire i frammenti fino alla bocca di un silos, dove erano fatti cadere dentro;
5. nei silos, magneti elettrici deviavano la caduta della magnetite, separandola dalla roccia;
6. la magnetite, che atterrava in uno scomparto, era poi fusa in pani e venduta alle fonderie; la roccia, che cadeva in un altro scomparto, era venduta come sabbia edile.

Allora i minerali di ferro si vendevano a 6 dollari la tonnellata. Edison calcolò che il suo impianto avrebbe prodotto magnetite a un costo di 5 dollari, quanto bastava per trarne profitti generosi.

Non andò così. Innanzi tutto, costruire l’impianto fu un’avventura. Edison dovette inventare molti congegni ex novo, perché non trovava sul mercato quelli che gli servivano. Per Edison inventare era divertimento, ma le invenzioni procedono per prove ed errori. Edison non faceva eccezione, se è vero che, come dicono i suoi biografi, accese la prima lampadina dopo tredicimila tentativi falliti. In un impianto come quello di Ogdensburg, prova ed errore significarono cremagliere inceppate, giunti spezzati, cilindri sfondati, motori in fiamme, condutture esplose e altri incidenti che terminavano nella fuga degli operai sotto una pioggia di selci, con scene pittoresche che ricordavano l’eruzione di Pompei.

L’impianto aprì solo nel 1891, e solo nel 1898 scese ai livelli di costo che Edison aveva sperato.

Intanto, nel 1890, compagnie minerarie rivali avevano scoperto il giacimento di ematite di Mesaba, nella zona dei Grandi Laghi. Questo giacimento aveva caratteristiche straordinarie:

• l’ematite era in concentrazione altissima;
• stava in superficie;
• i cristalli erano mescolati con rocce friabili e facili da separare;
• il giacimento era tanto grande da potere rifornire tutte le acciaierie americane per decenni.

Le compagnie impiantarono a Mesaba un processo di estrazione assai semplice: le ruspe scavavano canali a cielo aperto; gli operai, armati di vanghe, recuperavano i cristalli; i cristalli erano caricati su vagoni e spediti ai clienti.

Nel 1894 John D. Rockefeller acquistò il giacimento e, deciso a creare un monopolio del ferro, inondò la nazione di ematite. Nel 1898, quando Ogdensburg era a regime e i costi di produzione erano arrivati a 4,75 dollari la tonnellata, il prezzo di mercato era sceso a 3,5 dollari.

Edison, che non solo aveva speso tutto il suo denaro, ma era nei debiti fin sopra le orecchie, alzò bandiera bianca e chiuse l’impianto di Ogdensburg. I biografi ci informano che Edison accettò il disastro con serenità; agli amici diceva che alla peggio sarebbe tornato a fare il telegrafista, il suo primo mestiere. Invece si rimise in piedi: aprì un cementificio, dove trasferì molte tecniche inventate a Ogdensburg, e in pochi anni ricostituì il suo patrimonio.

Questa storia ci insegna quattro lezioni.

La prima è che potete concepire un progetto cattivo anche se siete molto intelligenti. Edison, che era un genio, non pensò che negli Stati Uniti c’erano territori insondati che potevano celare giacimenti favolosi. Scommettere tutto il proprio denaro su un giacimento di seconda scelta mentre le esplorazioni erano ancora in corso era come stuzzicare la sfortuna a colpire.

La seconda è che spesso la sfortuna colpisce.

La terza è che dopo avere avviato un progetto sentirete una forte motivazione a portarlo a termine. Questa motivazione può farvi superare le difficoltà, ma può anche farvi trascurare i segnali avversi che vi dicono che fareste meglio a lasciare perdere. Mesaba fu scoperto nel 1890; Edison avrebbe potuto capire già allora che Ogdensburg era condannato; eppure continuò a investirci quattrini per altri otto anni.

La quarta è che un progetto cattivo dura quanto durano le vostre risorse. In affari, le risorse sono i soldi. Produrre senza vendere, o vendendo sotto costo, vi manda in perdita; e a furia di perdite giungerete al punto in cui dovete capitolare. Nella vita personale le risorse sono la pazienza, la capacità di soffrire e altre virtù che, tirando le somme, è meglio abbiate in piccola quantità se non volete insistere nei vostri cattivi progetti fino alla vecchiaia.