1.4.1 Special Attention Given to Churches

NKVD Instruction NK/003/1947, point 34:– ‘We should give special attention to churches. Cultural and educational activities should be directed in such a way as to create a general antipathy towards them. Pay particular attention and place under special controls church printing houses, libraries, archives, sermons, pastoral visits, catechism classes and funeral ceremonies’.

From what we have said before, it should already be clear that churches are not very popular with communist regimes, even if sometimes communists have tried to use them for limited periods of time in order to promote their own agendas. Some naïve church leaders were fooled by this circumstantial benevolence and became ‘fellow travellers’. To their great surprise, they were later dumped by their supposedly friendly protectors as soon as their help was no longer needed.

Definition – Fellow travellers was a label used to identify those people and institutions that the communists used in order to strengthen their position and influence in society. They invariably discarded them later on (and sometimes literally destroyed them in the process) after they had seen their purposes accomplished.

No matter what the immediate tactical attitudes of the communist regimes were towards the church, their long-term purposes always included the idea of compromising the testimony and influence of church leaders and of the church as a whole in society.

Terror by Quota–State Security from Lenin to Stalin

Misterioasa sotie a lui Kim Philby

Cea mai redutabila cartita sovietica din toate timpurile a avut un punct vulnerabil. Kim Philby, omul infiltrat de KGB in fruntea contraspionajului britanic, ar fi putut fi deconspirat, in orice moment, de o femeie. Un risc pe care Philby si l-a asumat. Cine era femeia? Fosta sa sotie, frumoasa austriaca Litzy Friedmann. Un personaj la fel de fascinant ca si celebrul spion, insa mult mai misterios. Racolata ea insasi de NKVD la inceputul anilor ‘30, Litzy Kohlmann a fost primul “om de legatura” intre Philby si spionajul sovietic, in timpul razboiului din Spania. Biografia ei tumultuoasa constituie subiectul cartii “Un capitol din viata mea”, aparuta recent la Viena, sub semnatura scriitoarei Barbara Honigmann. O carte care dezvaluie detalii inedite despre tineretea lui Kim Philby, dintr-o perspectiva pe care arhivele secrete nu o pot oferi: perspectiva femeii care i-a influentat decisiv destinul. Cum a reusit autoarea sa afle asemenea informatii? Chiar de la mama ei, nimeni alta decat Litzy Friedmann insasi.

Un gentleman marxist
Kim Philby si Litzy Friedmann s-au cunoscut in toamna lui 1933, la Viena. Ea avea 23 de ani si el 21. Ea era fiica unor evrei saraci din Austria, el, unicul fiu al unei bogate familii din inalta societate britanica. Amandoi aveau insa puternice convingeri marxiste si frecventau cercurile “revolutionare”. Proaspat absolvent de Cambridge, Philby sosise la Viena animat de dorinta de a participa efectiv la “lupta de clasa”. Era o epoca violenta si tulbure. Confruntarile dintre sindicate si guvern impinsesera Austria in pragul razboiului civil. La Viena, Philby lucra pentru Organizatia Internationala de Sprijin Muncitoresc (MOPR). In secret, facea pe curierul pentru Partidul Comunist Austriac, aflat in ilegalitate. In timpul unei intruniri clandestine, Philby a vazut-o pentru prima oara pe Litzy Friedmann. A fost imediat cucerit de frumoasa bruneta, recent divortata. Pasiunea a fost reciproca. Multi ani mai tarziu, Litzy i-a povestit fiicei ei: “Era cu doi ani mai tanar ca mine… abia absolvise Cambridge-ul si era un barbat foarte chipes. Se purta ca un gentleman. Si era marxist. O combinatie rara. Schiopata usor, uneori mai vizibil, alteori mai putin. Ca multe dintre persoanele cu handicap, era foarte fermecator. Ne-am indragostit imediat.” Cei doi s-au casatorit in februarie 1934. Trei luni mai tarziu, Kim Philby se intorcea la Londra, insotit de proaspata lui sotie.

Racolarea

Barbara Honigmann sustine ca Philby ar fi fost racolat de NKVD abia dupa 1935, prin intermediul unui alt eminent absolvent de Cambridge, Douglas McLean. Mama sa i-ar fi marturisit acest lucru, comentand: “Englezii erau asa de naivi, asa de naivi”. Documente din arhivele sovietice, date publicitatii dupa detectarea deja celebrului Vasili Mitrohin, spun insa, o cu totul alta poveste.

Dragostea pentru Litzy l-a aruncat pe Philby direct in bratele spionajului sovietic. Potrivit “Arhivei lui Mitohin” (Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, Londra,1999), Litzy Friedmann fusese deja racolata de NKVD in 1933, la fel ca si buna sa prietena, Edith Suschitscky. Amandoua se aflau in legatura lui Arnold Deutsch (alias “Stefan”, alias “Otto”), si el evreu austriac, cel mai talentat “vanator de talente” pentru spionajul sovietic din epoca interbelica. In urmatorii ani, Deutsch avea sa racoleze celebra “celula de la Cambridge”.

In toamna lui 1933, Edith Suschitscky s-a maritat si ea cu un englez, doctorul Alex Tudor Hart si l-a urmat la Londra. Hart fusese si el racolat de Deutsch. El si Edith au primit – impreuna – numele conspirativ “Strela” (“Sageata”).

In mai 1934, Kim si Litzy Philby soseau si ei in Marea Britanie. Spre marea bucurie a lui Edith Suschitscky, care isi regasea astfel nu doar o veche prietena de la Viena, ci si o “tovarasa de lupta”. Aproape in acelasi timp se instalase la Londra si Arnold Deutsch.

Se pare ca Edith Suschitscky a fost cea care i-a atras atentia lui Deutsch asupra “potentialului” tanarului Philby. Cert este ca ea a intermediat prima intalnire “conspirativa” intre cei doi, in iunie 1934, pe o banca din Regent’s Park. Intrevederea a fost un succes. Philby a fost cucerit imediat de inteligenta si farmecul interlocutorului sau, un intelectual rafinat care se bucura deja de un imens prestigiu in mediile academice. Psiholog abil, Deutsch a speculat idealismul tanarului sau recrut. L-a invitat sa se alature razboiului secret lansat de Komintern impotriva fascismului, aflat in ascensiune in Europa. Prima sa misiune: sa rupa orice legaturi vizibile cu miscarile comuniste. “Avem nevoie de oameni care sa infiltreze In institutiile burgheze”, a explicat Deutsch. Kim Philby s-a angajat sa o faca.

Un debut anevoios

Au urmat trei ani dificili. Litzy a fost primita cu ostilitate fatisa de familia sotului ei. Ea i-a povestit, decenii mai tarziu, fiicei sale: “Mama lui Kim nu putea sa ma sufere. Era oripilata de mariajul nostru, pe care il considera o cumplita mezalianta. Singurul ei fiu sa se insoare cu o comunista evreica din Viena – ce cosmar!” Intre timp, Kim se straduia din rasputeri sa-si faca uitate vechile convingeri marxiste si sa isi croiasca o cariera in diplomatie. Fara succes. Cererile sale de a fi angajat la Foreign Office au fost respinse. Trecutul marxist si nevasta “atipica” nu erau bine vazute de “establishmentul” britanic. Abia a reusit sa obtina o slujba la o obscura publicatie lunara de orientare liberala, “Review of Reviews”. Mult sub asteptarile la care ar fi fost indreptatit un eminent absolvent de Cambridge.

La indemnul lui Arnold Deutsch, Philby s-a inscris intr-o organizatie de prietenie anglo-germana, botezata de Churchill, in epoca, “Brigada Heil Hitler”. Initiativa s-a dovedit un esec din punct de vedere informational. Philby era din ce in ce mai demoralizat.

In aceasta perioada, singurele sale contributii in favoarea spionajului sovietic au constat in identificarea altor potentiali “recruti” pentru Arnold Deutsch. El a fost cel care i-a recomandat pe Donald McLean si Guy Burgess, doi eminenti absolventi de la Cambridge. Impreuna cu Philby, Anthony Blunt si John Cairncross (racolati abia in 1937), vor intra in istoria spionajului sub denumirea de “Cei cinci magnifici”.

Razboiul din Spania

Cariera de agent sovietic a lui Kim Philby a inceput sa ia avant abia incepand cu anul 1937, dupa izbucnirea razboiului civil din Spania. Philby si-a oferit serviciile unei agentii de presa londoneze.

In februarie 1937, plecat corespondent in Spania, ca jurnalist independent, platit la bucata, pentru fiecare material transmis. In realitate, Philby avea alte prioritati, in afara gazetariei. “Sarcina mea era aceea de a obtine informatii la prima mana cu privire la orice aspecte ale efortului fascist de razboi”, avea sa noteze el, peste ani, in Memoriile sale. Potrivit “Arhivei lui Mitrohin” misiunea lui Philby fusese, in realitate, mult mai ambitioasa. El primise instructiuni sa-l asasineze pe generalul Francisco Franco, liderul fortelor nationaliste. Ordinul venise de la Moscova si fusese aprobat, cu siguranta, de insusi Stalin. Un ordin care i-a lasat probabil perplecsi pe controlorii de la Londra ai lui Philby. Acestia au avertizat, imediat, conducerea NKVD ca misiunea depaseste cu mult puterile tanarului lor recrut.

Philby s-a intors la Londra in mai 1937, fara sa-l fi vazut vreodata de-aproape pe Franco. “Era foarte deprimat”, se preciza intr-o nota informativa a NKVD. A reusit insa sa se angajeze la “Times” si sa se intoarca in Spania. Spre sfarsitul anului, un incident tragic avea sa-i aduca celebritatea. Masina in care calatorea impreuna cu alti corespondenti de razboi a fost lovita de o salva de artilerie. Trei jurnalisti au murit. Philby a scapat cu rani usoare si a scris un reportaj cutremurator. A devenit, peste noapte, un adevarat erou. Toate usile au inceput sa i se deschida. La 2 martie 1938, a fost decorat de insusi Franco. Intre timp insa, NKVD-ul renuntase la planul de a-l asasina pe liderul spaniol.

Litzy, omul de legatura intre Philby si Moscova

Barbara Honigmann dezvaluie in cartea sa ca mama ei a fost cea care, in timpul razboiului din Spania, a facut legatura intre Kim Philby si spionajul sovietic. La ordinele Moscovei, Litzy (care primise numele conspirativ “Maria”) se instalase la Paris. Calatorea, insa frecvent, pentru a-si intalni sotul in hoteluri din Biarritz, Perpignan sau Gibraltar. Relatiile dintre cei doi devenisera din ce in ce mai mult “profesionale”. Philby era un fustangiu notoriu, sau, cum ii placea sa se descrie, “un atlet al sexului”. La Paris, Litzy incepuse o aventura cu un sculptor olandez. Amandoi aveau o conceptie cat se poate de neconventionala despre casnicie. Totusi, la izbucnirea celui de-al doilea razboi mondial, Kim si Litzy s-au intors la Londra, ca sot si sotie. Philby a primit imediat un post in cadrul Sectiei D a SIS (Secret Intelligence Service), sectie care se ocupa cu organizarea de “actiuni subversive in spatele liniilor inamice”. Incepea, astfel, o prodigioasa cariera in cadrul serviciilor britanice de informatii. O adevarata mana cereasca pentru Moscova.

In septembrie 1941, Kim Philby a fost transferat la Sectia V -de contrainformatii – a SIS. Sediul ei se afla la St. Albans, la doar cativa metri de imobilul care adapostea arhivele operative. Imprietenindu-se cu arhivarul, mare amator de gin, Philby a reusit in numai cateva luni sa fotocopieze si sa trimita la Moscova dosarele tuturor agentilor britanici din strainatate. Ceea ce, paradoxal, i-a atras neincrederea mai marilor din NKVD. Acestia nu puteau crede ca englezii nu dispun de o retea de spionaj in Uniunea Sovietica. Ca nu exista nici macar o rezidenta la Moscova. Si totusi acesta era adevarul. Spionajul britanic avea cu totul alte prioritati, fiind canalizat exclusiv pe efortul de razboi. Rusii erau aliati si tratati ca atare. Cert este ca, pana in 1944, Moscova a fost extrem de reticenta fata de Philby si de ceilalti “magnifici de la Cambridge”, crezandu-i “agenti provocatori”, controlati de Londra.

Epilog

Kim si Litzy Philby au divortat in 1942. Mariajul se incheiase, in realitate, de mult. Dupa razboi, Litzy a parasit definitiv Marea Britanie si s-a instalat in Berlinul de Est. S-a recasatorit cu jurnalistul de stanga, Georg Kohlmann, cu care a avut un copil, astazi scriitoarea Barbara Honigmann.

Kim Philby a cunoscut o spectaculoasa ascensiune profesionala, ajungand sa fie cea mai nociva cartita sovietica din istorie. A fost, pe rand, seful Sectiei a IX-a din cadrul SIS (contrainformatii pe spatiul sovietic), sef de antena in Turcia si ofiter de legatura la Washington. Declinul sau a inceput in 1951, odata cu deconspirarea lui Burgess si McLean, care au reusit sa se refugieze la Moscova. Philby avea sa fie deconspirat abia in 1963. Si el a reusit sa fuga, cu sprijinul sovieticilor. A murit la Moscova, in 1988, alcoolic si profund deprimat. Viata in URSS se dovedise cu totul altfel decat isi imaginase.

Litzy Friedmann-Philby-Kohlmann a murit in 1991, la varsta de 80 de ani. Isi pierduse de mult toate iluziile cu privire la comunism, cu toate ca in Germania de Est se bucurase de un statut privilegiat. Acest statut i-a permis, in 1984, sa calatoreasca la Viena. A plecat cu doua valize si nu s-a mai intors niciodata.

Sursa:ziua.net (Miruna Munteanu)

Vad? Se del 1 för förklaring och källor.

Tabellerna öppnar i nytt fönster:

Döda i fängelser i Sovjetunionen 1939-1951

Förändringar i lägerbefolkningen i GULAG 1934-1947

Könssammansättning av lägerfångar i GULAG 1934-1948

Könssammansättning av kolonifångar i GULAG 1943-1946

Gravida och barn i läger och kolonier i GULAG 1947-1953

Utbildningsnivå för lägerfångar i GULAG 1934 och 1941

Nyttjande av fängslade specialister och kvalificerad arbetskraft i GULAG 1 januari 1947

Ålderssammansättning av fångar i GULAG 1 mars 1940

Fångar i GULAG efter strafflängd mars 1940

Fångar i GULAG efter brottstyp 1 mars 1940

Fångsammansättning i GULAG efter brottstyp 1 januari 1951 (detaljerad)

Etnisk sammansättning av lägerfångar i GULAG 1939-1947, 1951

Varför? Föråldrad – ofta – och felaktig – för det mesta – information om dimensionerna av förtrycket under Sovjet-tiden florerar trots att tillförlitliga uppgifter har funnits fritt tillgängliga i drygt tjugo år. Här presenteras, på svenska, baserad på interna uppgifter, statistik från den sovjetiska förtrycksapparaten, dess rättssystem och säkerhetstjänster, 1921-1953. (Se ref-länkarna för de tabeller som har varit min omedelbara förlaga.) Det här är del ett av två. Del två finns nu här.

Tabellerna har anpassats huvudsakligen från Viktor N. Zemskov:s artiklar (1991-) på basis av de öppnade sovjetiska arkiven.  Ytterst härrör mycket av informationen från Hruščiov:s undersökningar som låg till grund för det berömda talet 1956 som fördömde hans föregångare. Distanseringen från Stalin började ju redan med de omfattande amnestierna från och med 1953, samma år som Stalin dog.

Man bör på intet sätt tolka Zemskovs publiceringar som att sista ordet härmed var sagt, men det enda vetenskapligt godtagbara förhållningssättet har varit, är och förblir att utgå från dem.

Tabellerna öppnar i nytt fönster:

VČK-OGPU-ärenden under 1921-1929

OGPU-NKVD-ärenden under 1930-1936

NKVD-ärenden under 1937-1938

Ärenden under 1921-1938 (sammanställning)

Ärenden under 1939-1953

Antal fångar i fängelser i Sovjetunionen 1939-1948

Fångar i fängelser i Sovjetunionen 10 maj 1945 efter kategori

Antal fångar i GULAG 1934-1953 (översikt)

Ref:

http://soviet-history.com/doc/prison/1953_12_11_spravka_mvd.php

http://soviet-history.com/doc/prison/gulag_tab1.php

http://www.hrono.info/statii/2001/zemskov.html

Raportul Presfinţitului Arhiepiscop Ilarion de Smeliansk

mitropolitul Serghie

“Înaltpreasfinţia Voastră, Preasfinţiţii Voştri!

Patriarhia Moscovei (în continuare PM) aparţine la moment la, aşa numita, comunitate a „ortodoxiei universale”, pe care Soborul Arhieresc le consideră ca grupuri de pseudo-biserici unite, căzute în erezia ecumenistă. Dar fiecare din aceste grupuri îşi are propria istorie a decăderii. Unele au căzut deodată, altele – mai devreme au căzut din Biserică prin schismă.

PM, de cel puţin trei ori a săvârşit acţiuni, fiecare din ele fiind suficientă, pentru a cădea cu totul de la Biserică. Doar după tripla cădere în schismă, PM a primit la începutul anului 1961 mărturisirea eretică (ecumenistă) a credinţei.

Prima schismă, PM a săvârşit-o în 1927, când mitropolitul Serghie (de Stragorodsk) a uzurpat puterea soborului episcopal, dând un „nou curs” Bisericii în privinţa guvernării păgâne (n.ed. – fărădelege) şi caterisind necanonic episcopi protivnici acestui curs. Mitr. Serghie a preluat totalmente împuternicirile Locţiitorului Prestolului Patriarhal, deşi Locţiitorul legitim – Mitropolitul Petru (de Poleansk) – era în viaţă şi chiar a încercat să-l convingă (lumineze) pe mitropolitul Serghie prin scrisorile sale din exil. Partea însemnată a episcopatului Bisericii Ruse a recunoscut acţiunile mitr. Serghie fiind necanonice şi uzurparea puterii bisericeşti, întrerupând comuniunea canonică cu el.

A doua schismă, PM a săvârşit-o în 1936, când după o falsă veste a NKVD-ului despre moartea Mitropolitului Petru, mitr. Serghie s-a declarat Locţiitor al Prestolului Patriarhal şi a preluat Eparhia Patriarhală. Totodată în 1931, mitr. Serghie în „Jurnalul Patriarhiei Moscovei” a declarat oficial că înputernicirile Locţiitorului se termină odată cu moartea lui, ceea ce e adevărat.

A treia schismă, PM a săvârşit-o în 1943, când trei episcopi, chemaţi de către I.Stalin, luând încă câţiva arhierei de un cuget, l-au ales pe mitr. Serghie ca „patriarh”. Adunarea a 19 arhierei, declarată de ei înşişi ca „sobor arhieresc”, nu avea nici o putere să aleagă Patriarhul, nu doar din cauza că îl reprezentau doar o parte nesemnificativă din ierarhii Bisericii Ruse, dar şi din cauză că potrivit Hotărârii Soborului Local din 1917-18, alegerea Patriarhului este exclusiv o prerogativă a Soborului Local. Episcopatul canonic al Bisericii Ruse, reprezentat de cele 2 „ramuri” ale sale – catacombe şi diasporă – nu l-a recunoscut pe Serghie drept „patriarh”, totodată constatând decăderea definitivă a PM condusă de el spre schismă.

Schisma PM a devenit erezie odată cu aderarea sa la „The World Council of Churches” (WCC) care a însemnat implicarea PM în ecumenism. La aderarea în WCC delegaţia PM a semnat „baza” mărturisirii de credinţă a acestei organizaţii, prin aceasta recunoscând în numele întregii PM unicitatea mărturisirii de credinţă cu WCC. O mulţime de documente oficiale a PM, începând cu anii ’60, conţin făţiş mărturisirea ecumenismului eretic. Prin aceasta PM a dat un motiv suficient tuturor creştinilor ortodocşi pentru despărţirea de ea ca de la o societate eretică după legea a 15-a a celui de-Al Doilea Sobor.

Despre faptul că erezia ecumenismului până acum rămâne o parte oficială a mărturisirii PM, dovedeşte nu doar lipsa de pocăinţă a PM în această erezie sau continuitatea participării în WCC. Fiecare din ultimile patru soboare arhiereşti (1994, 1997, 2000, 2004) adopta hotărâri eretice, care dovedesc participarea PM în mişcarea ecumenistă şi accentuând foarte liber glasul ierarhiei PM. Aceasta face nestatornică încercarea de explicare a participării PM la erezia ecumenistă [ca fiind] din partea guvernării păgâne.

Patriarhia Moscovei ca schismă – nu este rezultatul fărădelegii a câtorva episcopi în 1927. Este o schismă triplă, urmările cărora nu s-au încercat a fi lichidate nici atunci când condiţiile politice deveniseră favorabile, adică în anii ’90. Înafară de aceasta, schisma este condiţionată de erezie. Astfel, despărţirea de PM poate fi bazată nu numai pe legea a 15-a a Soborului al Doilea, cât pe faptul căderii totale a PM în erezie. Soborul arhieresc constată, că la momentul de faţă statutul Patriarhiei Moscovei, principial, nu diferă prin nimic de statutul bisericii catolice de la Roma.

Soborul Arhieresc consideră valide încercările de identificare a datei concrete a căderii definitive a uneia sau altei comunităţi de la Biserică. În loc de aceasta  [sau: totodată] Soborul constată că în acest moment, nici Patriarhia Moscovei şi nici „ortodoxia universală” în întregime nu au legătură cu Biserica lui Hristos. Aceasta înseamnă că acolo nu pot să se săvârşească adevăratele taine bisericeşti. […]“

A Moscow court has ruled against Joseph Stalin’s grandson Yevgeny Dzhugashvili in a defamation lawsuit against the Novaya Gazeta newspaper.

The relative of the Soviet dictator wanted 10 million rubles (around $330,000) in compensation.

The reason for the claim was an article in a special edition of Novaya Gazeta dedicated to the Katyn massacre – the mass killings of Polish prisoners by the infamous NKVD. Dzhugashvili claimed facts in the April 22 article infringed on the honor and dignity of his grandfather, and went to court with a lawsuit.

A copy of the much-talked about Russian-Japanese-Canadian anime “First Squad” has been leaked on to the Internet. The film, about Soviet pioneer-superheroes, is due for release on October 15.

“It’s the first-ever time an anime was filmed on a mobile phone camera by ‘our compatriots’, right at the first festival screening. After the Moscow Film Festival, the film traveled to several more film festivals in Switzerland, America and Spain, but the ‘heroic deed’ of Russian pirates remains unbeaten. Our own countrymen have kindly uploaded the disk with the festival version of the film on to the Internet just ten days prior to the release. Right, guys, let the Japanese learn that there are only three big troubles in our country: the fools, the roads and the pirates, and – like in the time of the Soviet secret police agency, NKVD – there’s no hiding from them.”

Misha Shprits and Alyosha Klimov, Russian creators of First Squad

Pioneers declare war against piracy, Russia Today, 08 October, 200

Note: This post is another of my papers from my MA in History course that I have reworked some for this site.  The focus is on how the Germans and Russians fought the Stalingrad campaign. In  particular in the way the governments and military’s of both nations planned and executed strategy during the course of the campaign adjusted to the situation and how the campaign ended.  I conclude with a potential modern application for the US and NATO in Afghanistan.

Stalingrad: Primary or Secondary Objective

Following the Soviet winter offensive and the near disaster in front of Moscow the German High Command was faced with the strategic decision of what to do in the 1942 campaign.  Several options were considered and it was decided to seize the Caucasus oilfields and capture or neutralize the city of Stalingrad on the Volga.  However, the High Command was divided on the actual objective of the campaign.  OKH under the guidance of General Halder assumed that Stalingrad was the objective and the advance into the Caucasus was a blocking effort.[i] Hitler and OKW planned to capture the Caucasus oil fields and capture or neutralize Stalingrad to secure the left flank.[ii] Both OKH and OKW considered Stalingrad significant but “German commanders initially regarded it as a weigh station en route to the Caucasus oil fields.”[iii] The conflict echoed in the ambiguity of Directive No. 41 which “included the ‘seizure of the oil region of the Caucasus’ in the preamble concerning the general aim of the campaign, yet made no mention of this in the main plan of operations.”[iv] At the planning conference held at Army Group South in early June “Hitler hardly mentioned Stalingrad. As far as his Generals were concerned it was little more than a name on the map. His obsession was with the oil fields of the Caucasus.”[v] Manstein noted that “Hitler’s strategic objectives were governed chiefly by the needs of his war economy….”[vi] Anthony Beevor notes that at this stage of planning “the only interest in Stalingrad was to eliminate the armaments factories there and secure a position on the Volga. The capture of the city was not considered necessary.”[vii] German planners “expected that the Soviets would again accept decisive battle to defend these regions.”[viii]

Knocked Out T-34s

In Moscow Stalin and his Generals attempted to guess the direction of the impending German offensive.  “Stalin was convinced that Moscow remained the principle German objective…Most of the Red Army’s strategic reserves…were therefore held in the Moscow region.”[ix] To disrupt the German offensive and to attempt to recover Kharkov three offensives were launched by Red Army forces under the direction of Stavka. The largest of these on Kharkov was defeated between 12-22 May with the loss of most of the armor in southern Russia. This coupled with an equally disastrous defeat of Red Army forces in Crimea by Von Manstein’s 11^th Army meant that the Red Army would face the Germans in a severely weakened condition.[x]

Operation Blau: Opening Moves and Divergent Objectives

The German offensive began on 28 June under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Bock’s command included two separate army groups, Army Group B under General Von Weichs with 2^nd Army, 6^th Army and 4^th Panzer Army operated in the northern part of the operational area. Army Group A was to the south with 17^th Army and 1^st Panzer Army.[xi] Army Group B provided the main effort and quickly smashed through the defending Soviet armies and by the 20^th Hitler believed that “the Russian is finished.”[xii] One reason for the German success in the south was that until July 7^th Stalin believed that Moscow was still the primary objective.[xiii] Bock was prevented by Hitler from destroying Soviet formations left behind and was relieved of command by Hitler. He was replaced by Von Weichs which created a difficult command and control problem.  Manstein noted that this created a “grotesque chain of command on the German southern wing” with the result that Army Group A had “no commander of its own whatever” and Army Group B had “no few than seven armies under command including four allied ones.”[xiv]

Panzer IV F

This decision proved fateful.  Hitler’s decided to redirect the advance of the 4^th Panzer Army to support an early passage of the lower Don, diverting it from its drive on Stalingrad.  Additionally the army groups became independent of each other when Bock was relieved of command.  They were “assigned independent-and diverging-objectives” under the terms of Directive No.45.[xv] This combination of events would have a decisive impact on the campaign.  The decision prevented a quick seizure of Stalingrad by 4^th Panzer Army followed by a hand over to 6^th Army to establish the “block” as described by Directive No.41.  Kleist noted that he didn’t need 4^th Panzer Army’s help to accomplish his objectives and that it could have “taken Stalingrad without a fight at the end of July….”[xvi]

The result was damning. Air support and fuel needed by Army Group A was transferred to 6^th Army, denuding Army Group A of the resources that it needed to conclude its conquest of the Caucasus.[xvii] At the same time it denied Army Group B of the Panzer Army that could seize Stalingrad when it was still possible to do so.  Beevor calls Hitler’s decision a disastrous compromise.[xviii] Halder believed the decision underestimated the enemy and was “both ludicrous and dangerous.”[xix]

Focus on Stalingrad

On July 22 as the Wehrmacht ran short on fuel and divisions to commit to the Caucasus, and 6^th Army fought for control of Voronezh the Soviets created the Stalingrad Front. Stavka moved an NKVD Division to the city,[xx] and rapidly filled the new front with formations transferred from the Moscow Front.[xxi] Stalin issued Stavka Order 227, better known as “No Step Back” on 28 July. The order mandated that commanders and political officers who retreated would be assigned to Penal battalions[xxii] and armies were to form three to five special units of about 200 men each as a second line “to shoot any man who ran away.”[xxiii] Russian resistance west of the Don slowed the German advance. German commanders were astonished “at the profligacy of Russian commanders with their men’s lives.”[xxiv] Von Kleist compared the stubbornness of Russians in his area to those of the previous year and wrote that they were local troops “who fought more stubbornly because they were fighting to defend their homes.”[xxv] Additionally, Stalin changed commanders frequently in the “vain hope that a ruthless new leader could galvanize resistance and transform the situation.”[xxvi] General Chuikov brought the 64^th Army into the Stalingrad Front in mid-July to hold the Germans west of the Don.[xxvii]

German Soldier in Stalingrad

Further weakening the Germans OKW transferred key SS Panzer Divisions and the Grossdeutschland Division to France. Supporting Hungarian, Italian and Romanian allied armies which lacked motorization, modern armor or anti-tank units were unable to fulfill the gaps left by the loss of experienced German divisions and the expectations of Hitler.[xxviii] 6^th Army was virtually immobilized for 10 days due to lack of supplies allowing the Russians to establish a defense on the Don Bend.[xxix] To the south the Germans were held up by lack of fuel and increased Soviet resistance including the introduction of a force of 800 bombers.[xxx] Glantz and House note that with the fall of Rostov on July 23^rd “Hitler abruptly focused on the industrial and symbolic value of Stalingrad.”[xxxi] Undeterred by warnings from Halder that fresh Russian formations were massing east of the Volga and Quartermaster General, Wagner, who guaranteed that he could supply either the thrust to the Caucasus or Stalingrad but not both.[xxxii] Again frustrated by slow progress Hitler reverted to the original plan for 4^th Panzer Army to assist 6^th Army at Stalingrad, but the cost in time and fuel were significant to the operation and the question was whether “they could make up for Hitler’s changes in plan.”[xxxiii]

Strategic Implications

The changes in the German plan had distinct ramifications for both sides.  Von Mellenthin wrote that “the diversion of effort between the Caucasus and Stalingrad ruined our whole campaign.”[xxxiv] The Germans could not secure the Caucasus oil fields which Hitler considered vital to the German war effort.  They advanced deep into the region and captured the Maikop oil fields, though they were almost completely destroyed by the retreating Russians.[xxxv] Army Group A was halted by the Russians along the crests of the Caucasus on August 28^th.[xxxvi] This left Hitler deeply “dissatisfied with the situation of Army Group A.”[xxxvii] Kleist and others attributed much of the failure to a lack of fuel[xxxviii] and Blumentritt noted that Mountain divisions that could have made the breakthrough were employed along the Black Sea coast in secondary operations.[xxxix]

Fuel and supply shortages delayed 6^th Army’s advance while Hoth’s 4^th Panzer Army was needlessly shuttled between Rostov and Stalingrad. By the time it resumed its advance the Russians “had sufficiently recovered to check its advance.”[xl] As 6^th Army advanced the “protection of Army Group B’s ever-extending northern flank was taken over by the 3^rd Rumanian, the 2^nd Hungarian and the newly formed 8^th Italian Army.”[xli] The allied armies were neither equipped for the Russian campaign nor well motivated.[xlii] The supply shortage in both army groups was not helped by a logistics bottleneck. All supplies came over a single Dnieper crossing, which Manstein noted, prevented swift movement of troops from one area to another.[xliii]

Von Paulus’ 6^th Army now attempted to rush Stalingrad between the 25^th and 29^th of July, while Hoth milled about on the lower Don.  However, Paulus’s piecemeal commitment of his divisions and failure to concentrate in the face of unexpectedly strong Soviet resistance caused the attacks to fail.  Paulus halted 6^th Army on the Don so it could concentrate its forces and build its logistics base,[xliv] and to allow Hoth to come up from the south. This delay allowed the Russians to build up forces west of Stalingrad and reinforce the Stalingrad front and strengthen the defenses of the city,[xlv] and due to the distances involved it was easier for the Russians to reinforce the Stalingrad front.[xlvi] It also allowed the Russians to fill a number of key leadership positions with Generals who would skillfully fight the battle.[xlvii]

German Panzer Troops Look Upon the Caucasus Mountains

Hitler now focused on the capture of Stalingrad despite the fact that “as a city Stalingrad was of no strategic importance.”[xlviii] Strategically, its capture would cut Soviet supply lines to the Caucasus,[xlix] but this could be achieved without its capture. The checks in the south “began to give Stalingrad a moral importance-enhanced by its name-which came to outweigh its strategic value.”[l] To Hitler Stalingrad would gain “a mystic significance”[li] and along with Leningrad became “not only military but also psychological objectives.”[lii]

The Germans mounted a frontal assault with 6^th Army and elements of 4^th Panzer Army despite air reconnaissance that “the Russians are throwing forces from all directions at Stalingrad.[liii] Paulus as the senior General was in charge of the advance, with Hoth subordinated to him, but the attack had to wait until Hoth’s army could fight its way up from the south.[liv] Von Mellenthin comments rightly that “when Stalingrad was not taken on the first rush, it would have been better to mask it….”[lv] It is clear that the German advance had actually reached its culminating point with the failure of the advance into the Caucasus and Paulus’s initial setback on the Don, but it was not yet apparent to many involved.[lvi] The proper course of action would have been to halt and build up the front and create mobile reserve to parry any Russian offensive along northern flank while reinforcing success in the Caucasus. Manstein wrote that “by failing to take appropriate action after his offensive had petered out without achieving anything definite, he [Hitler] paved the way to the tragedy of Stalingrad!”[lvii]

Transfixed by Stalingrad

JU-52: Despite Tremendous Bravery of Luftwaffe Pilots Goering Failed to Keep Stalingrad Supplied

On August 19^th Paulus launched a concentric attack against the Russian 62^nd and 64^th Armies on the Don.  The attack ran into problems, especially in Hoth’s sector.[lviii] Yet, on the 22^nd the 14^th Panzer Corps “forced a very narrow breach in the Russian perimeter at Vertyachi and fought its way across the northern suburbs of Stalingrad,”[lix] and reached the Volga on the 23^rd. That day 4^th Air Fleet launched 1600 sorties against the city dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs.[lx] The breakthrough imperiled the Soviet position they had concentrated their strongest forces against Hoth.[lxi] The Germans held air superiority and continued heavy bombing attacks.  During the last days of August 6^th Army “moved steadily forward into the suburbs of the city, setting the stage for battle.”[lxii] As the Soviets reacted to Paulus, Hoth achieved a breakthrough in the south which threatened the Russian position.  However 6^th Army was unable to disengage its mobile forces to link up with the 4^th Panzer Army and another opportunity had been missed.[lxiii]

As 6^th Army moved into the city Yeremenko ordered attacks against Hube’s 16^th Panzer Division and Soviet resistance increased as more formations arrived the Germans suffered one of their heaviest casualty rates.”[lxiv] Though unsuccessful the counterattacks “managed to deflect Paulus’s reserves at the most critical moment.”[lxv] The Germans remained confident the first week of September as 6^th Army and 4^th Panzer Army linked up, but Yeremenko saved his forces by withdrawing and avoiding encirclement west of the city, retiring to an improvised line close to the city.[lxvi] On September 12^th Chuikov was appointed to command 62^nd Army in Stalingrad.  Chuikov understood that there “was only one way to hold on. They had to pay in lives. ‘Time is blood,’ as Chuikov put it later.”[lxvii] Stalin sent Nikita Khrushchev to the front “with orders to inspire the Armies and civilian population to fight to the end.”[lxviii] 13^th Guards Rifle Division arrived on the 14^th saved the Volga landings but it lost 30% casualties in its first 24 hours of combat.[lxix] An NKVD regiment and other units held the strategically sited Mamaev Kurgan, keeping German guns from controlling the Volga.[lxx] The defenders fought house to house and block by block, Army and NKVD were reinforced by Naval Infantry.  Chuikov conducted the defense with a brutal ferocity, relieving senior commanders who showed a lack of fight and sending many officers to penal units.  Chuikov funneled massed German attacks into “breakwaters” where the panzers and infantry could be separated from each other causing heavy German casualties.[lxxi]

Now the “city became a prestige item, its capture ‘urgently necessary for psychological reasons,’ as Hitler declared on October 2. A week later he declared that Communism must be ‘deprived of its shrine.’”[lxxii] The Germans did continue to gain ground, however slowly and at great cost, especially among their infantry, so much so that companies had to be combined.   Chuikov used his artillery to interdict the Germans from the far side of the Volga and the fight in the city was fought by assault squads with incredible ferocity and the close-quarter combat was dubbed “’Rattenkrieg’ by German soldiers.”[lxxiii] Paulus brought more units into the city and continued to slowly drive the Russians back against the river, by early October Chuikov wondered if he would be able to hold.[lxxiv] By early November Chuikov “was altogether holding only one-tenth of Stalingrad-a few factory buildings and a few miles of river bank.”[lxxv] Paulus expected “to capture the entire city by 10 November,”[lxxvi] despite the fact that many units were fought out. The 6^th Army judged that 42% of the battalions of 51^st Corps were fought out.[lxxvii] On 9 November Hitler declared “No power on earth will force us out of Stalingrad again!”[lxxviii]

Soviet Counteroffensive: Disaster on the Flanks

On September 24^th Hitler relieved Halder for persisting in explaining “what would happen when new Russian reserve armies attacked the over-extended flank that ran out to Stalingrad.”[lxxix] Many in the German side recognized the danger. Blumentritt said “The danger to the long-stretched flank of our advance developed gradually, but it became clear early enough for anyone to perceive it who was not willfully blind.”[lxxx] Warnings were also given by Rumanian Marshall Antonescu and the staff’s of Army Group B and 6^th Army[lxxxi] but Hitler was transfixed on Stalingrad.  In doing so the Germans gave up the advantage of uncertainty and once their “aim became obvious…the Russian Command could commit its reserves with assurance.”[lxxxii]

In the midst of Stalin’s concern about Stalingrad Stavka planners never lost sight of their goal to resume large scale offensive operations and destroy at least one German Army Group.[lxxxiii] Unlike Hitler Stalin had begun to trust his Generals and Stavka under the direction of Marshal Vasilevsky produced a concept in September to cut off the “German spearhead at Stalingrad by attacking the weak Rumanian forces on its flanks.”[lxxxiv] At first Stalin “showed little enthusiasm” for the attack, fearing that Stalingrad might be lost, but on 13 September he gave his full backing to the proposal[lxxxv] which Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Vatutin developed into a plan involving two operations, Operation Uranus, to destroy the German and allied forces at Stalingrad, Operation Saturn to destroy all the German forces in the south and a supporting attack to fix German forces in the north, Operation Mars aimed at Army Group Center.[lxxxvi]

Soviet Armor on teh Offensive

To accomplish the destruction of 6^th Army and part of 4^th Panzer Army the Red Army employed over 60% of the “whole tank strength of the Red Army.”[lxxxvii] Strict secrecy combined with numerous acts of deception was used by the Red Army to disguise the operation.[lxxxviii] The plan involved an attack against 3^rd Rumanian Army on the northern flank by 5^th Tank Army and two infantry armies with supporting units.[lxxxix] In the south against 4^th Rumanian Army and weak element of 4^th Panzer Army another force of over 160,000 men including 430 tanks were deployed.[xc] Despite warnings from his Intelligence Officer, Paulus did not expect a deep offensive into his flanks and rear and made no plans to prepare to face the threat.[xci] Other senior officers believed that the attack would take place against Army Group Center.[xcii] Warlimont notes that there was a “deceptive confidence in German Supreme Headquarters.”[xciii]

The storm broke on 19 November as Soviet forces attacked rapidly crushing Rumanian armies in both sectors[xciv] linking up on the 23^rd.[xcv] 48^th Panzer Corps supporting the Rumanians was weak and had few operational tanks.[xcvi] It attempted a counterattack but was “cut to pieces” in an encounter with 5^th Tank Army.[xcvii] A promising attempt by 29^th Motorized division against the flank of the southern Russian pincer was halted by the Army Group and the division was ordered to defensive positions south of Stalingrad.[xcviii] German airpower was neutralized by bad weather.[xcix] Paulus continued to do nothing as since the attacks were outside of his area of responsibility and waited for instructions.[c] As a result the 16^th and 24^th Panzer Divisions which could have assisted matters to the west remained “bogged down in street-fighting in Stalingrad.”[ci] Without support 6^th Army units west of Stalingrad were forced back in horrific conditions.  By the 23^rd 6^th Army was cut off along with one corps of 4^th Panzer Army and assorted Rumanian units, over 330,000 men.  This now entrapped force that would require seven rifle armies and much staff attention to eliminate.[cii]

The Death of 6^th Army

T-34 in Stalingrad

Hitler ordered Manstein to form Army Group Don to relieve Stalingrad. Hitler would not countenance a break out and wanted Manstein to break through and relieve 6^th Army.[ciii] Hitler refused a request by Paulus on 23 November to move troops to prepare for a possible a break out attempt, assuring him that he would be relieved.[civ] Albert Speer notes that Zeitzler who replaced Halder insisted that the Sixth Army must break out to the west.”[cv] Hitler told Zeitzler that “We should under no circumstances give this up. We won’t get it back once it’s lost.”[cvi] Goering promised the Luftwaffe would be able to meet the re-supply needs of 6^th Army by air, even though his Generals knew that it was impossible with the number of transport aircraft available.[cvii] Hitler took Goering at his word and exclaimed “Stalingrad can be held! It is foolish to go on talking any more about a breakout by Sixth Army…”[cviii] and a Führer decree was issued ordering that the front be held at all costs.[cix] Goerlitz states that “Hitler was incapable of conceiving that the 6^th Army should do anything but fight where it stood.”[cx] Likewise Manstein had precious few troops with which to counterattack and had to protect the flank of Army Group A deep in the Caucasus. His army group was only corps strength and was spread across a 200 mile front.[cxi] Any relief attempt had to wait for more troops, especially Panzers.  Manstein too believed that the best chance for a breakout had passed and that it was a serious error for Paulus to put the request to withdraw through to Hitler rather than the Army Group or act on his own.[cxii] Many soldiers were optimistic that Hitler would get them out.[cxiii] Other generals like Guderian, Reichenau or Hoeppner might have acted, but Paulus was no rebel.[cxiv]

The Madonna of Stalingrad

Operation Saturn began on 7 December destroying the Italian 8^th Army and forcing the Germans to parry the threat.[cxv] A relief attempt by 57^th Panzer Corps under Hoth on 12 December made some headway until a massive Soviet counterattack on 24 December drove it back.[cxvi] This attack was hampered by OKW’s refusal to allocate the 17^th Panzer and 16^th Motorized divisions to Manstein,[cxvii] and by 6^th Army not attacking out to link with the relief force.[cxviii]By 6 January Paulus signaled OKW: Army starving and frozen, have no ammunition and cannot move tanks anymore.”[cxix] On 10 January the Soviets launched Operation Ring to eliminate the pocket and despite all odds German troops fought on. On the 16^th Paulus requested that battle worthy units be allowed to break out, but the request was not replied to.[cxx] On the 22^nd the last airfield had been overrun and on 31 January Paulus surrendered.[cxxi]

POWs: Only 5,000 of 90,000 POWs would return

Analysis: What Went Wrong

Stalingrad had strangely drawn the attention of both sides, but the Russians never lost sight of their primary objectives during the campaign. The Germans on the other hand committed numerous unforced errors mostly caused by Hitler or Paulus. After the fall of Stalingrad as the Soviets attempted to follow up their success by attempted to cut off Army Group “A” Manstein was permitted to wage a mobile defense while Von Kleist managed to withdraw with few losses.[cxxii] The superior generalship of Manstein and Von Kleist prevented the wholesale destruction of German forces in southern Russia and Manstein’s counter offensive inflicted a severe defeat on the Soviets. However the German Army had been badly defeated.  The seeds of defeat were laid early, the failure to destroy bypassed Soviet formations in July, the diversion of 4^th Panzer Army from Stalingrad, and the divergent objectives of trying to capture the Caucasus and Stalingrad at the same time.  This diluted both offensives ensuring that neither succeeded.  Likewise the failure to recognize the culminating point when it was reached and to adjust operations accordingly was disastrous for the Germans. The failure create a mobile reserve to meet possible Russian counter offensives, and the fixation on Stalingrad took the German focus off of the critical yet weakly held flanks. The hubris of Hitler and OKW to believe that the Russians were incapable of conducting major mobile operations even as Stavka commenced offensive operations on those flanks all contributed to the defeat.  Clark notes these facts but adds that the Germans “were simply attempting too much.”[cxxiii] Soviet numbers allowed them to wear down the Germans even in defeat.[cxxiv] At the same time Stalin gave his commanders a chance to revive the mobile doctrine of deep operations with mechanized and shock armies that he had discredited in the 1930s.[cxxv] All through the campaign Zhukov and other commanders maintained both their nerve even when it appeared that Stalingrad was all but lost. They never lost sight of their goal of destroying major German formations though they failed to entrap Army Group A with 6^th Army.

A Modern Application

It is well and good to attempt to remain on the offensive.  The U.S. currently has forces spread thinly over two combat theaters with possibilities that other threats in the same region could flare up.  Like the Germans the U.S. is operating in areas, especially Afghanistan where overland supply lines are vulnerable and where weather can and does affect resupply operations by both ground and air.  The fact that the U.S. is operating with just barely enough forces in areas where others have met disaster calls for a circumspect look at what our enemy’s capabilities really are and not allowing ourselves to be surprised when they do things that have worked for them in the past against the Russians.  While it is unlikely that the U.S. and NATO would face a Stalingrad type situation in Afghanistan it is possible that isolated forces could be overrun as the Afghans reprise tactics used so successfully against the Soviets and as they begin to operate in larger units, concentrate them quickly and with more firepower to catch NATO forces when they are most vulnerable.  It is true that they will not mass large numbers of tanks and artillery as the Soviets did against the Germans, but the principle of speed, concentration at the critical point and surprise can inflict defeats that will turn public sentiment in the U.S. and Europe against further commitments and against the war and force the NATO governments as well as the U.S. to give up the effort.

[i] Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict:1941-45. Perennial Books, An imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY 1965. p.191

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titan’s Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1995. p.111

[iv] Ibid. Clark. p.191

[v] Beevor, Anthony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943. Penguin Books, New York NY 1998. p.69

[vi] Manstein, Erich von. Forward by B.H. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Lost victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, St Paul MN 2004. First Published 1955 as Verlorene Siege, English Translation 1958 by Methuen Company. p.291 This opinion is not isolated, Beevor Quotes Paulus “If we don’t take Maikop and Gronzy…then I must put an end to the war.” (Beevor pp. 69-70)  Halder on the other hand believed that Hitler emphasized that the objective was “the River Volga at Stalingrad. (Clark. p.190)

[vii] Ibid. Beevor. p.70.

[viii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.106

[ix] Ibid. p.105-106

[x] Ibid. Clark. p.203.  The offensive did impose a delay on the German offensive.

[xi] Ibid. Clark. p.191 Each group also contained allied armies.

[xii] Ibid. p.209.

[xiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.119

[xiv] Ibid. Manstein. p.292.

[xv] Ibid. Clark. p.209

[xvi] Ibid. Clark.  p.211

[xvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.120. There is a good discussion of the impact of this decision here as 6^th Army’s advance was given priority for both air support and fuel.

[xviii] Ibid. Beevor. p.74

[xix] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964. p.249

[xx] Ibid. Beevor. p.75 This was the 10^th NKVD Division and it took control of all local militia, NKVD, and river traffic, and established armored trains and armor training schools.

[xxi] Ibid. Clark. p.212

[xxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.121

[xxiii] Ibid. Beevor. p.85

[xxiv] Ibid. p.89

[xxv] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishers, New York, NY 1979. Originally published by the author in 1948. p.202

[xxvi] Ibid. Beevor. p.88

[xxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.90

[xxviii] Ibid. Beevor. p.81

[xxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.121

[xxx] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.202

[xxxi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.120

[xxxii] Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff. Westview Press, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Boulder, CO. 1985 p.416

[xxxiii] Ibid. Beevor. pp.95-96.

[xxxiv] Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated H. Betzler, Edited by L.C.F. Turner. Oklahoma University Press 1956, Ballantine Books, New York, NY. 1971. p.193

[xxxv] Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960. p.914

[xxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.122

[xxxvii] Ibid. Warlimont. p.256

[xxxviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.203

[xxxix] Ibid. p.204

[xl] Ibid. Shirer. p.914

[xli] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.416

[xlii] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.416

[xliii] Ibid. Manstein. p.293

[xliv] Ibid. Clark. p.214

[xlv] Ibid. Beevor. pp.97-99. The mobilization included military, political, civilian and industrial elements.

[xlvi] Liddell-Hart, B.H. Strategy. A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY. 1974, Originally Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1954 & 1967. p.250

[xlvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.99.  Two key commanders arrived during this time frame, Colonel General Andrei Yeremenko, who would command the Stalingrad Front  and General Chuikov commander of 64^th Army who would conduct the defense of the city.

[xlviii] Carell, Paul Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, German Edition published 1963. p.581

[xlix] Ibid. Shirer.  p.909.

[l] Ibid. Liddell-Hart, Strategy. p.250

[li] Wheeler-Bennett, John W. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY 1954.  p.531

[lii] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett. p.531

[liii] Ibid. Beevor. p.96

[liv] Ibid. Clark. p.216.

[lv] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. P.193

[lvi] See Von Mellinthin pp.193-194.  Von Mellinthin quotes Colonel Dinger, the Operations Officer of 3^rd Motorized Division at Stalingrad until a few days before its fall. Dingler noted that the Germans on reaching Stalingrad “had reached the end of their power. Their offensive strength was inadequate to complete the victory, nor could they replace the losses they had suffered.” (p.193) He believed that the facts were sufficient “not only to justify a withdrawal, but compel a retreat.” (p.194)

[lvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.294

[lviii] Ibid. Clark. p.216

[lix] Ibid. Clark. p.217

[lx] Ibid. Beevor. p.107

[lxi] Ibid. Beevor. p.107

[lxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.122

[lxiii] Ibid. Carell. P.601

[lxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.118

[lxv] Ibid. Beevor. p.118

[lxvi] Ibid. Carell. p.602

[lxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.128

[lxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.603

[lxix] Ibid. Beevor. p.134

[lxx] Ibid. Beevor. pp.136-137

[lxxi] Ibid. Beevor. p.149

[lxxii] Fest, Joachim. Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Publishers, San Diego, New York, London. 1974. p.661

[lxxiii] Ibid. Beevor. pp. 149-150

[lxxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.164

[lxxv] Ibid. Carell. p.618

[lxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.123

[lxxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.218

[lxxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.623

[lxxix] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.418

[lxxx] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. The German Generals Talk. p.207

[lxxxi] Ibid. Manstein. p292

[lxxxii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. History of the Second World War. p.258

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.129

[lxxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[lxxxv] Ibid. Beevor. pp.221-222 Glantz and House say that Stalin gave his backing in mid-October but this seems less likely due to the amount of planning and movement of troops involved to begin the operation in November.

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.226

[lxxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.132

[lxxxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[xc] Ibid. Beevor. p.227

[xci] Ibid. Beevor. p.228

[xcii] Ibid. Clark. p.235

[xciii] Ibid. Warlimont. p.274

[xciv] Ibid, Carell. p.627 3^rd Rumanian Army lost 75,000 men in three days.

[xcv] Ibid. Clark.pp.247-248

[xcvi] The condition of the few German Panzer Divisions in position to support the flanks was very poor, the 22^nd had suffered from a lack of fuel and maintenance and this many of its tanks were inoperative. Most of the armor strength of the 48^th Panzer Corps was provided by a Rumanian armored division equipped with obsolete Czech 38t tanks provided by the Germans.

[xcvii] Ibid. Clark. pp.251-252. The designation of 2^nd Guards Tank Army by Clark has to be wrong and it is the 5^th Tank Army as 2^nd Guards Tank was not involved in Operation Uranus.  Carell, Beevor and Glantz properly identify the unit.

[xcviii] Ibid. Carell. p.630

[xcix] Ibid. Beevor. p.244

[c] Ibid. Beevor. p.247

[ci] Ibid. Beevor. p.245

[cii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.134

[ciii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.134

[civ] Ibid. Clark. p.256

[cv] Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970. p.248

[cvi] Heiber, Helmut and Glantz, David M. Editors. Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945. Enigma Books, New York, NY 2002-2003.  Originally published as Hitlers Lagebsprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart, 1962. p.27

[cvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.135 Glantz and House note that the amount of aircraft estimated to successfully carry out the re-supply operation in the operational conditions was over 1,000.  The amount needed daily was over 600 tons of which the daily reached only 300 tons only one occasion.

[cviii] Ibid. Speer. p.249

[cix] Ibid. Carell. p.636

[cx] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.426

[cxi] Ibid. Clark. p.252

[cxii] Ibid. Manstein. p.303

[cxiii] Ibid. Beevor. p.276

[cxiv] Ibid. Carell. p.640

[cxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.140

[cxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.140

[cxvii] Ibid. Clark. p.264

[cxviii] Ibid. Manstein. p.337

[cxix] Ibid. Beevor. p320

[cxx] Ibid. Beevor. p.365

[cxxi] Of the approximately 330,000 in the pocket about 91,000 surrendered, another 45,000 had been evacuated.  22 German divisions were destroyed.

[cxxii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. The German Generals Talk. p.211

[cxxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.250

[cxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.124

[cxxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.221

Bibliography

Beevor, Anthony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943. Penguin Books, New York NY 1998

Carell, Paul Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, German Edition published 1963.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict:1941-45. Perennial Books, An imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY 1965.

Fest, Joachim. Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Publishers, San Diego, New York, London. 1974

Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titan’s Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1995.

Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff. Westview Press, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Boulder, CO. 1985

Heiber, Helmut and Glantz, David M. Editors. Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945. Enigma Books, New York, NY 2002-2003.  Originally published as Hitlers Lagebsprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart, 1962.

Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishers, New York, NY 1979. Originally Published by the author in 1948.

Liddell-Hart, B.H. Strategy. A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY. 1974, Originally Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1954 & 1967

Manstein, Erich von. Forward by B.H. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Lost victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, St Paul MN 2004. First Published 1955 as Verlorene Siege, English Translation 1958 by Methuen Company

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970.

Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated H. Betzler, Edited by L.C.F. Turner. Oklahoma University Press 1956, Ballantine Books, New York, NY. 1971.

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY 1954

Today is the 70th anniversary of the beginning of World War II as Germany bombarded Westerplatte with canon fire.  Eventually Germany made peace with their neighbors by recognizing the role they played in the devastation of Europe.  Since then Europe has experienced only one conflict[1] since the end of World War II.

But Russia remains another matter.

Russia continues to be belligerent in their interpretation of the war.  Denying much culpability in their conflict with Poland and even insinuating of Polish-German designs on the Soviet Union.

In the days leading up to anniversary, Russian media has aired a string of accusations against Poland, claiming that Warsaw intended to collaborate with Hitler in an invasion of the Soviet Union, and that Jozef Beck, Poland’s foreign minister in 1939, was a German agent. Moscow broadcasters have also claimed that there was a “German hand” in the 1940 Katyn massacre of thousands of Polish PoWs, an atrocity generally held to have been the exclusive work of Stalin’s secret police.

In fairness, the de facto ruler of Russia, Vladimir Putin, did offer a conciliatory tone relating to Russia’s aggression towards Poland:

“Our duty is to remove the burden of distrust and prejudice left from the past in Polish-Russian relations,” wrote Mr Putin, who went on to describe the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as “immoral”, and also thanked Poland “from the bottom of my heart” for the 600,000 Poles who fought on the Eastern Front under Red Army command.

When Russia finally admits its role in World War II and the atrocities committed by Adolph Hitler’s evil twin in terror, Joseph Stalin, will there be a final peace in eastern Europe.

To read more of this article by Matthew Day of London’s Daily Telegraph click here.

_._

[1] See the Third Balkans War or the Yugoslav Wars.

[2] See Katyn Massacre.

Adolph Hitler’s evil twin in terror, Joseph Stalin, once remarked “How many divisions has the Pope?”.  This was done in response to the  future saint Pope Pius XII’s[1] disapproval of his policies.

Well it wasn’t a mocking tone nor was it a sarcastic remark in reference to the Vatican.  It was a serious concern to the ‘meddling’ of the Catholic Church in thwarting Communism’s attempt at world domination.  Stalin was well aware of the tremendous moral power that the Vatican wielded and Vladimir Lenin implemented the full power of the KGB and the eastern bloc spy agencies to monitor and undermine the mission of the Catholic Church.

A new non-fiction book by John Koehler titled, Spies in the Vatican, has recently come out that documents the final twenty years of the Cold War and how it played out as the Soviet Union and their allies infiltrated the Vatican.

Patrick Devenny of the American Thinker reviewed the Mr. Koehler’s new book:

Koehler abruptly begins the story in the Chekist dungeons of the early 1920s as a gleeful Chairman Lenin oversaw the mass murder of thousands of clerics.  The decades of atrocities that followed drive home the central theme of Spies: beginning at its inception, the Soviet government was willing to use all available tools to counter religion’s influence.  Overseeing this effort, Stalin’s successors relied less on brute force and more on the panoply of covert tools wielded so ruthlessly by the KGB and its sister services in East Germany and Poland.  Especially wary of the curia’s influence in the Soviet sphere, Moscow’s spymasters relentlessly pushed their field officers to target church institutions for subversion.  As Koehler deftly recounts using actual Communist source reports, the result was startling:  Soviet leaders enjoyed regular access to the inner deliberations of Vatican leaders for years, secured by the work of several spy networks.

John Koehler was a former U.S. intelligence officer and an Associated Press (A.P.) writer while in Europe.  After retiring from his government post Mr. Koehler investigated and studied into Cold War-era intelligence data which resulted in his new book.

Concerning the new pope in Cardinal Karol Cardinal Wojtyla, the Politburo authorized the vaunted KGB to:

“Use all possibilities available to the Soviet Union to prevent the new course of policies initiated by the Polish pope; if necessary with additional measures beyond disinformation and discreditation.”

Mr. Devenny reports that Mr. Koehler implies that the result may have been the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II, but confesses this issue may never be answered.

The book does divulge that a Polish bishop and a German priest and monk were one of the many informants to communist intelligence services but only providing their pseudonyms since that was all that could be mined from the many archives.

We can certainly all agree that one of the many successes of the sons of the French Revolution[2] have been the discrediting of Pope Pius XII by accusing him of failing in saving the Jews.

In time the Truth slowly reveals itself by uncovering the machinations of Soviet and eastern bloc spy agencies and their accomplices.

This is an intriguing article by Patrick Devenny called The Kremlin vs. the Cardinals and if you want to read more click here.

_._

[1] When told of Stalin’s response, Pope Pius XII said, “You may tell my son Joseph he will meet my divisions in heaven.”

[2] The French Revolution was the catalyst for the fall of the Romanov dynasty in Russia that ushered in 70 years of atheistic terror.

Colonel Otto Skorzeny</strong

Brandenburgers

Early Brandenburgers

Sten Mk-II

A Mk IIIBritish SOE agentset introduced in 1944. Used by the Resistance in Europe.

Abwehr receiver
This unit was taken from a German spy by MI5 during WW2.

Funkhorch-emfanger + Zubehorkaste

SE 109                             
WW2 German agent set captured by M.I.5

Torn.Fu.H            
Tornister( backpack) set Torn Fu.H. Complete with antenna.

SE 109 Documentation           
Original operator instructions in German and calibration chart

“Olga”
Designed by Norwegian Resistance engineer Arne Hannevold. amateur callsign LA5K. Manufactured under the nose of Wehrmacht in a cellar in downtown Oslo from 1943.

British “Sten”-s

Paris, summer 1940, hotel “Lutecia”. Part of Abwehr Radio Command from Oscar Reile`s Abwehrcomando.

Radioset N 11

Radioset N 11

LRDG`s radioset

Radiooperator from LRDG

You know about Auschwitz, Dachau, Buchenwald. This place was the model for all them.

Sachsenhausen lies just north of Berlin in the town of Oranienburg. When it opened in 1936, it was the first Nazi facility purpose-designed and built as a concentration camp, a test bed for controlling the maximum number of inmates with the minimum number of guards.

The SS soldiers who would make places like Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen infamous were trained here. The insidious, mocking motto “Arbeit Macht Frei” — Work Makes You Free — first appeared on Sachsenhausen’s main gate. The entire concentration camp system was administered from Oranienburg.

If Evil ever had a headquarters, this may have been it.

In the Nazi system, Sachsenhausen was considered a concentration camp rather than a death camp. I wonder if those who perished here appreciated the difference, because when it came to institutionalized murder, there is nothing that happened at any Nazi death camp that didn’t happen here first.

DECEPTIVE BEAUTY
If you take the route that Heinrich Himmler and his driver might’ve taken, the trip from Berlin to Sachsenhausen will take you a little under an hour. The route is lined with cool green forests and picturesque, square country homes of two and three stories, with steeply angled tile roofs to shed the rain and snow. The camp itself lies at the end of a short residential street.

None of the peaceful beauty you see along that route prepares you for what lies at the end of that street.

A sprawling triangular complex covering about a thousand acres, Sachsenhausen is defined by a perimeter wall interspersed with guard towers. At its height, there were 68 long, one-story barracks laid out in a fan pattern.

Most of the barracks are gone now. A handful — including the two where medical experiments were conducted on inmates –have been restored, along with the “execution trench” and a portion of the inner perimeter death strip that includes coils of barbed wire and what had been an electrified fence.

In front of the fence and the barbed wire coils was a single strand of straight, unadorned wire, running about six inches above the ground. In prison parlance, this is a “dead man’s line” and its meaning is clear:

Step over this wire and you will be shot. No questions, no warnings, no exceptions.

In reality, though, you didn’t have to step over the wire. Death could come calling from anywhere on these grounds at any moment. Inmates could be beaten or shot simply for not moving fast enough when given an order. Starved and brutalized, they sometimes collapsed in roll call and died where they fell.

GALLOWS AND GALLOWS HUMOR
Two holes in the middle of the compound served as mounts for a simple gallows. It didn’t work with the typical German efficiency. The condemned were left to slowly strangle in their nooses.

In December, the scaffold mount held a Christmas tree.

They injected Jewish children as young as 11 with bacteria to experiment with hepatitis C, a disease for which there is no cure. They stitched moldy hay and straw into the flesh of healthy prisoners to see how gangrene worked.

At one point, they tested mustard gas on 30 inmates. No record remains of what happened to them, or even who they were.

Periodically, a Nazi psychologist visited Sachsenhausen to select inmates to send to the death camps, a task he pursued as calmly and cheerfully as if he were the local milkman.

The cruelty wasn’t limited to physical brutality or sadism in the name of science. The SS officers, who lived just outside the camp, treated themselves to lavish banquets, which they pointedly had served to them by their starving prisoners. They habitually told new arrivals that their only path to freedom ran through the chimneys of the camp’s “special” ovens.

The guards seemed to think that was funny.

SECRET SHAME, SILENT SCREAMS
In April 1945, with the Red Army closing in, the Sachsenhausen guards tried to march 33,000 inmates away from potential rescue. Those too weak or sick to keep up were beaten or shot to death. Exhaustion killed still others before the guards could get around to them.

The exact number who survived the death march is unknown. Most did not.

When the Red Army finally overran the camp, they found 3,000 inmates, barely alive. They also found nearly 13,000 bodies. That should’ve closed the book on Sachsenhausen.

It didn’t.

The Soviet NKVD transformed Sachenhausen into one of their “special camps,” in which they imprisoned Nazis, Red Army deserters and anyone else Josef Stalin didn’t like.

Soviet soldiers who contracted venereal diseases from women in occupied Germany wound up here rather than in hospitals.

Unlike the previous landlords, the NKVD wasn’t into experimenting on folks. Their camps were Soviet-style old school — starvation, beatings, generic brutality. By the time the place closed for good in 1950, another 12,000 people — at least 12,000 — had died here, hidden from the world behind the Soviet Union’s “Iron Curtain.”

Overall, no one knows for sure how many died in Sachsenhausen. The best guesses range from 30,000 to as many as 100,000 — not counting those who perished on the death march. Many of the camp’s victims are still here, buried in mass graves just inside the perimeter.

In place of the horror that once filled that perimeter is now a vast emptiness. The wind that sweeps across the vast grounds — and the murmuring of tour groups — are the only sounds here.

In Sachsenhausen, silence is a scream that never ends.

BRÄNDA AV SOLEN

Atlanticfilms

Den ryske skådespelaren Nikita Mikhalkov har både skrivit, regisserat och spelar huvudrollen i filmen ”Brända av solen”. Den utspelas under inledningen av Josef Stalins stora utrensning i Sovjetunionen under mitten av trettiotalet. Filmen visar hur revolutionshjälten överste Kotov (spelad av Mikhalkov) spenderar en ledig söndag med familjen i sin datja, lyckligt ovetande om den annalkande katastrof man som tittare känner närma sig. En oväntad gäst dyker upp och den initiala harmonin  byts mot en känsla av hot. Besökaren är fru Kotovs ungdomskärlek och jobbar för NKVD, Stalins hemliga polis, att ont blod gjutits mellan Kotov och den objudne gästen märks tydligt. Ett olustigt spel inleds.

Filmen är i mitt tycke fantastisk, vackert fotograferad, med starkt bildspråk och skådespelarinsatser på topp. Somliga kan nog anse den för långsam, men jag tycker det lugna tempot blir ett plus när regissören långsamt drar åt snaran om den godtrogne överstens hals och kastar hans och familjens liv över stupkanten.

MAFFIA

Fischer & Co

Den svenske journalisten Tomas Lappalainens bok Maffia handlar om den sicilianska maffians historia, kultur, samt dess betydelse och påverkan på dagens italienska samhälle.

Lappalainen sammanfattar maffians verksamhet som ”våldsbaserad privat beskyddarverksamhet i strid med det statliga våldsmonopolet”. Orsaken till att detta privata våld ”accepterats” av befolkningen, är rädslan för att själv bli utsatt i i kombination med en kultur där misstro mot statens institutioner är näst intill betingad i den sicilianska folksjälen. Orsaken till statens dåliga anseende på Sicilien är att folket genom tiderna ständigt invaderats och förtryckts av andra. En annan betydande faktor i maffians utveckling var öns topografi, den bergiga terrängen isolerade både byar och städer, och då statens representanter oftast verkade i de större städerna, växte en lokal rättsskipning fram där den som tog för sig kunde skapa en maktbas för att dominera den lokala ekonomin.

Boken är intressant och upplysande, även om författaren emellanåt blir något långrandig i filosoferandet runt frågan om statlig kontra privat våldsutövning.

GLASVEGAS

Sony Music Entertainment UK Ltd

Glasvegas självbetitlade debutalbum släpptes i september 2008 och har sedan dess vunnit ett flertal priser. Bandet bildades 2003 i Glasgow, Skottland, och består av fyra medlemmar; James Allan (sång, gitarr), Rab Allan (gitarr), Paul Donoghue (bas) och Caroline McKay (trummor).

Musiken är melodisk pop/rock, inspelad med distad ljudbild som ger ett både smutsigt och vackert sound, där tydligt släktskap med band som The Jesus & Mary Chain och The Smiths framträder. Textmaterialet är mycket starkt, så långt från genrens alla klichéer man komma kan. Här avhandlas kärleksförklaringar till socialsekreterare, destruktiva relationer, frånvarande fäder och en nästintill sakral ballad där en glassbil får symbolisera hoppet om en bättre värld.

Albumets absoluta höjdpunkter utgörs i mitt tycke av låtarna ”Geraldine”, ”Daddy´s  Gone” och ”Flowers & Football Tops”, men faktum är att större delen av de tio spåren håller högsta klass. För att vara ett debutalbum är skivan galet stark. Jag utfärdar hög klassikervarning.

Text: Christer Jansson

June 9, 2009

Vladimir Rzyhkov, of the Moscow Times

Read Here

Vasili Mikhailovich Blokhin (1895 – February 1955) was a Soviet Major-General who served as the chief executioner of the Stalinist NKVD under the administrations of Genrikh Yagoda, Nikolai Yezhov and Lavrenty Beria. Hand-picked for the position by Joseph Stalin in 1926, Blokhin led a company of executioners that performed the majority of executions carried out during Stalin’s reign (most during the Great Purge). Claims by the Soviet government put the number of NKVD official executions at 828,000 during Stalin’s reign, and Blokhin is recorded as having personally executed tens of thousands of prisoners by his own hand over a 26-year period—including 7,000 condemned Polish POWs in one protracted mass execution—making him ostensibly the most prolific official executioner in recorded world history. He was awarded both the Order of the Mark of Honor (1937) and the Order of the Red Banner (1941).

Blokhin’s most notable performance was the April 1940 mass execution by shooting of 7,000 Polish officers, captured following the Soviet invasion of Poland, from the Ostashkov POW camp, during the Katyn massacre. Based on the 4 April secret order from Stalin to NKVD Chief Lavrenti Beria (as well as NKVD Order № 00485, which still applied), the executions were carried out in 28 consecutive nights at the specially-constructed basement execution chamber at the NKVD headquarters in Kalinin (now Tver), and were assigned, by name, directly to Blokhin, making him the official executioner of the NKVD.

Blokhin initially decided on an ambitious quota of 300 executions per night, and engineered an efficient system in which the prisoners were individually led to a small antechamber—which had been painted red and was known as the “Leninist room”—for a brief and cursory positive identification, before being handcuffed and led into the execution room next door. The room was specially designed with padded walls for soundproofing, a sloping concrete floor with a drain and hose, and a log wall for the prisoners to stand against. Blokhin—outfitted in a leather butcher’s apron, cap, and shoulder-length gloves to protect his uniform—then pushed the prisoner against the log wall and shot him once in the base of the skull with a German Walther Model 2 .25 ACP pistol. He had brought a briefcase full of his own Walther pistols, since he did not trust the reliability of the standard-issue Soviet TT-30 for the frequent, heavy use he intended. The use of a German pocket pistol, which was commonly carried by Nazi intelligence agents, also provided plausible deniability of the executions if the bodies were discovered later.