After the debacle of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its dissolution, the loss of its sphere of influence in Central an Eastern Europe, the economic and political woes of the 1990’s as well as lowed failures in its foreign and security policies (the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo and the First Chechen War), Russia has begun quite forcefully to assert itself again as a great power in the international system. It has become evident that Russia under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin is no longer the sick man of Europe, but on the contrary we are now dealing with a different Russia, one that has managed to put an end to its internal instability, has become quite prosperous and has an active foreign policy that befits a great power.

The return to an assertive foreign policy has been a trend in Russia’s dealings with the world since the election of Vladimir Putin as president – however this trend has been more evident in the last six months. On February 2, 2007 Vladimir Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Conference Security Policy in which he heavily criticized US foreign policy for its unilateralism and use of force, and made a veiled threat regarding the possible rise of a balancing coalition against the US. Another sign of increased assertiveness was the crackdown by the Russian government against internal opposition, most notably against the movement led by Gary Kasparov as well as vocally denouncing Western interference or advice regarding democracy in Russia. Furthermore in early April 2007 Gazprom sprang the idea of creating a gas cartel modelled around OPEC, in order to prevent “conflicts caused by energy resources issues in the future.” Russia has rejected from the onset any deployment in Central Europe of any parts of the American ballistic missile shield and to make its point clear it embarked on series of exercises carried out by its strategic missile forces as well as bellicose statements made by its generals – a clear signal that it will not tolerate such actions so close to its borders. On July 14, 2007 came the latest diplomatic skirmish with the West (NATO and US) as well as the clearest signal that Russia is asserting again its great power status, as President Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of Russia’s participation in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, a cornerstone of European security, citing as reasons the non-compliance of NATO member states with some terms of the treaty as well as U.S. redeployment of bases in Romania and Bulgaria and a perceived inequity in the quotas of major arms categories. Russia also opposes US plans regarding the independence of Kosovo, threatening to veto any such proposition if it is put forward in the UN Security Council. Last but not least, in an ongoing spying scandal, reminiscent of the Cold War, Russia sent two Tu-95 strategic bombers towards the United Kingdom to demonstrate its will and capabilities and disenchantment with the latter’s foreign policy.

What does this means for the West (NATO, EU and United States)? It means that Russia will be increasingly difficult to deal with on hot topics such as energy security, European security, West Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Middle East, WMD proliferation or strategic forces. Russia will also put forward many more foreign policy initiatives and will constantly challenge the power of the United States of America, currently the only great power in the international system. However such a heightened strategic posture will not necessarily mean that Russia will have its way regarding some international issues or that its foreign policy will be successful. For the present it just marks the end of the period of Russian weakness and debacle.

What does this means for the international system? A tentative answer would be that the post Cold War unipolar structure of the international system is drawing slowly to a close. Slowly but surely other actors will rise to the status of great power – Russia therefore is no exception. However what will be the exception, at least in terms of recent history, is that the international system is not likely to be shaped solely by the actions of one or two great powers, but by increasingly more actors. It is too early to estimate how many great powers will rise in the future or how successful they will be – nonetheless the writing is on the wall. On the other hand one should bear in mind that the distribution of power among the great powers will not be equitable, and there is likely to be great capability gaps among them.

George VIŞAN

In this article I will argue that EU’s relations with the Russian Federation are at a crossroads, with the latter gaining leverage while the former has trouble finding an adequate response to this challenge.

The differences between two actors stem from two quite different perceptions of world politics and diplomacy. Russia sees international politics from a realist perspective emphasising power politics and strategic cooperation while the EU is advancing a post-Westphalian agenda of international politics based on shared norms and values. These different approaches and understandings of the international system have lead to an impasse in EU-Russian relation.

This impasse has become more evident in the last two years when a number of points of contention have arisen between the EU and Russia. These are: the Russian use of its huge energy supplies to reverse its demise as a great power after the end of the Cold War, the rollback of democracy in Russia, divergent views regarding Central and Eastern Europe and perceived Western encroachments in the Russian sphere of influence – more explicitly the case of Ukraine. The souring of relations between EU and Russia, as well as the West in general was evident in February 2007 at the Munich Security Conference, when President’s Putin speech on international security did not go very well with the representatives of EU member states present there.

However Russia has for now the upper hand when it comes to bilateral relations with the EU. Russia is no longer dependent on Western aid due to its revenues obtained from the energy market and the dependence of EU member states on its supplies of gas. Actually now Russia, as a result of its assertive energy policy, holds the world’s third largest holdings of convertible currency and gold – these financial and economic resources can be easily transformed in political and military resources. Moreover over the last years the Kremlin was able to renegotiate to its advantage extraction deals with foreign partners and has put under government control the oil and gas industry. The Kremlin and Russian companies are coordinating their efforts in order to open up markets in many EU member countries for Russian capital that can be turned into political influence when the time comes. All in all Russia is in the midst of a diplomatic offensive to re-establish itself as a major actor in world affairs.

Despite recognizing the assertive character of Russian diplomacy, the EU has yet to develop a coherent answer to this challenge. The EU’s soft approach in terms of diplomacy and security is largely responsible for this situation and unfortunately this is not likely to change. With the failure of the Constitutional Treaty a coordinated EU foreign policy is out of the question. Moreover foreign policy is the hallmark of sovereignty of all EU member states and it is unlikely to change, even if a new a Constitution is negotiated and adopted, making a coordinated EU foreign policy unlikely. Furthermore the responsibility for this incoherence does not rest wholly with the EU as an institution; member states following their national interest in terms of energy have actually increased the dependence on Russian gas and energy supplies. The best known example is the underwater gas pipeline that links Russia and Germany and bypasses Poland, an issue which has become emblematic for the divisions regarding energy security and Russia among EU member states. Another incident reminiscent of the Russian-German pipeline happened this year when Hungary decided to opt for the BlueStream pipeline, putting in doubt its participation in the Nabucco project, which would have diminished EU dependence on Russian gas supplies.

In order to deal with Russian assertiveness and aggressive tone, as well as to avoid being placed in a strategic disadvantage by energy dependence, the EU and its member states must take immediate action. EU must place more pressure on Russia on sensitive issues such as energy supplies and the security of Central and Eastern Europe. Member states must be aware of Russian interests and counter them effectively whenever these interests become liabilities for them in terms of security and foreign policy. Cooperation with Russia in terms of soft security (anti terrorism, illegal trafficking and securing dangerous substance) must continue, but must be framed within a larger policy which takes into consideration the differences between EU and Russia. Furthermore member states should avoid acting unilaterally in terms of their relation with the Russian Federation and must put aside petty squabbles. Europe should be afraid of using its transatlantic partnership in order to deal with an assertive Russia. All in all the new challenges Russia raises to Europe must be dealt coherently and effectively.

George VIŞAN