Lord Stern, who last month suggested we should all become vegetarian for the good of the environment, has an ally in Peter Singer, a professor of bioethics at Princton University.

Writing in the New York Daily News under the headline, Make meat eaters pay: Ehicist proposes radical tax, says they’re killing themselves and the planet, he says:

. . . the reasons for a tax on beef and other meats are stronger than those for discouraging consumption of cigarettes, transfats or sugary drinks. 

First, eating red meat is likely to kill you. Large studies have shown that the daily consumption of red meat increases the risk that you will die prematurely of heart disease or bowel cancer. This is now beyond serious scientific dispute. When the beef industry tries to deny the evidence, it is just repeating what the tobacco industry did 30 years ago.

There is a lot of evidence which suggests too much read meat is bad for the health. But eating moderate servings of lean meat a few times a week is not generally regarded as dangerous and insufficient protein, iron and B vitamins, of which red meat is a good source, can be.

Singer uses examples of animal cruelty to further his argument then gets to the environment:

Third, industrial meat production wastes food – we feed the animals vast quantities of grains and soybeans, and they burn up most of the nutritional value of these crops just living and breathing and developing bones and other unpalatable body parts. We get back only a fraction of the food value we put into them.

This is a valid criticism but he is talking about the United States. In New Zealand almost all sheep, cattle and deer are pasture reared and much of the land on which they graze is not suitable for cropping.

The clincher is that taxing meat would be a highly effective way of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions and avoiding catastrophic climate change. . .

. . .  So let’s start with a 50% tax on the retail value of all meat, and see what difference that makes to present consumption habits. If it is not enough to bring about the change we need, then, like cigarette taxes, it will need to go higher.

Singer appears to miss a vital difference between cigarettes and meat. People who stop smoking don’t have to replace the tobacco with anything else. People who stop eating meat have to replace it with other food.

A 50% tax on meat would not only increase the price of meat it would increase the demand for alternative food sources which would become more expensive, at least in the short term until the supply increased.

If a lot more grains and cereals were needed to replace meat, there is no guarantee that production methods would be without negative environmental impacts.

Singer’s suggestion would add to world hunger and associated health problems with no guarantee of helping the environment.

The following is a mixture of my own thoughts and thoughts from “The Moral Course of Thinking” in Gathered for the Journey: Moral Theology in Catholic Perspective, ed. David Matzko McCarthy and M. Therese Lysaught. Grand Rapids: Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007. pp. 1-19.

Two of the most popular approaches to ethics in modern philosophy are utilitarianism and deontological ethics, both of which are normative theories.  Normative theories of ethics are those that offer a principle as the key criterion by which actions are determined to be good or bad. 

The more common of these two approaches today is probably utilitarianism.  The strength of this view can be seen, for example, in the influence of ethicist Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton University.  As one of the leading ethicists of our day, his paradigm for ethics is thoroughly utilitarian.  It leads him to some very counter-intuitive opinions about what is right and what is wrong.  He argues, for example, that killing handicapped infants is the best thing to do if the parents will have a second infant who has the prospects for a happier life (Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.  pp. 181-91).  How does he come to such a conclusion?  In order to understand this, you would have to have a basic understanding of the utilitarian philosophy of ethics.   

What is utilitarianism?

“Utilitarianism is the moral doctrine that we should always act to produce the greatest possible balance of good over bad for everyone affected by our actions” (9).  By this criterion, actions considered by themselves are morally neutral—it all depends on their consequences as to whether they are good or bad.  Apart from consideration of such consequences, actions are neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy.

Because of this criterion, it is often the burden of utilitarian thinkers to convince their readers—against their better intuitions—that the reason we call certain desires or actions “good” or “bad” is not because they are bad in themselves but because we associate good or bad consequences with such actions.  Thus, we come to think of them as good or bad actions, when in reality, the actions are not good or bad, but are widely believed to have good or bad consequences.  (NOTE: In a previous post, I showed how one utilitarian took on the ambitious task of convincing his readers that the desire to torture other human beings is not wrong).

At this point, I need to make a qualification.  Many people (myself included) would probably incorporate some degree of utilitarianism in their criterion for ethics.  For example, although I personally believe that certain actions are inherently wrong (apart from evaluation of their consequences), I would still allow for the degree of wickedness to increase or decrease depending on its consequences. 

For example, it’s a bad thing for a man to rape and beat a woman (regardless of consequences), but it’s even worse if as a result of the brutality, her unborn daughter is killed and the rape victim who survives gets AIDS.  This makes the crime much, much worse. 

I also believe that consequences are built into the very logic of why we label actions as inherently right or wrong in the first place.  For example, adultery is wrong because it hurts the person who gets cheated on, creates the risk of irresponsible baby-making, introduces the risk of STD’s into an otherwise risk-free marriage (if both entered into that marriage without any STD’s).  Adultery is always an injustice, and it is wrong in itself.  Yet, at least a great part of the reason that it is always wrong (regardless of context) is due to its destructive consequences.  I happen to think the dichotomy between actions as inherently right or wrong verses their being right or wrong based on consequences is a bit overdone.

With this caveat on the table, then, let me proceed to distinguish what I call the utilitarian factor (incorporation of consequences into one’s ethical thinking) from utilitarianism.  While some might consider it a good thing to keep consequences in mind when making moral choices, utilitarianism has the burden of claiming that such criterion be the exclusive grounds for judging the merit of all ethical action.  On the basis of this distinction, then, I will sometimes refer to utilitarianism as exclusive utilitarianism.

What’s wrong with utilitarianism?

McCarthy and Lysaught rehearse some of the standard criticisms of utilitarianism, for which I have given my own articulation and creative names.  They run as follows:

1) The Inevitability of Arbitrariness—It has no way to objectively determine the nature, importance, and value of consequences.  To put it another way: How do we know what are “good” and “bad” consequences?  What consequences count most?  Whose opinion of what are “good” consequences and what are “bad” consequences counts most?  Failure to give coherent and rational criterion for answering such questions spells decisive defeat for the whole theory of exclusive utilitarianism.  It seems to need something else to help it out.  That is why I personally think that the utilitarian factor is legitimate when considered as part of the picture, but exclusive utilitarianism always leads to arbitrary judgment of consequences, and therefore arbitrary ethics.

2) The Contrary Intuition—It often undermines our common sense and moral intuitions, often demanding certain actions that rub our conscience the wrong way.  For example, what if I knew I could cheat on my wife with my female boss without her ever finding out in order to get a raise, which would have “good” consequences for my family (less financial stress, my wife could cut back to part time to spend more time with the kids, the kids could benefit from more parental care, I could save more money for the kids for college, etc.)?  My gut tells me: Don’t do this, it is wrong, wrong, wrong.  But utilitarianism tells me it’s like a math problem (good consequences = good action). 

3) The Omniscience Requirement—Sometimes it is impossible to know the totality of the potential (much less the actual) consequences of one’s actions.  Sometimes what looks to us to be a disaster turns out to be a blessing in disguise.  We get fired only to later realize that the new job we attain as a consequence pays better and is more enjoyable.  On the flip side, sometimes we think something is going to turn out great, but in the end is a big let down.  If these small scale experiences in the lives of ordinary people demonstrate how difficult it is to know the consequences of certain actions—how much more difficult must it be for people whose decisions effect an entire nation (e.g. the President) to judge the full weight of the consequences of their decisions?

Conclusion

I agree with McCarthy and Lysaught that these criticisms are decisive and that the wide variety of contrary opinions to the same ethical questions among exclusive utilitarians “makes clear that the theories are not doing a good job accounting for what actually shapes moral judgments” (12). 

Since The Enlightenment, unaided reason so often attempts to bypass the God question and arrive at “neutral” criterion for judging right from wrong through autonomous reason (without trying bring “religion” into the question).  In my opinion, The New Enlightenment is this: The Old Enlightenment has proven to be bankrupt for ethical foundations.  Maybe the God question is relevant after all.

Peter Singer présente the Ethics of What We Eat

Je cite souvent Peter Singer, un des rares philosophes à s’intéresser à l’éthique de l’alimentation. Singer est l’auteur d’Animal Liberation (traduit en français) et de The Ethics of What We Eat (que je devrais peut-être traduire!). En gros, il soutient que les conséquences d’utiliser des animaux pour se nourrir sont plus grandes que le plaisir ou les bienfaits qu’on en retire et qu’on devrait donc s’en abstenir. Il va aussi plus loin en examinant l’impact de nos différents choix alimentaires (la viande, mais aussi les légumes, les produits bio et équitable, fruits de mer, etc) tant sur l’environnement que sur les autres êtres humains. Il présente ici les grandes idées derrière The Ethics of What We Eat.

Henry Spira und die Tierrechtsbewegung

von Peter Singer

Harald Fischer Verlag

Henry Spira war mir bis zur Lektüre des Buches von Peter Singer kein Begriff. Peter Singer allerdings schon. Vor ca. 12 Jahren habe ich von Singer „Animal Liberation – Die Befreiung der Tiere“ gelesen. Das Buch hat mein Leben verändert, denn es hat mein Interesse am Thema „Tierrechte“ geweckt und dazu geführt, dass ich Vegetarierin geworden bin.

Peter Singer stellt uns mit seinem Freund Henry Spira einen beeindruckenden Menschen vor. Nach dessen unmittelbar politischem Engagement in der Sozialistischen Arbeiterpartei der USA ((kein Wunder, dass er in den Focus des FBI geriet) und der Seeleute-Gewerkschaft wandte er sich vor allem Tierschutz- und Tierrechtsfragen zu. Obwohl Spira in und mit seiner kleinen Organisation „“Animal Rights International“ weitgehend ein Einzelkämpfer war, erzielte er – wenn nötig in Kooperation mit und „Koalitionen“ von Tierrechtsorganisationen-  beeindruckende Erfolge, die das Leben von Tieren in Tierversuchen oder auch von sog. „Nutztieren“ verbesserten.

Spira war in seinen Aktionen eher Pragmatiker als Fundamentalist. was in der amerikanischen Tierrechtsbewegung durchaus zu Konflikten führte. Für ihn kam es aber vor allem darauf an, durch konkrete Maßnahmen die reale Lebenssituation der Tiere zu verbessern.  Dafür war er zu Kompromissen und Übereinkünften mit Konzernen -  z. B. in der Kosmetikindustrie hinsichtlich der Einschränkung der grausamen Draize-Tests – bereit. Er lehnte zwar Tierversuche eigentlich grundsätzlich ab, war aber bereit, dieses Ziel in Teilschritten zu verfolgen, statt einen ultimativen, aber auf absehbare Zeit  aussichtslos erscheinenden Kampf zu ihrer vollständigen und sofortigen Abschaffung zu führen.

Qu’est-ce qu’un flexitarien ?

Après les omnivores, les crudivores, les localovores, les végétariens et les végétaliens, une nouvelle classe de mangeurs a fait son apparition : les flexitariens. Être flexitarien, en gros, c’est être végétarien à temps partiel. Ou mieux, être végétarien en se permettant de sauter la clôture de temps en temps. On parle aussi de semi-végétariens. Dans The Ethics of What We Eat Peter Singer parle de l’exception parisienne, en racontant qu’une amie végétarienne se permet de manger de la viande lorsqu’elle visite la France. Dans Food Matters, Mark Bittman, chroniqueur au New York Times et critique gastronomique, se décrit comme un part-time vegan : Il est complètement végétalien jusqu’à 17h et se permet de manger ce qu’il veut pour souper.

La définition du flexitarisme n’est pas très claire, mais je doute qu’un carnivore qui mange un plat de pâtes sauce tomate quand il ne reste plus rien puisse se considérer comme un flexitatrien. On peut penser qu’est flexitarien quelqu’un qui diminue volontairement sa consommation de viande sans l’éliminer complètement. Disons que le niveau d’entrée, ce serait suivre le Meatless Monday, ce mouvement né il y a quelques années mais qui prend de plus en plus d’ampleur et qui vise à encourager une réduction de la consommation de viande. Des écoles, des hôpitaux et même des villes suivent le mouvement. Les purs et durs traitement les flexitariens de traitres. Les plus modérés se disent que c’est quand même mieux que rien, et un pas dans la bonne direction. Martin parlerait ici de classique débat entre déontologisme et conséquentialisme.

En fait, on peut regrouper les arguments en faveur d’une réduction de la consommation de viande en trois catégories : pour des question de santé, pour l’environnement et pour empêcher la souffrance des animaux. Les deux premiers arguments sont plutôt rationnels, le dernier plus émotif. Et c’est justement lorsqu’on pose la question de la souffrance animale que le flexitarisme devient plus difficile à justifier – faire souffrir un peu, est-ce vraiment moins pire que faire souffrir beaucoup ? La question de la souffrance engendre des réponses d’ordre émotif (dégoût, compassion), qui ne sont pas là lorsqu’on parle de santé ou d’environnement, et c’est sans doute pour cette raison que de nombreux vegans peuvent s’abstenir de tout produit animal. On entend «quand je vois un morceau de poulet, je vois un animal mort, ça me coupe l’appétit» mais beaucoup moins souvent «lorsque je vois une tranche de bœuf, je pense à l’impact de sa production sur le réchauffement climatique et j’ai envie de vomir». J’ai tendance à penser que les flexitariens adoptent une diète semi-végétarienne d’abord pour des raisons rationnelles – comme celles qui nous amènent à acheter une voiture hybride – alors qu’il est plus naturel de refuser toute consommation de produits d’origine animale pour ceux qui font ce choix pour des raisons émotives.

Reste que les arguments en faveur d’une diète flexitarienne sont nombreux : on obtient les bénéfices physique d’un régime végétarien sans avoir en en suivre les règles strictes, on réduit largement sa contribution aux émissions de GES, on peut même s’éloigner de la production industrialisée de viande pour se tourner vers de la viande bio. Et les flexitariens qui consomment des produits végés encouragent les épiceries à garnir leurs tablettes d’alternatives aux produits animaux et les restaurants à offrir de véritables plats sans viande, au plus grand bonheur des végétariens purs à 100% (qui ne compteraient que pour de 3% de la population). En sortant le végétarisme de la cour des granos du Plateau et en offrant du lait d’amande au Provigo de Trois-Rivières, on permet à chacun de choisir un régime qui se rapproche de ses besoins et ses valeurs et on contribue aussi à réduire la souffrance animale.

Ressoures complémentaires :
Part-Time vegetarian, Newsweek, 29 septembre 2008
The rise of the non-veggie vegetarian, BBC, 5 novembre 2009
La popularité de «flexitarian» et de«vegetarian» sur Google Trends

Peter Singer propose d’instaurer une taxe sur la viande

Le 25 octobre dernier, Peter Singer, célèbre éthicien et auteur de The Ethics of what we eat proposait d’instaurer une taxe sur la viande. Selon lui, les consommateurs de viande imposent des coûts aux autres citoyens. Payer une taxe sur la viande pourrait les conscientiser et les aider à réduire leur consommation, comme ce fut le cas pour la cigarette. La même semaine, l’économiste Lord Stern of Brentford, ancien vice-président de la Banque Mondiale, soutenait que, pour combattre le réchauffement climatique, nous devions devenir végétariens.  Taxer la viande serait-il un moyen de sauver la planète ?

Lord Stern of Brentford nous rappelle des données de l’ONU: la production de viande serait responsable de 18% des émissions totales de gaz à effet de serre. C’est davantage que toutes les formes de transport combinées. D’autres sources vont même jusqu’à parler de plus de 50% des émissions de GES qui seraient causées par la production de viande. Il faut le savoir: la molécule du méthane (CH4) rejetée par les flatulences du bétail aurait un effet de serre 21 fois supérieur à celle du CO2. Pourtant, à l’heure où chaque rapport sur le réchauffement climatique est plus alarmant que le précédent, la consommation de viande par habitant continue d’augmenter. Au Canada, elle a gagné 12% depuis 10 ans et elle devrait doubler à l’échelle planétaire d’ici 2050.

Par ailleurs, cette croissance de la demande de produits carnés engendre d’énormes usines à bétail, grandes consommatrices d’eau et d’énergie. Ces usines polluent les cours d’eau, génèrent elles aussi des GES et dépendent de la production de maïs et de soya pour nourrir le bétail. Toujours selon l’ONU, 30% des terres arables sont utilisées pour nourrir ces animaux. Cela entraîne une grande partie de la déforestation, particulièrement dans les pays en voie de développement. Ainsi, en Amazonie, c’est 70% de la forêt qui est devenue du pâturage.

En 2002, chaque Canadien a consommé 108 kg de viande. C’est de deux à quatre fois plus que l’apport quotidien recommandé. Une simple réduction de la consommation de viande aurait déjà des conséquences bénéfiques pour l’environnement. En effet, réduire sa consommation individuelle de 20% aurait autant d’impact que remplacer sa voiture classique – par exemple, une Camry – par une Prius ultra efficiente.

De plus, pendant que l’occident mange trop, et surtout trop de viande, 800 millions de personnes souffrent de faim et de malnutrition. Si l’ensemble du monde mangeait autant de viande que nous, il faudrait défricher 67% de plus de terres arables que ce que la terre contient aujourd’hui pour les transformer en pâturage. Pourtant, le rendement calorique de la viande est faible. Comme le rappellent Singer et Mason dans The Ethics of What We Eat, un champ de céréales qui nourrit une personne lorsqu’il sert à produire de la viande, en nourrirait de deux à cinq s’il produisait des aliments directement consommés par des humains. Et la plupart des experts s’entendent aujourd’hui pour dire qu’il n’y a pas de différence significative entre la qualité des protéines animales et végétales.

Pour Lord Stern of Brentford, la mentalité des consommateurs doit évoluer: la consommation de viande doit peu à peu devenir inacceptable. Nous devons prendre conscience des coûts réels de la production de viande. Qui nous fera croire que le kilo de porc haché en spécial à 2,18$ couvre le coût véritable de sa production? Émissions de GES, cours d’eau pollués, mauvaise qualité de l’air autour des porcheries, déforestation. Sans parler des conditions de travail dans les abattoirs et les usines à viande, des problèmes de santé associés à sa consommation et de la souffrance animale.

Les arguments pour taxer la viande sont bien plus solides que ceux pour taxer le tabac. Répétons le: les consommateurs de viande imposent des coûts à la société et à l’environnement. Plus nous consommons, plus ces coûts sont importants. La proposition de Peter Singer est simple:  augmenter de 50% la valeur au détail de tout type de viande. Cela ne pourra que modifier nos habitudes de consommation. Mis à part les lobbys de producteurs, nous avons tous à y gagner.

Es geht um Leben oder Tod…

“Wenn der Wunsch nach einem selbstbestimmten Ende so groß ist, dann dürfen wir zwar nicht Ja zur aktiven Sterbehilfe sagen”, erklärte Margot Käßmann kurz nach ihrer Berufung an die Spitze der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands. “Aber das kategorische Nein kann auch nicht die Antwort sein.“

Quelle

Na was denn nun, Frau Käßmann? Ja oder nein… 1, 2 oder 3?

Vielleicht doch lieber mal in Deckung bleiben und abwarten, wie das Urteil der politischen Elite demnächst aussehen wird? Dann empfehle ich aber dringend schon mal die Fahne zu bügeln, dann flattert sie in der jeweiligen Windrichtung besser.

Wie sagte Weihbischof Andreas Laun? Unsere Gesellschaft befindet sich im “slippery slope”. Für ein “Wehret den Anfängen” ist es schon lange zu spät, denn der Abrutsch hat längst begonnen und setzt sich immer weiter fort, hinein in den Abgrund. Man muss sich nur einmal überlegen, dass man vom Teufel besessenen Menschen wie Norbert Hoerster oder Peter Singer die “Meinungsfreiheit” nicht absprechen möchte. Bitte was? Diese zwei – in meinen Augen besessenen – Menschen propagieren in der Öffentlichkeit die “Meinung”, behinderte Kinder auch noch nach der Geburt zu töten. Sie meinen – genauso wie Dawkins – das Wesentliche am Menschen sind die Gene und man sollte kranke und alte Leute umbringen. Peter Singer tut sich dann auch noch als großer Tierschützer hervor. Ihm ist ein Laubfrosch wichtiger als ein ungeborenes oder ein behindertes Kind. Bitteschön, solche geäußerten und publizierten Ansichten werden heute unter den Schutz der Meinungsfreiheit gestellt, während Menschen strafrechtlich verfolgt werden, weil sie die Zahlen der Holocaust-Opfer leugnen. Würde man in der Äußerung von Peter Singer das Wort “behinderte Kinder” durch “Juden” oder “Schwarze” ersetzen, wäre schon längst der Teufel los. Wobei ich mir da auch nicht ganz sicher bin, denn viele Politiker haben auch keine Probleme  ausländische Antisemiten ohne Vorbehalt anzugrinsen. Es kommt also wahrscheinlich darauf an, wer was sagt und nicht was er sagt. Schöne neue Welt.

Mich beschleicht das ungute Gefühl, dass man nicht nur das Wort “Religionsfreiheit” falsch verstanden hat, sondern auch das Wort “Meinungsfreiheit”.

Freilich ist es dann sehr einfach für die Giordano Bruno Stiftung den Kölner Kardinal Meisner als “Hassprediger” zu bezeichnen. Aber mit welchem Recht tun sie das? War es eine freie Meinungsäußerung des Kardinals, die nun seitens der GB-Stiftung mit ihrer Meinungsäußerung beantwortet wird, oder ist das Wort “Hassprediger” bezeichnend für einen Menschen, den man strafrechtlich verfolgen muss?

Entweder man unterscheidet zwischen Meinungsäußerung und Propaganda bzw. Aufruf zum Mord und zieht letzteres Vergehen vor das Gericht, oder man lässt alle sonstwie gearteten Äußerungen als “Meinungsfreiheit” gelten.

Singer, divertido

O mais famoso bioeticista do mundo, o conhecido utilitarista Peter Singer, escreveu o seguinte no seu livro “Rethinking Life and Death” (Repensando a vida e a morte):

« Uma vez que nem uma criança recém-nascida nem um peixe são pessoas, o grau de gravidade em matar tanto a primeira como o segundo não é o mesmo do que a gravidade de se matar uma pessoa. »

Peter Singer compara uma criança nascida a um peixe.

Na Holanda, 8% dos óbitos de crianças são assassinadas pelos próprios médicos nos hospitais. Pela primeira vez, em toda a História, foi constituída a figura jurídica e cultural do “humano não pessoa” (HNP). O feto é um HNP. A partir do conceito de HNP chegaremos ao conceito de PNH (Pessoa Não Humana). É uma questão de tempo enquanto as elites poderosas se movem e apontam o caminho da política, da cultura e das ideias do futuro.

One Community One Book: Rabbi Joseph Telushkin
November 5th | 7:30pm
Rabbi Joseph Telushkin of the Synagogue for the Performing Arts (Los Angeles) speaks on the topic of “Tzedakah is Not Charity.” This FREE event is part of the One Community One Book program, which encourages everyone in Silicon Valley’s Jewish community to read the same book and discuss it. This year’s book is The Life You Can Save by Peter Singer. For more information, contact the JCC’s Center for Jewish Life & Learning at CJLL@svjcc.org or 408.357.7413.

Tzedakah is Not Charity

Thursday, November 5th, 2009 at 7:30pm

Joseph Telushkin was named by Talk Magazine as one of the 50 best
speakers in the United States. He was ordained at Yeshiva University in
New York, and pursued graduate studies in Jewish history at Columbia
University. Telushkin is the author of Jewish Literacy: The Most
Important Things to Know About the Jewish Religion, Its People and Its
History, the most widely selling book on Judaism for the past two
decades. His earlier book, Words that Hurt, Words that Heal became the
motivating force behind Senators Joseph Lieberman and Connie Mack’s
1996 Senate Resolution #151 to establish a “National Speak No Evil Day”
throughout the United States. In 2006, he published the first volume of
his monumental work, A Code of Jewish Ethics: You Shall be Holy, a
comprehensive presentation of Jewish teachings on the vital topic of
personal character and integrity. Richard Joel, president of Yeshiva
University, called the book, “a gift to humankind,” and Rabbi David
Wolpe hailed it as “a remarkable guide to goodness.”

See PDF of Event Flyer

This lecture is free of charge and open to the public, and will be held
at the JCC.

Center for Jewish Life & Learning
Silicon Valley JCC
14855 Oka Road
Los Gatos, CA 95032
CJLL@svjcc.org <mailto:CJLL@svjcc.org>
408.357.7413

very good, accessible book overall, though with some unfortunate typos.  but that’s just the bored copyeditor in me.

anyway, as this book has reaffirmed for me, eating meat “fails” on a number of fronts concerning the head & heart, but eating meat produced through industrialized farming — which in this country unfortunately makes up 90-98% of the meat available, depending on which meat (or eggs) — fails on every imaginable front: health; ethical for the animals (living conditions, selective breeding, slaughter, etc.); ethical for humans (wages, conditions, environmental concerns, health risks to humans in terms of viruses and chemicals, etc.); and environment (pollution, inefficient use of food/energy used in industrialized farming, etc.).

of course, it is possible to eat meat that avoids most of these ethical concerns, but it takes some effort to certify that the meat and eggs are genuinely coming from a responsible, sustainable, humane farm.  there are still health questions, however, as well as concerns about energy uses to produce and transport the food (vs. more efficient options), but those can be addressed on a more personal basis.  the other ethical concerns, however, should genuinely trouble all persons with consciences and challenge them to re-consider what, and the ways in which, they eat.

I feel a bit of disclosure is necessary so as to not appear to be taking the moral higher ground.  Emily and I are already vegan, but we made that decision while only being marginally informed on ethical questions such as these.  so that removes me from having to really engage in and struggle with most of these issues.  it would be easy, then, to pump a fist in hearty agreement, forgetting the fact that I lived 27+ years (even having briefly dated someone who was hardcore vegan in the past) without engaging in these concerns, even though I generally knew about them.  the truth is, even when I thought about reading Peter Singer’s more famous Animal Liberation (which I still haven’t read), I put it off, knowing (but not admitting) that I wasn’t ready to make radical changes.  and informing myself would only make it harder to make excuses.  I do think, however, that a book like this, focused on more ethical concerns overall, not just on animal welfare, would have had a greater impact on me.  but that’s only conjecture.

that being said, however, I don’t think these issues are any less of a concern just because we’re already vegan, and I do think that everyone (or as many people as willing) should give this a fair shot in order to see where they stand and what changes (if any) they are willing to make.  but I understand (as do the authors) that it’s not easy, and sometimes it takes time to change.  but I do hope we can find ways; we certainly need it.  and I hope I can find ways to talk to friends and families without coming off as pushy or judgmental …

but rest assured: this book is not a blatant case for veganism, and I’m not suggesting that vegans can read it with little to no ethical stirrings.  there are a still a host of ethical issues relating to fruits, veggies, rice, coffee, etc., particularly when it comes to concerns about the environmental impact of buying organic and/or buying local — this is an issue that Emily and I have wondered about, and this book was helpful in addressing some of the ethical concerns in, for instance, buying more locally grown but not organic fruit vs. organic fruit imported from another country.  also, is it always better to buy local when the money can go further and do more good in developing countries?  actually, this book has only further complicated the picture for me — but that’s because the issues are so darn complex, not because of any fault of the writers.  most helpful has been the prod to think and research, and the sources they provide to help are a great start.

so now Emily and I (well more me right now, as I’m the one who has just read it) have to wrestle with taking measure to find out (or pay more attention to) where the food we buy comes from and whether we can learn anything about the means of its production.  we need to pay more attention to “fair trade” and “organic” certification standards.  and we also need to start thinking about eating more seasonally — if not ruling out certain foods that don’t grow locally (or even regionally) without a significant energy output, at least reducing them.  we’ve already started some new discussions and hopefully we will follow through with what we decide.

after reading this book, I am even more eager for the time when Emily and I will have a yard (whether at a rented place or our own place) where we can start a garden.  I would love it if we could produce the great majority of vegetables we eat for the entire year in our own garden, and simply freeze, pickle, or can the leftovers for the winter haul.

Hi Everyone,

The question is very simple:What are you doing Saturday, November 14th, 2009? While there are many things that you may have planned for that day, very few of them could be as important as this day. Georgia Right to Life is hosting its South Metro Conference in Tyrone, GA.

This conference “How to Be Pro-Life in the 21st Century” is crucial to understanding where the pro-life movement has been and where we are going in the future. 

Whether you are a mom, dad, pastor, student, teacher, prayer warrior, etc, there is no event like this conference that will give you key insight into the battle ahead of us and the tools to use in the fight for the sanctity of human life.

The Conference will feature Dan Becker, President of Georgia Right to Life discussing where the pro-life movement has been, and where we need to go in order to be effective in the 21st Century.

Catherine Davis will be discussing the History of Eugenics in America and how to Reclaim the Legacy of the African American community and society at large.

Other presentations will include the Top 10 Ways to Impact Life in the 21st Century and insight on efforts to get involved in the South Metro area and Georgia.

Again, you don’t want to miss this life changing event.

Tickets are $1o for Students, $15 for adults, and 2 for $25. Please RSVP by Thursday, November 12, 2009.

The conference will be held at Operation Mobilization, 285 Lynnwood Ave, Tyrone, GA.

For more information about the conference or to register online, click here

Remember in order to change the culture, we need you to be present!

Have had to change glasses for the second home-exam of the week. Off with the pragmatic and rather fixed glasses of law, on with the idealistic and theoretical ones for cosmopolitanism and civil society.

So is civil society good or bad? Mary Kaldor argues in her book Global Civil Society (2008) that the term has to be re-conceptualized and understood in a more global perspective than it has been before. Now I only have to stretch this statement out to a full page and do this with a few more books, write a vs. text on Kant and Peter Singer and analyze World Social Forum as an expression of a global civil society. Wonderful.

Might I add that after a week of sickness….yes I’m still sick and it’s not looking much better. Was told for the hundreth time to get my H1N1 flu shot, by my mother. And yes I will before I go to the Netherlands.

I’d read an earlier piece on this horrible fad of learning to butcher animals in your home, but now it seems to include slaughtering them yourself, too. Read the latest DawnWatch Alert on this fad and Peter Singer’s call for a tax on meat, which is brilliant, in my opinion.

New York’s Sunday papers, October 25, included some fascinating articles about meat. The New York Times had a piece in the Sunday Styles section about classes in the skill of personally slaughtering and butchering the animals one intends to eat. The New York Daily News included a piece by Peter Singer suggesting that meat should be taxed at the sales level to help cover its disastrous environmental impact and its drain on health care.

Though unfortunately it is featured in the Style Section instead of the crime section, Alex Williams’ article about classes in private meat butchering, titled “Slaughterhouse Live,” doesn’t simply present this trend as the best thing since sliced bread. The lead photo is chilling: the carcass of a pig laid out on her back, looking rather human, but for her decapitated sweet-faced head sitting next to the body, facing the camera. And though we read that the program is popular, Williams shares quotes such as the following from student Christian Rusby:

“That faint smell reminded me of being covered all over my arms in this animal’s death. It was more profound than I expected, because it was an olfactory experience, like a smell you remember from childhood. Every time I ate a tamale from this pig, I remembered it laying on a pallet and being shaved.”

Peter Singer is quoted in this New York Times piece, apart from having his own piece in the New York Daily News on the same day. Addressing the notion that people take the class because they want to be in touch with their food and where it comes from, he retorts:

“If you just say, ‘I’m in touch with their pain,’ that can be hypocritical, because you’re not experiencing their pain.”

Williams ends the article with a quote from a student, Jack Lahne, who wanted “a real understanding of where meat comes from.” Williams comments, “He got it.” He shares Lahnes’ words:

“Animals do not want to die. They can feel pain and fear, and, just like us, will struggle to breathe for even one single more second. If you’re about to run 250 volts through a pig, do not look it in the eyes. It is not going to absolve you.

“I truly believe that humane slaughter is important and possible, but, as I have been learning, here’s the truth about any slaughter: it is both morally difficult and really gross.”

While this article in the Style section could have been a fluff piece on a dark new fad, Williams did not handle it as such. It is well worth checking out, and it opens the door for letters to the editor from those who, without having to take the class have worked out what Jack Lahne came to realize. The article is online at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/fashion/25meat.html. The New York Times takes letters at letters@nytimes.com.

Peter Singer’s piece in the Sunday, October 25, Daily News, is headed: “Make meat-eaters pay: Ethicist proposes radical tax, says they’re killing themselves and the planet.” That lengthy heading does a good job of summing up a detailed and engaging article, cutting edge and unapologetic, as one would expect from Singer. While Singer’s tax point is based on the drain of resources caused by meat consumption, the article also discusses some of the horrors visited upon animals on factory farms and in slaughterhouses. It is well worth reading. And it is worth forwarding to all of your friends; papers note which articles get the most forwards.

You’ll find Singer’s piece online at http://tinyurl.com/ykw32mk. You can send a supportive letter to the editor to voicers@edit.nydailynews.com.

Always include your full name, address, and daytime phone number when sending a letter to the editor. Remember that shorter letters are more likely to be published. And please be sure not to use any comments or phrases from me or from any other alerts in your letters. Editors are looking for original responses from their readers.

Yours and the animals’,
Karen Dawn

(DawnWatch is an animal advocacy media watch that looks at animal issues in the media and facilitates one-click responses to the relevant media outlets. You can learn more about it, and sign up for alerts at http://www.DawnWatch.com. You may forward or reprint DawnWatch alerts if you do so unedited — leave DawnWatch in the title and include this parenthesized tag line. If somebody forwards DawnWatch alerts to you, which you enjoy, please help the list grow by signing up. It is free.)

Please go to www.ThankingtheMonkey.com for a fun celeb-studded promo video and information on Karen Dawn’s book, “Thanking the Monkey: Rethinking the Way we Treat Animals,” which was chosen by the Washington Post as one of the “Best Books of 2008.” And check out Karen’s new blog at www.ThankingtheMonkey.com/blog!

s.

Yesterday was World Food Day, a day to mark the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization at the United Nations. This organization was established on October 16, 1945 and its purpose is to make sure that the world gets adequately fed, but their latest report reeks of failures. While we would have loved to have been in Rome to hear the 6th Annual George McGovern World Food Day lecture by Marion Nestle, we were busy teaching high schoolers. And while we weren’t there, we feel good knowing that her comments about the solutions to hunger lie squarely in the social sphere, not the tech-world.

While Bill Gates, who also spoke this week (at the World Food Prize forum), firmly believes that developments in technology (mainly transgenic plants and fertilizers) will play a major role in solving hunger issues, he misdirects his frustrations by blaming environmentalists. He’s correct in asserting that technology has a role to play, but the inability of poor farmers to grow crops is only a small part of the problem facing those starving in the third world. If you want to point fingers, environmentalists are minor and largely irrelevant target. I recommend starting with someone bigger, maybe the World Bank?

For all the hype about the development of new tech-crops, like those of the Norman Borlaug’s Green Revolution in the 70s, which produced high-yield rice and wheat (and won him a Nobel prize), we already know what solves hunger: Breastfeeding, clean water and safe food, empowerment of women, education, community food security, sustainable agriculture, and political stability. The technology Gates is talking about has yet to solve such problems, and probably never will (although, I’m open to it!). However, amidst all the passionate calls to end hunger, there was one voice that definitely stood out, and it wasn’t that of Pope Benedict the XVI.

While the Pope called for “determined and effective” action from Rome on World Hunger Day, and said that, “Access to food is more than a basic need, it is a fundamental right of individuals and peoples,” his own organization has the money to meet many of these needs and could do more. Even Jesus told his followers to sell what they had and give it to the poor. While the Catholic Church and its thousands of charities across the globe are known for their dedication to the poor, it’s hard for folks like Sarah Silverman to take the Pope seriously when he has a palace to sleep in. Maybe this is why Silverman decided to call him out. Even though selling the Vatican wouldn’t be enough, it would be helpful.

While the Web site Slashfood.com has recently ranked their “Top 10 Most Awesome Food Mascots,” (the Jolly Green Giant should have been #1), we are giving our own award, and it goes to Sarah Silverman for “Best World Food Day” message of 2009. While many will find her message crude, she has a point: If we say we care, we need to ante up. Which is why I have decided to take Peter Singer’s challenge from his latest book “The Life You Can Save” and give a percentage of my income each month to groups working on these issues. It’s not the only thing I plan to do, but it is one that is vital. To the pope: Do it, sell the Vatican, and feed the 1 billion people who need it. It’s just a building.

- Christopher

p.s. In other news:

Government researchers want to peek in grocery carts

Oregon launches anti-junk food TV ads campaign

Matt Damon Helps With Hunger, 

 
By Daniel Becker, President of Georgia Right to Life
October 16, 2009

Personhood is the pro-life battleground of the 21^st century. Throughout the history of the Church the doctrinal teaching of the “Sanctity of Life” (Genesis 1:26-27) has been the belief that Man is created Imago Dei (Latin: in the image of God) and therefore has worth at all stages of life. This is the bedrock of Western civilization’s understanding and practice of human dignity. We are told in the gospels that John the Baptist was known by God, called by God, named by God and then filled by God with the Holy Spirit while still in his mother’s womb. This is an example of the biblical worldview of Personhood.

Let’s contrast our biblical worldview with an emerging secular worldview. Peter Singer is the DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University. This excerpt was taken directly from his website’s FAQ’s:

 “Q. You have been quoted as saying: “Killing a defective infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Sometimes it is not wrong at all.” Is that quote accurate?

A. It is accurate, but can be misleading if read without an understanding of what I mean by the term ‘person’ . . .”

 He argues his case in his book, Unsanctifying Human Life. He believes that the “right to life” should be granted to all “persons” equally. Unfortunately, his definition of “person” is very narrow and excludes all pre-born children, disabled children, born infants (through 18 months) and the elderly infirm. He goes on to declare that his own mother probably wouldn’t be alive if he were the sole caregiver in his family.  According to Singer, a self-aware dog would have more “personhood” than his mom.

 One would think that Singer’s position would be considered on the loopy fringe of public policy discussions. Surprisingly, his prestigious position at Princeton and his vast international influence has earned him the acclaim of being one of the leading bioethicists of our day.  Don’t be surprised if twenty years from now we find his positions on “personhood” to be encased in our law, our hospitals, our research laboratories and universities. The Right to Life movement is “fifteen years behind the curve”, according to pro-life bioethicist Wesley Smith, “in addressing and responding to this threat.” Our narrow focus on being anti-abortion in the 20^th century has not expanded to embrace a host of issues which are emerging in the 21^st century.

Destruction of human children at the embryonic level has now expanded beyond research laboratories to be enshrined as a “pro-creative right” of infertile couples seeking to become parents.  It is not uncommon to create between fifteen and twenty children at one time and then through the processes of selective reduction and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) kill all but one of those children. When did it become acceptable for a couple’s “right to parent” to supersede another’s right to life?

 Drug companies and biotech businesses need human subjects to perfect their products. A steady supply of human embryos are needed in order to conduct these lethal experiments. Because fertility clinics can not possibly supply the large number of embryos needed, the biotech industry has resorted to a transgenic solution . . . combining 98% human DNA with 2% cow DNA to form a human-animal hybrid child known as a “chimera.” Cornell University, May 2008, created a “glow in the dark” human child by crossing human genes with a fluorescent gene from an Australian jellyfish. A spokesman for the National Institutes of Health said, “the Cornell work would not be classified as gene therapy in need of federal review, because a test-tube embryo (child) is not considered a person under the regulations.”

 Our effort to promote a culture of life in our day, requires that we develop a clear and consistent message to alert our culture to the dangers that lie ahead if the definition of “person” is eroded and changed from its historical meaning. This is the clear battleground of the pro-life movement in the 21^st century. Our website at Personhood.net is our attempt to engage the 21^st century with a clear “Sanctity of Human Life” foundation and we would encourage you to familiarize yourself with its resources and message.

Hace poco más de una semana escribí en este blog mi primer artículo sobre el tema del aborto, sin darme cuenta de que se empezaba a armar un debate paralelo en la actual coyuntura política del Perú. Lamentablemente, sólo se está poniendo en discusión el aborto terapéutico, cuando corre riesgo la vida de la madre, y el que se da en casos excepcionales, como cuando la madre ha sido víctima de una violación, o el feto sufre ciertos defectos. Esto es lamentable porque incluso si se llega a despenalizar en todos esos casos, el problema principal se mantiene, y miles de mujeres seguirían recurriendo a abortos ilegales, poniendo en peligro sus vidas.

No quiero, sin embargo, adentrarme en los detalles del actual debate (cosa que me parece poco productiva puesto que éste se caracteriza en no escuchar lo que las otras partes tienen que decir), sino más bien abordar el problema desde la perspectiva de una teoría ética. En el primer artículo, me enfoqué en criticar la primera premisa del argumento contra el aborto, que sostiene que está mal tomar una vida humana inocente, ayudándome en buena parte de lo que el controvertido bioeticista Peter Singer aporta al debate. No obstante, no entré con mucha profundidad desde la perspectiva de la ética kantiana, lo que no quiere decir que lo dicho en el artículo anterior no esté de acuerdo con dicha teoría ética.

Así, en este artículo, abordaré el tema en particular desde la ética kantiana, aludiendo primero a lo que dirían algunas interpretaciones tradicionales; luego volviendo explícita una posición coherente que se pueda formular desde la ética kantiana hoy; y por último, examinando algunas opiniones del mismo Kant al respecto—para satisfacer a los que buscan en Google “qué dice Kant sobre el aborto” y llegan aquí.

Si pensamos “Kant” y “aborto” a la vez, seguro nos vendrá a la mente la segunda formulación del imperativo categórico, que nos dice “Actúa de tal forma que uses a la humanidad, tanto en tu propia persona como en la de cualquier otro, siempre al mismo tiempo como fin y nunca meramente como medio”. Si caemos en el muy común error de pretender aplicar directamente la ley moral a casos concretos—error que trato con más profundidad en el primer artículo en la historia de este blog—, podríamos pensar que la ética kantiana niega categóricamente—no pun intended, como dicen en inglés—el aborto, pues se está tratando al feto o embrión como un medio, y no como un fin en sí mismo[1]. Sin embargo, es la labor trascendental de este blog ayudar a desterrar de la ética kantiana semejante uso de sus términos, y atrevernos a una interpretación que le haga mayor justicia y que, además, nos resulta más útil a la hora de reflexionar sobre dilemas éticos.

Así, antes de pretender usar la segunda formulación del imperativo categórico de la primera forma que se nos ocurra, debemos entender dos conceptos importantes, y que están relacionados entre sí: el de persona y el de humanidad.

La humanidad no es pues la simple pertenencia a la especie humana (somo se podría pensar irreflexivamente), sino la capacidad presente en seres racionales de decidir cómo llevar sus vidas y buscar la felicidad. No es pues, un mero uso técnico de la razón, sino más bien prudencial—de esto hablé con más detalle en un artículo anterior, sobre esta humanidad como valor fundamental de toda la ética kantiana—, que va de la mano inevitablemente con el uso moral.

De la misma forma, una persona no es tampoco cualquier miembro de la especie humana, sino un ser racional que cuenta con dichas capacidades. La ética kantiana reconoce una dignidad inherente e irrenunciable en todas las personas, por más que estemos hablando de la Madre Teresa o de Adolf Hitler (disculpen por los ejemplos trillados).

Surge inmediatamente el siguiente problema: la ética kantiana parece reconocer valor moral fundamental solamente a las personas, lo que excluye a animales no racionales, e incluso niños pequeños. La respuesta a esta aparente paradoja ha sido por lo general la posición que sostiene la “unidad de la persona”, que implica que un ser humano es el mismo ser durante toda su existencia, y ocasiona que otorguemos el mismo estatus moral no sólo a los niños, sino también a los fetos y embriones.

Esta posición, si se examina de forma más detallada, se vuelve difícil de fundamentar racionalmente. ¿Es acaso la mera posibilidad de un ser de convertirse en persona suficiente para otorgarle los mismos derechos que a una persona, incluso si esto nunca llega a suceder? A fin de cuentas, ser una persona conlleva ciertas responsabilidades al igual que derechos, que es imposible exigir a niños pequeños, y mucho más a un embrión o feto.

Por eso, Allen W. Wood, autor de Kantian Ethics, desarrolla una distinción que ciertamente no está presente en los escritos de Immanuel Kant, pero que no obstante, llena un vacío en su ética, y que resulta muy valioso para defender dicha teoría en la actualidad. La distinción que propone Wood es la de personas en sentido estricto, y personas en sentido extendido—o por chorreo, como se diría de forma coloquial.

Veamos cómo lo pone Wood en la siguiente—y algo extensa, disculpen—cita:

Un acercamiento kantiano más consistente se basa en la idea de que podemos tratar, o fallar en tratar, la naturaleza racional como un fin en sí mismo no sólo en la persona de un ser racional en sentido estricto sino también en la forma que tratamos a otros seres que no son personas en sentidos estricto. Por ejemplo, ciertamente mostraría una falta de respeto a la naturaleza racional no avanzar el desarrollo a la madurez de un niño en el que ya se ha empezado a desarrollar. Lo mismo es válido si es que no nos preocupamos sobre la recuperación de la naturaleza racional en un adulto que ha dejado temporalmente de ser una persona en sentido estricto por alguna lesión, enfermedad u otra incapacidad.

Así, para respetar propiamente la naturaleza racional, estamos requeridos a tratar a algunos seres que no son personas en sentido estricto en ciertos aspectos  exactamente como si fueran personas en sentido estricto. o, para ponerlo de otra forma, estamos obligados a otorgar, al menos para ciertos propósitos, un estatus equivalente al de una persona [personhood] a algunos seres que simplemente no son personas en sentido estricto. Por ejemplo, deberíamos tratar a niños pequeños como si teniendo el derecho a no ser matados, a tener su bienestar cuidado por otros, y su desarrollo hacia la madurez resguardado. Propongo que apliquemos el término personas en sentido extendido a los seres que no son personas en sentido estricto pero que deberían serle otorgados un estatus moral (en los aspectos relevantes) exactamente como el de los seres que son personas en sentido estricto[2].

Si aceptamos la diferencia que hace Wood, todavía podríamos afirmar que un feto o embrión debe ser considerado como una persona en sentido extendido, y en consecuencia, el aborto considerado como inmoral. No obstante, lo que señala el mismo Wood es que, al otorgar el carácter de persona en sentido extendido a un feto o embrión, se vulnera el derecho de personas en sentido estricto; es decir, de las mujeres que llevan el feto o embrión en su vientre. El nacimiento, entonces, resulta un límite apropiado para empezar a considerar al recién nacido como una persona en sentido extendido, y otorgarle los derechos respectivos. Tengan en cuenta que—cómo se dijo en el artículo anterior sobre el tema ya mencionado—el problema de la legalización del aborto pertenece estrictamente a la esfera del derecho, lo que no se opone a que, en la esfera privada, de la virtud, personas distintas tengan posiciones distintas y actúen de acuerdo a ellas.

El razonamiento de Wood es ciertamente temporal e imperfecto, pero igual lo considero uno de los mejores argumentos a favor del derecho a abortar, y no sólo en casos excepcionales. Así también, se refuerza mutuamente con una posición como la de Peter Singer, que examinamos con más detalle también en el artículo precedente.

Finalmente, dijimos que íbamos a mencionar las opiniones de Kant mismo al respecto, y lo haré de forma muy breve. Mientras que en la parte de la doctrina de la virtud (en La metafísica de las costumbres) Kant menciona que si una mujer embarazada comete suicidio está cometiendo un delito hacia otra persona (422); en el mismo libro, pero en la doctrina del derecho, Kant sostiene la algo tétrica posición que permite que una mujer que ha dado a luz un niño fuera del matrimonio puede eliminarlo para salvar su honra, pues legalmente no pertenece a la comunidad (336).

Como ven, lo dicho por Kant refuerza la necesidad de establecer una posición coherente procedente de sus propios principios, pues él, obviamente, no pudo hacerlo.

[1] Una posición todavía más superficial y absurda sería la que, basándose en la primera formulación del imperativo categórico, rechaza el aborto porque no puede ser universalizable.

[2] Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). La cita corresponde a las páginas 96 y 97, y la muy imperfecta traducción es mía.

If you happen to be a Christian you have certainly been told at some point that to believe in God, the Bible, Creation, Heaven, etc., one must “check their brains at the door.” Since this is one example of the numerous emotionally provocative, superficial, and unsubstantiated claims that are made about Christians it is not only ineffective but also a waste of time to attempt to do battle against it.  What you will also find is that the amount of “brainpower” is irrelevant if it belongs to someone who claims to be a person of faith.

“Outspoken religious commitment as a sign of mild dementia.” This statement allegedly describes how many in the scientific community might characterize a scientist that might evidence a belief in God. In an op-ed that appeared in today’s Wall Street Journal, “God vs. Science Isn’t the Issue,” William McGurn referred to New York Times reporter Gardiner Harris writing about Dr. Frances Collins. If that name does not ring a bell Francis Collins is the newly appointed director of the National Institutes of Health. “Dr. Collins is perhaps best noted for his leadership on the Human Genome Project, an effort to map the genetic makeup of man. But he is also well known for his unapologetic talk about his Christian faith and how he came to it.”

In describing the disdain that is often communicated from the scientific world McGurn continues with the following statement–”In 1997, for example, an International Academy of Humanism statement in defense of human cloning—whose signatories included scientists such as E.O. Wilson, Francis Crick and Richard Dawkins—went out of its way to attack the special dignity of human beings. ‘Humanity’s rich repertoire of thoughts, feelings, aspirations, and hopes seems to arise from electrochemical brain processes, not from an immaterial soul that operates in ways no instrument can discover.’ They concluded ‘it would be a tragedy if ancient theological scruples should lead to a Luddite rejection of cloning.’ Here’s the problem: Almost no one really believes this. Not, at least, when it comes to how we behave. And the dichotomy between scientific theory and human action may itself have something to tell us about truth.”

I would like to address two issues here. The first has to do with “apparent” intelligence. You can be a scientist that heads up the team that maps out the human DNA and because you have the audacity to believe in God you might possibly have a form of “mild dementia.” On the other hand, you can be part of the Princeton faculty and be a highly published “ethicist” (such as Peter Singer), who makes provocative statements like, “The life of a fetus is of no greater value than the life of a nonhuman animal at a similar level of rationality, self-consciousness, awareness, capacity to feel, etc.” And because you don’t believe in God you are obviously a genius.  Of course, this is a completely objective judgment.

The second one has to do with a persistent issue that the “thinkers” have to deal with regularly–reality. If experience teaches us nothing else, it shows us that difficult times will come into our lives and the lives of the ones we love. Very often, when one is confronted with the hard issues of life–sickness, suffering, need–philosophical pronouncements give way to actions that illustrate we really do see there is something “special” about the human being after all.  Even if we do fight like crazy against the notion that we are created in the “image of God” we find it very difficult to deny it in the midst of the realities of life. Or, as William McGurn writes, “the result may not be a return to religion but a healthy agnosticism about agnosticism itself.”

Pastor Jeff

to read the entire column go to http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704429304574467320574576460.html

Katie Hance

How would you define a “vegetarian”?  A “vegan”?  Animal rights scholars have not collectively provided clear definitions for these terms.  I believe that it hurts the vegetarian and vegan advocacy efforts that these causes are not clearly defined.

For example, Peter Singer who advocates for vegetarianism describes avoiding eating meat or fish.  Tom Regan describes vegetarianism embodying the belief that it is wrong to eat meat.  Yet, Gary Francione, a vegan advocate, describes a “vegetarian” as basically one who does “not eat the flesh of cows, pigs, and birds, but who eats some other animal products, such as fish, dairy products and eggs” (see “The Abolition of the Property Status of Animals”).  Combining these definitions vegetarians believe it is wrong to eat meat or fish but still eat fish.  Not exactly a strong (or even logical) slogan for vegetarianism.   While there are other terms defining different degrees to which people do not consume animal products, such as pescatarian (those who do not eat meat but eat fish), lacto-ovo vegetarian (vegetarians who eat eggs and dairy) lacto-vegetarian (vegetarians who eat dairy but not eggs) and ovo-vegetarian (vegetarians who eat eggs but not dairy) none of these additional terms lead to a simple definition of “vegetarian.”

Similar confusion exists over the term “veganism.”  Brian Leiter, a legal scholar, recently conducted a poll on veganism and described vegans as “those whose dietary regimen excludes all animal products.”  Gary Francione believes a vegan is one who excludes all animal products from their diet and lifestyle including the wearing or use of animal products.  Leiter later noted that some people thought it was an error to portray veganism as just a dietary choice.  Leiter may believe that veganism is a lifestyle, but his poll certainly did not reflect such a characterization.

Perhaps, the terms “vegetarian” and “vegan” are loosely defined because different people, including animal rights scholars, have different beliefs regarding the degree to which animal products should be excluded from one’s life.  I am not proposing that animal rights scholars reconcile their beliefs but rather suggest that animal rights scholars should collectively adopt a clear definition of the terms “vegetarian” and “vegan.”  By providing clear definitions scholars could more effectively debate and advocate for animal rights positions without distracting the audience by using ambiguous and confusing terms.  A uniform definition would not hurt the scholars work or cause.  For example, even if Leiter defined veganism as a lifestyle choice he could still poll public opinion on vegans.  Additionally, Gary Francione’s vegan advocacy would not suffer by defining vegetarians as those who do not eat meat or fish.  Finally, if animal rights scholars were to adopt uniform definitions these definitions would hopefully spread to the public, clarifying people’s general understanding of these terms.

¿Por qué consideramos el racismo como moralmente malo? Una posible respuesta—y la mejor que se me ocurre—es que es irracional, pues en última instancia no hay motivos objetivos para considerar las diferencias estéticas que hay dentro de nuestra especie (siendo la más notable la del color de la piel) como relevantes para el estatus moral de sus integrantes; esto es, claro, si es que nos manejamos dentro de una moral racional, que fundamenta—o intenta fundamentar—sus creencias en razones que puedan ser válidas para todos.

De la misma forma se puede rechazar, también, el sexismo.

Sin embargo, a lo largo de la historia, y en distintas culturas (e incluso en nuestros días, y en nuestra sociedad), la irracionalidad del racismo o del sexismo no resulta clara en lo absoluto, y distintas costumbres y sistemas de creencias pseudomorales aceptan y adoptan prácticas de esa índole. Y es que si, históricamente se relega a la mujer a un papel secundario e inferior en la sociedad, por cientos—e incluso miles—de años, no debe resultar extraño que esto llegue a parecer equivocadamente un orden natural.

Racismo, sexismo... y especismo.

A estas alturas resulta absurdo seguir atacando teóricamente la irracionalidad del racismo o del sexismo, pues, ¿acaso a alguien pensante le puede quedar duda alguna al respecto? Obviamente no, lo que no implica que ambos tipos de discriminación estén erradicados del todo (en realidad, están muy lejos de estarlo), pero la resolución del problema—me parece—depende de la resolución de ciertas contradicciones inherentes a nuestro actual sistema económico, junto con una paralela reforma educativa.

Quería hacer ese último punto, puesto que el caso es distinto con el especismo, término relativamente nuevo, que hace referencia al tipo de discriminación que se basa en la diferencia de especie animal, y que me parece sí necesita en la actualidad de esta argumentación teórica como apoyo.

Confesaré que hasta hace pocos meses que leí el libro de Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (libro que mencioné por primera vez en este artículo), no le había prestado particular importancia a este problema. A simple vista, resulta obvio que debemos asignar mayor valor (y por lo tanto, proteger legalmente) a la vida humana por sobre otros tipos de vida animal. No obstante, la problemática es bastante más sutil, y la abordaremos sólo de forma introductoria en el presente artículo.

Cuando Peter Singer nos dice que en la nueva ética que propone—que reconoce que la calidad de la vida humana varía (quality of life ethics) y que se contrapone a la ética tradicional, que le otorga carácter de santidad a toda vida humana (sanctity of life ethics)—no se debe discriminar según la especie, no nos está diciendo que todo tipo de vida posea igual valor, más bien todo lo contrario, y lo explica de la siguiente forma:

Obviamente, puesto que la nueva visión ética que he estado defendiendo rechaza incluso el punto de vista de que todas las vidas humanas son de igual valor, no voy a sostener que toda la vida es de igual valor, sin tener en cuenta su calidad o sus características. Estas dos exigencias—el rechazo al especismo, y el rechazo a cualquier diferencia en el valor de diferentes seres con vida—son bastante distintas. La creencia en el igual valor de toda vida sugiere que está igual de mal arrancar una col como matar con un disparo a la próxima persona que toque tu puerta. Podemos rechazar el especismo, y sin embargo, todavía encontrar numerosas buenas razones para sostener que no hay nada de malo en arrancar una col, mientras que disparar a la próxima persona que toque tu puerta es increíblemente espantoso. Por ejemplo, podemos señalar que las coles carecen del tipo de sistema nervioso o cerebro asociado con el estar consciente, y por lo tanto no son capaces de experimentar nada. Arrancar una col, en consecuencia, no frustra sus preferencias conscientes para continuar viviendo, no la priva de experiencias agradables, sentir pena por sus familiares, ni le causa alarma a otras coles el que ellas también puedan ser arrancadas. Disparar a la siguiente persona que toque tu puerta probablemente ocasione todas esas cosas[1].

Debe quedar claro que cuando Singer afirma que no todas las vidas humanas poseen igual valor, no está sugiriendo que, por ejemplo, los más inteligentes valen más, o que los que creen en tal religión valen más, sino que limita estas diferencias a condiciones médicas, que afectan biológicamente cada vida. Por ejemplo, un enfermo terminal de cáncer, que se encuentra en gran sufrimiento, puede decidir él mismo que su vida ya no vale tanto como antes, y por lo tanto, recurrir a la eutanasia. No va a correr el riesgo que se instaure una ley que obligue a matar a pacientes con determinadas condiciones; sino, todo lo contrario, una ley que proteja el derecho de las personas a decidir de forma informada y libre sobre si quieren continuar viviendo o no.

No sólo los seres humanos son capaces de querer y preocuparse por animales de especies distintas.

En todo caso, ese último párrafo fue un excurso del tema que trato en este artículo, así que volvamos al mismo. Lo que nos pide el especismo es asignar valor a los seres vivos según sus características, y no según su especie. Alguien puede replicar rápidamente que la especie tiene ciertas características que le son inherentes. Tal replica es acertada, pero no toca el tema de fondo, que trata a los individuos particulares de una especie, y un bebé anencefálico puede no poseer muchas o todas las cualidades que normalmente podríamos esperar de un ser humano, mientras que muchos animales sí poseen cualidades a las que le atribuimos gran valor.

Lejos de sugerir que todos nos volvamos vegetarianos, una de las implicancias inmediatas de deshacernos del especismo sería la de otorgar derechos a algunos animales, basándonos en las cualidades que posean. Así también, dentro de nuestra propia especie, tratar de deshacernos del carácter sagrado que se le suele asignar a cada miembro de la misma, por más que algunos carezcan de consciencia, y por lo tanto, de las cualidades que efectivamente apreciamos en los seres vivos. De esta forma—y como ya aludimos en un artículo reciente—podremos acercarnos con una mayor claridad al tratar problemas éticos como el del aborto, pues ahora podemos reconocer (sin contradicción ética) mayor valor en una vida humana que se ha desarrollado completamente en una persona en sentido estricto, por sobre otra que todavía carece de consciencia (e inclusive que nunca podrá poseerla), y por lo tanto las cualidades que usualmente valoramos en una persona.

Volviendo—para finalizar—a lo que dijimos en los primeros párrafos en referencia al racismo y al sexismo, tenemos que solemos asignar más valor de forma predeterminada a miembros de nuestra propia especie por sobre miembros de otras especies animales, cuando, sin embargo, en algunos casos, miembros de otras especies animales poseen cualidades superiores a las de miembros de nuestra propia especie. El fundamento de esto es el dogma irracional de la santidad de toda vida humana (¿alguien dijo “alma”?), que extiende ciegamente el valor que le asignamos a ciertas características comunes en seres humanos desarrollados (algunas presentes también en otras especies) a todos los individuos de la especie, por más que, de hecho, no las posean.

Así, nos encontramos con que ha llegado la hora de revisar reflexivamente este aparente orden natural ético, que otorga carácter de santidad a toda vida humana, labor que no compete—¡en lo absoluto!—exclusivamente al filósofo, sino que es una responsabilidad que todos debemos compartir.

Y disculpen por ese final medio meloso.

[1] Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994). La cita corresponde a las páginas 202-203. La imperfecta traducción es mía.

Encontré este video y me pareció que valía la pena difundirlo, a pesar de que esté en inglés. En particular recomiendo la sección de Singer que va desde el minuto 4:38 hasta el 6:09, y que aborda algo de la problemática expuesta en mi reciente artículo sobre el tema.

Esperen en los próximos días un último artículo sobre el aborto, en el que pretendo abordarlo más concretamente desde la perspectiva de la ética kantiana, cosa que me parece no hice con éxito en el primero.

Allen W. Wood nos dice en las páginas finales de su excelente libro publicado el año pasado, Kantian Ethics, que en última instancia, una teoría ética nos debe servir para reflexionar sobre nuestras creencias morales, ayudándonos a entender por qué valoramos ciertas cosas por sobre otras, etc., pero de tal forma que tampoco nos aferremos dogmáticamente a tal teoría, a tal punto de terminar creyendo en ella, sino que la tengamos también en constante revisión.

De ahí que Allen W. Wood, al discutir ciertos problemas morales desde la ética kantiana (teoría ética que él defiende), tome prestado de Peter Singer—controvertido bioeticista—muchas ideas que enriquecen su análisis.

Para este artículo (que espero sea el primero de una prolongada serie), pretendo abordar reflexivamente el problema del aborto desde mi propia perspectiva ética, haciendo referencias constantes a ambos autores mencionados, que han ayudado a enriquecer y definir mi posición sobre el tema (pero que, por supuesto, no pretendo que sea necesariamente definitiva).

A ver qué tal sale.

En Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics, libro que ya mencioné en un artículo anterior, Peter Singer explicita el argumento contra el aborto de la siguiente forma:

Primera premisa: Está mal tomar una vida humana inocente.

Segunda premisa: Desde la concepción, un embrión o feto es inocente, humano y con vida.

Conclusión: Está mal tomar la vida de un embrión o feto[1].

Luego procede a criticar la forma arbitraria en que los defensores del aborto han concentrado sus esfuerzos en criticar la segunda premisa, sin atreverse a tocar la primera.

Personalmente, siempre me pareció que la posición “pro-elección” no lograba con éxito argumentar en favor del aborto, y más bien, caía en dogmas parecidos a los que defienden la posición contraria. El motivo, me parece, es justamente no detenerse a reflexionar honestamente sobre los valores que hay de fondo. Y es que, cuando se justifica el derecho de la mujer a abortar, se está dando más valor a su decisión por sobre la vida del feto o embrión. El problema que señala Singer, es que se trata de ocultar este juicio de valor aludiendo a argumentos como que el feto todavía no es una vida humana (sino recién desde el nacimiento o algún otro punto previo, mas no la concepción). De esa forma, se trata de mantener el mismo dogma que sostiene la posición radical del bando opuesto, y que corresponde a la primera premisa del argumento: la santidad de toda vida humana se mantiene. Sin embargo, en la práctica los defensores del aborto, lo quieran o no, están rechazando la primera premisa, pues Singer muestra con éxito que decisiones como la de considerar al feto una vida humana a partir de cierto punto, como el nacimiento o la viabilidad del feto de sobrevivir fuera de la madre, son ya de por sí decisiones éticas y no científicas.

La posición de Singer—y que como ya dijimos, está ganando la batalla en la práctica—es la de una ética que tome en cuenta la calidad de toda vida al margen de si es humana o no (contra la tradicional ética que le otorga carácter de santidad a toda vida humana, basándose en creencias religiosas). Así, nos exige no caer en un irracional especismo, del cual quiero hablar con más detalle en otro momento, y del cuál sólo diré vagamente ahora que es un conjunto de prejuicios análogos a los del racismo (pero que en vez de discriminar por raza, lo hacen por especie), y que de por sí, carecen de fundamento válido.

El problema del aborto, entonces, es una batalla en medio de una guerra entre estos dos modelos de ética.

No obstante, el objetivo de este artículo es concentrarnos en reflexionar sobre el aborto únicamente, así que volveremos al problema en cuestión.

Un valioso aporte que puede hacer la ética kantiana al problema es la clara división que establece entre el ámbito del derecho y de la virtud, a tal punto que ambas esferas están fundamentadas en principios distintos. Mientras que el derecho depende de una legislación que se encarga de regular la libertad externa de los miembros de un determinado Estado, esto es, sus acciones; la virtud depende de una legislación interna (la ley moral), que regula los motivos de nuestras acciones, y no nos puede ser exigida por otros.

Si aceptamos—como dice Singer—que no hay un fundamento racional que nos exiga la santidad de toda vida humana, entonces no hay un motivo para que las leyes protejan ciegamente a todos los fetos o embriones (e incluso a bebés recién nacidos con serias discapacidades). Lo que se propone es que sólo debemos traer al mundo a los bebés que sean queridos por sus padres; es decir, es una decisión que pertenece a la esfera de la virtud, y la ley no debe entrometerse. Estamos valorando más el derecho de las personas a decidir cómo llevar sus vidas (valor que la ética kantiana recoge bajo el nombre de humanidad, y que tiene nada menos como su valor más importante), por sobre un supuesto e infundado carácter santo que tendría todo ser perteneciente a la especie humana.

Allen W. Wood acentúa esta posición al discutir las implicancias de tener a la humanidad como valor fundamental en la ética kantiana, de la siguiente forma:

Los problemas que estamos discutiendo acá, en términos kantianos, son problemas de derecho, no de ética. Estos conciernen deberes y exigencias que pueden ser coactivamente impuestos. Es una cuestión distinta si es que el valor de un feto, y su desarrollo hasta el nacimiento, puede constituir una razón para que una mujer considere un deber ético el llevar su embarazo hasta el final incluso  con un costo considerable para su salud o bienestar. Probablemente existe tal deber ético, al menos en varios casos. Pero quienes negarían a una mujer incluso el derecho a elegir si cumplir con tal deber han, por lo mismo, perdido completamente su derecho a discutir sobre tales problemas[2].

Como se puede ver, los que se califican como “pro-vida” se colocan en un lugar que no deja espacio al diálogo, y por lo tanto su posición debe resultar inaceptable para quienes quieran adentrarse en el problema de forma racional. Está demás decir que, también, tal posición no debe tener cabida en un Estado laico.

Está claro que quién se aferre a la validez de la primera premisa no podrá ser persuadido por esta argumentación. Tal persona podrá, pues, jactarse de defender una ética dogmática. Pero tampoco pretendo haber logrado una argumentación perfecta, sino que espero no sea más que la base para que se pueda armar una discusión y enriquecerla con los comentarios.

[1] Peter Singer, Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our Traditional Ethics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1994). La cita corresponde a la página 100, y la traducción es mía.

[2] Allen W. Wood, Kantian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). La cita corresponde a la nota 9, de la página 291. La imperfecta traducción es mía.

Last night I went and watched the wonderful new Pixar movie Up with my wonderful girlfriend. It really is an amazing film and I unreservedly recommend it to everyone. You’ll definitely laugh, you’ll probably see your life in a new light, if only for a moment, and you may even cry.

Admittedly, I am a sucker for Pixar movies. But Up is particularly touching and hilarious. For a movie filled with silliness, it communicates a lot about the human need for companionship, the personal liberation which comes only with genuine acts of selflessness, and the adventure that it can be to befriend, empathise with, and even love, odd and different people/animals. The comparison between the life the protagonist led with his wife, and the life that the evil villan ended up living – alone in some parallel odd world with only his bones and ambition for company – is a great example of the way good film can simply communicate profound insights about the human condition.

I feel like to justify blogging about a children’s movie on my ‘philosophy’ blog I need to include some sort of philosophical reflection on the film. Well, the film involves an act of civil disobedience which would have made Henry David Thoreau and Dr. King smile from ear to ear; it raises metaphysical questions about the existence of possible worlds which David Lewis and perhaps Gottfried Leibniz would find illustrative; it raises the issue of animal ethics and the value of non-human life which would make Peter Singer sing showtunes; and suggests that the most happy life is one filled with activity, not passivity, which would rock Aristotle’s ancient socks.

p.s. This is my 50th blog post!