A quick summary of all the positions on the mind-body problem.

Ned Block’s On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.

A reader pointed Barchester to Fr Hunwicke in the previous post and upon looking at his blog, discovered a blurb on Lewis’s concept of Bulversim. Bulverism, Lewis explains, is thus:

You must show that a man is wrong before you start explaining why he is wrong.  The modern method is to assume without discussion that he is wrong and then distract his attention from this (the only real issue) by busily explaining how he became so silly.  In the course of the last fifteen years I have found this vice so common that I have had to invent a name for it.  I call it ‘Bulverism’.  Some day I am going to write the biography of its imaginary inventor, Ezekiel Bulver, whose destiny was determined at the age of five when he heard his mother say to his father — who had been maintaining that two sides of a triangle were together greater than a third — ‘Oh you say that because you are a man’.  ’At that moment’, E. Bulver assures us, ‘there flashed across my opening mind the great truth that refutation is not a necessary part of argument.  Assume that your opponent is wrong, and the world will be at your feet.  Attempt to prove that he is wrong or (worse still) try to find out whether he is wrong or right, and the national dynamism of our age will thrust you to the wall’.  That is how Bulver became one of the makers of the Twentieth Century.

This form of ad hominem circumstantial is employed by our ‘aggressive atheist’ in the video about which Barchester is attempting to discern the Nameless Mode of Thinking.  The Nameless Mode precisely cannot exist without first employing Bulverism (or is it vice versa?), but it–in and of itself–is not Bulverism.  It is something greater, something psychological.

How Fundamentalists (whether Christian, Islamic or Secular, etc.) argue against other systems of thought (for they, by being Fundamentalists, are not true liberals in the classic sense of the word, nor are they pluriformists):

Proposition A

They first employ Bulverism:

• Aggressive Atheist claims that his (secular) understanding of ‘human rights’ is true.
• Because he believes Atheism supports his understanding of ‘human rights’ (and it does), he sees Theism (which does not) as the enemy.
• Therefore, Theism is untrue.

Then they employ the Nameless Mode of Thinking (the pyschology) in making sweeping over-generalisations concerning Theism and end up, in their loathing, almost foaming at the mouth in hatred (such as Aggressive Atheist did).

Proposition B

Or, rather is it the reverse?

They first employ the Nameless Mode of Thinking (the pyschology) in making sweeping over-generalisations concerning Theism and end up, in their loathing, almost foaming at the mouth in hatred (such as Aggressive Atheist did).

Then they employ Bulverism to ‘justify’ their claims:

• Aggressive Atheist claims that his (secular) understanding of ‘human rights’ is true.
• Because he believes Atheism supports his understanding of ‘human rights’ (and it does), he sees Theism (which does not) as the enemy.
• Therefore, Theism is untrue.

Which is the order?  Or does it depend upon the individual?  Still searching for a name for the Nameless Mode…

Since the rise and dominance of metaphysical naturalism in both science and philosophy, many academics have rejected the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding of the soul.  To be sure, substance dualism–the view that both immaterial and material substances exist–is not a popular position amongst contemporary philosophers of mind.  However, substance dualisms’ fall from grace is not entirely due to naturalistic philosophy.  Another reason for its failure has been its persistent association with Cartesian dualism.[1]   

            The linkage between substance dualism and Cartesian dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind is unfortunate for two reasons: (1) most philosophers believe Descartes arguments have been soundly refuted, and (2) the Cartesian form of dualism exhibits significant conceptual difficulties.  It seems, then, that it is not substance dualism, per se, that modern philosophers find repugnant, but its widespread Cartesian formulation. 

Thankfully, while Christians are committed to some form of substance dualism, they are not necessarily committed to a Cartesian view.  As Eleonore Stump explains, Cartesian dualism is hardly the only game in town for orthodox Christians: 

As a matter of historical fact . . . it is not true that a Cartesian sort of dualism has been the view traditional espoused by all major monotheisms.  Aquinas, whose views surely represent one major strand of one major monotheism, is familiar with an account very like Cartesian dualism, which he associates with Plato; and he rejects it emphatically.[2]

Unbeknownst to many, Aquinas proposed a form of substance dualism significantly different from both Plato and Descartes; one which naturalistic philosophers may find harder to refute. 

This paper will introduce Thomistic dualism, compare and contrast it with the Cartesian view, and offer several reasons why Christian philosophers should favor this form of substance dualism above the Cartesian model.  It will accomplish this by: (1) outlining Descartes understanding of the mind and the body and posing two formidable difficulties facing it, and (2) outlining Thomistic dualism and explaining how it better addresses the problems facing the Cartesian view. 

Descartes and Cartesian Dualism

  Cartesian dualism, as it is most commonly formulated, goes something like this:  the mind, being a nonphysical object, is a completely different sort of thing than the body, which is a physical object, “located in space” and comprised of, “atoms familiar to chemistry.”[3]  Unlike the body, the mind is completely immaterial, lacking an exact special location, and unable to be seen or touched.[4]  Although the mind and the body are two completely different substances, they stand in a causal relationship with one another; each having a distinctive impact on the other.

To understand this causal relationship, one can imagine the mind and body working together in a way much like a scientist controlling a space probe:

Your body is like a probe, sent by NASA to explore a distant planet.  The probe sends pictures back to mission control, where scientists decide what the probe should do next.  Instructions are sent back to the probe which responds accordingly.  The probe itself is entirely unintelligent.  Similarly, information about the world is communicated by the body to the mind; the mind decides on a course of action and communicates the decision back to the body.  The body itself makes no decisions.[5]

As it stands, the body is not autonomous; depending upon the direction of the mind to accomplish anything.

Descartes arrived at these conclusions about the nature of the mind and the brain through a prolonged introspective process which he recorded in his seminal work: Meditations on First Philosophy.  During his meditations, Descartes came to the startling conclusion that he could imagine himself without a body.[6]  Conversely, he also realized it was equally impossible for him to doubt that he had a mind: “If I try to doubt I have a mind, I will discover myself with thoughts like ‘I doubt I have a mind’, and so must admit that I have a mind—for the activity of doubting is mental.”[7]  Based upon these fundamental introspections, Descartes developed his theory of substance dualism. 

As his thinking evolved, Descartes came to the disquieting conclusion that the mind constituted the total essence of the human being.  As he explains, “I know I exist, and meanwhile notice nothing clearly to pertain to my nature or essence, except this alone, that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my whole essence consists in this one thing, that I am a thinking thing.”[8]  Descartes refusal to give the body a place in the essence of a human being was the natural outgrowth of his epistemology; namely, his near complete rejection of empiricism.  For Descartes, the senses could not be trusted, and therefore, the only true knowledge one could have about the world was that which could be arrived at by pure reason.  As a rationalist, the only aspect of his own humanity that he could be totally certain about, was the unavoidable fact that he was a “thinking thing.”[9]

       Seeing as how the mind and the body constitute two “ontologically distinct substances”, and that the, “mind alone constitutes the essence of the individual and the body in no way partakes of this essence,” Descartes concluded that the mind could exist completely independent from his body.[10]  This is made clear enough in his own words,

Because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking thing, not extended, and on the other hand a distinct idea of body in so far as it is only an extended thing, not thinking, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it.[11]   

Unsurprisingly, this radical distinction between the mind and body is the source of significant challenges for Cartesian dualists.

To begin with, from a philosophical and scientific perspective, Cartesian dualists fail to provide an adequate account of the, “union of mind and body,” that is, to explain how two ontologically distinct and self-contained substances are capable of working together in a causally integrated way.  Exactly, how is it that the mind (which is immaterial) can have a direct casual affect on the brain (which is material)?  While, this objection does not constitute a defeater for Cartesian dualism, it does constitute a significant conceptual hurtle; one which is responsible for it’s rejection by contemporary philosophers.

Secondly, from a theological and anthropological perspective, Cartesian dualism fails to account for the importance or value of the physical body.  Why is it, that God embodied our souls in the physical realm at all?  Why is it that God insists on resurrecting our bodies in the last days?  Why did God come down as the incarnate word of God—as the physical man Jesus Christ?  Furthermore, why is it wrong, morally, to harm or disparage the human body?  These, and other questions, are exceedingly difficult to answer under the Cartesian model.

It is for this reason that the author recommends the following Thomistic form of substance dualism. 

Aquinas and Thomistic Dualism

        In order to understand Aquinas’ view of the soul, one must first have a basic grasp of Medieval metaphysics.[12]  Like Aristotle, Aquinas and other scholastic philosophers distinguished between two basic dimensions of physical entities: matter and form.[13]  To understand Aquinas’ distinction between matter and form, one must strip away any modern conceptions of matter they might have. 

To begin with, one should not think of matter in a physical sense; that is, “as an independently existing raw material yet to be formed.”[14]  Rather, one must think of matter in terms of “potentiality”; as Aquinas explains, “Matter is that which is not as such a ‘particular thing,’ but is in mere potency to become a ‘particular’ thing.”[15]  In other words, matter (or ‘prime matter’ as Aquinas termed it) on its own has no existence; it simply has the potential of being actualized into an existent entity.[16]  In this sense, prime matter is, “that which is common to all material things and which is formed into different entities by the second element—the substantial form.”[17]

This leads naturally into the second dimension of all physical entities: the substantial form.  The substantial form is the, “inherent principle which makes the existent entity [a physical object] what it is.”[18]  Or, put another way, the substantial form constitutes the essence of and actualization of a physical entity.  One could very well imagine the substantial form as being the “information”, “blue-print”, or “code” underlining all reality and bringing physical existence into being.  

    When combined with prime matter, the substantial form “becomes the existent [individual] entity,” or substance.[19]  Hence, the substantial form acts as the grounding of all physical being; and as such, any physical thing that exists, or has being, has form.  This basic metaphysical truth can be most easily remembered in Aquinas’ famous dictum:  “form gives existence to matter.”[20]

Seeing as how form is the essence of all existing entities, and provides grounding of being, it follows that physical entities are not the only objects which have form.  According to Aquinas, immaterial entities (such as God or Angels) do as well–he referrers to this as the subsistent form.  Subsistent form applies only to immaterial entities which have no physical instantiation—in this sense, it can be understood as, “form existing on its own.”[21] 

Aquinas’ motivation for adopting this view was derived from Augustine, who believed that, “being is a matter of having order, species, and mode.”[22]  In other words, anything that has being or existence must have some distinguishable order, configuration, or characteristics which make it distinctive from other entities; that is, it must have an essence.  This is why immaterial entities, like angles, must also have form.[23]

Now that these basic metaphysical principles have been elucidated, the reader is in a position to grasp Aquinas’ understanding of the human soul.

Aquinas and the Human Soul

To begin with, Aquinas understood the soul to be the substantial form of the body.  He maintained this view because human beings are a part of physical reality; as such, like any other physical entity, they require a substantial form in order to instantiate or actualize their physical existence.  As the reader will recall, “a substantial material form is the configurational state of a material object that makes that object a member of the kind or species to which it belongs and gives it the causal powers characteristic of things of that kind.”[24]  Accordingly, the soul, acting as the substantial form of the body, is what configures and differentiates and gives life to a unique human individual. 

J. P. Moreland explains it this way:  “the soul is an individuated essence that makes the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies and grounds the biological functions of its body.”[25]  As such, the human person “must be defined as a deep unity of form and matter.”[26]  Accordingly, the combination of body and soul, like matter and form, constitutes one complete substance.[27]

However, the soul, unlike the substantial form of other physical objects, may persist upon the death of the body, and unlike other material things is capable of existing without a physical instantiation.  For this reason, Aquinas also identified the soul as being a subsistent form.  In this sense, the human soul is truly unique, in that it has its foot in both the material and immaterial realms.[28]  Stump elucidates this paradoxical reality:

The human soul . . . is a configured configurer.  On the one hand, like an angel, it is able to exist and function on its own, apart from matter.  On the other hand, the human soul is not, as Plato thought, a spiritual substance moving the body which is also a substance in its own right; rather, the human soul is the substantial form constituting the material substance that a human being is, and it configures matter, as material forms do.[29]

Hence, the soul, as both the substantial and subsistent form, contains the information that constitutes human essence; and even after we die, and the particles of our body dissipate, the information, that constitutes our essence, our identity, continues to exist.

However, it is important to note that when the soul is separated from the body this constitutes an abnormality; that is, the existence of the soul apart from the body is an incomplete one.  As Aquinas explains, “since the soul is a part of human nature, it does not have perfection of its nature except in union with the body . . . and so, although the soul can exist and intellectively cognize when it is separated from the body, nonetheless it does not have the perfection of its nature.”[30]

Facing the Challenges of Cartesian Dualism

The reader may recall that Thomistic dualism was offered up as a happy alternative to Cartesian dualism in light of the significant challenges facing Descartes theory.  This final section will briefly demonstrate how Thomistic dualism faces up to the considerable challenges facing the Cartesian model and why Christian philosophers should favor this form of substance dualism above others. 

The first hurdle facing Cartesian dualism was its inability to define the union between the soul and the body–more pointedly, it’s failure to explain how two ontologically distinct and self-contained substances are capable of working together in a causally integrated way.  While this is a formidable problem for Cartesian dualism; the Thomistic dualist has less to be concerned about.  This is because the Thomistic dualist, unlike the Cartesian, is not postulating the existence of two individual substances; rather they are postulating one complete being whose nature is comprised of both material and immaterial form. 

As Aqunias says, “We must not think . . . of the soul and body as though the body had its own form making it a body, to which a soul is super-added, making it a living body; but rather that the body gets its being and its life from the soul.” [31]  Under the Thomistic view, the union of body and soul is deep and well defined; hence, the conceptual problem of explaining the causal relationship between soul and body is much less significant.

Regarding the second hurdle, concerning the theological and anthropological significance of the body, Thomistic dualism is completely unfazed.  Unlike the Cartesian, the Thomistic dualist holds that the physical body is part of the nature of man.  Under the Thomistic model it’s considered normal for a soul to be united to a body; and, while the soul can subsist without a body, this is considered abnormal.  Accordingly, it’s easy to see why God places such importance and value on the human body; why God sent his son to exist as a physical man; and why God intends to reunite our souls with a new glorified body at the resurrection. 

Conclusion

While Cartesian dualism is viewed by many philosophers as being the only option for someone interested in substance dualism; it is most defiantly not the only game in town.  As this paper demonstrates, Thomistic dualism offers a dynamic and arguably superior alternative to the Cartesian view.  Unlike Descartes’ model, Aquinas’ conception of the body and soul is comprehensive and avoids the major challenges often thrown at substance dualism; by providing a clearer picture of the soul’s unity with the body and rendering the body intrinsically valuable.  Consequentially, Thomistic dualism is more likely to stand up against the materialistic explanations of the mind which currently dominate western thinking; and place substance dualism back on the table as a viable option.             

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, Thomas. Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings. Translated by Ralph McInernny. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Graham, George. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

Moreland, J. P. and Scott B. Rae. Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000.

———. P. and Stan Wallace. “Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics.” International Philosophical Quarterly XXXV, no. 3 (Fall 1995). http://www.afterall.net/papers/490580.

Moyal, George J. D., ed. Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III. New York: Routledge, 1991.

Ravenscroft, Ian. Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.

[2]Ibid., 191-192.

[3]Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., 10.

[6]George Graham, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 151.

[7]Ibid.

[8]George J. D. Moyal, ed., Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III (New York: Routledge, 1991), 150.

[9]Ibid.

[10]J. P. Moreland and Stan Wallace, “Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly XXXV, no. 3 (Fall 1995), http://www.afterall.net/papers/490580.

[11]Moyal, Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III, 150.

[12] It is the opinion of the author that this is the primary reason why Thomistic dualism is completely overlooked in contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind.

[13] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20]  Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, trans. Ralph McInernny (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 19.

[21]Stump, Aquinas, 198.

[22] Ibid., 200.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 197.

[25] J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000), 202.

[26] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.

[27] This point can be confusing because Thomistic dualism is classified as a form of substance dualism.  The truth be told, Thomistic dualism is a bit strange; it doesn’t fit into any category neatly.  It is not a materialistic reductionist theory which reduces the mind to the brain and it also doesn’t fit well within the confounds of property dualism (the postulation that mental states emerge from brain states).  Seeing as how Thomistic dualism still distinguishes between material and immaterial entities, it makes more sense to classify it as a form of substance dualism. 

[28] Stump, Aquinas, 200.

[29] Ibid., 200-201.

[30] Ibid., 201.

[31] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.</I>

This is yet another perfect example of how true it is that ‘pluriform truth’ is sheer and utter nonsense. The polarising pop-atheism in Britain is just as scary (scarier perhaps) than the fundamentalism that exists within certain sects of Christianity. Might one be forgiven for wondering whether the mode of thinking that produces this degree of loathing, polarising, aggression, and over-simplification, is in fact very similar to the mode of thinking existing in Wahhabism?

Barchester suggests that if intelligent analysis of weltanschauungs is to occur, and bypass such over-generalisation and over-simplification by the ignorant, then this mode of thinking needs to be publicised and shown for what it is. But in order to deal with it further, this mode of thinking needs a name. Does a reader have a suggestion? There may be one already out there that Barchester is not aware of, but if not, could someone suggest one?

More on this later.

For my twentieth century analytic philosophy class, I am taking on the challenge of writing a final paper that will critique J.P. Moreland’s chapter, “the argument from consciousness” from his book, Consciousness and the Existence of God. Once this semester commences, I will be able to catch up on previous discussions and offer more profound writings–at least that is the goal.

I have previously argued that synchronous neural activity is a candidate for a theoretical account of  what a brain state is.  Here is an Interesting article reviewing a new paper that suggests an interesting role for neural synchrony.

Si on s’interroge sur la nouvelle carte décrivant l’humain du futur, il faudrait d’abord commencer par répondre à l’éternelle question philosophique de la nature de l’esprit (pas dans le sens fantomatique francophone, mais dans le sens anglophone d’essence) et de sa différentiation ou non du corps, la questionde de l’essence et du corps ou Mind-Body en anglais.

Reproduction d'une plaque lithographique du manuel Grey's Anatomy, une oeuvre artistique en deux dimensions.

L’article «Philosophie de l’esprit» sur Wikipédia traite partiellement de cette question et l’article «Philosophy of Mind» sur Wikipedia en traite plus en profondeur.

Tout au long de notre séminaire, nous nous sommes penché sur plusieurs des façons réductrices pour essayer de découvrir la nature de l’humain. J’ai présenté quelques notions qui ont permis de comparer l’humain aux animaux, une des branches d’études de la compréhension corps et essence (Mind-Body). J’ai beaucoup abordé les questions de participation des individus à un super corps baptisé la ruche.

Maintenant il nous reste à reconstruire l’humain de demain, d’en établir une carte. En tant que personne littéraire, ma carte sera donc un plan, en tant qu’entrepreneur ce sera un plan d’action.

M. Dyens a fait une remarque qui me semble capitale : «comment doit-on repenser les programmes en humanités?» Comme il est  « Vice-Provost, Teaching and Learning » de l’Université Concordia, c’est donc une question fondamentale pour lui.

Voici donc mon plan

- Entendu qu’on ne peut pas changer l’humanité au complet.

- Entendu qu’on ne dispose pas immédiatement, ni d’un budget, ni du temps nécessaire pour faire un travail en profondeur tel que le sujet le mérite.

- Nous devons donc nous limiter à un aspect particulier de la question.

• Je propose donc que nous soumettions un modèle d’environnement de travail collaboratif qui pourrait être appliqué à divers départements de la Faculté des Arts et Sciences, en commençant par le Département d’Études françaises.

• Nous pourrions expliquer pourquoi la nécessité de repenser le modèle traditionnel au sein des études universitaires.

• Nous pourrions relier bien des sujets abordés pour démontrer les transformations sociales en cours et à venir sur la façon collaborative. Cela permettrait de démontrer les avantages et bénéfices d’une telle approche,

• Ensuite nous présenterions un modèle de travail basé sur le contrôle départemental d’un laboratoire Mac, Unix et Windows et d’un serveur Mac équipé du logiciel OS X Server avec tous ses outils de collaboration contrôlés à l’interne et non pas par les ressources informatiques de l’université comme c’est le cas présentement.

• Ce serveur permettrait d’implanter des possibilités de travailler en collaboration un peu comme on l’a fait avec notre blogue, mais sur une plus grande échelle et appliqué à l’ensemble des activités du Département.

• Seraient utilisés des outils comme la trousse gratuite de développement iPhone OS afin de créer du contenu multimédia pour de iPhone et iPod Touch. Éventuellement d’autres trousses de développement pourraient être ajoutées.

• Nous pourrions même y ajouter la description de l’étude des besoins, des budgets types nécessaires, de la préparation, de l’implantation, de la formation, des tests et évaluations (je me charge de ces aspects).

• Le tout se terminerait sur une vision positive d’une plus grande collaboration en temps réel et sur le développement d’une méthodologie qui impliquerait tous les intervenants du Département, et qui pourrait éventuellement être appliqué à d’autres Départements.

• Notre exposé se terminerait sur la création de l’Honnête homme (ou bien du Surhomme) du XXIe Siècle (il faudrait préférablement inventer notre propre terme, comme l’Humi et l’Humie, ou l’Humeille, ou encore le Fourmien et la Fourmienne ou en anglais the Humant ou the Humbee — prononcé yum et non pas hum — par exemple).

Un tel modèle nous permettrait de répondre aux exigences du travail demandé tout en proposant une solution utile et pratique (je suis toujours dans le pragmatique).

N’oublions pas qu’à titre d’expert de cette question, nous aurions la chance de pouvoir nous placer préalablement dans un tel projet s’il venait à se réaliser comme nous le présenterions, peut-être même dans le cadre du laboratoire NT2 en juin prochain…

If one creates knowledge about mind and sense perception styles, then if one creates relation between self-consciousness (self-awareness) and all around existence, then if one tries to imagine reality as existence in its full potential while himself is being just one part of a system; could one then feel nature of reality? Could one then catch the Spirit?

I was just reading, in Ned Block’s Concepts of Consciousness, about the presence of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness (or rather the conceptual possibility thereof). In the thought experiment he uses, a person becomes aware (a-conscious) of a noise in the background, and realizes that he has been ‘aware’ (p-conscious) of it all this time. While I was reading this, there was constant static in the library. As soon as he mentioned becoming a-conscious and p-conscious of the noise, I became a-conscious and p-conscious of the static .

It’s not a very remarkable coincidence, but it did make me laugh inside. Phil of Mind nerds understand.

~ Nathan Smith

Today, we will be talking about the Philosophy of Mind in philosophy club. I am posting a powerpoint presentation for today’s talk. Please feel free to use this material and view this presentation as you please.

Philosophy of Mind

(cross-posted at Brains)

There is a nice video of a recent talk by David Chalmers on the singularity available here. Dave also summarizes the argument in a recent post at his blog Fragments of Consciousness (here). He also gave this talk at the Graduate Center, which is where I saw it last Wednesday. It is an excellent talk and I hope it starts people talking about these interesting issues. Assuming you believe that AI is a possibility I find the general line he is pushing very persuasive and would be interested to hear what others thought about it.

Thomas Nagel: What Is It Like To Be a Bat?

1) Consciousness keeps the mind/body problem alive because reductive physicalism is incomplete when it comes to accounting for phenomenological features of subjective experience. Nagel is not refuting reductive physicalism, but merely states that it is an incomplete theory. For example, the neurophysiology of tasting a strawberry does not give account of the qualitative experience of tasting a strawberry.

2) Nagel further illustrates the problem with psychophysical reduction with his bat example. We can talk about what it’s like to be a bat with sonar, but we as humans will never know what it is truly like to be a bat, let alone a blind person or a Martian. Nagel asserts that there are facts that do not fit into human language and concepts. While disparate things (i.e. human and a bat) can objectively experience a wall in that we both know its there and looks a certain way, neither can know what its like to experience a wall as the other.

3) Further problems with psychophysical reduction: In one sense, phenomenological facts can be objective, as in one person can know what the other is experiencing, but the more disparate the experiencers are, the less objectivity remains in their experiences. So, objective processes can have subjective nature.

4) More thought needs to be given to the problem of objective and subjective phenomenology in order to begin discussing the mind/body problem.

Searle: Can Computers Think?

Searl is arguing against strong AI. In fact, he coined the term “strong AI” with his Chinese room experiment and worked to distinguish between 2 hypotheses about Artificial Intelligence:

1) An artificial intelligence system can think and have a mind.
2) An artificial intelligence system can (only) act like it.

Can computers think? Yes in a sense they can compute inputs and formulate outputs, but Searl’s main question is whether implementing the right inputs and outputs are sufficient for thinking. The answer is no. Syntax does not equal semantics. Thus, meaning does not equal symbolic manipulation, which the Chinese Room experiment demonstrates.

It is important to note the difference between duplication and simulation:

A computer can simulate the weather, but simulations are not the real thing. A computer simulation of a storm will not leave us all wet. Searle thinks that simulation of mental processes does not mean that the computer actually possesses mental processes. Thus, a computer is unable to duplicate consciousness, thoughts, feelings, & emotions.

Searle thinks there’s a simple solution to the mind/body problem. Mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. As a biological naturalist, he claims that mental states are biological phenomena. Consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity and mental causation are all a part of our biological life history, along with growth, reproduction, the secretion of bile, and digestion.

Back in 1966 Joseph Weizenbaum created “ELIZA”, a relatively simple computer program which was meant to simulate a psychotherapist. The program worked largely by rephrasing a patient’s statements as questions which were then posed back to the patient. Many subjects reported preferring ELIZA to their human therapists, and some continued to value ELIZA’s therapy even after Wiezenbaum revealed ELIZA’s workings. (You can read a transcript of ELIZA in action here.)

Things have moved on somewhat since ELIZA’s day. Maja Matarić, a Professor of Computer Science at the University of Southern California, has developed Robots that can provide advice and therapy to patients who have suffered strokes, or who suffer from Alzheimer’s. The Robot can monitor the patient’s movement as they perform a regime of physical therapy, using a combination of laser scanners and cameras, and provide encouragement and advice. But even more impressively, the robot can monitor how introverted or extroverted the patient is, and tailor the tone of their advice giving accordingly. One stroke patient reported much preferring the robot’s advice and encouragement to that of her husband . . .

Similar robots have also been developed as learning aids for autistic children, who seem to prefer the stable repetitive demonstrations and advice that a robot can provide to the subtly varying instructions of a human. But quite apart from the familiar philosophical issues that such increasingly sophisticated robots raise concerning whether a machine can think and feel, these “caring” robots also raise ethical issues. Sherry Turkle, a professor at MIT, is concerned by the risk such machines will pose to “the most vulnerable populations—children and elders”. Turkle warns: “The paradox is that you can get more attachment with less, so the more simple robots can pose even greater dangers.”

Interestingly, roboticists like Matarić are now confronting what has become known as the “uncanny valley” effect. This is the problem that as a robot becomes increasingly human-like, empathy and familiarity can turn to unease and disgust – an idea that goes back (at least) to Freud’s 1919 essay “Das Unheimliche” (“The Uncanny”).

You can read about Matarić’s work, and about Turkle’s worries, here.

Related articles: Two Dogmas of Neo-Empiricism By Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh (June 2006)
Philosophy Compass

It’s the end of week 1 and we’ve got a great line-up for you today, but unlike with ‘ordinary’ conferences, you can still access all the previous presentations and add your comments at any time. There are some great discussions going on, so why not join in – and maybe win a free book for the best comment of the day!

• Introduction to the Conference: Regenia Gagnier (University of Exeter): Why Interdisciplinarity?
• Keynote: Roger Griffin (Oxford Brookes): ‘The Rainbow Bridge’: Reflections on Interdisciplinarity in the Cybernetic Age
• Paper: Anne H. Charity Hudley (College of William and Mary) & Christine Mallinson (University of Maryland, Baltimore County): Communicating about Communication: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Educating Educators about Language Variation
• Paper: Daniel Wasserman Soler (University of Virginia): Language and Communication in the Spanish Conquest of America
• Publishing workshop: Michael Bradshaw (University of Leicester): Why Write a Review Paper? And How to Do It!
• Keynote: David Crystal (University of Wales, Bangor): Language Death: a Problem for All
• Paper: Wendy Turner (Augusta State University): Human Rights, Royal Rights and the Mentally Disabled in Late Medieval England
• Paper: Maeve M. O’Donovan (College of Notre Dame of Maryland): The Status of the Learning Disabled in Philosophy of Mind and Disability Studies
• Paper: Nancy Naples (University of Connecticut): Borderlands Studies and Border Theory: Linking Activism and Scholarship for Social Justice
• Paper: Alexander Diener (Pepperdine University) & Joshua Hagen (Marshall University): Theorizing Borders in a ‘Borderless World’: Globalization, Territory and Identity
• Publishing workshop: Kivmars Bowling (Wiley‐Blackwell): The Online Author’s Survival Guide
• Keynote: Mark Macklin (University of Wales, Aberystwyth): Floodplain Catastrophes and Climate Change: Lessons from the Rise and Fall of Riverine Societies
• Paper: Susan Morrison (Texas State University – San Marcos): Waste Studies ‐ A New Paradigm for Literary Analysis, Something is Rotten in the Denmark of Beowulf and Hamlet
• Paper: Tim Cooper (University of Exeter): Recycling Modernity: Towards an Environmental History of Waste

A brain in a vat

While bumping my way around the internet, a found an online excerpt from a book by a philosopher named Hilary Putnam. It attempts to show that the brain in a vat thought experiment is self–refuting, and implicitly disproves the real world. I am posting about it, not because I agree with it, but because I think it is interesting.

The argument starts by considering what a brain in a vat is. We can all imagine it, an evil mad scientist kidnaps us, cuts open our heads, puts our brains in a tub of fluid, and hooks them up to a supercomputer. The supercomputer feeds our brains with impulses, and it creates a complete illusion of reality. In principle, this means that nothing is “real” as there is no way for the brain to tell where it is.

Now, consider the case of a brain “born” in a vat. In such a case it would never experience anything of the “real” world, but rather only the supercomputer’s virtual world.

Suppose that the brain in a vat has a certain object in its world. Having a term for that certain object is a reasonable assumption, as it fulfills a need to talk about and think about that certain object. Let’s say that that certain object is called a flig. When the BIV refers to a flig, it is clearly referring to a virtual object, even if by coincidence a flig looks exactly like a brain in the real world.

Based on the previous, a BIV can only think about and talk about virtual things that have been fed to it by the supercomputer. This stays the same even if the word ‘flig’ is changed to ‘brain.’ Hence, if a brain in a vat in the real word says, “I am a brain in a vat,” what it is really saying is “I am a virtual brain in a virtual vat,” even though it clearly isn’t. Since the BIV is always stating a falsehood, the thought experiment is self-refuting. Basically, if all you know are virtual things and virtual facts, you cannot know anything about real things and real facts.

Recall that we are brains born in bodies. The role of our bodies and senses are hence directly analogous to the vat and the supercomputer respectively. We are therefore only thinking about things sent to us by our senses and not “real” things. Hence, if you say “I am a brain in a body,” what you are really saying is that “I am a virtual brain in a virtual body.” In this sense, nothing you see, think about, or experience, is real; the “real world” is all in your head.

Image via the Wikimedia Commons.

(cross-posted at Brains)

I have long wondered what dualists mean when they speak of nonphysical properties. Today I was reading Chalmers’ paper The Matrix as Metaphysics and he says something that may shed some light on the way in which he thinks of nonphysical properties. He argues that the matrix scenario can be construed as a metaphysical hypothesis about the ultimate nature of the physical world. If this is right then there is a sense in which dualism is true. The mind is a distinct entity that exists outside of physical space-time and causal interacts with the physical body. This is because the physical theory that is true of reality in the matrix is a computational theory on which the ultimate things which exist are bits (zeros and ones). Thus brains in the matrix are ultimately composed of bits and when people in the matrix talk about brains they ultimately are talking about bits. The brain which is outside of the matrix is not composed of bits (let us assume). It is ultimately composed of something else (let’s say strings). Thus the brain outside the matrix, when viewed from the perspective of someone who is in the matrix, is nonphysical. It is not something that could be deduced from a completed matrix microphysics (which would be phrased in terms of ones and zeros).

One might wonder whether a completed matrix physics would have to be supplemented with (from the perspective of the matrix) nonphysical laws in order to capture outside the matrix facts or whether we might view the truly completed matrix physics as being expanded to include the outside the matrix physics. On this latter view the laws of matrix-physics would be a special subset of the laws of outside-physics. If this were true then the matrix-physics would not be complete until it was expanded to include outside-physics and physicalism could still be true. One might also wonder whether people in the matrix had largely true outside-physics beliefs since the matrix world is a deliberate simulation of outside-physics.

But even setting aside these issues there are strange results. Suppose that physicalism is true and that consciousness is a purely physical property of the brain. Let us also assume that this is true of a brain that is not in a matrix scenario. Call this scenario 1. Now imagine that a physical duplicate of this physicalist brain that has been in a matrix scenario since birth Call this scenario 2). Then physicalism is true in scenario 1 and dualism is true of scenario 2. But these brains are physically identical! Furthermore this shows that we could not resolve the dispute between the physicalist and the dualist until one was in a position to determine whether or not one is in a matrix scenario. Since Chalmers himself admits that he cannot a priori rule out that he is not in a matrix scenario he must also admit that he is not in a position to a priori tell if physicalism or dualism true. So, suppose that we are actually in a matrix scenario then conceiving of zombies is just conceiving of a computer simulation composed completely of NPCs (non-player characters). But this doesn’t show that physicalism is false, since physicalism is best construed as the claim that lines up with the first brain; since with this understanding of nonphysical physicalism turns out to be nothing but the hypothesis that we are not in the matrix.

But even if we were in the matrix there is a sense in which we can say that physicalism is still ultimately true since in the above envisioned world qualitative properties turn out to be identical to properties which are physical in terms of outside-physics (since these properties are the very same as the ones in the world where physicalism is true).

Zoombies are creatures that are nonphysically identical to me in every respect and which lack nonphysical qualitative properties. I have in the past suggested that one way to conceive of zoombies is as Cartesian minds that only have thoughts but no qualia but now we can put it in terms of matrix scenarios. A zoombie has all of the same nonphysical properties that I in fact do. Suppose that I am in fact in scenario 2 above. Then a creature that has all of the nonphysical properties that I in fact do will have a brain that is identical to my outside-brain. This is to imagine scenario 1.

The traditional zombie is a creature that is physically identical to me and lacks consciousness. Now suppose that I have a zombie twin who is in a matrix scenario since birth. My matrix zombie twin has nonphysical properties (which are the very same properties that I physically have) but no qualitative properties. So, whether one has nonphysical properties or not is simply a matter of whether one is in the matrix or not. Chalmers’ defense of nonphysicalism can thus be seen as a defense of the claim that we are in the matrix.

Kenny Pearce has the new Philosophers’ Blog Carnival. There is a link in the upper right corner of his page that says “view with boring colors” in case you find his all green writing on all black background unpleasant.

Your Thoughts?

Rumi

A phrase to describe my beliefs popped to mind today — “Cognitive Mysticism“.  Well, being only two common words, and lots of writers out there, I am sure these two words have been put together before so please excuse me if someone has grabbed them and given them their meaning before me, and please indulge me.

Religious mystics are generally despised by the orthodox in their home religion.  The orthodox value creeds, doctrines and right thinking.  The Mystic values relationships and being.  The mystic’s first offense, a social one, is to deny the need the religious specialists or traditions to communicate to their god.  The Mystic’s second offense, a philosophical one, is to hold doctrines as suspect — Mystics questions the power of language to capture that truth of the encounter with the divine.

I too question authority (while understanding it’s usefulness in the lives of others) and hold that beliefs are merely anchors for our web of life with no more substance than the function they serve.   Our webs of belief capture far deeper realities than the words that string them together.   These deeper realities are our relationships — relationships to ourselves, others and the world we live in.

Cognitive mysticism allows me to dialogue with other faiths without, at times, a need to challenge their treasured assumptions.  If I want to help a person change their way of relating to their world I can still look to change their web while still preserving many of their cherished beliefs.  I can take pleasure in just making them a better version of themselves while they do the same to me.
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Related Posts:

• Beliefs as Circuit Components
• Beliefs: A Diagram
• Web of Beliefs