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Fighting for an education: More Latinos joining the U.S. Army for school benefits

Iconoculture — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 17:26:57 +0000

by Rocio Zamora Arzola

WHAT’S HAPPENING

As Latinos fight to keep their head above water in the lagging economy, more are joining the U.S. Army. Although enlistment bonuses and military pay are welcome, the lure of a higher education has proven to be a strong incentive.
A study by the RAND Corporation found that Latino young adults are most responsive to the military’s educational benefits, whereas black Army applicants respond most to salary and bonus incentives, and whites to military pay (CNN.com 10.21.09).
According to the study, the percentage of Army recruits who were Latino rose from 6.6% in 1994 to 11.4% in 2007.

WHAT THIS MEANS TO BUSINESS

Steady pay, job training and the opportunity to serve their country is helping to increase military recruitment among young adults overall. But for Latinos, the promise of higher education is a bonus that’s most attractive.
Companies that are hiring can look to Latino military veterans who’ve taken advantage of educational benefits.

RESOURCES

An Aryan Nations E-Mail Box Hacked ;)

BBVM — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 04:26:21 +0000

WikiLeaks: aryannationspa@hotmail.com leaked emails, 2009 mail archives (chronological)

( Aryan Nations (AN) is a white nationalist neo-Nazi organization founded in the 1970s by Richard Girnt Butler as an arm of the Christian Identity group Church of Jesus Christ-Christian. As of December 2007 there were two main factions that claimed descent from Butler’s group. Aryan Nations has been called a “terrorist threat” by the FBI, and the RAND Corporation has called it the “first truly nationwide terrorist network” in the USA. ) Download zip file here.

Obama Passes on the 'Four Options' to Increase Troops in Afghanistan

Editors — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 05:00:18 +0000

The options on the table before the Obama Administration War Cabinet all involved escalating the occupation by as many as 80,000 troops. The president wants other options as he continues dithering.

President Barack Obama is not satisfied to execute on any of the options his national security team have brought to the table, “pushing instead for revisions to clarify how and when U.S. troops would turn over responsibility to the Afghan government”, the Associated Press (AP) reports tonight from a senior administration official. The Afghan government has shown itself to be nothing more or less than a brutal mafia. The druglords and warlords are now the taxmen—rightfully scrutinized for being immoral, but actually just acting as a government.

The news comes as Karl Eikenberry, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, “sent two classified cables to Washington in the past week expressing deep concerns about sending more U.S. troops to Afghanistan until President Hamid Karzai’s government demonstrates that it is willing to tackle the corruption and mismanagement that has fueled the Taliban’s rise”, The Washington Post reported earlier from senior officials.

At today’s meeting with the War Council, Mr. Obama entertained—what was referred to throughout the day as—”the four options”, which WaPo reported would cost around $1bn per thousand troops. Christi Parsons and Julian Barnes reported them at the Los Angeles Times as:

At least 40,000 additional troops, the ‘medium-risk’ option from General Stanley McChrystal, the top commander of the U.S.-led occupation—the ‘low-risk’ option being an escalation of 80,000 troops;
34,000 additional troops, including 23,000 for combat and support, 7,000 for the occupiers’ command base and 4,000 trainers, officials confirmed over the weekend;
20,000 additional troops, the ‘high-risk’ option from Gen. McChrystal—”known by military planners as ‘the hybrid’,” WaPo reports, “to shore up security in 10 to 12 major population areas”; and
around 12,000 additional troops, supported by Senator John Kerry (D-MA), more geared toward counterterrorism operations, maintaining the same troop level for counterinsurgency.

Mr. Obama was “leaning toward” escalating the occupation by 34,000 and announcing it after his trip to Asia in a week, Jonathan Landay reported at McClatchy over the weekend.

“The sense that he was being rushed and railroaded has stiffened Obama’s resolve to seek information and options beyond military planning, officials said, though a substantial troop increase is still likely,” the AP reports tonight, adding: “The options presented to Obama by his War Council will now be amended.”

Since Mr. Obama began his presidential run in early 2007, he referred to the occupation of Afghanistan as a “war of necessity”. Leading political scientists, notably Council on Foreign Relations President Richard Haass, see no reason for such an assessment.

Counterterrorism operations have been dubbed by human rights groups and military officials as “death from above”, as strikes have killed 49 civilians for every terrorist leader assassinated. It’s uncontroversial such civilian casualties are counter-intuitive to “winning the hearts of minds of the population”, as Gen McChrystal reported to the president was crucial to avoid “mission failure”.

The argument for shifting to a counterterrorism mission is the concern over the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the possibility of Afghanistan or Pakistan becoming a ’safe haven’ or ‘base of operations’ for ‘terrorists to conduct operations against the U.S. and the fulfillment of juvenile revenge fantasies over 9/11.

Seymour Hersh wrote of the politics toward understanding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at The New Yorker over the weekend, of which Little Alex partially analyzed. He discussed the battle between the military and the White House over the Afghanistan occupation and his article with Rachel Maddow this evening (7:18):

Here at Wonderland, we’re not giving the president as much credit as Mr. Hersh. (In his defense, Mr. Hersh was probably not aware that the reports actually stated there was no indication Mr. Obama would cease to escalate the occupation, as Ms. Maddow mistook.) Our message to the president remains the same: Stop dithering and bring the troops home, now!

To execute a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, the U.S. and its allies would need to commit at least another 100,000 troops to begin building an Afghan Security Force of 400,000. This assessment was made by us before military officials confirmed the number, 600,000, as the amount of counterinsurgent forces needed to begin stablizing Afghanistan.

“Nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try,” George Will wrote at WaPo over two months ago. “Afghanistan would need hundreds of thousands of coalition troops, perhaps for a decade or more. That is inconceivable.”.

On Veterans Day, we’re reminded of the deaths of U.S. soldiers during war, but the casualties of war remain, recklessly, forgotten.

“On MSNBC, and the other cable hawkers of government propaganda this morning, veterans were absent, despite the constant invocation of Veterans Day,” Lew Rockwell, Jr., president of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, commented. “All the photos and discussion were of active-duty troops in the various U.S. occupations. None of the kids with missing limbs or brain parts were shown, the actual veterans, nor that single-payer Hell, the V.A. medical system and its inmates. It was all lies about the glory of war, by a caw-cawing bunch of chickenhawks.”

In-action U.S. casualties from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan total over 90,000, on record. “That includes a tire-screeching 75,134 dead, wounded-in-action, and medically evacuated due to illness, disease, or injury in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and 14,323 and counting in Afghanistan, or Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),” Kelley B. Vlahos reports at AntiWar.com, adding:

Larry Scott, who runs VAWatchdog.org, an invaluable daily monitor of ongoing issues affecting the 23.4 million living U.S veterans, said the 90,591 figure relating to OIF/OEF casualties is valid—and ultimately overwhelming. “People just forget, they don’t realize there is an ongoing cost of war. Whether you agree with the war or not is not the issue. We have to be ready to pay the price.”

Documents from the government and non-governmental organizations have found that 170,000 veterans of the Vietnam Counterinsurgency have committed suicide, Dahr Jamail reported at AntiWar Radio today. The Veterans Health Administration confirmed in an email dated 15 December 2007: 6,552 veterans commit suicide every year—126 every week, 18 every day. Any suicide survivor can attest to the fact that the casualties of every suicide are exponential to the statistic itself.

The RAND Corportation, according to the Online Journal in April 2008, stated around 300,000 troops sent to Iraq and Afghanistan are suffering major depression or Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—better known as shell shock—and nearly 370,000 received traumatic brain injuries.

Any native of a nation-state invaded by the U.S. Armed Forces can attest to the fact that for every U.S. casualty is a potential nationwide population of human beings and property and natural resources damaged or destroyed.

Mr. Obama won the 2008 presidential election with 52.9% of the vote. That was a year ago. Today, a CNN poll reports 56% of those polled oppose sending more troops to Afghanistan and 58% oppose the occupation as a whole.

Mr. President, politics has a price. Life does not. Morality exceeds value. Integrity makes you a man. Defying power with integrity makes you a leader.

End the occupation of Afghanistan. Yes, you can.

A totally HYPERGRAPHIC morning: read at your own risk

Harold Knight — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 15:38:39 +0000

OK. Let’s “Oedipus out” this writing as far as it will go.
(Professor Nelsen used to tell us in fiction-writing class to “weird out” our short stories.)

stiff-necked

I woke up hearing my mother’s voice: “You are a stiff-necked people: Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against you.” It’s a biblical quotation (Exodus 32:9). God screaming at the Israelites through Moses, my mother changing the words just enough to make it obvious that God was angry at me.

This is a morning when my writing is trying to catch up with what I want to say, and I have no way to make sense because it’s so confused in my mind that it would take four or five well-reasoned essays, and this morning well-reasoning is beyond my ability.

The stiff-necked people are the ones Charlton Heston came down from Sinai and smashed the Golden Calf built by Edward G. Robinson with the gold he bilked his friends out of. Did you ever think that “Charlton” is a faggy (I can use that word; you can’t) name for a macho man who wanted us to pry his cold dead fingers from around his gun when he died? I had a high school friend named Charlene who looked like Ben-Hur (blonde hair, blue eyes, and a jutting chin). It would be slanderous for me to say Bruce Hoffman looks like a skinny Edward G. Robinson. See? I told you this wasn’t going to make sense.

Back to Mother’s voice. I have no idea why she was in my head this morning, except yesterday I was thinking about the “stiff-necked” people dancing around the Golden Calf and making Charleneton go back up that ridiculous mountain, bizarre fireballs zooming out at him again writing on those silly tablets. I was thinking about “stiff-necked people” because even Obama got in on the act yesterday saying that we have to hate the Ft. Hood killer because he’s a Muslim (read the speech!).

Let’s all hate, OK? Stiff-necked. Bearing false witness. The ninth fireball.

That got me to thinking about Mother and me. Don’t ask me to explain the connection. She and I had this sort of special musical relationship. She was ridiculously more musically talented than I. But she was the preacher’s wife and mother of three kids, and had no chance of a “career.” When they were in high school her brother would buy her sheet music of all the popular tunes, and she could still play them from memory when I was learning to play. I have some of that sheet music. And you should have heard Mother play gospel hymns after she was too far gone with Alzheimer’s to make much sense in any other way.

So I’m thinking about Mother and stiff-necked Americans-who-hate-Muslims (I do wish the NPR “hosts” would learn to pronounce “Muslim” so it doesn’t sound like a racial slur), and then suddenly (and there is absolutely NO connection here, but I can’t not write about it) I remember her taking me to hear a traveling men’s choral group with a small orchestra and one woman (soprano) soloist through the Community Concert Association in Scottsbluff (stopover of Charlie Starkweather) at the high school auditorium. This men’s choral group plus one woman sang Stravinsky’s Oedipus Rex. One of the great formative musical moments of my life. Why on earth they were singing Stravinsky in Nebraska in the ‘50s I will never know. But it’s one of those “Small Good Things” (see Raymond Carver) for which I will be eternally grateful (or at least until this poor abused body dies and I cease to exist—back to my disbelief in heaven).

I remember the music.

Oedipus and mom

So we have ole Oedipus gouging out his eyes because of the monstrosity he has committed. Imagine. Gouging out your eyes because you couldn’t look at the disaster you’d caused.

I’m back to yesterday. Finally, but the strands are still not-tied-up out in the universe. Oh well. Yesterday I wrote about Bruce Hoffman which I’m sure hardly anyone understood because the quotes were too long (but no one would have read my bizarre attempt to write all of that out myself and tie it together). I let people who know what they are talking about say what I was trying to say.

I’ll quote the crux of the matter one more time.

There is now a Homeland Security Institute as well as related journals, degree programs, and conferences, all of which continue to develop approaches and procedures rooted in the idea of a United States in a perpetually defensive mode against a hostile world . . . . the fact of the war [on terror] was rapidly concretized for audiences across the political, professional, and cultural spectrum. Distinguished academics from the country’s most prestigious universities provided intellectual grounding; Washington think tanks supplied the administration with a perpetual flow of policy assessments that . . . .played the overall role of confirming the larger effort; and the mainstream media either cheered the war or muted its criticism…

The American people are wacko. Wacko. They believe the idiocies that Bruce Hoffman (I don’t care if he is a full professor at Georgetown University) spews out—every Muslim, everyone with an Arabic name, everyone who has a friend who is in jail because he’s been convicted of “terrorism” is himself a terrorist. (I wonder why the FBI hasn’t set up Muslim American women to entrap them in bogus plots to bomb 60-story buildings. The FBI is as sexist as the next US government agency.)

How does this relate to the “stiff-necked” people or to Oedipus or to Scottsbluff? or to Charlene Heston or the golden calf? or Bruce Hoffman? I feel like a Greek oracle singing in Latin.

It’s pretty simple. The American people are so willing to be hoodwinked and propagandized by weaselly (in the Hebrew Bible sense of “unclean”) little men like Bruce Hoffman—just as the Hebrews were convinced by weaselly Edward G. Robinson—whose entire career has been spent doing research (RAND Corporation, anyone?), not to find the truth but to prove his presuppositions, and then to feed to the results of his “research” to a government made up of weaselly little men and women who want desperately to hold onto their jobs (their Golden Calf), so they propagandize YOU and scare good sense out of you (us) so you will believe that a deranged murderer who happens to have an Arabic name is a terrorist. To them that’s logical, of course, because every Muslim is a terrorist—or at least in a “sleeper cell” devoted to destroying American Christianity.

This country is wacko. Wacko. The likes of Bruce Hoffman have driven us out of our collective mind. I’ll bet there wasn’t one letter to the editor of the Christian Science Monitor asking what in God’s name Bruce Hoffman meant by saying, “I don’t see a nervous breakdown as being mutually exclusive of terrorism,” or why a newspaper with the word “Christian” in its name would print such an incendiary, xenophobic statement.

And so we’re back to “STIFF-NECKED PEOPLE.” Edward G. Robinsons all. Not a Charlene Heston in the lot (much less a gun-toting, ten-commandmants-toting Charlton) to tell us that Yahweh is pissed. Tell us that we should at least have the decency to repent—maybe not go as far as Oedipus, but repent. Get over our worship of the Golden Calf of xenophobia.

Will Pakistan be fragmented? This Is How Democracy Is Destroying Pakistan

Nitrocario — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 10:23:59 +0000

Latheef Farook ║ SriLankaGuardian.org Now even outsiders are laughing at Pakistan’s messed up ‘democ

Will Pakistan be fragmented? This Is How Democracy Is Destroying Pakistan

pakalert — Fri, 06 Nov 2009 18:03:23 +0000

Now even outsiders are laughing at Pakistan’s messed up ‘democracy’ and the countr

The DARPA Network Challenge

Michael Magee — Tue, 03 Nov 2009 08:50:19 +0000

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has put out a challenge. Try to find ten 8-foot, red weather balloons located at ten fixed locations in the continental United States and then report their locations. This challenge has started a bit of a buzz in the ARG community and has led a number of influential figures to call for the gathering of the kinds of collective problem solving groups that appeared during The Beast and ilovebees. Groups, like The Cloudmakers, who solved the ARG The Beast, were able to sift through clues located throughout the web, solve puzzles presented in those clues and ultimately finish the game. The ARG community has long believed that they could deal with real world problems and approach them in ways that were quicker and more innovative than traditional approaches. If this latest call to action is taken up they might finally have a chance to prove it.

The idea that ARG players could deal with real-world problems isn’t new. The things that happened during game play started to get a few people interested in what an organized and motivated group of people could do with a real world problem. The Rand Corporation was just one of many who speculated about what could happen. Their 2004 report, Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior, examined how a dynamic network of information in the hands of an ARG-like group could be used to identify a threat. They believed the same behaviour used by self-organizing ARG players could be used to sift through real information. The result would be patterns and meaning that would not be readily apparent otherwise.

I’ll be watching the chatter back on forth in the community to see where this goes in the next few weeks. It would be very interesting if the community took up the challenge and were able to step out of the world of alternate and into the pure reality.

Lessons for the Afghan War: The Effects of Counterinsurgency Warfare on the French Army in Indo-China and Algeria and the United States Military in Vietnam

padresteve — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 04:36:18 +0000

Note: This is an article that I wrote for a class a year ago which has been updated in order to show the lessons of history that can be useful in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

French Foreign Legionnaires in Indo-China

The effects of the wars Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam on the French and American military organizations internally and in relationship to their nations piqued my interest in 2005. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced me to start asking the question of what short and long term effect that these wars might have on the U.S. military. As such I wondered what historical precedent that there was for the question. My interest was furthered by my deployment with Marine and Army advisors to Iraqi Army and Security forces in 2007-2008. My search led to the French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria and the American experience in Vietnam. Recently with the Iraq war winding down and ongoing war in Afghanistan which has gone from apparent victory to mounting concern that the effort could fail as the Taliban and Al Qaida have regained momentum amid widespread corruption by the Afghan government and weakness of NATO forces.

Thesis

The counterinsurgency campaigns conducted by the French and American militaries in Vietnam and Algeria had deep and long lasting effects on them. The effects included developments in organization and tactics, relationship of the military to the government and people, and sociological changes. The effects were tumultuous and often corrosive. The French Army in Algeria revolted against the government. The US Army, scarred by Vietnam went through a crisis of leadership and confidence which eventually resulted in end of the draft and formation the all volunteer military. The effects of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are yet unknown but could result in similar situations to the militaries and governments involved,

Historiography

Foreign Legion in Algeria

There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth’s About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore’s We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy’s The Battle of Dien Bien Phu and General Paul Aussaresses’ The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, the authors, veterans of the wars, only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience in war can skew a writer’s objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.

Another source is found in the official histories written by the military forces involved in the wars. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be.

Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall’ Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.

Another source is the writings of participants who critically examine their participation in the wars. Many of these, French and American provide insights into the minds of leaders who are reflective and critically examine what happened to their military institutions in these wars. The best of these is French Colonel David Galula whose books Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice provide first-hand accounts of the subject combined with critical reflection. Galula’s works have been important to John Nagl, General David Petreus and others who helped write the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Other sources, both online and print, such as RAND, provide excellent analysis of selected topics within the scope of this essay, especially COIN.

French at Dien Bien Phu

The ability to dispassionately and critically examine and evaluate these sources over a period of several years was and integrate them with my own experience has been a critical to me. It has changed the way that I look at sources, and caused me to be much more aware of bias, the limitations of sources and the need to have a multiplicity of sources and points of view and to be suspicious of contemporary reports and accounts of the war in Afghanistan regardless of the source.

Analysis of the Issue

Viet Minh Supply Columns were Never Stopped by French Air power or Artillery

Joint US and ARVN Operation

The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the “legacy of conventional thinking” slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that “the population was the objective.”[2] Krepinevich notes that “any changes that might have come about through the service’s experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies.”[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people. Unfortunately instances of all of these have occurred or can be seen in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

French Prisoners after Dien Bien Phu: Many Survivors Would be Fighting in Algeria within Two Years

The French Army had the misfortune of fighting two major insurgencies back to back. The French military was handicapped even before it went into these wars. The Army came out of World War II defeated by the Germans, divided by loyalties to Vichy or one of the Free French factions. They were humiliated by the Japanese in Indo-China, while in Algeria France’s crushing defeat was devastating. “Muslim minds, particularly sensitive to prestige and baraka, the humiliation made a deep impression.”[4] French society was as divided as the Army; the economy in shambles, the government weak and divided. The Viet-Minh had prepared well making use of time and training to get ready for war. “Once full-scale hostilities broke out, the French, for budgetary and political reasons could not immediately make the large scale effort to contain the rebellion in the confines of small-scale warfare.”[5]

In both Indo-China and Algeria the French attempted to fight the budding insurgencies in a conventional manner. This was particularly disastrous in Indo-China when on a number of occasions battalion and regimental combat team sized elements were annihilated by Viet-Minh regulars. Between October 1^st and 17^th 1950 every French garrison along the Chinese border was over-run. The French lost over 6000 troops and enough equipment to outfit “a whole additional Viet-Minh division.” It was their worst colonial defeat since Montcalm at Quebec.[6] In Algeria when the fight began in earnest France’s “ponderous ponderous N.A.T.O forces found themselves at an impossible disadvantage,”[7] unable to have any influence off the main roads.

French Troops and Tanks in Indo-China: Road Bound Forces were often Defeated by Viet- Minh Forces

In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an “Air ground base” deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap’s forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. General Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the “air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories.”[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]

The most inventive French creation in Indochina was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide “permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas” to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that “the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth.”[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border “for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men.”[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 “If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves.”[14]

Algeria was different being part of Metropolitan France; there the French had support of European settlers, the pieds-noir. Many French soldiers had come directly from Indo-China. There French made better adaptations to local conditions, and realized that they had to win the population and isolate the insurgents from it and outside support. As Galula said, victory is the destruction of the insurgent’s political and military structures, plus “the permanent isolation from the population, not forced upon the population, but by and with the population.”[15] The lessons learned by the French in both Algerian and Indo-China were lost upon the Americans.

US Heavy Forces including Armor had Little Utility in Many Parts of Vietnam

The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, referred to as the “Army concept.” [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions “based upon the U.S. divisional force structure.”[17] Due to the imposition of an American template and organizational structure upon it, ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced.”[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of American troops poured in taking the lead against the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong . The American method of counterinsurgency was costly. It was “almost a purely military approach”[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Instead of focusing on protecting the Vietnamese people and denying the Communists a safe haven the Army in particular believed that massive firepower was the best means to be“utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count.”[20] In the end the American defeat was a “failure of understanding and imagination.”[21] The one shining success was the Marine Corps experimentation with “Combined Action Program” platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results “in eliminating local guerillas”[22] but was killed by the Army.

NVA Main Forces

These wars tore the heart out French and American armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government’s “lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable.”[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called The Centurions had been turned into liars.”[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their “independent” nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. “They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: ‘Nous sommes trahis!’-‘We are betrayed.’”[25]

US Veterans of Vietnam Would Return to a Deeply Divided Country that turned its Back on Them for Years

The U.S. Army left Vietnam and returned to a country deeply divided by the war. Vietnam veterans remained ostracized by the society until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts “in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned.”[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007. These lessons however were not applied to Afghanistan and the Taliban which seemed to have been defeated have regained the initiative, policy is being debated amid discord in the west and there are reports of American and NATO forces becoming discouraged by the course of the war and concern that their efforts will be in vain. This is a dangerous situation to be in and if we learn from anything from our own history as well as that of foreign military forces in Afghanistan we need to be very careful in implementing strategy to get whatever we do right.

Training Team Base in Afghanistan: Some of these Bases Have proven Vulnerable to Well Planned and Coordinated Taliban Attacks

Conclusion

The effects of these wars on the French and American military establishments were long lasting and often tragic. The acceptance of torture as a means to an end sullied even the hardest French officers. Men like Galula and Marcel Bigeard refused to countenance it, while others like Paul Aussaresses never recanted. Americans would repeat the tactic at Abu Ghraib rallying the Iraqis against them and nearly losing the war because of it.

For the Americans, the effects of Vietnam continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Many incompetent leaders who had “ticket punched” their careers kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. The years following Vietnam were a severe test of the US Military and took years for the military to recover. Likewise It took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.

What are the lessons to be learned from these campaigns as well as from the various accounts? Andrew Krepinevich prophetically noted that the failure to learn the lessons of Vietnam “represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempting to fight a conventional war against a very unconventional opponent.”[27] Obviously, there are lessons to be learned, especially in understanding the nature of revolutionary war as well as the culture and history of our opponents. The U.S. has made some improvement in this regard but there is still much to be learned, especially since after the war the Army was “erecting barriers to avoid fighting another Vietnam War.”[28] From these wars we learn that nations and incompetent governments who mismanage wars can alienate themselves from the soldiers that they send to fight, with serious consequences. As far as historiography we learn that certain historical fallacies are evident when one reads the accounts critically and recognize the bias and limitations of the various sources.

[1] Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. “Revolutionary War” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,” Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986 p.849

[2] Galula, David. Counterinsurgency in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2006. First published by RAND in 1963. p.244

[3] Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986 p.213

[4] Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006 p 41

[5] Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27

[6] Ibid. p.33

[7] Horn. p.100.

[8] Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004 p.63

[9] Fall, Bernard B. “The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place.” Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1^st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967 pp. 456-457 Fall discusses in depth the lack of French Air support and the antecedents that led to the shortage following World War II.

[10] Pottier, Philippe(2005)’Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War’, Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874

[11] Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171

[12] Trinquier, Roger. “Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,” translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title “La Guerre Moderne” by Editions Table Ronde. p.87

[13] Windrow. p.652.

[14] Roy, Jules. “The Battle of Dien Bien Phu” Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York. p.xxx

[15] Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54

[16] Krepinevich. p.213

[17] Ibid. p.24

[18] Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005 p.138

[19] Shy. p.856

[20] Krepinevich. p.202

[21] Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993 p.314

[22] Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984 p.555

[23] Windrow. p.655

[24] Ibid. p.657

[25] Ibid.

[26] Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992 p. xx

[27] Krepinevich. p.275

[28] Ibid. p.274

News you may have missed #0146

intelNews — Sun, 18 Oct 2009 09:59:10 +0000

El sexo en televisión hace aumentar el número de embarazos entre adolescentes

puntope — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 09:34:07 +0000

Un estudio norteamericano, realizado por la Rand Corporation, ha establecido un vínculo científico entre la exposición de los adolescentes a los contenidos de carácter sexual en televisión y los embarazos. Según concluye el informe, los programas con sexo en televisión pueden estar jugando un papel determinante en el hecho de que persistan altos niveles de embarazos no deseados entre la población adolescente, pese a que los jóvenes dispongan hoy en día de más información sexual que nunca.
Según el estudio, la exposición al sexo en televisión crea la percepción de que el riesgo en la práctica sexual, sin usar anticonceptivos, es pequeño, lo que acelera la iniciación al sexo.
La base del informe ha sido una encuesta nacional realizada a 2.000 adolescentes entre 12 y 17 años que fueron reclutados en 2001 y encuestados sobre sus hábitos de consumo de televisión y actividad sexual. Los participantes fueron estudiados de nuevo en 2004, año en el que el estudio se concentró en los 700 participantes que se habían iniciado ya en la práctica sexual. Un tercer estudio se dedicó a la parte de éstos que ya había tenido una situación de embarazo.

La información obtenida se combinó con los hábitos televisivos de los jóvenes encuestados. Entre todos ellos existía un elevado consumo de un total de 23 programas muy populares entre adolescentes que incluían altos niveles de contenidos sexuales. Se trata de programas de todo tipo de géneros: dramas, comedias, ‘realities’ e incluso dibujos animados.
El sexo para un adolescente es lo que ve en televisión. Los padres pocas veces transmiten algo sobre sexo a sus hijos por lo que el adolescente se basa en lo que ve en televisión, lo que le dan los medios.

Nathalia Tárano Andrade

RAND Corporation -- defense is the best cyberattck offense

davidkirkpatrick — Fri, 09 Oct 2009 05:54:11 +0000

Cybersecurity news from the RAND Corporation:

U.S. Must Focus on Protecting Critical Computer Networks from Cyber Attack

Because it will be difficult to prevent cyber attacks on critical civilian and military computer networks by threatening to punish attackers, the United States must focus its efforts on defending these networks from cyber attack, according to a new RAND Corporation study.

The study finds that the United States and other nations that rely on externally accessible computer networks—such as ones used for electric power, telephone service, banking, and military command and control—as a foundation for their military and economic power are subject to cyber attack.

“Adversaries in future wars are likely to go after each other’s information systems using computer hacking,” said Martin C. Libicki, the report’s lead author and senior management scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “The lessons from traditional warfare cannot be adapted to apply to attacks on computer networks. Cyberspace must be addressed in its own terms.”

Working against connected but weakly protected computer systems, hackers can steal information, make the systems malfunction by sending them false commands and corrupt the systems with bogus information.

In most instances, the damage from cyber attacks is temporary and repeated attacks lead the victim to develop systems that are more difficult to penetrate. The RAND study finds that military cyber attacks are most effective when part of a specific combat operation—such as silencing a surface-to-air missile system protecting an important target—rather than as part of a core element in a long, drawn out military or strategic campaign.

Libicki says it is difficult to determine how destructive a cyber attack would be. Damage estimates from recent cyber attacks within the United States range from a few billion dollars to hundreds of billions of dollars a year.

The study indicates that cyber warfare is ambiguous, and that it is rarely clear what attacks can damage deliberately or collaterally, or even determine afterward what damage was done. The identity of the attacker may be little more than guesswork, which makes it hard to know when someone has stopped attacking. The cyber attacker’s motivation, especially outside physical combat, may be equally unclear.

The weapons of cyber war are amorphous, which eliminates using traditional approaches to arms control. Because military networks mostly use the same hardware and software as civilian networks, they have similar vulnerabilities.

“This is not an enterprise where means and ends can be calibrated to one another,” Libicki said. “As a result, it is ill-suited for strategic warfare.”

Because offensive cyber warfare is more useful in bothering, but not disarming, an adversary, Libicki does not recommend the United States make strategic cyber warfare a priority investment. He says similar caution is needed for deterring cyber warfare attacks, as it is difficult to attribute a given attack to a specific adversary, and the lack of an ability to counterattack is a significant barrier.

Instead, Libicki says the United States may first want to pursue diplomatic, economic and prosecutorial efforts against cyber attackers.

The study, “Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar,” was prepared by RAND Project AIR FORCE, a federally funded research and development center for studies and analysis aimed at providing independent policy alternatives for the U.S. Air Force.

About the RAND Corporation

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

American Police Force & Civilian National Security Force Taking Aim in USA

ahrcanum — Fri, 02 Oct 2009 15:37:03 +0000

BILLINGS, Mont. —AP-http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ifOx0LPKy5B_0KAyPHyNTEqdQz6QD9AM0VM80 The Two Rivers Detention Center was promoted as the largest economic development project in decades in the small town of Hardin when the jail was built two years ago. But it has been vacant ever since.”

There were no takers on the facility until recently when a company called the American Police Force signed a lease. “Problem is, no one’s heard of them, yet they’ve got tons of cash and guns with them and the Sheriff’s Department will cease to have jurisdiction as of the end of this October.” http://www.the-912-project.com/2009/09/30/heads-up-mt-you-are-the-front-line-against-american-security-force/

State legislatures have granted police powers to private licensed security firms for decades so that’s not so new, but I got to thinking about President Obama’s new law for Civilian National Security Force http://giveusliberty1776.blogspot.com/2009/09/hr-675-civilian-national-security-force.html ,http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h675/text . Is the American Police Force is just a front for Blackwater? http://www.americanpoliceforce.net/ and Alex Jones at http://www.prisonplanet.com/exposed-american-police-force-is-a-blackwater-front-group.html offer proof that APF is in fact a Blackwater Front Group.

Xe Services, LLC
PO Box 1029
Moyock, NC 27958

Xe Services LLC is the new name of Blackwater USA. In addition, the U.S. Training Center contact page carries the exact same address.

PO Box 1029
Moyock, NC 27958

A domain registry check confirms that the U.S. Training Center website is registered to XE Services. Pretty compelling proof Mr. Jones!

From the http://www.americanpolicegroup.com/ web site:
American Police Force, dedicated security agency…extensive global network to provide local, regional, and national security solutions to the United States Government…services include highly sophisticated background checks, asset searches, undercover investigations both domestic & international, … Covers the equipment, operations, and individual combat skills essential for soldiers and others who must act as infantry. (emphasis mine) Essential for Army infantry leaders at the platoon and company level, Special Forces troops, Air Force security and patrol services, Marines, and other Army branches.

Would that include assisting Armed forces including the National Guard since a pandemic emergency as was declared over the H1N1 Swine Flu?

The U.S. Training Center is run by Blackwater. Indeed, The U.S. Training Center website, can be accessed via Blackwater’s forwarding URL at http://www.blackwaterusa.com/ aka. http://www.ustraining.com/new/index.asp.

According to The New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/14/us/14blackwater.html?_r=1, RALEIGH, N.C. (AP) — Blackwater Worldwide is abandoning the brand name that has been tarnished by its work in Iraq, settling on Xe (pronounced zee) as the new name for its family of two dozen businesses. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, the subsidiary that conducts much of the company’s overseas operations and domestic training, has been renamed U.S. Training Center Inc., the company said Friday.

Xe or Zee, http://www.xecompany.com/ has a much improved and less aggressive image no longer showing Men In Black holding AK-47’s Mercenaries, but make no mistake, as the site says, “Man-made and natural disasters require an immediate robust response. The USTC and staff of former military and law enforcement professionals can provide the needed training and operational expertise to prepare security teams to effectively support state and federal emergency response units.” -emphasis mine.

Federal response units—can you say FEMA?

Excerpts from the site- Xe is supported by its own construction capability. With a team of electricians, plumbers, engineers….transport resources, including its own in-house travel agency, design and construction teams can be mobilized quickly and efficiently to where their services are needed within the United States….Xe is equipped and prepared to move cargo and people from anywhere in the world….offers an array of capabilities to transport freight and personnel…..outfitted with armored vehicles for safe transport and delivery…

For all intents and purposes we have an organization that exists on U.S. Soil with the capability and know how to wage war on American citizens. The U.S. government contracted with them in Iraq and Afghanistan, why not here in America to quell the the citizen who seek transparency from The Obama Administration?

Why would the U.S. Government allow this? Putting on a legitimate face does not preclude XE, Blackwater, or The American Police Force from being a militia. Could say China, Russia or anyone of a number of countries with enough money, hire them to carry out these tasks upon America? While anti-government sentiment is on the rise with peaceful tea party gatherings, the rest of the world does not look to have a party, but would love to over throw the U.S.A. Even the UN has stated that the U.S. dollar should no longer be the basket currency for the world.

Now comes research described in this report, sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.- The authors for a Stability Police Force (SPF) “containing 6,000 people — created in the U.S. Marshals Service and staffed by a “hybrid option,” in which SPF members are federal police officers seconded to federal, state, and local police agencies when not deployed.” The pdf can be downloaded here http://chriskillz503.blogspot.com/2009/10/apf-mercs-are-fullfilling-rand.html

Last October 2008, According to reports out of top Chinese mainstream news outlets, the RAND Corporation also presented a proposal to the Pentagon lobbying for a war to be started with a major foreign power in an attempt to stimulate the American economy and prevent a recession.

sourced at – http://www.prisonplanet.com/rand-lobbies-pentagon-start-war-to-save-us-economy.html

RAND directors include Frank Charles Carlucci III, former Defense Secretary and Deputy Director of the CIA, Ronald L. Olson, Council on Foreign Relations luminary and former Secretary of Labor, and Carl Bildt, top Bilderberg member and other notables who purport to honor, serve America.

Putting on a legitimate face does not preclude XE, Blackwater, or The American Police Force from being a militia.

News you may have missed #0120

intelNews — Tue, 29 Sep 2009 09:52:31 +0000

Film on America’s most famous whistleblower. A new documentary film, The Most Dangerous Man in

The Effects of Counter-Insurgency Operations on U.S. and French Forces in Vietnam and Algeria and Implications for Afghanistan

padresteve — Mon, 28 Sep 2009 04:38:56 +0000

1st Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment in Indo-China

Introduction

Primitive but Effective- Viet Minh Supply Column The French Could Never Stop them

There is a wealth of data regarding these wars. There are several types of materials. The accounts of soldiers, diplomats and reporters who experienced these events contained in memoirs and diaries. The best include David Hackworth’s About Face and Steel My Soldiers Hearts; and General Harold Moore’s We Were Soldiers Once… and Young. French works include Jules Roy’s The Battle of Dien Bein Phu and General Paul Aussaresses’ The Battle of the Casbah. There are innumerable popular accounts written by NCOs and junior officers. These accounts may contain a wealth of information, but are limited by a number of factors. First, many only saw part of the overall picture and first-hand experience can skew objectivity. Those who have been through the trauma of war interpret war through their own experience. Physical and psychological wounds can have a major impact on the interpretation of these writers as can their experience and political ideology. Finally few of these writers are trained historians. Despite this they can be a valuable resource for the historian.

Another source is official histories. Often these incorporate unit histories and individual narratives and analyze specific battles and the wider campaigns, but do little in regard to broader conditions that affected operations. While a good source, many are not as critical of their institutions as they should be. Histories by trained historians and journalists provide another view. The most insightful of the journalist accounts include Bernard Fall’ Street Without Joy and The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place. A limitation of all of these is that they are often heavily influenced by the political and societal events. This means that earlier accounts are more likely to be reactive and judgmental versus critical and balanced. Later accounts have the benefit of access to the opposing side and documents not available to earlier writers. Alistair Horn in A Savage War of Peace provides one of the most informative and balanced accounts of the war in Algeria. Martin Winslow does the same regarding Dien Bien Phu in The Last Valley.

Isolated and Besieged Dien Bien Phu

Another source is the writings of participants who critically examine their participation in the wars. Many of these, French and American provide insights into the minds of leaders who are reflective and critically examine what happened to their military institutions in these wars. The best of these is French Colonel David Galula whose books Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice provide first-hand accounts of the subject combined with critical reflection. Galula’s works have been important to John Nagl, General David Petreus and others who helped write the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency manual. Andrew Krepinevich in The Army and Vietnam provides a critical analysis of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. Other sources, both online and print, such as RAND, provide excellent analysis of selected topics within the scope of this essay, especially COIN.

Effects of Insurgencies on the Armies that Fought Them

The conflicts in French Indo-China, Algeria and Vietnam had major effects on the French and American military institutions. These effects can be classified in a number of ways. First, the manner in which each military waged war, including tactics and weapons systems was changed. The use of airpower, especially helicopters and use of Riverine forces provided an added dimension of battlefield mobility but did not bring victory. As John Shy and Thomas Collier noted regarding the French in Indo-China: “French mobility and firepower could take them almost anywhere in Vietnam, but they could not stay, and could show only wasted resources and time for their efforts.”[1] The use of intelligence and psychological warfare, including the use of torture became common practice in both the French and American armies. The wars had an effect on the institutional culture of these armed services; neither completely embraced the idea of counterinsurgency and for the most part fought conventionally. Galula notes how the “legacy of conventional thinking” slowed the implementation of proper counterinsurgency tactics even after most commanders learned that “the population was the objective.”[2] Krepinevich notes that “any changes that might have come about through the service’s experience in Vietnam were effectively short-circuited by Army goals and policies.”[3] Finally the wars had a chilling effect on the relationship between the both militaries and the state, veterans from each nation often felt betrayed or disconnected from their country and people.

Foreign Legion in Algeria

Surrender at Dien Bien Phu

In Vietnam the French did not absorb the lessons of fighting a well established insurgent force. French forces hoped to draw the Viet-Minh main forces into battles of attrition where their superior firepower could be brought to bear. Such was the case at Na San in December 1952 where the French established an “Air ground base” deep in Viet-Minh territory to draw Giap’s forces into open battle. This worked, but just barely. Giap, short of artillery and not planning on a long battle frittered away his troops in mass charges. However, the French, because of Na Son assumed they had found the key to victory. In their embrace of the “air ground base concept, French staff officers were following an intellectual tradition that had long been prone to seduction by elegant theories.”[8] The result was the disaster at Dien Bien Phu the following year. The destruction of the elite Group-mobile 100 near Pleiku in 1954 was the coup de grace. In Indo-China the French made limited use of helicopters, used paratroops widely, and developed Riverine forces. One thing they were critically short of was significant tactical air support.[9]

The most inventive French creation was the GCMA/GMI forces composed of mountain tribesmen led by French NCOs and Junior Officers. They were designed to provide “permanent guerilla groups rooted in remote areas” to harass and interdict Viet-Minh forces.[10] Trinquier noted that at the time of the Dien Bien Phu defeat that these forces had reached over 20,000 trained and equipped maquis in the Upper Region of Tonkin and Laos. These forces achieved their greatest success retaking Lao Cai and Lai Chau May 1954 as Dien Bien Phu fell.[11] Trinquier stated that “the sudden cessation of hostilities prevented us from exploiting our opportunities in depth.”[12] The GMI units and their French leaders were abandoned fighting on for years after the defeat. One account noted a French NCO two years after the defeat cursing an aircraft patrolling the border “for not dropping them ammunition so they could die like men.”[13] In the end the French left Indo-China and Giap remarked to Jules Roy in 1963 “If you were defeated, you were defeated by yourselves.”[14]

The United States military, especially the Army approached the Vietnam War with a conventional mindset, the “Army concept.” [16] It not only approached the war in this manner, but it trained and organized the South Vietnamese forces, ARVN into the American model. Americans re-organized ARVN into divisions “based upon the U.S. divisional force structure.”[17] ARVN was not structured appropriately for the threat that it faced.”[18] The results were as to be expected. Large numbers of troops poured in, American counterinsurgency was costly. It was “almost a purely military approach”[19] which ignored political and social realities on the ground. Massive firepower was the means “utilized by the Army to achieve the desired end of the attrition strategy-the body count.”[20] In the end the American defeat was a “failure of understanding and imagination.”[21] The one shining moment was the Marine Corps experimentation with “Combined Action Program” platoons which lived in the villages with militia for long periods of time. This program produced great results “in eliminating local guerillas”[22] but was killed by the Army.

For both the French and Americans these wars tore the heart out of their armies. For the French the defeats inflicted a terrible toll. In Indo-China many French career soldiers felt that the government’s “lack of interest in the fate of both thousands of missing French prisoners and loyal North Vietnamese…as dishonorable.”[23] Divisions arose between those who served and those who remained in France or Germany and created bitter enmity between soldiers. France would endure a military coup which involved many who had fought in Vietnam and Algeria. Having militarily won that war, were turned into what Jean Lartenguy called ‘the Centurions” had been turned into liars.”[24] They were forced to abandon those who they had fought for and following the mutiny, tried, imprisoned, exiled or disgraced. Colonial troops who remained loyal to France were left without homes in their “independent” nations. They saw Dien Bien Phu as the defining moment. “They responded with that terrible cry of pain which pretends to free a man from his sworn duty, and promises such chaos to come: ‘Nous sommes trahis!’-‘We are betrayed.’”[25]

Joint US-ARVN Operation

The U.S. Army returned to a country deeply divided and Vietnam veterans remained ostracized until the 1980s. As Harold Moore recounts “in our time battles were forgotten, our sacrifices were discounted, and both our sanity and suitability for life in polite American society were publically questioned.”[26] The Army endured a massive reorganization that resulted in the formation of the All-Volunteer force, which would redeem itself and emerge from the ashes in the Gulf War. The Americans would not learn the lessons of revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency until forced to do so in Iraq in 2004-2007.

Conclusions and Possibilities

For the Americans, the debacle continued at home. Race riots tore at the force while drug addictions and criminal activities were rampant. Incompetent leaders kept their jobs and highly successful leaders who became whistle blowers like Hackworth were scorned by the Army institution. It took years before either the French or American veterans again felt a part of their countries. They ended up going to war, and when it was over; feeling abandoned, their deepest bonds were to their comrades who had fought by their side.

In Iraq the U.S. adapted, albeit belatedly to the nature of the insurgency and took advantage of Al Qaeda Iraq (AQI) over-reach in the manner that they abused the Iraqi people. The situation turned dramatically in September of 2007 when Al Qaeda killed the most prominent Sunni Sheik outside of Ramadi. The Sheik had begun to work with Americans on security issues and his death turned much of the Sunni populace in Al Anbar and other provinces against AQI for the first time allying them with the Sh’ia dominated government. Changing focus the U.S. Forces focused on safeguarding the population and building up the capabilities of Iraqi forces. Within months because of the increased security and stability in Al Anbar the U.S. Marine trained and Iraqi led forces of the 1^st Iraqi Division were able to be moved to Basra where they retook the city from insurgent forces and to Diyala where they helped the government gain the upper hand. Success in Iraq did not come easy, American forces suffered their greatest losses since the Vietnam War in the cities, villages and countryside of Iraq. The U.S. is now in the process of drawing down as the Iraqis take over their own security. The process is not perfect as there still tension between Sunni and Sh’ia factions as well as Kurds and other minority ethnic groups. However it is still going better than most experts predicted.

The Author and Advisors with Iraqi Border Troops near Syria

Afghanistan is another matter. After early success in overthrowing the Taliban and isolating Al Qaeda the Americans and NATO pretty ran a status quo operation attempting to legitimize the Karzai government, eliminate the Opium poppy crops and establish government presence and security in outlying areas. There was a problem in this; both the Taliban and Al Qaeda used border sanctuaries in Pakistan and financial support from worldwide Moslem groups to continue the fight. As Al Qaeda and the Taliban built themselves up the Afghan government lost support. This loss of support was in large part due to rampant government corruption as well as to the perception of U.S. and NATO forces being occupiers and not liberators. This perception of the U.S. and NATO forces was in large part because they had ignored the lessons of French Indo-China, Algeria, Vietnam and Iraq. Isolated from the population the bulk of NATO forces performed in a reactionary manner and often used aircraft and artillery to respond to Taliban forces often killing non-combatants by mistake. Each time this happened, the Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders used the results to further bolster their image and portray the allies as the oppressors. As the Taliban took back much of the country they also returned to oppressive means to subdue the population by fear and intimidation.

Taliban Insurgents

The new American commander, General Stanley McChrystal has asked for more forces in order to run a proper counter-insurgency campaign which focuses on the security of the population to isolate the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Whether General McChrystal gets his forces and whether they are enough to turn the tide before all political and public support in the U.S. and NATO countries is lost is another matter. Right now the situation is tenuous at best. There are means to win this war despite the history of Afghanistan which suggests that this is not possible. The key is he Afghan population, if they believe that the U.S. and NATO are n their side, that we respect them, their culture, religion and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban are the real oppressors the war can be won. This requires patience, forethought and deliberate measures to secure the population, build up a government that they can trust and de-legitimatize Al Qaeda and the Taliban. If that does not happen, the U.S. and NATO run the risk of repeating the story of the French in Indo-China. Unlike AQI and Iraqi insurgents the Taliban are very capable of running military operations capable of defeating small to medium sized units in isolated locations. They know the terrain, often have the support of the people, are highly mobile and not dependant on roads and can mass quickly at critical points. Last year the Taliban launched a large scale assault on an American COP which came close to overrunning it. They were repelled with heavy casualties but the incident demonstrated a capability that is growing. What I would be concerned about is the total destruction of an isolated post or a convoy which could be used to demoralize western nations. While I do not think that the Taliban could pull off the defeat of a major US or NATO base or force as the Viet-Minh did at Dien Bien Phu but the threat should not be minimized.

USMC Training Team in Afghanistan

How we learn the lessons of past insurgencies and revolutionary wars is important in Afghanistan. The stakes are higher than most would want to admit. A withdraw would be seen by militants outside of Afghanistan would be emboldened just as the Algerians were by the loss of the French in Indo-China. It would again provide Al Qaeda with a safe haven and secure base of operations. The stakes are high. Who knows what will happen?

Bibliography

Aussaresses, Paul, “The Battle of the Casbah: Counter-Terrorism and Torture,” translated by Robert L Miller. Enigma Books, New York, 2005. Originally published in French under the title of “SERVICES SPECIAUX Algerie 1955-1957” Perrin 2001

Fall, Bernard B. “The Siege of Dien Bien Phu: Hell in a Very Small Place.” Da Capo Press, New York an unabridged reprint of the 1^st Edition reprinted in arrangement with Harper and Row Publishers, New York. 1967

Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961

Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006

Galula, David. “Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958.” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA 2006. Originally published by RAND 1963

Hackworth, David H. and Sherman, Julie. “About Face: The Odyssey of an American Warrior,” a Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, New York. 1989

Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006

Karnow, Stanley. “Vietnam, a History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War,” The Viking Press, New York, 1983

Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986

Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984

Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992

Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005

Nolan, Keith William. “The Battle for Hue: Tet 1968,” Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1983

Pottier, Philippe (2005) Articles: GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War, Small Wars & Insurgencies,16:2,125 — 146 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310500079874

Roy, Jules. “The Battle of Dien Bien Phu” Carrol and Graf Publishers, New York 1984. Translated from the French by Robert Baldrick. English translation copyright 1965 by Harper and Row Publishers, New York.

Sheehan, Neil. “A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam,” Vintage Books, a division of Random House, New York, 1989

Shy, John and Collier, Thomas W. “Revolutionary War”in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,” Peter Paret editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton N.J. 1986

Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994

Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993

Trinquier, Roger. “Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency,” translated from the French by Daniel Lee with an Introduction by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Security International, Westport CT and London. 1964 and 2006. Originally published under the title “La Guerre Moderne” by Editions Table Ronde.

West, F.J. “The Village,” Pocket Books, a division of Simon and Schuster, New York. 1972.

Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004

[2] Galula, David. Counterinsurgency in Algeria: 1956-1958. RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2006. First published by RAND in 1963. p.244

[3] Krepinevich, Andrew F. “The Army and Vietnam,” The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1986 p.213

[4] Horn, Alistair. “A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962,” a New York Review Book published by the New York Review of Books, New York, 1977, 1987, 1996, and 2006 p 41

[5] Fall, Bernard B. “Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina.” Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg PA, 2005, originally published by Stackpole Publications 1961 p.27

[6] Ibid. p.33

[7] Horn. p.100.

[8] Windrow, Martin. “The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam,” Da Capo Press, Novato, CA 2006, originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 2004 p.63

[11] Simpson, Howard K. “Dien Bien Phu: The Epic Battle America Forgot,” Potomac Books Inc. Washington DC 2005, originally published by Brassey’s Inc. 1994 pp. 170-171

[13] Windrow. p.652.

[15] Galula, David. “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” Praeger Security International, Westport CT 1964 and 2006 p. 54

[16] Krepinevich. p.213

[17] Ibid. p.24

[18] Nagl, John A. “Learning to East Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,” University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2005 p.138

[19] Shy. p.856

[20] Krepinevich. p.202

[21] Spector, Ronald H. “After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam,” Vintage Press, a division of Random House, New York, 1993 p.314

[22] Millett, Allan R. and Maslowski, Peter. “For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America.” The Free Press, a division of Macmillian, Inc. New York, 1984 p.555

[23] Windrow. p.655

[24] Ibid. p.657

[25] Ibid.

[26] Moore, Harold G and Galloway, Joseph L. “We were Soldiers Once…and Young: Ia Drang: The Battle that Changed Vietnam,” Harper Collins Publishers, New York NY 1992 p. xx

[27] Krepinevich. p.275

[28] Ibid. p.274

Erroneous Assumptions

acolucci — Sun, 27 Sep 2009 14:12:03 +0000

War Games

During the days of the Cold War the danger of nuclear proliferation by the hands of the “Red” Soviets weighed heavy over those within the United States Army and the United States government. The impending threat of an nuclear attack and/or war lead to the movement for the monitoring and prediction of enemy military plans by calculation and record of all options within a possible military attack. This threat lead to the eventual research, development and implementation of what is termed in De Landa’s article as war games.

Two war theoreticians named Jomini and Clausewitz would rise to prominence within this area based of off the strategic military history of Napoleon. Jomini argued for a total elimination of any sources of friction (friction within this article means “any event or circumstance that may upset the implementation of the military plan” ) , and advocated the view of war as an endeavor ruled by “eternal laws”, which did not include the need for political maneuvering. In contrast Clausewitz argued that war did adhere to certain general guidelines or rules, however it included a political view of the military situation which enabled a strategy that could better deal with friction and could be easily manipulated to the situations unique factors. Despite the actual proof of the validity of war games from the Clausewitz’s approach, as witnessed in Helmuth von Moltke’s strategies during the Franco-Prussian war, Jominian theories prevailed due to Sheiflen’s leadership in World War I, and lead to the foundation of the current war game models first devised during the 1950s.

The Jominian theory was further bolstered by the historian Delbruck and his reconstruction of old battles with the use of current geographical and military statistical data. Much of Delbruck’s book History of the Art of War dismissed the fantastic accomplishments of ancient battles, which previously had been accepted as apart of the ‘eternal laws’ of military strategy. Additionally these lead to a greater emphasis on statistical data to help current modern militaries further their systematic and ‘scientific’ approach to mobilization and strategy in general. Hence, if an army general like Hannibal had indeed not mobilized a military force of 700,000 soldiers as previously accepted then how could modern militaries with their current technology and machine in tow, be able to do so?

Thus enters engineer Richard Lancaster, who helped militaries overcome this dilemma by providing a “mathematical expression to one of the ‘eternal laws’ of warfare.” This equation represented the true “physical situations involved and encouraged a purely numerical approach to warfare based on success in a limited domain”. This rigid “limited domain” aspect is amplified within war games and signals the beginning of a purely Jominian approach which omits any frictional factors. As the war games enter the computerization era under the leadership of companies such as RAND and entities like Operations Research, this artificial environment and it’s set of assumptions that are reinforced while the scientists try to “think RED”, begins to foster a limited approach to military and political circumstances.

RAND created a new paradigm called the Prisoner’s Dilemma which acted as an example of the nuclear dangers present during the Cold War. The Prisoner’s Dilemma was an imaginary scenario in which two prisoner’s are given various options; 1) help the police by testifying against their partner and receiving no jail time, 2) both betray each other they receive a mid-level sentence, and 3) if the neither betrays another they get a short sentence. The best choice according to “rational” thought would be to not trust your partner and to betray them. Thus in terms of nuclear disarm as De Landa states you cannot trust the enemy to get rid of his nuclear stockpile in the case that they do betray you so therefore you do not get rid of your own stockpile. This leads to the Nash Equilibrium in which both parties act out of self-interest and do not choose the most cooperative option but opt to do as they please, thus creating a sort of equilibrium in which this case both parties have the ability to annihilate the other by nuclear means, but latently act out of the self-good by recognizing the danger and decide to not use their nuclear weapons on each other. This type of logic was utilized within the war games even though it was a limited view based on a series of assumptions about humans, human behavior and their mindset. Additionally this game theory couldn’t account for what is termed as a “squishy problem”. Such squishy problems include morale, skill, motivation, negotiation, cooperation etc. Such a rigid war game model could never take into account these very human concerns. Other dangers as outlined by de Landa include;

Blurring of the situation between simulation and reality. Meaning that since these war games was utilizing real military data and actual maps of terrain it lead to the vision that this type of war effort was in fact a very near possibility. This then lead to irrational thinking and assumptions based off of war games within the military. The blurring of fantasy and reality can be seen in this clip of the film War Games starring Matthew Broderick in which “a young man finds a back door into a military central computer in which reality is confused with game-playing, possibly starting World War III”. (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086567/)
Corruption of data placed within the war games. This data was routinely manipulated by a series of factors such as the budgetary wars of the various branches of the military, which had to justify the amount of war weapons and their subsequent abilities within combat.
The increasing use of computerized war games as a “crystal ball”. Due to the first factor, which blurred the lines between reality and simulation, there was the danger of having people both within the project and people outside such as the public turning to these war games as a fortune-teller of the future.

These errors of assumptions based off of a limited persepctive are further explored in Andy Curtis’ documentary title The Trap.

The Trap

As seen within Andy Curtis’ film The Trap the basis of their models on the Nash school of game theory, has led to an inherently paranoid view of the world; in which individuals are constantly monitoring others and acting out of pure individual self-interest, the war game programmers began to unconsciously accept this artificial worldview omitting any ‘political’ and/or the other extraneous factors which are represented within the world outside of the model’s assumptions. This has led to a limited worldview, which is bleak, cold and ruthless. It is important to recognize that these war games and their views were born out of an era of heightened paranoia and therefore the assumptions and perspectives are specific to that time within history. Hence the continued use of such erroneous worldviews, assumptions about human behavior/character and current geo/political circumstances only further injuries mankind. This erroneous view was further exemplified when the Prisoner’s Dilemma was tested on the secretaries at RAND, in which they all trusted each other and opted to not betray one another and hoped for the shorter sentence. Consequently this demonstrates the inherent flaws possessed by game theory and within war games.

Meanwhile, these types of limited perspectives permeated throughout society as depicted within the film, ultimately these perspectives lead to paranoid thinking, and took hold within the political realm. In particular the film depicts the spread of the political notion within England that all governmental agencies where indeed trying to curtail the inherent freedoms of the people it was trying to serve. Thus according to Prime Minister Margret Thatcher, England would have to break down these governmental agencies and allow for free market enterprise to take control. However this type of thinking has been created out of a series of assumptions based off of a paranoid worldview in which humans only act out of self-interest, this worldview does not always work within the real world, and this lays the problem of it all.

If you assume then you know nothing. Such an assumption of general paranoia about the world and its people can only lead to a spiraling path downward.

War Games and the End of the World

nsussmane — Sun, 27 Sep 2009 03:22:33 +0000

In this section of War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Manuel de Landa recounts the role of modern war games in predicting military conflict. When modern war games first came into being, there were two theories of how these games should be played to accurately predict battles. There was the theory of Jomini: war as a purely military concern, governed by a set of eternal laws that act as the basis of the game. There was also the theory of Clausewitz: war as an extension of politics with outside factors such as friction and fear, taken into account. In the end, it was Jomini’s theory that became the basis of modern war games.

De Landa suggests that war games consist of two components: hardware and software. The hardware component consists of a model of a stretch of terrain or a map. The software component consists of a relatively rigid set of rules that represent the laws of warfare, as suggested by Jomini.

The eternal laws of war were first expressed in mathematical form when Richard Lanchester distilled Jomini’s concentration of force principle into an equation, encouraging a purely numerical approach to warfare. Mathematics was applied to warfare with the creation of the RAND Corporation, which focused on game theory. The main application of game theory in this setting is to create a model of the enemy’s mind (in this case the Soviet mind) and then use this model to predict how a conflict (global nuclear war) would play out.

De Landa suggests that this mathematical modeling of conflict has introduced an artificial pro-conflict bias into nuclear negotiations, making nuclear disarmament impossible. RAND’s simulations depended on one scenario created by game theory, a branch of mathematics created to analyze poker games. This scenario is called “The Prisoner’s Dilemma” in which two prisoners are accused of a crime. The prisoners are separated and each presented with the choice of testifying against his partner or of maintaining his innocence. If one betrays the other, the betrayer walks free and the other gets a long sentence. If they both betray each other, they both get mid-length sentences. If they neither betrays the other, they both get short sentences. Although the best overall outcome is for neither to betray the other, it is considered more rational to betray one’s partner. If his partner does not betray him, then he goes free. If his partner does betray him, then he avoids the longer sentence.

This conclusion was applied to the process of nuclear negotiations. While the best overall result is nuclear disarmament, neither can risk betrayal, and the nuclear annihilation that could accompany it. So they betray each other, and build up nuclear arsenals.

The Trap

According to Adam Curtis’ film “The Trap”, this paranoid philosophy has infected all aspects of society. Both sides use their stockpiles of nuclear weapons as deterrents and each side is kept from acting out of the fear of nuclear annihilation. This proves that stability can be created through fear and self-interest.

The mathematician John Nash applied this to all human interactions. He showed through his Nash Equilibrium, the point at which neither player can improve his outcome assuming that the other player does not change her actions. In this sense, everyone’s self interest is balanced. This only works when people behave selfishly and fails when people begin to cooperate. This theory relies on the idea that people are selfish and isolated, working only for themselves. This idea gained acceptance in the climate of fear that accompanied the Cold War period, when the world seemed to be on the edge of nuclear annihilation. To get a sense of the possible consequences of nuclear war and better understand this paranoid mentality, I would recommend Albino Black Sheep’s “End of the World” Video and the doomsday scene in the film “Dr. Strangelove or How I learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb”, see bellow.

Social policies based on these theories were implemented by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. In these policies, public servants were encouraged to follow their own self-interest through incentives rather than for the public good. These systems utilize a strategy created by Alian Enthoven called Systems Management that aims to eliminate all emotions and replace them with mathematical targets. These mathematical incentives helped shape the health care systems of the US and UK.

At first, these theories of self interest reminded me of the 17th Century economist Adam Smith and his book “The Wealth of Nations”, in which he advocated for a free market, unrestricted by government intervention. He believed that the individual’s pursuit of his own interests would inadvertently benefit society more than if he had been working to better society. However, as I progressed further into the reading and the film, it became increasingly clear to me that the theory of unimpeded self-interest benefiting society, as supported by John Nash and Margaret Thatcher, was really an excuse to take stricter control. By supporting this bleak vision of humanity and keeping the United States on the brink of nuclear war, these governments kept people in constant fear, both of nuclear annihilation and of the motives of those around them. In this climate, it was easy to maintain control over people by placing them into a mathematical system in which they governed themselves, chasing after the goals that the government had set for them.

So what do you guys think? Do I have it completely wrong and am I just a crazy conspiracy theorist? Do you think that people are as isolated and selfish as suggested by this Cold War ideology?

Former Taiwanese President Jailed for Life

count us out — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 11:59:54 +0000

By John Chan 23 September 2009 In a highly political court decision on September 11, former Taiwanes

Somalia Refugee Situation Worsens

Kevin — Fri, 18 Sep 2009 20:04:05 +0000

Somali Children

Recent reports coming from the Voice of America and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are indicating that the loss of life from Somalis fleeing poverty and conflict will increase. A number of factors are influencing people to flee the country. Decades of instability, extreme poverty, and now the armed conflict between al-Shabab and the African Union Peace Keeping forces.

For some the most likely route to a better life entails crossing the Gulf of Aden to Yemen. Already this year 270 people have drowned in the attempt. For others who choose a shelter in place strategy, the results are not much better. A recent LA Times article reports that the hospital in Mogadishu is filled with gunshot and shrapnel victims. Sadly, one third are children.

Even for those removed from the conflict, daily life is at best a struggle. With nearly 50% of the population living on less than $2US a day survival is a long shot.

Ironically this humanitarian catastrophe has only recently received major media attention as Somalia gained notoriety for pirate activities. Despite rumors to the contrary piracy is not a means to finance the conflict or terrorism, according to the NATO maritime wing commander in the country. Instead piracy has become a means for a few to enhance the lives of many in a country with few other options. The RAND Corporation recently stated that as much as 20% of the ransom pirates earn goes into improving infrastructure and increasing employment. The RAND study suggested that piracy could be kept under control by enhancing economic incentives so that local residents would have other means to earn a living.

Somalia is not the only African country to experience economic or political strife. Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi all bare the scars of turmoil, famine, and civil wars. Compassion International has been working in Africa since 1980 helping children cope with famine, drought, epidemics of AIDS, cholera, and the hardships of ongoing local conflicts. Even after nearly 30 years of humanitarian efforts Compassion International still serves over 317,000 children; a testimony to the dire conditions found in most African countries.

Still, Somalia somehow stands out. It is country with economic potential, military significance, and a desire by its people for a stable government. Right now though, it is a country with not much more than hope.

[If you would like to help children in need Compassion International operates in many African countries. Please sponsor a child. ]

Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clips re: 9/11 & Nuclear Trafficking

Erik Larson — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 06:27:35 +0000

Sibel Edmonds testified under oath August 8, 2009. This post contains links to four video clips and transcript portions related to her testimony regarding 9/11 and nuclear trafficking:

1) Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: State Secrets Gag Order

This segment covers her testimony regarding former Attorney General John Ashcroft claim of State Secrets to justify placing two gag orders on her. The first gag order was in response to her First Amendment case, the second when she was subpoenaed by 9/11 families regarding her knowledge of Saudi institutions and Al Qaeda financing.

2) Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: Nuclear Trafficking- US & Turkish Officials & RAND

This segment covers her testimony regarding the involvement of US and Turkish officials in a nuclear trafficking network, and the outing of Brewster Jennings as a CIA front company which was investigating them.

3) Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: Behrooz Sarshar – 9/11 Foreknowledge

This segment covers her testimony regarding Behrooz Sarshar, an FBI translator who Edmonds took to the FBI’s Inspector General and the 9/11 Commission; Sarshar had personal knowledge that the “FBI received information in April 2001 from a reliable Iranian intelligence asset that Osama bin Ladin was planning attacks on four to five cities with planes. Some of the people were already in the country, and the attacks would happen in a few months.”

4) Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: ‘Cold War Is Not Over’

This segment covers her testimony regarding US and Turkish government officials and other entities engagement in “… practices and policies that were inimical to American interests and had, in fact, resulted in both the direct and indirect loss of American lives.” To summarize this, Edmonds says, “The best way to describe it is Cold War is not over.” These ‘practices and policies’ include: CIA radicalizing Muslims for use in proxy wars contributed to 9/11; providing protection and aid, including US sanctuary, for Fetullah Gulan- a founder of radical Madrassahs; trafficking in nuclear secrets and outing Brewster Jennings as a CIA front company in Summer 01, when Marc Grossman discovered it was getting close to the nuclear trafficking network.

For the deposition video in its entirety, see BradBlog.com: http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7374

Full transcript here: http://www.bradblog.com/Docs/SibelEdmondsDeposition_Transcript_080809.pdf

Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: 'Cold War Is Not Over'

Erik Larson — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 04:52:15 +0000

Sibel Edmonds testified under oath August 8, 2009. This segment covers her testimony regarding US and Turkish government officials and other entities engagement in “… practices and policies that were inimical to American interests and had, in fact, resulted in both the direct and indirect loss of American lives.” To summarize this, Edmonds says, “The best way to describe it is Cold War is not over.” These ‘practices and policies’ include: CIA radicalizing Muslims for use in proxy wars contributed to 9/11; providing protection and aid, including US sanctuary, for Fetullah Gulan- a founder of radical Madrassahs; trafficking in nuclear secrets and outing Brewster Jennings as a CIA front company in Summer 01, when Marc Grossman discovered it was getting close to the nuclear trafficking network.

VIDEO CLIP:

youtube.com/watch?v=Mk_jI1kewko (REMOVED – 12” vid; YouTube has 10” limit)

http://my.nowpublic.com/world/sibel-edmonds-cold-war-not-over

SOURCE: See Video 3 of 5, Transcript pgs 88-99

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7374

http://www.bradblog.com/Docs/SibelEdmondsDeposition_Transcript_080809.pdf

TRANSCRIPT, Pgs. 88-99:

Q … I understand that you executed an affidavit or a declaration actually in this case on August 5, 2009. I’m happy to show it to you. I’ve only got one copy, but I’m happy to show it to you if you’d like to see, but I just have some questions about some of the things you said in the declaration. In Paragraph 3 of your declaration, you say, “I also obtained evidence that the government of Turkey had engaged in practices and policies that were inimical to American interests and had, in fact, resulted in both the direct and indirect loss of American lives.” Do you recall saying that in your declaration?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell me what practices and policies that you were referring to that were inimical to American interests?

A There’s several. One is practices and operations implemented from mid-1990s at least until towards end of 2001 in Central Asia and Caucasus, and these operations and practices included Islamization of certain segments of those Turkic nations, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan. There are so many of them in that — in that area, and setting up madrasahs and bringing in, helping bringing — at the time they were not referred to as al-Qaeda until 2001, September 11th. They were referred to as mujahideens from Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia, then to Turkey to give them passports, and then funnel them in 1997, 1998 to certain Eastern European countries and the Balkans. And also — and it’s very broad I can go on for a long time about what practices and why they were — they were against the security and the interests of the Americans and the lives.

Q Okay. Well, I don’t want to burden you too much, but I would like as complete an answer as you can give us in terms of what you were referring to.

A Those operations when until — at least until September 2001, and again, for those operations, they corroborated and worked with certain U.S. persons who were involved in these operations. The other, the obtaining, illegally obtaining and selling U.S. military and military technology and that includes weapons and nuclears, and even from foreign policy related secret or high — top secret information, and not only for Turkey, but passing this information to what they refer to as highest bidders and whoever bid highest, whether these people were nation-states or they were just individuals that they were pursuing under counterterrorism after September 11. That would be another example of activities that they were involved that were against the security and the interest of the Americans with cost in terms of lives.

Q Well, that was going to be my next question, is how do you connect what the Turkish government was doing to the direct and indirect loss of American lives.

A One example of this would be with Brewster Jennings, for example, just selling that information and giving that information out in the hands of those foreign entities, including Pakistan. One of the things that the CIA was asked for right away, to do damage assessment, and one of the things that came out of it was the damage assessment included damage to asset both in terms of effectiveness, which was neutralized and that Brewster Jennings’ front company for CIA have to be immediately absolved that summer after this information was obtained, but also they were accessing U.S. people who were compromised because of that by — within these foreign governments. That’s another. And the third one that I started talking about were helping these individuals from Azerbaijan, the Turkey entities that served the mujahideen groups starting from 1995, 1996. They were given Turkish passports. In some cases they were given Azerbaijani passports, and they — Turkey played a very active and important role in taking these people and moving them into Europe and some of those people actually ended up in the United States.

Q And I think you indicated earlier that the Turkish government to your knowledge was provided support to what was once called the mujahideen.

A Correct.

Q It’s now called al-Qaeda.

A Right.

Q And has it generally been publicly reported that al-Qaeda was behind the 9/11 attacks?

A Correct.

Q And that cost American lives?

A Correct.

Q How else has, to your knowledge, the mujahideen or al-Qaeda that Turkey was supporting cost American lives?

A September 11 and the other category I talked about was the intelligence and identifying assets or the front companies. The third category that involved narcotics activities and that was, at least until I left, these Turkish people, and some of them are directly connected to Turkish intelligence and Turkish military in the United States, they played a very significant role in bringing in heroin from source from Afghanistan to Turkey, but from Turkey into both United States, but also directly to Belgium, large quantity, very, very large quantity of heroin.

Q All right. So if I were to say that — if I were a Congress person and I’m taking money from the Turkish government either directly or indirectly, would it be a fair statement that I’m taking money from a government that has engaged in policies and practices that cost American lives?

A Correct.

Q Are you familiar with a person named Fetullah Gulan, G-u-l-a-n?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us who that is?

A My information is mainly about his activities and issues that were, again, done from late 1990s until I left, and then after that it will be known activities here in the United States. He shortly — he was the religious activist figure in Turkey, and he landed on Turkish government’s wanted list and was going to be persecuted for wanting to throw Turkish secular government — replace it with Islamic shariah kind of type of government. And when he was wanted in Turkey for that and he was going to go to jail, he actually got on the plane and came to the United States, and he was given immediately visa to stay in the United States, and he has been in the United States until now as far as I know. He has since established more than 300 madrasahs in Central Asia and what he calls universities that have a front that is called Moderate Islam, but he is closely involved in training mujahideen-like militia Islam who are brought from Pakistan and Afghanistan into Central Asia where his madrasahs operate, and his organization’s network is estimated to be around $25 billion. He has opened several Islamic universities in the United States. As I said it’s being promoted under Moderate Islam. It is supported by certain U.S. authorities here because of the operations in Central Asia, but what they have been doing since late 1990s is actually radical Islam and militizing (phonetic) these very, very young, from the age 14, 15, by commandoes they use, and this is both commandoes from Turkish military, commandoes from Pakistani ISI in Central Asia and Azerbaijan, and after that they bring them to Turkey, and from Turkey they send them through Europe, to European and elsewhere. Up until 1999, the Turkish government, also paramilitary units in Central Asia, they operated under the groups that call themselves Gray Wolves, ultra-nationalists, and their method was, you know, assassination of certain leaders in the Central Asian countries, and militizing, but not through Islam. But after this scandal that took place in Turkey, Susurluk scandal, they were no longer supported by certain segments in the United States, and instead some of our people involved in foreign policy, they supported the Islamic movements of Gulan in the Central Asian countries in order to counter Russia as far as the energy sources are concerned in those countries.

Q How is it, if you know, or how is it that Gulan is allowed to be in the United States? Let me ask a different question.

A Okay.

Q I’m sorry. Is that an individual based on what you’ve told me that you would be — that you would consider a threat to U.S. interests?

A One hundred percent, absolutely.

Q And if you know, how is it that he’s allowed to be in the United States?

A Because part of what he has in terms of the deal with certain segments in the United States is furthering the interests of the people who are interested in the energy sources in Central Asia, and that is the — whether it’s oil or whether it’s natural gas, and basically it’s a fight. The best way to describe it is Cold War is not over. It’s a continuation of Cold War over those nations, and what we did in Afghanistan in early 1980s with mujahideen, we have been joined now in Central Asia by using Islam and extremism and these madrasahs, and Pakistani and Afghani elements to build (unintelligible) and staff in terms of those resources towards certain business interests.

Q Did you say that Gulan had set up schools in the United States as well?

A Yes.

Q Are some of those in Cincinnati, if you know?

A I’m not sure. I know of some in Texas. I know one in Virginia, but I don’t know. They are multiplying, and they’re spreading rapidly. There’s Islamic madrasahs or universities everywhere. So I haven’t kept track of the locations. I don’t know.

Sibel Edmonds Deposition Video Clip: Nuclear Trafficking- US & Turkish Officials & RAND

Erik Larson — Thu, 17 Sep 2009 04:36:50 +0000

Sibel Edmonds testified under oath August 8, 2009. This segment covers her testimony regarding the involvement of US and Turkish officials in a nuclear trafficking network, and the outing of Brewster Jennings as a CIA front company which was investigating them.

VIDEO CLIP:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sEk3JybztZg

http://my.nowpublic.com/world/sibel-edmonds-nuclear-trafficking-us-turkish-officials-rand

SOURCE: See Video 2 of 5, Transcript pgs 54-64

http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7374

http://www.bradblog.com/Docs/SibelEdmondsDeposition_Transcript_080809.pdf

TRANSCRIPT, Pgs. 54-64:

Q Okay. Ms. Edmonds, have you ever reviewed your Wikipedia entry?

A Once in a while I do. I don’t know when was the last time, but maybe a year ago.

Q Okay. I mean, do you know have you contributed to it or do you know people who do contribute to it?

A No. I know many people, they give me mainstream media articles or any reports. They put it in there, but, no, I haven’t contributed.

Q When you’ve looked at it, have you thought that it’s generally accurate about most of the statements?

A Yes, generally, yes.

Q One of the things that it indicates in your biographical information is that you’ve made certain allegations. Some of them we’ve talked about a little bit, and I wanted to ask you about some of the others. One of the entries indicates nuclear secrets black market, and it says, “Edmonds alleges that in the course of her work for the government she found evidence that the FBI, State Department and Pentagon had been infiltrated by a Turkish and Israeli run intelligence network that paid high ranking American officials to steal nuclear weapons secrets,” and they have some footnotes for that, some cites.

Is that correct that you’ve made those allegations?

A That information is correct, and if ever — you can get, I would say, those government organizations and others. There’s another place missing there. They list the State Department itself, but there is one other place that’s missing.

Q And what is that place?

A That would be RAND Corporation.

Q And can you tell me about the — give me some more information about the Turkish and Israeli run intelligence network that is referred to there?

A This information has been public, documenting methods of intelligence gathering. Yes. Through certain U.S. officials, executively appointed officials, foreign entities, not necessarily or not only government related; so if you say Israel and Turkey, not only government but other entities because it has multi-layers.

Q All right.

A Their operations, and some of these layers sometimes they conduct their operations independently and with the sole purpose of obtaining a profit, and therefore, the information they obtain, let’s say, the nuclear or weapons technology, weapons technology related information doesn’t necessarily only go to Turkey or Israel, but they sell it to the highest bidder. That’s how they operate. They contact their people whether it’s in ISI, in Washington, D.C. part of the military attache for Pakistani intelligence, or the certain Saudi business people in Detroit may be contacted, and they say, okay, and talk about these Turkish entities. This is we have obtained this particular DVD containing this, and this person is willing to pay 500,000. Will you offer more because if you don’t, we will give it to this person. So what I’m trying to say is they do it both for governments, foreign governments, but some of those operatives, they also — they offer it in open market, and they have — they have individuals on their payroll on almost every major nuclear facility in the United States. RAND Corporation and various — in Midwest, various Air Force labs that develop certain weapons technology, which I am not very familiar with the technology itself.

Q When you refer to the or when the article refers to the paid, high ranking American officials, can you identify who they are?

A That person has been identified by others.

Q Okay.

A And he has been identified as Mr. Marc Grossman, who used to work for the State Department.

Q Right, and Mr. Grossman, I think, was also in your gallery, correct?

A Yes.

Q And I read somewhere that Mr. Grossman had some relationships with a Turkish organization, Turkish diplomats here in the United States.

A Yes. He had very, very close relationship with not only Turkish diplomatic communities and entities, but business and also some of these criminal layer operatives that I told you about. Currently, that he’s nor working; he actually is working for a Turkish company called Ihals Holding.

Q Okay. Now, was Mr. Grossman the ambassador to Turkey at some point?

A Yes.

Q Okay, and then what was his position at the State Department, if you recall?

A He had several different positions. I believe in 1999 or 2000, was European Affairs. That dealt a lot with NATO, and afterwards during early bush administration’s stage, he was the second or the third highest person in the State Department. I’m not sure about the title.

Q Okay, and during that time — I’m sorry — during that time when he was the second or third highest ranking person in State, I’ve read somewhere that you’ve alleged that he actually warned the Turkish Embassy about a CIA front company that had been set up to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A That would be summer 2001. Whatever title he held at that point, he, Mr. Grossman, informed a certain Turkish diplomatic entity who was also an independent operative of a company called Brewster Jennings because Brewster Jennings was frequenting the American Turkish Council as a consulting or analyst firm, and there were certain nuclear related operatives who wanted to hire Brewster Jennings and have it pose as a front company. So there were talks between those Turkish operatives and Brewster Jennings, and Mr. Grossman wanted those people to be warned that Brewster Jennings was a government front, front for government, and it was a front. It was not a company for the front for government, U.S. government, and for those Turkish individuals to be told to stay away from Brewster Jennings. But the person who received that information, the Turkish diplomatic but also operative, actually contacted the Pakistani military attache and discussed with the person who was there about this fact and also told them, warned them to stay away from Brewster Jennings.

Q And now was this one of the allegations or one of the concerns that you brought to the attention of anybody at any point?

A You mean when I was working for the FBI –

Q Yes.

A — and I blew the whistle inside the FBI?

Q Right.

A No, I didn’t do it inside the FBI because at that point I didn’t know they were covering up this information. Only after I was fired and the State Secrets Privilege was invoked, and knowing what I knew, I went to Congress and discussed it with certain people in Congress. I brought it up with the Inspector General’s Office inside during a meeting, and at that point will provide them the details in terms of dates and who were those targets, which I can’t provide right now, the direct targets.

Q And when you say “the Inspector General’s Office,” do you mean a DOJ Inspector General?

A Correct. I’m sorry. Glenn Fine’s, under Glenn Fine’s office.

Q And why would Mr. Grossman, if you know, warn the Turkish government and other people not to deal with this CIA front?

A There were various relationships and various activities Mr. Grossman was engaged with these individuals, and I don’t know which reasons was the top reason for him to do it. Some of them were the monetary relationship, but others dated back to operations that he was leading while he was an ambassador in — U.S. ambassador in Ankara, in Turkey, until 1997, and some of these operatives dealt with him, and they were doing certain operations in Central Asia for him. I don’t know who he was working for, Mr. Grossman, at the time for his operations. It’s hard for me to tell. He was involved in so many different things, and I don’t know which one constitutes the biggest reason he was providing this.

Rand Corporation on Healthcare...

Tamara — Fri, 04 Sep 2009 12:28:00 +0000

News Release

OFFICE OF MEDIA RELATIONS
703-413-1100 x5117
and 310-451-6913
media@rand.org

FOR RELEASE
Monday
August 31, 2009

Retail Medical Clinics Can Provide Care at Lower Cost, Similar Quality As Other Medical Settings

Retail medical clinics located in pharmacies and other stores can provide care for routine illnesses at a lower cost and similar quality as offered in physician offices, urgent care centers or emergency departments, according to a new RAND Corporation study.

The study, the first to assess the quality of care provided in retail medical clinics in the United States, compared the care provided in different settings for patients with middle ear infections, sore throats and urinary tract infections. Researchers found no difference in the quality offered to patients visiting retail clinics, physician offices and urgent care centers, but retail clinics did slightly better than hospital emergency departments.

The American Academy of Pediatrics and other physician groups have raised concerns about the quality of care provided at retail clinics, including whether the clinics might be likely to overprescribe antibiotics and limit preventive care by disrupting normal doctor-patient interactions. The RAND study found no evidence to support the concerns. The study is published in the Sept. 1 edition of the Annals of Internal Medicine.

“These findings provide more evidence that retail clinics are an innovative new way of delivering health care,” said lead author Dr. Ateev Mehrotra, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and a researcher at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. “Retail clinics are more convenient for patients, less costly and provide care that is of equal quality as received in other medical settings.”

In a second study also published in the Annals of Internal Medicine, RAND researchers found that there are almost 1,000 clinics in the United States and that about one-third of urban Americans now live within a 10-minute drive of a retail medical clinic, further evidence the clinics can provide care to a growing number of Americans.

Retail medical clinics are walk-up medical providers typically located in drug stores and other retail chain stores such as Target and Wal-Mart rather than in medical facilities. Care most often is provided by nurse practitioners rather than by physicians.

In the study of quality of care, researchers examined the experiences of 2,100 patients treated at retail clinics in Minnesota during 2005 and 2006 for middle ear infections, sore throats or urinary tract infections. Those patients were compared to similar patients treated for the same ailments in physician offices, urgent care centers or hospital emergency departments.

The quality of medical care was judged using 14 indicators of quality and whether patients received seven preventive care services during the initial visit or over the subsequent three months. Quality scores for retail clinics were equal to or higher than those in other care settings, with the exception that a smaller proportion of high-risk patients received a urine culture at retail clinics.

The study found that the costs of treating the acute illnesses at retail clinics were 30 percent to 40 percent lower than in physician offices or urgent care centers and 80 percent lower than in emergency departments. The differences were primarily caused by lower payments for professional services and lower rates of laboratory testing.

Researchers caution that their findings may not adequately represent the care provided at all retail medical clinics. The study was conducted only in Minnesota, among insured patients, and among patients of only one retail clinic chain. In addition, the findings could be influenced by unmeasured factors such as whether less-sick patients, who need less-intensive services, seek out care at retail clinics rather than going to one of the other medical providers.

“We need to continue to examine retail medical clinics as they grow in number, but the results we have seen thus far suggest they provide high-quality care in a convenient and cost-effective fashion,” Mehrotra said.

The second study also found that more enterprises are beginning to operate retail medical clinics. While three for-profit companies including industry leader MinuteClinic operate about 70 percent of the nation’s retail medical clinics, an increasing number of hospital chains and physician groups are becoming involved.

In addition, new types of partnerships between existing providers and retail clinics have developed. Retailer Wal-Mart has partnered with local hospitals to co-brand clinics in its stores, and MinuteClinic and the Cleveland Clinic recently announced a partnership to run nine clinics together and to integrate electronic medical records.

Researchers also found that while retail clinics initially did not accept insurance, now most accept both private insurance and Medicare, and more than half also accept some form of Medicaid.

Funding for both studies was provided by the California HealthCare Foundation. Other authors of the studies are Rena Rudavsky, Hangsheng Liu, John L. Adams, Margaret C. Wang, Dr. Craig E. Pollack and Elizabeth A. McGlynn of RAND; Judith R. Lave of the University of Pittsburgh; and Dr. N. Marcus Thygeson and Dr. Leif I. Solberg of HealthPartners.

RAND Health, a division of the RAND Corporation, is the nation’s largest independent health policy research program, with a broad research portfolio that focuses on quality, costs and health services delivery, among other topics. RAND Health is the developer of COMPARE (Comprehensive Assessment of Reform Efforts), a one-of-a-kind online resource that provides objective analysis about national health care reform proposals. Visit www.randcompare.org to learn more.

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VA health care outperforms national average

morelightthanheat — Thu, 20 Aug 2009 04:15:57 +0000

The progressive blog posted an article recently that points out how an existing socialist health care system right here in the US outperforms the private system on all but one key indicator. Lest you dismiss the facts due to their supposedly unreliable source, the source is actually the RAND Corporation, hardly a bastion of liberal thought.

Here are the facts:

The only measure that lagged the national system was acute care, that was a small lag compared to the other indicators where the VA system generally outshone the national system by double digits.

Sure, you say, but what about the mold at Walter Reed? Yes, it was a problem, but it was fixed and people were held accountable, as in fired, as soon as the reports hit the news. Let us not forget who is currently the head of the Veterans Administration. None other than retired US Army General Eric Shinseki, the guy who dared to speak the truth to Donald Rumsfeld about the number of troops that would be required to win decisively in Iraq. The guy who was fired for speaking truth to power. Somehow ya gotta think that he’ll be a bit more willing to listen to dissent than the average joe. I’m glad he’s running the VA. He is one more example of the way President Obama picks people who are smart and who are willing to speak their minds. Too bad the previous administration couldn’t handle the truth.

So, once again, people are being frightened by lies.

Health Care Debate on Larry King Live with Dr. Ron Paul

fortruthandfreedom — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 17:05:27 +0000

It defies all logic and common sense to put the government in charge of anything important–especially health care.

Wasting money and waging unnecessary wars are about the only two things that the government consistently does efficiently and well.

STORIA DELLO SPIONAGGIO,A CURA DI TOMASO VIALARDI DI SANDIGLIANO E VIRGILIO ILARI,EDIZIONE ASSOCIAZIONE EUROPEA DEGLI AMICI DEGLI ARCHIVI STORICI,2006 15.00 EURO

prupitto24 — Thu, 23 Jul 2009 17:11:22 +0000

Il volume -frutto del lavoro di noti analisti strategici e storici militari-pone l’enfasi da un lato su alcuni aspetti di indubbio rilievo della intelligence italiana,nipponica,inglese e dall’altro lato pone l’accento sugli strumenti di contrasto del terrorismo e sulla importanza della guerra elettronica.
Sul fronte della intelligence italiana-PETROLA-sottolinea come durante il REGNO DI SARDEGNA le fonti di intelligence derivassero ora dalle analisi statistiche,ora dalle testimonianze degli emigrati ora infine dalle ricognizioni militari. Di fondamentale importanza-per comprendere chiaramente l’organizzazione dello spionaggio militare italiano-fu il contributo del gen.GOVONE che fu in grado di organizzare un efficiente servizio di intelligence a partire dal 1859.Questo successo fu reso possibile anche dalla lungimiranza del Ministro della Guerra LA MARMORA che,nell’aprile del 1855,emano’ una breve istruzione sulla necessita’ della intelligence e sulla indispensabilita’ di crearla secondo un criterio interforze.Tuttavia,tale legittima aspirazione,fu pienamente recepita-come sottolinea PASQUALINI-soltanto tra il 1918 e il 1925,periodo nel quale si consolido’ l’idea di una intelligence militare interforze .Proprio in questa direzione andarono le osservazioni di TATTONI-ministro degli Esteri-che nel 1919 contribui’ indubbiamente a gettare le premesse per la nascita del SIM,la cui struttura organizzativa fu tuttavia piu’ volte rivista nel corso della seconda guerra mondiale finendo per minarne l’efficienza. Paradossalmente l’attivita’ informativa militare italiana deve considerarsi piu’ organica e unitaria durante i primi anni del novecento,periodo nel quale-rileva CAPPELLANO-lo spionaggio fu centralizzato nell’UFFICIO I e nelle sue fondamentali ramificazioni periferiche(alludiamo all’Ufficio Scacchiere Orientale,Occidentale e Coloniale).Il contributo dato alla guerra elettronica dall’Inghilterra durante il primo e il secondo conflitto mondiale,fu assolutamente decisivo-sottolinea SANTONI-per lo sviluppo della SIGINT attuale.Infatti la STANZA 40 della Royal Navy-che fra l’altro consenti’ la corretta interpretazione del telegramma Zimmermann nel 1917-e la realizzazione di ULTRA nel 1939 presso BLETCHLEY PARK-grazie al quale fu possibile decifrare i messaggi della macchina crittografica tedesca ENIGMA-,costituiscono due pietre miliari della guerra elettronica.A tale proposito-TANI-osserva che durante la cold war l’uso della guerra elettronica raggiunse il proprio apice.Sia sufficiente riflettere sulla guerra del Vietnam- nella quale gli Usa si servirono con successo di RWR,ECM di nuova generazione,di missili anti-radiazione e veivoli specializzati denominati WILD-WEASEL-,sul conflitto arabo-israeliano del 1973 durante il quale Israele si servi’ di avanzate tecniche di inganno ECM RANGE GATE PULL OFF(che resero inutilizzabili i missili egiziani antinave STIX) e infine su quello con il Libano nel quale Israele distrusse l’intera difesa aerea siriana attraverso l’impiego combinato di mezzi di scoperta ESM,RPV,di missili guidati ZEEV portando in tal modo a termine una operazione NETWORKCENTER ante-litteram.Al di la’ della complessa articolazione della intelligence cinese-oggetto del saggio di MINI-e’ opportuno individuare alcune linee guida di rilievo.In primo luogo,la sicurezza dello stato cinese si costruisce sull’attivo coinvolgimento della societa’ civile sia nel settore della intelligence che in quello della counter-intelligence.Coinvolgimento reso possibile dalla piena compenetrazione tra il partito comunista e lo stato che si concretizza anche attraverso le unita’ di lavoro,i capi villaggio e i capi fabbrica.Tuttavia,allo scopo di realizzare un controllo sempre piu’ ampio della societa’,anche il partito possiede una serie di organismi di intelligence autonomi rispetto a quelli istituzionali.Sotto il profilo operativo,lo spionaggio cinese opera all’interno grazie all’uso della delazione,della tortura mentre all’esterno anche attraverso canali informali quali gli studenti, le agenzie di viaggio e gli istituti strategici.A conclusione del saggio,MINI osserva che per i cinesi il vantaggio tecnologico americano e’ disperso e reso vano da una prospettiva strategica limitata e dalla incapacita’ di valutare le conseguenze delle informazioni.La centralita’ della intelligence ,nel contrasto del terrorismo, e’ esplicitamente riconosciuta da GORI che-dopo una breve sinossi delle principali scuole di pensiero antiterroristiche(l’autore-a tale riguardo- scarta la soluzione di DERSHOWITZ ritenendola troppo radicale),sottolinea la grande utilita’ della strumentazione denominata ASAP messa a punto dalla RAND e altresi’ rileva l’indipensabilita’ di una collaborazione euro-americana possibile a patto che si comprenda la forma mentis del nemico servendosi della intelligence principalmente come strumento di prevenzione del terrorismo.Una riflessione a parte merita il saggio di VIALARDI e VIVIANI relativo al celebre caso MITROKIN.Secondo l’analitica disamina della vicenda compiuta dagli autori,emergono con nettezza alcuni punti fermi:in primo luogo appare inconsueto che un funzionario di statura mediocre quale fu MITROKIN potesse avere accesso a una documentazione cosi’ vasta e importante;in secondo luogo,appare altrettanto inusuale l’incompetenza del KGB nel consentirgli di accedere a questa documentazione senza rispettare le usuali misure di sicurezza.In terzo luogo,il contenuto dei fascicoli possiedono solo un valore storico e comunque furono certamente “ trattati” dal SIS e dalla CIA.Infine-secondo un modo di fare tipico delle farse teatrali-l’intelligence italiana e la classe politica invece di chiarire contenuti e finalita’ dei dossier,si accusarono reciprocamente di varie inadempienze contribuendo in tal modo da un alto a ingenerare maggiore confusione e dall’altro a privare di credibilta’ la documentazione di MITROKIN.
GAGLIANO GIUSEPPE