Bernard Madoff entrou para a história como ninguém deseja, ao ser o mentor do esquema Ponzi que resultou em um prejuízo total de US$ 50 bilhões, segunda maior fraude da história dos EUA, atrás apenas do escândalo da Enron em 2001, com perdas de US$ 63,4 bilhões.

Imagine se existisse uma fraude 50 vezes superior à de Madoff, com cerca de US$ 2,5 trilhões em perdas. Além do montante expressivo, idealize uma periodicidade mensal para tal prejuízo. Do impossível para a realidade subliminar, esse é o provável montante que os traders e bancos roubam da renda real do mundo através do petróleo.

Em artigo publicado no website Seeking Alpha, Philip Davis desnuda a possibilidade da maior fraude existente na história, ao revelar como aproximadamente 99% dos negócios nos mercados futuros de petróleo não passam de meras especulações, em um esquema envolvendo bancos, petrolíferas e até a própria imprensa.

Fantasma de mão dupla

“US$ 2,5 trilhões é menos do que o preço excedente que a população é manipulada todo mês para pagar por um barril de petróleo”, afirma Davis, ao ressaltar que tais roubos ocorrem na ICE (Intercontinental Exchange).

Criada em 2001, a ICE possui como fundadoras as petrolíferas BP (British Petroleum), Royal Dutch Shell e Total, além dos bancos Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank e Société Générale. A bolsa é sediada em Altanta, nos EUA, mas a regulação norte-americana passa longe das negociações.

Tamanha falta de regulação gera as chamadas dark pools of liquidity, ATS (Alternative Trading Systems) usados por traders que procuram movimentar grandes quantias sem revelar as operações no mercado aberto. Como decorrência, a especulação toma forma, e explica como o barril de petróleo saltou de US$ 40,00 para US$ 80,00 somente este ano, em meio à fraca demanda física pela commodity.

Á procura da verdade, Davis mostra que investigação do Congresso dos EUA datada de 2003 descobriu como a ICE é usada para facilitar negociações “round trip” (viagens de ida e de volta), nas quais uma firma “A” vende energia para uma empresa “B”, que vende novamente o mesmo montante de volta para a firma “A”: o resultado real é nulo, mas o sinal ascendente para os preços do petróleo não.

Preços disparam e ignoram demanda real

Na época em que a DMS Energy foi investigada pelo governo norte-americano, a empresa de energia assumiu que nada menos de 80% das negociações em 2001 eram fantasmas. Em movimento semelhante, a Duke Energy revelou que negociou US$ 1,1 bilhão através das round trips, sendo dois terços comercializados na ICE.

“Você pode enxergar o dano causado pelo Goldman Sachs e por sua gangue de ladrões quando olhar a diferença de preços antes da criação da ICE e depois da criação da ICE”, afirma Davis, ao ressaltar que, em apenas cinco anos após a criação (de 2001 a 2006), os preços das commodities triplicou – contraparte impossível na demanda.

Para Chris Cook, ex-diretor da International Petroleum Exchange, os laços entre bancos e petrolíferas são bem mais antigos do que se pensa. “Parece-me claro que o Goldman Sachs e a BP vêm trabalhando em cooperação – ao menos em um nível estratégico – por pelo menos 15 anos”, diz Cook.

A ponte mais do que estreita entre bancos e petrolíferas lembra a tese de Vladimir Lenin no texto “Imperialismo, fase superior do capitalismo”, no qual explicita a junção entre capital industrial e capital bancário, resultando apenas em um tipo de capital: o financeiro.

Petróleo: causa da recessão?

Antes da existência da ICE, as famílias norte-americanas gastavam, em média, 7% de sua renda em alimentos e combustíveis. No último ano, a proporção saltou para 20%. “Isso é 13% da renda de todo norte-americano, o que dá mais de US$ 1 trilhão por ano, roubados através da manipulação do mercado”, completa Davis, citando que, em uma escala global, US$ 4 trilhões são roubados por ano – 80 vezes o tamanho da fraude de Madoff.

Nesse sentido, Jeff Rubin, economista-chefe do CIBC (Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce), sugere que a recessão corrente foi causada pelos altos preços do petróleo, ao afirmar que as hipotecas não pagas nos EUA são apenas um sintoma da doença causada pelo óleo bruto. Talvez explique porque o Japão e algumas economias na Zona do Euro entraram em recessão antes mesmo da bolha norte-americana estourar.

Além disso, os elevados preços do petróleo foram responsáveis por quatro das últimas cinco recessões do mundo, podendo ter começado também a atual, caso confirmada a tese. “Os choques do petróleo criam recessões, ao transferirem bilhões de dólares de economias em que os consumidores gastam cada centavo que possuem para países com alta taxa de poupança. Enquanto esses petrodólares podem ser reciclados de volta para fundos soberanos de investimento, eles não são reciclados para a demanda real”, completa Rubin.

Parabéns, você construiu Dubai

Embora sem provas concretas, dada à falta de regulação na ICE – reguladores seriam subornados? -, a teoria da manipulação pode ser verdadeira, em um mercado cansado de especulação. Ou seria o próprio mercado a personificação da especulação?

Entre tantas questões, sempre lembre: quanto será da minha renda que está indo para a construção de um palácio de ouro no Oriente Médio, ou para algum trader do Goldman Sachs?

Fonte: Infomoney

E. Segovia – 23/11/2009

Fuente: Cotizalia

Parece que lo peor de la crisis mundial ha pasado, que por fin llegan los “brotes verdes”, que el pánico de hace un año no se repetirá, que la bolsa va a seguir subiendo indefinidamente y que el futuro será sin duda más brillante que el pasado. Pero todo esto puede ser un espejismo de acuerdo con el banco francés Société Générale (SG), que plantea un escenario de colapso de la economía mundial en algún momento de los dos próximos años.

Se trata sólo de una posibilidad; no es el escenario central de SG, sino el más negativo. Ahora bien, después de que hace un año ocurriera algo que ni siquiera los “peores escenarios” habían llegado a imaginar, no se puede descartar que ninguna posibilidad se haga real. Máxime cuando existen importantes argumentos que sostienen esta tesis y que el informe de SG desgrana.

A juicio de este estudio, los rescates estatales del último año han servido simplemente para transferir las obligaciones del sector privado a los sufridos hombros del público, lo que crea una enorme cantidad de problemas. La clave es que la deuda (tanto pública como privada) sigue siendo estratosférica en casi todos los países ricos, con niveles del 350% del PIB en EEUU. Y la solución no es que cambie de manos, sino reducirla con un duro ‘desapalancamiento’ que durará años.

“Por el momento, nadie puede decir con cualquier grado de certidumbre que hemos escapado de verdad de la posiilidad de un colapso económico global”, asegura el informe que firma el equipo de estrategia de activos capitaneado por Daniel Fermon. Si se cumple este escenario negativo de SG, el dólar seguirá cayendo, las bolas mundiales volverán a los mínimos de marzo, los precios de la vivienda volverán a hundirse y el petróleo recaerá por debajo de 50 dólares en 2010.

Los Gobiernos ya han agotado su margen de maniobra fiscal, pero, incluso aunque no incrementen el gasto, la deuda pública se disparará dentro de dos años hasta el 105% del PIB en Reino Unido, el 125% en EEUU y la zona euro, y un estratosférico 270% en Japón. El volumen global de deuda pública alcanzará 45 billones de dólares, lo que significa que se habrá multiplicado por dos veces y media en una década.

La deuda pública es insostenible

“El altísimo nivel de deuda pública parece totalmente insostenible a largo plazo. Prácticamente hemos alcanzado un punto de no retorno para la deuda de los Estados”, concluye el informe. Ahora bien, reconoce que inflar la deuda pública es considerado el mal menor por muchos Gobiernos, lo cual hará que el oro “suba y suba sin parar” como el único refugio frente al dinero fiduciario.

La situación de la deuda privada no es mejor: a juicio de este banco, aunque la tasa de ahorro de EEUU se estabilice en el 7% y se utilice entera para reducir deuda, harán falta nueve años para que los hogares devuelvan su ratio deuda/ingresos a los niveles seguros de los años 80.

Con este panorama, son inevitables las comparaciones con Japón durante su Década Perdida (o dos), aunque con una gran diferencia: lo nipones pudieron mantenerse a flote gracias a sus exportaciones a una sólida economía global y a la depreciación del yen. Ahora no es posible que medio mundo persiga la misma estrategia al mismo tiempo.

¿Qué hacer para protegerse del desastre?

Las recomendaciones de SG para sus clientes son vender dólares y ponerse bajista en valores cíclicos como tecnología, automóviles y viajes para evitar ser atrapados en la “espiral deflacionista”. También sufrirán los mercados emergentes, que son más dependientes del crecimiento norteamericano que la propia Wall Street. En cuanto a materias primas, recomienda las agrícolas. Tampoco le gustan los bonos de alta rentabilidad (high yield), para los que espera una caída del 31% en 2010.

Paradójicamente, SG sí confía en la deuda pública, que cree que puede ofrecer grandes ganancias si se repite el desplome de su rentabilidad (precio y rentabilidad se mueven a la inversa en los bonos) de los bonos japoneses en lo peor de la crisis: el tipo de bono japonés a 10 años llegó a caer al 0,4%. Además, la Fed piensa seguir comprando bonos, lo que presionará aún más en esa dirección. Ahora bien, la opinión mayoritaria es la contraria: que los altos precios actuales no son sostenibles si los Gobiernos siguen inundando el mercado de papel.

Potrivit unui site specializat in informatii financiare, Guvernul francez si-ar dori o fuziune intre Société Générale si banca franco-belgiana Dexia, care beneficiaza de o bucata de vreme de sprijin financiar guvernamental. Este al treilea zvon aparut in ultimele 7 zile care anunta pe surse o asemenea fuziuni, cu toate ca ambii protagonisti refuza sa comenteze pe marginea lui. Potrivit Wansquare, Société Générale s-ar fi opus unui asemenea proiect, desi analistii vad il vad ca pe unul foarte fezabil.

Societe Generale, a doua bancă din Franţa după capitalizare, prezentă şi în România prin BRD SocGen, a rambursat statului francez ajutorul de 3,4 miliarde euro primit pe fondul crizei, a anunţat arbitrul pieţei de capital franceze, citat de Bloomberg.
Astfel, SocGen a rambursat pe 4 noiembrie suma primită de la Societe de Prise de Participation de l’Etat, instituţia statului francez care a făcut injecţia de capital băncilor.
Societe Generale, condusă de directorul său general Frederic Oudea, şi-a sporit capitalul cu 4,8 miliarde euro luna trecută, cu scopul de a rambursa ajutorul primit de la stat şi pentru a-şi consolida capitalul.
Primele cinci bănci din Franţa au primit circa 20 miliarde euro de la stat, pentru susţinerea capitalului acestora şi al finanţărilor, după şocul suferit anul trecut de piaţă în urma prăbuşirii Lehman Brothers.

IN THE SCENARIO I’M ABOUT to paint for you, the dialog is fictional, but all the facts and figures are real.

The time: 1 a.m., November 23, 2011, exactly two years from now.
The place: the White House, suddenly and unexpectedly under siege as a new financial crisis erupts.

The economic booms of 2010 have morphed into superbooms … the superbooms into bubbles … and the bubbles into busts.
Large banks are again on the brink. Financial markets are again in turmoil. Wall Street giants like Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley — the outstanding survivors of an off-again-on-again debt crisis — are now its primary victims. Investments like long-term U.S. Treasury bonds — long sought as safe harbors — are now collapsing in price, turning into torpedoes that can sink even the sturdiest of portfolios. But most important, the government’s too-big-to-fail bailouts, shotgun mergers, and mad money printing — previously hailed as cures that killed the contagion of 2008 — are now widely viewed as far worse than any disease.

President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner have huddled in the Oval Office for hours, struggling to find new solutions to old problems: Wall Street meltdowns, renewed threats of a great depression, millions more thrown out of work. After a long and heated debate, the president slumps back into his armchair, signaling it’s time to talk more frankly — to reminisce about past policies and rethink what might have gone wrong.

“With 20-20 hindsight,” he remarks after an introspective pause, “it’s clear we were overly focused on the intended consequences of our efforts — the economic recovery, the bounceback in markets, the jobs saved. Meanwhile, we were blindsided by the unintended consequences, many of which have proven to be bigger, more durable and, ultimately, more impactful than the benefits we did achieve.”

The Treasury Secretary, weary from marathon meetings on precisely the same subject, nods in silent agreement. “So, perhaps one of our tasks,” continues the president, “should be to document two basic issues: What precisely are the unintended consequences? And what exactly did we do to cause them?”

“We don’t have to,” says Geithner sheepishly.
“Why not?”
“Because it’s already been done. Those issues have already been thoroughly documented.”
“Since when?”
“Since the fall of 2009. That’s when SIGTARP — the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program — revealed the mistakes we made with the giant AIG bailout. And that’s also around the time the public began to react to the enormous contradiction between massive unemployment on Main Street and the monster we helped to create on Wall Street.”

Monster Bonuses
“Monster?” queries Obama. “You mean the giant bonuses?”
“Exactly. We already knew Wall Street execs had been giving themselves megabonuses for most of the decade —
— $29 billion for Citigroup’s Weill in 2003 … $27 billion for Blankfein at Goldman Sachs in 2006 … another $106 billion for Jon Winkelried and Gary Cohn, also at Goldman Sachs, in 2006-2007 … and many more. We already knew how the money from these obscenely large bonuses alone could have been enough to save millions of jobs.”
“Yes.”
“But what we did not know is how soon after the bailouts Wall Street would be at it again — first, dishing out megabonuses to heavy hitters in their trading rooms … then to sluggers in their sales departments … and later, as soon as the public tired of protesting, to themselves.”
“Exactly how soon?”

Geithner answers with questions of his own. “When was Wall Street on the verge of a total meltdown? In September of 2008! When were the record bonuses paid out? In December of 2009! So that’s 14 months. It was just 14 months later that the employee bonuses at the three big Wall Street survivors — Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley — exceeded all prior records.”
“Even the record bonuses they paid out before the crisis?” the president asks with a mix of disbelief and disdain.
“Yes, even bigger than their record bonuses paid out before the crisis.”
“But why do we blame ourselves for all this?” the president wonders out loud.

The Bungled AIG Bailout
“In public, we don’t … and hopefully never will,” responds Geithner furtively. “But in private, we must admit that we screwed up — particularly with the AIG bailout.”
“Why?”
“For the simple reason that we — the Treasury and FRBNY, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York — didn’t just bail out AIG. Indirectly, we also bailed out all of AIG’s major counterparties, the biggest of which were Société Générale and Goldman Sachs.”
“Said who?”
“Said SIGTARP, the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, in its special report of November 2009. I have a copy of the report right here.”
“What precisely did SIGTARP find?” asks the president.
“In essence, they found that AIG’s counterparties — 16 major global banks — should have lost money in their trades with AIG, just like most investors lost money when other companies failed. But instead, AIG’s counterparties did not lose money. We made those creditors whole, practically to the penny.”
“How much did we pay ‘em?”
Before responding, the Treasury secretary flips to page 20 of the SIGTARP report and glances down at Table 2 — Total Payments to AIG Default Swap Counterparties (reproduced below).

Source: SIGTARP, November 17, 2009. “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit 
Payments to AIG Counterparties”

“Société Générale,” he says, “got $9.6 billion in collateral payments from the money we had loaned earlier to AIG. Plus, we paid Société Générale another $6.9 billion through a special purpose vehicle we created, called Maiden Lane III. In total, the French bank walked off with $16.5 billion.
“Goldman Sachs,” continues Geithner, “got $8.4 billion in collateral payments, plus another $5.6 billion from Maiden Lane, adding up to $14 billion. “Deutsche Bank got a total of $8.5 billion … Merrill Lynch — $6.2 billion … UBS — $3.8 billion … plus …”
“Please cut to the chase,” says the president impatiently. “How much overall?”
“They got $62.1 billion, plus another $2.5 billion we agreed to pay to compensate them for shortfalls in their collateral. Grand total — $64.6 billion.”
“Wait a minute!” interjects the president. “A lot of these big banks, notably Goldman Sachs, have forever insisted that they never wanted a bailout, never needed one, and never got one.”
Geithner picks up the report and waves it for emphasis. “And SIGTARP has forever disagreed.”
“What’s their conclusion?”
“In effect, SIGTARP concluded that, via this back door, the 16 banks not only got big bailouts … they never had to pay back a dime of the money.”

The Sad Saga of How Taxpayers Were Sold Out
“What do you think really happened?” asks the president.
“I don’t think; I know. Remember, I was not only there, I was mostly in charge. So I can tell you flatly: We had our backs to the wall. Sure, we asked 12 of the biggest AIG counterparties to take haircuts, to accept some losses. But 11 out of the 12 refused. So we had no choice but to give them everything they wanted.”
“Why didn’t you press harder?”
“We had no negotiating leverage. Later, with GM and Chrysler, we forced creditors to make concessions by threatening to let the automakers fail. But with AIG, we had already declared, in effect, that we’d never let it fail.”
“When?”
“Several weeks earlier — when we loaned $86 billion to AIG, the biggest bailout in history. The end result was that, when it came time to negotiate with AIG’s creditors, we could no longer function as unbiased regulators. We were already in deep — as the company’s biggest stakeholder. The creditors knew they had us over a barrel. There was no way we could twist their arms.
“If that wasn’t bad enough,” Geithner continues, “I then compounded the problem by adhering too strictly to one of FRBNY’s core values — the concept of treating all counterparties equally. That doomed the negotiations because it gave each party effective veto power over any possible concession from any other party. The way I set things up, either all the banks had to agree to concessions … or none of the banks would agree to concessions. So, needless to say, none agreed to concessions. They got everything.”

Profound Impacts
My fictional scenario ends here. But the impacts of those fateful decisions of late 2008 and early 2009 do not.
The AIG rescue was the biggest taxpayer rip-off of all time. Worse, it was the master seed that sprouted a whole series of similar taxpayer rip-offs on Wall Street. Just connect a few of the dots, and you’ll see what I mean:

1. The U.S. Treasury rushes to bail out AIG. That alone helps protect AIG’s counterparties from the direct losses they’d otherwise suffer in an AIG failure.

2. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York creates a special entity to pay off AIG’s creditors in full. While ordinary U.S. investors lose fortunes even in companies that are financially viable, 16 major banks don’t lose a penny even in a company that would otherwise be bankrupt — all thanks to the Fed’s largesse.

3. Prominent among these government-blessed banks is Goldman Sachs, Wall Street’s most extravagant giver of executive bonuses in 2006 and 2007 … and also Wall Street’s most lavish payer of employee bonuses in 2009.

The money flow is clear:
• From taxpayers to AIG …
• From AIG and the Fed to big Wall Street investment banks like Goldman Sachs, and then …
• From Goldman Sachs to its employees in the form of lavish bonuses.

It is, by far, the greatest taxpayer rip-off off all time!

Alors que nos gouvernants répètent à qui veut l’entendre que la crise est derrière nous parce que des indicateurs économiques semblent clignoter de la bonne couleur, malgré une grosse majorité de français et de françaises qui ont du mal à finir les fins de mois, un rapport de la Société Générale dit, bien au contraire, que le pire est à venir !

J’vous le dis, moa, “on ne nous dit pas tout” ! Y a des p’tits menteurs derrière tout cela !

Alors que les classes économiques et sportives (ce sont les mêmes, non ?) du pays se félicitent de la main providentielle de Thierry Henry et que tout ce beau monde se congratule de l’exploit extraordinaire de l’équipe de France lors du match France-Irlande en vue des qualification pour le Mondial 2010, je lis ce matin que les français (81%) ne sont pas favorables à la participation de leur pays en Afrique du Sud.

Mais… en général, on s’en fout de ce que pensent les français ? Les intérêts de la France sont ailleurs, non ?

Alors que le chômage ne cesse de croître, voilà t’il pas que notre ministre de “je ne sais pas trop quoi” veut fermer les entreprises qui emploient des sans-papiers !

Encore une mesure sociale pour améliorer la situation de l’emploi en France (du bon sens élémentaire, certainement mon cher Watson !!!)

Oui, comme le prévoit la Société Générale, le pire semble à venir, mais pas forcément là où on l’attend ! Nos gouvernants ont la mémoire courte et devraient retourner en cours d’histoire pour se rappeler que toutes les révolutions ont eu lieu à cause d’une exagération du pouvoir sur le peuple. Je sais, le petit peuple français a bien avalé sagement toutes les pilules sopporifiques qu’on lui administre depuis des années. Mais arrive un jour où les excipients n’ont plus d’effet et les réveils sont généralement douloureux. Mai 68 semblera alors une sympathique et grande kermesse bariolée pour adolescents en crise de puberté. Il ne fera pas bon se trouver sur la route des affamés, des assoiffés, des spoliés, des exploités, des manipulés, des amis des suicidés, des nouveaux esclaves de nos systèmes économiques et politiques, des employés aux cadres, des sans-papiers, des exclus de toutes sortes, des immigrés et de tous ceux et celles qui en ont simplement ras le bol qu’on bafoue leur dignité d’être humains. Car c’est de cela, ce dont il s’agit d’abord !

Malgré tous les beaux discours de façade, notre despote national, dans un plan machiavélique incroyable, se joue de tout et de tous, brouille toutes les cartes dans sa politique nommée d’ouverture, ramène peu à peu la France et le peuple français à ce qu’ils étaient en 1789. A la différence près, que les manipulations d’aujourd’hui où l’on vous carresse dans le sens du poil d’un coté pour mieux vous asséner un grand coup de l’autre, tout en continuant de vous caliner, sont des armes puissantes pour endormir le monde et transformer les personnes en marionnettes, tel Geppetto sculptant son morceau de bois pour en faire un pantin.

Je rêve du jour où les Pinocchio des temps modernes couperont leur fil et deviendront enfin … des enfants libres et autonomes ! Vivant !

Car pour le moment, on peut quand même le dire, le côté sombre de la force a quand même bien pris le dessus ! Mais la lumière finira bien par triompher, qu’on se le dise !

lefigaro.fr, NC, le 20 novembre 2009

La Société Générale tire la sonnette d’alarme

Dans un rapport adressé à ses clients, la banque française les appelle à dessiner une stratégie d’investissements de défense afin de se préparer à l’explosion éventuelle de nouvelles bulles financières.

Le pire pourrait être devant nous. C’est une des hypothèses qui ressortent d’un rapport de la Société Générale, intitulé « le pire scénario de la dette», selon lequel les récents plans de sauvetage mis en place par les gouvernements mondiaux ont simplement transféré des passifs du secteur privé au secteur public, créant une nouvelle série de problèmes. Premier d’entre eux, le déficit. «Le niveau de la dette paraît tout à fait insoutenable à long terme. Nous avons pratiquement atteint un point de non retour en ce qui concerne la dette publique», précise le rapport de 68 pages.

L’endettement global est beaucoup trop élevé dans la plupart des économies des pays développés, par rapport à leur PIB. Aux Etats-Unis et dans l’UE, la dette publique représentera ainsi 125 % du PIB dans deux ans. Au Royaume-Uni, elle s’élèvera à 105 % et au Japon, à 270 %. Le problème de la dette sous-jacente est plus important qu’il n’était après la seconde Guerre Mondiale, alors que les taux nominaux étaient similaires. Sauf que cette fois-ci, les gouvernements seront pris à la gorge, le vieillissement de la population rendant plus difficile qu’auparavant l’effacement de cette dette avec la croissance. Les pays émergents ne seraient pas non plus épargnés, même si leur marge de manœuvre sera plus importante qu’au sein des grandes économies occidentales.

Parmi les pires scénarios envisagés, le rapport évoque une nouvelle chute des marchés, une inflation galopante ainsi qu’une forte chute du dollar. Or quand la crise bat son plein, tout le monde se retourne vers la valeur refuge par excellence, l’or. Dans ce contexte, le prix du métal jaune atteindrait des sommets jamais vus. En plus du métal jaune, le rapport table qu’une autre valeur refuge devrait tirer son épingle du jeu, les denrées alimentaires. A contrario, la banque conseille de se désengager du dollar et des valeurs cycliques, telles que les technologiques ou celles liées au secteur de l’automobile.

Gretchen Gets It. The entire article is worth reading and even studying. If you get what she is saying, you can understand just how false this Waltz has been.

“The very design of the federal assistance to A.I.G. was that tens of billions of dollars of government money was funneled inexorably and directly to A.I.G.’s counterparties.” The report noted that this was money the banks might not otherwise have received had A.I.G. gone belly-up.

Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Société Générale and other banks were in the group that got full value for their contracts when many others were accepting fire-sale prices.

Ms. Tavakoli argues that Goldman should refund the money it received in the bailout and take back the toxic C.D.O.’s now residing on the Fed’s books — and to do so before it begins showering bonuses on its taxpayer-protected employees.

According to an e-mail message that Goldman sent to the New York Fed at the time, Mr. Geithner talked about the article with Mr. Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer, before calling me. When Mr. Geithner called, he said that Goldman had no exposure to an A.I.G. collapse and that the article had left an incorrect impression about that. When I asked Mr. Geithner if he, as head of the regulatory agency overseeing Goldman, had closely examined the firm’s hedges, he said he had not.

Probing, in-depth analyses of regulatory responses to the financial meltdown are worth their weight in gold. Mr. Barofsky’s certainly is. Yet in its rush to put financial reforms into effect, Congress seems uninterested in investigating or grappling with truths contained in such reports — and until it does, our country’s economic and financial system will continue to be at risk.

Revisiting a Fed Waltz With A.I.G.

A RAY of sunlight broke through the Washington fog last week when Neil M. Barofsky, special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, published his office’s report on the government bailout last year of the American International Group.

It’s must reading for any taxpayer hoping to understand why the $182 billion “rescue” of what was once the world’s largest insurer still ranks as the most troubling episode of the financial disaster. And it couldn’t have come at a more pivotal moment.

Many in Washington want to give more regulatory power to the Federal Reserve Board, the banking regulator that orchestrated the A.I.G. bailout. Through this prism, the actions taken in the deal by Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, who was president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at the time, grow curiouser and curiouser.

Of special note in the report: the Fed failed to develop a workable rescue plan when A.I.G., swamped by demands that it pay off huge insurance contracts that it couldn’t make good on as the economy tanked, began to sink. The report takes the Fed to task as refusing to use its power and prestige to wrestle concessions from A.I.G.’s big, sophisticated and well-heeled trading partners when the government itself had to pay off the contracts.

The Fed, under Mr. Geithner’s direction, caved in to A.I.G.’s counterparties, giving them 100 cents on the dollar for positions that would have been worth far less if A.I.G. had defaulted. Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Société Générale and other banks were in the group that got full value for their contracts when many others were accepting fire-sale prices.

On the question of whether this payout was what the report describes as a “backdoor bailout” of A.I.G.’s counterparties, Mr. Barofsky concluded: “The very design of the federal assistance to A.I.G. was that tens of billions of dollars of government money was funneled inexorably and directly to A.I.G.’s counterparties.” The report noted that this was money the banks might not otherwise have received had A.I.G. gone belly-up.

The report zaps Fed claims that identifying banks that benefited from taxpayer largess would have dire consequences. Fed officials had refused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or details of the payments, warning “that disclosure of the names would undermine A.I.G.’s stability, the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of the markets,” the report said.

When the parties were named, “the sky did not fall,” the report said.

Finally, Mr. Barofsky pokes holes in arguments made repeatedly over the past 14 months by Goldman Sachs, A.I.G.’s largest trading partner and recipient of $12.9 billion in taxpayer money in the bailout, that it had faced no material risk in an A.I.G. default — that, in effect, had A.I.G. cratered, Goldman wouldn’t have suffered damage.

In short, there’s an awful lot jammed into this 36-page report.

Even before publishing this analysis, Mr. Barofsky had made a name for himself as one of the few truth tellers in Washington. While others estimate how much the taxpayer will make on various bailout programs, Mr. Barofsky has said that returns are extremely unlikely.

His office has also opened 65 cases to investigate potential fraud in various bailout programs. “When I first took office, I can’t tell you how many times I’d be having a sit-down and warning about potential fraud in the program and I would hear a response basically saying, ‘Oh, they’re bankers, and they wouldn’t put their reputations at risk by committing fraud,’ ” Mr. Barofsky told Bloomberg News a little over a week ago, adding: “I think we’ve done a good job of instilling a greater degree of skepticism that what comes from Wall Street isn’t necessarily the holy grail.”

Mr. Barofsky says the Fed failed to strong-arm the banks when it was negotiating payouts on the A.I.G. contracts. Rather than forcing the banks to accept a steep discount, or “haircut,” the Fed gave the banks $27 billion in taxpayer cash and allowed them to keep an additional $35 billion in collateral already posted by A.I.G. That amounted to about $62 billion for the contracts, which the report describes as “far above their market value at the time.”

Mr. Geithner, who oversaw those negotiations, said in an interview on Friday that the terms of the A.I.G. deal were the best he could get for taxpayers. He considered bailing out A.I.G. to be “offensive,’ he said, but deemed it necessary because a collapse would have undermined the financial system.

“We prevented A.I.G. from defaulting because our judgment was that the damage caused by failure would have been much more costly for the economy and the taxpayer,” Mr. Geithner said. “To most Americans, this looked like a deeply unfair outcome and they find it hard to see any direct benefit. But in fact, their savings are more valuable and secure today.”

The report said that while bailing out Goldman and other investment banks might not have been the intent behind the Fed’s A.I.G. rescue, it certainly was its effect. “By providing A.I.G. with the capital to make these payments, Federal Reserve officials provided A.I.G.’s counterparties with tens of billions of dollars they likely would have not otherwise received had A.I.G. gone into bankruptcy,” the report stated.

As Goldman prepares to pay out nearly $17 billion in bonuses to its employees in one of its most profitable years ever, it is important that an authoritative, independent voice like Mr. Barofsky’s reminds us how the taxpayer bailout of A.I.G. benefited Goldman.

A Goldman spokesman, Lucas van Praag, said that Goldman believed “that a collapse of A.I.G. would have had a very disruptive effect on the financial system and that everyone benefited from the rescue of A.I.G.” Regarding his firm’s own dealings with A.I.G., Mr. van Praag said that Goldman believed that its “exposure was close to zero” because it insulated itself from a downturn in A.I.G.’s fortunes through hedges and collateral it had already received. (Goldman’s complete response is here.)

The inspector noted in his report that Goldman made several arguments for why it believed it was not materially at risk in an A.I.G. default, but he is skeptical of the firm’s reasoning.

So is Janet Tavakoli, an expert in derivatives at Tavakoli Structured Finance, a consulting firm. “On Sept. 16, 2008, David Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer, said that whatever the outcome at A.I.G., the direct impact of Goldman’s credit exposure would be immaterial,” she said. “That was false. The report states that if the New York Fed had negotiated concessions, Goldman would have suffered a loss.”

The report says that Goldman would have had difficulty collecting on the hedges it used to insulate itself from an A.I.G. default because everyone’s wallets would have been closing in a panic.

“The prices of the collateralized debt obligations against which Goldman bought protection from A.I.G. were in sickening free fall, and the cost of replacing A.I.G.’s protection would have been sky-high,” she said. “Goldman must have known this, because it underwrote some of those value-destroying C.D.O.’s.”

Ms. Tavakoli argues that Goldman should refund the money it received in the bailout and take back the toxic C.D.O.’s now residing on the Fed’s books — and to do so before it begins showering bonuses on its taxpayer-protected employees.

“A.I.G., a sophisticated investor, foolishly took this risk,” she said. “But the U.S. taxpayer never agreed to be a victim of investments that should undergo a rigorous audit.”

Perhaps Mr. Barofsky will do that audit, and closely examine the securities that A.I.G. insured and that Wall Street titans like Goldman underwrote.

Goldman contends that it had a contractual right to the funds it received in the A.I.G. bailout and that the securities it returned to the government in the deal have increased in value.

For his part, Mr. Geithner disputed much of the inspector general’s findings. He also took issue with the conclusion that the Fed failed to develop a contingency plan for an A.I.G. rescue and largely depended on plans proffered by the banks themselves.

He said the report’s view that the Fed didn’t use its might to get better terms in the rescue was unfair. “This idea that we were unwilling to use leverage to get better terms misses the central reality of the situation — the choice we had was to let A.I.G. default or to prevent default,” he said. “We could not enforce haircuts without causing selective defaults and selective defaults would have brought down the company.”

Mr. Geithner also said that the “perception that this decision by the government, not my decision alone, was made to protect any individual investment bank is unfounded.”

Less than two weeks after the A.I.G. bailout, Mr. Geithner took the firm’s side when he criticized a Sept. 28, 2008, article in The New York Times that I wrote about the A.I.G. bailout. That article included Goldman’s statement that it wouldn’t have been affected by an A.I.G. collapse. Among other things, the article, like Mr. Barofsky’s report, questioned Goldman’s assertion.

According to an e-mail message that Goldman sent to the New York Fed at the time, Mr. Geithner talked about the article with Mr. Viniar, Goldman’s chief financial officer, before calling me. When Mr. Geithner called, he said that Goldman had no exposure to an A.I.G. collapse and that the article had left an incorrect impression about that. When I asked Mr. Geithner if he, as head of the regulatory agency overseeing Goldman, had closely examined the firm’s hedges, he said he had not.

Mr. Geithner told me on Friday that he spoke with Mr. Viniar that day to ensure that Goldman’s hedges were adequate. And, notwithstanding the inspector general’s findings, he said he still believes Goldman was hedged.

Probing, in-depth analyses of regulatory responses to the financial meltdown are worth their weight in gold. Mr. Barofsky’s certainly is. Yet in its rush to put financial reforms into effect, Congress seems uninterested in investigating or grappling with truths contained in such reports — and until it does, our country’s economic and financial system will continue to be at risk.

Someone recently sent this to me: “Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for potential ‘global collapse’”

For those who do not think that “doomsday scenarios” are realistic, articles like this should cause them to think again.  Global financial services companies like Société Générale, one of the oldest banks in France, do not waste time and money needlessly scaring their investors with information like this if they did not feel it was important to consider.

Habakkuk 2:6-8 describes the possible ultimate result of taking on too much national debt.  And while Habakkuk 2 does not necessarily prophesy directly of the U.S. and the U.K. (it was written concerning Babylon and the Chaldeans, not Israel or Judah), Deuteronomy 28:43-51 does.  For those who want details, our free booklet is a great place to start: The United States and Great Britain in Prophecy.

(Just a quick “hit and run” today — back to my scripts I go!)

Sa svih relevantnih strana dolaze uvjerenja da je najgore završilo, da sve vodeće svjetske ekonomije izlaze iz ekonomije te da će se stvari, uz pojedine izuzetke kao što je koja lijepa riječ više za Karla Marxa, stvari vratiti na isto ono liberalno-kapitalističko mjesto na kome su bile prije histerije o globalnom financijskom Armagedonu.

Izuzecima, kao što je dežurna Kasandra po imenu Nouriel Roubini, prikljkučila se, pak, jedna prilično ugledna financijska institucija. Francuska banka Societe Generale je tako izdala brošuru od 68 stranica pod naslovom “Najgori mogući scenarij”. Autor Daniel Fermon u njoj tvrdi da spasiteljske državne intervencije kojima je prošle i početkom ove godine spriječen financijski kolaps nisu dugoročno učinile ništa osim toga da je problem dugova s privatnih banaka prebačen na leđa poreznih obveznika, te da je takvo stanje stvari dugoročno neodrživo.

Izvještaj sadrži tri moguća scenarija, a najgori od njih predviđa da globalna kriza ponovno udari već na proljeće. Fermon predviđa da će situacija biti slična onoj u kojoj se našao Japan u svom “izgubljenom desetljeću” 1990-ih, ali da za razliku od azijske ekonomske supersile koja se održavala snažnim izvozom i niskim jenom, takve recepte ne može koristiti “polovica svijeta”.

   Citez din articolul Societe Generale prevede un colaps economic global:

   Grupul francez Societe Generale, care patroneaza si banca romaneasca BRD, si-a sfatuit clientii sa se pregateasca pentru un posibil colaps economic global, care ar putea sa aiba loc in urmatorii doi ani.

   Banca franceza urmareste sa faca investitii defensive pentru a evita distrugerea capitalului, fiind de parere ca fondurile alocate de state pentru a-si salva economiile nu au facut decat sa transfere datoriile. Acest lucru a creat un nou set de probleme, informeaza Daily Telegraph, preluat de ziare.com.

   Francezii spun ca datoriile sunt inca foarte mari in majoritatea tarilor bogate, chiar daca e vorba de cele private sau publice.

   “Pana acum, nimeni nu poate spune cu siguranta daca am scapat de perspectiva unui colaps economic global”, se arata intr-un raport de 68 de pagini care incearca sa arate varianta cea mai pesimista care ar putea deveni realitate.

   Societe Generale averizeaza ca guvernele si-au oprit ajutoarele fiscale pentru economie, dar chiar si fara alte cheltuieli, datoria publica va exploda in urmatorii doi ani. Astfel, aceasta va ajunge la 105% din PIB in Marea Britanie, 125% in Statele Unite si zona euro. Cea mai afectata va fi insa Japonia, a carei datorie va ajunge la 279% din PIB.

   In urmatorii doi ani, datoria de stat la nivel global va ajunge la 45 de trilioane de dolari, de doua ori si jumatate mai mare decat in urma cu zece ani.

Povara datoriei este mai mare decat cea de la sfarsitul celui de-al Doilea Razboi Mondial, cand era totusi la un nivel asemanator. Cresterea economica va fi din ce in cel mai greu de sustinut pentru ca populatia imbatraneste, iar forta de munca se pierde.

   Chiar daca economiile facute de americani se vor stabiliza la 7%, iar toata suma va fi folosita pentru plata datoriei, tot va fi nevoie de noua ani pentru a se ajunge la nivelul de siguranta din anii 1980.

   Banca franceza mai spune si ca actuala criza seamana foarte mult cu situatia Japoniei in timpul “deceniului pierdut”. Exista insa o mare diferenta: Japonia a ramas in picioare cu ajutorul exporturilor spre economii puternice din lume si si-a lasat moneda nationala sa cada. Aceasta varianta este imposibil de aplicat de jumatate din tarile din lume.

   Sfatul Societe Generale pentru clientii ei este sa isi vanda dolarii si sa cheltuie mai putin pe masini, calatorii si tehnologie pentru a nu cadea in spirala inflatiei care ar fi inerenta in acest caz.

   Raportul mai spune si ca pretul actiunilor riscante va scadea cu 31% in 2010, in timp ce titlurile de stat vor valora foarte mult.

Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for potential 'global collapse'

via Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for ‘global collapse’ – Telegraph.

Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for potential ‘global collapse’

Société Générale has advised clients to be ready for a possible “global economic collapse” over the next two years, mapping a strategy of defensive investments to avoid wealth destruction.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
Published: 6:12PM GMT 18 Nov 2009

… “Worst-case debt scenario” … last year have merely transferred private liabilities onto sagging sovereign shoulders … Overall debt is still far too high  … GDP (350pc in the US) (and will be) “deleveraging”, for years. …

Under the French bank’s “Bear Case” scenario (the gloomiest of three possible outcomes), the dollar would slide further and global equities would retest the March lows. Property prices would tumble again. Oil would fall back to $50 in 2010. …

Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for ‘global collapse’

Société Générale has advised clients to be ready for a possible “global economic collapse” over the next two years, mapping a strategy of defensive investments to avoid wealth destruction.

See article at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6599281/Societe-Generale-tells-clients-how-to-prepare-for-global-collapse.html

Eher erlernt der Elefant das Baumklettern bevor wir diese elektrisierende Meldung in deutschen Systemmedien finden:

Die führende Bank Frankreichs gibt reichen Kunden einen Report von 68 Seiten. Er hat den Titel “Worst-Case Schuldenszenario”. In ihm steht was auf uns zukommt nach Ansicht der Société Générale und er enthält konkrete Handlungsanweisungen wegen bevorstehendem globalem Crash. Eine davon ist: Sofort raus aus dem Dollar! (Was schreibt dieses Blog hier seit Jahr und Tag?)

Der Report sagt:

Staatliche Rettungsprogramme im vergangenen Jahr haben nur

private Schulden umverteilt auf öffentliche Hände.

Daraus, schreibt der Report, entstehen neue Probleme. Die öffentliche Verschuldung ist in allen reichen Staaten viel zu hoch. Der Report wörtlich:

“Niemand kann mit Sicherheit sagen ob wir wirklich der Aussicht auf einen weltweiten Zusammenbruch entronnen sind.”

Sie malen das Bild eines entwerteten Dollars und
über Gold schreiben sie es würde

go “up, and up, and up”

Der Report der Société Générale hat Klienten auf beiden Seiten des Atlantiks alarmiert.

Mehr finden Sie beim englischen Telegraph von Ambrose Evans-Pritchard:

Société Générale tells clients how to prepare for ‘global collapse’

Société Générale has advised clients to be ready for a possible “global economic collapse” over the next two years, mapping a strategy of defensive investments to avoid wealth destruction.

Wollen Sie die Studie selber lesen? Sie können Sie hier herunterladen.

Earlier today, the agency auditing America’s bank bailout funds—or the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, if you prefer—published a report about AIG. Specifically, the agency details the efforts of the New York Federal Reserve to negotiate with banks on the other sides of AIG’s ill-fated trades in the credit default swap market.

As the agency describes it, up to US$30bn was authorised in November 2008 to purchase the rapidly souring collateralised debt obligations on which AIG’s trades were based. In the end, US$27.1bn was paid to AIG’s counterparties for the assets. They were also allowed to keep US$35bn in collateral that AIG posted before the government-funded vehicle bought out the contracts.

“Questions have been raised,” the report notes, about whether the deal constituted a “backdoor bailout” of banks that did business with AIG. This remains a contentious issue because the government—as described in great detail in the report—was unable to force “haircuts” on the price of the assets acquired and, even worse, because the majority of beneficiaries from the deal were foreign. (It also didn’t help that the largest domestic recipient was Goldman Sachs.)

Although the sums have been reported before, seeing Société Générale at the top of the list of banks to rake in funds funnelled “inexorably and directly” from US government coffers—quelle horreur!—is reigniting criticism of Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed during the AIG affair and now US treasury secretary.

Na wstępie proponuję obejrzeć film, który został zamieszczony już jakiś czas temu na YouTube.

Czy kogoś to bawi? Prawda jest taka, że emeryci faktycznie stanowią główny target tego “banku”. Dziwię się, że pracownicy oddziału nakręcili tego rodzaju film. Zastanawia mnie co by na to powiedziały osoby zajmujące się bezpieczeństwem wewnętrznym Eurobanku.  Niestety sami sobie wystawiają etykietkę. I to ma być poważna instytucja finansowa? Wstyd i jeszcze raz wstyd.

The majority of data and analysis at Financial Services Briefing is available only to subscribers. Each week, a small share of content from the service is made available to non-subscribers.

The latest results from BNP Paribas prove that good things come to those who wait.

The bank, France’s largest, sat out the bout of mega-deals that marked the peak of the bubble—namely, the takeover of ABN Amro by a consortium of RBS, Fortis and Santander. Although Santander escaped relatively unscathed from the ill-fated deal, the takeover marked the beginning of the end for RBS and Fortis, both of which are in various stages of being carved up by regulators. BNP Paribas snapped up pieces of Fortis earlier this year. In its first full quarter under the French bank’s umbrella, Fortis accounted for around 21% of revenues and 24% of BNP Paribas’s third-quarter profits.

Meanwhile, Société Générale reported a doubling of net profit in its third-quarter results. With growing clout in investment banking and solid retail franchises, French banks are well positioned to take on a more prominent role in the regional financial scene in the years ahead.

Read more at Financial Services Briefing: “Vive la différence” (November 9th)

Entre la gare et chez nous il y a un distributeur automatique qui est pile poil à la bonne hauteur…

… pour se moquer des gens qui n’arrivent pas à lire !

Bon, c’est quand même abusé, surtout pour les personnes handicapées…