“Fortress Stalingrad” had a grandiose sound to it, but the title was deceiving.  German General Friedrich Paulus knew that his 6th Army was in serious trouble.  What a difference 5 days made!  Back then he believed his Soviet enemies had their backs against the proverbial wall and that Stalingrad was nearly his.

But a massive Soviet counterattack was rapidly changing the situation.  Launched in the dim morning hours of November 19th, Operation Uranus crashed into the weakened German flanks with devastating effect.  By the end of that first day, the Romanians (manning the flanks) had suffered more than 55,000 casualties.  The next day saw the 1st Romanian Armoured Division eliminated and the 22nd Panzer Army badly mauled.

The flanks largely collapsed, leaving the Soviets only modest resistance on their path to encirclement.  Paulus, seeing a horrific disaster unfolding to his back (the west), released his own 3 Panzer divisions, but a lack of fuel and ammunition – keep in mind that supply lines, which were incredibly long, came from the west – made their efforts much less effective.

On November 23, 1942, Paulus’ nightmare became reality when Soviet forces, which had stepped off from both north and south of the city, met up at Sovietskiy, 30 miles west of Stalingrad.  The encirclement, although tenuous, was complete.  What was left of the Romanian Third Army (more than 25,000 men) was forced to surrender…the Romanians suffered nearly 90,000 total casualties in four days of brutal fighting.

Inside the pocket lay Stalingrad, General Paulus, and his forces.  They comprised remnants of the Romanian Fourth Army, the Fourth Panzer, and (of course) the German Sixth Army…nearly 270,000 men.  It was at this point that Paulus stood his best chance of escape from his “trap on the Volga”.  Soviet forces had yet to consolidate their positions, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein was pushing to reinforce the destroyed flanks, and Paulus still commanded a formidable force with substantial artillery.  A breakout, while not anything close to victory, would have prevented certain destruction.

But it was at this point that the German High Command did itself in.  Hermann Goering foolishly boasted that his Luftwaffe could keep Fortress Stalingrad supplied from the air…even though Wolfram von Richthofen’s 4th Air Fleet only had half the aircraft it needed.  And Adolf Hitler, blinded to all reality but the now vanishing hope of capturing Stalingrad, bought Goering’s plan and ordered Paulus to hold his ground.  One can almost hear Goering’s arrogant assurance and the remaining Generals giving each other those fleeting glances of dismay.

However, in speaking of the German failures, one should not minimize Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov’s genius in launching Uranus.  I’ve mentioned Chris Bellamy’s book Absolute War on several occasions, and he is effusive in his praise…and rightly so.

He writes, “Along with the Carthaginians’ encirclement and annihilation of the Romans at Cannae in 216 BC, Zhukov’s destruction of the Japanese at Khalkin Gol in 1939, and Schwarzkopf’s Hail Mary of 1991, it was from a purely military point of view one of the greatest encirclements of history.  But its staggering scale, in spatial and human terms, especially given the very thin margins available to the Soviet High Command, and its strategic and political consequences must make it the greatest encirclement of all time.”

Experts may argue over the “greatest”, but the Soviet linkup at Sovietskiy set in motion the most significant defeat in the 4-year Russo-German war…probably the biggest defeat for Germany in the entire war.

Introduction

World War II saw some of most rapid technological advances impacting military forces in history. The advances in technology impacted the organization and tactics of major power military forces, especially those of the United States, Germany, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.  These advances combined to revolutionize the way wars were fought and military forces have been organized to the current day.

Heinz Guderian’s Theories of Mechanized and Combined Arms Warfare and His Organizational Genius Revolutionized  Land Warfare

The technical developments and their relationship to military organization and tactical applications began in the years following World War I as various writers began to analyze that war and formulate ways not to repeat the grist mill of trench warfare that dominated it.  The writers looked at tactical innovations, new technology and enunciated ways that technology and tactics could be combined with organizational changes to revolutionize the ways that wars were fought.  Chief among these writers were General Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart in Britain, Colonel Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel in Germany.  Airpower theories were dominated by the strategic bombing theories of Italy’s Guido Douhet and tactical air theories of American Marine General Roy Geiger as well as the pioneers of tactical air support in the Luftwaffe.   In the United States General George C. Marshall helped initiate doctrinal changes that would change the way that the U.S. Army would fight.

Among the common elements found in the works of these men was the necessity to apply technology to overcome the pitfalls that all of the armies which fought in the First World War found themselves.

The Mechanization of Ground Forces

Mass Speed and Firepower: The Germans Would Pioneer the New Style of Warfare

There were a number of major technological advances between the wars and during the war that helped change the nature of warfare.  One of the earliest was the mechanization of armies which began toward the end of the First World War and continued between the wars to varying degrees in each country.  All the major armies experimented with mechanized forces to one degree or another. In Britain these got the earliest start with some formations being 100% mechanized by the early 1930s.  France was more circumspect about mechanization only slowly converting forces as they were focused on a defensive strategy based on the Maginot Line.  Many in the German high command resisted Guderian and other innovators regarding the mechanization of the Wehrmacht as well as the development of the Panzerwaffe.

The Soviet Union Would Turn the Tables on the Germans using their own Tactics

The Soviet Union had a large number of mechanized and armored formations prior to the war though they were not proficient in their use and had not developed doctrine to match the forces that they controlled.  The Untied States also resisted efforts to mechanize its Army but seeing the results of the German Blitzkrieg quickly overcame years of resistance to become an Army that save for 2 Cavalry Divisions was 100% mechanized.  The development of Airborne formations added the possibility of vertical envelopment to ground operations. These developments impacted nearly every campaign in Europe and North Africa and to a much lesser degree the Pacific theater. German performance in the early Polish, French, North African and Balkan Campaigns as well as the initial foray into the Soviet Union were all successful due to the proficiency of their combined mechanized, Panzer and tactical air forces.  The Soviets would develop and become very effective at this type of warfare on a much large scale than the Germans could have imagined beginning with the Stalingrad counteroffensive and especially in the destruction  of the German Army Group Center in the summer of 1944.

Though Using Lighter Armored Forces the Americans Would become Proficient in the New Type of Warfare by the Summer of 1944

The Americans became proficient at mobile operations during the war, especially during the “dash across France” and the breakout in the Saar-Palatine campaign in 1945,  but many times uninventive commanders squandered the advantage and allowed themselves to be sucked into battles of attrition that their forces were not made for.

Communications

A key development that accompanied and accentuated the mechanization of ground forces were advances in tactical wireless communications which made it possible for commanders to keep up with fast moving formations and react in near real time to changing tactical situations.  The Germans were the first to become very proficient in this as they not only developed communications for ground forces but also for coordination between tactical air forces and ground forces.  This made the German Blitzkrieg the first example of modern air-ground combat cooperation.  The Americans, British and Soviets would follow suit but it was the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe that pioneered the communications revolution.  As the war went on communications capabilities increased and armies became more dependent on tactical and long range wireless communications.  The dependency of military forces on communications networks became a major factor in operational planning and the success of the Allies in breaking Japanese and German codes gave them an advantage in anticipating German or Japanese moves.

Armor, Firepower and Mobility: The Tank Comes into its Own

World War Two Saw Tanks become Deadly Instruments of Modern Warfare

Mechanization was a major factor in the war and the most decisive component of the mechanization of ground forces was the development of the tank as well as specialized formations which employed tanks in close cooperation with other arms, such as mechanized infantry and artillery.  The development of such forces really began with the British but the best example of this was the German Panzer Division.  The Panzer Division was a totally mechanized and integrated force of all arms which was employed in mass and capable like all German units to be task organized into Kampfgruppen to optimize tactical flexibility.  British Armored Divisions were tank heavy and infantry light which made them far less flexible organizations.  Soviet Armored forces were slow to develop but they became masters of large level operational maneuver using mechanized and tactical air forces to a deadly effect against the Wehrmacht.  The Americans delivered a light and flexible armored formation and became very proficient in combined arms warfare though the divisional structure often proved too light and not as resilient as German formations.  It was in this environment that the tank truly came into its own to dominate the battlefield in a way that many could not have imagined prior to the war. Firepower, protection and mobility advantages gained through technological advances increased the lethality and survivability of the tank and forced each side to develop better ways of neutralizing tanks through more powerful anti-tank guns, sabot rounds and shaped charges.

Tactical and Strategic Air developments

The Americans and the British Would Develop the Concept of Strategic Bombing against Germany

With the technical revolution came revolution in the skies both at the strategic and tactical levels.  Modern bombers with good navigational gear guided by radar and assisted by modern bombsites such as the Norden developed by the United States would wreak havoc on industrial and civilian centers. Advances in aircraft technology saw fast and more lethal aircraft being fielded by all powers as the war progressed and while Jet propulsion developed during the war would doom piston powered aircraft as first line assets.

The P-47 Thunderbolt Would Serve as both a Long Range Bomber Escort and as Seen Here as an Excellent Ground Attack Aircraft

Tactical air developments would be led by the Germans but as the war went on the Allies developed sophisticate tactical air forces that dominated battlefields when the weather permitted. The Germans pioneered the use of ballistic missiles as well as the cruise missile while the United States and Britain developed the Atomic Bomb.  Specialized types of tactics and organizations were developed for strategic, tactical and naval air forces. At the strategic level there were the dueling schools of precision versus area bombing while at the tactical level the developments were as much predicated on air-ground communications as they were the aircraft flown.  Specialized aircraft were developed or modified as tank-killers while fighter forces became more specialized to into interceptors, bomber escorts and night fighters.

The Obselecent Junkers JU-87 found New Life on the Eastern Front as a Tank Killer armed with 2 37mm FLAK cannon

The influence of air assets, especially at the tactical level would become more pronounced as the war went on.  Allied air superiority ensured that the landings in France and the breakout in Normandy succeeded and tactical air dominance by US Navy and Marine air forces in the Pacific aided ground operations as well as sea battles.

Amphibious Warfare developments

The US Navy and Marine Corps Would Perfect Amphibious Operations in the Pacific

Technology came to the fore in amphibious operations with the development of specialized landing craft, beach clearing equipment and naval gunfire support.  This effort was led by the United States with the most advanced force being the Marines.   The combined use of air, land, sea and naval air forces to include the use of Aircraft Carriers revolutionized how the campaign in the Pacific would be fought to a conclusion long before anyone thought that it could be.

General Naval Developments

At sea ship design advanced new and better classes of warships as technologic advances in radar, sonar, gunnery systems, torpedo and ant-aircraft technology made warships far more formidable than those built only years before the war.  This was nowhere more apparent than in submarine development especially that of Germany’s U-boat arm with the development of streamlined hulls and “schnorkel” technology.  The use of U-Boats and later American submarines in the Pacific into “Wolf Packs” increased the lethality of submarine forces to a near decisive state in the war.  Naval tactics were influenced by the use of air and surface search radar as well as sonar.

US Fast Carrier Task Forces Would Dominate the Pacific War and Naval Warfare to the Present Day

The development of the US Navy into the dominant Naval Power of the next 65 years was built upon the success of the Navy in the Second World War.  The largest and some of the bloodiest sea battles in history were fought in the Pacific with decisive results in that theater of operations.  Operationally the major Navies all were influenced to one degree or another by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Summary and Conclusion

The course of World War Two was determined by the strategic and operational theories developed in the inter-war years. These were applied correctly by some powers and not by others.   The use technological advances and more effective organizational structure developed in the inter-war years and refined by the experience of war impacted the war on land, at sea and in the air in every theater of war.  The use of combined arms and joint operations revolutionized the manner in which wars would be fought.  If the technology, theory and force structure had not come together when it did the war might have been fought much as the First World War.  Instead warfare became faster and more lethal than ever and would lead to even more advances in the years to come.

Concord – Battle of Stalingrad

Case Blue, launched in late June of 1942, got off to a smashing start for both the Soviets and the German aggressors…sort of.  The Red Army got smashed a lot, and the Wehrmacht did a lot of smashing.

By mid-August, the Germans were knocking on the doors of Stalingrad, having reached the Volga River north of the city.  The Soviet armies, having spent a couple of months retreating to avoid the dreaded encirclement, now had their backs to a river a mile wide.

At this point, the fighting degenerated into a meat-grinder house-to-house battle.  General Friedrich Paulus’ 6th Army drove into, and largely through, the city, with elements reaching the Volga to fire at the forces staged on the far side.  But Paulus and his men, while fully ensconced in the city, could not break through.

As the August heat gave way to the inevitable October cooldown, Soviet Marshal Georgy Zhukov began preparing a massive counterattack.  Codenamed Operation Uranus, it involved a double encirclement, with large forces attacking across the Volga to both the south and north of Stalingrad.

The ultimate goal was to drive through the German flanks (protected by 170,000 Romanian troops) and trap the German 6th Army in the city.  But it was a massive undertaking to move the requisite men and supplies into place while still maintaining some form of secrecy.

General Paulus recognized that his flanks were weak and over-exposed and, on November 17, 1942, German reconnassaince discovered what appeared to be a Soviet buildup northwest of the city.  But still his troops were slashing the remnants of decimated Soviet 62nd Army.  The German press said that the battle for Stalingrad was in its final phase…

…until November 19, 1942.  At 7:30am, Uranus was launched with a massive artillery barrage.  More than a million men, nearly 1,500 tanks, and 900 aircraft crashed into Paulus’ Romanian flanks.  The Romanians put up a valiant effort, but were simply overwhelmed.

Zhukov’s Operation Uranus was a brilliant counterstroke, catching an over-extended army trapped in the rubble of a city.  What’s more, Paulus’ Sixth Army wasn’t allowed to retreat from their positions, forced to hold Stalingrad by Hitler, who had become obsessed with the river-side city.  In less than a week, the German Army would go from “the verge of victory” to trapped.

Recommended Reading: Absolute War

I went to a lecture by Jochen Hellbeck last night at the American Academy in Berlin. I didn’t realize that you were supposed to register beforehand, so I felt pretty awkward inside after wheedling my way in (not to mention I am so tired of being either the youngest, the most American, or the most female person everywhere I go, and sometimes all three), but the lecture itself was awesome.

Hellbeck’s last work was called Revolution on My Mind, and was a history of diary-keeping under Stalin. The Stalinist regime was obsessed with the idea of revolutionary biography, and citizens who applied to study or to work for the government had to submit autobiographies. Diaries are in many ways the first draft of autobiographies, and in analyzing diaries Hellbeck found that citizens were constantly trying to tell the story of their lives with the revolutionary narrative in mind, faulting themselves for not living up to the promise of socialism.

His current project is a cultural history of the battle of Stalingrad (the bloodiest battle in human history, claiming over 2 million casualties), focusing on letters and diaries from the front and seeing what they can tell us about German and Russian ideologies and their grip (or lack thereof) on the soldiers.

In the lecture he didn’t actually analyze the content of the letters, but analyzed the way that they were interpreted by military intelligence. This is something I had never thought about before, but if you were a German soldier, and you died, and the Russians got to your body, they were going to raid your pockets for letters from home and send them to military intelligence to be analyzed. That’s really weird.

He argued that the Russians were very invested in analyzing the text of the letters and writing detailed reports on the moral state of the Germans. For example, they wrote that Germans were bizarrely obsessed with food (“They’re not used to going hungry… they complain all the time!”) and not ideologically committed to their cause, which gave the Russians hope for their own cause, and propaganda material.

On the other hand, Hellbeck argued, Germans were so invested in their ideas about racial physiognomy, and about the Russians being an inferior race, that they barely read the text of the letters. They didn’t need to explore how the enemy thought, because in their mind the enemy didn’t think–they just took pictures of the swarthy Russians and used those for propaganda. He suggested that this might be one of the reasons that Germans underestimated Soviet fanaticism, which would have been easy to see if they had only looked at the diaries for a few minutes.

I’m really looking forward to seeing the book now! Hellbeck was obviously generalizing a bit for the sake of the forty-minute lecture format, and I’m interested in seeing how he might further problematize the “Russians are interested in words, Germans are interested in physiognomy” binary he set up.

Plus I’m curious about the content of the letters. At the end I wanted to ask a question (“In your last book you argued that diary writers under Stalin had a keen sense of how their life story measured up to the ideal revolutionary biography. Are you finding that this carried on into letters and diaries at the front? Were soldiers self-aware of their successes or failures at being a good Soviet soldier?”), but I was pretty intimidated, and by the time I got my hand up, it was the end of question time.

Which was silly of me, because it was totally as good as any of the other questions that got asked. But you learn and you learn, right?

The History Channel will air a program this evening titled “WWII in HD”. Rare footage, and personal accounts, will trace the stories of 12 soldiers throughout the course of the war. The program will be a 10-part series, airing from Sunday-Thursday. Given the fact that Veterans Day was just celebrated in America on Nov. 11th, and Armistice Day was celebrated all around the world (which technically commemorates the end of hostilities in WWI) it seems just as good a time as any to remember the sacrifices the Greatest Generation made for the sake of humanity during WWII.

Make no mistake, the Nazi war machine was the most formidable fighting force the world had ever seen. It took what would become two world superpowers (i.e. USA and USSR) and two well-established global empires (i.e. Britain and France) to defeat Hitler’s mechanized hordes and liberate virtually the whole of Europe from his iron rule. Hitler annexed the largest land empire ever seen in Europe, in the shortest amount of time. He conquered more land than Charlemagne, more than Napoleon, more than the Caesar’s, etc… and could have annexed even more had he not been such a self-destructive, hot-headed, stubborn, psychopathic, megalomaniac, prone to folly and blunder. Borders that had stood for centuries were smashed thru with ease, and countless age-old armies were completely annihilated in the course of weeks and months. Truth be told, the Nazi victories in Europe were some of the most remarkable victories in military history. To give you an idea, in about a month the whole of the Polish army was obliterated; 66,000 dead, 133,700 wounded, and 694,000 captured. In one month and 15 days, the French army, thought by many at the time to be the most powerful army in the world, was altogether wiped out; 360,000 dead and wounded, and 1.9 million captured. In 18 days of German Blitzkrieg, the Belgian army ceased to exist; 222,443 casualties, and 200,000+ captured. Over the course of roughly 6 months, 802,191 Soviets were killed, 3 million were wounded, and another 3.3 million were captured during Operation Barbarossa (translation: Operation Redbeard, so named for the charismatic Holy Roman Emperor Friedrich Barbarossa, who had fought many Crusades against the Slavic and Baltic peoples). These jaw-dropping numbers were only the results of single battles and offensives. In total, about 3.5% – 4% of the world’s population at the time was killed in the war that Hitler had started (62 mil – 78 mil), and the light of European Jewry was almost completely extinguished in the Holocaust. Victory was by no means a guarantee for the Allies. There were countless instances throughout the war in which world history could’ve turned on a dime (instances I will discuss in detail in later posts).

It may be a decades-old, silly-sounding cliché, but if it wasn’t for the Allied Forces who stormed the bloody beaches of Normandy, and snatched victory from defeat in the bombed out ruins of Stalingrad, we all would be speaking German right now, quite literally. The younger generations casually blow this saying off, as if it is an exaggeration, but the possibility was very real. In the post-war world, English, the language of the Western victors (i.e. USA and the UK), became the formal and informal language of the world. Everything from global trade to air traffic control is conducted in English, and had Germany emerged from WWII as the dominant Western power, there is no doubt international treaties would be dotted with umlauts and oil would be traded in Reichsmarks, rather than American dollars.

To give you an idea of the kind of enemy America faced, let’s take a look at the absolutely stunning casualty numbers. During America’s first major offensive against Germany in the previous war, WWI (i.e. the Battle of Argonne Forest), America suffered 117,000 casualties, in a little over two weeks worth of fighting. To put this into context, America only lost 172 men during the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, in roughly the same amount of time fighting. The German army was very well trained, equipped, disciplined, and technologically advanced, and could match, and even outmatch Anglo-American ingenuity and innovation in many aspects of warfare. Comparing Middle-Eastern despots, like Saddam Hussein, to Hitler doesn’t pay the respects due to the millions of men, women, and children who gave their lives to defeat him. Fighting Hitler, and Nazi Germany, was essentially like fighting an aggressive, ruthless, and sadistic version of ourselves; an industrialized, 1st world death machine, armed to the teeth, steeped in warrior culture, and hell bent on domination and dominion. On D-Day alone (i.e. a single day) the United States lost exponentially more men (2,499) than we’ve lost in the entire Afghan War over the course of 8 years (916). The Germans killed over 26 million Soviet citizens, military and civilian, throughout the course of the war on the Eastern Front. The USSR lost more men in WWII than America has lost in battle throughout all of the wars she’s ever fought, collectively, which includes both WWII and Civil War fatalities; soldier and civilian. Keep in mind, I am not trying to minimize the sacrifices of our current veterans serving overseas in any way. I am only using them as an example to embellish the achievements of the Greatest Generation and contrast the sheer, mind-boggling size of the sacrifice they made. Losing 2,499 Americans over the course of a day (8 hrs or so) is incomprehensible to most Americans today, yet that was the cost of establishing a single beachhead in France; a mere fraction of the cost it would take to break the Nazi stranglehold over Europe and loosen Japan’s imperial grip over Asia. 

Defeating Hitler cost the world a massive loss of life, unparalleled in world history, yet that was only one of the wars going on at the time. On the other side of the globe, the Allied Forces were embroiled in a vicious war against Hitler’s Axis allies in Asia, Imperial Japan. Imperial Japan was an advanced, militaristic, industrialized nation, much like Germany, that had built up a massive armed force in the years leading up to the war. The Imperial Fleet alone rivaled that of the legendary British Royal Navy, and the Japanese air force was just as advanced, if not more so, than any air force in the world, dominating the skies of Asia virtually unchallenged. Like Nazi Germany, Japan’s ground forces were known to be exceedingly brutal in their pursuit of conquest, and were seemingly just as fanatical in their cause as the Nazis were, routinely fighting to the last man, taking no prisoners, and launching suicidal attacks when all else had failed. A warrior culture had fomented in Japan for ages, and old traditions were hard to break on the isolated island country. Plus, one must keep in mind that fighting an archipelago empire such as Japan was all the more costly because it required multiple d-day landings on tiny island beaches where all of the defending forces were concentrated. Although the battle lasted for a little over six months, 7,100 Allied soldiers were lost on Guadalcanal, 6,821 on Iwo Jima in about a month, and 2,949 were lost on Saipan in about 3 weeks… and that’s just to name of few of the horrific battles in the Pacific. To avoid Operation Downfall (i.e. the Invasion of Japan), which would’ve required multiple d-day landings on multiple fronts, and islands, against a die-hard, desperate enemy fighting to protect their homes, families and honor, undoubtedly costing hundreds of thousands, if not millions of American lives, America became the first, and only country to ever drop an atomic bomb on another country. As ungodly as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were, they were not anywhere near as costly as the fire-bombing of Tokyo. It is uncertain how many people were killed in the bombings of Tokyo but the city was one of the most densely populated in the world and was largely built of flammable wooden materials. Some estimates have placed the death toll as high as 1.5 million, whereas others have placed it as low as 150,000, but the latter number is highly unlikely given the fact that over 100,000 people were reportedly killed during the raid conducted on the night of March 9th-10th, 1945 alone. In total, over 50% of the city was destroyed, and keep in mind Tokyo was only one of the many cities Allied bombers were targeting in the country. In truth, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which coerced Imperial Japan to lay down her arms, ultimately saved lives… which goes quite a ways to demonstrate the unmitigated madness and horror that had gripped the world. When a-bombs are saving more lives than they are taking, it is clear that humanity has suffered a cataclysm of unrivaled proportions. 

When commemorating the sacrifices of the Greatest Generation, remember that the men who fought the Axis Powers had no idea they were going to win the war when they left their homes and families to set out to fight the dark forces of tyranny. Hitler had controlled Europe for 4 long years when the Soviets defeated the Blitzkrieg at Stalingrad, and the Allies stormed the beaches of Normandy, and before either of those milestones took place, and even for some time after they did, Hitler’s dreams of a “thousand year Reich” seemed to be all but set in stone. Average Americans; teachers, doctors, lawyers, farmers, clerks, engineers, machinists, laborers, postmen, bus drivers, etc… left their simple and peaceful lives behind to combat a savage machine built of fire and steel and fueled by the blood of millions of innocent people. Grocers and retail salesmen suddenly found themselves in the hedgerows of France face-to-face with the ruthless, battle-hardened, fanatical, Waffen-SS, and accountants and stockbrokers abruptly took to the skies over the Pacific to engage the vastly more experienced and tested Japanese Zeros in dogfights. The entire country banded together to win the war. All able men were conscripted to fight, and the woman on the home front worked their jobs to keep the economy going while they were gone. Operations of entire industries were diverted to the war effort, and the civilian population was forced to ration food and other materials for the good of their fathers, sons, and brothers dying on the battlefields far from home. Total war engrossed the Western World, and our very livelihood depended on the outcome of the campaign. For some demographics, such as the Jews, Russians, Chinese, etc… their very survival as a people depended on the outcome of the war. 

No matter which way you look at it, WWII was the most pivotal, and catastrophic event in human history. The debt of gratitude we owe to those who gave their lives, and bodies, for the cause is unfathomable.

“Never was so much owed by so many to so few” — Sir Winston Churchill

In later posts I shall discuss certain aspects of the war in much greater detail, but for my first entry, I’d simply like to say thank you to all of those aging vets, and their deceased brothers-in-arms, who answered the call when the world needed them the most, and saved humanity from a new Dark Age. 

“Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, ‘This was their finest hour’”. — Sir Winston Churchill

L'Opera Peniche

Siete amanti dell’opera lirica ma l’idea di dover restare in silenzio durante tutta la durata del concerto non vi fa impazzire?
Sappiate, allora, che esiste un posto capace di coniugare e far convivere la musica classica e la convialità: l’Opera Peniche.

Si tratta di un battello in cui potrete gustarvi le opere dei vostri artisti classici preferiti senza temere i rimproveri del vicino che vi invita a fare silenzio.
Il programma é alquanto diversificato: musica contemporanea i lunedì, barocca i martedì, da camera i mercoledì, colazione lirica la domenica mattina e numerose commedie musicali e cabarets durante tutta la settimana.
Nell’universo musicale parigino, la Peniche Opera occupa un posto unico, coniugando creazione e riscoperta, fedeltà al repertorio classico e inventiva raffinata e audace.

Questa piattaforma musicale galleggiante, creata nel 1982 da Mireille Larroche, Ivan Matiakh, Béatrice Cramoix et Pierre Danais, non ha simili.
Dall’entusiasmo di un’equipe affiatata e appassionata nascono spettacoli di alto livello: dall’ opera buffa a quella comica, dalle cantate alle commedie musicali o ancora al teatro.

Péniche Opéra
Face au 46, quai de Loire, Paris 19e
Metro: Jaurès, Stalingrad
Tel: 01 53 35 07 77
www.penicheopera.com/

First of all, apologies for that bloody awful headline, I can get a bit too alliterative when I’ve eaten too much sugar…

But do check out this fab audio slideshow, again from the BBC (they are not paying me, honest) on the former Soviet Union’s extraordinary all female pilot squadrons who fought so valiantly in World War Two.  They scared the bejeesus out of German soldiers, who took to calling them “Night Witches” and claimed they’d been injected with drugs to make them see in the dark.

Most poignantly, they often flew without parachutes, condemning many to horrific, and needless deaths. This story is not the only one I’ve read of Soviet women’s heroism in WW2 – Anthony Beevor notes the courage of women tank crews at Stalingrad – and I hope more of these women’s stories are unearthed and given the due recognition in history they deserve.

After all, it seems that there is still a dearth of popular histories on women’s involvement in the military during the Two world wars.

While there are academic studies – and of course towering works such as Vera Brittain’s Testament of Youth and works by Martha Gelhorn, also Lee Miller’s photography springs to mind, but with the exception of books such as Singled Out by Virginia Nicholson (Guardian review here), which commendably studies the effect of the man shortage on women following the wars, I can’t remember a recent mainstream book that has dealt with the matter. I’m happy to be proved wrong, of course, but maybe I should just shut up and write it myself.

Hapoel s’est fondé sur un constat simple : notre époque est celle de la crise générale du capitalisme.

Ainsi la crise capitaliste fait rage, ceux qui ont un travail souffrent, ceux qui n’en ont pas survivent difficilement, les femmes subissent une violence quotidienne, le racisme se répand et se revendique, les animaux sont exterminés et la planète est saccagée, la guerre règne sans discontinuer depuis 1945.

Ainsi l’antisémitisme s’affirme de manière de plus en plus décomplexée avec un caractère de plus en plus génocidaire : le capitalisme pourrit sur pied, la petite-bourgeoisie s’effondre, l’antisémitisme explose.

Et que voit-on ? Quelles sont les voies proposées à la minorité nationale juive ?

Les sionistes poussent au repli raciste et veulent imposer la fuite vers un ailleurs fantasmé. Les religieux croient se préserver de la politique et écartent les femmes. Les institutions juives enseignent la soumission à la bourgeoisie française et prônent la confiance en son État. Quant aux intellectuels juifs « de gauche », ils nient jusqu’à l’existence de l’antisémitisme.

Bref : l’arbre préfère le calme.

L’arbre préfère le calme, mais le vent continue de souffler !

Car la crise du capitalisme, et ce qu’elle charrie comme barbaries, constituent une tendance inéluctable. Et plus le capitalisme s’enfonce dans sa crise, plus il est féroce dans sa quête de profit : c’est la marche au fascisme et à la guerre impérialiste.

Il est donc temps d’assimiler l’enseignement de Mao Zedong : « Ou bien la révolution conjurera la guerre, ou bien c’est la guerre qui déclenchera la révolution. »

Sauf que pour les juifs, pour les juives, pour les minorités nationales, pas besoin de dessin pour comprendre ce que signifierait la guerre impérialiste…

Reste donc la révolution, reste donc le drapeau rouge.

L’alternative pour la minorité juive se pose ainsi en ces termes : socialisme ou barbarie.

Stalingrad ou Auschwitz.

Et l’existence même d’Hapoel relève d’une course contre la montre, car chaque jour qui passe sous le capitalisme est un jour qui nous rapproche d’Auschwitz.

Certains se moquent, demandent où sont aujourd’hui les parades nazies.

C’est là qu’on voit qui est né avec Auschwitz et Stalingrad gravés dans les tripes, et qui a vendu sa rage de vivre aux dominants et aux racistes.

Car quand la bourgeoisie basculera entièrement derrière la dictature des monopoles, quand la marche au fascisme et à la guerre s’accélerera, il sera déjà trop tard pour construire le rempart antifasciste des masses.

Et il sera déjà trop tard pour nos familles…

En ce sens, Hapoel est peut-être une proposition encore trop en avance, afin d’espérer conjurer Auschwitz. En avance oui, mais pas éternellement…

Voilà pourquoi Hapoel affirme comme unique perspective pour les masses populaires juives : s’organiser pour vaincre, vaincre pour vivre !

Juif ! Juive ! Rejoins l’Action Antifasciste !
Car si ce n’est toi, qui ? Si ce n’est maintenant, quand ?
Et si ce n’est Stalingrad, quoi ?

HaPoel HaAntifashisti, octobre 2009.

http://www.hapoel.fr/

Tras la última digresión músical el instituto de estudios solarísticos se complace de volver a hablar de juegos de mesa. Esta vez para saludar la aparición en el mercado de “Roads to Stalingrad” (Caminos a Stalingrado) de la compañía sevillana Bellica Third Generation.

Precisamente hablaba en las anteriores entradas de la necesidad de estar atento a lo que se cocía en lugares en principio alejados de los tradicionales centros de producción culturales. Y esta vez toca hablar de uno tan cercano a mi, como puede ser Sevilla, donde un grupo de aficionados y emprendedores se han atrevido con algo tan anglosajón como son los wargames, y en esta ocasión, tras “Tomb for an empire” han probado con uno  la Segunda Guerra Mundial, la ofensiva de verano del eje en la Unión Soviética, Case Blue, en el sector de Stalingrad.

Poco puedo decir en profundidad, ya que dispongo de la copia de Roads to Stalingrad desde hace tan sólo unos días. Ojala tenga la voluntad de decicarles una reseña en profundidad cuando lo haya jugado. De momento sólo he leído las reglas y he visto sus videos explicativos. Y sí algo se puede decir ya de ellos, es que no se han limitado a copiar un sistema de juego de alguna de  las grandes compañias americanas sino que han buscado las respuestas a sus propias inquietudes.  El caso que nos ocupa Roads to Stalingrad, es el primer juego de una serie pensada como asequible, en cuanto a las limitaciones habituales que tenemos todos de espacio y de tiempo. Y pretendiendo en lo posible que el juego no sea una simplificación extrema. Un juego de hoy en día, sin hexágonos, con zonas y cartas, donde los jugadores alternan las activaciones, huyendo de los largos turnos entre uno y otro jugador, y que presenta un curioso motor de juego, quizá lejanamente emparentado con el de cartas, y con una utilización de los recursos simple pero que da mucho sabor, o al menos eso me parece. Son muchas las cosillas que llaman la atención de este juego. Los únicos peros que se me ocurren son la portada del juego, el volga tintado en rojo, parece un no sé que. No transmite la sensación de estar bañado en sangre si esa era la idea. Y la calidad de las cartas no es la optima, pero bueno, tiene solución para futuros lanzamientos.

No tiene mucho sentido que me extienda en las aparentes bondades del juego, ya que repito todavía no lo he jugado. Tampoco hablar sobre Stalingrado, ya lo hice no hace mucho en este mismo blog. Así que mejor os dejo con alguna foto del juego, los videos explicativos que han subido la gente de 3thd Bellica, iniciativa encomiable que me imagino se vera continuada por más gente del sector y un pseudo montaje que hecho para la ocasión, para intentar suplir la falta de contenido histórico-solarístico de esta entrada.

Y los videos que ha colgado  Bellica 3thd:

Patton with French Renault F1 Tank in WWI

One of the problems that any coalition of unequal partners as is the case in Afghanistan is the role of the lesser partners, their capabilities and limitations imposed on them by their own governments.  When NATO joined the US led effort in Afghanistan a number of NATO allies contributed troops to the effort.  The same was true of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq.  While obviously the US appreciated and continues to appreciate the efforts of its allies in both theaters the unique problems associated with coalition warfare are often not appreciated until the strengths and weaknesses of each junior partner in the coalition are shown to include the effect of each nation’s choice of units sent, logistics capability and rules of engagement.  Thus when some Americans are critical of the contribution of some allies, or the limitations imposed by their governments they should remember that in the First World War the United States was dependant on France and Britain for the majority of the Artillery, all of the tanks and aircraft as well as instructors and training facilities for the rapidly recruited American Expeditionary Force.

US Ace Eddie Rickenbacker with French Supplied Nieuport 28

Every nation works within its own national interests and domestic political situation as well as its military capabilities. Unfortunately many people do not look at history to see how a coalition of a major power allied with a number of minor powers each with their own limitations as well as motivations for entering the war execute that war after the initial plan is foiled.  This is something that has happened in Afghanistan after the initial success disappeared with the corrupt and ineffective Afghan government, the resurgent Taliban and the resiliency of Al Qaida in their bases in the remote border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

French Troops in Afghanistan: The French, British and Canadians have the most Robust Rules of Engagement of Non US NATO Forces (Time Magazine Photo)

One of the best places to find such an example is the German relationship with their allies on the Eastern Front.  The question of the German dominated European Axis alliance in the Second World War is one of the more neglected subjects of World War Two II. In most accounts of the war, the relationship of the Germans to their coalition is minimal.  This includes the works of B.H. Liddell-Hart, Williamson Murray, Chester Wilmot and David M Glantz.   Italy usually receives some attention in the context of the campaign in North Africa and Mediterranean.  Hungary, Romania and Finland receive scant attention from anyone except as to how their armies were overrun during the Stalingrad campaign. Popular German memoirs provide little substantive help. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring’s memoirs and Erwin Rommel’s papers give some views of the Italian efforts in North Africa and the Mediterranean and Erich Manstein gives a limited amount of attention to the Italians, Finns, Hungarians and Rumanians in Russia.

Conflicting War Aims: Hitler with Finland’s Field Marshal Von Mannerheim

In his essay The Dysfunctional Coalition Robert Di Nardo examines the relationship of Germany to her allies on the Eastern Front where the Germans due to their own limitations were forced into a coalition war with weak allies of uncertain reliability. This is a subject that Di Nardo expanded on in his book Germany and the Axis Powers: from Coalition to Collapse (University of Kansas Press, 2005).  Di Nardo believes that there are important lessons to be learned from the failure of Germany and its coalition. Unfortunately we in the west are more often than not content to judge coalitions by the success of the Allies in the Second World War.  Di Nardo’s work on the subject is something that the United States must learn from as it works with coalitions whose members have significant military weaknesses often magnified by the domestic political climates in their own country. The situation, especially in Afghanistan places he United States in a similar position to Germany in relation to the current wars on terror and campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Italian M 13-40 tanks were the mainstays of Italian Armored Units, Slow, Undergunned and Poorly Armored they were No Match for Soviet T-34s

Di Nardo asserts “the way in which Germany conducted coalition warfare was reflective of the manner in which Hitler and the German military looked at the world, as well as the war in general.”  Germany often displayed a haughtiness toward its allies and even knowing their weaknesses was both unable and often unwilling to do much to strengthen them for the fight against the Soviet Union.  Di Nardo believes that the German attitudes were “a significant factor that contributed to the ultimate defeat of Nazi Germany.” (p.712)  In the essay Di Nardo notes the few successes of the coalition. In particular he looks at the German work with Rumanian air defense around the Ploesti oil refineries and the German-Finnish Winter Warfare School.  Apart from these instances he characterizes Axis coalition warfare on the eastern front as “poor” with “failures at every level.” (p.713)

Di Nardo analyzes the problems with language barriers, the wide differences of modernity of the armies and levels of technology and training of the coalition partners many of which are common to the war in Afghanistan. Germany’s failure to become the “arsenal of Fascism” which the United States became “the Arsenal of Democracy” for its allies hindered the Germans in their relationship to their poorly equipped allies.  Likewise, the lack of understanding of all the partners regarding the “relationship between national objectives, strategy and the morale of soldiers of officers and soldiers alike”(p.713) was a major obstacle.

Di Nardo provides a good description of the German liaison detachments allotted to the coalition armies.  These teams functioned as advisors to their allies as well as liaisons between the German army and the allies. These teams dealt with language, tactical communications weaknesses and often displayed the generally haughty attitude that the Germans displayed to their partners. There is an excellent illustration of this in dealing with the failure of XLVIII Panzer Corps at Stalingrad when the German Liaison to the Romanian 1^st Panzer Division was wounded.  At the operational and strategic levels Di Nardo describes the German policies and attitudes toward their allies as “imperialist.” (p.718)

He examines the wide gap in transportation capabilities of the various armies and the failure of the Germans to better provide for the needs of their partners in contrast to the United States assistance to her allies.   Germany provided obsolete captured Czech and French weapons and vehicles to her allies.  They refused to supply the Romanians and Hungary with the plans to build German tank and aircraft in Romanian and Hungarian industrial concerns capable of their manufacture. (pp.718-719) Di Nardo notes how this lack of modern equipment impacted the allies operations against the Red Army and their defeat at the hands of the Soviets.  Although Di Nardo alludes to how even elite German formations had substandard equipment he does not explain principle reason for this.   This was due to the fact that the Germans did not go to a “total war” footing in regard to industrial production until Albert Speer took over as Armaments Minister in 1943.

The number of troops contributed by the German Allies was substantial. Hungary began Barbarossa with two corps, including its Mobile Corps and in 1942 supplied their 2nd Army which was composed of 1 Armored and 9 Infantry Divisions. 2nd Army was crushed by the Soviet offensive against Stalingrad. The Italians began with an expeditionary corps of 2 Semi-Motorized and 1 Light Infantry Divisions. In early 1943 they added 4 Infantry and 3 Alpine Divisions and a number of other smaller formations. This force became the 8th Army. It fought well during the advance toward Stalingrad but spread out over a wide front with little armored or air support was decimated by the Soviet offense against the city.  The remnants were no longer battle worthy and were evacuated to Italy.  Most of the Finnish Army was engaged in the war but after September 1939 made no major offensive contribution to the war. In 1944 following a major Soviet offensive which forced them to withdraw from the territory that they had captured in 1941 the Finnish government sued for peace. The Russians occupied a number of border provinces and islands and Finland was obliged to expel German Forces.  This resulted in the “Lapland War” between the Finns and the Germans with the Germans adopting a scorched earth policy as they withdrew from the country. The quality of the Finnish forces was generally higher than that of Germany’s other Allies.

Obsolete French Built Romanian R-35 Light Tank

The Romanians contributed 19 divisions organized into 3 Armies to Barbarossa. They were limited by their equipment and logistics. The 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies were shattered at Stalingrad forcing a major reorganization as they continued the war.  In August 1944 with the Soviets pressing their border King Michael led a coup to overthrow the Fascist dictatorship of Antonescu. The Germans elected to fight and the Romanians changed sides and joined the Russian advance to the end of the war with their 1st Army taking part in the Prague offensive. Another contributor of troops was Franco’s Spain although it was a neutral country. Spain provided a division of volunteers which became the famous “Spanish Blue Division” or the 250th Infantry Division. It was outfitted as a German unit and received additional training from the Germans before it went into action. The division fought near Leningrad and was engaged in many tough fights.  A Spanish “Blue” Fighter squadron allotted to and equipped by the Luftwaffe also distinguished itself. In October 1943 Spain under allied pressure withdrew the division from the front although many soldiers volunteered to remain and fight on as smaller units attached to German formations. One volunteer company became part of the 11th SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland at Berlin.  One thing that probably was a factor in the Spanish effectiveness as well as commitment to to German cause was their genuine loathing of the Soviets following the Spanish Civil War.

The final part of Di Nardo’s essay deals with the strategic goals and conflicts among the Axis coalition which were never worked out.  Examples of this include how the Finns never signed a formal alliance with Germany and how their national strategy did not allow them to deeper into the Soviet Union instead settling on recovering territory lost to the Soviets in 1939 with a few minor gains.  There was also the problem that the Romanians and Hungarians distrusted each other so much that they could not work together over their own territorial disputes.  The Italians joined the campaign late and their 8^th Army participated in the German advance toward Stalingrad protecting the German flank.  While the Italians provided their own equipment including armor and aircraft they and their weapons were woefully suited for the war that they faced on the Eastern Front.  Di Nardo finishes his essay noting morale problems in the Hungarian, Italian and Romanian armies, the lack of understanding and general lack of motivation for the campaign.

Romanian ME-109 E4, The Romanian Air Force Was One of the Axis Success Stories

This article is well sourced. Di Nardo uses histories, archival sources, operational orders and analysis by the various armies as well as interviews with participants. Of particular note is that he goes to sources of the coalition partners and not just German sources.  This allows him to be far more nuanced and detailed in his discussion as opposed to others who simply ignore the contributions of the Axis partners.  His footnotes provide added detail and provide and lend support to his arguments.

The importance of this essay is twofold.  First it provides a look at the relationship of German to her coalition partners on the Eastern Front.  This is important from a historic standpoint simply because it is such a neglected topic in most histories of the period and gives added depth to the reasons for Germany’s defeat.  One has to ask the “what if questions” in regard to had the Germans better treated, equipped and recognized their allies’ contributions to the war effort.

The second and probably more important for Afghanistan is that it provides lessons to any nation which has to engage in coalition warfare.  In particular it has lessons for the United States which has found itself as the senior and vastly superior partner in a war which has multiple coalition partners in several theaters of operations.  Each coalition partner has certain military strengths and weaknesses in relationship to the United States, national interests, geo-political and economic relationships with competitors to the United States and internal political realities which impact their cooperation in the war.  As such the United States cannot allow itself to be cast in the role of a haughty imperialistic senior partner as did Germany.  The US instead must cultivate an attitude of assistance, respect and trust among its partners to assure their full cooperation and assistance in relation to U.S. goals in the war. This is particularly important now was it appears that the Afghan war is reaching a point where the deteriorating situation on the ground could invite the early withdraw of allies and necessitate either the addition of more US troops or a strategic withdraw which would be for all intents and purposes a defeat for the US and NATO. The consequences would not be good and while the Taliban may be able to be contained they undoubtedly would invite Al Qaida back and provide them with a sanctuary just as Pakistan has stepped up its efforts on the border.

Four Generals trapped; (October 4, 2009)

            The German army failed to capture Stalingrad and the Soviet army has encircled it.  The Fuhrer Hitler decided to supply his army by air; by then the German army could no longer retreat.  The Fuhrer ordered his army “never to surrender”.

            Now you have four Generals trapped in a hut during Russia’s winter; they have not eaten for two days and didn’t sleep for three night.  The highest ranked among the Generals is the German Leopold Reims,  another German General Von Augenstrahl, the Austrian General Kowalka, , and the Italian General Capognoni. There is no gunfire; just strong wind sweeping the flat desolate land covered with snow and dead bodies of man and animals.

            “I give it another ten minutes,” growled Reims in a weak voice “and then I will take my life.”  Kowalka replied: “Why wait ten minutes?”  Reims threw him a look of disdain.  Capognoni had three Turkish flat cigarettes left and offered one to Reims who was fumbling in his empty packet of Overstolz cigarettes. Reims said: “I don’t smoke”. Capognoni hatred for Reims was too deep to linger on this last stung. Kowalka accepted one with pleasure.

            General Von Augenstrahl said: “Suicide is the ultimate form of cowardice.”  Reims shouted feebly: “It is the height of honor” Von Augenstrahl retorted: “By killing yourself, you are doing the work of the enemy. For one thing, you are wasting a bullet to be used in battle”. Reims snapped: “Our orders specifically forbid us to fall into enemy hands.” Von Augenstrahl could no longer control his nerves and said: “Our orders were given by a crackpot Austrian corporal residing in Berlin.” Kowalka laughed: “Our friend in Berlin was a corporal in the German army. Had he stayed in his homeland of Austria he would have remained a private.”

            After a short silence Kowalka broke it: “Hey, General Capognoni, we fought the only civilized wars. At Caporetto you ran away, at Vittorio Veneto it was our turn.  It was all done as gentlemen should do it. At the first sign of an advance, the other side retreated.  There was none of this nonsense of both sides trying to advance at the same time.” Capognoni flushed and retorted: “Wars are to be won, and every effort should be made to win them.” Reims butt in: “It is well known that Italian strategy leads in only one direction, backwards!” Capognoni replied: “The German strategy is to leave the dirty work to their allies. It is in the greatest tradition of the German Army: it is to fight with the Italian soldiers every where the Italian army was present such as in Libya and Greece.”

            Reims said around noon: “I have decided that if by noon no relief arrives then I will end it in honor. The order is not to fall in enemy hands. To insure this, with the exception of General Capognoni, I order you all to take your own lives in an honorable way.  Are there any question?” Von Augenstrahl, a Catholic, reiterated his answer: “I will not waste my breath. I cannot obey orders which are against the dictates of my conscience and of common sense.”  “You are under arrest” snapped Reims.  Kowakli laughed: “Is there no end to absurdity?” Kowakli left the hut in search of any Soviet soldier to surrender. “I am staying here,” said Capognoni. “As a Roman, it amuses me to see how the barbarians prepare for the end.”

            Reims needed help to insert the bullet in his revolver. When he was ready Von Augenstrahl stepped outside the hut. Capognoni is day dreaming of the good life he had prior to joining the Russian front amid the blood in the hut; he had all the right connections not to join the army to the Russian front; and then he heard a shot outside. The Italian army did not fight well on this front, nor had he. His temperament was too volatile for battles of attrition; for battles when reason declared to be lost from the outset. It was no proof of courage voluntarily to disobey your own intelligence. It was not as you are driving a racing car with a public gallery to play to. The Italian could coax his less performing race car than the German one and win by humanizing the inanimate. That was courage.

            After a while a Russian young soldier entered hesitantly and then rushed out to call on his Lieutenant. “Lei parla italiano?” asked Capognoni. “Raus” shouted the Soviet Lieutenant. “Parlez-vous Francais?” asked Capognoni, “I refuse to surrender. We are still at war”.  The Russian replied with a smile: “What do you want to do about it?” Capognoni faked to shoot at the Russian who was stumbling to remove his revolver and then the Russian shot Capognoni.  The Lieutenant was utterly angry and cried: “What did you do that for?” Capognoni said before dying: “You tell them that the Italian Army was the last to cease resistance on this front”.  The Russian retorted: “Crackpot! Who the hell cares; so long as we are winning!” Capognoni had a witness to his courage and that was the ultimate in aftertaste: an applauding gallery.

Note: This topic was taken from “The Aftertaste”"; it is a short story of the book “Add a dash of pity” by Peter Ustinov.

Introduction

After Stalingrad the Soviets followed up on their success and attempted to entrap the rest of Army Group South. Field Marshall von Manstein attempted to save the Army Group and perhaps prevent the Soviets from collapsing the entire German front.

Manstein planning at the front

Chaos and Peril in the South

As 6^th Army died at Stalingrad field Marshall von Manstein was faced with one of the most challenging situations faced by any commander in modern times.  He faced strategic and operational “problems of a magnitude and complexity seldom paralleled in history.”[i] Manstein had to deal with a complex military situation where he had minimal forces to counter the moves of a superior enemy force that was threatening to entrap all German forces in southern Russia. Additionally Manstein had to deal with the “Hitler’s obstinate opposition to a maneuver defense and a Red Army flushed with the victory of Stalingrad.”[ii] Facing him were the six Russian armies of the Voronezh and Southwestern Front’s led by Mobile Group Popov[iii]. These Armies had broken through the Hungarian and Italian armies “making a breach 200 miles wide between the Donetz and Voronezh, and were sweeping westward past Manstein’s flank.”[iv]

The most dangerous threat that Manstein faced was to Army Group A in the Caucasus. This Army Group “found itself in danger of being cut off, forcing an immediate withdraw.”[v] Disaster was averted by the desperate holding actions of Manstein’s meager forces, Army detachment’s Fretter-Pico and Hollidt, and winter conditions that made “offensive operations extraordinarily difficult, even for the hardiest Soviet troops.”[vi] A smart withdraw executed by General von Kleist managed to extricate the Army group “just as the Stalingrad forces collapsed.”[vii] To parry the Soviet thrusts the Germans lacked forces to “establish a deeply echeloned defense” and “instead combined maneuver… with stubborn positional defense to give artificial depth to the battlefield.  In this way the Germans were able to break major Soviet attacks, preventing catastrophic breakthroughs….”[viii] The timely introduction of a battalion of Tiger tanks prevented the Russians from breaking through to Rostov and “cutting the rail and road lines on which First Panzer Army’s retreat depended.”[ix] Even so the escape of the Army Group was narrow. “In terms of time, space, force, and weather conditions it was an astonishing performance-for which Kleist was made a field-marshal.”[x] With the Russians only 70 kilometers from Rostov and his own forces 650 kilometers from that city Kleist executed a withdraw “which had appeared hardly possible to achieve.”[xi] The divisions extricated by Kleist would be instrumental in the coming weeks as Manstein moved to counter the Soviet offensive.

Hitler and Manstein

Despite the successful withdraw the situation was still precarious in early February, Manstein had no effective contact with his left wing, the bulk of which was tied to Kharkov, The Russians had “virtually complete freedom of action across a fifty-mile stretch of the Donetz on either side of Izyum.”[xii] Manstein was hard pressed to “halt the raids of Mobile Group Popov and other exploiting Soviet tank corps in Operation Gallop.”[xiii] Manstein’s forces in the eastern sector had been divided by Russian penetrations, which threatened 1^st Panzer Army’s western flank and blocked the Army Group’s main railway line.[xiv] On 15 February “the SS Panzer Corps withdrew from Kharkov-in spite of orders from Hitler…that the city was to be held to the last.”[xv] SS General Paul Hausser, the corps commander realized that the order to hold Kharkov was impossible and requested permission to withdraw. This was was refused by General Lanz. Under pressure from encircling Russian forces outside and from partisans inside the city, Hausser disobeyed the order and extricated his troops,[xvi] thereby saving thousands of German soldiers and preserved the SS Panzer Corps as a fighting unit.[xvii] Lanz was relieved by Hitler for the loss of Kharkov and although Hausser would escape immediate censure, “Hitler did see it as a black mark against his name.”[xviii] With Kharkov in Soviet hands the gap between Manstein’s army group and Field Marshal von Kluge’s Army Group Center increased to over 100 miles.[xix] It appeared that the entire German southern flank was disintegrating.  Manstein estimated the ratio of German to Soviet forces in his area at 1:8.[xx] He believed that the Soviets could advance and subsequently “block the approaches to the Crimea and the Dnieper crossing at Kherson” which would “result in the encirclement of the entire German southern wing.”[xxi] Popov’s Mobile Group crossed the Donets and reached Krasnoarmeiskaia by 12 February. Vatutin committed two additional fresh tank corps toward Zaporozhe, a critical transport node which was also the location of Manstein’s headquarters.[xxii]

Tiger Tanks assigned to 1st SS Panzer Division

Hitler arrived to consult with Manstein on 17 February and remained for three days with Soviet forces perilously close.  Manstein only had some flak units and the Army Group Headquarters Company between him and Popov’s advanced elements. On Hitler’s last day “some T-34’s approached to within gun range of the airfield.”[xxiii]

The conference of Hitler with Manstein at Zaporozhe as well as a previous conference at the Wolfsschanze on 6 February was critical to the development of Manstein’s plan to restore the front. Manstein had now gotten both the 1^st and 4^th Panzer Armies across the Don, and “with this striking force, he felt confident of smashing the Russian offensive if he was given a free hand to withdraw from the line of the Donetz, evacuate Rostov and take up a much shorter front along the Mius river.”[xxiv] The conference on the 6^th was one of the “rare moments in the war where Hitler authorized a strategic withdraw on a major scale.”[xxv] Yet as the Russians continued to advance Hitler became concerned and came to Zaporozhe.  At first Hitler would not concede to Manstein, as he wanted to assemble the SS Panzer Corps for an attack to recapture Kharkov.[xxvi] Manstein explained the need for a counter stroke and through much explanation was able to convince Hitler that the capture of Kharkov was not possible unless “we first removed the danger of the Army Group being cut off from its rear communications.”[xxvii]

Soviet formations advance

The Russian aim was now obvious[xxviii] and Manstein had correctly discerned their strategy.  Manstein knew that his Army Group had to hold the line on the Mius and then quickly defeat the enemy between 1^st Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf[xxix] in “order to prevent its own isolation from the Dnieper crossings.”[xxx] The Soviets had outrun their logistics support and had suffered heavy losses of their own and had serious equipment shortages.[xxxi] Manstein explained to Hitler the opportunity offered as it was now the Russians who “were worn out” and far from their supply dumps as the Germans had been in November 1942.  Manstein “foresaw an opportunity to seize the operational initiative with a counter offensive of his own.  Manstein’s target was the Soviet armored spearheads, still careening southwestward between Kharkov and Stalino.”[xxxii] Manstein believed that when the Russian “spearhead lunged, as it must toward the crossings on the upper Dnieper,” then Hoth’s Army would be let loose again.  The three SS Panzer divisions could then “play their rightful role as avengers, and strike southeast to meet 4^th Panzer Army, catching the Russian armour in a noose.”[xxxiii] Hitler agreed to Manstein’s plan and Manstein shifted 4^th Panzer Army to assume control of the SS Panzer Corps, now reinforced by 3^rd SS Panzergrenadier Division “Totenkopf.” Hitler reinforced Manstein and released 7 battle worn Panzer and motorized divisions for his attack.[xxxiv]

Soviet Miscalculation

It was now Stalin’s time to miscalculate. He and his subordinates “continued to believe that they were on the verge of a great victory. German defenses in southern Russia appeared to be crumbling and the Stavka sought to expand that victory to include Army Group Center.”[xxxv] To this end they diverted armies to the north and launched attacks in that direction.  However German defenses were stiff and the plan was “predicated on the assumption of continued offensive success further south.”[xxxvi] Reinforcements from Stalingrad failed to deploy and “Army Group Center’s defenses, prepared for the past year and a half proved formidable.”[xxxvii]

In the south Stalin saw the Dnieper and almost “heedlessly drove his armies towards what he thought would be the decisive victory on the banks of this huge Russian river,”[xxxviii] but, Soviet “ambitions exceeded their available resources and the skill of their commanders.”[xxxix] The SS Panzer Corps withdraw from Kharkov “further heightened the Soviet’s intoxication with victory”[xl] and confirmed their beliefs that the Germans were withdrawing.  Stalin believed that “it was inconceivable that Hitler’s Praetorian Guard would abandon Kharkov except as part of a general order to retreat.”[xli] He believed that the encirclement of Army Group South would lead to a chain reaction and quick way to victory over German forces in the east.  Believing that there was no way for the Germans to recover and establish a solid front on the Mius,[xlii] Stalin continued to drive his forces to attack, yet the Russian offensive in the south had reached what Clausewitz had called the “culminating point” and Stalin’s armies were now extremely vulnerable. “The weather, the devastated communications, and their own inexperience in maintaining the traffic density required to support a deep penetration on a narrow front had combined to force a dangerous dispersal of effort on the Russian advance which had broken down into four separate groups.”[xliii]

Panzers assembling to attack

The Soviet forces were now in a dangerous predicament being spread out across the entire south of Russia.  One group, composed of the 69^th Army and 3^rd Tank Army pushed against Army detachment Kempf west of Kharkov.  To the south the badly depleted 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army were now “strung out down a long corridor they had opened between Izyum and Pavlograd,”[xliv] Mobile Group Popov was lagging further east near Krasnoarmeiskaia.   Additional units were isolated behind the front of Army Detachment Fretter-Pico and near Matveyev.  Soviet commanders believed that the Germans were in worse shape and that “the risks of dispersal were justified.”[xlv] They had not anticipated or made allowance for Manstein’s coolness under pressure and actions to preserve his armor while thinning his front “well past the accepted danger limit.”[xlvi] Likewise the Soviets did not know that the Germans had cracked the code used by the Southwest front and from 12 February on “were now privy to Popov’s and Vatutin’s thoughts,” now knowing precisely where the Russians would attack.[xlvii] Manstein had withstood temptation and Hitler’s pressure to use his reserves “for a direct defense of the Dnieper line.”[xlviii] As such he was prepared to launch a devastating counter-stroke against the dispersed and weakened Russian armies which were still advancing into the trap he planned for them. He had managed to “save his counteroffensive plan from Hitler’s shrill demands that the new reserves be thrown into battle piecemeal to prevent further territorial losses.”[xlix] The stage was now set for a two classic mobile operations.[l]

The Destruction of Mobile Group Popov, 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army

Manstein launched his counter-stroke on 21 February against Popov’s Mobile Group using XL Panzer Corps under the command of General Henrici composed of the 7^th and 11^th Panzer Divisions and SS Motorized Division Viking. Popov’s Group was exposed. Popov had “succeed in cutting the railway from Dnepropetrovsk to Stalino and was itching to push further south to Mariupol on the Sea of Azov.”[li] The Soviets once again had failed to discern German intentions, believing that the Germans were retreating.[lii] Likewise the Soviet high command did not fully understand Popov’s situation. His force was weak in tanks and low on fuel and his Mobile Group was defeated in detail by the German Corps.  Popov’s immobilized tank and motorized rifle formations resisted desperately but were bypassed by the panzers.  The 330^th Infantry Division mopped up the remnants of these formations.[liii] The key battles took place around the town of Krasnoarmeiskaia and the battle became a running battle between that town and the Donets River.[liv] Popov requested permission to retreat, but still believing the Germans to be retreating Vatutin gave a categorical “no.” The terrain in the area was “almost completely open”[lv] and “Popov’s proud Armoured Group was cut up like a cake.”[lvi] Popov extricated some of his units but “only after serious losses in manpower and equipment.”[lvii] Despite this it would not be until the 24^th that Vatutin would order a halt to offensive operations.[lviii]

SS Panzers in Kharkov

As Popov sought to get his units out of the German scythe Manstein set his sights on 6^th Army, 1^st Guards Army and 25^th Tank Corps which was approaching Zaporozhe.[lix] He assigned the task to Hoth’s 4^th Panzer Army and its XLVIII Panzer Corps under General Knobelsdorf composed of the 6^th and 17^th Panzer Divisions and the SS Panzer Corps comprising SS Divisions Liebstandarte, Das Reich and Totenkopf.[lx] Manstein gave Hoth a brief but explicit order: “The Soviet Sixth Army, now racing towards Dnepropetrovsk through the gap between First Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, is to be eliminated.”[lxi] The XLVIII Panzer Corps and SS Panzer Corps were unleashed against the exposed flank of the 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army.   XLVIII Panzer Corps quickly “seized bridgeheads over the Samara River, and prepared to move north into the rear of the exhausted Soviet Sixth Army.”[lxii] The two Panzer Corps then made a coordinated concentric attack northwest which “came as a complete surprise to the Russians.”[lxiii] Das Reich thrust deep into the flank of 6^th Army supported by Stukas from Richthofen’s 4^th Air Fleet.  This attack dislodged one Soviet Rifle Corps and destroyed another allowing the division to capture Pavlograd while XLVIII Panzer Corps led by 17^th Panzer Division pushed from the south linking up with the SS Corps. This cut off the Soviet 25^th Tank Corps and threatened 6^th Army.[lxiv] What followed was a disaster for the Russians.        Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary the Stavka and Front commanders still believed that the Germans were retreating.  6^th Army was ordered to continue its advance by the front commander who believed that the two German Panzer Corps were withdrawing.[lxv] In a few days the 17^th Panzer Division “gained the Izyum-Protoponovka sector on the Donetz River, while the SS Panzer Corps took Losovaya and established contact with Army Detachment Kempf, which had joined the attack from the west.”[lxvi] XL Panzer Corps with the 3^rd and 7^th Panzer Divisions and 333^rd Infantry Division joined in the attack on Popov’s remaining forces completing their destruction.[lxvii] As Hoth and Hausser converged on Pavlograd, Das Reich and Totenkopf “swung left to the east and then wheeled back north again running parallel to the Russian divisions fleeing from Forty-eighth Panzer Corps. What ensured was a turkey shoot.”[lxviii] Fleeing Russian forces on the open steppe were visible and engaged at long range.[lxix] Leibstandarte helped by holding the left flank against Russian counter attacks from the units now isolated in the west,[lxx] and Totenkopf’s grenadiers fanned out supported by Stukas to “kill or capture as many Russians as possible.”[lxxi] By 1 March the Russian penetrations had been eliminated. Popov’s Mobile Group was smashed, 6^th Army and 1^st Guards Army badly mauled. 25^th Tank Corps and three Rifle divisions had to be completely written off and numerous other corps and divisions took heavy casualties.  Two additional corps, encircled before the offensive began were eliminated by German forces.[lxxii] The Germans counted 23,000 Russian dead on the battlefield, and Manstein noted that “the booty included 615 tanks, 354 field pieces, 69 anti-aircraft guns and large numbers of machine guns and mortars.”[lxxiii] The Germans only took 9,000 prisoners as they were too weak, especially in infantry to seal off the encircled Soviet forces.[lxxiv] Yet the forces that escaped they were in no condition to “block the continued progress of the Panzers and SS.”[lxxv] Now there was a 100 mile gap in the Russian lines with nothing no troops to fill it and only “General Mud” could stop the Germans.[lxxvi] Manstein was not yet finished and the next phase of his operation against the Soviet formations west of Kharkov and that city were about to commence.

The Destruction of 3^rd Tank Army

With the immediate threat to his Army Group eliminated and having regained the initiative, Manstein and Army Group South now “proceeded to deliver the stroke against the ‘Voronezh Front’- i.e. the forces located in the Kharkov area.”[lxxvii] But the Russians had not been idle. In order to attempt to assist 6^th Army 3^rd Tank Army moved two tank corps and three Rifle divisions south and these ran into Manstein’s advancing panzers.[lxxviii] Manstein’ noted his objective now was “not the possession of Kharkov but the defeat-and if possible the destruction of the enemy units located there.”[lxxix] Between March 1^st and 5^th his forces advanced on Kharkov. Not knowing the Germans dispositions[lxxx] 3^rd Tank Army made the mistake of moving between the Leibstandarte’s defensive positions and the attacking divisions of the SS Panzer Corps. Hausser wheeled Totenkopf around and completed an encirclement of these units near Bereka on 3 March.[lxxxi] The Russians made futile attempts to break out but the SS Divisions tightened the noose around them and they were eliminated by the SS Panzer Corps which “engaged in concentric attacks during the three days of hard fighting.”[lxxxii] Even Regimental commanders like Heinz Harmel of Das Reich’s Der Fuhrer regiment became engaged in close combat with the Russians.[lxxxiii] The battle was fought in “snowstorms whose intensity caused the SS severe privations.”[lxxxiv] Totenkopf and Das Reich slammed the Russians “back against the Tiger tanks and assault guns of the Leibstandarte.”[lxxxv] The elimination of these units netted another 12,000 Russians killed,[lxxxvi] knocking “out the last remaining obstacle between the Germans and Kharkov.”[lxxxvii]

Return to Kharkov and Controversy

Manstein turned his attention to Kharkov, supported by Richthofen’s 4^th Air Fleet which for the last time in Russia “provided undisputed air superiority for a major German mechanized operation.”[lxxxviii] He decided to “roll up the enemy from the flank and force him away from Kharkov in the process.”[lxxxix] He ordered a “pincer on the town, sending Grossdeutschland around to the north with a reinforced Kempf detachment and the combined force of Hoth and the SS to attack the town from the south and rear.”[xc] Manstein planned to make a wide envelopment to avoid embroiling his panzers in costly urban combat stating “that at all costs the Army Group wished to avoid Kharkov’s becoming a second Stalingrad in which our assault forces might become irretrievably committed.”[xci] To this end he sent Das Reich and Totenkopf approaching from the south to west of the city[xcii] while XLVIII Panzer Corps swung east toward the Donetz.[xciii] As Hoth’s forces came up from the south to envelope the city, Grossdeutschland and the XI and LI Corps fought the Russians to the north and west,[xciv] eventually moving up to Belgorod.  By 8 March lead elements of the SS Panzer Corps were on the outskirts of the city.

At this point there is some controversy as to German actions. As noted Manstein wished to avoid urban combat and desired to surround the city and force its surrender.  According to one writer Hoth ordered Hausser “to seal off the city from the west and north and to take any opportunity to seize it.”[xcv] Others including Glantz and House and Murray and Millett state that Hausser “ignored a direct order” and attacked into the city.[xcvi] Manstein does not explicitly say that there was a direct order but notes that the Army Group “had to intervene vigorously on more than one occasion to ensure that the corps did not launch a frontal attack on Kharkov.”[xcvii] Sydnor states that Hausser ignored a direct order by Hoth on the 11^th by detailing a battalion of Totenkopf to assist Das Reich and Leibstandarte in retaking Kharkov by direct assault. The order entailed pulling Das Reich out of the city and taking it to the east.[xcviii] Lucas adds that this order came in the midst of hard fighting in the city and could not be carried out by the division.[xcix]Carell notes that on 9 March Hoth instructed Hausser that “opportunities to seize the city by a coup are to be utilized,”[c] and goes into detail regarding how Hoth’s 11 March order applied to Das Reich. It was to be pulled out of action and brought east, but division was heavily engaged and in the process of breaking through Soviet defenses “quicker in fact than if he had pulled “Das Reich” out of the operation and led it all the way round the city along those terrible muddy and time wasting roads.”[ci] In the end the SS took Kharkov, Manstein said that the city “fell without difficulty”[cii] while others note the difficulty of the action and the casualties suffered by the SS.  Kharkov’s capture; the defeat of Rokossovsky’s campaign against Orel and the beginning of the spring Rasutitsa ended the winter campaign and stabilized the front.

Analysis

The Russian winter offensive following Stalingrad had great potential.  Manstein said: “the successes attained on the Soviet side, the magnitude of which is incontestable.”[ciii] The greatest Soviet shortcomings were inexperience in conducting deep mobile operations and the inability of their logistics system to keep up with their advance.  Clark notes that this was their “first experience of an offensive war of movement on a large scale.[civ] Glantz and House are not alone in noting that the “Stavka continued to undertake operations that were beyond its resources.”[cv] Murray and Millett state that they “lacked the operational focus that had marked the Stalingrad offensive.”[cvi] Had they had the resources and ability to execute their plans they might have destroyed all German forces in the south.  They misread German intentions based on their own over-optimistic expectations opened their forces to Manstein’s devastating counter stroke.  Von Mellenthin, possibly showing some prejudice commented that the Russian soldier “when confronted by surprise and unforeseen situations he is an easy prey to panic.”[cvii]

The Germans snatched victory out of what appeared to be certain defeat aided by Russian mistakes and operational shortcomings.  Manstein refused to panic and conserved his forces for his counterattack.[cviii] Kleist brought his Army Group out of what might have been encirclement worse than Stalingrad.  Hitler for the most part gave Manstein operational freedom which he had not provided other commanders.  German Panzer forces conducted mobile operations against superior enemy armored forces and bested them.  Landsers held their own in at critical junctures, especially on the Mius and gave Manstein the opportunity to employ the panzers in the mobile defense.[cix] The Luftwaffe recovered its balance and the coordinated operations between it and German ground forces gave them an edge at a point where the Red Air Force was unable to support the Red Army.[cx] Above all the Germans still maintained the edge in both overall quality of generalship, especially that of Manstein and Kleist, but not to exclude Hoth, Hausser and lower level commanders.  Additionally the average German soldier still maintained an edge over his Soviet adversary in the confusion of mobile operations in open terrain.   Manstein and his forces gave Hitler breathing room on the eastern front.[cxi] As Clark notes: “few periods in World War II show a more complete and dramatic reversal of fortune than the fortnight in February and the first in March 1943…it repaired its front, shattered the hopes of the Allies, nipped the Russian spearhead. Above all it recovered its moral ascendancy.”[cxii]

[ii] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995. p.143

[iii] Ibid. Glantz. P.143. These units include 3^rd Tank Army, 1^st and 3^rd Guards Armies and the 6^th, 40^th and 69^th Armies.

[iv] Liddell-Hart. B.H. Strategy.  A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY 1974, first published by Faber and Faber Ltd. London, 1954 and 1967. p.253

[v] Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operation: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003. p.185

[vi] Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R. A War to Be Won: Fighting the Second World War, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 2000. pp.291-292

[vii] Liddell-Hart, B.H. History of the Second World War. G.P. Putnam’s Son’s, New York, NY. 1970  p.478

[viii] Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front in World War II, Prewar to March 1943. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1986. p.161

[ix] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[x] Ibid. Liddell-Hart, Second World War. p.479

[xi] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart. pp.211-212.

[xii] Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45. Perennial, an Imprint of Harper Collins Books, New York, NY 2002. Originally published by William Morrow, New York, NY 1965. pp.299-300

[xiii] Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999. p.11

[xiv] Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Translated by Anthony G. Powell, Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing Company, St Paul, MN. 2004. First Published as Verlorene Siege Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn, GE 1955, English edition Methuen & Company Ltd. 1958  p.417

[xv] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xvi] Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company. pp.196-199

[xvii] Lucas, James. Das Reich: The Military History of the 2^nd SS Division. Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, UK, 1999. First published by Arms and Armour, 1991. p.91  Glantz and House criticize Hausser saying that the SS Panzer Corps Staff lacked the experience to perform its mission.  (Titans Clashed p.144) Most other commentators agree with the necessity of his withdraw.

[xviii] Messenger, Charles. Sepp Dietrich: Hitler’s Gladiator. Brassey’s Defence Publishers, London, 1988. p.113

[xix] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xx] Ibid. Manstein. p.419

[xxi] Ibid. Manstein. pp.418-419

[xxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.144

[xxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.300

[xxiv] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.251

[xxv] Ibid. Carell. p.191

[xxvi] Ibid. Manstein. p.424.

[xxvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.428

[xxviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. Second World War. p.481

[xxix] This had previously been Army Detachment Lanz, but Lanz had bee relieved over the loss of Kharkov.

[xxx] Ibid. Manstein. p.429

[xxxi] Ibid. Murray and Millet. p.292

[xxxii] Ibid. Wray. p.162

[xxxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.302.

[xxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.145

[xxxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed . pp.144-145

[xxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.146

[xxxvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[xxxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.191

[xxxix] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[xl] Ibid. Carell. p.199

[xli] Ibid. Carell. p.199

[xlii] Ibid. Carell. p.193

[xliii] Ibid. Clark. p.303

[xliv] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlv] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlvi] Ibid. Clark. p.304

[xlvii] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[xlviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. Strategy p.253

[xlix] Ibid. Wray. p.163

[l] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147. Note comments by Glantz and House in footnote 31 on relative strengths of forces involved, especially the weakness of German forces.

[li] Butler, Rupert. SS Wiking: The History of the Fifth SS Division 1941-45. Casemate, Havertown, PA. 2002. p.93

[lii] Ibid. Carell. p.211

[liii] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[liv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lv] Ibid. von Mellenthin. p.253

[lvi] Ibid. Carell. p.210

[lvii] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[lviii] Ibid. Carell. p.213

[lix] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lx] There is difference in various accounts as to which units composed these Panzer Corps. Von Mellenthin adds 11^th Panzer to the XLVIII Panzer Corps and some accounts do not list the Liebstandarte as part of the SS Panzer Corps.

[lxi] Ibid. Carell. p.211

[lxii] Sydnor, Charles W. Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division 1933-1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 1977. p.268

[lxiii] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.252

[lxiv] Ibid. Carell. p.212

[lxv] Ibid. Carell. p.212

[lxvi] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.252

[lxvii] Ibid. Carell. p.213

[lxviii] Ibid. Sydnor. pp.268-269

[lxix] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.253

[lxx] Meyer, Kurt. Grenadiers. Translated by Michael Mende and Robert J. Edwards. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. Winnipeg, Manitoba. Canada. 2001. pp.180-181

[lxxi] Ibid. Sydnor. p.269

[lxxii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxiii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433. Sydnor lists an addition 600 anti-tank guns and notes that the tanks were almost all T-34s. (Sydnor. p.269)

[lxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.147

[lxxv] Ibid. Clark. p.306

[lxxvi] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[lxxvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed. p.187

[lxxix] Ibid. Manstein. p.433

[lxxx] Ibid. Meyer. p.181

[lxxxi] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[lxxxii] Ibid. Meyer. pp.181-182

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Lucas. p.95

[lxxxiv] Ibid. Lucas. p.95

[lxxxv] Ibid. Sydnor. p.277

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Manstein. p.434

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.277

[lxxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. Kursk. p.13

[lxxxix] Ibid. Manstein. p.435

[xc] Ibid. Clark. p.306

[xci] Ibid. Manstein. p.435

[xcii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.278

[xciii] Weingartner, James. J. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933-45. Battery Press, Nashville, TN.(no publication date listed)  p.75

[xciv] Ibid. Raus. pp.189-192

[xcv] Ibid. Messenger. p.114

[xcvi] See Glantz and House p.187 and Murray and Millett p.293

[xcvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.436

[xcviii] Ibid. Sydnor. p.278

[xcix] Ibid. Lucas. p.96

[c] Ibid. Carell. p.216

[ci] Ibid. Carell. p.219

[cii] Ibid. Manstein. p.436

[ciii] Ibid. Manstein. p.437

[civ] Ibid. Clark. p.303

[cv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.143

[cvi] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.292

[cvii] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. p.254

[cviii] A comment by Von Mellenthin commenting on Manstein’s coolness in the conduct of his operations compares him to Robert E. Lee. “To find another example of defensive strategy of this caliber we must go back to Lee’s campaign in Virginia in the summer of 1864. (Von Mellenthin. p.245)

[cix] For some additional comments along these lines see vn Mellenthin who notes four points in regard to the counter stroke: 1. High level commanders did not restrict the moves of armored formations, but gave them long range tasks. 2. Armored formations had no worries about their flanks because the High Command had a moderate infantry force available for counterattacks. 3. All commanders of armored formations, including corps, conducted operations not from the rear, but from the front. 4. The attack came as a surprise regarding the time and place. (Von Mellenthin p.254)

[cx] Ibid. Murray and Millett. p.293

[cxi] Despite his success Hitler was not happy with Manstein in regard to giving up ground for operational purposes and Manstein would lose much of the freedom that he enjoyed by March. Wray has a discussion of this.  See Wray. pp.162-163.  The Nazi hierarchy actively promoted the exploits of the SS Panzer Corps and its leaders, especially the commander of the Leibstandarte Sepp Dietrich. (see Weingartner pp. 76-77) The recognition of Hausser would be delayed, some speculate as a result of his disobedience in giving up Kharkov in February.

[cxii] Ibid. Clark. p.306

Bibliography

Butler, Rupert. SS Wiking: The History of the Fifth SS Division 1941-45. Casemate, Havertown, PA. 2002

Carell, Paul. Scorched Earth: The Russian German War 1943-1944. Translated by Ewald Osers, Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, published in arrangement with Little-Brown and Company

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict, 1941-45. Perennial, an Imprint of Harper Collins Books, New York, NY 2002. Originally published by William Morrow, New York, NY 1965

Glantz, David M and House, Jonathan. The Battle of Kursk.  University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1999

Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995

Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart.

Liddell-Hart, B.H. History of the Second World War. G.P. Putnam’s Son’s, New York, NY.

Liddell-Hart. B.H. Strategy.  A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY 1974, first published by Faber and Faber Ltd. London, 1954 and 1967

Lucas, James. Das Reich: The Military History of the 2^nd SS Division. Cassell Military Paperbacks, London, UK, 1999. First published by Arms and Armour, 1991

Manstein, Erich von. Lost Victories. Translated by Anthony G. Powell, Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing Company, St Paul, MN. 2004. First Published as Verlorene Siege Athenaum-Verlag, Bonn, GE 1955, English edition Methuen & Company Ltd. 1958

Messenger, Charles. Sepp Dietrich: Hitler’s Gladiator. Brassey’s Defence Publishers, London, 1988

Meyer, Kurt. Grenadiers. Translated by Michael Mende and Robert J. Edwards. J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing Inc. Winnipeg, Manitoba. Canada. 2001

Raus, Erhard. Panzer Operation: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945. Compiled and Translated by Steven H Newton. Da Capo Press a member of the Perseus Book Group, Cambridge, MA 2003

Sydnor, Charles W. Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division 1933-1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 1977

Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated by H. Betzler, Ballantine Books, New York, NY, 1971. Originally Published University of Oklahoma Press, 1956

Weingartner, James. J. Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler: A Military History, 1933-45. Battery Press, Nashville, TN.(no publication date listed)

Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front in World War II, Prewar to March 1943. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1986

It took longer for me to read this than it took the Allies to take Paris.  That’s because it is an intense and extremely detailed account of the D-Day landings, the Normandy battles and the march to Paris.  It covers the action from four sides; the British under Monty (portrayed as a fool throughout by Beevor – he clearly has a thing against Monty), the Americans under Patton (The top dog in Beevor’s eyes),  the Germans under Hitler and Kluge and the French under De Gaul.

Actually, the D Day section is no more than quarter of the book.  The vast majority is dedicated to the battles in Normandy, and focusses heavily on the ultimate victory when the allies trapped the Germans in the Falaise Pocket.  His description of the feelings of the Allies landing on the beaches of Normandy are so vivid and visceral that it makes you flinch.

If you don’t like extreme detail this book will not be for you, but if you can deal with the unceasing map reading and referencing, and if understand your east from your west and your left flank from your right you may well love this.  The language is real and hugely engaging.  But the thing that really grips one in reading this account is the huge degree of human suffering, unneccessary death and the sheer scale of retribution, rape, murder and looting that went on on all sides.

The French play a big part in this book as both heroes (it would not have happened without The French Resistance) and villians (there was an incredible amount of both forced and willing prostitution going on all over France).

For me the single most engrossing aspect of the whole thing is Beevor’s description of The Bocage.  Thousands of tiny Normandy fields with huge hedgerow surrounding them that had to be taken on a field by field basis with German booby traps and dug in Panzers everywhere.  To say progress was slow and dangerous would be the understatement of the century.

Beevor’s skill is to turn the delivery of historic fact into a form of prose that grips one from start to finish.  He truly is a unique talent.  Stalingrad is equally compelling and I would not hesitate to recommend either of them.

Ein Monat ist nun schon vergangen, ein Monat sind wir nun genau in Wolgograd… wer dachte, dass ein Monat so schnell verfliegen kann. Kaum sind Isa und ich hier im Wolgograder Gebiet („Область Волгоград“ – das übrigens größer ist als Österreich) angekommen und schon sind wir mitten in unserem Auslandssemester und haben uns eigentlich schon vollkommen an alles gewöhnt.

Einige erste Eindrücke aus dem flächenmäßig größten Staat der Welt habe ich hier ja schon dargestellt, jedoch diese sind nur ein WINZIGER, MIKROFASER-mäßiger (Worte im Russischen haben wir in diesem Monat ja schon viele erfunden, warum also nicht im Deutschen ) Teil dessen, was wir hier wirklich erlebt, gesehen und mitgemacht haben!!!!

Kaum hier angekommen, wurde uns auch schon in den ersten beiden Wochen das Zentrum der Stadt im Detail gezeigt. Es wurden so genannte „Touristische Wanderungen“ (туристические маршруты) speziell für uns „organisiert“… die erste Wanderung machten Isa und ich gleich am Tag nach unsrer Ankunft in Wolgograd mit unsrer „ersten“ russischen Freundin machten … Dazu eine kleine Vorgeschichte:

Am Montag den 24.10 2009, wie schon mal erwähnt, verbrachten wir zwangsmäßig einen ganzen Tag am Flughafen von Moskau und lernten so Nadja kennen… sie war uns von Anfang an sympathisch… auch sie musste auf das verspätete Flugzeug nach Wolgograd warten und so kamen wir ins Gespräch.

Als wir in Wolgograd, um 22:00 Uhr, ankamen fanden wir erst niemanden, der uns von der Uni abholte und so halfen sie und ihr Freund (der schon zuvor in Wolgograd war) uns ein Taxi zu finden… denn bei diesem abgelegenen Flughafen war es gar nicht so einfach ein Taxi zu finden, geschweige denn zu bestellen, wenn man keine Nummer hatte.

Zu viert nahmen wir dann ein Taxi in die Stadt (ich glaube den Großteil des Platzes im Taxi nahm unser Gepäck ein ….) und kamen so zum Beschluss, dass uns die beiden in den nächsten Tagen die Stadt zeigen werden…. und so kam es auch :

Es ging zum ersten Mal auf den Mamaj-Hügel („Мамаев Курган“) – dem Hügel der berühmten Schlacht von Wolgograd im zweiten Weltkrieg, als die Russen den ersten Sieg über die Nazis erlangten(mehr dazu lest auf der folgenden Adresse: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mamajew-H%C3%BCgel ),  wir tranken den berühmten russischen Kvas («квас»), der bei dieser Hitze eine tolle Auffrischung war… JA hier war noch Hochsommer als wir ankamen!!! …so viel zu…. „So, Sabine genieß’ die letzten Tage in Österreich, das werden deine letzten Sommertage sein, denn in Russland…..“ (Freitag vor meiner Abreise am Wörthersee, Strand von Krumpendorf, hörte ich diesen Satz nicht nur ein Mal )….Aber das nur nebenbei … und machten einen herrlichen Spaziergang entlang der Wolga…

Leider mussten die beiden schon bald wieder zurück nach Moskau (sie waren auf Urlaub bei Bekannten)….

Die zweite Wanderung machten wir mit unsrer Truppe vom Studentenheim, die wir schon in den ersten Tagen in unsre Herzen geschlossen haben…

Am letzten Sonntag bevor die Uni begann, verbrachten wir zusammen mit allen bis dahin angekommenen Auslandsstudenten (Flo, Lena, Julia (sie kam zwei Tage nach unsrer Ankunft aus Moskau zurück, weil sie dort Bekannte besucht hatte – seitdem sind wir eigentlich das Trio-triumphale – ALLE, ohne Ausnahme, glauben beim ersten Kennenlernen, dass Julia Russin ist und das nicht nur wegen ihres Namens. Hingegen bei Isa und mir wissen alle, auch ohne dass wir unseren herrlichen österreichisch-russischen Akzent bekanntgeben, sofort dass wir nicht aus Russland kommen… „Ihr habt ein südliches Aussehen!“… wir sind für die Leute hier eher Italienerinnen oder auch Kafkasierinnen), Isotschka und Ich aus Österreich – wir nennen uns auch gern „Австрийская Банда» (so viel wie „Die Österreichische Bande“), Jonathan aus den Niederlanden (Isa nennt ihn liebevoll „Йонатан Дом“ – Jonathan, das Haus, weil er einfach eintypischer RIESIGER Holländer ist, mit dessen Hilfe ich super meine Holländisch-Kenntnisse ausbauen kann ) und Fanfej aus China (sie ist eine echt interessante Frau und half uns in diesem Monat mit vielen Sachen, da sie schon ein Jahr hier war)) und einer Truppe von wirklich kompetenten Touristenführern (Schenja (m.), Vova (m.), Maxime, Jurij, Lena und Vitali) einen wunderschönen Tag im Zentrum Wolgograds und schauten uns alle Sehenswürdigkeiten noch mal genauer an …. Für Isa hatte an diesem Tag die Suche nach „Vasilijev Sajzev –dem mysteriösen Held der Schlacht von Stalingrad„ ein Ende…. wir erblickten sowohl am Mamaj,-Hügel ein ihm gewidmetes Denkmahl und ein Bild von ihm im Museum der Stalingrader Schlacht (auch genannt „Panorama“, weil dort ein riesiges Rundgemälde der Schlacht um Stalingrad hängt)…. schaut euch einfach mal die Seite an :

http://panorama.volgadmin.ru/opis_de.html

Eine grundlegende Frage, die sich natürlich in jeder modernen Stadt stellt, ist die des öffentlichen Verkehrs: „Mit was bewegt man sich einer Stadt wie Wolgograd fort?“… naja, da gibt’s viele verschiedene Möglichkeiten:

1.)    Man nimmt, so wie in jeder Stadt in Österreich auch, den Bus!
…ABER wir doch nicht… das wär zu gewöhnlich…

2.)    Was gibt’s da wohl noch? – Den s.g. „Trolleybus“ – ein Bus der mit Elektrizität betrieben wird – scheint, wenn man dieses öffentliche Verkehrsmittel von der Ferne betrachtet, eine Straßenbahn zu sein, fährt jedoch nicht auf Schienen, sondern auf Rädern, wie eben ein Autobus…. nichts besonderes, aber BILLIG (7 Rubel pro Fahrt, egal wo man hin fährt und wie weit = 15 Cent) und die Tickets werden noch ganz altmodisch von „Konduktoren“ verkauft (eigentlich alle Frauen in mittlerem Alter)… und apropro Kondutkor … in Russland gibt es den Brauch oder besser den Glauben daran, dass wenn man die ersten drei Zahlen und die letzten drei Zahlen der Nummer auf dem Ticket getrennt zusammenzählt und dabei hinten und vorne die gleiche Zahl heraus kommt, dass dies dann ein s.g. „Glücksticket“ ist und damit es Glück bringt soll man es aufessen…. so viel zu den Russen und ihren Abergläuben und Sprichwörtern

3.)    UUUNND NUUUN… mein Lieblings-fortbewegungsmittel: die «Маршрутки» („Marschrutki“).
Das sind gelbe, steinalte Kleinbusse, die auf bestimmten Routen von einem zum anderen Ende der Stadt fahren (oh… da hab ich ja ein wichtiges Detail der Stadt vergessen… Wolgograd ist eine Stadt entlang der Wolga (na gut, das ist nichts Neues) und ist eher lang als breit – lang ist sie 80 KILOMETER!!!!! und wenn man vom einen bis zum anderen Ende der Stadt mit diesen Marschrutkas gelangen möchte braucht dies ca. 2 Stunden (so erzählte mir zumindest Meister Jurij )).
Jetzt könnte man fasst den Eindruck haben, dass diese Marschrutkas keine hohen Geschwindigkeiten kennen, naja… ganz im Gegenteil, haben sie mal die Chance (d.h. ist mal kein Stau) rasen sie so schnell sie nur können, so dass man als Insasse glaubt, dass jeden Moment das ganze Gefährt auseinander brechen könnte.
Ihr glaubt, dass es für sie spezielle Haltestellen gibt?… falsch gedacht… man steigt ein, fragt den Preis bis zu dem Punkt, wohin man fahren möchte, zahlt und dort wo man aussteigen möchte sagt man dem Fahrer, dass er anhalten soll…. leichter gesagt als getan… was ist wenn einen der Fahrer nicht versteht??? … oder man nicht weiß wo man genau aussteigen muss?…. oder der Fahrer den Ort, wo du hin willst gar nicht kennt?…..

Was wir sonst noch alles erlebt und getan haben?

Kurz gefasst …. VIEEEEEL , oder besser gesagt NUR Russisch gesprochen (untereinander.. auch unter uns Österreichern und auch mit den Deutschen im Heim …. wird ausnahmslos russisch gesprochen und das seitdem wir das erste Mal unsre Füße auf wolgograder Boden gestellt haben …. und mittlerweile ist es auch schon komisch, wenn ich Isotschka am Telefon mit ihren Eltern oder sonst wem aus Österreich deutsch reden höre…. „Und sie kanns doch noch!“ ), russische Filme (die Isa und ich hier in Wolgograd schon gekauft haben – und das sind so ca. 20) und Fussball geschaut,…

… Feste gefeiert, gesportelt, auf die Uni gegangen, ich weiß nicht wie viele Shoppingtouren gemacht und …

…gekocht…

…und zu guter letzt auch ins Konzert gegangen (ich muss sagen, es war eines der besten Konzerte, die ich je gesehen habe) – http://www.symphony.avtlg.ru/

Nebenbei hat man uns mal so einfach 24 Stunden das Wasser abgeschaltet und den Strom genommen …. es muss jedoch gesagt werden, dass das mit dem Wasser angekündigt wurde und alljährlich passiert – ist eine rein vorbeugende Maßnahme, die stets vor dem Winter einmal durchgeführt wird. Es wurden also zuvor literweise Wasser in fünf verschiedene Kübel gefüllt, um am nächsten Tag zumindest ein paar mal aufs Klo gehen zu können …. Zähne geputzt Katzenwäsche wurde paarweise gemacht – einer haltet den Kübel der andere putzt und wäscht J …. HEY, so ein „Wasserausfall“ macht sogar richtig Spass!! …. Wir sind, um nicht den ganzen Tag ohne Wasser zu verbleiben, in die Stadt in ein Restaurant namens „Mc Donalds“ geflüchtet (mit Computer und allem drum und dran)… schon mal den Namen des Restaurants gehört? ist hier anscheinend sehr bekannt!! ….

Nach 24 Stunden war der Spuk dann wieder vorbei und die Uni, die an diesem Dienstag ihre Pforten geschlossen hatte (wegen des „Wassermangels“), konnte ihren Betrieb wieder fortsetzen……

Jetzt mal ein paar Worte zu unsren Mitbewohnerinnen: seit letzten Mittwoch (23.09) ist unser „Block“ vollständig. Wir wohnen zu Viert und teilen uns ein WC, eine Duschen, einen Korridor und zwei Schlafzimmer. Im größeren, in dem normalerweise drei Personen untergebracht werden können, schlafen Sveta und ich und im anderen Schlafzimmer, das für zwei Personen gedacht ist, schlafen meine Isotschka und Katja (sie kam erst letzten Sonntag aus Amerika – von Work and Travel – zurück).

Isa und ich hättens mit unseren beiden Mädels echt nicht besser erwischen können. Sveta und Katja studieren auch Dolmetschen und Übersetzen und sind beide bodenständige, herzhafte und wirklich spitze Mädels!!! (ein gemeinsames Foto muss erst entstehe, aber das kommt schon bald  … versprochen!!!)

Und mit diesem Versprechen werd ich für heute schließen. Ich würd euch ja gern noch mehr von unseren insgesamt 5 GB Fotos raufladen, aber leider hab ich pro Monat ein Limit an MG, das ich nicht überschreiten kann….

Freu mich schon auf rege Kommentare von euch!

Bis dann… Eure Sabinotschka

Note: This post is another of my papers from my MA in History course that I have reworked some for this site.  The focus is on how the Germans and Russians fought the Stalingrad campaign. In  particular in the way the governments and military’s of both nations planned and executed strategy during the course of the campaign adjusted to the situation and how the campaign ended.  I conclude with a potential modern application for the US and NATO in Afghanistan.

Stalingrad: Primary or Secondary Objective

Following the Soviet winter offensive and the near disaster in front of Moscow the German High Command was faced with the strategic decision of what to do in the 1942 campaign.  Several options were considered and it was decided to seize the Caucasus oilfields and capture or neutralize the city of Stalingrad on the Volga.  However, the High Command was divided on the actual objective of the campaign.  OKH under the guidance of General Halder assumed that Stalingrad was the objective and the advance into the Caucasus was a blocking effort.[i] Hitler and OKW planned to capture the Caucasus oil fields and capture or neutralize Stalingrad to secure the left flank.[ii] Both OKH and OKW considered Stalingrad significant but “German commanders initially regarded it as a weigh station en route to the Caucasus oil fields.”[iii] The conflict echoed in the ambiguity of Directive No. 41 which “included the ‘seizure of the oil region of the Caucasus’ in the preamble concerning the general aim of the campaign, yet made no mention of this in the main plan of operations.”[iv] At the planning conference held at Army Group South in early June “Hitler hardly mentioned Stalingrad. As far as his Generals were concerned it was little more than a name on the map. His obsession was with the oil fields of the Caucasus.”[v] Manstein noted that “Hitler’s strategic objectives were governed chiefly by the needs of his war economy….”[vi] Anthony Beevor notes that at this stage of planning “the only interest in Stalingrad was to eliminate the armaments factories there and secure a position on the Volga. The capture of the city was not considered necessary.”[vii] German planners “expected that the Soviets would again accept decisive battle to defend these regions.”[viii]

Knocked Out T-34s

In Moscow Stalin and his Generals attempted to guess the direction of the impending German offensive.  “Stalin was convinced that Moscow remained the principle German objective…Most of the Red Army’s strategic reserves…were therefore held in the Moscow region.”[ix] To disrupt the German offensive and to attempt to recover Kharkov three offensives were launched by Red Army forces under the direction of Stavka. The largest of these on Kharkov was defeated between 12-22 May with the loss of most of the armor in southern Russia. This coupled with an equally disastrous defeat of Red Army forces in Crimea by Von Manstein’s 11^th Army meant that the Red Army would face the Germans in a severely weakened condition.[x]

Operation Blau: Opening Moves and Divergent Objectives

The German offensive began on 28 June under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Bock’s command included two separate army groups, Army Group B under General Von Weichs with 2^nd Army, 6^th Army and 4^th Panzer Army operated in the northern part of the operational area. Army Group A was to the south with 17^th Army and 1^st Panzer Army.[xi] Army Group B provided the main effort and quickly smashed through the defending Soviet armies and by the 20^th Hitler believed that “the Russian is finished.”[xii] One reason for the German success in the south was that until July 7^th Stalin believed that Moscow was still the primary objective.[xiii] Bock was prevented by Hitler from destroying Soviet formations left behind and was relieved of command by Hitler. He was replaced by Von Weichs which created a difficult command and control problem.  Manstein noted that this created a “grotesque chain of command on the German southern wing” with the result that Army Group A had “no commander of its own whatever” and Army Group B had “no few than seven armies under command including four allied ones.”[xiv]

Panzer IV F

This decision proved fateful.  Hitler’s decided to redirect the advance of the 4^th Panzer Army to support an early passage of the lower Don, diverting it from its drive on Stalingrad.  Additionally the army groups became independent of each other when Bock was relieved of command.  They were “assigned independent-and diverging-objectives” under the terms of Directive No.45.[xv] This combination of events would have a decisive impact on the campaign.  The decision prevented a quick seizure of Stalingrad by 4^th Panzer Army followed by a hand over to 6^th Army to establish the “block” as described by Directive No.41.  Kleist noted that he didn’t need 4^th Panzer Army’s help to accomplish his objectives and that it could have “taken Stalingrad without a fight at the end of July….”[xvi]

The result was damning. Air support and fuel needed by Army Group A was transferred to 6^th Army, denuding Army Group A of the resources that it needed to conclude its conquest of the Caucasus.[xvii] At the same time it denied Army Group B of the Panzer Army that could seize Stalingrad when it was still possible to do so.  Beevor calls Hitler’s decision a disastrous compromise.[xviii] Halder believed the decision underestimated the enemy and was “both ludicrous and dangerous.”[xix]

Focus on Stalingrad

On July 22 as the Wehrmacht ran short on fuel and divisions to commit to the Caucasus, and 6^th Army fought for control of Voronezh the Soviets created the Stalingrad Front. Stavka moved an NKVD Division to the city,[xx] and rapidly filled the new front with formations transferred from the Moscow Front.[xxi] Stalin issued Stavka Order 227, better known as “No Step Back” on 28 July. The order mandated that commanders and political officers who retreated would be assigned to Penal battalions[xxii] and armies were to form three to five special units of about 200 men each as a second line “to shoot any man who ran away.”[xxiii] Russian resistance west of the Don slowed the German advance. German commanders were astonished “at the profligacy of Russian commanders with their men’s lives.”[xxiv] Von Kleist compared the stubbornness of Russians in his area to those of the previous year and wrote that they were local troops “who fought more stubbornly because they were fighting to defend their homes.”[xxv] Additionally, Stalin changed commanders frequently in the “vain hope that a ruthless new leader could galvanize resistance and transform the situation.”[xxvi] General Chuikov brought the 64^th Army into the Stalingrad Front in mid-July to hold the Germans west of the Don.[xxvii]

German Soldier in Stalingrad

Further weakening the Germans OKW transferred key SS Panzer Divisions and the Grossdeutschland Division to France. Supporting Hungarian, Italian and Romanian allied armies which lacked motorization, modern armor or anti-tank units were unable to fulfill the gaps left by the loss of experienced German divisions and the expectations of Hitler.[xxviii] 6^th Army was virtually immobilized for 10 days due to lack of supplies allowing the Russians to establish a defense on the Don Bend.[xxix] To the south the Germans were held up by lack of fuel and increased Soviet resistance including the introduction of a force of 800 bombers.[xxx] Glantz and House note that with the fall of Rostov on July 23^rd “Hitler abruptly focused on the industrial and symbolic value of Stalingrad.”[xxxi] Undeterred by warnings from Halder that fresh Russian formations were massing east of the Volga and Quartermaster General, Wagner, who guaranteed that he could supply either the thrust to the Caucasus or Stalingrad but not both.[xxxii] Again frustrated by slow progress Hitler reverted to the original plan for 4^th Panzer Army to assist 6^th Army at Stalingrad, but the cost in time and fuel were significant to the operation and the question was whether “they could make up for Hitler’s changes in plan.”[xxxiii]

Strategic Implications

The changes in the German plan had distinct ramifications for both sides.  Von Mellenthin wrote that “the diversion of effort between the Caucasus and Stalingrad ruined our whole campaign.”[xxxiv] The Germans could not secure the Caucasus oil fields which Hitler considered vital to the German war effort.  They advanced deep into the region and captured the Maikop oil fields, though they were almost completely destroyed by the retreating Russians.[xxxv] Army Group A was halted by the Russians along the crests of the Caucasus on August 28^th.[xxxvi] This left Hitler deeply “dissatisfied with the situation of Army Group A.”[xxxvii] Kleist and others attributed much of the failure to a lack of fuel[xxxviii] and Blumentritt noted that Mountain divisions that could have made the breakthrough were employed along the Black Sea coast in secondary operations.[xxxix]

Fuel and supply shortages delayed 6^th Army’s advance while Hoth’s 4^th Panzer Army was needlessly shuttled between Rostov and Stalingrad. By the time it resumed its advance the Russians “had sufficiently recovered to check its advance.”[xl] As 6^th Army advanced the “protection of Army Group B’s ever-extending northern flank was taken over by the 3^rd Rumanian, the 2^nd Hungarian and the newly formed 8^th Italian Army.”[xli] The allied armies were neither equipped for the Russian campaign nor well motivated.[xlii] The supply shortage in both army groups was not helped by a logistics bottleneck. All supplies came over a single Dnieper crossing, which Manstein noted, prevented swift movement of troops from one area to another.[xliii]

Von Paulus’ 6^th Army now attempted to rush Stalingrad between the 25^th and 29^th of July, while Hoth milled about on the lower Don.  However, Paulus’s piecemeal commitment of his divisions and failure to concentrate in the face of unexpectedly strong Soviet resistance caused the attacks to fail.  Paulus halted 6^th Army on the Don so it could concentrate its forces and build its logistics base,[xliv] and to allow Hoth to come up from the south. This delay allowed the Russians to build up forces west of Stalingrad and reinforce the Stalingrad front and strengthen the defenses of the city,[xlv] and due to the distances involved it was easier for the Russians to reinforce the Stalingrad front.[xlvi] It also allowed the Russians to fill a number of key leadership positions with Generals who would skillfully fight the battle.[xlvii]

German Panzer Troops Look Upon the Caucasus Mountains

Hitler now focused on the capture of Stalingrad despite the fact that “as a city Stalingrad was of no strategic importance.”[xlviii] Strategically, its capture would cut Soviet supply lines to the Caucasus,[xlix] but this could be achieved without its capture. The checks in the south “began to give Stalingrad a moral importance-enhanced by its name-which came to outweigh its strategic value.”[l] To Hitler Stalingrad would gain “a mystic significance”[li] and along with Leningrad became “not only military but also psychological objectives.”[lii]

The Germans mounted a frontal assault with 6^th Army and elements of 4^th Panzer Army despite air reconnaissance that “the Russians are throwing forces from all directions at Stalingrad.[liii] Paulus as the senior General was in charge of the advance, with Hoth subordinated to him, but the attack had to wait until Hoth’s army could fight its way up from the south.[liv] Von Mellenthin comments rightly that “when Stalingrad was not taken on the first rush, it would have been better to mask it….”[lv] It is clear that the German advance had actually reached its culminating point with the failure of the advance into the Caucasus and Paulus’s initial setback on the Don, but it was not yet apparent to many involved.[lvi] The proper course of action would have been to halt and build up the front and create mobile reserve to parry any Russian offensive along northern flank while reinforcing success in the Caucasus. Manstein wrote that “by failing to take appropriate action after his offensive had petered out without achieving anything definite, he [Hitler] paved the way to the tragedy of Stalingrad!”[lvii]

Transfixed by Stalingrad

JU-52: Despite Tremendous Bravery of Luftwaffe Pilots Goering Failed to Keep Stalingrad Supplied

On August 19^th Paulus launched a concentric attack against the Russian 62^nd and 64^th Armies on the Don.  The attack ran into problems, especially in Hoth’s sector.[lviii] Yet, on the 22^nd the 14^th Panzer Corps “forced a very narrow breach in the Russian perimeter at Vertyachi and fought its way across the northern suburbs of Stalingrad,”[lix] and reached the Volga on the 23^rd. That day 4^th Air Fleet launched 1600 sorties against the city dropping over 1,000 tons of bombs.[lx] The breakthrough imperiled the Soviet position they had concentrated their strongest forces against Hoth.[lxi] The Germans held air superiority and continued heavy bombing attacks.  During the last days of August 6^th Army “moved steadily forward into the suburbs of the city, setting the stage for battle.”[lxii] As the Soviets reacted to Paulus, Hoth achieved a breakthrough in the south which threatened the Russian position.  However 6^th Army was unable to disengage its mobile forces to link up with the 4^th Panzer Army and another opportunity had been missed.[lxiii]

As 6^th Army moved into the city Yeremenko ordered attacks against Hube’s 16^th Panzer Division and Soviet resistance increased as more formations arrived the Germans suffered one of their heaviest casualty rates.”[lxiv] Though unsuccessful the counterattacks “managed to deflect Paulus’s reserves at the most critical moment.”[lxv] The Germans remained confident the first week of September as 6^th Army and 4^th Panzer Army linked up, but Yeremenko saved his forces by withdrawing and avoiding encirclement west of the city, retiring to an improvised line close to the city.[lxvi] On September 12^th Chuikov was appointed to command 62^nd Army in Stalingrad.  Chuikov understood that there “was only one way to hold on. They had to pay in lives. ‘Time is blood,’ as Chuikov put it later.”[lxvii] Stalin sent Nikita Khrushchev to the front “with orders to inspire the Armies and civilian population to fight to the end.”[lxviii] 13^th Guards Rifle Division arrived on the 14^th saved the Volga landings but it lost 30% casualties in its first 24 hours of combat.[lxix] An NKVD regiment and other units held the strategically sited Mamaev Kurgan, keeping German guns from controlling the Volga.[lxx] The defenders fought house to house and block by block, Army and NKVD were reinforced by Naval Infantry.  Chuikov conducted the defense with a brutal ferocity, relieving senior commanders who showed a lack of fight and sending many officers to penal units.  Chuikov funneled massed German attacks into “breakwaters” where the panzers and infantry could be separated from each other causing heavy German casualties.[lxxi]

Now the “city became a prestige item, its capture ‘urgently necessary for psychological reasons,’ as Hitler declared on October 2. A week later he declared that Communism must be ‘deprived of its shrine.’”[lxxii] The Germans did continue to gain ground, however slowly and at great cost, especially among their infantry, so much so that companies had to be combined.   Chuikov used his artillery to interdict the Germans from the far side of the Volga and the fight in the city was fought by assault squads with incredible ferocity and the close-quarter combat was dubbed “’Rattenkrieg’ by German soldiers.”[lxxiii] Paulus brought more units into the city and continued to slowly drive the Russians back against the river, by early October Chuikov wondered if he would be able to hold.[lxxiv] By early November Chuikov “was altogether holding only one-tenth of Stalingrad-a few factory buildings and a few miles of river bank.”[lxxv] Paulus expected “to capture the entire city by 10 November,”[lxxvi] despite the fact that many units were fought out. The 6^th Army judged that 42% of the battalions of 51^st Corps were fought out.[lxxvii] On 9 November Hitler declared “No power on earth will force us out of Stalingrad again!”[lxxviii]

Soviet Counteroffensive: Disaster on the Flanks

On September 24^th Hitler relieved Halder for persisting in explaining “what would happen when new Russian reserve armies attacked the over-extended flank that ran out to Stalingrad.”[lxxix] Many in the German side recognized the danger. Blumentritt said “The danger to the long-stretched flank of our advance developed gradually, but it became clear early enough for anyone to perceive it who was not willfully blind.”[lxxx] Warnings were also given by Rumanian Marshall Antonescu and the staff’s of Army Group B and 6^th Army[lxxxi] but Hitler was transfixed on Stalingrad.  In doing so the Germans gave up the advantage of uncertainty and once their “aim became obvious…the Russian Command could commit its reserves with assurance.”[lxxxii]

In the midst of Stalin’s concern about Stalingrad Stavka planners never lost sight of their goal to resume large scale offensive operations and destroy at least one German Army Group.[lxxxiii] Unlike Hitler Stalin had begun to trust his Generals and Stavka under the direction of Marshal Vasilevsky produced a concept in September to cut off the “German spearhead at Stalingrad by attacking the weak Rumanian forces on its flanks.”[lxxxiv] At first Stalin “showed little enthusiasm” for the attack, fearing that Stalingrad might be lost, but on 13 September he gave his full backing to the proposal[lxxxv] which Zhukov, Vasilevsky and Vatutin developed into a plan involving two operations, Operation Uranus, to destroy the German and allied forces at Stalingrad, Operation Saturn to destroy all the German forces in the south and a supporting attack to fix German forces in the north, Operation Mars aimed at Army Group Center.[lxxxvi]

Soviet Armor on teh Offensive

To accomplish the destruction of 6^th Army and part of 4^th Panzer Army the Red Army employed over 60% of the “whole tank strength of the Red Army.”[lxxxvii] Strict secrecy combined with numerous acts of deception was used by the Red Army to disguise the operation.[lxxxviii] The plan involved an attack against 3^rd Rumanian Army on the northern flank by 5^th Tank Army and two infantry armies with supporting units.[lxxxix] In the south against 4^th Rumanian Army and weak element of 4^th Panzer Army another force of over 160,000 men including 430 tanks were deployed.[xc] Despite warnings from his Intelligence Officer, Paulus did not expect a deep offensive into his flanks and rear and made no plans to prepare to face the threat.[xci] Other senior officers believed that the attack would take place against Army Group Center.[xcii] Warlimont notes that there was a “deceptive confidence in German Supreme Headquarters.”[xciii]

The storm broke on 19 November as Soviet forces attacked rapidly crushing Rumanian armies in both sectors[xciv] linking up on the 23^rd.[xcv] 48^th Panzer Corps supporting the Rumanians was weak and had few operational tanks.[xcvi] It attempted a counterattack but was “cut to pieces” in an encounter with 5^th Tank Army.[xcvii] A promising attempt by 29^th Motorized division against the flank of the southern Russian pincer was halted by the Army Group and the division was ordered to defensive positions south of Stalingrad.[xcviii] German airpower was neutralized by bad weather.[xcix] Paulus continued to do nothing as since the attacks were outside of his area of responsibility and waited for instructions.[c] As a result the 16^th and 24^th Panzer Divisions which could have assisted matters to the west remained “bogged down in street-fighting in Stalingrad.”[ci] Without support 6^th Army units west of Stalingrad were forced back in horrific conditions.  By the 23^rd 6^th Army was cut off along with one corps of 4^th Panzer Army and assorted Rumanian units, over 330,000 men.  This now entrapped force that would require seven rifle armies and much staff attention to eliminate.[cii]

The Death of 6^th Army

T-34 in Stalingrad

Hitler ordered Manstein to form Army Group Don to relieve Stalingrad. Hitler would not countenance a break out and wanted Manstein to break through and relieve 6^th Army.[ciii] Hitler refused a request by Paulus on 23 November to move troops to prepare for a possible a break out attempt, assuring him that he would be relieved.[civ] Albert Speer notes that Zeitzler who replaced Halder insisted that the Sixth Army must break out to the west.”[cv] Hitler told Zeitzler that “We should under no circumstances give this up. We won’t get it back once it’s lost.”[cvi] Goering promised the Luftwaffe would be able to meet the re-supply needs of 6^th Army by air, even though his Generals knew that it was impossible with the number of transport aircraft available.[cvii] Hitler took Goering at his word and exclaimed “Stalingrad can be held! It is foolish to go on talking any more about a breakout by Sixth Army…”[cviii] and a Führer decree was issued ordering that the front be held at all costs.[cix] Goerlitz states that “Hitler was incapable of conceiving that the 6^th Army should do anything but fight where it stood.”[cx] Likewise Manstein had precious few troops with which to counterattack and had to protect the flank of Army Group A deep in the Caucasus. His army group was only corps strength and was spread across a 200 mile front.[cxi] Any relief attempt had to wait for more troops, especially Panzers.  Manstein too believed that the best chance for a breakout had passed and that it was a serious error for Paulus to put the request to withdraw through to Hitler rather than the Army Group or act on his own.[cxii] Many soldiers were optimistic that Hitler would get them out.[cxiii] Other generals like Guderian, Reichenau or Hoeppner might have acted, but Paulus was no rebel.[cxiv]

The Madonna of Stalingrad

Operation Saturn began on 7 December destroying the Italian 8^th Army and forcing the Germans to parry the threat.[cxv] A relief attempt by 57^th Panzer Corps under Hoth on 12 December made some headway until a massive Soviet counterattack on 24 December drove it back.[cxvi] This attack was hampered by OKW’s refusal to allocate the 17^th Panzer and 16^th Motorized divisions to Manstein,[cxvii] and by 6^th Army not attacking out to link with the relief force.[cxviii]By 6 January Paulus signaled OKW: Army starving and frozen, have no ammunition and cannot move tanks anymore.”[cxix] On 10 January the Soviets launched Operation Ring to eliminate the pocket and despite all odds German troops fought on. On the 16^th Paulus requested that battle worthy units be allowed to break out, but the request was not replied to.[cxx] On the 22^nd the last airfield had been overrun and on 31 January Paulus surrendered.[cxxi]

POWs: Only 5,000 of 90,000 POWs would return

Analysis: What Went Wrong

Stalingrad had strangely drawn the attention of both sides, but the Russians never lost sight of their primary objectives during the campaign. The Germans on the other hand committed numerous unforced errors mostly caused by Hitler or Paulus. After the fall of Stalingrad as the Soviets attempted to follow up their success by attempted to cut off Army Group “A” Manstein was permitted to wage a mobile defense while Von Kleist managed to withdraw with few losses.[cxxii] The superior generalship of Manstein and Von Kleist prevented the wholesale destruction of German forces in southern Russia and Manstein’s counter offensive inflicted a severe defeat on the Soviets. However the German Army had been badly defeated.  The seeds of defeat were laid early, the failure to destroy bypassed Soviet formations in July, the diversion of 4^th Panzer Army from Stalingrad, and the divergent objectives of trying to capture the Caucasus and Stalingrad at the same time.  This diluted both offensives ensuring that neither succeeded.  Likewise the failure to recognize the culminating point when it was reached and to adjust operations accordingly was disastrous for the Germans. The failure create a mobile reserve to meet possible Russian counter offensives, and the fixation on Stalingrad took the German focus off of the critical yet weakly held flanks. The hubris of Hitler and OKW to believe that the Russians were incapable of conducting major mobile operations even as Stavka commenced offensive operations on those flanks all contributed to the defeat.  Clark notes these facts but adds that the Germans “were simply attempting too much.”[cxxiii] Soviet numbers allowed them to wear down the Germans even in defeat.[cxxiv] At the same time Stalin gave his commanders a chance to revive the mobile doctrine of deep operations with mechanized and shock armies that he had discredited in the 1930s.[cxxv] All through the campaign Zhukov and other commanders maintained both their nerve even when it appeared that Stalingrad was all but lost. They never lost sight of their goal of destroying major German formations though they failed to entrap Army Group A with 6^th Army.

A Modern Application

It is well and good to attempt to remain on the offensive.  The U.S. currently has forces spread thinly over two combat theaters with possibilities that other threats in the same region could flare up.  Like the Germans the U.S. is operating in areas, especially Afghanistan where overland supply lines are vulnerable and where weather can and does affect resupply operations by both ground and air.  The fact that the U.S. is operating with just barely enough forces in areas where others have met disaster calls for a circumspect look at what our enemy’s capabilities really are and not allowing ourselves to be surprised when they do things that have worked for them in the past against the Russians.  While it is unlikely that the U.S. and NATO would face a Stalingrad type situation in Afghanistan it is possible that isolated forces could be overrun as the Afghans reprise tactics used so successfully against the Soviets and as they begin to operate in larger units, concentrate them quickly and with more firepower to catch NATO forces when they are most vulnerable.  It is true that they will not mass large numbers of tanks and artillery as the Soviets did against the Germans, but the principle of speed, concentration at the critical point and surprise can inflict defeats that will turn public sentiment in the U.S. and Europe against further commitments and against the war and force the NATO governments as well as the U.S. to give up the effort.

[i] Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict:1941-45. Perennial Books, An imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY 1965. p.191

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titan’s Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1995. p.111

[iv] Ibid. Clark. p.191

[v] Beevor, Anthony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943. Penguin Books, New York NY 1998. p.69

[vi] Manstein, Erich von. Forward by B.H. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Lost victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, St Paul MN 2004. First Published 1955 as Verlorene Siege, English Translation 1958 by Methuen Company. p.291 This opinion is not isolated, Beevor Quotes Paulus “If we don’t take Maikop and Gronzy…then I must put an end to the war.” (Beevor pp. 69-70)  Halder on the other hand believed that Hitler emphasized that the objective was “the River Volga at Stalingrad. (Clark. p.190)

[vii] Ibid. Beevor. p.70.

[viii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.106

[ix] Ibid. p.105-106

[x] Ibid. Clark. p.203.  The offensive did impose a delay on the German offensive.

[xi] Ibid. Clark. p.191 Each group also contained allied armies.

[xii] Ibid. p.209.

[xiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.119

[xiv] Ibid. Manstein. p.292.

[xv] Ibid. Clark. p.209

[xvi] Ibid. Clark.  p.211

[xvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.120. There is a good discussion of the impact of this decision here as 6^th Army’s advance was given priority for both air support and fuel.

[xviii] Ibid. Beevor. p.74

[xix] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964. p.249

[xx] Ibid. Beevor. p.75 This was the 10^th NKVD Division and it took control of all local militia, NKVD, and river traffic, and established armored trains and armor training schools.

[xxi] Ibid. Clark. p.212

[xxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.121

[xxiii] Ibid. Beevor. p.85

[xxiv] Ibid. p.89

[xxv] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishers, New York, NY 1979. Originally published by the author in 1948. p.202

[xxvi] Ibid. Beevor. p.88

[xxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.90

[xxviii] Ibid. Beevor. p.81

[xxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.121

[xxx] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.202

[xxxi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.120

[xxxii] Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff. Westview Press, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Boulder, CO. 1985 p.416

[xxxiii] Ibid. Beevor. pp.95-96.

[xxxiv] Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated H. Betzler, Edited by L.C.F. Turner. Oklahoma University Press 1956, Ballantine Books, New York, NY. 1971. p.193

[xxxv] Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960. p.914

[xxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.122

[xxxvii] Ibid. Warlimont. p.256

[xxxviii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. p.203

[xxxix] Ibid. p.204

[xl] Ibid. Shirer. p.914

[xli] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.416

[xlii] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.416

[xliii] Ibid. Manstein. p.293

[xliv] Ibid. Clark. p.214

[xlv] Ibid. Beevor. pp.97-99. The mobilization included military, political, civilian and industrial elements.

[xlvi] Liddell-Hart, B.H. Strategy. A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY. 1974, Originally Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1954 & 1967. p.250

[xlvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.99.  Two key commanders arrived during this time frame, Colonel General Andrei Yeremenko, who would command the Stalingrad Front  and General Chuikov commander of 64^th Army who would conduct the defense of the city.

[xlviii] Carell, Paul Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, German Edition published 1963. p.581

[xlix] Ibid. Shirer.  p.909.

[l] Ibid. Liddell-Hart, Strategy. p.250

[li] Wheeler-Bennett, John W. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY 1954.  p.531

[lii] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett. p.531

[liii] Ibid. Beevor. p.96

[liv] Ibid. Clark. p.216.

[lv] Ibid. Von Mellenthin. P.193

[lvi] See Von Mellinthin pp.193-194.  Von Mellinthin quotes Colonel Dinger, the Operations Officer of 3^rd Motorized Division at Stalingrad until a few days before its fall. Dingler noted that the Germans on reaching Stalingrad “had reached the end of their power. Their offensive strength was inadequate to complete the victory, nor could they replace the losses they had suffered.” (p.193) He believed that the facts were sufficient “not only to justify a withdrawal, but compel a retreat.” (p.194)

[lvii] Ibid. Manstein. p.294

[lviii] Ibid. Clark. p.216

[lix] Ibid. Clark. p.217

[lx] Ibid. Beevor. p.107

[lxi] Ibid. Beevor. p.107

[lxii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.122

[lxiii] Ibid. Carell. P.601

[lxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.118

[lxv] Ibid. Beevor. p.118

[lxvi] Ibid. Carell. p.602

[lxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.128

[lxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.603

[lxix] Ibid. Beevor. p.134

[lxx] Ibid. Beevor. pp.136-137

[lxxi] Ibid. Beevor. p.149

[lxxii] Fest, Joachim. Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Publishers, San Diego, New York, London. 1974. p.661

[lxxiii] Ibid. Beevor. pp. 149-150

[lxxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.164

[lxxv] Ibid. Carell. p.618

[lxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.123

[lxxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.218

[lxxviii] Ibid. Carell. p.623

[lxxix] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.418

[lxxx] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. The German Generals Talk. p.207

[lxxxi] Ibid. Manstein. p292

[lxxxii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. History of the Second World War. p.258

[lxxxiii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.129

[lxxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[lxxxv] Ibid. Beevor. pp.221-222 Glantz and House say that Stalin gave his backing in mid-October but this seems less likely due to the amount of planning and movement of troops involved to begin the operation in November.

[lxxxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[lxxxvii] Ibid. Beevor. p.226

[lxxxviii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.132

[lxxxix] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.130

[xc] Ibid. Beevor. p.227

[xci] Ibid. Beevor. p.228

[xcii] Ibid. Clark. p.235

[xciii] Ibid. Warlimont. p.274

[xciv] Ibid, Carell. p.627 3^rd Rumanian Army lost 75,000 men in three days.

[xcv] Ibid. Clark.pp.247-248

[xcvi] The condition of the few German Panzer Divisions in position to support the flanks was very poor, the 22^nd had suffered from a lack of fuel and maintenance and this many of its tanks were inoperative. Most of the armor strength of the 48^th Panzer Corps was provided by a Rumanian armored division equipped with obsolete Czech 38t tanks provided by the Germans.

[xcvii] Ibid. Clark. pp.251-252. The designation of 2^nd Guards Tank Army by Clark has to be wrong and it is the 5^th Tank Army as 2^nd Guards Tank was not involved in Operation Uranus.  Carell, Beevor and Glantz properly identify the unit.

[xcviii] Ibid. Carell. p.630

[xcix] Ibid. Beevor. p.244

[c] Ibid. Beevor. p.247

[ci] Ibid. Beevor. p.245

[cii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.134

[ciii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.134

[civ] Ibid. Clark. p.256

[cv] Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970. p.248

[cvi] Heiber, Helmut and Glantz, David M. Editors. Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945. Enigma Books, New York, NY 2002-2003.  Originally published as Hitlers Lagebsprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart, 1962. p.27

[cvii] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.135 Glantz and House note that the amount of aircraft estimated to successfully carry out the re-supply operation in the operational conditions was over 1,000.  The amount needed daily was over 600 tons of which the daily reached only 300 tons only one occasion.

[cviii] Ibid. Speer. p.249

[cix] Ibid. Carell. p.636

[cx] Ibid. Goerlitz. p.426

[cxi] Ibid. Clark. p.252

[cxii] Ibid. Manstein. p.303

[cxiii] Ibid. Beevor. p.276

[cxiv] Ibid. Carell. p.640

[cxv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.140

[cxvi] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.140

[cxvii] Ibid. Clark. p.264

[cxviii] Ibid. Manstein. p.337

[cxix] Ibid. Beevor. p320

[cxx] Ibid. Beevor. p.365

[cxxi] Of the approximately 330,000 in the pocket about 91,000 surrendered, another 45,000 had been evacuated.  22 German divisions were destroyed.

[cxxii] Ibid. Liddell-Hart. The German Generals Talk. p.211

[cxxiii] Ibid. Clark. p.250

[cxxiv] Ibid. Glantz and House. p.124

[cxxiv] Ibid. Beevor. p.221

Bibliography

Beevor, Anthony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege: 1942-1943. Penguin Books, New York NY 1998

Carell, Paul Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Ballantine Books, New York, NY 1971, German Edition published 1963.

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict:1941-45. Perennial Books, An imprint of Harper Collins Publishers, New York, NY 1965.

Fest, Joachim. Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich Publishers, San Diego, New York, London. 1974

Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titan’s Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence KS, 1995.

Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff. Westview Press, Frederick A. Praeger Publisher, Boulder, CO. 1985

Heiber, Helmut and Glantz, David M. Editors. Hitler and His Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945. Enigma Books, New York, NY 2002-2003.  Originally published as Hitlers Lagebsprechungen: Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942-1945. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart, 1962.

Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishers, New York, NY 1979. Originally Published by the author in 1948.

Liddell-Hart, B.H. Strategy. A Signet Book, the New American Library, New York, NY. 1974, Originally Published by Faber and Faber Ltd., London. 1954 & 1967

Manstein, Erich von. Forward by B.H. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Lost victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, St Paul MN 2004. First Published 1955 as Verlorene Siege, English Translation 1958 by Methuen Company

Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. A Touchstone Book published by Simon and Schuster, 1981, Copyright 1959 and 1960

Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970.

Von Mellenthin, F.W. Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War. Translated H. Betzler, Edited by L.C.F. Turner. Oklahoma University Press 1956, Ballantine Books, New York, NY. 1971.

Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964.

Wheeler-Bennett, John W. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press, New York, NY 1954

Fiind primul meu post m-am gandit ce sa scriu, cui sa ii multumesc … Al` Dracu` si-ar baga ceva in originile mele daca i-as multumi asa ca m-am hotarat sa multumesc fantasticei natii de tigani.

Multumesc celui care a hotarat sa isi aseze prima oara caravana pe acest petic minunat de pamant!

Multumesc tiganilor ca ne-au oferit o cultura atat de vasta si ca sunt un stalp de rezistenta in civilizatia Romaneasca actuala!

Multumesc tiganilor ca au evoluat atat de mult de cand au pasit in aceasta tara!

Multumesc tiganilor ca ne fac mandri sa fim Romani de fiecare data cand trecem granitele!

Multumesc tiganilor ca ne-au oferit minunatul gen muzical numit manele (pacat ca strainii nu il apreciaza, pun pariu ca luam Eurovisionul daca participa Salamu`)!

Multumesc tiganilor ca ne-au oferiti o importanta lectie de igiena si de buna educatie a copiilor!

Multumesc Tiganilor ca existati! Romania ar fi fost alta tara fara voi, nici nu vreau sa imi imaginez cum am fi trait…

Later edit: Acest articol a fost scris de catre un nou colaborator pe numele sau de scena Rana! Daca se ridica la nivelul asteptarilor ii dam bomboane si il mai lasam sa scrie, daca nu ii oferim pula pe post de bomboana!

Myron Price sprinted up his stone stairs and fished a locking card from his runner. Entering the relative warmth of his cottage, he felt satisfaction at having risen early on another winter morning. Fourteen kilometres was pretty good for one who sat on his backside all day.

At twenty-five he was determined to maintain his physique, unable to fathom why so many men took thirty as their cue to obesity. Each run set him further from average and he was glad of the distance.

Myron towelled his face and relished the excitement of his day off. It had been a good month and his home-based software consultancy could tick over without him. His second reward was to be the latest performance PC. The Panrax 3700J boasted far more power than his business required and quite enough to make the most of the latest games.

Brochures littered the lounge. Though computing was his passion, Myron didn’t like online catalogues. In anticipating a major purchase, it was more satisfying to possess the desired object on glossy paper than to see it on a monitor. Faced with this reality, advertisers had met strict environmental standards with recycling triggers. Of the many available, single-use literature employed fabric violation zones.

Tearing a zone initiated an accelerated weakening of molecular bonds which, under time lapse, looked like an eerie invisible fire. Showered and shaved, Myron ripped and binned the brochures he no longer wanted. By collection day, the paper discarded during the month would be reduced to fibres tailor-made for reconstitution.

Myron saved the well-thumbed Panrax brochure and felt a tug of pleasure. Soon he would own the finest PC yet built. Too distracted for breakfast, he left home with a light step and a sense of anticipation remembered from childhood.

**********

 Soon Myron was slicing through bubble wrap and tape. His face glowed as cardboard petals revealed the black device swathed in cellophane. His superseded PC called Franz Heilmayr, who looked up from his soldering iron.

‘Hello, Mr Price. What’ve you got there then?’

‘The new toy, just out of the box.’

‘I see,’ said Franz with feigned disapproval. ‘And what possessed you to purchase this…,’ he peered through his sandy fringe.

Myron grinned. ‘3700J. I told you I was due for a reward.’

‘You must have done some very special work.’

‘Yeah, well, my company values me extremely highly. It follows that I should be compensated accordingly.’

‘I’m very happy for you.’

Myron knew his friend was envious, but not enough to begrudge him pleasure. ‘Thanks. Now, what say you come over and road test it with me?’

‘I can’t, I’ve got jobs on.’

‘Oh, bullshit! How can you think of work?’ Myron’s eyes narrowed conspiratorially. ‘I’ll let you take it to bits.’

Franz contemplated his bench. He enjoyed his work, but it didn’t compare to pulling apart the latest box. ‘You won’t have kittens every time I use my pliers?’

‘Absolutely not. Once we’ve seen what it can do, you may disembowel it — so long as you get us back online for tonight’s campaign.’

Franz’s pale blue eyes stared. ‘Shit! Is it two weeks already? Kiev seems like yesterday.’

‘Ja,’ said Myron, ‘und tonight is Stalingrad. We’re going to combine your paratroop strategy with this new beast. We’ll run their moves and send ours back so damn fast it’ll take their heads clean off!’

‘I still think they’re women,’ said Franz, referring to the team which challenged them fortnightly on PanzerNet. ‘Why else would they want to stay anonymous?’

Myron laughed. ‘Just because your dream girl has to be able to change a fan belt on a Tiger II.’

‘That’s not true! It’s their tactics; they’re diabolical and quite… merciless.’

‘Franz, I don’t care if we’re fighting gifted ferrets. If we don’t take Stalingrad tonight, our whole campaign’s at risk. So the sooner you satisfy your curiosity, the better we can ready for the fray.’

‘Alright; how does this sound? I’ll meet you half way. You play with your bells and whistles; I’ll come after lunch, look inside and get us up by 18:00. Then we can have a spot of pre-battle sustenance and I can enjoy the evening without freaking out about work. OK?’

‘You’ll miss the fireworks.’

‘I’m sure you’ll deign to run them again for me.’

‘Yeah, righto, but I want you here no later than 13:00. You know how carried away you get.’

‘Alright,’ said Franz, ‘See you then.’

‘OK.’

Myron slid the 3700J into his workstation, then fetched a beer. It was mid-morning, but he felt like celebrating. He settled back to watch the PC self test and the beverage went warm in his hand. The industry managed to produce a unit totally superior to its predecessor every two years. Myron never witnessed the change without a feeling of awe. Would the technology never reach a limit? After wrestling with the improbability of his machine’s existence, he surrendered to the fact and simply enjoyed the invention whose complexity was approaching that of the human brain.

**********

Franz Heilmayr shared Myron’s interest, but was less demonstrative. Dressed as usual in his rough, many-pocketed blouse and trousers, he removed the casing while Myron made a late lunch, then systematically disassembled the Panrax. Inside he discovered components which all but defied recognition. Paying homage to those responsible, he realised he’d have to study up to offer a customisation service.

Towards the end of his voyage, Franz grunted.

Myron looked up from a magazine. ‘What is it?’

‘Something strange.’ Franz slipped the Panrax’s manual into Myron’s old PC and a detailed schematic filled the screen. His tweezers held a blue, egg-shaped gob of plastic, three millimetres high and two wide. A fibre protruded from the narrow end. On the table lay a power module.

Myron felt a stab of anxiety. ‘You haven’t busted it, have you?’ He received the Look of Death. ‘Sorry, I didn’t mean that. What is it?’

‘Good question, infidel,’ said Franz. ‘It’s a resistor, but as to its purpose, I know not. Even more amazing than my admission of ignorance, your manual doesn’t seem to know either.’

Myron pointed. ‘Did it come from there?’

Franz peered through his magnifying glass. ‘Yes, where a resistor has no place to be. Thinking I was onto another ingenious piece of redesign, I called up the schematic. The component isn’t named at all. See?’

Myron followed the tweezers but saw only a sea of angular tagliatelli. ‘I’ll take your word for it.’

‘Well, my word says it doesn’t match the product.’

‘Typo?’

Franz shook his head. ‘Not likely; the legal ramifications would be horrendous. Quality Control would never allow it.’

‘But it could be an error,’ said Myron, with no other idea to offer.

‘Possible, but extremely unlikely. I’d lay sixty to one against it.’

‘Well… what, then?’

‘I don’t know. There, I’ve said it again — that’s twice in one month!’ Franz rummaged in his tool bag and withdrew a slim rectangular card.

‘What’re you doing now?’

‘Keep your pants on; just a once over with the multimeter.’

‘Ah, to see if the resistor really is a resistor?’

‘Yeah.’

Myron was pleased with his glimmer of understanding. Franz performed the standard tests, then pushed away from the desk and rubbed his eyes.

‘I’ll be damned; it is a resistor. But what’s it doing there? I’ve gotta get up to speed with this stuff if I’m to stay in business.’

‘Well it’s nice to see that hardware can be as fickle as software,’ said Myron. ‘I’ve always envied you working with things you could smash against the wall. I’ve never had that luxury with coding.’

Franz stared at the schematic. ‘Looks like you might be right about the typo. You should’ve taken my odds.’ He began to reassemble the PC. ‘Why don’t you call Panrax? They might send you a token of thanks.’

‘What would I tell them? “The thingo left of the jigger is light on for tendrils”? They’d think I was mad. You’re the boffin; you call ‘em. Just put me down for twenty percent of the reward, whatever it is.’

‘If it’s booze, you’ll not get a drop. Ignorant bastard.’

‘Oh-ho! Bastard am I? Gunner Heilmayr wishes to forfeit his chance to duel with the gorgeous tractor factory amazons using Colonel Price’s superior technology. The Eastern Front Dating Agency is no more!’

‘Steady on, you black mongrel. Drummer Price forgets that Field Marshall Heilmayr has his precious technology in a thousand pieces and that without a full retraction of his insulting outburst, such pieces shall be reunited nevermore.’

Myron leapt to attention. ‘Sir, I hereby request permission to withdraw my insinuation that you participate in our campaign merely to nurture twisted fantasies about women who are into turn-based battle simulations. Forgive me.’

Franz returned the salute. ‘You are forgiven. Your penance shall be to command auxiliary units for the first hour. Also, I want a beer.’

‘Yes Sir! Now, please put my baby back together.’

**********

 After three days, Myron had a good idea of what his machine could do. As he watched it handle his most complicated applications with ease, he felt humbled and even sad that he had nothing with which to challenge it. He imagined himself devising software of a complexity that demanded a new class of platform. His accounting and investment programs seemed drab and trivial by comparison.

On Friday he prepared for a drinking and bullshit session with Franz. Though alcohol, like all drugs, had been replaced by templates kind to bodies, it retained its disinhibiting effects. Narcotic Template Renaturing was akin to DNA engineering. Feeding off each other, the two research streams had developed in parallel. Just as it were possible to switch off codes for hereditary traits, adjustments in the molecular composition of intoxicants had swept away the undesirable consequences of a big night out.

Myron filled his freezer bag and wondered why many people had to be pissed to reveal their feelings. The situation had a flip side: if you wanted the truth from someone, you need only get him drunk. Myron resolved to raise the topic after a few beers.

‘It’s a funny old world,’ he said sagely to the mirror.

‘Mustn’t grumble,’ his reflection agreed brightly.

He lived in a doughnut-shaped zone that had once serviced the CBD. Now sourcing decisions were based on performance indicators and customers had abandoned their quest for human service. Materials and products sped cheaply and cleanly beneath the city, making it no longer necessary to locate close to clients. Zones became blurred as manufacturers moved out. Developers renovated most of the shells; councils demolished others for parks. A few niche businesses lived on among nascent residential communities.

Myron power-walked along reclaimed nature strips and bicycle tracks, past converted warehouses, concept domiciles and a growing number of svelte, well-designed public housing projects. Bricks and cancered concrete fought carbon fibre and Electroglass for his attention — two centuries of urban history framed in competing elevations.

The one constant among the farrago was advertising. Whoever owned a surface could rent it and few had resisted the temptation. Some builders even specialised in windowless homes, since unbroken surfaces commanded higher returns. Cued by their own flashing facades, owner-occupiers used the rent for gambling, intoxicants or take-away food. The fiscal advantage of prostituting the suburb thus returned via domestic budgets to corporate coffers.

A phalanx of these ‘advertitles’ pulsed a visual metronome at the end of Myron’s street — garish characters streaming over walls and roofs. As Myron approached, they quizzed his mobile and switched to products in keeping with his purchasing history.

Except for his PC, Myron was one of the few consumers who bought only when he needed to. He was in tune with his needs and no advertising, however intuitive, could move him. Like his friends, Myron deplored the mainstream and was proudly immune to calls for conformity, unless disinhibited by narcotics. Stoned, he was as vulnerable as any to sugar and sex. In his defence, he’d once held that society had been psychologically drugged and was experiencing an era he termed ‘The Global Munchies’. As a Rational Man, he could connect with the majority only by submitting to a drug-induced transformation of identity.

Myron’s friends, themselves considerably disinhibited at the time, had replied candidly that he was full of shit.

Staghound
A Visual History of the T17E Series Armored Cars in Allied Service 1940-1945
Photo-essay revealing the origins, development and characteristics of the US design 4×4 armored car that most famously found a home in British and Commonwealth service.

CONCORDE SERIES REPRINTS
German Half-Tracks of World War Two (Concorde Series 7054)
Panzers in the Gunsights: German AFVs in the ETO 1944-45 in US
Army Photos (Concord Series 7055)
Stalingrad Inferno: The Infantryman’s War (Concord Series 6509)