http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1b1067b2-dacd-11de-933d-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

Vi consiglio vivamente questo bel intervento di Al Gore sul Financial Times. Ho sempre apprezzato l’ex vice presidente Democratico. Mi è molto dispiaciuto il fatto che abbia perso con Bush nel 2000.  Il mondo sarebbe stato migliore con Gore alla presidenza.  Il passaggio che mi piace molto è :

“In truth, this approach to investing is not investing at all. It is trading, or – at its worst – gambling.”

“In verità questo approccio all’investimento non è in realtà investire. E’ commercio o nella peggiore delle ipotesi gioco d’azzardo.”

Si fa riferimento alla valutazione nel breve degli investimenti.

Penso che sia arrivato il tempo per una vera governance globale nell’ambito della finanza. Non è possibile avere un flusso globale di capitali e poi non pensare ad una forma di controllo sulla correttezza delle operazioni finanziarie e sulla loro trasparenza per poi arrivare a delle crisi globali che danneggiano tutti. E’ stato il caso dei subprime e oggi è il caso di Dubai. Uno scenario macroeconomico stabile, dove il rischio di cambio ed il rischio finanziario siano contenuti, è la condizione necessaria per uno sviluppo sostenibile degli investimenti e del commercio internazionali

▪ Peu importe ce qui se dit. C’est une dépression. Cela n’a rien à voir avec une des petites récessions de la période d’après-guerre.

C’est une dépression à cause du travail qu’elle doit faire. Elle doit nettoyer trois décennies de mauvais bilans. Elle doit balayer des milliers de milliards de dollars de dettes de crédit à la consommation. Elle doit désamorcer la bombe de milliers de milliards supplémentaires de dettes à Wall Street. Elle doit nettoyer des milliards… peut-être des milliers de milliards de dollars de mauvaises décisions — des maisons trop grandes, trop chères, trop grandioses pour leurs propriétaires, des centres commerciaux avec trop d’espaces de vente pour les nouveaux consommateurs économes, des entreprises outillées pour produire des biens et des services pour des millions de gens qui ne peuvent plus se les acheter.

Quand la dépression se terminera-t-elle ? Quand tout ce travail aura été accompli.

▪ Mais attendez… Les gouvernements du monde accumulent les déchets plus vite que la dépression ne peut les enlever. Et voici venir la prochaine méga-crise !

“Aux Etats-Unis, le coût de paiement des dettes est de plus en plus élevé”, annonce un gros titre en première page de The International Herald Tribune.

Et au Financial Times à Londres, Gillian Tett s’interroge :”La dette souveraine sera-t-elle le prochain subprime ?”

Tout le monde sait comment les choses se sont passées avec le subprime. Quand vous prêtez de l’argent à des gens qui ne peuvent pas le rembourser, vous allez au devant d’ennuis. Donc, si vous n’avez pas de travail et que vous voulez un prêt pour acheter une grosse caravane, vous n’avez pas de chance. Les banquiers ne vous donneront pas un centime.

Mais aujourd’hui, les prêteurs du monde entier font une chose tout aussi stupide. Ils prêtent aux gouvernements. Imaginez que vous êtes un banquier. Et le gouvernement américain vient vous demander un prêt.

“Avez-vous suffisamment de revenus pour rembourser les traites ?” demandez-vous.

“Eh bien, non,” répond-il. “En fait, nos revenus ont un peu baissé. C’est à cause de la récession, vous savez. C’est pareil pour tout le monde.”

“Vous pouvez être un peu plus précis ?”

“Euh… nous avons dépensé près de deux dollars pour chaque dollar de revenu.”

“Oh… et vous espérez que l’on vous prête de l’argent ? Qu’avez-vous comme garanties ? Quelle est votre valeur nette ?”

“Nous espérions que vous ne demanderiez pas. Le dernier relevé de nos obligations atteint 113 000 milliards de dollars.”

“Vous n’avez pas d’actifs ?”

“Nous avons quelques bâtiments à Washington… des bases militaires partout dans le monde… ce genre de choses. Mais concrètement, vous ne pourriez jamais les saisir.”

“Oh, je vois…”

▪ Ce qui est intéressant, c’est que les investisseurs du monde entier commencent à voir que les Etats-Unis et beaucoup d’autres gouvernements sont des emprunteurs à haut risque. C’est une chose qui sort de l’ordinaire. Jusqu’à maintenant, le gouvernement américain avait pu financer et refinancer ses dettes aux taux les plus bas en trois générations. Les prêteurs ont bien voulu prêter de l’argent aux gouvernements, parce qu’ils pensaient qu’ils étaient les emprunteurs les plus sûrs du monde.

On peut toujours compter sur les banquiers pour trouver les pires investissements au pire moment. Ils sont tout au bout de la chaîne de ceux qui anticipent ; cette chaîne commence par les analystes les plus indépendants et les plus pointus, passe par la communauté des fonds de couverture/courtiers, puis par les journalistes financiers et les experts de la télévision, arrive aux investisseurs stupides en passant par les médias populaires… et atteint enfin les banquiers quand ils tombent par hasard sur le Wall Street Journal et le lisent pour savoir ce qu’il se passe.

▪ Maintenant, les banquiers achètent de la dette souveraine — du papier émis par les gouvernements — parce qu’ils pensent que cela leur offre un rendement “sans risque”. En réalité, c’est l’un des investissements les plus risqués qui existe.

Cette année et l’année prochaine, les principaux gouvernements vont devoir lever 12 000 milliards de dollars pour financer leurs dettes et déficits. C’est une augmentation énorme de la quantité d’obligations souveraine dans le monde. Notre collègue Porter Stansberry estime que le gouvernement américain à lui seul va devoir trouver 4 500 milliards de dollars en obligations l’année prochaine. Ce montant représente deux fois le capital total de la plus grosse Banque centrale du monde — la Fed. Même si les Chinois prenaient tout ce qu’ils ont dans leurs réserves financières et s’en servaient pour acheter la dette américaine, il resterait encore près de 2 300 milliards d’obligations invendues.

En ce qui concerne le coût de la dette en lui-même, il va lui aussi atteindre des niveaux stupéfiants. L’administration Obama prévoit que les intérêts dépassent de 200 milliards de dollars leur niveau actuel, à 700 milliards de dollars d’ici 2019. C’est sûrement encore sous-estimé. Si le déficit atteint le niveau annoncé par l’ancien directeur du Bureau du Budget et de la Gestion, la dette nationale va grimper de 12 000 milliards de dollars à plus de 20 000 milliards de dollars en cinq ans. Les prêteurs vont certainement demander des rendements plus élevés. Même un banquier va sûrement vouloir plus que 3,5% d’intérêts pour prêter de l’argent au gouvernement sur dix ans. Peut-être 5%… peut-être 10%. Souvenez-vous que pendant les premières années de Volcker à la Fed, les taux d’intérêt sont montés à 18% pour les bons du Trésor à 10 ans.

Il existe aussi une autre possibilité — qui semble vague dans ce cas précis — et qui serait qu’une vente aux enchères de bons du gouvernement ne reçoive aucune offre. Cela arrive parfois. Quand les prêteurs voient que le risque est plus élevé que le potentiel de rendements, même s’ils sont élevés. Et quand cela se produit — ou même devient potentiel — les dirigeants se retrouvent dans la même situation que celle à laquelle des centaines de leurs ancêtres ont dû faire face pendant des siècles. Tous les gouvernements se retrouvent à sec de temps à temps. Puis ils sont en cessation de paiement. Quand ils contractent plus de dettes qu’ils ne peuvent en rembourser, ils se retrouvent toujours à sec.
chronique agora en intégralité.

Bon, vous comprenez, il n’ y aura pas assez d’argent pour tout le monde, et les usa vont crouler sous les intérêts, officiellement 700 milliards pour un budget de 3000 milliards, c’est à dire qu’entre le budget de la défense et le remboursement de la dette, c’est 50 % du budget qui disparait !!!!!

Le système est cassé, il est structurellement et irrémédiablement vicié, et rien ne pourra plus le sauver. C’est une certitude mathématique, la dette va submerger les états, et cela a été fait exprès.Nos élites sont en train de détruire le système et les vies de ceux qui y vivent.

La situation est déja intenable alors que les taux des banques centrales sont à 1 %, imaginez quand les taux vont monter…au moment ou la surliquidité va enfin produire ses effets…
Allez à la campagne, sortez du système bancaire, souvenez vous que la SOG a alerté d’un problable ” global collapse ” , même si les français disent la vérité, c’est que la situation doit être catastrophique !!!!

Notre société doit être brisée pour mener au NWO.Et rien de mieux pour briser les gens que de prendre leurs portefeuilles.

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Today’s market-moving headlines, macro trade ideas and more…

• Could sovereign debt be the new subprime?
• Mexico’s Credit Rating Cut by Fitch on Fiscal Outlook
• Utility players
• City of London’s Corporate Governance and Voting Policy for Closed-End Funds
• ETF Investing, With a Twist
• China Wants to Slow Credit Boom
• Citi Research: Nightmare on Commodity Street
• Rand firms as South Africa exits recession
• Gold stocks pricing in $940/oz long-term gold price
• Medtronic Profit Soars 59%, Boosts Forecast
• Now Chinese banks are under-capitalised
• Wave of Debt Payments Facing U.S. Government
• Forecasters See Dollar Decline Next Year
• Case-Shiller: Home Price Recovery Stumbles, Results Worse Than Expected
• A Mad Rush as Gold Bugs Get the Boot

I’d really hate to say the campaign is corrupt. Allegedly, reportedly, yada, yada, yada. I think it’s corruption IF his campaign is taking money from attorneys representing clients that his office is investigating, or even simply has jurisdiction over. Why are only attorneys exempt? “Attorney General” Andrew Coumo… attorneys exempt… is that a coincidence or what? Conflict of interest must be avoided. I don’t care if “every body does it,” that is no excuse. Corruption must stop.

Cuomo Took Cash From Lawyers With Matters Before Him

Nov. 23 (Bloomberg) — New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo’s campaign fund took tens of thousands of dollars from law firms representing clients his office investigated or accused of wrongdoing, state records show.

Well then, I guess that settles it. It’s not “corruption”, it’s ‘ethically challenged!’ HAHAHAhahaha!!!

Besides, who is going to enforce any law signed by a Governor… the Attorney General?

For the most part, Gross says that lawyers have always been exempted from restrictions on contributions. “Generally speaking [Spitzer] accepted contributions across the board from lawyers,” he says. “I don’t know of other AGs who have taken the position that they would not, I’ve just never heard of it.”

Gross adds that expanding such a ban would surely put a candidate at a disadvantage against their competition.

A disadvantage? Tough noogies. Ethics are more important. If it’s not the ideal career path, get over it.

Governor Cuomo? NY AG Will Need Cash from Lawyers to Run

It seems like we haven’t heard much from New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo in recent weeks. But a report Monday by Bloomberg figures to push Cuomo back into the spotlight.

With an expected run for governor of New York in 2010, the AG–son of former New York governor and Willkie Farr & Gallagher of counsel Mario Cuomo–will need plenty of contributions to fund his campaign. Cuomo has been hard at work bringing in serious cash. Now, some of the names on his donor list are raising questions.

Of the $16 million contributed so far to the attorney general, nearly $1 million comes from lawyers representing clients who are being investigated by Cuomo, Bloomberg reports.

So why is the Attorney General raising campaign cash???

A call to Cuomo’s office inquiring about who he has retained as outside counsel to advise him on his political campaign was not returned by the time of this post. The attorney general has not yet officially announced plans to run for governor.

Really?

For his fund “Andrew Cuomo 2010” he raised more than $10 million as of July, according to records at the New York State Board of Elections. By the next filing due mid-January, Cuomo, 51, plans to have $20 million in donations and plans to run for governor, said a person familiar with his plans.

Governor!

He’s already a movie star!!!

He’s got the support of adoring fans!

Support of a well-known economist!

Well maybe he doesn’t have all that. He does have $16 million in cash so far…

and people remember his dad’s name.

http://wp.me/pFeEj-8R

E. Segovia – 23/11/2009

Fuente: Cotizalia

Parece que lo peor de la crisis mundial ha pasado, que por fin llegan los “brotes verdes”, que el pánico de hace un año no se repetirá, que la bolsa va a seguir subiendo indefinidamente y que el futuro será sin duda más brillante que el pasado. Pero todo esto puede ser un espejismo de acuerdo con el banco francés Société Générale (SG), que plantea un escenario de colapso de la economía mundial en algún momento de los dos próximos años.

Se trata sólo de una posibilidad; no es el escenario central de SG, sino el más negativo. Ahora bien, después de que hace un año ocurriera algo que ni siquiera los “peores escenarios” habían llegado a imaginar, no se puede descartar que ninguna posibilidad se haga real. Máxime cuando existen importantes argumentos que sostienen esta tesis y que el informe de SG desgrana.

A juicio de este estudio, los rescates estatales del último año han servido simplemente para transferir las obligaciones del sector privado a los sufridos hombros del público, lo que crea una enorme cantidad de problemas. La clave es que la deuda (tanto pública como privada) sigue siendo estratosférica en casi todos los países ricos, con niveles del 350% del PIB en EEUU. Y la solución no es que cambie de manos, sino reducirla con un duro ‘desapalancamiento’ que durará años.

“Por el momento, nadie puede decir con cualquier grado de certidumbre que hemos escapado de verdad de la posiilidad de un colapso económico global”, asegura el informe que firma el equipo de estrategia de activos capitaneado por Daniel Fermon. Si se cumple este escenario negativo de SG, el dólar seguirá cayendo, las bolas mundiales volverán a los mínimos de marzo, los precios de la vivienda volverán a hundirse y el petróleo recaerá por debajo de 50 dólares en 2010.

Los Gobiernos ya han agotado su margen de maniobra fiscal, pero, incluso aunque no incrementen el gasto, la deuda pública se disparará dentro de dos años hasta el 105% del PIB en Reino Unido, el 125% en EEUU y la zona euro, y un estratosférico 270% en Japón. El volumen global de deuda pública alcanzará 45 billones de dólares, lo que significa que se habrá multiplicado por dos veces y media en una década.

La deuda pública es insostenible

“El altísimo nivel de deuda pública parece totalmente insostenible a largo plazo. Prácticamente hemos alcanzado un punto de no retorno para la deuda de los Estados”, concluye el informe. Ahora bien, reconoce que inflar la deuda pública es considerado el mal menor por muchos Gobiernos, lo cual hará que el oro “suba y suba sin parar” como el único refugio frente al dinero fiduciario.

La situación de la deuda privada no es mejor: a juicio de este banco, aunque la tasa de ahorro de EEUU se estabilice en el 7% y se utilice entera para reducir deuda, harán falta nueve años para que los hogares devuelvan su ratio deuda/ingresos a los niveles seguros de los años 80.

Con este panorama, son inevitables las comparaciones con Japón durante su Década Perdida (o dos), aunque con una gran diferencia: lo nipones pudieron mantenerse a flote gracias a sus exportaciones a una sólida economía global y a la depreciación del yen. Ahora no es posible que medio mundo persiga la misma estrategia al mismo tiempo.

¿Qué hacer para protegerse del desastre?

Las recomendaciones de SG para sus clientes son vender dólares y ponerse bajista en valores cíclicos como tecnología, automóviles y viajes para evitar ser atrapados en la “espiral deflacionista”. También sufrirán los mercados emergentes, que son más dependientes del crecimiento norteamericano que la propia Wall Street. En cuanto a materias primas, recomienda las agrícolas. Tampoco le gustan los bonos de alta rentabilidad (high yield), para los que espera una caída del 31% en 2010.

Paradójicamente, SG sí confía en la deuda pública, que cree que puede ofrecer grandes ganancias si se repite el desplome de su rentabilidad (precio y rentabilidad se mueven a la inversa en los bonos) de los bonos japoneses en lo peor de la crisis: el tipo de bono japonés a 10 años llegó a caer al 0,4%. Además, la Fed piensa seguir comprando bonos, lo que presionará aún más en esa dirección. Ahora bien, la opinión mayoritaria es la contraria: que los altos precios actuales no son sostenibles si los Gobiernos siguen inundando el mercado de papel.

Here is one of the best explanations of the financial crisis I’ve come acrossed…

Heidi is the proprietor of a bar in Berlin . In order to increase sales, she decides to allow her loyal customers – most of whom are unemployed alcoholics – to drink now but pay later. She keeps track of the drinks consumed on a ledger (thereby granting the customers loans).

Word gets around and as a result increasing numbers of customers flood into Heidi’s bar.

Taking advantage of her customers’ freedom from immediate payment constraints, Heidi increases her prices for wine and beer, the most-consumed beverages. Her sales volume increases massively.

A young and dynamic customer service consultant at the local bank recognizes these customer debts as valuable future assets and increases Heidi’s borrowing limit.

He sees no reason for undue concern since he has the debts of the alcoholics as collateral.

At the bank’s corporate headquarters, expert bankers transform these customer assets into DRINKBONDS, ALKBONDS and PUKEBONDS. These securities are then traded on markets worldwide. No one really understands what these abbreviations mean and how the securities are guaranteed. Nevertheless, as their prices continuously climb, the securities become top-selling items.

One day, although the prices are still climbing, a risk manager (subsequently of course fired due his negativity) of the bank decides that slowly the time has come to demand payment of the debts incurred by the drinkers at Heidi’s bar.

However they cannot pay back the debts.

Heidi cannot fulfill her loan obligations and claims bankruptcy.

DRINKBOND and ALKBOND drop in price by 95 %. PUKEBOND performs better, stabilizing in price after dropping by 80 %.

The suppliers of Heidi’s bar, having granted her generous payment due dates and having invested in the securities are faced with a new situation. Her wine supplier claims bankruptcy, her beer supplier is taken over by a competitor.

The bank is saved by the Government following dramatic round-the-clock consultations by leaders from the governing political parties.

The funds required for this purpose are obtained by a tax levied on the non-drinkers.

Source: Unknown (landed in my email inbox)

▪ Nous anticipions depuis plusieurs semaines le développement de formations orageuses dans le secteur des prêts immobiliers aux Etats-Unis. La structure dépressionnaire qui se dessine sur l’écran radar des banques spécialistes des crédits hypothécaires est bien pire que ce que nous redoutions. En effet, le taux de défaillances (retards de paiements + saisies/ventes) atteint le score jamais observé depuis les années 1930 de 14,4% au troisième trimestre. Et cela empire de semaine en semaine depuis le quatrième trimestre.

Le taux de défaut de remboursement durant plus de 90 jours s’élève à 9,6% — contre 7% au plus fort de la crise financière de l’automne dernier. Le nombre de foreclosure (expulsion des propriétaires pour cause de créances irrécouvrables) a progressé de 4,5% de juin à fin septembre, contre 4,3% au deuxième trimestre — qui était déjà un des pires de l’histoire en la matière.

C’est typiquement le genre de statistiques dont Wall Street affecte de se moquer éperdument tandis que les médias économiques n’y consacrent même pas une ligne, sauf les jours de publication des enquêtes trimestrielles — sans trop s’appesantir sur la question. Mais il y a une excellente raison pour expliquer cette omerta !

Ce qui se prépare pour l’été 2010 est du même acabit que ce qui pendait au nez des banques depuis l’été 1997.
chronique agora

14 % de retard et d’impayé, c’est vraiment abérrant, je comprends aisément qu’il faille aller à la grande dépression pour trouver des chiffres aussi catastrophiques. Vous vous rendez compte des sommes d’argent perdues ou en passe d’être perdues, des millions de crédits de plusieurs centaines milliers de dollars chacun qui ne seront pas payés.Il ne fait aucun doute que bon nombre de banque vont faire faillite.

Voila la carte des saisies aux USA :

Il y a une autre chronique j’aime bien :

▪ Qu’est ce que c’est que cette étrange reprise ?

Une enquête a montré que seulement 1 travailleur sur 10 a vu son revenu augmenter. C’est le taux le plus bas depuis 1946.

Nous avons appris il y a trois jours que la construction a plongé en octobre. Il se construit 11% de maisons en moins par rapport au mois dernier. Sur les habitations collectives, les chiffres sont pires — moins 35%.

Pourquoi la construction serait-elle en baisse au moment même où l’économie reprend soi-disant des forces ? Eh bien, les constructeurs se sont demandés ce qui arriverait aux maisons une fois qu’ils auraient fini de les construire. Le nouveau crédit d’impôt sur les maisons devait expirer ; ils n’étaient pas sûrs que les politiciens seraient assez idiots pour le renouveler.

Ils n’auraient pas dû s’inquiéter. Les politiciens ne ratent jamais une occasion de faire quelque chose d’idiot. Depuis la fin du mois d’octobre, le Congrès et le président Obama ont signé une extension du crédit d’impôt sur l’immobilier. Jusqu’en avril prochain, au moins, les primo acquéreurs vont avoir droit à un crédit d’impôt de 8 000 $.

On pourrait penser que cela réveillerait les esprits dans le secteur de la construction résidentielle. Mais les nouvelles d’hier nous disent que les demandes d’hypothèques s’effondrent — même avec des taux d’intérêt plus bas.
chronique agora

Il est possible qu’une chute sévère des marchès et l’établissement de la loi martiale pour la grippe tombent par miracle au même moment !
Même avec des taux très bas et même si les prix ont fortement baissé les gens n’achètent plus de maisons,
LOL !!! C’est mort, les gens sont lessivés, même avec des aides, ils ne peuvent plus rien acheter, sans taf, pas de thune, sans thune pas d’achat !

Souvenons nous que les subprimes n’étaient qu’une première vague, ce graphique l’explique très bien :

Vous voyez, il va y avoir du sport !!! à partir de l’été 2010 jusqu’à fin 2012 !!!!

“These cases encourage debtors and other parties to defensively use the mortgage securitization servicing system to prohibit servicers and other non-lending parties from enforcing rights under a mortgage. This trend, if it continues, may have significant impacts for consumer-debtor lawyers, as well as law firms that enforce mortgages and participated in mortgage loan securitization.”

“A note and mortgage may go through multiple transfers. Documentation of these transfers is imperfect, and many assignments were not recorded at the local real estate filing offices.”

“The creation of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) further complicated matters.”

“For instance, if a debtor raises these or similar defenses, it may only be necessary for the servicers and the mortgagees to complete and file the proper assignment documents.“

The fabricated fraudulant assignment.

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/

Indymac Bank F.S.B. v Yano-Horoski

“Upon the Court’s own motion, it is

ORDERED that the Adjustable Rate Note in the amount of $ 292,500.00 dated August 4, 2004 made by Diana J. Yano-Horoski in favor of IndyMac Bank F.S.B. shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, voided, avoided, nullified, set aside and is of no further force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED that the Mortgage in the amount of $ 292,500.00 which secures said Adjustable Rate Note given by Diana J. Yano-Horoski to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. As Nominee For IndyMac Bank F.S.B. dated August 4, 2004 and recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County on August 16, 2004 in Liber 20826 of Mortgages as Page 285, as assigned to IndyMac Bank F.S.B. by Assignment recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County in Liber 21273 of Mortgages at Page 808 shall be and the same is hereby vacated, cancelled, released and discharged of record; and it is further

ORDERED that the Plaintiff, its successors and assigns are hereby barred, prohibited and foreclosed from attempting, in any manner, directly or indirectly, to enforce any provision of the [*7]aforesaid Adjustable Rate Note and Mortgage or any portion thereof as against Defendant, her heirs or successors; and it is further

ORDERED that the Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale granted under this index number on January 12, 2009 and entered in the Office of the Clerk of Suffolk County on January 23, 2009 shall be and the same is hereby vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency filed with the Clerk of Suffolk County on July 27, 2005 under sequence no. 172456, which was extended by Order dated September 2, 2008 shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency filed with the Clerk of Suffolk County on August 29, 2008 under sequence no. 199616, shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Suffolk County shall cause a copy of this Order & Judgment to be filed in the Land Records so as to effectuate of record each and every one of the provisions hereinabove set forth with respect to cancellation of the instruments and items of record; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of Suffolk County, within ten (10) days from the date of entry hereof, any and all fees and costs required to effect cancellation of record of the Mortgage, Notices of Pendency and any other fees so levied; and it is further

ORDERED that within ten (10) days of the date of entry hereof, Plaintiff’s counsel shall serve a copy of this Order upon the Clerk of Suffolk County and the Defendant.

This shall constitute the Decision, Judgment and Order of this Court.”

2009 NY Slip Op 52333(U)
Decided on November 19, 2009
Supreme Court, Suffolk County
Spinner, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and will not be published in the printed Official Reports.

Decided on November 19, 2009

Supreme Court, Suffolk County

Indymac Bank F.S.B., Plaintiff

against

Diana Yano-Horoski, Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota National Association as Trustee for Soundview Home Equity Loan Trust 2001-1 and Kimberly Horoski, Defendants.

2005-17926

Steven J. Baum P.C.

Attorney for Plaintiff

P.O. Box 1291

Buffalo, New York 14240

Diana Yano-Horoski

Defendant Pro Se

8 Oakland Street

East Patchogue, New York 11772-5767

Jeffrey Arlen Spinner, J.

This is an action wherein the Plaintiff claims foreclosure of a mortgage dated August 4, 2004 in the original principal amount of $ 292,500.00 recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County, New York in Liber 20826 of Mortgages at Page 285. The mortgage secures an adjustable rate note of the same amount with an initial interest rate of 10.375%. The mortgage encumbers real property commonly known as 8 Oakland Street, East Patchogue, Town of Brookhaven, New York and described as District 0200 Section 979.50 Block 05.00 Lot 001.000 on the Tax Map of Suffolk County. Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Summons, Verified Complaint and Notice of Pendency on July 27, 2005. The Notice of Pendency was extended by Order dated April 28, 2008 and a Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale was granted on January 12, 2009.

Thereafter and in accordance with the Laws of 2008, Ch. 472, Sec. 3-a and in view of the fact that the loan at issue was deemed to be “sub-prime” or “high cost” in nature, Defendant seasonably requested that the Court convene a settlement conference. That request was granted and a conference was commenced on February 24, 2009 which was continued five times in a series of unsuccessful attempts by the Court to obtain meaningful cooperation from Plaintiff. In view of Plaintiff’s intransigence in its continuing failure and refusal to cooperate, both with the Court and with Defendant’s multiple and reasonable requests, the Court directed that Plaintiff produce an officer of the bank at the adjourned conference scheduled for September 22, 2009.

At the conference held on September 22, 2009, Karen Dickinson, Regional Manager of [*2]Loss Mitigation for IndyMac Mortgage Services, division of OneWest Bank F.S.B. (“IndyMac”) appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. IndyMac purports to be the servicer of the loan for the benefit of Deutsche Bank who, it is claimed, is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage (though the record holder is IndyMac Bank F.S.B., an entity which no longer is in existence). At that conference, it was celeritously made clear to the Court that Plaintiff had no good faith intention whatsoever of resolving this matter in any manner other than a complete and forcible devolution of title from Defendant. Although IndyMac had prepared a two page document entitled “Mediation Yano-Horoski” which contained what purported to be a financial analysis, Ms. Dickinson’s affirmative statements made it abundantly clear that no form of mediation, resolution or settlement would be acceptable to Plaintiff. IndyMac asserts the total amount due it to be in excess of $ 525,000.00 and freely concedes that the property securing the loan is worth no more than $ 275,000.00. Although Ms. Dickinson insisted that Ms. Yano-Horoski had been offered a “Forbearance Agreement” in the recent past upon which she quickly defaulted, it was only after substantial prodding by the Court that Ms. Dickinson conceded, with great reluctance, that it had not been sent to Defendant until after its stated first payment due date and hence, Defendant could not have consummated it under any circumstances (Defendant, through Plaintiff’s duplicity, found herself to be in the unique and uncomfortable position of being placed in default of the “agreement” even before she had received it). Plaintiff flatly rejected an offer by Plaintiff’s daughter to purchase the house for its fair market value (a so-called “short sale”) with third party financing. Plaintiff refused to consider a loan modification utilizing any more than 25% of the income of Plaintiff’s husband and daughter (both of whom reside in the premises with her), the excuse being that “We can’t control what non-obligors do with their money” (the logical follow up to this statement is how does the bank control what the obligor does with her money?). The Court found IndyMac’s position to be deeply troubling, especially since a plethora of sub-prime loans in this County’s Foreclosure Conference Part have been successfully modified with the lender’s reliance upon the income of non-obligors who reside in the premises under foreclosure. The Plaintiff also summarily rejected an offer by both Plaintiff’s husband and daughter to voluntarily obligate themselves for payment upon the full indebtedness, thus committing their individual incomes expressly to the purpose of a loan modification. It should be noted here that Defendant did not even request any waiver or “forgiveness” of the indebtedness aside from some tinkering with the interest rate, just a modification of terms so as to enable her to repay the same. It was evident from Ms. Dickinson’s opprobrious demeanor and condescending attitude that no proffer by Defendant (short of consent to foreclosure and ejectment of Defendant and her family) would be acceptable to Plaintiff. Even a final and desperate offer of a deed in lieu of foreclosure was met with bland equivocation. In short, each and every proposal by Defendant, no matter how reasonable, was soundly rebuffed by Plaintiff. Viewed objectively, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s conduct in this matter falls within the definitions set forth in 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1( c)(2), which might well warrant the imposition of monetary sanctions.

On the Court’s own motion, a hearing was held on November 18, 2009 in order to explore the issues herein. At the hearing, Ms. Dickinson appeared as well as Mr. Horoski. IndyMac claimed a balance due, as of September 22, 2009 of $ 527,437.73 which included an escrow overdraft of $ 46,627.88 for taxes advanced since the date of default but did not include attorney’s fees and costs.. Plaintiff was unable to tell the Court the amount of the principal [*3]balance owed. Mr. Horoski advised the Court that according to two letters received from Plaintiff, the principal balance was said to be $ 285,381.70 as of February 9, 2009 and $ 283,992.48 as of August 10, 2009. Plaintiff stated was that Defendant must have made payments though it was conceded that in fact no payment had been made.Plaintiff insisted that it had remained in regular contact with Defendant in an effort to reach an amicable resolution, that it had extended two modification offers to Defendant which she did not accept and further, that due to her financial status she was not qualified for any modification, even under the Federal HAMP guidelines. Plaintiff denied that it had “singled out” Defendants, simply stating that her status was such that she fell outside applicable guidelines. All of these assertions were disputed by Defendant.

That having been said, the Court is greatly disturbed by Plaintiff’s assertions of the amount claimed to be due from Defendant. The Referee’s Report dated June 30, 2008, which has its genesis in a sworn affidavit by a representative of Plaintiff (presumably one with knowledge of the account), reflects a total amount due and owing of $ 392,983.42. The principal balance is reported to be $ 290,687.85 with interest computed at the rates of 10.375% from November 1, 2005 through August 31, 2006 ($ 25,118.62), 12.50% from September 1, 2006 to February 28, 2007 ($ 18,018.66), 12.375% from March 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008 ($ 39,126.39) and 11.375% from April 1, 2008 to June 24, 2008 ($ 7,700.24) totalling $ 89,963.91. Plaintiff also claims $ 20.00 in non-sufficient funds charges, $ 295.00 in property inspection fees and $ 12,016.66 for tax and insurance advances. The Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale dated January 12, 2009 was granted in the amount of $ 392,983.42 with interest at the contract rate from June 24, 2008 through January 12, 2009 and at the statutory rate thereafter plus attorney’s fees of $ 2,300.00 and a bill of costs in the amount of $ 1,705.00. Even computing the accrual of pre-judgment interest of $ 18,299.18 (using Plaintiff’s per diem rate in the Referee’s Report) together with post-judgment interest at a statutory 9% through November 19, 2009 (an additional $ 31,740.90), the application of simple addition yields a total amount due of $ 447,028.50. This figure is $ 80,409.23 less than the $ 527,437.73 asserted by Plaintiff to be due and owing from Defendant. The Court is astounded that Plaintiff now claims to be owed an escrow advance amount of $ 46,627.88 when, under oath, its officer swore that as of June 24, 2008 that amount was actually $ 34,611.22 less. Moreover, it now appears that the elusive principal balance is either $ 290,687.85, $ 285,381.70 or $ 283,992.48.

It is the province and indeed the obligation of the trial court to assess and to determine issues regarding credibility, Morgan v. McCaffrey 14 AD3d 670 (2nd Dept. 2005). In the matter before the Court, the pendulum of credibility swings heavily in favor of Defendant. When the conduct of Plaintiff in this proceeding is viewed in its entirety, it compels the Court to invoke the ancient and venerable principle of “Falsus in uno, falsus in omni” (Latin; “false in one, false in all”) upon Defendant which, after review, is wholly appropriate in the context presented, Deering v. Metcalf 74 NY 501 (1878). Regrettably, the Court has been unable to find even so much as a scintilla of good faith on the part of Plaintiff. Plaintiff comes before this Court with unclean hands yet has the insufferable temerity to demand equitable relief against Defendant.

The Court, over the course of some six substantive appearances in seven months, has been afforded more than ample opportunity to assess the demeanor, credibility and general state [*4]of relevant affairs of Defendant and Plaintiff. Although not actually relevant to the disposition of this matter, the Court is constrained to note that Defendant is afflicted with multiple health problems which outwardly manifest in her experiencing great difficulty in ambulation, necessitating the use of mechanical supports. Moreover, Defendant’s husband, Mr. Gregory Horoski, suffers from a myriad of serious medical conditions which greatly impede most aspects of his daily existence. Nonetheless, both of these persons, together with their adult daughter who resides with them and who is substantially and gainfully employed, receive income which they are more than willing to commit, in good faith, toward repayment of the debt to Plaintiff and indeed, despite their physical challenges, they have appeared at each and every scheduled conference before this Court. At each appearance, they have assiduously attempted to resolve this controversy in an amicable fashion, only to be callously and arbitrarily turned away by Plaintiff. This has been so even in spite of the Court’s continuing albeit futile endeavors at brokering a settlement.

As a relevant aside, the scenario presented here raises the specter of a much greater social problem, that of housing those persons whose homes are foreclosed and who are thereafter dispossessed. It is certainly no secret that Suffolk County is in the yawning abyss of a deep mortgage and housing crisis with foreclosure filings at a record high rate and a corresponding paucity of emergency housing. While foreclosure and its attendant eviction are clearly the inevitable (and in some cases, proper) result in a number of these situations, the Court is persuaded that this need not be the case here. In this matter, Defendant is plainly willing to make arrangements for repayment and both her husband and daughter are likewise willing to allocate their respective incomes in order to reach the same end. Were Plaintiff amenable, she would presumably continue to maintain the property’s physical plant, pay taxes thereon and the property would retain or perhaps increase its market value. Plaintiff would receive a regular income stream, albeit with a reduced rate of interest and without sustaining a loss of several hundred thousand dollars. In addition, no neighborhood blight would occur from the boarding of the property after foreclosure which would, in turn, avert problems of litter, dumping, vagrancy and vandalism as well as a corresponding decline in the property values in the immediate area. In short, a loan modification would result in a proverbial “win-win” for all parties involved. To do otherwise would result in virtually certain undomiciled status for two physically unhealthy persons and their daughter, leading to an additional level of problems, both for them and for society.

Since an action claiming foreclosure of a mortgage is one sounding in equity, Jamaica Savings Bank v. M.S. Investing Co. 274 NY 215 (1937), the very commencement of the action by Plaintiff invokes the Court’s equity jurisdiction. While it must be noted that the formal distinctions between an action at law and a suit in equity have long since been abolished in New York (see CPLR 103, Field Code Of 1848 §§ 2, 3, 4, 69), the Supreme Court nevertheless has equity jurisdiction and distinct rules regarding equity are still extant, Carroll v. Bullock 207 NY 567, 101 NE 438 (1913). Speaking generally and broadly, it is settled law that “Stability of contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympathy…” Graf v. Hope Building Corporation 254 NY 1 (1930). However, it is true with equal force and effect that equity must not and cannot slavishly and blindly follow the law, Hedges v. Dixon County 150 US 182, 192 (1893). Moreover, as succinctly decreed by our Court of Appeals in the matter of Noyes v. [*5]Anderson 124 NY 175 (1890) “A party having a legal right shall not be permitted to avail himself of it for the purposes of injustice or oppression…” 124 NY at 179.

In the matter of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz 133 NYS2d 908 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 1954), Special Term stated that “The maxim of “clean hands” fundamentally was conceived in equity jurisprudence to refuse to lend its aid in any manner to one seeking its active interposition who has been guilty of unlawful, unconscionable or inequitable conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks relief.” 133 NYS2d at 925, citing First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. 98 F 2d 416 (8th Cir. 1938), cert. denied 305 US 650, 59 S. Ct. 243, 83 L. Ed. 240 (1938), reh. denied 305 US 676, 59 S Ct. 356 83 L. Ed. 437 (1939); General Excavator Co. v. Keystone Driller Co. 65 F 2d 39 (6th Cir. 1933), cert. granted 289 US 721, 53 S. Ct. 791, 77 L. Ed. 1472 (1933), aff’d 290 US 240, 54 S. Ct. 146, 78 L. Ed. 793 (1934).

In attempting to arrive at a determination as to whether or not equity should properly intervene in this matter so as to permit foreclosure of the mortgage, the Court is required to look at the situattion in toto, giving due and careful consideration as to whether the remedy sought by Plaintiff would be repugnant to the public interest when seen from the point of view of public morality, see, for example, 55 NY Jur. Equity § 113, Molinas v. Podloff 133 NYS2d 743 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 1954). Equitable relief will not lie in favor of one who acts in a manner which is shocking to the conscience, Duggan v. Platz 238 AD 197, 264 NYS 403 (3rd Dept. 1933), mod. on other grounds 263 NY 505, 189 NE 566 (1934), neither will equity be available to one who acts in a manner that is oppressive or unjust or whose conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to prohibit the party from asserting its legal rights against a defaulting adversary, In Re Foreclosure Of Tax Liens 117 NYS2d 725 (Sup. Ct. Kings County, 1952), aff’d on other grounds 286 AD 1027, 145 NYS2d 97 (2nd Dept. 1955), mod. on other grounds on reargument 1 AD2d 95, 148 NYS2d 173 (2nd Dept. 1955), appeal granted 7 AD2d 784, 149 NYS2d 227 (2nd Dept. 1956). The compass by which the questioned conduct must be measured is a moral one and the acts complained of (those that are sufficient so as to prevent equity’s intervention) need not be criminal nor actionable at law but must merely be willful and unconscionable or be of such a nature that honest and fair minded folk would roundly denounce such actions as being morally and ethically wrong, Pecorella v. Greater Buffalo Press Inc. 107 AD2d 1064, 468 NYS2d 562 (4th Dept. 1985). Thus, where a party acts in a manner that is offensive to good conscience and justice, he will be completely without recourse in a court of equity, regardless of what his legal rights may be, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Schwartz 133 NYS2d 908 (Sup. Ct., New York County, 1954), York v. Searles 97 AD 331, 90 NYS 37 (2nd Dept. 1904), aff’d 189 NY 573, 82 NE 1134 (1907).

An objective and painstaking examination of the totality of the facts and circumstances herein leads this Court to the inescapable conclusion that the affirmative conduct exhibited by Plaintiff at least since since February 24, 2009 (and perhaps earlier) has been and is inequitable, unconscionable, vexatious and opprobrious. The Court is constrained, solely as a result of Plaintiff’s affirmative acts, to conclude that Plaintiff’s conduct is wholly unsupportable at law or in equity, greatly egregious and so completely devoid of good faith that equity cannot be permitted to intervene on its behalf. Indeed, Plaintiff’s actions toward Defendant in this matter have been harsh, repugnant, shocking and repulsive to the extent that it must be appropriately [*6]sanctioned so as to deter it from imposing further mortifying abuse against Defendant. The Court cannot be assured that Plaintiff will not repeat this course of conduct if this action is merely dismissed and hence, dismissal standing alone is not a reasonable option. Likewise, the imposition of monetary sanctions under 22 NYCRR § 130-1.1 et. seq. is not likely to have a salubrious or remedial effect on these proceedings and certainly would not inure to Defendant’s benefit. This Court is of the opinion that cancellation of the indebtedness and discharge of the mortgage, when taken together, constitute the appropriate equitable disposition under the unique facts and circumstances presented herein.

After careful consideration, it is the determination of this Court that the indebtedness evidenced by the Adjustable Rate Note dated August 4, 2004 in the original principal amount of $ 292,500.00 made by Diana J. Yano-Horoski in favor of IndyMac Bank F.S.B. should be cancelled, voided and set aside. In addition, the Mortgage which secures the Adjustable Rate Note, given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. As Nominee For IndyMac Bank F.S.B. dated August 4, 2004 and recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County on August 16, 2004 in Liber 20826 of Mortgages at Page 285, as assigned by Assignment recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County in Liber 21273 of Mortgages at Page 808 should be cancelled and discharged of record. Further, Plaintiff, its successors and assigns should be forever barred and prohibited from any action to collect upon the Adjustable Rate Note. In addition, the Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale granted on January 12, 2009 and entered on January 23, 2009 should be vacated and set aside and the Notice of Pendency should be cancelled and discharged of record. For this Court to decree anything less than the foregoing would be for the Court to be wholly derelict in the performance of its obligations.

Upon the Court’s own motion, it is

ORDERED that the Adjustable Rate Note in the amount of $ 292,500.00 dated August 4, 2004 made by Diana J. Yano-Horoski in favor of IndyMac Bank F.S.B. shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, voided, avoided, nullified, set aside and is of no further force and effect; and it is further

ORDERED that the Mortgage in the amount of $ 292,500.00 which secures said Adjustable Rate Note given by Diana J. Yano-Horoski to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. As Nominee For IndyMac Bank F.S.B. dated August 4, 2004 and recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County on August 16, 2004 in Liber 20826 of Mortgages as Page 285, as assigned to IndyMac Bank F.S.B. by Assignment recorded with the Clerk of Suffolk County in Liber 21273 of Mortgages at Page 808 shall be and the same is hereby vacated, cancelled, released and discharged of record; and it is further

ORDERED that the Plaintiff, its successors and assigns are hereby barred, prohibited and foreclosed from attempting, in any manner, directly or indirectly, to enforce any provision of the [*7]aforesaid Adjustable Rate Note and Mortgage or any portion thereof as against Defendant, her heirs or successors; and it is further

ORDERED that the Judgment of Foreclosure & Sale granted under this index number on January 12, 2009 and entered in the Office of the Clerk of Suffolk County on January 23, 2009 shall be and the same is hereby vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency filed with the Clerk of Suffolk County on July 27, 2005 under sequence no. 172456, which was extended by Order dated September 2, 2008 shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Notice of Pendency filed with the Clerk of Suffolk County on August 29, 2008 under sequence no. 199616, shall be and the same is hereby cancelled, vacated and set aside; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Suffolk County shall cause a copy of this Order & Judgment to be filed in the Land Records so as to effectuate of record each and every one of the provisions hereinabove set forth with respect to cancellation of the instruments and items of record; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay to the Clerk of Suffolk County, within ten (10) days from the date of entry hereof, any and all fees and costs required to effect cancellation of record of the Mortgage, Notices of Pendency and any other fees so levied; and it is further

ORDERED that within ten (10) days of the date of entry hereof, Plaintiff’s counsel shall serve a copy of this Order upon the Clerk of Suffolk County and the Defendant.

This shall constitute the Decision, Judgment and Order of this Court.

Dated: November 19, 2009

Riverhead, New York

E N T E R:

______________________________________

JEFFREY ARLEN SPINNER, J.S.C.

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. and
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.,

v

WARREN E. AGIN, TRUSTEE,

A Massachusetts federal judge has upheld a bankruptcy court ruling allowing a trustee to treat a mortgage as an unsecured claim, which strips the mortgage holder of foreclosure rights, because of defective mortgage paperwork.

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/

EXECUTIVE ORDER 13519

- – - – - – -

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINANCIAL FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to strengthen the efforts of the Department of Justice, in conjunction with Federal, State, tribal, territorial, and local agencies, to investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes and other violations relating to the current financial crisis and economic recovery efforts, recover the proceeds of such crimes and violations, and ensure just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial crimes and violations, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Establishment. There is hereby established an interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Task Force) led by the Department of Justice.

Sec. 2. Membership and Operation. The Task Force shall be chaired by the Attorney General and consist of senior-level officials from the following departments, agencies, and offices, selected by the heads of the respective departments, agencies, and offices in consultation with the Attorney General:

(a) the Department of Justice;

(b) the Department of the Treasury;

(c) the Department of Commerce;

(d) the Department of Labor;

(e) the Department of Housing and Urban Development;

(f) the Department of Education;

(g) the Department of Homeland Security;

(h) the Securities and Exchange Commission;

(i) the Commodity Futures Trading Commission;

(j) the Federal Trade Commission;

(k) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;

(l) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;

(m) the Federal Housing Finance Agency;

(n) the Office of Thrift Supervision;

(o) the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;

(p) the Small Business Administration;

(q) the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(r) the Social Security Administration;

(s) the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigations;

(t) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network;

(u) the United States Postal Inspection Service;

(v) the United States Secret Service;

(w) the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement;

(x) relevant Offices of Inspectors General and related Federal entities, including without limitation the Office of the Inspector General for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program; and

(y) such other executive branch departments, agencies, or offices as the President may, from time to time, designate or that the Attorney General may invite.

The Attorney General shall convene and, through the Deputy Attorney General, direct the work of the Task Force in fulfilling all its functions under this order. The Attorney General shall convene the first meeting of the Task Force within 30 days of the date of this order and shall thereafter convene the Task Force at such times as he deems appropriate. At the direction of the Attorney General, the Task Force may establish subgroups consisting exclusively of Task Force members or their designees under this section, including but not limited to a Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Attorney General, and subcommittees addressing enforcement efforts, training and information sharing, and victims’ rights, as the Attorney General deems appropriate.

Sec. 3. Mission and Functions. Consistent with the authorities assigned to the Attorney General by law, and other applicable law, the Task Force shall:

(a) provide advice to the Attorney General for the investigation and prosecution of cases of bank, mortgage, loan, and lending fraud; securities and commodities fraud; retirement plan fraud; mail and wire fraud; tax crimes; money laundering; False Claims Act violations; unfair competition; discrimination; and other financial crimes and violations (hereinafter financial crimes and violations), when such cases are determined by the Attorney General, for purposes of this order, to be significant;

(b) make recommendations to the Attorney General, from time to time, for action to enhance cooperation among Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial authorities responsible for the investigation and prosecution of significant financial crimes and violations; and

(c) coordinate law enforcement operations with representatives of State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement.

Sec. 4. Coordination with State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Law Enforcement. Consistent with the objectives set out in this order, and to the extent permitted by law, the Attorney General is encouraged to invite the following representatives of State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement to participate in the Task Force’s subcommittee addressing enforcement efforts in the subcommittee’s performance of the functions set forth in section 3(c) of this order relating to the coordination of Federal, State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement operations involving financial crimes and violations:

(a) the National Association of Attorneys General;

(b) the National District Attorneys Association; and

(c) such other representatives of State, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement as the Attorney General deems appropriate.

Sec. 5. Outreach. Consistent with the law enforcement objectives set out in this order, the Task Force, in accordance with applicable law, in addition to regular meetings, shall conduct outreach with representatives of financial institutions, corporate entities, nonprofit organizations, State, local, tribal, and territorial governments and agencies, and other interested persons to foster greater coordination and participation in the detection and prosecution of financial fraud and financial crimes, and in the enforcement of antitrust and antidiscrimination laws.

Sec. 6. Administration. The Department of Justice, to the extent permitted by law and subject to the availability of appropriations, shall provide administrative support and funding for the Task Force.

Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof, or the status of that department or agency within the Federal Government; or

(ii) functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This Task Force shall replace, and continue the work of, the Corporate Fraud Task Force created by Executive Order 13271 of July 9, 2002. Executive Order 13271 is hereby terminated pursuant to section 6 of that order.

(c) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(d) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 8. Termination. The Task Force shall terminate when directed by the President or, with the approval of the President, by the Attorney General.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

November 17, 2009.

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/

John Paulson is now one of the richest men in the world and one of the most successful Wall Street traders based upon his bet that the housing market was going to come a part.  According to the Wall Street Journal, John Paulson is now taking some of those winnings and building an investment portfolio with the belief that gold is going much, much higher than $1,150 per ounce.

While the gold supporters are happy to hear this news, the one thing I keep thinking about is that when he “shorted the housing market” in a massive way in 2008, I don’t recall hearing much about him and his investment beliefs.  Now that it’s out in the open, perhaps it’s just too conventional.

There are those who believe the U.S. Dollar is going to collapse and that gold is going to the moon.  Perhaps those folks are right, but it seems like the whole world believes the U.S. Dollar is going to zero and every other ad on the radio is some vendor selling gold.

Let’s see…conventional wisdom in 1999 is that the internet changed everything and that earnings no longer mattered.  It was a New Economy.   Then after than crashed and everyone moved in to real estate, people said that housing never goes down….and then that crashed and about put us in to a Depression.   Now they say that the U.S. Dollar is going to collapse and that gold is going to $2,000, or $5,000 or $10,000 per ounce.   This last scenario has yet to play out fully.   I can see why people think this is going to happen because of the way the Obama Administration and Congress are spending money, but when the whole world is on one side of the trade, I say beware!

Außerdem wird in nachfolgendem Artikel das nächste größere Problem in den Staaten angesprochen: dem staatlichen Hypothekengarant “Federal Housing Administration” droht ebenfalls der Kollaps… Siehe auch “USA: Einlagensicherungsfond FDIC kommt in finanzielle Nöte!“.

Gefunden bei telepolis.de:

Banken müssen die US-Einlagensicherung retten

Ralf Streck 17.11.2009

Die große Zahl der Bankenpleiten in den USA hat Einlagensicherungsbehörde an den Rand einer Pleite gebracht

Es war zu erwarten, dass die vielen Bankenpleiten auch die US-Einlagensicherungsbehörde (FDIC) in Bedrängnis bringen würden (Finanzkrise: “Das Schlimmste kommt noch”). Schon vor einem Jahr war die Einlagensumme auf einen historischen Tiefstand von 45 Milliarden Dollar geschrumpft. Die sind nun auf ein Minimum eingedampft, denn in diesem Jahr sind in den USA schon mehr als 120 Banken abgestürzt und darunter sind auch einige große Institute (Arbeitslosigkeit in den USA steigt stärker als erwartet).

Am vergangenen Wochenende wurde die Einlagensicherung erneut über die Pleite von drei Instituten geschröpft. So waren zwei Banken in Florida – die Orion Bank of Naples und die Century Bank – betroffen und dazu kam ein kleineres Institut in Kalifornien, die Pacific Coast National Bank of San Clemente. Der neue Aderlass schlägt ein neues Loch in die FDIC-Kassen, denn die drei Institute hatten zusammen fast drei Milliarden Dollar an Einlagen.

So sah sich die FDIC zu einem dramatischen Schritt gezwungen. Mit den Mitgliedsbanken wurde vereinbart, dass diese eine Vorauszahlung der Gebühren für die nächsten drei Jahre leisten müssen. Damit erhält die Federal Deposit Insurance Corp rund 45 Milliarden Dollar. Doch dass die lange reichen, davon darf kaum ausgegangen werden. Denn das Bankensterben geht immer schneller voran. Waren im vergangenen Jahr 25 Institute abgeschmiert, waren es 2007 waren sogar nur drei. Die 123 Pleitekandidaten haben also in nur knapp 11 Monaten die 45 Milliarden aufgebraucht, die nun an frischem Kapital an die FDIC fließen könnten.

Die rote Liste der FDIC wird zudem immer länger, sie umfasste im Sommer schon mehr als 400 Institute. Zum Jahresbeginn waren es noch 252 gewesen, obwohl sich die Zahl im Vergleich zum Vorjahr schon verdreifacht hatte. Und ob tatsächlich 45 Milliarden fließen werden, ist auch fraglich. Die FDIC kann bei besonders klammen Instituten auch Ausnahmen zulassen, die dann die Vorauszahlung nicht leisten müssen, die für alle anderen Banken bis zum Ende dieses Jahres fällig wird. So wird die Zahlung wohl zu einem kleinen Stresstest für viele Banken, der vielleicht mehr über deren Zustand aussagt, als es der nicht so stressige Test von Präsident Obama ausgesagt hatte.

Ohnehin ist die Lage in den USA weiter alles andere als rosig. Wegen der schlechten Daten vom Arbeitsmarkt ist das Verbrauchervertrauen deutlich gefallen. Die Arbeitslosigkeitsquote hat offiziell die 10-Prozenthürde überwunden. Real liegt sie längst weit darüber, weil sich viele Arbeitslose schlicht nicht mehr melden, wie auch eine Statistik der der Household-Survey belegt. Das Verbrauchervertrauen ging deshalb im November von 70,6 auf 66,0 Punkte in die Knie. Es fiel damit auf den tiefsten Stand seit August. Die Experten hatten eigentlich sogar einen Anstieg auf 71 Punkte erwartet. Das ist ein fatales Zeichen für eine Wirtschaft, die am Inlandskonsum hängt.

Zudem wächst ein neues Debakel heran. Dem staatlichen Hypothekengarant Federal Housing Administration (FHA) droht ebenfalls der Kollaps. Die Reserven der FHA haben sich in den letzten Monaten drastisch reduziert. Der Puffer beträgt nur mehr 0,53 % von 653 Milliarden Dollar an Hypotheken, die durch die FHA versichert werden. Vorgeschrieben ist ein Wert von 2 %. “Es besteht die Möglichkeit, dass die Reserven unter Null gehen und auch dort bleiben”, sagt Shaun Donovan, Chef des Ministeriums für “Housing and Urban and Development”. Nach [extern] Angaben der FTD hatte sich die FHA zuletzt als wichtiger Akteur bei der Vergabe von Krediten hervorgetan. Ihr Marktanteil sei seit September von 24 auf 63 % angeschwollen..

Pikant ist, dass die FHA ausgerechnet gemeinsam mit der staatlichen Finanzierungsagentur Ginnie Mae die schlecht abgesicherten Subprime-Hypotheken wiederbelebt hat. Derlei Ramsch-Kredite zählen zu den Auslösern der Finanzkrise und die wurden zuvor auch zuhauf von den Großen im Geschäft vergeben. Das Handelsblatt berichtet mit Bezug auf eine Studie der US-Notenbank in San Francisco, die FHA habe nach dem Zusammenbruch des Marktes 2008 den Anteil dieser Subprime-Kredite wieder auf 20 % erhöht, damit wäre der Wert sogar höher als vor dem Absturz. Die großen Vorbilder von Ginnie sind Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac, die zuhauf mit diesen Krediten gehandelt hatten und längst verstaatlicht wurden, hängen am Tropf der Steuerzahler, weil sie seit neun Quartalen in Folge nur Milliardenverluste einfahren.

“Well, in short, in the words of the Rapper Puff Daddy, “It’s all about the benjamins, Baby.”

By O. Max Gardner III

Wayne Gretzky once said that his success was due to the fact that he focused on where the puck was going to be, not where it was. For most consumer debtors who have home mortgage loans and are involved in Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, this Gretzkyism is somewhat of a double entendre. The fact of the matter is that most of these debtors have no idea who really owns their home mortgage loan and they most assuredly do not know why the balance owed keeps going up. Or, as Yogi Berra might say, these “guys have been double-pucked!”

And, the so-called “double-pucking” all starts with mortgage securitization. Securitization is a complex series of financial transactions designed to maximize the cash flow and cash out options for loan originators. The securitization and sale of assets is what gets the “off the balance sheet” boost in reported income for the originator. The originators secure immediate liquidity from assets that, in some circumstances, could not be readily traded in the capital markets. On paper, it sounds simple, in the real world it involves the creation of numerous Special Purpose Vehicle Corporations (SPV) designed to create the legal impression of an actual BPF sales transaction. However, the residuals, credit enhancements, and other derivative rights retained by the originators in the transferred assets create a Pandora’s Box of problems. A good example is Enron. Enron had enhanced the credit worthiness of thousands of asset-backed securitizations with Enron stock. When the Enron stock tanked so did the securitizations and Enron had to “recognize” all of these “off the books” transactions as liabilities. We know the rest of the story.

To securitize an asset, the loan originator creates a pool of financial assets such as mortgage loans. It then uses one or more SPV corporations to convert the large pools of these mortgages into complex investment certificates, backed or securitized by valid liens on the transferred collateral. These certificates are then rated and offered for sale to asset capital investors, foreign investors and life insurance companies to name a few. The certificates are normally split into various types or tranches, each of which has pre-determined cash flow or equity positions in the underlying collateral.

Unlike conventional bonds, payments of principal and interest from these mortgage backed securities (MBS) are based on the cash generated by the pooled assets. Cash can be generated by monthly mortgage payments and the pre-payment of the mortgage instruments by refinancing or early payment. The collateral for all of these bonds is always a pooled trust of the underlying assets, administered by a designated Trustee. The Trustee then enters into an agreement with a third-party to actually service the collection of the income from the pooled assets. These servicing agreements are normally consummated prior to the initial funding or transfer of the assets to the trust and are normally referred to as a Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA).

In many cases, the entity that originates or aggregates the assets for securitization will retain the rights to service the pool of mortgage loans for the trustee. These rights are referred to in the mortgage context as retained mortgage servicing rights (MSR). The entity holding the MSR rights is normally referred to as the Master Mortgage Servicer. The PSA may give the Master Mortgage Servicer the right to “farm-out” the actual servicing and collection of the mortgage loans to a primary servicer, a secondary or subservicer, or a default servicer. In the vast majority of cases, the consumer-mortgagor is making his or her monthly payments to one of these servicers, whom they erroneously believe is the entity that actually “owns their mortgage.”

The rights to service a mortgage loan are considered to be assets with recognized value. In fact, Mortgage Servicing Assets (MSA) are sold, assigned, and securitized just like the mortgage loans they service. Suffice it to say, the buying and selling of servicing rights accounts for much of the consumer confusion that leads to the common misstatement that “my mortgage has been sold 4 times in the past five years.” The mortgage has not been sold, just the rights to service the mortgage, the mortgage is still swimming in a pool with other similar debt instruments. And, since a Master Mortgage Servicer receives a service release premium (SRP) when it sells the servicing rights, the market is certainly active.

The final element in understanding this financial model is that you have public and private label placements of mortgage securitizations. All of the public placements are originated by the Government Sponsored Entities (FannieMae, FreddieMac, and GinnieMae commonly referred to as the GSE’s) and normally involve a single form of an investment bond or certificate called Pass-Through Certificates. All of these placements are the subject of detailed SEC filings and other public reports. The private-label placements, on the other hand, represent mortgages that have been aggregated on the secondary market by private investors and the pooled trusts of these assets are normally not subject to any SEC reporting or filing requirements. The private placement MBS’s also normally offer multiple forms of investments and create these instruments by splitting the income and principal aspects of the MBS trust into many different segments or tranches. The GSE’s have historically purchased for securitization only traditional mortgage products but in recent years have expanded into a variety of areas such as loan size, higher loan-to-value loans, alternative mortgages (ARMS, Hybrid ARMS, Interest Only ARMS, etc.). The private label aggregators, on the other hand, have purchased all of the others including Alt-A, sub-prime, etc.

At his point, you might ask what does any of this have to do with consumer mortgages and Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases. Well, in short, in the words of the Rapper Puff Daddy1, “It’s all about the benjamins, Baby.”* The problem arises out of the fact that in most cases the “income” for servicing a mortgage is “fixed” at the time of securitization. The “fixing” of this compensation is based on historical financial models of the pooled mortgages that make certain assumptions on default rates, foreclosure rates, the ability to market REO (real estate owned) properties, and the like. If these projections are not accurate, then the costs of servicing an above average pool of defaulted mortgage loans may be a money losing proposition for the servicers. And there is a fine margin in the mortgage servicing business between operating in the black or in the red.

One of the most startling statements about these revenue reduction problems that this writer has seen was one reported in the August 2005 edition of Mortgage Banking. Mortgage Banking is published monthly by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America and touts itself as “the magazine of real estate finance.” In an Article by Thomas J. Healy, a Certified Mortgage Banker employed by HanoverTrade Inc., the following statement is made:

“Because servicers average approximately $60 per loan per year in net profit, it does not take much in the way of additional non reimbursable inspections/collections/foreclosure costs to wipe out the profits on a lot of loans.”

This statement is supported by a “cost of servicing” survey that is being conducted by the Research Department of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America. Marina Walsh, the Director of this Department, was recently quoted as saying that “in general, servicing costs [for subprime mortgages] were about three times that of the prime side.” Ms. Walsh went on to state that when subprime loans go into default, the servicing costs are 4.5 times higher than for defaulted prime loans.

These quotes and these statistics remind me of some advice I received about 30 years ago from a veteran personal injury attorney. We were about to settle a very large medical malpractice case and our fee was based on a percentage of the total recovery. I remember asking the veteran, “How much is 33% of that settlement?” He responded as follows: “I don’t know for sure but 33% of a lot is a lot!” Well, in order to enhance their default servicing revenues, mortgage servicers “involved in” consumer bankruptcy cases have created all sorts of new fees and charges that are not assessed against the investors (the holders of the certificates in the pooled trusts, who will not pay these fees) but against the poor Chapter 13 debtors.

What type of fees are we talking about? Well in Mr. Healy’s article, he writes about inspections. What type of inspections is he referring to? I guess the best place to start would be with Gerald Stark, a civil engineer for whom I filed a Chapter 13 case about 10 years ago. Gerald had a mortgage loan that had been securitized by FannieMae and was being serviced by Crestar Mortgage Corporation. The mortgage was current on the petition date and remained current during the course of the plan. Notwithstanding the Chapter 13 filing, Crestar continued to send monthly billing statements to the debtor. It was not the billing statements that concerned Gerald but the $9.00 additional fee added to his statement each month designated as “other charges.” Mr. Stark called Crestar numerous times about these charges and was told everything from “we have no idea” to they are just “bankruptcy fees.” Mr. Stark took the matter up with me when the total amount of the monthly property inspection charges reached $135.00.

Mr. Stark subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against Crestar for violations of the automatic stay. Crestar admitted that it had caused the home to be inspected once per month so as to make sure it had not been vacated, which was curious in itself since the debtor at all times remained current on his mortgage payments. If Gerald had abandoned his home, you would assume he would have stopped making the mortgage payments.

The property inspection fees in Stark’s case were allegedly paid to third parties who would simply ride by the house and file a written report indicating such things as the grass was mowed. Crestar’s defense to Gerald’s motion was that, as servicer, it was only acting in compliance with the Mortgage Servicing Guidelines issued by FannieMae. In rejecting this defense, and holding in favor of the debtor, the Bankruptcy Court stated: “The $9.00 monthly inspection fee that Crestar imposed on the debtors in this case was in effect a monthly bankruptcy ‘monitoring fee’”. Stark v. Crestar Mortgage Corp., 242 B.R. 866, 871 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 199). The Court went on to hold that “since Crestar attempted to collect these ‘inspection or bankruptcy monitoring fees’ from the debtors while the stay was in effect, by adding fees to the debtor’s monthly statements, Crestar violated Section 362(a)(3).” Id. at 873.

Gerald Stark’s case turned out to be the tip of a very large ice-berg of unlawful and illegal mortgage servicer fees in consumer bankruptcy cases. The next case that came to light involved the practice of advancing various sums of money against the mortgage for the costs of alleged legal fees related to the filing of a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 case. Samuel and Melinda Smith filed a Chapter 13 case in 2000 (W.D.N.C., 00-31220) and scheduled a secured debt to TMS Mortgage, Inc (now HomEq). TMS filed a proof of claim that included the sum of $125.00 for “legal fees related to the preparation and filing of the claim.” TMS admitted that it had never filed a motion under Code Section 506(b) or Bankruptcy Rule 2016 for approval of this fee. About the same time, Jason and Sherri Tate, who had filed a Chapter 13 case in 1997 (W.D.N.C. 97-32126), noticed that the proof of claim on their home mortgage filed by Nationsbanc Mortgage Corporation (now Bank of America) included the sum of $125.00 for “bankruptcy fees”. Tate v. Nationsbanc Mortgage, 253 B.R. 653,660 (Bankr. W.D.N.C 2000). Nationsbanc’s defense was that it had outsourced the proof of claim process to a law firm in Texas and the $125.00 was a reasonable fee for their services. The charge was a flat fee that the lawyers charged per case, per claim.

In rejecting these arguments, the Court in Smith and Tate found these attorney fees to be procedurally “per se unreasonable.” Id. at 665. Specifically, the Court noted that Rule 2016 sets forth “a straight forward methodology for requesting payment of attorney fees. The rule applies to any person or entity seeking compensation for services or reimbursements of expenses from estate assets.” Id. To the Court, it seemed pretty simple: 11 U.S.C. Section 506(b) authorizes the payment of legal fees to secured creditors who seek such fees upon the filing of a proper application with adequate notice; and, the Court has authority under 11 U.S.C. 105 to enforce a failure or refusal of a creditor to so comply. Id. at 668. In concluding the decision in Tate, the Court stated: “In summary, Section 105 authorizes this Court to take whatever action is necessary to enforce the Code’s provisions. The bankruptcy court is entitled to exercise its powers under the Code to restrain a creditor from overreaching. To do otherwise would allow Nationsbanc to perpetuate a fraud on the Court and other parties in interest.” Id. at 669.

Unfortunately, the only thing the Mortgage Servicers appear to have learned from any of their cases is that the vast majority of Chapter 13 debtors and their attorneys do little or nothing about these illegal fees and charges. As a result, it is actually profitable to “perpetrate a fraud” on the Bankruptcy Courts, the Bankruptcy Trustees, the attorney for the debtors, and of course the debtors. A good example of these practices can be found in a trilogy of cases presented to the Bankruptcy Court in New York in November of 2002. In Re Gorshtein, 285 B.R. 118, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).

One of the Gorshtein cases was a Chapter 13 case, which had been filed by Mandy Abrue in July of 2000. On February 7. 2001, Fairbanks Capital Corp. (now Select Portfolio Servicing) filed a motion for relief from stay in which it alleged that “no post-petition payments have been received from the Debtors.” Id. The debtor objected and provided proof that all these payments had been made. The motion was thereafter withdrawn. Exactly one year later Fairbanks filed a second motion for relief from stay in which it made the same allegations as the first motion (no payments had been made on the mortgage since filing). This second motion was filed by the same attorney who filed the first motion. Once again the debtors objected and provided proof of all post-petition payments. Fairbanks explained that due to some type of internal accounting function the motions had been filed because the payments had been placed “into a debtor’s suspense account” and therefore they had never been applied to the mortgage loan. Id. at 123. (FN2). The use of various forms of “suspense accounts” by the mortgage servicers deserves a separate Chapter. The accounts, in short, allow the servicers to “hide payments” and then raid the accounts to pay themselves bogus fees and charges.

The Gorshtein court imposed sanctions on its own motion pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011 in all three of the consolidated cases including the one involving Fairbanks. The Court noted that whether “the cause of the false certification [of a serious payment default in each case] should be labeled intent to deceive, gross negligence, incompetence or mere inadvertence is indeterminable and, in any event, it really does not matter. It does not matter because the result is the same for the debtor and the judicial process, which will be victimized by the misstatement if for any reason the debtor fails to respond timely to a baseless motion.” Id. at 126.

Fairbanks learned little if nothing from the Court in Gorshtein. On July 16, 2002 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts entered a judgment for sanctions against Fairbanks (including rescinding the mortgage) in the case of Pearl Maxwell, an 83 year old woman with minimal schooling and limited financial recourses. This case provides a textbook illustration of the extent to which the mortgage servicing industry is out of control.

During the Maxwell case, Vince Brando, who identified himself as a Special Default Technician, testified that “ Fairbanks buys loans in bulk without checking to ascertain whether each loan is accompanied by proper documentation.” Maxwell v. Fairbanks, 2002 W.L. 1586325 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002). Mr. Brando testified at one time Fairbanks paid $129,344.00 for the Maxwell loan but admitted that Fairbanks at another point claimed to have paid $175,955.00. In trying to explain this and other inconsistencies in the amount of the default, the principal balance owed, the corporate advances and the use of suspense accounts, Mr. Brando indicated that “Fairbanks has no documents in its possession to substantiate payments of that amount, and Fairbanks cannot identify any account, fund or other source of monies from which that amount was paid.”

Brando later testified that rather than purchase the mortgage Fairbanks actually only acquired the servicing rights. When questioned about the payment history, he said that Fairbanks, “never had the prior payment history from the prior servicer.” He added that “he could not say what happened when the prior lender owned the loan.” And, when pressed how Fairbanks could determine the amount owed, the amount of arrears, or the current payment status without a payment history, he said: “I go off of whatever the computer has for me and what it offers me, because that’s all the information we would have. No one would have any more than that.” Id. Fairbanks, of course, was later involved in a consumer class action and was named in a Fair Debt Collection Act enforcement proceeding filed by the FTC. In addition to agreeing to pay more than $56,000,000.00 in the class action, Fairbanks also agreed to terminate the CEO and president, and to terminate many officers, attorneys, agents, and employees.

The abuses of the mortgage servicers have been described by many knowledgeable commentators as “predatory mortgage servicing.” This term does not do justice to the current practices of these parties. These practices are beyond predatory in that they constitute more of a premeditated plan to ignore the entire bankruptcy process. The actions of these mortgage servicers in consumer bankruptcy cases are nothing more or less than an intentional abuse of the judicial process and the rule of law. It is also part of a pervasive pattern of chicanery, fraud, trickery, deceit, double-dealing and just plain old-fashioned illegal conduct.

During the past 7 years I have compiled a list of my own Top 10 Mortgage Servicer Abuses. The list is reprinted below along with representative cases if applicable:

1. The systematic and universal creation of junk fees such as monthly property inspections, monthly property preservation fees, broker price opinion fees, proof of claim preparation fees, review of Chapter 13 plan fees, and other similar and related charges. Case Examples: In Re Coates, 292 B.R. 894 (Bankr. D. Ill 2003) and Dawkins v. Chase Manhattan, unpublished Slip Opinion, Case No. 99-40552. (Chase was actually seeking over $11,000 in attorney fees for simply a motion for relief from stay that Chase lost).

2. The systematic failure to disclose any of the junk fees during the pendency of the Chapter 13 case by way of the filing of a proper Rule 2016 Fee Application with adequate due process notice and the right to object. Case Example: Tate v. NationsBanc Mortg. Corp. (In Re Tate), 253 B.R. 653 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2000); Harris v. First Union Mortg. Corp. (In re Harris), 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 771 (Bankr. D. Ala. 2002) (awarding $2,000,000 in damages).

3. The sinister collection of these fees post-discharge in Chapter 13 cases when the debtor no longer has the benefit of a bankruptcy attorney or any other party who can review a payoff statement for accuracy. Since many Chapter 13 debtors are eligible to refinance their mortgage loans after a Chapter 13 discharge, many of these charges are secretly collected at closing. And, most of the software systems used by the servicers are programmed to automatically download all of the fees and charges held in “suspense” into a payoff quote.

4. The use of these fees to create negative payment histories that result in motions for relief from stay. The system developed by the servicers is both complex and simple. The servicer establishes a software program that automatically adds a late charge to any post-petition payment based solely on the pre-petition default. The system is also designed to transfer any post-petition payment that does not include the “secret late fee” into a suspense or forbearance account. The funds in these accounts are obviously not applied to the post-petition mortgage payments. The debtor receives no interest on these funds and the suspense account is not a trust account. In many instances, the servicers will raid the suspense accounts to pay the unlawful corporate advances and other undisclosed fees and charges.

5. As the court noted in Gorshtein, the attorneys for the mortgage servicers are guilty of the repeated and systemic filing of false representations of defaults in motions for relief from stay. The attorneys know or should know that the data they are receiving from the servicers is not accurate or otherwise reliable; yet, in order to keep a “good client” they continue to accept the cases and file the motions.

6. The attorneys for the servicers who do ask for court approval of their legal fees in connection with a motion for relief from stay are also guilty of making false representations to the Court, the Trustee, the debtor, and the attorney for the debtor. These false representations relate to the nature and extent of their attorney fee agreements with the servicers. For example, many courts have a presumed no-look fee of $450.00 for a motion for relief from stay plus the filing fee of $150.00. Many attorneys for the servicers agree to these fees with full knowledge that their firm has been paid $850.00 plus the $150.00 filing fee by the servicer and that these “actual” fees and not the court approved fees will be charged back to the debtor’s account.

7. The creation of bogus “escrow” accounts to fund unlawful corporate advances. The obvious intent is to use these “escrow accounts” to hide the improper application and disbursement of funds from the debtor’s contractual payments and from the Trustee arrearage payments.

8. The practice of including undisclosed legal fees in attachments to proofs of claim and then inserting language in a hidden addendum that the failure of the debtor to object to these fees constitutes a waiver, estoppel, or res judicatta defense. See Slick v. Norwest Mortg. Inc. (In re Slick), 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 772 (Bankr. D. Ala. 2002 ).

9. The placement of forced-place insurance with a captive company (i.e., a wholly owned or related subsidiary) when debtors have such insurance. This triggers an escrow review, an enhanced payment, and more money for the suspense accounts.

10. The advancement of funds against the debtor’s mortgage loan for monetary damages actually paid to the same debtor for violations of the bankruptcy law. The servicer will also charge the debtor for the attorney fees incurred in defending such action. Case Example: In Re Riser, 289 B.R. 201 (Bankr. D. Fla. 2003).

*The writer is fully aware that Puff Daddy is currently known as “Diddy” per his request, but thought Puff Daddy to be the more accurate name for such an old school song reference.

Mr. Gardner received his undergraduate degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1969 and graduated with high honors from the UNC School of Law in 1974. Among others, he was a member of the Law Review, President of the Student Bar Foundation and elected to the Order of the Coif. Following graduation, he served as law clerk to the Hon. William H. Bobbitt, the late Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, and to the Hon. William Copeland, an Associate Justice.

He opened a law practice in Shelby, NC in 1977 and currently limits his practice to consumer bankruptcy issues and related law.

Gardner was named the Outstanding Consumer Lawyer of 2004 by the National Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyers and was elected a Member of the North Carolina Legal Elite by Business North Carolina in December of 2004. He is a long-time member of NACBA and NACA and a frequent national speaker on bankruptcy law and consumer representation.

4closureFraud

“It’s actually been happening for a year or more in large numbers. Why the media hasn’t picked up on this story is a good question to ask…

I don’t think anyone realizes how big this area of fraud actually is or could believe that it’s truly happening. The biggest reason is probably because the judicial system is a player in this area of fraud. Not as an active participant but more as a guilty bystander. In about half of the states in the Union, foreclosures must be brought in a lawsuit in court, otherwise called judicial states. One would think that in non-judicial states, it would be much easier to get away with the fraud because the courts are not involved usually. Sorry to say but it might even be easier to commit Foreclosure Fraud in judicial states because no one’s really asking any questions in these foreclosure cases as I think that just about anyone would automatically assume that the Judicial System would exert much more quality control to prevent such massive fraud to work its way through the system. Guess again…

Statistically speaking, 98% of all foreclosure cases, judicial or non-judicial, go uncontested by the borrower. In other words, the borrower does nothing whatsoever to defend themselves in the foreclosure process. In a judicial state, an uncontested foreclosure complaint results in a Default Judgment against the borrower/defendant. Essentially, any and all claims made by the Plaintiff is accepted as true and legitimate at face value. The presiding judges, at least here in Florida, are doing practically nothing to inspect the merits of the case based on the documents produced – which, by the way, is very little – or the actual authenticity of the documents that are produced. Yes, they are slammed and overrun with foreclosure cases. No, it’s no excuse to deny citizens due process.

Here in Florida, 80-90% of the cases are being filed without any evidence of the debt, which is the original Promissory Note, not some early copy of it. Take a sampling of any 10 or 100 cases filed in court and you’ll find this to be true. In other words, a company/institution is coming into court, suing a borrower and alleging that the borrower owes them $_______. Yes, really fill in the blank… and they are producing NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE that this allegation has any truth to it.

Oh, but it gets better. They are alleging that they lost the Note (or it was destroyed). Hmmm… if I gave you a $1000 check, would you lose it? How about if I gave you a $50,000 check? How would you treat that little piece of paper? But lo and behold, these institutions are saying that in 80-90% of the cases they have Lost the Notes! Now, let’s put this in perspective… in January 2009, Lee County, FL alone had about 2200 foreclosure cases filed. So let’s do the math together, shall we? That would put us at over 1700 cases where the Notes were mysteriously LOST! And that’s just one month’s worth folks. Now anyone with just a bit of common sense would say, something’s fishy with this. No? But most judges seem to have taken no issue with this. I mean, doesn’t this very fact make you, the reader, say to yourself, “this is not right, something’s up here, there should be an investigation into this.” But no, our judicial system seems to have no problem with this or even ask the deeper question as to “why?”

But it gets better… not only have they “lost” the notes, but the mortgages that were “recorded” in public records after closing (to declare to the public of who has a lawful lien on this property) are in someone else’s name. Let’s call them “ABC Lender.” So ABC Lender is the “mortgagee” of record in the public records. But ABC Lender is not the Plaintiff suing for Foreclosure! No, it’s XYZ Lender who is the Plaintiff; and in XYZ Lender’s Foreclosure Complaint, they allege that they are the owner and holder of the Note (that was lost) and the mortgage was assigned to them. Problem is (besides no note of course) is that there’s no Assignment of Mortgage recorded in Public Records; oh and no Lost Note Affidavit either, which by the way is supposed to be required.

Public records still show ABC Lender as the mortgagee. More than that, XYZ Lender/Plaintiff produces that very mortgage (which they can print online from the Clerk of Court’s website) in their Foreclosure Complaint and then simply states, for the record, that the Mortgage (in ABC Lender’s name) was assigned to them. But no assignment is recorded NOR is an assignment even produced in the foreclosure case in at least 50% of the cases. And when we do see an Assignment produced, lo and behold, you know who drafted that Assignment of Mortgage? Allow me to answer that… it’s the law firm that filed the foreclosure complaint for the Plaintiff. How about that, so you’re telling me that now foreclosure law firms are also in the business of transferring mortgages and notes? I think not. But this is exactly what is happening folks. Sure as my fingers are typing this post.

Oh, but I’ll do you one better… but before I do, all of what I just stated above is enough for XYZ Lender to be granted foreclosure in 98% of the cases because these ALLEGATIONS by XYZ Lender are never even challenged by the borrower/defendant. So the court places the proverbial RUBBER STAMP on this fraud and away you go… “NEXT” as most Florida Judges would say… all in about 15 seconds in their self-proclaimed ROCKET DOCKETS. Nice.

So back to doing one better… in these 2% of cases where the borrower does even a little something to defend themselves or better, has a competent attorney represent them against this FRAUD, we would ask the Plaintiff to actually prove their case. You know, “excuse me but I don’t think your claims are true Mr. XYZ Lender. Yes, I borrowed and owe the money to someone, but I have no idea at all who YOU are and I don’t think I owe the money to you and I don’t think that you have any right whatsoever to be here in this court suing me and trying to take my home away from me.” That’s how I would say it at least but attorneys are little more verbose than me…

So guess what these Plaintiff/XYZ Lender’s come back with to that request… you’re going to love this… “If it will please the court, your honor, these requests are out of line and merely meant to ’stall’ the process. The defendant hasn’t paid their mortgage in ____ months your honor; and this request for us to disclose who the real owner of the mortgage and note is proprietary information and we are not required to disclose that information.” Oh, I’m sorry, I thought you alleged in your original complaint that YOU were the owner and holder… now someone else is but you can’t tell us? Hmmm. By the way, 15 U.S.C. 1641(f)(2) says that the Servicers are under federal obligation to disclose the true owner of the obligation. Read the federal law here! Scroll down to paragraph “F” part 2.

Yep, you’re tracking with me now…. it gets even better. Somehow, by some miracle of St. Mary, mother of Jesus, in some of these cases, the Note magically appears! Oh, thank heaven, the Note has appeared. So XYZ Lender puts the court and everyone else on notice with a “Notice of Filing Original Documents” in the court record. To the unsuspecting citizen, this Note, purportedly a copy of the Original Note, sure does look the part. Never mind that one of these Notes can be re-created out of thin air. Have we Alzheimer’s this bad folks? I mean, what gives? Have we not been talking and ranting and raving as a country about all the FRAUD that occurred in the mortgage industry and WALL STREET these past 7-8 years? Does no one think that these Notes aren’t really being re-created. I mean, XYZ Lender did swear before the court that the Note was Lost. Was that a lie or is the Note they are now producing a fraud? I mean, which one is it? Or is our judicial system going to let them do both… Lie and commit Fraud that is.

But you see, I have a little more knowledge about this whole “SECURITIZATION THING” than the unsuspecting homeowner and probably even these foreclosure attorneys representing these financial institutions. You see, since the mid-80’s when the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Reform Act of 1984 was enacted, 99% of all residential mortgages have been securitized. The opposite of a Securitized Loan is what we call a Portfolio Loan. These are our 2 options folks… it’s either a Portfolio Loan or it was a Securitized Loan. Your honor, it’s either Option A or Option B. Not BOTH.

So let me break this down into byte sized pieces. A Portfolio loan is a loan where ABC Lender makes the loan (ie. lends the money) and keeps that loan in their “portfolio” for the life of the loan. ABC Lender is going to keep the loan, service the loan and manage it until it is paid off. This “portfolio lending” thing is a DINOSAUR folks. This is a bona fide fact.

So, Option B, your honor, is this thing we call “Securitization.” And yes, your honor, I expect that we all take the time to UNDERSTAND IT because these thousands of CASES before your court involve PEOPLE, human beings (the same people who elected you by the way) and their lives, and their credit and their liability if this ‘aint done right.

Sorry about that, as you might guess, I am perturbed with the “pleading ignorance” of the courts or worse “I just don’t care” judges who’s pat answer is that “the borrower/defendant hasn’t paid their mortgage in 6 months so throw justice and matters of law aside because they’re all a bunch of deadbeats. I read the Wall Street Journal article on Feb. 18, 2009. We can all read between the lines your honor… Now let me say this real quick before I give a quick overview of securitization and the applicability of it to foreclosure cases… Not all judges are created equal. There are some very good one’s out there who care about the law and due process and making sure that the law is actually followed. For those judges out there who aren’t letting these issues just get swept under the rug because it’s so damn “inconvenient” – all these foreclosure cases, -we thank you and we hope you’ll see to it that more of your peers adopt the same position.

By the way, the question that the judges referred to in the Wall Street Journal story asked, “Are you paying your mortgage and are you living in your home?” – these 2 questions are completely inappropriate and immaterial to the case and matters of law. If I’m a homeowner and I don’t know who the heck owns my mortgage and my inquiries into this fact go unanswered, then I’m not paying ANYONE until I figure this out already! So if I”m before that judge my answer is very clear, “Excuse me your honor but that question is completely immaterial to my case before you. I owe the money to someone but I dispute the assertion by the Plaintiff that I owe the money to them.

I have asked them to provide valid and authentic documentation that I in fact owe them the money and they have failed to provide that documentation. The documentation that they have provided appears to be a complete fraud on this court and therefore I would humbly request your honor look into the material facts in this case, not whether or not I’m paying someone I don’t know even exists or if I’m living in a home that I have valid title to.” – and Judge G. Keith Cary, the Chief Judge in Lee County said, “A guy hasn’t paid his mortgage in a year, what’s there to talk about?” – well your honor, I believe I’ve presented plenty to talk about. If not, let me continue…

Ok, securitization and how it applies to a judicial foreclosure case. In securitization there are specific entities who are the “players” in this process. Not all entities are created the same because they have different ROLES in the securitization process. Roles: Originator, Sponsor, Master Servicer, Depositor, Issuer, Trustee and Custodian are the main ones. We also might see a “Special Servicer” in the mix here and there. The Originator is ABC Lender in the above fictitious case I mentioned. XYZ Lender from above is the Sponsor who usually serves as the Servicer as well.

Folks in 99.9% of these loans, the Trust owns the loan. The Trust is comprised of several to several hundred investors who own a “piece” of the loan. But more than that… EVERY loan including the specific loan in our fictitious case above has been bought and sold NO LESS THAN 3-4 times. When a Note is sold/transferred (and it is a true sale by the way), the Note MUST be endorsed, just like a check. From one payee to the next. IF the loan was securitized and it is very safe to assume that every loan is/was, there will be NO LESS THAN 3 endorsements on the actual, ORIGINAL note which has the borrower/defendant’s wet signature on it.

So when XYZ Lender produces the “Original” Note for the court and it has NO endorsements on it, it’s what we call a FRAUD folks – one way or another, it is NOT the original nor is it a copy of the original note OR, in the alternative, XYZ Lender lied to the SEC, the Securities and Exchange Commission AND the IRS. You see, in securitization, all of this activity MUST be disclosed. No, it’s not proprietary or confidential, it’s PUBLIC DISCLOSURE. These documents filed with the SEC are very specific. The players involved are all disclosed. Their ROLES are disclosed, the CHAIN OF OWNERSHIP of the loans in the Asset Pool is disclosed. The governing or operative document for this loan pool is the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, and it is disclosed. These Trusts are electing to be treated as a REMIC (short for Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit), which provides Pass-Through Taxation on the pool cash-flow, so that the Trust avoids double-taxation. That’s disclosed and strict guidelines of the chain of ownership AND timelines of ownership must be adhered to OR the REMIC status will be/can be revoked by the IRS.

So when XYZ Lender comes into a court of law and throws all these allegations of ownership, produces nothing to speak of, and expects to take Mrs. Smith’s home from her, I suggest that our judicial system do something more than turn a blind eye and claim that is their job to “efficiently dispose” of the case – all in about 15 seconds – or worse, ask completely inappropriate questions of that homeowner. I also suggest that Mrs. Smith defend herself and I highly suggest our local and national media do more to expose what you can now call “FORECLOSURE FRAUD” because it’s happening ladies and gentleman. The SAME INSTITUTIONS that created this global meltdown through greed and fraud, who have received hundreds of BILLIONS of taxpayer dollars to bail them out of their gross (and greedy) mismanagement are NOW stealing citizen’s homes from them like a thief in the night to boot. The FBI should be investigating, prosecuting and sending these fraudsters to jail – both the bank reps/employees AND their law firms colluding with them on this massive fraud!”
____________________________________________________________
Author Info: Lane Houk has 8 years of mortgage banking and finance experience and also maintains an active real estate license in Florida. Lane has done well over 400 hours of research on Foreclosure Defense and Consumer Rights Issues in the areas of Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Truth in Lending Act, RESPA and more. He has combined his research, reading and experience in the real estate and finance industries to develop resources to help others who find themselves in a tough situation. You care read more on Lane’s Educational Blog at http://www.thePatriotsWar.com

4closureFraud

“Regarding MERS and why they have a big problem with no quick solution. This is because MERS is the Beneficiary of the Security only and they nothing to do with the Note and are not a party to the Note.

The problem is that an Assignment is worthless if it only transfers the Deed of Trust without the Note. So to get around this major problem, MERS simply ignores it which has worked up until now because no one really understood the role of MERS.

Now that the cat is out of the bag, every Assignment they record is fraudulent and in fact separates the Note from the Security.”

SAXON MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. RUTHIE B. HILLERY, et al., Defendants.

No. C-08-4357 EMC,(Docket No. 7)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Almost a year later, on or about June 20, 2008, MERS, acting as nominee for New Century, assigned the deed of trust to Consumer. In the assignment, MERS claimed to assign not only the deed of trust but also the promissory note itself (i.e., the debt owed by Ms. Hillery to New Century for the loan that was extended to her). See Compl., Ex. D (assignment, recorded on 7/21/08). However, there is no evidence of record that New Century ever assigned MERS the promissory note or otherwise gave MERS the authority to assign the note.

THE COURT

There is evidence that the deed of trust was transferred to Consumer. As noted above, New Century designated MERS the beneficiary of the deed and gave MERS broad authority to act with respect to the property. See Compl., Ex. A (Deed at 3) (stating that MERS “has the right to exercise any or all of those interests [granted by Ms. Hillery] in this Security Instrument”). The Court thus assumes MERS had the power to assign the deed to Consumer, which it apparently [*15] did on or about June 20, 2008. See Compl., Ex. D (assignment, recorded on 7/21/08).

However, for there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of the deed alone; the note must also be assigned. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274, 21 L. Ed. 313 (1872)(stating that “[t]he note and mortgage are inseparable; the former as essential, the latter as an incident”; adding that “[a]n assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity”); In re Leisure Time Sports, Inc. 194 B.R. 859, 861 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that “[a] security interest cannot exist, much less be transferred, independent from the obligation which it secures” and that, “[i]f the debt is not transferred, neither is the security interest”); Kelley v. Upshaw, 39 Cal. 2d 179, 192, 246 P.2d 23 (1952) (stating that assigning only the deed without a transfer of the promissory note is completely ineffective); see also Restatement (3d) of Property (Mortgages) § 5.4 (stating that “[a] mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the obligation that the mortgage secures”) (emphasis added). As Kelley establishes, this is true under California [*16] law which presumably applies here.

As noted above, MERS purportedly assigned both the deed of trust and the promissory note to Consumer. See Compl., Ex. D (assignment, recorded on 7/21/08). However, there is no evidence of record that establishes that MERS either held the promissory note or was given the authority by New Century to assign the note. Indeed, Consumer’s own complaint contains only an allegation about assignment of the deed of trust — and not the note. See Compl. P 17 (alleging that “New Century assigned its beneficial interest of the Deed of Trust to Plaintiff Consumer Solutions”).

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/

Recommendation regarding verification of “ownership” of the mortgage

“The Task Force has recommended a requirement for a plaintiff in a foreclosure action to verify that it owns and holds the note. Typically, the plaintiff in a foreclosure action does not own the underlying note or loan that is secured by the property subject to the foreclosure proceeding. Freddie Mac’s servicers initiate foreclosure actions in their names, even though they are not the owners of the notes or loans in question, because they are the mortgagees as shown on the land records (by fraudulent, fabricated assignments) and they are the holders (not in due course) or otherwise in possession of the (fabricated) notes. During foreclosure proceedings, our servicers and foreclosure counsel have authority to negotiate and execute loan restructurings (against what the pooling and servicing agreements state) and other foreclosure alternatives (trial modifications that are ultimately denied) with borrowers as well as attend (pointless) mediation. To require investors who do not service the loan to be a party in the foreclosure action and attend mediation would be costly and unduly burdensome, which may result in additional costs being passed on to the borrower. The intended purpose of the mediation program could be achieved effectively without this verification requirement.”

Robert E. Bostrom
Freddie Mac
Executive Vice President
General Counsel & Corporate Secretary
____________________________________________________________

“TYPICALLY……….The Plaintiff in a foreclosure action does not own the underlying note or loan………”

OH THEY SLAY ME!

It IS Typical today!

You know what’s the biggest crack up?

Here we are struggling mightily to PROVE that the Plaintiff doesn’t own the mortgage or note in cases where the Plaintiff is forging documents to PROVE that they DO own the mortgage and note………………and la-de-da in waltzes Freddie Mac’s VP and bumbles his way into the most inane (and shockingly honest) comment in the world!

4closureFraud
http://4closurefraud.wordpress.com/
____________________________________________________________

Le Département fédéral des finances a désigné deux experts afin d’enquêter sur la façon dont la FINMA a joué son rôle dans la surveillance d’UBS en relation avec les pertes subies par celle-ci dans les marchés financiers, et qui ont nécessité une aide de la Confédération et de la BNS. Le mandat a été confié au professeur Hans Geiger, du Swiss Banking Institute, et à David Green, ancien cadre de la Banque d’Angleterre et de la FSA. Il est prévu que leurs travaux s’achèveront au cours du premier trimestre 2010. Cette enquête consistera pour commencer à analyser de façon critique le rapport élaboré par la FINMA elle-même sur la surveillance d’UBS avant et pendant la crise financière.

Source : Communiqué de presse DFF, 10 novembre 2009

Sometimes I do wonder how they determine who gets a loan or not.  I wish I could have thought of a way to represent “subprime”.  That would have been a bit more poignant

Loan Application

“If you owe a bank a dollar and can’t pay, you have  a problem.  If you owe them a million and can’t pay, they have a problem.”
“Se sei in debito di un dollaro verso una banca e non puoi pagare, tu hai un problema.  Se invece sei in debito di un milione e non puoi pagare, sono loro ad avere un problema”.

(Mark Twain)

Mark Twain, il cui vero nome era Samuel Langhorne Clemens (1835 – 1910) è stato uno scrittore e umorista statunitense, uno dei più importanti della letteratura americana del XIX secolo. Tra i suoi romanzi più celebri troviamo “le avventure di Tom Sawyer” e “Huckleberry Finn”.

Questo aforisma è sicuramente molto attuale.
Una delle cause all’origine della crisi finanziaria internazionale, che ha causato il default di grandi società come Lehman Brothers, è stata proprio una concessione del credito non regolamentata a soggetti che nella loro storia finanziaria personale avevano generalmente avuto problemi di insolvenza, i cosidetti debitori  “subprime”.
Il rischio di insolvenza è stato poi trasferito attraverso complicati strumenti finanziari agli investitori.

Questo prestito a soggetti che non potevano accedere ai tassi del mercato veniva concesso per finanziare l’acquisto di una casa o di beni di consumo durevoli, come le automobili e ha la caratteristica di avere alti tassi di interesse e di richiedere poche garanzie da parte del creditore.
Il sistema del credito americano si basa su dei punteggi con i quali vengono classificati i debitori.
Negli Stati Uniti tutti coloro che hanno un punteggio di credito inferiore a 620 sono definiti dei debitori subprime

Vediamo quali sono le caratteristiche di questa classe:
•    Due o più pagamenti di crediti pregressi effettuati oltre 30 giorni dopo la scadenza nell’anno precedente la richiesta del prestito.
•    Insolvenza di un mutuo negli ultimi 2 anni.
•    Dichiarazione di bancarotta negli ultimi 5 anni.
•    Alte probabilità relative di inadempienza

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A crise econômica internacional que assolou os mercados teve sua origem no mercado imobiliário de hipotecas subprime dos Estados Unidos, que atenuada pelo processo de especulação e globalização financeira, se alastrou pelos mercados mundiais.

Ainda que essa crise tenha se originado nos Estados Unidos, o dólar continua sendo a moeda de maior aceitação mundial, em conseqüência do acordo firmado no tratado de Bretton Woods, que instituiu o dólar como moeda de referência nas trocas comerciais.

Os impactos dessa crise no mercado financeiro de acordo com Filgueiras (2007), é um dos primeiros a serem sentidos devido à mobilidade dos fluxos de capitais, com a compra e venda de ações e em títulos da dívida pública. Nessa visão, os efeitos causados pela crise são: queda da bolsa, elevação do risco Brasil e desvalorização cambial.

De acordo com o Banco central do Brasil (2008), essa insegurança no mercado financeiro, atenuada pela deflagração da crise, aumenta a demanda por títulos do tesouro americano, que são considerados de alta liquidez e risco praticamente nulo. A fuga de capitais para esses títulos americanos repercuti na negociação de títulos soberanos dos países emergentes, com os investidores desfazendo suas posições nesse mercado.

A saída de capital estrangeiro do Brasil, que estão alocados em sua maioria em títulos da divida publica interna e na bolsa de valores de São Paulo (BOVESPA), pressiona o cambio spot (à vista) para cima, devido ao aumento da demanda por dólares de investidores estrangeiros que desfazem de suas posições compradoras no Brasil, para cobrir perdas oriundas de outros investimentos.

De acordo com João Sicsú (2008), a obrigação institucional de o investidor estrangeiro ter de converter dólares em moeda nacional para comprar títulos domésticos, impõe o mesmo caminho na saída, e introduz uma variável crucial no modelo: a expectativa cambial, já que a taxa de câmbio pode se desvalorizar durante o tempo de permanência do capital transnacional no país. A expectativa cambial (moeda nacional ante ao dólar) pode ser considerada uma variável importante na composição do risco de carregamento de um determinado ativo em moeda nacional, podendo impor um custo transacional para aquele que deseja liquidez máxima. Nesse contexto a desvalorização “retira liquidez da moeda em uma economia financeiramente integrada” (SICSÚ, 2008, pg. 436)

O dólar comercial PTAX/BCB que em 01/09/2008 estava cotado a R$ 1,64 passou a valer R$ 2,41 em 02/03/2009, representando no período uma depreciação do real ante ao dólar de 46,95%. Esse panorama cambial se reflete também no IBOVESPA que viu seu patamar de fechamento histórico de 73.516 pontos em 20/05/2008 recrusceder para 36.234 pontos em 02/03/2009, uma retração de 50,71% no período.

O risco Brasil (EMBI+), tendo como cerne essa maxidesvalorização cambial, passou de 246 pontos em 02/09/2008 para o pico de 458 pontos registrados em 05/03/2009, representando um aumento de 86,18% no período.

O ouro durante esse período de retração e instabilidade econômica representou uma alternativa de “hedge” frente à volatilidade no mercado de câmbio. As incertezas e insegurança aumentaram a demanda por esse ativo, cuja liquidez ainda se mantém com o passar do tempo. Essa tendência pode ser verificada com a valorização do preço spot (à vista) do ouro negociado no mercado disponível da BM&F, cujo valor em 02/09/2008 era de R$ 45,00/1g passando a valer R$ 75,50/1g em 20/02/2009, representando uma apreciação no período de 67,78%.

Segundo Neto e Wajnberg (2008), os feitos da depreciação cambial sobre a inflação no Brasil costuma gerar um coeficiente de repasse do câmbio para a inflação em torno de 8%, ou seja, para cada 10% de desvalorização cambial, a inflação aumentaria 80bps. Entretanto, como houve uma desaceleração interna e queda nos preços das commodities, essa depreciação no câmbio não gerou pressões inflacionarias fortes, sendo portanto amortecidas.

A crise possui um revés, que é a conseqüente desvalorização cambial, ocasionado intrinsecamente pelo fluxo de capital externo para fora do país, à medida que a crise se agrava, as perdas aumentam e a confiança se deteriora.

Artigo elaborado por Danilo Medina Vieira para publicação nos anais da Universidade Estadual de Goiás

Fed to markets: Let the bubble blow David Callaway – MarketWatch

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