I felt duty bound to watch Tony Robinson’s documentary “Britain’s Real Monarch” screened on Channel 4 on Saturday evening.  I won’t spoil the plot for you by revealing too much detail (there’s a summary of the programme here).  Suffice it to say that according to the royal family’s own rules of hereditary succession, Britain’s “real” monarch is not sitting in Buckingham Palace but is alive and well and living in the Australian outback.

History is fragile, it’s accidental.

Amusing and interesting though this genealogical exercise is, whether we have Queen Elizabeth or King Michael is largely irrelevant.  No one in their right mind could consider it sensible that our country’s constitution could be based on the outcome of one night of passion over five hundred years ago.  It is not just individual kings and queens who are illegitimate: it is the institution of monarchy itself that is illegitimate.

We tend to think nowadays of the monarchy as such a solid institution whereas, in fact, wealth and privilege and power and status just hang by a thread. There’s no such thing as the divine right of kings.

There are many whose only real argument in favour of the monarchy is that it offers solidity, dependability and an unbroken line that connects us here in the present to centuries of common history.  What “Britain’s Real Monarch” illustrates all too clearly is that it offers nothing of the sort.  Far from being the bedrock upon which this country is built, the current monarchy owes its fragile existence to a history of sexual scandal and back-room political dealing.

In debunking the widely held belief that the hereditary legitimacy of the monarchy cannot be questioned, Tony Robinson demonstrates that there is nothing special about being “royal”.  There has been no “Lady of the Lake” moment.  The myth and magic of the monarchy is a sham.

Behind all the pomp and ceremony, behind the elaborate court ritual and costumed pageantry, the Windsors are just another family, but one that knows its cover has been blown and its time is nearly done.   Time has moved on, and with it has come more enlightened ideas of how Britain’s political and social landscape should develop in the 21st century.

Supporters of Republic are united in a vision of a better, fairer, democratic Britain in which all of us own, control and take responsibility for our political affairs: the idea of ‘popular sovereignty‘.  It’s a vision in which patronage, deference and privilege based purely on an accident of birth play no part.

As we face the unedifying spectacle of a feudal family, out of step and out of touch with its fellow citizens, grimly clinging onto the last vestiges of inherited power, the thread of credulousness that has sustained the monarchy for so many years is wearing ever more thin.  With your help, together we will make the final cut.

Kim Jong-il at the Wonsan University of Agriculture Greenhouse in April 2009 (Photo: KCNA)

AFP channels a report from the Japanese newspaper Mainichi Shimbun which obtained a PAD document that relates Kim Jong-un joined his dad when General-Secretary Kim conducted a guidance tour of the Wonsan University of Agriculture on or around 26 April 2009.  Mainichi Shimbun reports: “This is the first public document to make an announcement regarding General Kim Jong-un. The document was made when Kim Jong-il provided on-site guidance during a visit to the North Korean southeastern naval base city of Wonsan.  The title of the document is ‘Kim Jong-il Converses with Activists While Giving On-Site Guidance at Wonsan University of Agriculture.”

Mainichi Shimbun then relays the following remarks made by General-Secretary Kim within the document: “This is a very significant university where the stunning achievements of Great Leader Kim Il-sung and Mother Kim Jong-suk are exemplified.  Today I have come here with General Kim [Jong-un].  This is a glorious university which has served the Great Leader, Mother Kim Jong-suk, me and General Kim.”

The April 2009 trip was General-Secretary Kim’s second trip to the Wonsan University of Agriculture in 2009.  On this particular tour, Kim Jong-il visited the university’s new greenhouse.  The KCNA report only notes the presence of the usual trio of KWP Secretary Kim Ki-nam, KWP Financial Planning Director Pak Nam-gi and KWP Administration Director Jang Song-thaek.  Not reported, but present at this guidance tour was United Front Director Kim Yang-gon, NDC Director and KPA General Hyon Chol-hae (in Zhongshan civvies), Kangwon Provincial KWP Chief Secretary Ri Chol-pong and Kangwon Provincial People’s Committee Chairman Ko Chong-tok.  It should go without saying, however, that Kim Jong-un’s presence would not be reported nor would the Morningstar countenance have any prominence in this tour’s photographs.

This certainly adds more grist to the mill, not about current succession planning perhaps, but about the possible succession campaign underway in Spring 2009.  As AFP notes “South Korean officials have said relations between the two Kims after junior intervened in military personnel matters without consulting his father.”  You can read about this intra-Kim Family chilliness in other KJU postings and links on this site.  I will also add that guidance tours are a Kim Family activity, as Kim Jong-nam escorted his dad in the 1990’s and Kim Sol-song has participated as both family and support staff over the years.

Everyone Has a Will

By Brian Madigan LL.B.

Everyone has a Will. The problem is that most people don’t know where it is. They have never seen it, they never signed it and they don’t know what it says.

The Ontario Government has written out a generic Will for everyone. It’s set out in the Succession Law Reform Act. So for those of you who have never taken the time to sign one of your own, let’s have a look at what it says when it comes to dividing up your property:

1) the first $ 200,000 to my spouse,

2) the balance, ALL to my spouse, (except if I have a child),

3) one child, then ½ to my child and ½ to my spouse, (except if I have more than one child)

4) 2/3 to my children to be shared equally, and 1/3 to my spouse,

5) all to my parents (if I have no spouse and no children),

6) all to my brothers and sisters (if no one in 5),

7) all to my nieces and nephews (if no one in 6),

all to my next of kin (if no one in 7), and

9) all my estate to the Province of Ontario (if no one in 8).

There are a couple of additional rules that you need to know. Children may represent their deceased parents as long as the parent was a child, brother or sister of the person who died intestate. Half blood is the same as whole blood. Adopted children are included, as are unknown and undetermined relatives (as long as the connection can be proved by DNA). There is no such thing as “in-laws” or “godchildren”. These people are just strangers, and if there is an intention to include them, they must be mentioned in a Will.

You will also appreciate that it may be difficult to determine just precisely who is included in the term “next-of-kin”.

All in all, the generic Will seems to be reasonably fair. The only real problem is that nobody really ever likes it completely. Everyone wants to change it, even just a little bit.

Also, there is nothing in there about any kind of tax planning or particular financial management opportunities. And, there is nothing about the guardianship of your children. So, if you have children, don’t just leave them up for grabs, sit down and write out your intentions when it comes to guardianship.

After children, the next important issue might be your house. It’s not necessarily going to your spouse! Who gets it? Is that fine with you? What about your parents’ home? As time marches on, preparing your own Will might be something to think about.

Brian Madigan LL.B., Realtor is an author and commentator on real estate matters, Royal LePage Innovators Realty
905-796-8888
www.OntarioRealEsateSource.com

By Adeola Aderounmu

BBC reported that the continued ill-health of Nigeria’s ruler Mr. Yar Adua poses a problem for Nigeria’s constitution. If he were to step down or die, he would be replaced by Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan, who is from the country’s southern Niger Delta region.

But according to the ruling People’s Democratic Party’s own formula for sharing power among the country’s regions, the president must be a northerner. Herein lies the recipe for disaster. I have continued to mention that Nigeria has serious problems and the fact that a party like the PDP is in control is worrisome.

From the start I am not impressed that the farce committed in 2007 was used to imposed Yar Adua on Nigerians. The guy was fraudulently bundled into power by the machinery of the PDP majorly controlled by retired generals who have committed treason against the people of Nigeria. These military men and their civilian accomplices have continued to loot and plunder the Nigerian treasury. It is very disheartening also that these tropical gangsters think that they can decide (without elections / votes) who rules Nigeria at any given point in time.

That Nigerians are resilient and quiet gives an indication of our level of reasoning. Perhaps these events are connected to how our collective intelligence is viewed and it is easy to play down the IQ of our race.

What is happening in Nigerian Political space is absolute madness and idiocy. The kind of people parading themselves in our senate/ house of assembly and the interests that they serve are absolutely ridiculous. Nigerians have to stand up one day and say enough is enough.

Indeed, our constitution given by the military leaves spacious rooms for amendments. Despite the fact that I dislike the illegal regime currently parading itself in Nigeria I cannot help but wonder why a vice-president will not be able to take over IF in case the ruler takes his exit.

Nigeria cannot stop producing amusing dramas all over. It is only in our country that a known thief would be made the president of senate and all sorts of people lacking integrity would parade themselves as honorables. It is in Nigerian only that the Attorney General knows himself as a stupid liar and defender of corruption. Still, we do nothing about these anomalies. What a country..!

Election or no election, succession or no succession, Nigerians must know their silence means stupidity. Poverty will continue to spread like wild fire and the standard of living will be similar to pre-industrial revolution. That we lack electricity defines where we stand in the order of things. The Nigerian system needs an overhaul. 140m people cannot sleep and face the same direction. To do that is to leave our destiny to chance. It is better to take it in our hands for the sake of our children’s children.

A moins de 3 ans des élections présidentielles, quelles sont les chances de succéder à ATT de ces 4 autres candidats et que nous vous présentons aujourd’hui ?
Dr Oumar Mariko, Secrétaire général du parti SADI, opposant radical

Malgré sa position inconfortable, le SADI demeure un parti qui a su garder le cap de sa création à nos jours. C’est un parti de gauche au Mali même si avec le calcul politicien, il forme un groupe parlement Sadi-Parena. Figure emblématique de l’opposition, ce parti présentera un candidat aux présidentielles de 2012. Ce qui est sur, le candidat sera Oumar Mariko ,le défenseur des ruraux et des pauvres. Né le 4 février 1959 à Bafoulabé, le Dr Oumar Mariko a été leader estudiantin (AEEM), avant de devenir député de Kolondieba. Il est aujourd’hui l’homme politique qui défend le plus les intérêts des défavorisés. Il milite activement en faveur de la lutte contre la pauvreté et la délinquance financière. Habitué des élections, Mariko, constitue une candidature crédible aux élections présidentielles prochaines.
Modibo Sidibé, dauphin naturel d’ATT

Aux yeux de certains, Modibo Sidibé serait le dauphin du président ATT à cause des relations qui les lient. Cet inspecteur général de police est l’actuel Premier ministre du Mali. Il est né le 7 novembre 1952 à Bamako. C’est un administrateur confirmé qui a occupé tous les postes juteux de ce pays. Beaucoup voit en lui, le probable dauphin d’ATT, dont il dirige le gouvernement. Sa candidature est vivement attendue par ses supporters et certains militants de grands partis.

Housseini Amion Guindo dit le jeune Poulo

Cet enfant de Sikasso et actuel député à l’Assemblée Nationale a crééE la surprise, en seulement 10 mois depuis la création de son parti, CODEM ( Convergence pour le développement du Mali) et a enlevé près de 445 conseillers communaux aux dernières joutes électorales. Auparavent, il avait réussi a formé à l’assemblée Nationale, un groupe parlementaire de 5 députés. Ce qui laisse une bonne perspective pour les élections de 2012. Sa candidature ne sera pas une surprise dans la course présidentielle en 2012. Par ailleurs, Amion Guindo cherche activement le soutien des chefs d’états Africains, notamment lors d’une récente tournée en Côte d’Ivoire.
Housseini Amion Guindo, du parti Codem, nouvellement créée

Iba N’Diaye probable candidat du parti des Abeilles

L’Adema, la première force politique a perdu beaucoup de ses repères depuis les élections de 2002. Il manque de candidats charismatiques. Déjà, certains hauts responsables de ce parti ont déjà levé le voile sur leur intention. On peut citer Lancéni Balla Keïta, Iba N’Diaye, Dioncounda Traoré, Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga entre autres.

Au regard de leur passé, tous ces cadres n’ont pas assez de crédibilité pour réunir la famille ADEMA. Pis, la plupart d’entre eux ont été au moins une fois trempés dans une sale affaire. Leur candidature pourrait diviser le PASJ. C’est pourquoi d’aucuns avaient souhaité que le parti cherche un candidat indépendant pour le soutenir. Cette idée gêne les barons du parti qui ne voient plus les choses du même oeil que les autres.

Parmi ces ténors du Parti, Iba N’Diaye, actuel ministre de l’emploi et de la formation professionnelle et ancien maire du district de Bamako semble avoir gagné la confiance des jeunes, non seulement dans les capitales régionales mais aussi dans les villages à travers son département pour la formation des jeunes avec l’ANPE.

DailyNK published two (2) English Language reports (see here and here) regarding the the Is he?/Isn’t he? status of rumored hereditary successor Kim Jong-un.  DNK has actually been rather skeptical about the Kim Jong-un successor rumors, and to its credit held off from conveying the rumors and half-baked speculation about the the Captain of Paektu.  According to their sources, a pattern has emerged whereby memos are floated and indoctrination sessions held to boost the young Mr. Kim’s profile and a few months later another memo is issued through the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department [PAD] advising the campaigns to slow down or cease altogether.  The last reported memo issued demanding the succession campaign quiet down came early this month.

Last weekend, saw the performance of two (2) songs that may be associated with the Kim Jong-un succession campaign, “Sound of the General’s Footsteps” and “Chollima of Songun Korea Runs at Full Gallop.”  So, it is difficult to determine what qualifies (or not) as muting the succession campaign.  One reason cited by Daily NK is that the propaganda drive in support of Captain Kim is that the campaign is more intense than that which ushered in Kim Jong-il’s succession.  This may be true from an internal perspective, but by the mid-1970’s propaganda media targeted to an external audience, particularly books, were attributing things to the (pick your descriptive) creative/imaginative/innovative/glorious Party Center.

There is another problem with the succession campaign, also conveyed by Daily NK and in previous reports from other sources, which is that it is may well be eclipsing General-Secretary Kim’s power.  Kim Jong-un has been reported to have begun a process of installing his own loyalists into certain Party and State positions in coordination with Organization and Guidance Department Senior Deputy Director Ri Je-gang.  There is also an account that Kim Jong-un has convened a small working group studying how the DPRK can initiate some economic policy reforms and engage with the Western world.  This summer a report emerged that Kim Jong-un may have crossed a bridge too far when he attempted to install his own loyalists into key positions in the Guard Command.  While General-Secretary Kim may have tolerated shuffling Provincial Party Committee bosses or mid-level management changes, the Guard Command is under his direct control.  Kim Jong-il may also be establishing boundaries on how a possible hereditary succession will proceed, and may not appreciate his son displacing the control and reporting channels in place.   General-Secretary Kim may also be send a signal to his son, his son’s loyalists and Pyongyang watchers that hereditary succession is not certain.

Has the Kim Jong-un tribute song been performed under a new title?  On Friday (13 November) a schoolchildren’s poetry and song recital was held at the Central Youth Hall in east Pyongyang.  The event ostensibly commemorated the 55th anniversary of Kim Jong-il expressing his filial piety to Kim Il-sung.  Among the poems and music numbers performed by the young artistes was “Oungum ensemble ‘Sound of the General’s Footsteps.’”  Pyongyang watchers (including this one) have been on the hunt for performances of a tune called “Footsteps.”  “Footsteps” was listed as being performed under that title in May of this year.  But, a quick and dirty check of the North Korean press has not found any record of a previous performance of “Sound of the General’s Footsteps” until Friday.  Tramp, tramp, tramp.  And stay tuned.

(n.b. This will be the first in a series of occasional postings about the people and personalities close to Kim Jong-il.  Some of this will relate to succession issues or to the broader dynamics of Pyongyang’s internal politics.)

Kim Kyong-hui in June 2009.

Kim Kyong-hui

No other North Korean knows Kim Jong-il better, or has a longer relationship with him, than his sister, Kim Kyong-hui.  When Kim Il-sung remarried in the early 1950’s, Kim Kyong-hui and Kim Jong-il more or less formed their own family unit, and General-Secretary Kim became highly protective of his younger sister from their step-mother and their father.  When the late DPRK President Kim Il-sung attempted to break up her courtship with future husband Jang Song-thaek , Hwang Jang-yop was struck by how “she was direct and very intelligent.”  Kim Kyong-hui has served in a few key KWP positions working in the International Department (under Kim Yong-nam) and the Korean Democratic Women’s Union (under her step-mother, Kim Song-ae).  For twenty-one (21) years she has been a member of the KWP Central Committee and since 1987 director of its Light Industry Department or Economic Policy Inspection apparatus.  She also had an informal executive role in Office #35 (the External Liaison Department).

Kim Kyong-hui has served as her brother’s eyes and ears in the DPRK and within the Kim Family.  During the 1990’s Ms. Kim conducted her own inspection tours under the auspices of her management of the Light Industry Department.  Not requiring the elaborate security preparations for Kim Jong-il’s appearances, Ms. Kim has reportedly dropped in on North Korean factories.  This has afforded General-Secretary Kim more candid reporting than he receives from his subordinates.  Kim Kyong-hui has also managed General-Secretary Kim’s sometimes thorny relations with the Kim Family.

Kim Kyong-hui

The extended Kim Family is more or less hermetically sealed from all but the top elite of the North Korean population, and Kim Jong-il does not have a subordinate to whom he can delegate such sensitive interpersonal tasks, as he does in managing the Party or State.  Ms. Kim maintains General-Secretary Kim’s relationships with Kim Il-sung’s elderly in-laws and members of the Kang family.  Kim Kyong-hui was tasked as an intermediary with the late Song Hye-rim, and informed Ms. Song of her exile from the DPRK.  Ms. Kim was said to have a close relationship with the late Ko Yong-hui.  It is highly likely Kim Kyong-hui who dispatched Kim Jong-nam (with whom she has a very close relationship) to Europe to solicit medical treatment after Kim Jong-il’s stroke in late summer 2008.

Kim Kyong-hui currently enjoys a more public profile.  She is the only woman who holds a Department Director title in the KWP Central Committee’s subordinate departments.  According to reports in early 2008, she and Jang Song-thaek have hosted dinner and music parties for North Korean elites at their palatial Pyongyang residence.  She attended the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly (a body of which she has been a member since 1990) and was listed on the platform list of the KWP Central Committee’s memorial meeting on the 15th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s death. She has joined General-Secretary Kim’s travel party on his guidance tours, most recently in October of this year watching a performance at the North Hwanghae Provincial Art Theater.  Kim Kyong-hui has personal ties to KWP Secretaries Kim Ki-nam and Kim Jung-rin, SPA Presidium President Kim Yong-nam, United Front Director Kim Yang-gon and KPA Gen. Hyon Chol-hae.

Kim Kyong-hui’s role in succession politics and potential contingencies is significant.  Singly, she will ensure the extended Kim Family supports the succeeding regime.  With her husband Jang Song-thaek she will be an essential adviser and operative in support of Kim Jong-un, the alleged hereditary successor, or she work with her husband to guarantee a less rocky transition than expected by Pyongyang watchers, and hold a key management position in the post-KJI era.  Conversely, if there is a power competition among North Korean elites or General-Secretary Kim loses central command and control, Kim Kyong-hui will most likely be one of the first elites to depart the country.

Kim Kyong-hui is also mother of another dark-horse succession candidate, Jang Kim-sung (born ca. 1979).  The young Mr. Jang studied in Sweden in the late 1990’s.  He should not be confused with a man named Kim Hyun, said to be the love child of Kim Il-sung and his nurse and adopted into the Jang-Kim household.  An account surfaced this year that Kim Hyun was executed around 2001.

Kim Ok

Kim Ok

Kim Ok perhaps has the closest relationship to General-Secretary Kim.  She is said to be his fifth domestic partner, although there are disputes as to whether she bore any children from her relationship with Kim Jong-il.  She was born in the early 1960’s and attended the Pyongyang University of Music and Dance.  She was a pianist in the 5th Cadres’ Section of Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat, providing musical entertainment at dinner parties and music performances for General-Secretary Kim and members of the KWP Central Committee.  In the late 1980’s, Kim Ok was promoted within the Personal Secretariat and became an administrative secretary and household manager to Kim Jong-il.  Unlike Kim Jong-il’s previous wives/domestic partners who were related to North Korean elites (Hong Il-chon; Kim Yong-suk) or professional entertainers (Song Hye-rim; Ko Yong-hui), Kim Ok was actually involved, albeit in a clerical context, in the policy process in the DPRK and has some personal and professional ties to North Korean policymakers.

For a number of years, Kim Ok was said to been in the support staff on VMAR Jo Myong-rok’s 2000 trip to the United States.  Former sushi chef Kenji Fujimoto disputes that Ms. Kim is the same woman who appeared in photographs from that trip.  Kim Ok did appear in 2000 with Kim Jong-il, at the Inter-Korean summit meeting with the late ROK President Kim Dae-jung.  She also traveled with General-Secretary Kim in 2006 to China where she may or may not have been introduced to Chinese officials as Kim Jong-il’s wife.

Since 2006, Kim Ok’s power in Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat has steadily increased.  She is said to have daily operational control over the Third Floor, managing General-Secretary Kim’s personal finances and ladling out gifts to North Korean elites.  This is due in part to the 2006 Macau arrest of Personal Secretariat Director Kang Sang-chun, who was allegedly involved in illegal land swaps; Mr. Kang was released, but like Kim Jong-nam’s 2001 passport arrest, this stained his reputation in the Haebangsan-dong court.  Kim Jong-il’s 2008 health problems saw Kim Ok becoming a conduit between General-Secretary Kim’s sickbed and the National Defense Commission.  It seems Ms. Kim took on a kind of Edith Wilson role communicating messages from and to the General-Secretary, and facilitating the paper traffic.  No doubt, Kim Ok did not operate independently, as Jang Song-thaek is reported to have assumed some executive powers at this time.

Kim Ok’s power is found in her daily, personally intimate access to Kim Jong-il.  Many Pyongyang watchers believe that she is highly influential in the succession process–which is to say she can tip the scale in favor of one person over the other.  Kim Ok is said to be a supporter of Kim Jong-un.  However, if Kim Jong-un did trespass the Guard Command, as alleged by some reports, it is likely Ms. Kim was involved, to a certain degree, in the punitive response, the tamping down, if you will.

Kim Ok is reputed to have close personal ties to OGD Senior Deputy Director Ri Je-gang.   While Ms. Kim interacts with Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hui, Gen. Hyon Chol-hae and Gen. Ri Myong-su, the nature of their relationships is not known and accounts are mixed.  Things can not be so bad, as all of the above-named individuals have daily access to General-Secretary Kim, and Jang/Kim and Gens. Hyon and Ri have seen their respective power and influence continue to ascend.

Ms. Kim is purely a creature of the Personal Secretariat which is to say any power and influence she has is predicated on a living, sentient General-Secretary Kim.  Members of the Personal Secretariat seldom interact with other North Korean elites and are forbidden from forming the kind of political networks on which elites base their power.  Personal Secretariat employees also possess neither State identification documents nor social security cards, exacerbating their “non citizen” status.  This differentiates her from North Korean elites such as Jang Song-thaek/Kim Kyong-hui, Ri Je-gang or Gens. Hyon and Ri.  It is highly unlikely in the event of a contingency or Kim Jong-il losing his command and control, Ms. Kim will seize power or make any attempt so to do.  Kim Ok could buy time for the succeeding regime, if General-Secretary Kim were to pass away or become physically incapacitated.  News of the Wonsu’s demise are the informational means for the succeeding regime to take command and control over the internal security apparatus, constituencies that manage civilian and military life in the DPRK.  If Kim Ok unexpectedly turns up in Europe with heavily weighted luggage and a sheet of paper with account numbers, this would indicate a serious power competition in the DPRK.

Kim Sol-song

Kim Sol-song

Arguably Kim Jong-il’s favorite child, Kim Sol-song was the first grandchild acknowledged and, in conforming with tradition, named by Kim Il-sung.  She was born around 1974.  Unlike her half- and step-siblings she was educated domestically in the DPRK, including attending Kim Il-sung University  She speaks several languages (including English and Russian) and is conversant in foreign policy, economics and literature.  Kim Sol-song worked in her late grandfather’s Presidential Office and the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Department.  Since the late 1990’s, she has been employed in Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat where she holds a Department Director’s position, presiding over Office #99 which is said to manage some of General-Secretary Kim’s financial accounts and as well as technology (computers and software) acquisition.

Kim Sol-song has escorted her father on his guidance and inspection tours, as his aide.  She has also served as her father’s interpreter in meetings with foreign heads of state, and traveled to Russia with him in 2002.  Kim Sol-song is highly valued as an adviser and aide to General-Secretary Kim.  According to a couple of reports, she was reported as wearing a KPA Lieutenant Colonel’s uniform on guidance tours and may hold an unofficial rank in the Guard Command, over which she is likely tasked with some administrative oversight.  With Kim Ok, she shares responsibility for managing Kim Jong-il’s calendar, travel schedule and security arrangements.  Unlike Kim Ok, Kim Sol-song has political and policy credibility and should be viewed as highly influential in decisions affecting succession and contingency planning.  Circumstantially, she has a position of import among North Korean elites as she is directly and legitimately linked to Kim Il-sung, in addition to years of service in KWP departments.  She most likely has personal and professional ties to MAR Ri Ul-sol, Gen. Hyon Chol-hae, Gen. Ri Myong-su, KWP Secretary Kim Ki-nam, PAD Director Cho Ik-gyu and PAD Senior Deputy Director Ri Jae-il.  She has familial and political ties to Jang Song-thaek, Kim Kyong-hui, VMAR Ri Yong-mu and Kang Sok-ju.

One might want to view Kim Sol-song as a Third Generation Kim Kyong-hui, in that she is not only a descendant of Kim Il-sung, but educated, politically savvy and, at the age of 35, a seasoned veteran of the bureaucratic competitions among North Korean elites.  Because of Kim Ok’s alleged ties to deputy directors in the Organization and Guidance Department and the National Defense Commission, it is highly likely that her opinions regarding succession and contingency planning may be taken more seriously by General-Secretary Kim because she could be viewed as a disinterested party.  It is also likely that an important role has been designed for her in a post-KJI regime, and it would not be surprising to see her holding a significant support role in both a hereditary, or collective succession.  If the North Korean elites (including General-Secretary Kim) could subsume their patriarchal sexism, Kim Sol-song is the ideal candidate for hereditary succession.  This would be the Empress Myeongseong scenario previously put forth by the eminent Dr. Mansourov.

Kim Yong-suk

Kim Yong-suk is the daughter of a KPA General tied to Kim Il-sung, and was a clerical worker for the Ministry of Public Security’s provincial branch in North Hamgyong when her marriage to Kim Jong-il was arranged in 1973.  She is Kim Jong-il’s official wife, which is to say his legal wife and the only domestic partner recognized by Kim Il-sung.  Kim Yong-suk and General-Secretary Kim have two daughters: Kim Sol-song and Kim Chun-song.  She was living with General-Secretary Kim in the early 1980’s, prior to his establishing his household with Ko Yong-hui.  Kim Yong-suk appeared in formal photographs with Kim Jong-il as recently as 2002, but she does not participate in DPRK political or public life.  There are accounts that like members of Kim Jong-il’s Personal Secretariat, she does not possess pertinent citizens’ documents.  A handsome woman at the age of sixty-two (62), Kim Yong-suk resides in a villa in Pyongyang and is reported to travel regularly to Europe.

Will Prince Charles,  the controversial successor to Queen Elizabeth II, spell the end of Britain’s thousand-year monarchy?  Most people seem to think so, according to John Curtin’s documentary “After Elizabeth II” which is being screened this evening by Canadian broadcaster CBC.  If the preview clip is anything to go by, the royal family will find little to cheer them in the hour-long film.

The timing of the broadcast coincides with the conclusion of Prince Charles’ and his wife’s state visit to Canada in which public attitudes to the royals have wavered between apathy and indifference on the one hand to outright hostility on the other.  Polls show that the vast majority of Canadians couldn’t care less about the British monarchy and that nearly half of them don’t even realise that the queen is their head of state.

They have to have the right person leading.  If they make a bad choice, then that will be the end of the monarchy.

Here in Britain, as a recent phone-in discussion on BBC Northampton demonstrated, Prince Charles as the future head of state is increasingly being seen as a liability .  Yet constitutionally the monarchy has no choice but to remain constrained by its own principle of primogeniture. You can’t just decide to “skip a generation” when it suits you. The idea that we should all have to hope and pray that Charles predeceases his mother is as barmy as it is distasteful.

Conversely, the burgeoning republican movement here in Britain continues to grow its support as the constitutional mess offered by the Prince of Wales’ accession to the throne looms ever nearer.  The idea of an unelected King Charles interfering in the running of parliament has become the spur for people to now say: “enough is enough”.

With Charles Windsor we have an opportunity to politely but firmly say goodbye to the anachronistic and feudal institution that is the monarchy.  It is an opportunity we should grasp with both hands.  As each day passes, it seems more and more certain that we are now looking at the final days of the House of Windsor.

“After Elizabeth II” will be screened this evening at 8pm ET/PT on the CBC-TV channel in the regular Doc Zone slot and will be repeated tomorrow, Friday 13th at 10pm on CBC News Network.  The programme will be available for viewing online after broadcast but only, it seems, if you’re viewing from within Canada.  If you do get to see the programme, maybe you could share your comments with us here in the UK.

Presumably this article from the Times will also be blocked in Thailand (11 November 2009: “Siamese spat”). PPT reproduces it here:

Thais should be free to understand more about the role of their own monarchy

On Monday The Times published an interview with Thaksin Shinawatra, the ousted Prime Minister of Thailand. As a result of his comments about that country’s Royal Family, part of the Times Online website has been blocked in Thailand. Thaksin and this newspaper’s Asia editor could also, theoretically, face up to 15 years in jail. The Thai laws of lèse-majesté have always been excessive. They now look childish, too.

To those unversed in the peculiarities of the Thai system, Thaksin’s alleged offence may be hard to discern. He did not abuse the Royal Family, or even find fault with them. Instead, he merely discussed the link between the monarchy and Thai politics, and speculated as to how the landscape might change if the much revered king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, should one day die.

King Bhumibol is the world’s longest-serving head of state and is admired in Thailand for the stabilising role he has played during his six decades on the throne. He is also 81, and has been in hospital for the past seven weeks with suspected pneumonia. This should not have been inflammatory stuff. Thailand is an exciting, modern, forward-looking nation, but nothing jars with this quite so much as the antiquated prohibition against discussing the monarchy in anything but the most fawning and platitudinous terms. At times, the country can seem less like a constitutional monarchy and more like a personality cult. This benefits nobody, not even the royals themselves.

Indeed, in this as in so many things, King Bhumibol himself is a beacon of good sense. “The King can do wrong,” he reminded the Thai people, in an address on the eve of his 78th birthday. “If we hold that the King cannot be criticised or violated, then the King ends up in a difficult situation.”

In recent years, the King has found himself in such a difficult situation a number of times. The Royal Family themselves do not invoke the law of lèse-majesté , but when citizens bring charges on their behalf the police are obliged to investigate. Earlier this year the King pardoned an Australian author who had been sentenced to three years in prison owing to a 100-word passage in a novel that sold seven copies. More often, they are exploited as a means of silencing dissent, imprisoning dissenters or of cowing domestic and international journalists. The BBC’s respected correspondent Jonathan Head has found himself investigated for lèse-majesté on several occasions. This is a petty law, which only opens Thailand up to ridicule.

In Thaksin’s words, either way, one finds neither criticism nor violation of the monarchy. Instead we find something that the Thai Establishment regards as equally taboo — the mere acknowledgement that some in the royal circle may have some involvement in Thai politics. That this should be publicly unutterable in any 21st-century nation beggars belief, let alone one with the potential and ambition of Thailand.

In his interview, Thaksin spoke of how influences in Thai public life may change, should King Bhumibol be succeeded by the Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. We wish the King a speedy recovery, but whatever the future holds, Thailand can only benefit from a free and frank discussion of its own system of government. Scrutiny need not entail disrespect.

Update: Richard Lloyd Parry (Times, 11 November 2009: “The interview that dared to break Thai royal taboo”) has a short commentary on the meaning of his interview with Thaksin and the question of succession, which is reproduced in full below:

Blogs, chat rooms and websites are buzzing with it; the item has been partially banned [Thaksin-RichardLloydParry] and the interviewee and interviewer face prosecution for “insulting” the monarchy. So what has so upset Thailand about The Times’s interview with Thaksin Shinawatra , the deposed Prime Minister?

In the interview, Thaksin — who was deposed in a military coup subsequently approved by King Bhumibol — spoke warmly of the monarch. The former Prime Minister’s complaint that royal courtiers had plotted his overthrow had been made before.

“The King is the most respected person,” he said. “The monarchy is good for Thailand. Thailand needs a monarchy, but it should not be abused or played by the palace circles.” But Thaksin also spoke of his hopes for the King’s heir, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn.

“After he becomes king, I’m confident . . . because he has observed His Majesty, his father, for many years.”

It appears that this reference to the eventual demise of King Bhumibol has upset Thai royalists. A commentary in the Bangkok Post, a national English-language newspaper, said: “Several people who have read the full transcript of Thaksin’s interview do not find any remarks offensive to the monarchy. But for many Thais, any public discussion about the succession is deemed offensive and inappropriate to the reigning monarch.” However, there is more to it than the pain of imagining the inevitable demise of a beloved monarch.

Like his father, the Crown Prince is protected by the lèse-majesté treason laws, which explains the tentativeness with which even the foreign media speak of Thai attitudes towards him. But, as Thaksin acknowledged with considerable understatement, Vajiralongkorn “may not be as popular as His Majesty the King”. A biography of King Bhumibol by Paul Handley, an American writer, which also touches on the taboo subject, is denied distribution in Thailand.

Giles Ungpakorn, a left-wing Thai academic who fled to Britain after facing a lèse-majesté prosecution, said: “The King will be dying soon and his son — to quote Paul Handley — is ‘hated and feared’. And I think Paul Handley is right.”

The fear is that, with Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn on the throne, the shaky unity would be tested, perhaps to breaking point.

The government quickly blocked the Times article but not the transcript.

In the banned story there is “Thaksin calls for shining new age after King’s death” line. I don’t know why exactly the government feels it warrants blocking but Thaksin has all the reasons to be enraged – for all the things he said, he didn’t “call” for it, he said “I’m confident he can be shining to perform Kingship”, which has a completely different meaning.

Too late now, in PR wars it’s not the truth that matters it’s the perception, and Thaksin has been buried here. The govt is actually doing him a favor, considering the way Thais could have passed it around.

On the other hand, Thaksin made his preferences clear, too, just in a more subtle way.

Red shirts will continue to worship him, and probably look forward to the succession, but for the rest of the society Thaksin has passed the point of no return. Double whammy in one week: “I will work for Hun Sen and I will wait for the King to die”.

Interesting point is that he admitted to having a hundred, maybe two hundred million dollars outside the country. Those funds never appeared on his asset declarations and this fact alone could disqualify him from entering politics again. Doesn’t matter, with all the legal hurdles he is facing, but if he talks about political persecution that would eventually end, and his slate will be wiped clean, the stashed funds will become a hot issue again.

100-200 mil is also well within range of Nation’s Thanong estimate he published last year, not many people believed in his calculations then.

According to Thaksin’s interview published in Times Online it will be shining new age after the King’s death. Apparently Thaksin puts high hopes in the Crown Prince.

Is he talking about his personal fortunes or the country, though? Rumors of Thaksin courting the Crown Prince were around even before Thaksin got elected, so it’s not surprising that Thaksin expect better treatment from him. It can’t get any worse, afterall.

On the other hand I can’t see the monarchy as being relevant to Thailand’s future, so no matter how well the Crown Prince performs, setting off the “shining age” is a bit out of his jurisdiction. If one thing the recent political upheavals taught the palace is that it should stay out of the way. Even with King Bhumibol’s unmatched reputation and authority, he doesn’t want to displease any of his subjects on any side of the political spectrum. If the Crown Prince decides to flex his muscles it would be a painful lesson – without the “barami” and without legal grounds he’d be simply slaughtered, politically, of course.

Thaksin doesn’t seem to learn that the country is run by people now, not by “elites”. He believes in his own story about “elite conspiracy”, that if he could get along with Prem he’d be set for life here. He refuses to acknowledge that Prem and coupmakers were forced to act on behalf of the people, not for personal gains or power. He refuses to acknowledge the power of massive anti-Thaksin movement that compelled the “elites” to get involved.

Two point to consider – it’s impossible that Crown Property Bureau, major shareholder in Siam Commercial Bank, had no knowledge of the bank underwriting the biggest deal in Thailand’s history. Apparently no one in the palace circles thought it would be so disastrous. Another point is that I suspect ill-fated April 2006 elections were Prem’s idea in the first place. Thaksin reportedly had consultations with the palace just on the eve of dissolving the house. There were no problems with “elites” at that time either.

Massive protests that were sparked by Shin sale and massive opposition and boycotts to the elections show that the “elites” were led by the people in this war on Thaksin, not the other way around.

If Thaksin thinks that changing palace guard can solve all his problems, which are run ins with the law and massive public outrage, he is deeply mistaken. Opposition to Thaksin is not going to stop, and the palace should try its best to stay clear of it. Officially it can only insist on everybody doing their ascribed duties – the ministers, the judges, EC and NCCC commissioners etc. This is exactly the line Abhisit has been drilling all along. Stepping outside it is very very risky for the new monarch.

It’s a pure speculation and conjecture on my part but this version seems plausible anyway.

Another thing, Thaksin is basically betting on the new generation of “ammart” while his foot soldiers are being told to fight it as a principle. It’s possible that the same red army he build to save himself would eventually spell his doom.

Original post (updates below): This article will cause apoplexy in the palace and government if for nothing else than the headline. Thaksin speaks to the Times Online (8 November 2009: “Ousted Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra calls for ‘shining’ new age after King’s death”) as he heads to Cambodia.

Thaksin is reported as calling “for reform of the country’s revered monarchy and spoken of his expectations of a ’shining’ new age after the passing of the ailing King Bhumibol Adulyadej.” According to the article, Thaksin sees that he has a political future in a Thailand led by King Vajiralongkorn.

Throwing his hat in that pond won’t win him a huge number of supporters or is he just further stirring the political and palace pots?

Thaksin says: “He’s not the king yet. He may not be shining [now]… But after he becomes the King I’m confident he can be shining . . . it’s not his time yet. But when the time comes I think he will be able to perform.”

According to the Times, “Thaksin is careful to emphasise his deep loyalty to King Bhumibol, but is deeply critical of the ‘palace circle’, principally members of the Privy Council, whom he blames for plotting his overthrow with the help of senior generals.”

The Times also makes this claim: “Supporters of Mr Thaksin have told The Times that by endorsing the Crown Prince and lending some of his own popularity, he hopes to gain the support of a future monarch who will not interfere with his political ambitions.” Thaksin is quoted as saying, “The Crown Prince may not be as popular as His Majesty the King…. However, he will have less problem because the palace circle will be smaller . . . He had education abroad and he’s young. I think he understands the modern world.

He went on: “When the world is changing every organisation must adapt to the changing environment…. Every institution, not just the royal institution, is the same — it must be adapted.”

The Times states that “Thaksin’s supporters are still hopeful that King Bhumibol may use his 82nd birthday next month to issue some kind of pardon or amnesty that would allow him to return to Thailand as early as January.” Thaksin says that he hopes that “after His Majesty gets stronger he will find a way for the country to be back to unity. We cannot let the country go on like this. We will be getting worse and worse and the division will be getting deeper and stronger.”

PPT leaves it to readers to contemplate this article and its implications.

Update 1: The transcript of the interview is at Times (9 November 2009: “Thaksin Shinawatra: the full transcript of his interview with The Times”). It is stated in the headline that it is a “full transcript” while the next lines state: “Richard Lloyd Parry, Asia Editor of The Times, spoke to the ousted Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra at his home in Dubai. Here are edited excerpts from their conversation.”

Update 2: Thaksin claims that this interview in the Times has distorted his views (Bangkok Post, 9 November 2009: “Thaksin: My comments were distorted”). He states: “It (the article) was a complete distortion of my interview. The falsified article has caused confusion among the readers and the Thai people. The headline made by Timesonline is not true. I never said that in the interview…”. He says he is “very upset” and “condemn[ed] Timesonline for publishing this false and confusing article.” The former prime minister says that he did not “offend any institutions” but “defended the monarchy as being above politics and said Thai people adore the institution.” He added: “I would like to repeat again that my family and I are loyal to His Majesty the King and Her Majesty the Queen and, like all Thai people, ready to sacrifice our lives to protect the monarchy.”

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s spokesman called on “all parties to take action on this matter, saying that it affected the feelings of Thais.” Democrat Party spokesman Buranaj Smutharaks “said that this is not the first time Thaksin has offended the high institution.” Buranaj, who regularly calls for media censorship, said that the “Democrat Party will propose the government and security agencies consider appropriate action against media that report the interview.”

Update 3:  Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya has called for the Ministry of Justice to decide whether Thaksin has committed lese majeste (not for the first time, see here): “The foreign minister said he found many of Thaksin’s comments in the interview to be strongly offensive, inaccurate and unacceptable by the majority of people.” PPT guesses that Kasit means that he believes that the majority will find it to be this way.

Kasit “believed Thaksin, in giving the interview, had a hidden objective.” He added that the “Foreign Ministry would issue a statement to the foreign media setting the facts straight…”. PPT can’t wait for that!

Perhaps not by chance, the Bangkok Post has its Quick Poll up today asking: “Do you feel Mr Thaksin has betrayed his country by becoming an economic adviser to Cambodia?” Again, PPT sees the coming together of two dangerous forces – xenophobic nationalism and blind loyalty monarchism.

Update 4: It seems the link to to story PPT originally posted on (Times Online, 8 November 2009: “Ousted Thai leader Thaksin Shinawatra calls for ‘shining’ new age after King’s death”) is now blocked in Thailand, with a default redirect to the MICT page for blocked sites. Even so, the fuller transcript (Times Online, 9 November 2009: “Thaksin Shinawatra: the full transcript of his interview with The Times”) appears not to be blocked. In any case, the transcript is a better read, with more details and greater context than the other, now censored, story.

If readers have access, Thai E-News is translating some of the transcript (see คำต่อคำทักษิณสัมภาษณ์ TIMESONLINE แฉสื่อลิ้ม-สื่อหลักบิดขาวเป็นดำจากภักดีเป็นล้มสถาบัน).

Update 5: The Times Online (10 November 2009: “Thai government bans Thaksin Shinawatra interview with The Times”) has a new article that details the moves to prevent people in Thailand see the original pice cited above.

For your posterity you are their future ancestor. What story of you will you leave them?

Sometimes, I think, our impulses come not from the past, but from the future. ~ Martha Stewart

Thitinan Pongsudhirak, one of the most frequent commentators in English on Thai politics has an article in the Guardian (8 November 2009: “Thailand’s urban-rural split”). Readers of this blog will find the analysis of interest.

PPT recognizes that the article is meant to explain a highly complex political situation to outsiders and that this necessitates a little simplification. However, we consider that Thitinan has made it just a little too simplistic.

Take, for example, his initial claim that the “country’s wrenching political struggle over the past several years has, at bottom, concerned what will happen after the … king’s reign … comes to an end.” We think this devalues the struggles and debates of the past decade. Sure, some analysts tried to say that the 2006 coup was, at base, about managing succession. But the evidence has been that the coup was one part of a broader reactionary agenda to maintain the political and economic status quo in Thailand politics. So, at bottom, the struggle is about power and control, not about what happens when the king dies. What is at stake is not “the soul of an emerging Thailand” but control of political and economic power in Thailand.

Further, the claim that “Thailand’s colour-coated crisis pits largely urban, conservative, and royalist “yellow” shirts against the predominantly rural “red” columns of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra” might have some validity but PPT would hope for an  analysis that explains the complexity associated with such a rural-urban characterization. Just one example. What are we to make of the working class? There’s been a tendency to say that their “connections back home” make them rural and “red.” These connections may be important, but they operate in a different social and political milieu born of industialization and urbanization. It may be that there class location is what is significant.

Thitinan makes much of inequality, and this is an important issue. Readers may well want to look at the recent Chang Noi column (2 November 2009: “Politics and Thailand’s wealth gap”) that has some data on the astounding income and wealth inequality in the country. The struggle is on, not necessarily for a “share” but for a different allocation of wealth and associated political power.

With the King being hospitalized for over a month now, people are naturally thinking of the succession issue. It has always been around and it has always been percieved as the most provocative and potentially dangerous. The feeling was that the country could explode in the aftermath. Now the succession talks are out in the open, and no one seems to care. What has changed?

I think the reason is that now the society is mature enough to separate the man and the principles, and what is needed is the succession of principles – justice, fairness, utmost concern for the country and so on. Back in 2005/2006 yellow PAD turned to monarchism to uphold those principles, their fight for justice and democracy became synonymous with the fight for the king. As they were forced to tone down their monarchism, the principles were left standing on their own, and they found out that they can survive just fine and have a lot of support in the society.

About a month ago Sondhi said in an interview that their support for the monarchy depends on the King following his prescribed duties, the ten royal qualities. I saw it on Bangkok Pandit’s blog here

Later on the reds brought the royal institution into public discussion, too, and lessons the society learned from them was that politics and governing should be kept separate from the monarchy, and that relying on the King to fix everything is not going to work.

It’s this attitude that helps the country to look at the succession possibilities without freaking out.

The speculation that the Crown Prince would be bypassed are being put to rest – another precious find by Bangkok Pandit.

Shawn Crispin in Asiatimes outlined several scenarios how succession could be managed exactly, and none of them leaves the possibility of any kind of serious revolution, or handing the power to Thaksin. It still might go terribly wrong, but my bet would be that the country survives just fine.

PREPARE YOURSELF

Take a deep breath, put your shoulders back and look  through the frenzy.

Reading the Democratic Alliance’s Diane Kohler Barnard pour scorn on the “rotund” and “Idi Amin-like” Julius Malema I couldn’t help but think that she is leaving herself as few choices as J.M. Coetzee leaves his fictional characters.

Julius Malema is a powerful contender for future ANC leadership – and is already a powerful politician. I think his rise to lead the ANC and possibly the country may be unstoppable. I fear that Barnard’s feisty and admirable rhetoric leaves her, and those she represents, no paths upon which she might ride her high horse back, when this is all over.

Barnard, recounting how Malema allegedly attempted to bully his way through a traffic violation with : “Don’t you know who I am?” arrogance, says:

[Julius Malema is] the man who believes there is one law for South African citizens, yet another law for him. He is the man who will slap a neighbour who has the temerity to ask that the music at his housewarming be turned down at 3 in the morning. He is the man who has turned hate-speech into an art form [...]

Barnard’s anger is palpable as she sneeringly reminds us that Malema has said he would fire Thabo Mbeki and any ANC parliamentarian “should he get the urge”

Malema’s ego and contempt for the law the rest of us must respect, is unparalleled [...] Is this, to quote the President, someone you honestly believe is a ‘leader in the making – worthy of inheriting the ANC”?

Well, is he “a leader in the making”? Is he “worthy of inheriting the ANC?”

The answer to the first question is: “yes” – more about that below.

The answer to the second question is irrelevant. Could we agree what this historical artefact: “the ANC”  is; could we agree on what its characteristics and values are? Could anyone make this judgement call?

Frankly,  history can give a fig whether you or I think Julius Malema is worthy of inheriting the ANC – or, quite frankly, whether the ANC is worthy of  inheriting Julius Malema.

This is not about what you or I think or believe or hope for; it is also not about what Diane Kohler Barnard and the Democratic Alliance and those they represent hope for and hope to accomplish.

This is not, unfortunately,  about how things aught to be, or about what is fair and just in the moral universe.

This is about how things are; this is history as a raging torrent.

A de facto leader

Assuming “leader” is neither complimentary nor derogatory  – the word can be either or neither – it is clear that Malema more than fits the common sense meaning of the term.

• Malema has been hot-housed as a boy in ANC training institutions and groomed for leadership after  joining the organisation at the point of its unbanning in about 1990;
• He has led the two key feeder organisations, the Congress of South African Students and the ANC Youth League;
• He has become the crucial port of call for politicians and individuals hoping to build support for any initiative that requires ANC support;
• He personally played an important role in the rise to dominance of the faction that backed Zuma for president;
• He is the only ANC politician – aside from Jacob Zuma – who has a significant and deliverable mass base; both numerous and militant;
• His rhetoric (in my opinion) is closer to the views of the core constituency of the ANC than the publicly expressed views of any other South African politician;
• His name/face recognition is almost unparalleled.

Julius Malema was born in the Northern Transvaal (Limpopo Province) and raised, like Jacob Zuma, by a single mother who worked as a domestic worker. This is the hard school of South African life and these kinds of  credentials are still highly valued in the ANC.

In the last few weeks Julius Malema has come over all statesmanlike:

• He acknowledged Thabo Mbeki’s key leadership role – of the ANC and the country;
• He declared the rector of the University of the Free State “one of our own” – thereby helping to defuse growing racial conflict on that campus.

This is deliberate marketing, evolving the brand [firebrand to Dollar Brand ...] while the news media, opposition politics and certain dinner table discussions remain obsessed with each new Malema gaff or his latest confrontational tirade.

It is striking how similar the Julius Malema story is to the Jacob Zuma story.

The human need is to normalise the inevitable or the inescapable present. Three years ago media and dinner table sentiment about Jacob Zuma was almost identical to the sentiment held by the same groups of people about Julius Malema today.

The central dilemma in J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace.

Is accepting – and trying to get your head around – the present and future leadership role of Julius Malema the moral equivalent of  the choices made by J.M Coetzee’s Lucy, the daughter of main character David Lurie in the 1999 novel Disgrace? Lucy (who is white) is raped and ends up seeking and receiving protection (and more) from Petrus (who is black) who is closely associated with those who raped her in the first place. Even if you have not read Disgrace I think you can understand the dilemma.

Is Julius Malema the Great Defiler – of our constitution, of the bill of rights and of our hopes for non-racialism?

No more than that previous rape accused, Jacob Zuma.

It sometimes feels that Julius Malema is deliberately teasing; upping the ante to cause his opponents to shriek ever louder and sound ever more shrill.

I have no idea whether he has the sense of humour or sense of the absurd to be deliberately inviting the kind of scorn he receives from those Dianne Kholer Barnard represents – and a smattering of those she hopes to represent.

But I have no doubt that it will be Julius Malema who laughs the longest.

by Patricia Sellers

Photo courtesy of Avon

Liz Smith, who was on track to succeed Andrea Jung as CEO of Avon Products (AVP), is moving to a new company and a new industry. Again.

The onetime star exec at Kraft (KFT), who made an unlikely leap from food to cosmetics in 2004, is the newly named chief executive of OSI, a chain of casual-dining eateries.

“What?!!” is a question that Smith admits she’s been asked often throughout her career. She says she follows her own guideline: “Be open to opportunity.”

There’s plenty of opportunity–and risk–at OSI, which you may not have heard of but is a giant in the casual-dining category. With 2008 revenues of $4 billion, OSI operates chains such as Outback Steakhouse, Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Bonefish Grill, Roy’s, and Fleming’s Prime Steakhouse and Wine Bar. Good brands, as restaurant brands go–and as Bain Capital and Catterton Partners thought when they acquired the company for $3.2 billion in 2007. But the global recession brutalized the business, which operates across the U.S. and in 20 other countries. OSI lost $739.4 million last year, and it’s been suffering serious declines in same-store sales.

Which may be ideal for Smith, since she adores companies that are ripe for overhaul. “It’s really always been in my DNA,” she told my colleague Jessica Shambora in September, on the day she announced her departure from Avon.

Smith’s exit from Avon shocked many people, since she was crucial to the cosmetic giant’s turnaround, well-liked across the company, and widely viewed as Jung’s eventual successor. But “eventual” was looking to be too long from now. While Smith, who is No. 29 on Fortune’s Most Powerful Women in Business list, is just 46 years old and has plenty of runway ahead, she lost patience. That’s understandable since Jung, who was named Avon’s CEO at age 41 a decade ago, has no plans to retire.

So now, Smith–who began her career at Morgan Stanley (MS) and then, as a Stanford MBA student, “wanted to start the next Microsoft or H-P”–is off in yet another new direction. Geographically, this time it is Manhattan to Tampa, Florida, where OSI is based. Smith plans to commute initially and then relocate with her husband and two young sons.

And though retail isn’t entirely new to Smith–she’s on the board of Staples (SPLS)–she’ll be testing herself against her own measure of leadership. “Nothing is more important than a nimble, agile leader who is comfortable with ambiguity,” she told me a few months ago.

“We have to be comfortable figuring it out as we go along,” Smith added. Definitely, she’s living her philosophy.

Also available as อัพเดทเพิ่มเติม: คดีเกี่ยวกับข่าวลือการสิ้นพระชนม์ ไล่ล่าหาแพะและการบีบคั้นทางการเมือง

A Google search now produces more than 125 stories on these cases internationally. Most are derivative of the earlier stories mentioned in PPT’s first post. For PPT readers, the following are the more detailed and, in our view, more interesting of these reports:

Wall Street Journal (1 November 2009: “Thai Police Arrest Two Accused of Violating Internet Laws”) – makes the point that the accused “face  up to five years in prison and a $3,000 fine each if convicted.” The story also quotes the still acting government spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn as previously saying that “the computer crimes law is designed to protect people from fraud and defamation as online commerce in the country develops”, but points out that the law is “also used at times to address what he describes as ‘national security’ concerns.”The WSJ also mentions Suwicha Thakor as a victim of this law, and might have mentioned the more recent case of Nat Sattayapornpisut.

In this case, PPT asks what the national security concern is or was. Is it talking of the king’s death? Is it causing the stock exchange to decline? No serious case could be made that either counts as a national security issue. The Abhisit Vejjajiva government should be condemned for its use of “national security” to prevent freedom of expression and to shore up its own rule.

The Times Online (2 November 2009: “Two charged over Thai king health rumours”) reports that Thiranan Vipuchanun has been released on 100,000 baht bail and makes the link between the sites the two accused posted to – Fa Diaw Kan and Prachatai – and recent politics as well as the succession issue.

The Times continues to state that the king “rarely makes direct interventions into politics.” PPT assumes that the author means highly public interventions, for the evidence is that the palace routinely intervenes in political issues from the judiciary, to appointments, legislation, to lese majeste and coups.

For unexplained reasons, there are no details PPT has been able to find regarding Khatha Pachachirayapong (but see below).

The BBC (2 November 2009: “Bid to ease Thai share volatility”) has a short story reporting that Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij is talking more to the “stock exchange to look at ways of managing volatility in the markets.” Is the pre-empting the fall that can now be predicted for when the king does pass away?

Update 1: The Bangkok Post (2 November 2009: “Police to arrest more suspects over fall in SET prices”) reports that both suspects have been bailed. It also reports that more scapegoats are being hunted. The Post report states that the reason for the arrests of the first two suspects was that it is “alleged the two accused spread false information about the health, possibly with the intention of manipulating the share market for profit.” If they did that, they seem to have been a bit slow.

More significantly, the police said that the “Information and Communication Technology Ministry will decide whether to close down the websites which carried the rumours.” So web sites and web boards are threatened, demonstrating the political intent of the government. PM Abhisit is reportedly on board for these and further witch hunts.

Meanwhile, The Nation (2 November 2009: “KT Zmico Securities distance itself from suspect”) reports that Khatha’s employer is trying to distance the company from the allegations.

Update 2: Confirming PPT’s suspicions noted above, and providing an excellent example of how this case is nothing more than a political witch hunt, view the Bangkok Post’s article (2 November 2009: “Two arrested over fall in SET prices”) where there is this statement (with no attempt to do anything other than make an accusation) that would be better suited to rags like The Nation or Manager/ASTV: “Both websites are known to present articles seen to be offensive to the monarchy.” The websites are Fa Diaw Kan and Prachatai.

This report also has a little more information on Khatha Pachachirayapong. Katha is said to have been “detained for questioning at the Hi-Tech Crime Division. He also has been charged with violating the computer act.  Police searched Mr Katha’s house and found evidence suggesting he had posted [the alleged] information at the http://www.sameskybooks.org website.”

PPT believes that the Abhisit government may well use this case to try to limit and even stop the work of these last bastions of more or less free expression in the mainstream. If successful, the odd thing about this clampdown is that it will leave a highly controlled media that is supportive of this government facing the still non-mainstream red shirt media.

Update 3: The Bangkok Post has a useful assessment of the charges in its editorial (3 November 2009: “Criminals or scapegoats?”). The statement: “The arrests are troubling on a number of grounds” says it all. The post states: “A vital and urgent question is whether Ms Thiranant and Mr Katha are scapegoats. On the evidence released by police, the two neither started nor profited from the rumour.” But then the Post editorial backtracks to more conservative attitudes: “If authorities expect to rebuild the confidence shattered by the October rumour-mongering, they will have to come up with the party or parties who started the ill-intentioned and criminal reports – not just simple messengers who passed them along.” The editor still wants a witch hunt. Why?

The Post also reports (3 November 2009: “Police plan to arrest one more suspect over rumours”) that the police are planning further arrests.

President H.W. Bush, borrowing a phrase from an earlier era, popularized the term “New World Order” (NWO) in the early 1990s. But while the New World Order has legitimate roots, it has come to be associated with little more than paranoid conspiracy.

Given what we’ve witnessed in recent times, however, is it wise to continue to dismiss the notion out-of-hand?

The following metaphor, Friedmanesque but nevertheless useful in view of the controversial nature of this topic, paints a picture of what political and economic progress may look like as the 21st Century progresses — and why a NWO may not be as far-fetched as so many of us are inclined to believe.

Imagine a smattering of raindrops hitting the pavement. Each raindrop represents the relative isolation and sovereignty of each nation. As those raindrops increase in number — meaning more countries climb aboard the international trade bandwagon — they connect like dots.

With enough rain — overlapping treaties and trade agreements — pools of water form (commonwealths operating under a shared constitution and/or currency). This is a natural evolution of the free trade process.

The European Union is but one such trade and currency pool, and it is not at all out of the question that more are to come. In Asia, in fact, The Wall Street Journal reported October 12, 2009 that an “Asean Plus Six” proposal seeks to integrate the 10 member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian nations as well as Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

Much like a succession of raindrops merging to form large swaths of water, boundaries between nations may become less distinct in the years to come. Such a progression inevitably begs the question: Is national sovereignty passé? And in even longer-range terms, will ethnic, language and cultural distinctions begin to dissolve too?

While far-sighted, these questions are just that: Legitimate questions.

When people say that the prospect for a North American Union is little more than a conspiracy, they are, in effect, saying that they know the future beyond a reasonable doubt. What this denies in the here-and-now is an appreciation for the reality that a World Federalist Movement (WFM) has been afoot for decades. The mainstream media may not give these long-ranging issues press time, but world federalist organizations do, in fact, exist in the United States, Canada and elsewhere in the developed world — and they run websites replete with historical timelines that anyone can verify for themselves.

This much we know of modern times: Peacetime economies are evolving toward tighter integration for the sake of shared prosperity. Debates over whether this is incidental or intentional detract from the point: The logical extension of removing conflicting trade laws and legal barriers may well be a set of conditions wherein borders are intact on maps, but members function more like states in a global confederation (interregionalism).

Some say we may even see this convergence culminate within our lifetimes.

In a speech then-president-elect Barack Obama gave in Berlin, he had this to say:

No doubt there will be differences in opinon. But the burdens of global citizenship continue to bind us together.

A change of leadership in Washington will not lift this burden.

In this new century Americans and Europeans alike will be required to do more, not less.

Partnership and cooperation between nations is not a choice. It is the only way. The one way to protect our common security and advance our common humanity.

President Obama’s message? This isn’t personal. This isn’t partisan. This “burden” is the future. And no, we do not have a choice.

President Obama, to be clear, is but one of several American presidents in recent years to share a globalized vision — hence his statement that a “change in Washington” will not deviate world leaders from a transnational progressive path:

SERIOUS QUESTIONS FOR SERIOUS TIMES

• Does a shift toward increasingly large and impersonal centralized governance bode well for freedom to exclude oneself or one’s nation from a one-size-fits-all policy? Or will freedom to opt out be the one guarantee regional integration proponents — world federalists — can’t promise?
• Is it in keeping with human history and human psychology to share a collective vision without breaking rank? How does world federalism propose to respond to “agitators” and civil unrest within its Utopian framework?
• Does consolidation of legal and political powers represent a net gain or is it offset by the potential for corruption and abuse at the hands of a powerful few whose legislative reach has gone global?
• At an economic level, can or will world federalism deliver on its promise of peace and prosperity for all world citizens? Or does it violate the all-eggs-in-one-basket principle: posing, instead, a dangerous level of economic and international codependency that will hold individuals and markets alike captive to the weakest link within the whole?

How do you feel about the path we are apparently headed down?

PPT has to give plaudits to Bangkok Pundit today. As many readers will have noticed, BP has moved to Asian Correspondent, and for a while that created some confusion and missing links. PPT is pleased to say that these teething problems seem to have been sorted out.

Among BP’s latest posts are two that are of special interest for PPT.

The first post is one PPT was about to write. Like us, BP is flabbergasted that The Nation has come up with an editorial that is measured, serious and important. Given its recent track record of xenophobia, an ability to simply make things up and a tendency to be the English-language mouthpiece for the craziest of speculative stories at ASTV/Manager, The Nation deserves credit for its editorial “Media under siege in Southeast Asia” (30 October 2009).

PPT had a post that related to this coverage of the Press Freedom Index a week ago, but we have to say that The Nation does a good job. Some examples of sharp observations in the editorial: “The annual Press Freedom Index for 2009, released earlier this month by Reporters Without Borders (RSF), makes for disturbing reading for the Asean region. People in Southeast Asia must ask if we’re sacrificing long-term democracy and freedom for short-term security and stability.” On Thailand, this, which we reproduce at length:

“Thailand, at number 130, has regretfully joined the ranks of Singapore (133) and Malaysia (131), which are traditionally known for their control of the press.

The Kingdom was ranked at number 66 only seven years ago. It has fallen so spectacularly because of the curbing of press freedom by ousted former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his supporters, then by the military junta which ousted Thaksin, and now by the Democrat-led government of Abhisit Vejjajiva, which cracked down mightily on the so-called “red” media in the aftermath of the April riots this year.

Then there is the lese majeste law, used with increased frequency as His Majesty advances in age. As RSF notes: ‘The Thai media has been buffeted by repeated political crises. Several journalists have been assaulted by demonstrators, and scores of media have been censored for openly supporting the red shirts.’

But it has been the crackdown on Internet users and intellectuals – for alleged crimes of lese-majeste – that poses the greatest threat to free expression in the country: ‘Most Thai journalists voice the same reverence for King Bhumibol as the vast majority of the population. The others are forced into self-censorship.’

Indeed, the Index might do well to rethink the direction Thailand and most of Asean is heading, especially when we can’t fall much lower than this.”

Well said. Let’s hope this is a sign of a more tolerant and principled stand at The Nation.

The second post is on succession. PPT has several posts on this topic, so we won’t go over them again, but BP draws our attention to a letter that we missed, sent to the Asia Times Online about a week ago. In it, Vimon Kidchob, the Director-General of the Department of Information at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who PPT also cited yesterday on a different story, has a letter dated 23 October 2009. Here is what he says, responding to an article on succession by Shawn Crispin:

Shawn W Crispin’s article (Thailand mulls royal succession, October 19) raises a few issues that need to be clarified. First, it tries to make the issue of royal succession in Thailand a mysterious one, full of questions and uncertainty. There is, in fact, nothing to speculate about. Those knowledgeable about Thailand would know that there are clearly stipulated rules, both in the Palace Law on Succession and the Thai constitution regarding the issue. Indeed, the relevant provisions in the current constitution – similar to previous ones, including the 1997 constitution – lay out the specific roles of the Privy Council, National Assembly and cabinet.

Second, the Thai lese-majeste law is not accurately understood. As part of the country’s criminal code, the law is there to protect the monarchy which is one of the Thailand’s principal institutions and integral to the country’s national security. It is necessary also because Thai law and convention do not provide for the monarchy to take legal action against the people nor allow them to act in their own defense. While the Criminal Procedure Code allows anyone who finds a suspected lese-majeste act to lodge a complaint, such a complaint must be handled in accordance with due legal process. To ensure its proper enforcement, the government is also in the process of providing clearer guidelines on its application. As it is though, the law is not aimed at curbing freedom of speech and expression nor the legitimate exercise of academic freedom including the debates about the monarchy as an institution. Amidst the on-going intense political differences, apparent attempts to politicize the monarchy for political ends seem to have unduly gained momentum. Those who follow developments in the country are therefore asked to be more careful in differentiating facts from rumors.

The comments on succession are worth reading. Those on lese majeste are another example of Vikom’s fairy tales (presumably demanded of him by the Abhisit government), reproducing statements that have long been shown to be false. Especially significant is the lie that “the law is not aimed at curbing freedom of speech and expression nor the legitimate exercise of academic freedom including the debates about the monarchy as an institution.” There are several pending and convicted cases that PPT tries to track that unambiguously demonstrate that the lese majeste law and the computer crimes act are specifically used to limit freedom of speech and expression. Every Thai knows this and any foreigner who maintains more than a passing interest in Thailand knows it too.

Surely there must be a better photo of Kim Jong-un than this age progression shot of how may look today.

Another report has surfaced in the South Korean press that Kim Jong-un is undergoing a “grooming process” (what Medieval Europe royalty would term a “prince’s education”) to succeed his father.  The Korea Herald reports that Mr. Kim is currently involved in middle-level personnel decisions within the Korean Workers’ Party with Ri Je-gang, Senior Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department. Previous reports found Kim Jong-un gainfully employed in middle management of the National Defense Commission, but he did not seem to have any KWP affiliations.  This could indicate that Kim Jong-un has a position or at least conditional admission within the OGD.   Despite the supreme power the DPRK Constitution endows the NDC, the KWP still retains supreme influence over the policy process in the DPRK.  The KWP Central Military Committee vets military promotions and the CCKWP Administration Department controls the internal security apparatus.  The Korea Herald report does not completely discard Nam Sung-wook’s contention that Kim Jong-un was (or has been) briefly sidelined.  Mr. Nam’s contention is predicated on Mr. Kim having involved himself in personnel matters affecting the Guard Command, which is directly subordinate to Kim Jong-il.  Muting any propaganda campaigns to boost Kim Jong-un, particularly in advance of negotiations with the US and a potential return to the Six Party Talks, is also in the DPRK’s strategic interest.  It presents the impression that Kim Jong-il is the actual power in Pyongyang, and assuages US or Chinese concerns that any deals to which General-Secretary Kim assents will not be nullified by a succeeding regime (be it a hereditary successor or collective leadership).

But Kim Jong-un will not be able to take his place in the big chair without the proper organization and guidance.  Yonhap News reports on a Brookings Institution event where the guest of honor was Kim Kwang-jin, a former Third Floor employee and arguably one of the high level North Korean migrant.  Kim Kwang-jin places the burden of succession squarely on the back of a collective power system and

Jang Song-thaek in December 2008

Jang Song-thaek (whom your humble servant thinks is the actual successor) and the political patronage network Mr. Jang and his wife Kim Kyong-hui long cultivated  Furthermore, according to a Reuters report of the same Brookings event, Kim Kwang-jin has doubts as to whether the hereditary succession will actually be a binding power arrangement.

Kim Kwang-jin proposes Kim Jong-nam as one possible successor-in-exile due to Kim Jong-nam’s contacts in China.  But Kim Jong-nam’s succession would be off-set by Mr. Jang and Ms. Kim in two ways: one is that Jang Song-thaek has his own contacts in Beijing, and; Kim Jong-nam is known to have a close relationship with his aunt and uncle.  As I have previously written with regard to DPRK succession, power will not actually reside with Kim Jong-un, or another hereditary designate.  It will reside with a small coterie of the North Korean elite–Party powers such as Ri Je-gang and Kim Kyong-hui, KPA powers such as Generals Ri Myong-su, O Kuk-ryol and Kim Jong-gak lined up with Jang Song-thaek who manages the internal security apparatus which is a conjunction of the Party and Army.

Kim Kyong-hui

So, the question remains, do we march to the footsteps of the Morningstar General?  Or Thaek it to the limit?

453321     กฎหมายว่าด้วยมรดก     Succession Law

การตกทอดแห่งทรัพย์มรดก การเป็นทายาท การตัดมิให้รับมรดก การสละมรดก สิทธิโดยธรรมในการรับมรดก การแบ่งทรัพย์และส่วนมรดกของทายาทโดยธรรมในลำดับและชั้นต่างๆ การรับมรดกแทนที่ พินัยกรรมและความเสียเปล่าแห่งพินัยกรรม วิธีจัดการและปันมรดก อายุความมรดก

(Devolution of an estate, heirship, disheritance, renunciation of an estate, statutory right of inheritance, division into portions between the several classes and degrees of statutory heirs, representation for the purpose of receiving inheritance, wills and nullity of a will, partition of an estate, prescription.)

(453321 มหาวิทยาลัยเกษตรศาสตร์)