This week or the next, North Korea will attempt to launch a rocket into space, and with it will go any remaining optimism that the U.S. could convince North Korea to suspend its nuclear program.

The regime claims that it is merely establishing a weather satellite. But said satellite has the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead, which defies U.N. sanctions. The U.S. sees the launch as a breach of a Feb. 29 deal with Kim Jong-un’s government, which had agreed to suspend portions of its nuclear program and allow the return of nuclear inspectors in exchange for U.S. food aid.

Media outlets including the Washington Post and the New York Times had described the deal as a potential “breakthrough,” and speculated that the Nuclear Security Summit in late March would clinch the agreement.

Instead, world leaders avoided the topic of North Korea’s nuclear program at the summit in Seoul, and North Korea announced mid-way through the meeting that it would launch a rocket into space to coincide with the 100^th birthday celebration of its founder, Kim Il-sung.

North Korean experts report feeling puzzled at the sense of optimism after the Feb. 29 deal and leading up to the Nuclear Security Summit.

“There is and was no reason to expect the North to have been responsive to U.S. demands for nuclear disarmament in exchange for food,” said U.C. Berkeley professor of political science T.J. Pempel.

“The North allowed 4 million of its citizens to starve in the late 1990s in part because of their ‘military first’ policy. That policy is, if anything, stronger now,” he said.

Pempel wasn’t surprised at the rocket launch announcement, either.

“My guess is that the decision to launch was made months ago by Kim Jong-il and it fell to his son to carry it out,” he said.

Since the devastating famine in North Korea declined in the late 1990s, rumors of persisting food shortage has regularly come up, sparking perennial hopes that North Korea would agree to meet foreign demands in exchange for food aid.

All North Korea experts canvassed for this article agreed that powerful nations, such as the U.S. and China, actually have little leverage in negotiations with the regime.

“For years, North Korea has used its nuclear program as a threat in order to get foreign aid and other strategic benefits, without having any intent of giving up their nuclear program,” said Duke University Korea expert Hwansoo Kim.

“North Korea has a shortage of 700,000 tons of food, and the money that North Korea spent on the rocket could’ve produced more than a million tons of food. But launching the rocket this month during the centennial celebrations of their founder was more important than getting food aid,” said Kim.

Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official of 15 years and current fellow at the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, had a slightly different point of view.

“I don’t think North Korea needed the food that the US offered to send them. They get a lot of aid from China, and the idea that North Korea is desperate for food and is therefore flexible to negotiations is something I’ve heard for the past 15 years, and had never been true.”

With the Obama administration facing few options, the attention has turned to China’s possible role in negotiations with North Korea. Yet China has little motivation to pressure North Korea to stop building its nuclear arsenal.

“China wants to kick the can down the road, and wants to avoid dealing with problems presented by North Korea,” said Wit. “China hopes instead that North Korea will change on its own, which it may eventually. But that’s not a short term process.”

However, diplomatic relationships with North Korea may improve in the future.

This fall, South Korea will elect a new president, and the nine members of China’s Politburo Standing Committee will be replaced. Depending on results of elections and the makeup of China’s new leaders, the climate for negotiations may be better next year.

“China really doesn’t have that much power over North Korea. The best scenario would be if South Korea elects a president more willing to negotiate with North Korea and Obama gets re-elected,” said Kim.

Professor Pempel in His Office

Q and A with Professor Pempel:

• Do you think Japan’s economical power has historically given Japan an advantage on trying to mark Dokdo their territory?

  • I think this was much more true in the 70′s and 80′s than it is today. Then Japan was very rich and Korea was relatively poor. Since 1990, Japan’s economy has been declining and South Korea has been very successful – clearly Japan is still more economically powerful than Korea but it is now balanced out a little bit more. Japan’s economic power is not as relevant now as it used to be.

• Despite Japan’s greater economic and political power in comparison to Korea, why do you think Japan wants this particular island? What do you see as their main motive?

  • It’s probably Nationalism – I don’t think its that important economically. Japan has a number of island disputes with Russia (Kuril Islands) and China (Senkaku Islands). Because Japan has some claims to Dokdo, whether it’s legitimate or not from South Koreans’ view, because there are some historical basis for Japan to say, “This [island] used to be ours,” I think they’re very reluctant to succeed the territory to Korea, because they’re afraid that if they do so then the Russia and China will say, “How about we get our islands too?”

  • Post WWII settlement – Japan didn’t have much bargaining power and various countries took advantage; Russia took advantage of Kuril islands, and maybe they thought Korea took advantage of Dokdo.

  • Japan’s argument was that Dokdo was taken by Japan well before Japan began to take over Korea in 1905 and 1910. So the argument for Japan would be, “This was a territory that wasn’t really claimed by Korea, that wasn’t really claimed by us [Japan], but we have some claims to it since before 1905 or before the Sino-Japanese war in 1894.” But I think it’s really a nationalistic issue for many Japanese, just like it’s a very nationalistic issue for many Koreans. They [Koreans] feel very strong that “This is ours and Japan should not claim for this at all.”

• What are some of Japan’s approach on trying to gain this land? They are using media and altering map proportions to symbolically make the island theirs; do you think this is in light of a new technique to modern imperialism?

  • I don’t think this is modern imperialism. Shimane prefecture announced relatively recently that some particular day was recovered “Takeshima Day” or “Honor Takeshima Day” and of course Koreans were very upset. Some Japanese right wing groups have tried to sail to the island and plant a flag but they have been stopped; there are sound trucks that go around making speeches about this [issue] and the Japanese ministry of foreign affairs and their official statements always talk about Takeshima as an unresolved issue with Korea that needs to be solved, but I don’t think anybody seriously expects that Japan is trying to take it back momentarily, or that this is some new wave of imperialism. For years, Japan has been talking about this and so every year ministry has to say the same thing so it doesn’t look like their position has changed. But I don’t think too many people in Japanese government seriously expect that the island is gonna come back or they’re going to take over or Korea’s going to negotiate. I guess it’s almost like any policy where a government, regardless of any country, that has been doing something for 20, 30, or 50 years feels like it has to make the same speech about how important something is even if reality has changed; so I think it’s more like a ritual for Japan than any indication of a serious challenge to South Korea. What I don’t understand is why South Korean government doesn’t just say, “It’s ours, it’s over, no discussion” and ignore Japanese speeches and demands. But South Korea gets very animated too.

• So you don’t think it’s necessary for Korea to bring the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ)?

  • No. The only thing that could happen is that they could lose. There is no way their position could be better. They now have territorial control; their navy controls the area. The Japanese can say “No, it’s ours,” and if it goes to ICJ, who knows, maybe the Japanese has some map that they don’t know about yet or maybe South Korea did something a hundred years ago that somehow could be seen as a claim to that island, but I don’t think Korea benefits from ICJ. But the Japanese would like to go there, because their position could only get better, it can’t get any worse. I think Korea’s position could only get worse. [So Korea should] stay away [from ICJ]. [This is just] my view.

• Koreans feel invaded and victimized in this particular situation. Do you think Koreans are blinded by the victimization and not recognizing a more pragmatic perspective when faced with Japan’s aggression?

  • Certainly Japan has been very insistent, noisy, obnoxious, but the Japanese government hasn’t really done much to reclaim the islands. It’s just right wing groups making speeches or occasionally television programs but government is clearly not pushing this issue very strongly and my view would be that the South Korean government say that “This issue is over, it’s not important, we’re not going to discuss it, it’s not worth getting excited about,” and just wait for the issue to calm down or die down. But I think, at the same time, Korea has long had very strong feelings about Japanese occupations during period of 1910 to 1945 and even though a peace treaty exists between the two [countries] and relations have been normalized, there is still kind of a cultural hostility there that I think reflects a certain victim mentality. But Japan has a victim mentality too, in a different way. For example, Japan has a victim mentality regarding Kuril islands. They feel like the Russians came in and unfairly stole those islands at the end of WWII, and that they [the islands] really belonged to Japan and that the Russians went much too far taking the islands back; so I think it’s very easy for countries to feel like somehow they were treated unfairly or the world is coming against them or they deserve retribution or the other countries should be punished for its bad sins – all of which are true, but WWII ended 1945 and so it’s been [more than 50] years since the end of the war. Japan has democracy, Korea has democracy, both are economically successful, they probably have more worries about North Korea than about each other – they are both a little bit worried about china – they’re both allies with United States, I think there are probably a lot of good reasons for Korea and Japan to try to cooperate despite the negative history; but those negative histories are not easy to get over. Japan was very slow to acknowledge some of the negative aspects of its rule in Korea and WWII. The comfort women issue – many in Japan still have not dealt with that, the government is not dealing with it. Prime ministers have made a number of visits to Yasukuni Shrine, that’s very upsetting to Koreans, and Japanese history books frequently talk about the history of Japan-Korea relations that Koreans find completely false. So I can understand why Koreans would say “It looks like Japan has not really come to grips with the negative consequences of its actions in the pre-war period.” So that has to make Koreans more worried, more concerned, and so in theory, these two countries should find a lot in common, but certainly Japan has done a lot to make it difficult for Korea to engage in positive relations, so I can see why there is still a lot of tension.

• Why Japan’s progress toward taking Dokdo from Korea has not declined especially when Korea has economically advanced so quickly in the past twenty years and can no longer seem entirely inferior to Japan? Could Korea’s quickly strengthening economic and political power be further provoking Japan to control Korea half in denial of becoming equal to a nation that they once colonized?

  • I’m sure there is still very strong segment in Japan that believes that Korea is [becoming] superior and China is [becoming] superior. And it’s very hard for Japan to overcome particularly when Japan’s economy is so bad. And so I’m sure that it becomes very difficult for Japanese who are attached to the issue of Dokdo to suddenly say, “This is not worth fighting over. This should be ours. Koreans do not deserve it,” but I have to think that these are shrinking proportion of Japan that believes that. But I know, from talking to many Japanese, that there are still, for some people, a certain sense, that Japan is [on top] and Korea is [below] and China is [below] and “We’re superior.” And I’m sure that plays out in some aspects of Japanese policy but I don’t think it’s that strong anymore. And I believe that Korea will be much better off to just say, “We’re not going to discuss this. It’s not an issue. Maybe the Japanese think it’s an issue but we’re not going to get excited about it.” But the trouble is, anytime Japanese will do anything about Dokdo, suddenly the entire Korea media goes crazy, instead of just saying, “That’s just not interesting to us, thank you, your opinions are very interesting,” and ignore it. I suspect that that will be much more powerful in defeating any Japanese plans. But that’s very hard to do.

• What do you think will happen from now on? How do you think this dispute will progress?

  • I assume Korea will keep Dokdo, Japan will keep talking about it as Takeshima, and if it’s handled correctly, it’ll become less and less relevant, and that 20 years from now, Japanese ministry of foreign affairs will still be saying, “We need to return Takeshima to Japan,” but it’ll be in very small prints and nobody will care. That’s my view; but it remains to be seen I guess. But many people in Korea are convinced that somehow Japanese destroyers will going to suddenly storm into the islands and they will suddenly plant flags and try to take over. I just don’t think it’s very realistic. And I certainly hope I’m right.

Professor T. J. Pempel:

• Joined Berkeley’s Political Science Department in 2001 and served as a director of the Institute of East Asian Studies from 2002 to 2006.

• From 1972 to 1991, he was director of Cornell’s East Asia Program.

• His research focuses on comparative politics, political economy, contemporary Japan, and Asian regionalism.

• His recent books: Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific, The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy, and Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes.

• His current research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and Asian regionalism.