US foreign policy in Africa IS military policy. The US State Department is starved for money. The Pentagon’s gargantuan budget is still largely unquestioned and treated politically as free money. Major portions of the State Department budget are allocated for military activity and support instead of traditional diplomacy. This picture illustrates the institutional problem US policy has created, and that it faces.

BAMAKO, Mali - U.S. Army Master Sergeant Robert Price stands with Malian soldiers he helped train as he is congratulated by Malian Minister of Defense Natie Pleah during a Counter Terrorism Train and Equip (CTTE) transfer of equipment ceremony in Bamako, October 20, 2009. Price, a logistics NCO with Special Operations Command Africa's Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara, supervised maintenance and supply accountability training provided to Malian soldiers for tactical vehicles and communications equipment transferred to Malian units. Under the U.S. State Department's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Program (TSCTP), U.S. Africa Command's Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) Counter Terrorism Train and Equip initiative provided 37 brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser pickup trucks and high-tech communications equipment that will allow Malian military units to move, transport and communicate across vast expanses of open desert in the northern region of the country. In addition, replacement parts, clothing, individual equipment and other supplies will be provided in the next few weeks as part of a U.S. government capacity-building equipment transfer totaling more than $5 million. The CTTE program is designed to develop stronger military-to-military relationships while underscoring U.S. support for partner nation sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. (Photo by Max R. Blumenfeld, JSOTF-TS PAO)

State Department money and contracts are paying for the equipment and the training described in this picture. The only significant budget the State Department has, particularly regarding African affairs is money that is spent on military supplies and activities, and therefore supplements the Pentagon’s already bloated military budget. In these circumstances the only possible product of US foreign policy is increased militarism.

Vijay Prashad recently published an article at Pambazuka that describes the ongoing effect of US policy on Mali:
Counterterrorism’s blindness: Mali and the US

Describing the military expenditure pictured above:

[T]he US government will provide US$5 million in trucks and military equipment to Mali. The aim of this donation is to help the Malian military fight the group known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Last December, AQIM kidnapped two Canadian diplomats, who were released after four months. This is what they do these days: kidnap, extort, run guns and drugs. Islam is a veneer.
…
The association with al-Qaeda is a propaganda coup … AQIM is a small shop with a large sign, paying its franchise dues without increasing its own business. But since AQIM operates on the border between Algeria and Mali, and does some of its business in Mali, the US government decided to help fortify Mali’s military. US$5 million is not much money for the US, but for a country with total revenues of US1.5 billion, with a military budget of about US$70 million per year, this small disbursement is considerable. And it is set to increase – keep an eye on that.

…

Through the TSCTP, the US government wanted not only to fight the Islamists on the battlefield, but also take on their extremist ideology. To this end, USAID got some funds to help revise textbooks, pay for schools that teach a ‘tolerant ideology’ and run rural radio stations ‘by broadcasting moderate views and providing information on government services’. The money for these non-military functions was available in 2005 and 2007, but not in 2006. Because of this fluctuation, according to the General Accounting Office of the US government, ‘the mission suspended its peace-building program in northern Mali‘.

All attention was focused on the military aspect, although even here there is some uneasiness. The US Embassy in Bamako was quick to point out that the US$5 million for trucks and other military hardware comes not from the US military, but from the US State Department.

The fact that this money comes from the State Department is not a mitigating factor. It only makes the situation worse. The principal US institution that should be working for peace and democracy, that should be working to strengthen civilian institutions, becomes just another tool to subsidize military activity and war.

Although, the State Department is not the only one involved; from April to June this year, 300 US Special Forces ‘advisers’ trained the Malian military at three of its bases. These Sahelian initiatives are now run through AFRICOM, the US African Command, set up in October 2007. It operates a programme called ‘Joint Task Force Aztec Silence’. … The ’silence’ after Aztec is chilling.

The insurgents in northern Mali are various. The longest tension is between the Malian government and the ‘Tuareg rebels’.

Prashad goes on to describe the tensions between Mali’s government and the Tuareg over the years. And as Keenan points out, quoted below, in 2006 US Special Forces worked with the Tuareg and the Algerians to destabilize Mali. Now in 2009 the US is backing Mali’s current government.

Prashad provides a summary history of Mali since independence. It came out of colonial rule almost completely dependent on cotton.

… a popular government led by the charismatic Modibo Kéita came to power. But the country was dependent on one crop (cotton) for more than half its GDP (gross domestic product), it had little processing and industry and almost no sources of energy. … Further, the cotton subsidy regime in both Europe and the United States strikes at the heart of Mali’s attempt to grow its already dismal economy.

Prashad recounts the changes in Mali’s leadership, and that immediately following Kéita, Mali came under military government:

Traoré had none of Kéita’s imagination, and none of the socialist movement’s patience with the devolution of power. When things turned bad, he went to Washington. The World Bank welcomed him in 1981, and Mali became the test case for its ’structural adjustment’ policies.

…

In 1995, Howard French reported from Bamako for The New York Times, ‘Diplomats also speak of this large landlocked country as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic militancy from its northern neighbor, Algeria. Already Mali faces a destabilizing conflict involving Tuareg tribesmen in the north, but any settlement has been thwarted by a lack of resources. At the same time, Mali’s debt burden, contracted under years of dictatorship, consumes so much of the country’s revenues that there is little left for development needs.’ The point was clearly made. No one listened.

…

Washington’s counterterrorism spectacles see only al-Qaeda. The debt burden and the impossibility of governance are not on the agenda. Whether the State Department or the Defense Department give arms to the Malian military says more about anxiety in the US than about the dynamic in Mali. Once more the US will strengthen the military against civil society, and once more we might see Mali fall the way of Guinea and others in the region that were set up to become dictatorships.

I have quoted from Demystifying Africa’s Security by Jeremy Keenan before, but he makes a number of points that are particularly relevant to Mali:

Beginning in early 2003, the US, in collusion with Algeria, its key regional ally in the GWOT, fabricated a string of false flag ‘terrorism’ incidents in the Algerian Sahara and across much of the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad) in order to justify the launch of a new or ‘second’ African front in the GWOT.

…

US presence sought to resolve conflicts in Africa by brute military intervention. Post-2006 interventions by US troops in the Sahara-Sahel have been widely documented(Keenan, 2006d, 2008b, 2009b). In May 2006, for example, US Special Forces, flown secretly from Stuttgart to Tamanrasset, accompanied Algeria’s secret military services into northern Mali to give support to the Algerian-orchestrated Tuareg rebellion designed to destabilise northern Mali. In February 2008, US Special Forces (possibly contractors – PMCs) accompanied Malian troops on a vindictive raid on a desert town in the same area, at the same time as AFRICOM’s commander, General William ‘Kip’ Ward and US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, were promoting AFRICOM at a RUSI meeting in London and at which Ms Whelan denied the presence of US ‘troops’ in northern Mali.

…

Since 2005-6, justification for the US’s militarisation of the continent has shifted from the GWOT and straightforward counterterrorism to the more humanitarian security-development discourse. The fundamental question with regard to AFRICOM is whether its website news headlines and its ‘peace and development’ oriented mission statements really do reflect a paradigm shift in US military thinking, or whether they are merely good PR, a further twist in Washington’s ‘information war’: a deceptive mystification process that enables AFRICOM to be portrayed as more benign than it really is. The answer is found on the ground – in Africa. Whether couched in the language of the GWOT or the security-development discourse, local-regional outbreaks of civil unrest and rebellion (‘incursions’) by minority-cum-opposition groups, frequently provoked by local US supported politico-military elites, continue to help legitimise the US military presence in Africa and are being dealt with by military means. Far from bringing ‘peace and security’ to Africa, AFRICOM is directly instrumental in creating conflict and insecurity.

…

Does AFRICOM have any prospect of bringing peace, security and development to Africa? While AFRICOM’s commanders have been preaching ‘security and development’, their operations on the ground have so far created insecurity and undermined democratic expressions of civil society.

…

… many [African regimes] are now using the pretext of the GWOT to repress legitimate opposition by linking it with ‘terrorism’

Following the great tradition of the Saharan Touareg, the desert bluesmen Tinariwen were back on the road to promote their brand new album, Imidiwan. They were recently passing by London and I met Eyadou Ag Leche, the bassist of the music act. He talked about their influences, the role of Tinariwen and its association, Taghreft Tinariwen, within the Touareg community. He also explained the signification of  the Tamasheq term assuf, which is often used to describe their music.

Eyadou Ag Leche by Amiram Bukowski

Nicolas Roux: How was Tinariwen born?

Eyadou Ag Leche: The band was born in the eighties. When Ibrahim [Ag Alhabib] was travelling between Algeria and Libya, he discovered the electric guitar. Using that instrument, his ideas came to light. He adapted these new ideas with the traditional music that already existed.

Nicolas: What does Tinariwen mean? Why did you choose that name?

Eyadou: It’s the plural of Ténéré*. It means “the deserts”. Generally speaking it’s in reference to the deserts where all the nomads live. They’re people who have always felt the love of the earth. They’re still adapted to the nature. In other words Tinariwen reflects our attachment to the desert.

Nicolas: Where does your music originate?

Eyadou: This music already existed when we were born. Our parents played it. There are some poets who date back more than a thousand years. It’s a very ancient music and we write our songs in this spirit.

Nicolas: With albums such as Aman Iman or Imidiwan, we can hear traditional influences but also a more recent rock or blues sound. Have you been influenced by western artists?

Eyadou: We really like discovering new artists but we also want to stay true to our roots. When you discover new instruments and new sound techniques, it helps you to transfer a type of sound towards another sound that doesn’t necessarily belong to you.

Nicolas: Your music is often described as assuf. Can you explain what it means?

Eyadou: Assuf, it’s a kind of deep nostalgia that is proper to the desert people. I can’t really translate it. You always feel a kind of nostalgia, an inner pain. You don’t really know where it comes from. You feel good but there’s a sense of nostalgia. That’s what assuf is.

Nicolas: Tinariwen is an engaged band. What message do you try to convey?

Eyadou: Today we have a peace message. The situation in our country is also happening in other parts of the world. There’s a lot of tension everywhere and it doesn’t lead to anything. It’s still possible to have a simple life in nature. We also talk a lot about education and love.

Nicolas: You and the other band members were part of the Touareg rebellion in the nineties. Do you think your music helped to raise awareness of the situation in the Sahara?

Eyadou: Yes of course. Our music played an important role. That’s the only way we found to gather a lot of people in order to talk about what’s happening. We do not sing to create problems. We sing about the things that we see, the colours that we see in life. People must wake up. They must see things the way they are but also accept them. That’s what we talk about. Some people did wake up and the situation got better after the rebellion.

Nicolas: Earlier this year there was a peace deal concluded between the Malian government and the Touareg community. Has the situation improved since then?

Eyadou: The region has been quiet. There’s a lot of politics involved. The rebellion pursues its policy and so does the Malian government. If we didn’t have a peace deal, far worse problems would come to light. We’d rather accept these conditions in order to secure peace. That’s always better.

Nicolas: Could you tell us about your association Taghreft Tinariwen?

Eyadou: It’s an association we created to protect the Touareg cause. It’s as if it was a mother or father of the Touareg activities. We haven’t got hospitals, schools. We have nothing. Therefore we hope that the association can help our community, Mali and even nomads from elsewhere. It’s like a dream that came true for us. The same way the band Tinariwen has made its way. We hope that the association will make its own way. We’re really tired but we’re happy with results. The task can be shared basically.

(Translated from French by Nicolas Roux)

* The Sahara desert is formed of several deserts. Ténéré, which means “the desert”, is the main part.

I am just absolutely in love with the style, craftsmanship, and regal qualities of the Tuareg people of Niger.  Sometimes they are called “The Blue People”, because of the deep indigo dye that is used in their tagelmusts (turbans) that can dye their skin.  They are traditionally semi-nomadic, traveling through the Sahara Desert.

One of their crafts that I’ve admired for years, are their skills as metalsmiths.  I personally would be content if my entire silver collection was completely Tuareg.  I came across a video, and a wealth of information about the Koumama Family of Niger, who are famous for creating traditional silver jewelry.  Elhadji Koumama is the 9th child, patriarch of his family, and a master silversmith.  He has his own business in creating and selling traditional Tuareg jewelry.  This video explains the process of creating a silver piece; from creating the mold from wax, casting it in silver, firing with a bellow, and engraving and filing so others may enjoy a beautiful silver piece.

Isn’t that amazing! Another wonderful thing that I just love are Tuareg Veil Weights.  These weights are tied to the ends of veils that women wear so that their veils don’t blow out of place in the strong Sahara winds.  As well as decoration…we all have to be fabulous right:)

Tuareg Veil Weights

Photographs © Tim Hamill

This is how Artist Infa Ouma creates his veil weights:

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Carving beeswax for veil weights

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Veil Weights encased in clay

 

 

Veil Weights emerged from silver mold

Do you have any Tuareg pieces? What’s your favorite?

Antyczni pasterze i wojownicy

Tuaregowie są nomadycznym ludem berberyjskim, zamieszkującym zachodnią Saharę. Berberyjskim- czyli należącym do kultury dużo starszej niż jakakolwiek arabska czy europejska inwazja. Przyjmuje sie, że praberberzy zamieszkiwali tereny wybrzeża śródziemnomorskiego i Sahary już 5000 lat temu, będąc istotnym ogniwem antycznej polityki, kultury i handlu. Przez wieki istnienia na arenie dziejów dużo częściej twórczo przekształcali obce wpływy, niż im ulegali, tworząc kulturę jednocześnie głęboko związaną z tradycją antyczną i semicką, jak i absolutnie niepowtarzalną. Z czasem jednak charakterystyczne cechy kultury berberyjskiej zaczely zanikać, poddane najpierw intensywnej arabizacji, potem zaś europeizacji.

Dzisiaj za Berbera uważa się osobę posługującą się jednym z berberyjskich dialektów i posiadającą świadomość swojej odrębności od arabskokulturowego “mainstreamu” – cechuje ich również umiłowanie niezależności, dochodzące często do skrajnego indywidualizmu. Ze wszystkich Berberów za to, za najbardziej “berberyjskich”- to znaczy, zachowujących najwięcej spośród charakterystycznych cech berberyjskiej kultury- uważa się właśnie Tuaregów.

Tuaregowie przez setki lat niepodzielnie rządzili pustynią. Podzieleni na liczne frakcje, zajmowali się pasterstwem, handlem transsaharyjskim i rabunkiem.Ich konfederacje były silnie zhierarchizowane, a podział pokrywał się z grubsza z różnicami rasowymi, tak że na jej szczycie stała biała arystokracja, a na samym dole znajdowały się grupy negroidalnych wyzwoleńców. Mimo przyjęcia Islamu, zachowali wiele wcześniejszych zwyczajów- jak na przykład dziedziczenie matrylinearne- i wydaje się, że nigdy nie stali się tak naprawdę częścią arabskiej ummy.
Rządzili się własnymi prawami, opartymi na odwiecznej tradycji plemiennej, a nie prawach szariatu. Przykładem tego może być wysoka pozycja kobiet, dość liberalny stosunek do instytucji małżeństwa, czy charakterystyczne dla nich męskie zasłony- prawdopodobnie sposób na zabezpieczenie się przed złymi duchami.

Przez sąsiadów często byli nazywani Niebieskimi ludźmi, od wspomnianych już, tradycyjnych, błękitnych zasłon noszonych przez mężczyzn, sami mają na siebie wiele określeń. Na tyle wiele, że pozwolę sobie zacytować fragmenty anglojęzycznej wikipedii:

They call themselves variously Kel Tamasheq or Kel Tamajaq (“Speakers of Tamasheq”), Imuhagh, Imazaghan or Imashaghen (“the Free people”), or Kel Tagelmust, i.e., “People of the Veil”. [..]

The Tuareg call themselves by the following names:

* Amajagh (a Tuareg man).
* Tamajaq (a Tuareg woman).
* Imajaghan (Tuareg men, people).
* Tamajaq (the Tuareg language).
* Timajaghen (Tuareg women).
* Kel Tamajaq (the Tuareg people).
* Tifinagh (the Tuareg alphabet).

Zanim przejdę dalej, chciałam zatrzymać się przy tifinagh- warto zauwazyć, że tuareski język tamaszek jest jedynym spośród języków berberyjskich posiadających własny alfabet. Jego użycie odnotowywuje się już w III w.p.n.e., co bez wątpienia jest kolejnym przyczynkiem do zwiększenia dumy etnicznej Tuaregów.
Jednak kluczowym wydaje się określenie Imazaghan- Wolni Ludzie. Takie postrzeganie samych siebie, duma z własnej tożsamości i każdego jej przejawu zdaje się być sednem “tuareskości”. I zapewne właśnie te cechy stały się zapalnikiem w latach 60-tych XX wieku, gdy francuskie kolonie w Afryce zyskały niepodległość. Obszar, od wieków będący domeną koczowników został podzielony pomiędzy kilka nowo utworzonych państw, pojawiły się nowe problemy gospodarcze, na które młode rządy reagowały próbując zmienić nomadyczny tryb życia Tuaregów.
W efekcie w roku 1963 w Mali wybuchło pierwsze powstanie Tuaregów, spacyfikowane szybko i brutalnie. Metody stosowane przez wojskowych wywołały wśród nomadów jeszcze większą złość, co sprawiło, że na początku lat 90-tych, dzieci pierwszych rebeliantów znów sięgnęły po broń. W roku 1995 mediacja Algierii i Francji doprowadziła do porozumienia pokojowego, które przetrwało do roku 2007. Po najświeższej rebelii wciąż stygnie broń- rozmowy pokojowe zakończono w maju tego roku.

Nomad z gitarą

Taka właśnie rzeczywistość ukształtowała Ibrahima ag Alhabiba, lidera zespołu Tinariwen. Sama jego biografia mogłaby być kanwą fascynującej powieści przygodowej. Osierocony w 1963 roku wyrastał w obozie dla uchodźców, gdzie w objazdowym kinie zobaczył western, a na nim kowboja z gitarą. Ten instrument stał się jego największym marzeniem. Mając dziewięć lat, uciekł z domu na ciężarówce z cementem i spędził następne lata zatrudniając się w wielu, często dziwnych, zawodach. Wreszcie, pod koniec lat 70tych spotkał innych, dzielących z nim korzenie i miłość do muzyki- i tak zaczęła się historia Tinariwen.
Zresztą, oddajmy może głos samym zainteresowanym

Historia Tinariwen (ang)

Oprócz interesującego brzmienia i historii moją uwagę zwróciło jeszcze jedno zdanie, które padło w pierwszym z filmików. Mowa była o tym, że Tinariwen stworzyli całkiem nową jakość w tuareskiej kulturze- gdyż zamiast opowiadać o pustynnych bohaterach z dalekiej przeszłości, śpiewaja o tym, co jest dla Wolnych Ludzi ważne dzisiaj.

The Sahel Blog has a post up about slavery in Mauritania, a major but neglected human rights issue in the West Africa and Sahel region, where millions of people are still subject to various forms of hereditary social discrimination, ranging from outsider status to outright slavery. While there is a black/white element to it in some areas, one shouldn’t confuse this with US traditions of skin-color based labor slavery among captured peoples. It’s more an outgrowth of traditional tribal culture, local adaptions of ancient Islamic rulings on slavery, and hereditary social stratification in nomad communities, and it has existed in various forms as a fact of life for hundreds of years. It’s quite repugnant nonetheless, of course, but understanding the context is important to realizing how deeply-rooted and hard to destroy these notions are.

Also, it’s not only among the Moors of Mauritania. The caste-like traditions that underpin these practices also apply to varying degrees to the closely related Sahrawi and other communities in Western Sahara, Morocco and Algeria (including among the Tindouf refugees, as this report from Human Rights Watch makes clear) as well as among non-Moorish, non-Arab Touareg communities in the wider Sahara, and also among several African peoples in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, etc. This is not to mention how traditional practices sometimes mix with modern slavery practices, tied to labor exploitation, warlordism, and such phenomena.

Niger’s President Mamadou Tandja is suddenly concerned to win back the friendship of his neighbors in West Africa.

Niger’s opposition rejects the results of last week’s parliamentary election, in which supporters of President Mamadou Tandja claimed victory with 76 out of 113 seats. But boycotts and protests did not sway the president’s course at any point in the last four months. As I commented on Friday, the regional and international politics around Tandja’s rule may stand a greater chance of affecting the president’s behavior than domestic protest, which has largely fallen on deaf ears in Niamey.

Significantly, initial bluster by Tandja’s regime regarding Niger’s suspension from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has given way to a “diplomatic offensive” in which Tandja’s top lieutenants will visit neighboring countries. Afrique en Ligne analyzes Tandja’s motivations:

Sources said the shuttle diplomacy was aimed at reassuring friends of Niger that the situation in the country was the expression of the choice of the people.

Tandja is hurriedly organising the mission less than one week after ECOWAS suspended Niger from its activities for violating the protocol on democracy and good governance.

Observers believe that Niger’s suspension from ECOWAS is a prelude to sanctions by the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU).

These have put the Tandja regime under pressure and experts say, very soon, the Niamey government could face stiff opposition at home like the ugly situation in Guinea.

This is an important reminder, too, that the separation I’ve been making between domestic opposition and international pressure may be overly neat. The two forces can feed off of each other, especially if this ECOWAS suspension affects the economic life of ordinary Nigeriens. While I doubt that Niger will become “Guinea Part II,” Tandja is concerned enough about the possibility of being isolated in the region that he is making rapid and serious overtures to his peers.

Meanwhile, his regime continues to pursue peace with Tuareg rebels in the north. On Friday, state television in Niger reported that Tandja has offered amnesty to the Tuaregs. I’ve been reading Tandja’s peace efforts partly as his means of extending control over the north at a time of political uncertainty, though a knowledgeable commenter (see linked post) questioned whether that tactic would work. In any case, stability seems to be the main goal in Niamey – domestic stability, political stability for the president and his party (even if it requires temporarily managing outcry and conflict in order to consolidate power), and now, stability in regional relations. Whether the regime can achieve that goal is open to question, even more so now that pressure from the outside appears to be having a stronger effect than I, at least, predicted.

“Civilisation was a last resort – a means of organising society and food production and distribution in the face of deteriorating environmental conditions. For many, if not most people, the development of civilisation meant a harder, often shorter life, less freedom and more inequality.

Dr. Nick Brooks – Web site

HBMT – 6000 years ago

Plant respiration = evaporation cooling.

Evaporation cooling = moist southern air moving north.

Water flows down hill… in ancient river beds under the sand.

Nut shell

Big Water and Grass

Big Picture

Data from the Soil Conservation Research project at McCredie during the summer drought of 1953 showed the corn crop exhausting the soil moisture to a depth of 3.5 feet under the fertilized soils. The equivalent of only 1.04 inches of water was left in that entire depth. Where the soil was not fertilized, the crop dried out the soil to a lesser depth. It left the equivalent of 4.5 inches of water in the upper 3.5 feet.
On the unfertilized corn, which took 14 inches of water from the soil, the yield was only 18 bushels per acre. It required 26,000 gallons of water to make a bushel of corn. On the fertilized soil with a yield of 79 bushels, only 5,600 gallons of water per bushel were required.

The drought was a case of plant hunger rather than thirst.

Or simply, 4 times the crop yeild with one fifth the amount of water on fertile soil.

Biosolids and grass seed: more crop less water.

In the late eighteenth century, a group of aristocratic British gentlemen formed the Association for Promoting the Discovery of the Interior Parts of Africa. The association particularly hoped to find the fabled, fabulously wealthy city of Tombouctou (also known as Timbuktu or Timbuctoo). The gentlemen did not know that the city they sought had long been in decline. Centuries earlier, however, Tombouctou had indeed been a prosperous center of gold and salt trade across the Sahara, and a center of Islamic scholarship.

This false-color image is captured by the Advanced Spaceborne Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer (ASTER) on NASA’s Terra satellite captured this false-color image of Tombouctou, Mali, on March 6, 2001. Vegetation appears red, water appears blue, human-built structures appear brown-gray, and land with little or no vegetation varies in color from off-white to tan. Bare ground dominates much of the image as Tombouctou is nearly surrounded by desert. South of the city, the runway for a small airport leaves a long, straight line on the arid landscape.

South of the city, the land changes dramatically, thanks to the vegetation-lined Niger River. Flowing from west to east, the Niger River occupies a network of braided stream channels with small, skinny waterways branching out from the main river.

Its proximity to the river long made Tombouctou a center of trade and learning. The city started as a seasonal camp used by Tuareg nomads around the year 1100. Within a few centuries, it was part of the Mali Empire, and a center of trade. Tombouctou also became a center of Islamic culture, home to three of West Africa’s oldest mosques as well as a university. Captured by Morocco in 1591, however, Tombouctou began a long, slow decline. The site’s historic significance earned the city its status as a World Heritage site in 1988.

Source: Earth Observatory, NASA

I had not intended to write on the controversies surrounding Robert Fowler, but the story keeps making headlines, so I will try and piece the events together as best I can.

In July 2008, Ban Ki-Moon appointed Fowler, a former Canadian ambassador, as UN Special Envoy to Niger. Fowler was tasked with helping to find a solution to the Tuareg conflict in the Agadez region in the north of the country.

Fowler was kidnapped near Niamey in mid-December 2008 by militants who turned out, the BBC later reported, to be affiliated with AQIM. A group of four European tourists were kidnapped in January 2009 and held with Fowler and his aide Louis Guay. Fowler, Guay, and two of the tourists were released in April; of the remaining captives one, British citizen Edwin Dyer, was executed by AQIM in June, while the final hostage was released in July.

So far as I understand it, those are the facts. Now the controversies begin:

• In early September, Fowler stated his belief that his itinerary was leaked to his kidnappers by either the government of Niger or the UN. He pointed a finger at Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja in particular:

Fowler said the government of Niger and in particularly President Mamadou Tandja “hated my mission”.

“It was clear from the first time I met him in August that he [Mr Tandja] was offended, annoyed and embarrassed by the fact that the secretary general of the UN [Ban Ki-moon] had seen fit to appoint a special envoy for his country.”

Analysts say Mr Tandja has had a fractious relationship with the UN during his 10 years in power.

During a food crisis in 2005 when 3.5 million people were left hungry, he accused UN agencies of exaggerating the country’s problems in order to get donor funds.

• Both the Nigerien ambassador in Canada and the UN strongly denied Fowler’s allegations.
• Now, Mali’s government says that four AQIM members were freed to secure Fowler’s release. Malian officials also confirm that a ransom was paid.

Speaking in detail for the first time about the circumstances that led to the diplomats’ release, Mali officials said they felt under heavy pressure to find ways to resolve the hostage situation, to the point they were worried that Canada might withdraw aid if the hostages were not freed.

Canada’s aid to Mali has increased sharply in recent years, from about $20-million in 2002 to more than $100-million last year. Mali is now one of the five biggest recipients of Canadian aid, and it is one of the few African countries to remain on Ottawa’s trimmed-down priority list for foreign aid this year.

Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, director of the Northern Mali Development Agency in the Mali government, said the four prisoners were released because Canada is a “big partner” of the country and needed to be kept happy. The prisoners who were involved in bomb-making were “very dangerous” but “not very well-known,” he said in an interview.

• Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper (previous link) “has denied that his government made any concessions, [but] he would not discuss whether other governments might have offered considerations to the kidnappers on behalf of Canada.”
• Additionally, a Malian businessman who helped broker Fowler’s release says he has not been paid for his efforts. The Globe and Mail reports there is some controversy around this man, Baba Ould Sheik, as well.
• Finally, there is some dispute over the role Tuareg rebels may have played in the kidnapping. Some sources told the BBC that a Tuareg group originally seized Fowler, implying the Tuaregs later handed him and others off to AQIM.

So there you have it. I am not in a position to evaluate all these different claims, but at the very least it’s clear that few of these actors – whether the individuals or the governments involved – trust each other. That lack of trust makes untangling the different accounts complicated, if not impossible, for the outside observer. And that lack of trust also suggests that these actors had a difficult time coordinating their efforts, and may again if a similar situation arises.

Any insights welcome – drop them in the comments.

The Sahel Blog has been posting on the recent peace agreement in Niger’s Touareg conflict:

• Niger: Opposition Boycotts, Tuareg Settlement Goes Forward
• Tuareg Peace Agreement Revisited

Not that they were fighting anyway, but Mali’s rebels are supposedly also involved. And so is Muammar, ambitious as always:

Gaddafi said all Tuaregs living in Niger and Mali, and elsewhere in Sub Sahara African areas, were Libyan but said he wanted them to live in peace where they had settled.

No need to thank him, that’s just the way he is: generous to a fault. But in fact, Qadhafi’s claims of leadership among the Touareg has a long history, and it has caused considerable irritation among some Algerians who fear that he’s trying to spread separatist ideas in the south of their country. However, after one newspaper started reporting on some quite blatant Libyan incitement of Algerian Touareg, it was told in no uncertain terms by Algeira’s judicial authorities to shut up, lest The Guide get mad. That’s soft power for you, Maghreb-style.

Yesterday I wrote about the recent Tuareg peace agreement in the context of Nigerien President Mamadou Tandja’s expanding power. But it’s worth considering the peace process from a few other angles as well. I’m still learning about the Tuareg rebellion, the latest round of which began in 2007, but here are a few unpolished thoughts on the ramifications if the peace holds:

1. Libyan Influence: The peace accords were brokered by Qaddhafi and formally concluded in Sabha, Libya. Qaddhafi has been a key player in the peace process, although past accords have fallen through despite his involvement. He has also, Reuters says, been involved in the conflict in another way – by providing arms and weapons to rebels. Both aspects of his intervention are a reminder, as if anyone needed one, of Qaddhafi’s influence on and importance for politics in the Sahel.
2. Terrorism and Transnational Politics: Last year, Kal argued that AQIM fighters “need the conflict in northern Mali to continue to profit from arms sales to the Tuareg. If the conflicts in the region were settled, a major portion of their income would dry up.” This type of relationship between Tuareg rebels and Al Qaeda causes concern among US policymakers and reminds us that, as in so many countries, problems of instability cross borders – the Tuareg have grievances against the governments of both Mali and Niger, suggesting no single national government can defuse the crisis on its own. If any solution is to work, it will have to be undertaken in the context of partnership among regional governments. That may mean that this peace accord, which has regional support, will succeed, but the history does inspire some pessimism.
3. Resource Conflict: Just as some warn that the Niger Delta amnesty will not hold unless oil resources are distributed more equitably, it seems that the politics of who gets what when in the Sahara, rather than the politics of who signs and says what where, will determine the course of relations between Tuareg groups and Sahelian governments going forward.

If you’d like more information, here’s a BBC Q&A on the conflict from when it began in 2007.

I really hate the term “world music”. I mean not only is it terribly vague in its actual utility as a description of a distinct musical style, it’s also just reductive and condescending. It’s as if we in the West (and I’m assuming you’re Western here, if that is not the case then just ignore what I’m about to write) have taken the time to identify our music in terms of musical similarity and then just thrown everything else in a globby badly assembled amalgamated heap. It kind of reminds me of when I first moved here to Germany and was surprised/amused at the fact that there was a clearly demarcated “black” music section in my local music store… people had grouped music together on a purely non-musical basis, which is, in my opinion, utterly pointless and completely stupid.

This is why I yell at my computer.

When I recently purchased Tinariwen’s newest album, Imidiwan:Companions, I was appalled to see it listed under the genre “world music”. It’s comparable to buying a James Brown record and then seeing it listed under “earth sounds”; it’s a throwaway term and does nothing in the way of actually describing the music. There’s also the fact that if anything, Tinariwen’s brand of Tuareg desert-rock should be described as, forgive my corniness, “out-of-this-world music”… but I’m getting a bit ahead of myself.

You see Tinariwen, in Tamashek, means desert boys. As tempting as it is, I’m not going to try and romanticize the story of these desert boys with their guns, violence, rebellion, and amazing music. I’m also not going to give you a history lesson about the Tuareg region of Mali (although it’s actually really interesting and has everything to do with who Tinariwen are and the music they make). What I will say is that Imidiwan is not just a record. I know it’s cliché to say so, but this time I really mean it. Tinariwen aren’t making music to get girls, or to make money, or to be able to afford new Bentley, they’re doing it because it is what they do, it is the embodiment of their entire being. Their songs of political awakening, nomadic life, and desert nights, despite their delivery in traditional Tamashek, will resonate in the truest part of your soul. When I first heard Lulla with its souring chorus and uplifting, sparkling guitar, it was like a revelation, an appeal to the joy in my heart.The best part is that, althought Imidiwan is informed by the rythyms and melodies of traditional Tuareg music, you can still hear traces of Led Zepellin, or Jimi Hendrix or even Bob Marley. It’s an eclectic musical mix in the best sense of the word.

I really feel like it’s pointless for me to write more about how much I love this band (although it seems a pit paltry to call them that), and this music. Instead I’ll end with a bit written by Andy Morgan about the origins of Imidiwan:

“‘Imidiwan’ is one of those big Tamashek words, to which no single English word can ever do justice. Just like ‘Assouf’, the name which the Touareg themselves often give Tinariwen’s guitar style. ‘Assouf’ means the blues, loneliness, heartache, longing, homesickness, the darkness beyond the campfire. ‘Imidiwan’ means friends, companions, soul-brothers, fellow travellers.”

When you listen to this record, you feel as if you have been inducted into this Imidiwan along with the entire human race. You can only smile in the warm light of your communal campfire.

Lulla – Tinariwen

Ahimana – Tinariwen

exterior features

* 17″ alloy wheels with all-season tires
* Silver roof rails
* Power liftgate
* Front and rear Park Distance
Control (PDC)

interior features

* Premium VI AM/FM stereo with CD player and SIRIUS® Satellite Radio
* Heatable front seats
* 4XMOTION permanent all-wheel
drive system

Mi próximo viaje humanitario irá por estas lindes… si el Destino así lo quiere.

Ahora disfruto de las enseñanzas de este pueblo…

Son incontables las veces que sale el tema “tiempo” en las sesiones de coaching. El coaching tiene una aplicación muy potente y eficaz para aprender a gestionar el tiempo con talento y eficacia…

Os dejo una entrevista a un tuareg que no tiene desperdicio. Disfrutadla.

Juan BELLIDO

coach

www.juanbellido.com

www.acompañamientopersonal.com

TU TIENES EL RELOJ, YO TENGO EL TIEMPO
entrevista realizada por VÍCTOR-M. AMELA a:
MOUSSA AG ASSARID,

No sé mi edad: nací en el desierto del Sahara, sin papeles…!

Nací en un campamento nómada tuareg entre Tombuctú y Gao, al norte de Mali. He sido pastor de los camellos, cabras, corderos y vacas de mi padre. Hoy estudio Gestión en la Universidad Montpellier. Estoy soltero. Defiendo a los pastores tuareg. Soy musulmán, sin fanatismo.

- ¡Qué turbante tan hermoso…!

- Es una fina tela de algodón: permite tapar la cara en el desierto cuando se levanta arena, y a la vez seguir viendo y respirando a su través.

- Es de un azul bellísimo…

- A los tuareg nos llamaban los hombres azules por esto: la tela destiñe algo y nuestra piel toma tintes azulados…

- ¿Cómo elaboran ese intenso azul añil?

- Con una planta llamada índigo, mezclada con otros pigmentos naturales. El azul, para los tuareg, es el color del mundo.

- ¿Por qué?

- Es el color dominante: el del cielo, el techo de nuestra casa.

- ¿Quiénes son los tuareg?

- Tuareg significa “abandonados”, porque somos un viejo pueblo nómada del desierto, solitario, orgulloso: “Señores del Desierto”, nos llaman. Nuestra etnia es la amazigh (bereber), y nuestro alfabeto, el tifinagh.

- ¿Cuántos son?

- Unos tres millones, y la mayoría todavía nómadas. Pero la población decrece… “¡Hace falta que un pueblo desaparezca para que sepamos que existía!”, denunciaba una vez un sabio: yo lucho por preservar este pueblo.

- ¿A qué se dedican?

- Pastoreamos rebaños de camellos, cabras, corderos, vacas y asnos en un reino de infinito y de silencio…

- ¿De verdad tan silencioso es el desierto?

- Si estás a solas en aquel silencio, oyes el latido de tu propio corazón. No hay mejor lugar para hallarse a uno mismo.

- ¿Qué recuerdos de su niñez en el desierto conserva con mayor nitidez?

- Me despierto con el sol. Ahí están las cabras de mi padre. Ellas nos dan leche y carne, nosotros las llevamos a donde hay agua y hierba… Así hizo mi bisabuelo, y mi abuelo, y mi padre… Y yo. ¡No había otra cosa en el mundo más que eso, y yo era muy feliz en él!

- ¿Sí? No parece muy estimulante. ..

- Mucho. A los siete años ya te dejan alejarte del campamento, para lo que te enseñan las cosas importantes: a olisquear el aire, escuchar, aguzar la vista, orientarte por el sol y las estrellas… Y a dejarte llevar por el camello, si te pierdes: te llevará a donde hay agua.

- Saber eso es valioso, sin duda…

- Allí todo es simple y profundo. Hay muy pocas cosas, ¡y cada una tiene enorme valor!

- Entonces este mundo y aquél son muy diferentes, ¿no?

- Allí, cada pequeña cosa proporciona felicidad. Cada roce es valioso. ¡Sentimos una enorme alegría por el simple hecho de tocarnos, de estar juntos! Allí nadie sueña con llegar a ser, ¡porque cada uno ya es!

- ¿Qué es lo que más le chocó en su primer viaje a Europa?

- Vi correr a la gente por el aeropuerto.. . ¡En el desierto sólo se corre si viene una tormenta de arena! Me asusté, claro…

- Sólo iban a buscar las maletas, ja, ja…

- Sí, era eso. También vi carteles de chicas desnudas: ¿por qué esa falta de respeto hacia la mujer?, me pregunté…. Después, en el hotel Ibis, vi el primer grifo de mi vida: vi correr el agua… y sentí ganas de llorar.

- Qué abundancia, qué derroche, ¿no?

- ¡Todos los días de mi vida habían consistido en buscar agua! Cuando veo las fuentes de adorno aquí y allá, aún sigo sintiendo dentro un dolor tan inmenso…

- ¿Tanto como eso?

- Sí. A principios de los 90 hubo una gran sequía, murieron los animales, caímos enfermos…. Yo tendría unos doce años, y mi madre murió… ¡Ella lo era todo para mí! Me contaba historias y me enseñó a contarlas bien. Me enseñó a ser yo mismo.

- ¿Qué pasó con su familia?

- Convencí a mi padre de que me dejase ir a la escuela. Casi cada día yo caminaba quince kilómetros.. Hasta que el maestro me dejó una cama para dormir, y una señora me daba de comer al pasar ante su casa… Entendí: mi madre estaba ayudándome…

- ¿De dónde salió esa pasión por la escuela?

- De que un par de años antes había pasado por el campamento el rally París-Dakar, y a una periodista se le cayó un libro de la mochila. Lo recogí y se lo di. Me lo regaló y me habló de aquel libro: El Principito. Y yo me prometí que un día sería capaz de leerlo…

- Y lo logró.

- Sí. Y así fue como logré una beca para estudiar en Francia.

- ¡Un tuareg en la universidad. ..!

- Ah, lo que más añoro aquí es la leche de camella… Y el fuego de leña. Y caminar descalzo sobre la arena cálida. Y las estrellas: allí las miramos cada noche, y cada estrella es distinta de otra, como es distinta cada cabra… Aquí, por la noche, miráis la tele.

- Sí… ¿Qué es lo que peor le parece de aquí?

- Tenéis de todo, pero no os basta. Os quejáis. ¡En Francia se pasan la vida quejándose! Os encadenáis de por vida a un banco, y hay ansia de poseer, frenesí, prisa… En el desierto no hay atascos, ¿y sabe por qué? ¡Porque allí nadie quiere adelantar a nadie!

- Reláteme un momento de felicidad intensa en su lejano desierto.

- Es cada día, dos horas antes de la puesta del sol: baja el calor, y el frío no ha llegado, y hombres y animales regresan lentamente al campamento y sus perfiles se recortan en un cielo rosa, azul, rojo, amarillo, verde…

- Fascinante, desde luego…

- Es un momento mágico… Entramos todos en la tienda y hervimos té. Sentados, en silencio, escuchamos el hervor… La calma nos invade a todos: los latidos del corazón se acompasan al pot-pot del hervor…

- Qué paz…

- Aquí tenéis reloj, allí tenemos tiempo.

El-Sharq el-Awsat reports that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, al-Qaida’s infamous emir of the Sahara, is about to enter into a peace treaty with the government, following a well-publicized call for peace by Hassan Hattab, the GSPC’s estranged founder. According to the report, based on “an Algerian security source”, Belmokhtar has moved with two aides to a designated place of “hudna” (ceasefire)  in anticipation of his negotiated surrender. Earlier, it says, he had been sheltered by Berabiche (a Moorish tribe, not Touaregs, as the article states) in northern Mali. Mediation allegedly took place through his brother, and now that he’s in place in a designated no-war-zone, he’s supposed to surrender to the Algerian army within days.

If true, that would be a major coup for the Algerians, and a painful blow for AQIM — not just the Saharan wing, but also the northern main branch, since it is supplied with money from down south. Belmokhtar was not only the man to construct AQIM’s semi-independent southern wing, he also established contacts (possibly parallel to those of the main leadership) with al-Qaida central from a very early date. Through the years, he emerged as a major smuggler baron (cigarrettes, guns, cars) with jihadism more or less relegated to a sideshow, but that didn’t lessen the importance of his illicit trade networks financing the rebels up north.

Now, this has been reported wrongly so many times — rumors, psychological warfare, etc — that I’m hesitant to put any confidence at all in it, especially given the source. Actually, I’m going to assume it’s false. However, the constant reports about Belmokhtar negotiating a retreat (they’ve been reappearing for years) does remind one of the similar reports about Hattab, which eventually turned out to be true,  suggesting the faulty reports themselves were perhaps part of the negotiations game. These last few years, other commanders have been stealing the spotlight in AQIM’s southern zone, eg. in the recent kidnappings, so it’s not unreasonable to assume that it’s true that he’s more or less retired from active-duty leadership — but from there to reconciling with the state, it’s still a big step. Possibly, whether true, mistaken or deliberately false, it has something to do with the much-talked-about multi-state chase for AQIM/Sahara.

02/03/2008 – Rai 3 – Alle falde del Kilimangiaro. Presentata da Licia Colò, Elena Dak, giovane scrittrice veneziana, racconta la sua eccezionale esperienza con 30 Tuareg nel deserto del Ténéré (Niger). Per la prima volta a memoria d’uomo, una donna partecipa a pieno titolo alla tradizionale Carovana del sale, che attraversa il deserto dei deserti, dal massiccio dell’Air alle saline di Bilma e ritorno. 50 giorni per un’avventura che è stata degna di essere raccontata in un libro: La Carovana del sale, appunto, di Elena Dak (Vivalda editrice, collana Le Tracce).

is awful. That’s the conclusion to draw from Alex Thurston’s post on the Sahel Blog. He describes the mushrooming of internicine conflict throughout the Sahel region, from Somalia to Mali, and connects it to the ever-present resource/environment factor, and the infectious effects of refugee crises. Darfur is of course the most well-known example — the racism angle aside, it has a lot to do with tribal competition for scarce land, drought etc, and it is now effectively perpetuated by having 2 m refugees locked into camps — but far from the only one. Mostly Eastern Sahel, but the dynamics are not really different back West.

Oh, and speaking of Darfur, you might also want to read this thought-provoking description of center-periphery relations in Sudan, over at Alex de Waal’s blog. A Marxist analysis, basically, but readers need not be to find it useful. It describes some of the dynamics in how local protest movements have gradually abandoned their stake in the center of the state, and the modern national identity as such, to instead turn increasingly inwards to ethnocentric and parochial identities, fuelling separatism, tribalism etc. Obivously relevant to other countries as well.

Possibly my worst headline ever. Anyway, it means that Wall Street Journal has a piece on the Saharan wing of AQIM by Yaroslav Trofimov, author of a book on the Meccan mosque assault of 1979 — it’s supposed to be good though I haven’t read it.

The article is fine, nothing much new, but I have a few quick quibbles and comments:

Mauritania, where most people speak Arabic and watch satellite TV chains like Al-Jazeera, is a particularly fertile ground for AQIM’s growth, and accounts for a growing share of the movement’s cadres, Western diplomats say. In Mali, Niger and Chad, the bulk of AQIM recruits also come from Arab-speaking communities, which in these countries are outnumbered by black African majorities.

Oh, drop it, Yaroslav: blaming al-Jazira for bin Laden is so 2001. But, that AQ is an Arab phenomenon first and foremost is an important point, because it has implications for how/if the movement may spread through the Sahara. More on this in Mali, below.

Security officials in Nigeria recently claimed that AQIM trained in Algeria some members of Boko Haram, the Islamist sect whose armed uprising cost several hundred lives in northern Nigeria last month. (…) Government officials here say that, without outside help, Saharan countries have little chance of defeating AQIM. “This is a zone that can’t be controlled. We don’t know who’s out there in the vast desert and what are they doing,” says Mohamed Ould Rzeizim, who served until this week as Mauritania’s minister of interior.

So let me get that straight: Nigerian officials say their enemies are trained by al-Qaida? No way! And Mauritanian officials demand US recognition of their junta and more money? No way!

…suspected militants also gunned down in Timbuktu the regional chief of Malian intelligence, Lt. Col. Lamina Ould Bou. The colonel, an ethnic Arab and former Islamist rebel, had played a crucial role in Mali’s efforts against AQIM.

There, this again highlights the Arab dimension of it all. Ould Bouh was from the Berabiche community, which links into the larger Hassaniya-speaking Moorish tribal community dominating Mauritania, Western Sahara (as Sahrawis), and adjoining areas of Morocco and Algeria. He was a former fighter in the FIAA, a Moorish outfit that fought in the Touareg wars against the central government, until joining the army after the peace accords. The FIAA was backed by Libya, but also had links to POLISARIO in its heyday (when arming angry Sahrawis was a dual Algerian-Libyan project), and members came both from Libyan-trained “Legion” units and from Mauritania and the Western Sahara diaspora. That this guy played a key role in the AQIM battles — key enough to get killed — is a reminder of how extraordinarily tangled the tribal politics of this region are, how much historical ballast everyone is hauling around, and how borders are often just lines on a map. (And of course of how our beloved Colonel has been pouring oil on the flames for forty years.) — See also this post and comments.

The Saharan rebels have so far targeted only foreigners and security forces, sparing civilian targets like restaurants and hotels. In Algeria, Pakistan and Iraq, by contrast, al Qaeda-affiliated militants showed no concern about killing large numbers of Muslim civilians.

Silly. The Algerian AQIM, i.e. the former GSPC, was specifically created out of protests against the takfiri bent of the GIA. They certainly killed their fair share of civilians, but either as collateral damage or because they were deemed to be in cahoots with the government — there was no random slaughter, and they repeatedly made a point of distancing themselves from such practices. In Pakistan, I am also not aware of such unfocused brutality; while Zarqawi and his ilk in Iraq, certainly the most extreme AQ wing so far, also aimed their otherwise indiscriminate attacks only against Shia, in the context of an open sectarian civil war. I see very little reason to suspect that AQIM is anywhere near the sort of strategic and psychological meltdown it takes to start butchering Muslim civilians indiscriminately. That said, there’s every reason to fear that they will continue to attack Western interests (including civilians) and government targets with increasing frequency.

At Jamestown, Riccardo Fabiani has  an article on the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline, a project to connect natural gas in Nigeria with Europe via a pipeline through the Saharan regions of Niger and Algeria. More gas from Africa (Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, etc) could help in the EU’s gas battles with Russia, for one thing. But, needless to say, there are some complications. Not least that each of the tree states involved has its own running insurgency: MEND in Nigeria, MNJ in Niger and AQIM in Algeria.

Well, read the whole thing.