Russia is concerned over the stance of the United States and the European Union on a United Nations resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism and the desecration of World War II monuments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia said on Sunday.

The United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 18, 2009 a draft resolution proposed by Russia on combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance.

The resolution is aimed at condemning attempts to heroize the Nazi movement and former Waffen-SS members and desecrate monuments to the fighters against Nazism.

“It is highly bewildering and regrettable that the United States voted against the resolution, supported by an overwhelming majority of UN member states, and a number of states, including all European Union members, abstained in the vote on the draft,” the ministry said in a statement.

The ministry said it was surprised by the position of the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova which abstained from the vote, even though their peoples fought against Nazis during World War Two.

“We believe this is disrespect for the heroism of those who glorified these countries by their heroic deeds in the struggle against Nazism,” the statement said.

On Saturday, the Georgian authorities demolished a memorial to WWII heroes in the country’s second largest city, Kutaisi. The blast, which was used to demolish the monument, killed two people.

Russia has condemned the Georgian war memorial demolition blast as an act of barbarism and state vandalism.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said the Georgian authorities “have committed an act of state vandalism, offending the feelings of any civilized person.”

This scene is, in my opinion, the natural progression of where I want to take the “real world” side of my modeling (I also do sci-fi subjects, which are a lot more flexible). Some modelers strive for their models to be the most realistic, they try to fool the observer into thinking that what they are seeing is indeed the real thing, but magically shrunk. There are very good modelers out there that definitely achieve that effect. But after modeling for a while I decided to go in a different direction, although I try to make realistic looking models I don’t push full force for that (I don’t add a lot of PE or do a lot of scratchbuilding), I want to strive to make thought provoking models, the ones that make the viewer go ‘hmmmm’. This came about because I started to think about the kind of models and dioramas that are created out there. They have never made me go hmmmmm, maybe because they depict scenes that are somewhat removed from reality. We see tons of models and dioramas related to war, but very few show wounded soldiers, even less show dead soldiers and almost none go the extra step and show dead civilians. So it seems we leave out the unpleasant aspect of a war and model the somewhat pleasant. With this in mind I decided to try to model unusual things, things that are not the norm. The first attempt was my AH Hellhound in Colombian Air Force markings, which is a statement against the War on Drugs. A bit subtle and abstract. Then came the Freedom Fighter, in honor of the Animal Liberation Front. This was a lot less abstract, although it had the advantage of the written word. Finally this scene, Liebe Mutter. The idea behind this scene came from thinking about why I did not model any vehicles belonging to SS units. I didn’t do it because the SS and specifically the Waffen-SS were “the real nazis” those that committed atrocities against civilians. Or so that’s how history has been written. Then I stopped to ask, what was really inside the mind of the men that did this? So this scene was born out of asking myself the question, what did these men do when they were not committing atrocities against humanity? Would a “real nazi” SS soldier find a moment of solitude in the forest to write his mom a letter and let her know he is ok? I don’t know, that’s where the viewer has to ask the question and answer it.

As with the Hellhound, this model is flawed, because it needs some sort of written statement to be made to get the “thought provoking” effect. The very subtle indicators require previous knowledge of history, what I mean here is that the viewer would have to know the vehicle belongs to an SS unit – almost impossible since it has no divisonal markings and the license plates are partially covered – and the other indicator is probably as bad, the camouflaged uniform was worn by the Waffen-SS.

Some other details about the model itself. Depicts an SdKfz 251/1 Ausf C from the 1st SS Panzerdivision in Kharkov, 1943. The driver figure is from a Tamiya set, heavily modified (it’s more putty now than plastic), all painted with Vallejo acrylics. The groundwork is a mix of plaster, static grass, dry kitchen herbs, tea leaves and the excellent paper leaves by Model Scene (glued down one by one).

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20091127/ap_on_re_eu/eu_germany_nazi_hit_man

klau|s|ens, der boere-prozess geht weiter?

zum glück, zum glück: man befürchtet ja alles.

was denn?

krankheit … oder neue verfahrenstricks der verteidigung.

und?

ich bete: möge dieser prozess bis zu einem urteil und bis zum ende durchgeführt werden können!

wieso denn?

weil es darum geht, die dinge aufzuklären oder zumindest etwas aufzuklären … und die taten sollen gesühnt werden. jedes verbrechen soll gesühnt werden. mord sowieso.

lässt sich da denn etwas sühnen, wenn so viele NS-täter durch die fänge des gesetzes geschlüpft sind?

wenn es im leben keine gerechtigkeit gibt, heißt das nicht, dass man den anspruch auf gerechtigkeit aufgibt. außerdem: alle verbrecher, die jemals verbrechen noch begehen, zumal gegen die menschlichkeit … die müssen und sollen wissen: “man wird mich suchen, bis zum bitteren ende – und dann wird man mir den prozess machen!”

aber bei boere kam es doch gar nicht zu dem prozess. es gab anläufe, aber die deutsche justiz hat das zustandekommen des prozesses behindert.

das stimmt – um so wichtiger, dass er dann doch noch zustande kommt oder kam.

und alle die anderen täter?

es gibt immer “andere”, die der strafverfolgung entkommen. das leben kennt keine gerechtigkeit, bisweilen kennt das leben nur den aberwitz. es gibt sogar heutzutage noch morde, deren urheber nicht ausfindig gemacht werden. aber dennoch muss und wird in jedem einzelnen fall genau dieses versucht werden: aufklärung und bestrafung der täter.

und dann dürfen gerade in diesen tagen in aachen zwei schwerverbrecher entfliehen?!

das ist jetzt ein extra thema, zu dem man sich erst dann äußern kann, wenn die umstände klarer geworden sind. außerdem befinden wir uns im boere-prozess bei der thematik NS-kriegsverbrechen oder auch NS-verbrechen.

gibt er es denn zu? der heinrich boere?

bislang nicht!

na also!

gestern gab es eine persönliche erklärung.

und?

die las dann sein rechtsanwalt gordon christiansen vor – die war also aufgeschrieben worden. und darin ging es um einige biografische stationen.

und?

vieles war undeutlich, nicht sauber recherchiert … vieles wurde ausgeklammert.

die zeit von 1944?

ja, die ganze zeit, als die morde geschahen. zu alledem hörte man nichts. man hörte sowieso sehr wenig. er hat dann geschwister, er hat eine mutter, er meldet sich freiwillig zur waffen-SS, als niederländer in den niederlanden. (er kommt später zur ss-standarte “westland”, untegruppierung der waffen-ss-division “wiking”, an die ostfront, lemberg z.b., aber zuerst nach münchen-freimann und später nach heuberg zur ausbildung.) … aber das meiste wusste man ja schon.

was hattest du erhofft?

man erhofft immer, dass einer vollständig auspackt, alles erzählt … und auch alles bereut. das hofft man immer. und zwar, dass es von herzen kommt, nichts als taktische masche.

und?

von “auspacken” kann gar keine rede sein, wenn die morde vollkommen ausgeklammert sind und die dargelegte biografie so viele unwägbarkeiten und lücken hat. allerdings sind wir immer noch quasi “am anfang” des prozesses.  der angeklagte hatte aber gestern die möglichkeit, sich zur sache zu äußern.  jedoch: er sagte zu den tat-vorwürfen quasi nichts.

ist das nicht normal?

du meinst, weil herr boere schon 88 jahre ist. aber wenn er mit den anwälten zusammen etwas aufsetzt, oder wenn die es für ihn vielleicht sogar geschrieben und formuliert haben, dann muss zumindest so ein leben viel deutlicher werden. (auch wenn man sonst zu schweigen gedenkt.)

wurde es das nicht? deutlich? das leben?

mir leider nein: z.b. die ganze seltsame flucht aus dem kriegsgefangenlager. alles sehr dünn. dann die frage, wie lange er wo und wie in den niederlanden untergetaucht war und wann er genau und wie nach deutschland kam. in deutschland taucht er offiziell dann 1954 auf. und wieso er ohne problem als bergmann dann arbeiten konnte. und er hat dann einen 1955 antrag auf kriegsgefangenentschädigung gestellt. man höre: ein waffen-ss-ler wollte entschädigungsbezahlung erheischen. aber das ist am ende nur “menschlich”. ein jeder sucht lücken in einem system, und er versucht dann, sein leben daraufhin zu verbessern. aber genau das möchten wir alles viel genauer wissen. denn auch darin liegt der sinn eines solchen prozesses: aufarbeitung. neubeleuchtung der geschichte, gerade auch der post-NS-geschichte … und dann der umgang mit den tätern in der nachkriegszeit.

aber der skandal ist doch, dass er dann jahrelang unbehelligt als bergmann / bergarbeiter in deutschland leben und arbeiten durfte.

ja, es ist ein skandal. einer von vielen. aber das hilft uns heute nicht mehr weiter. heute müssen wir erst einmal aufklären, wie es zu diesem skandal überhaupt kommen konnte.

und dazu hat die einlassung oder erklärung des heinrich boere gestern nichts beigetragen?

ich würde sagen: eher nein. wir wissen kaum mehr, als wir nicht schon vorher wussten.

das tut mir leid.

das kann dir gerne leid tun, aber das ist ein problem, wenn die leibhaftigen zeugen fast alle verstorben sind, und wenn ein wichtiger zeuge (ein – schon verurteilter – mittäter von einst) nicht mehr vor gericht erscheinen will, weil er fürchtet, dass sich sein eigenes leben durch diese neue öffentlichkeit des falles dann wieder verschlechtert. (z.b. weil die menschen ihn ausgrenzen oder beschimpfen).  also: es gibt so viele fußangeln und fallen und hemmnisse, dass man sich durch alte akten und berichte und urteile quälen muss, um dann zu entscheiden, wer hat wo mehr recht … was ist glaubwürdiger, was weniger glaubwürdig. so ein verfahren ist immer schwierig.

was ist denn so komplex daran?

da gab es beispielsweise die sache, ob er nach der rückkehr von der ostfront auch mal als zählerableser gearbeitet hat, in den niederlanden. circa 1943.

und?

man weiß es nicht. in alten befragungen /dokumenten taucht es auf, jetzt aber – in der erklärung, die der anwalt vortrug – ist davon keine rede (mehr). ich könnte noch viele beispiele aufzählen. da müsste mal ein echter ermittler oder rechercheur ran, oder ein guter detektiv. oder ein begabter historiker. oder alle zusammen. denn: diese biographie ist immer noch löchrig … wie ein schweizer käse.

schweizer?

ja, denn niederländischer gouda-käse passt bei “löchern” nicht so gut.

schreibst du denn noch LIVE-gedichte?

ja, ich schreibe weiterhin auf, was mir einfällt, was mir zukommt, was auf mich eindringt, alles das, zweitklausens – aber: es sind ja immer wir beide, die die dinge aufschreiben: http://www.klausens.com/klausens-beim-boere-ns-kriegsverbrecherprozess-in-aachen.htm

ob die nachwelt das dann mal zu würdigen weiß?

ist das so wichtig? solange wir unsere pflicht tun?

sag mal, haben das nicht schon ganz andere gesagt: “wir taten nur unsere pflicht!”???

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also, klau|s|ens, da gibt es derzeit den prozess am landgericht aachen gegen den heute 88-jährigen heinrich boere … und man wirft ihm vor, 1944 in den niederlanden an 3 morden beteiligt gewesen zu sein. gegen zivilisten. als mitglied der waffen-ss. “kommando feldmeijer”. und dazu die losung “silbertanne”.

darüber hatten wir gestern schon gesprochen, zweitklausens. gestern war der vierte prozesstag in aachen – und da wurde zum zweiten mal die anklage verlesen, weil nun ein hörgerät vorhanden ist. der mann steht nach 65 jahren nun endlich vor einem deutschen gericht, um sich für diese taten zu verantworten.

was ist denn nun mit dem namen “boere”.

also: da er von einem niederländischen vater stammt, dieser name, sollten wir diesen als einen niederländischen familiennamen sehen.

und?

es spricht viel dafür, dass der name eine ableitung von “boer” ist. und “boer” ist der bauer.

ist das so wichtig? boris becker ist ja auch kein bäcker.

es geht nicht so sehr um den namen, sondern um die aussprache.

wie spricht man denn “oe” in den niederlanden aus?

eigentlich “u”.

wirklich?

ja, ich kenne jetzt nicht alle dialekte des niederländischen, aber in der grundsprache wäre es “u”.

also?

boer (deutsch: bauer)
broer (deutsch: bruder)
boek (deutsch: buch)

aha, die würde ich dann sprechen müssen, wenn ich es auf niederländisch tun wollte: buhr, bruhr, buk. so in etwa.

ja, und jetzt kommt das seltsame.

was denn?

der vorsitzende richter nohl spricht immer “böre” … und nicht “bure”.

er spricht den namen also deutsch aus.

genau: “oe” ist für uns immer ein “ö”. und boere ist ja als niederländer in deutschland geboren, war aber offenbar niederländer, wurde aber dann nach 2 jahren in der waffen-ss deutscher. und weil er fortan offenbar als deutscher galt und seit 1947 auch gänzlich in deutschland lebte, wurde er dann nicht ausgeliefert, weil er als deutscher staatsbürger nicht ausgeliefert werden konnte, nach der rechtslage. (ich vereinfache jetzt die ganzen juristischen fachfragen.)

aha: und der richter sagt immer “böre”, als wäre der heinrich boere ein deutscher.

aber der oberstaatsanwalt aus dortmund, ulrich maaß, der spricht von “bure” und nimmt die niederländische aussprache des namens, der ja auch ursprünglich ein niederländischer wohl ist. (ich erinnere auch an die buren, die einst in südafrika eindrangen … was auch zu diesem schrecklichen apartheidsystem dann führte.)

und die verteidigung?

da muss ich jetzt genauer drauf achten. – ich glaube die nebenklage, die für die nachkommen der opfer aktiv ist, spricht den namen auch immer “bure” aus.

das ist ja ein fulminantes sprachthema, was mit dem sachthema verknüpft ist.

ich denke immer: es ist ein detail, aber eines, über das es sich (auch) lohnt nachzudenken.

ist der heinrich boere nun “bure” oder “böre” auszusprechen?

und die andere frage: muss man ihn als mörder nun aburteilen oder nicht. (aber vielleicht sind bisweilen kleine details und große details irgendwie verknüpft.)

vielleicht sollte heinrich boere mal erläutern, als was er sich versteht. ob er sich nun als deutschen sieht, oder am ende gar als einen europäer.

ein europäer des verbrechens? als europäischer ns-verbrecher? was denkst du für komische dinge?!

mir fiel gerade auf, dass ein prozess-zuhörer auf seinem t-shirt demonstrativ die aufschrift “100% nationalistisch” hatte.

da siehst du es: die nationalitätenfrage ist immer ein absichtlich hochgespieltes thema rechter kräfte und kreise.

um so wichtiger, dass man sich mit solchen dingen befasst. die ns-ideologie hatte ja diesen unsäglichen begriff der rasse und der reinrassigkeit so demonstrativ in den vordergrund gestellt.

fatal war das. – zudem: was würden heute die alten römer, die sich dereinst mit uns vermischten, zu solchen debatten sagen?

mir fiel diese unterschiedliche aussprache von boere auf, und ich wollte das mal festhalten. – aber der mord an 3 niederländern und das urteil dazu … das bleibt das hauptthema. zudem: die erinnerung an die opfer! bei alledem.

wo hattest du die LIVE-gedichte abgelegt? zu dem prozess?

ach so. hier: http://www.klausens.com/klausens-beim-boere-ns-kriegsverbrecherprozess-in-aachen.htm

mit der aussprache von KLAUSENS beschäftigen wir uns jetzt besser nicht.

nein, wir haben ja mit den vielen schreibweisen des namens schon genug zu tun.

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klau|s|ens, du warst bei diesem prozess in aachen, gegen heinrich boere. bei diesem NS-kriegsverbrecherprozess?

ja, es ist einer der letzten prozesse gegen NS-täter, weil täter (und opfer) bald nicht mehr auf der welt sind.

und dieser mann?

dieser mann ist 88 jahre alt und wohnt bei eschweiler in aachen.

ein deutscher?

ja und nein.

was heißt das?

er wurde in eschweiler geboren, aber als kind einer deutschen und eines niederländers, hatte offenbar anfangs den niederländischen pass, zog später sowieso in die niederlande, wurde da dann mitglied der waffen-SS, was ihm wiederum – scheinbar als automatismus – nach zwei jahren einen deutschen, also reichsdeutschen, pass verlieh – und dann wurde er auch verhaftet, er floh, lebte in der bundesrepublik, und …

das hört sich alles sehr kompliziert an.

ist es nicht oder ist es doch. auf jeden fall war der mann sogar schon zum tode verurteilt worden, in abwesenheit, am 14.10.1949 von einem sondergericht in amsterdam.

und?

er ist ist bis heute nicht belangt worden, wie man merkt.

d.h. alles ist schon jahrzehnte her, aber noch immer ist er nicht abgeurteilt?

in deutschland nicht – deshalb ja der prozess. endlich oder schlussendlich oder viel zu spät.

wie soll man das bewerten?

das musst du das ausland fragen. natürlich macht man sich gedanken, wie es sein kann, dass …

und nun?

nun wird verhandelt. gestern war schon der vierte verhandlungstag.

na, also: es geht doch.

die verteidigung hatte wegen der schwerhörigkeit ihres mandanten auf ein hörgerät gedrungen. das hat der mann nun. aber die anwälte der nebenkläger fürchten, dass mit miesen tricks alles getan werden soll, dass dieser prozess behindert wird.

man nennt das “verfahrenstricks”.

ja, dieser vorwurf steht im raum. dabei wäre es dringend geboten, dass man bis zu einem urteil kommt. es hat ja alles auch mit der aufarbeitung unserer geschichte zu tun, und mit den deutschen verbrechen … und auch mit der rolle einiger bei der besetzung der niederlande. es hängen viele themen drin.

gibt es noch mehr?

klar. die hatten schon den oberstaatsanwalt ulrich maaß (aus dortmund, wo er als leiter der schwerpunkt-staatsanwaltschaft für NS-verbrechen arbeitet) als befangen abgelehnt. das wurde aber vom gericht zurückgewiesen. – die verteidigung hat dann sogar mit bezug auf ein urteil des europäischen gerichtshofes eine einstellung des verfahrens beantragt. da geht es um rechtsdebatten, wie das verbot der doppelverurteilung für ein verbrechen etc.  – das ist schon eine komplexe justizmaterie.

und?

das gericht hat die einstellung des verfahrens gestern abgelehnt.

gibt es presse?

gestern waren mindestens 12 personen auf den bänken für die medien, und am ersten prozesstag war es um ein vieles mehr.

der prozess läuft also jetzt?

zumindest kam der alte mann im rollstuhl, dieser heinrich boere, nun mit einem hörgerät – und der richter versichterte sich (und uns), dass der mann anständig hören kann. es wäre fatal, wenn man wegen solcher sachen den prozess ruinieren könnte.

das heißt, man muss an alles denken?

sicher: erst hieß es ja, er sei nicht verhandlungsfähig. das ganze hat ja eine vorgeschichte von jahren.

wenn man die drei morde von 1944 nimmt, dann sind es ja 65 jahre.

genau: und der heinrich boere lebte ja in eschweiler und kam bis heute ungescholten davon, wenn man es auf den tatvorwurf bezieht.

was ist der tatvorwurf?

man hat drei niederländer umgebracht. menschen, die man einfach so nahm und auswählte, als racheakt. zivilisten. dann fährt das kommando dorthin, erinnert sich an seine aktion “silbertanne” und knallt die leute ab.

das ist ja schrecklich.

und dann gibt es eben die diskussion, inwiefern solche taten nach dem kriegsrecht zu ahnden wären oder nicht. da hängen sehr viele rechtliche probleme und debatten dran.

also doch nicht so einfach?

nein, überhaupt nicht. und die prozesstage sind wegen der gesundheit zeitlich begrenzt, und boere wird dann im rollstuhl rein- und rausgefahren. da gibt es dann extra ärztliches personal, welches mit dicken supertaschen den mann dann begleitet. damit ihm bloß nichts passiert.

dann ist er wie ein rohes ei?

in gewisser weise ja. es gibt ja die hinterbliebenen der getöteten, und die wollen endlich einen rechtsspruch. das verbrechen soll gesühnt werden, indem ein urteil zumindest fällt.

du meinst herrn groot?

der war zum ersten verhandlungstag gekommen, um das LIVE zu erleben, dass da ein täter vor gericht sitzt. einer, der seinen vater teun de groot umbrachte.

täter?

alles spricht dafür. er hat es auch selber mal zugegeben: dieser heinrich boere. nur: er beruft sich auf den krieg. befehle, junger mann, alles das – und da geht es dann um die prinzipielle frage, ab wann kriegsverbrechen anfangen.

ist das so schwer?

sicher, man muss scheidelinien ziehen, sonst wäre ja jeder schuss ein verbrechen (ich denke, jeder schuss ist irgendwie ein verbrechen, aber rechtlich ist es nicht so. und im krieg herrschen noch ganz besondere gesetze.)

aber die haben doch vorsätzlich leute ermordet. wie die mafia.

ja, das stimmt. aber das muss ja alles genauso auch dann festgestellt werden und vom gericht abgeurteilt werden.

und wie?

da ist ein weiteres problem: man muss wohl alte dokumente und urteile verlesen und vorlesen.

zeugen?

angeblich nur einer (1), der noch lebt. und der ist schon einmal nicht vor gericht in aachen erschienen. alles nicht leicht.

ich verstehe.

ich verstehe auch.

dann begeben wir uns nun in die untiefen von nationalsozialistischen verbrechen.

genau das – und in diesen deutsch-niederländischen mengenbereich. denn hier (in diesem konkreten fall) kann nicht die eine nation für sich beanspruchen, nur in der opferrolle gewesen zu sein, weil dieser mann quasi für beide nationen schon “aufgelaufen” ist.

ein deutsch-niederländischer konflikt also auch.

auch das. (wie rein war wer? wie schuldig? wie unschuldig?) – wir schrieben auch LIVE-gedichte: http://www.klausens.com/klausens-beim-boere-ns-kriegsverbrecherprozess-in-aachen.htm

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Amsterdam is the perfect European city for Americans. Almost everyone speaks English, and making it even better than London, the accents are more exotic. We arrived at Amsterdam’s Schipohl Airport early on a gray Friday morning, dragging our luggage to the light rail line that would take us from the airport to the city’s Centraal Station. We had agreed to try and do our unaccompanied, seven-day, two-city, Amsterdam and Paris trip without resorting to taxicabs.

The initial confrontation with the complexities of public transit in a strange city is almost always a painful process. It usually takes me several hit and miss encounters with ticket kiosks, exact fare rules, or pressing buttons to open subway doors. While we did manage the light-rail connection into the city. Finding our hotel, just blocks from the station, proved a minor ordeal with the inadequate, schematic tourist maps we were carrying. Jet-lagged, confused and over-packed, we wandered around trying to figure out where we were until a busy woman setting up a produce market stand grudgingly pointed us in the right direction.

The hotel, modern and crisp, was located in, gasp, “the Red Light District.” Ah those liberal Dutch. While it was still the morning rush hour when we wandered in search of our hotel, I noted that the numerous “Coffee” shops we passed were in full swing, with customers lounging on sofas, and I suppose, inhaling to their hearts’ content. I thought, “hey is this a great town, or what?”

Refreshed after a brief nap, we went out to discover the charms of Amsterdam. The rings of tree-lined, interconnected canals, the bow-to-stern barges and houseboats, the eccentric, centuries-old Dutch architecture, cobbled streets and the bicycles everywhere combine to create a wonderful sense of being in a one-of-a-kind place. In a comfortably down-to-earth café, I ordered my lunch, a roast-beef sandwich with egg and mayonnaise, and a large draft of Heiniken. We’d been told that Dutch cuisine was less than stellar, but with my comfort-food palate, just about everything we ordered suited me well. Thus fortified, we began walking, a process that barely stopped for any of our waking hours during the three days we stayed in Amsterdam.

The canal-side streets, block after block of them, flow with the canals themselves in concentric rings defining and demarking the old city of Amsterdam. Each turn of the head is another photo-op, another perfect Netherlands motif. I began snapping and had to exercise a force of will to cease, to say “enough.” The day was sunny and there were shopping streets, book-stalls, street musicians and cafes with outdoor seating for coffee, pastries or wine. We were in search of the St. Nicklas’ Boat Club, a non-profit, cooperative canal boat tour service, an open-air alternative to the larger, glitzier glass-covered canal tour launches. But like so many cooperative ventures, the enterprise had run aground and was no longer operating. More wandering, more pastry, more wine and back to the hotel for a break before dinner.

One residual piece of three centuries of Dutch East Indies colonial history is Amsterdam’s array of Indonesian restaurants, a cuisine I’d never experienced. On a recommendation, we selected a “Rice Table” offering at Indrapur, one of the tonier Indonesian eateries. Rice Table meals are an Indonesian version of Chinese Dim Sum or the Iberian Tapas. In deference to my Irish heritage, we chose a “mild” (a misnomer) selection of over twenty different and exotically flavored small dishes, every one of which was a treat. Returning from our East Indies meal, we caught a tram to a mid-town carnival and rode a giant Ferris wheel up and over the lights of the city. There was a brightly lit, ten-story swing with seats for two that swung out over the carnival below. I dared my wife to no avail. Two nights later we were on it.

Our second day in Amsterdam day came on cold and wet. With rain jackets, umbrellas and our new competence at navigating the city’s tram lines, we arrived early at the already crowded van Gogh museum. As a lifelong fan, I was thrilled to discover, along with so many favorites, a couple of stunning landscapes I’d never before seen. More walking in the drizzle through a half-dozen block street market, more tram riding and then a surprisingly good lunch in a pretentious restaurant with annoyingly indifferent service. Much more walking, window and actual shopping, until exhaustion and the proximity to our hotel got us back to our room for a break.

Relatively restored, we headed back out into the rain for dinner. We were to have a meal of traditional Dutch cuisine, another recommendation. When we arrived at the address, the Dutch eatery had been replaced by an Italian restaurant. At a more Dutch place down the street, we were told we could be seated in fifteen minutes and that we could wait in the bar. After a half hour, we left. Back out in the rain and several streets away, we passed a small bistro named Prego. Why not? We were seated and began what was to be one of the best meals of the entire trip. Two aging gays were running the place and the vibe was a pleasant as it was unostentatious. The food was first rate and creative. I had wild boar, my first ever, and my wife a fish dish. Everything was just right and the dessert more than just right. After warm farewells from our host and our waiter, we headed out once again into the chilly drizzle and toward our king-sized hotel bed.

Sunday, our last full day in Amsterdam, began with the Hotel’s inclusive and first-rate buffet breakfast. Then, a one-hour canal tour on a glass-covered boat accompanied by a large group of Chinese tourists. Strangely enough, my canal photos taken from water level proved less pleasing than those taken ashore. The loop of the city by boat and the accompanying sound track was instructive.

One of the sights from the boat was the lineup of visitors waiting to tour the Ann Frank House, an Amsterdam attraction as famous as the canals and the van Gogh Museum. For better or worse, I opted to pass on the Ann Frank house, feeling as I do that I’m already too well aware of the horrors of the all too recent past. Prior to this trip, a friend had given me tourist information on Amsterdam that included a brochure from the “Dutch Resistance Museum.” The brochure rightly celebrates the heroism of those who dared to actively resist one of the most brutal terror regimes in human history. On the other hand only a single allusion notes the existence of the NSB, the Dutch National Socialist Party, the active collaborators with the Nazi Occupation. Over 100,000 Dutch Jews perished during the war, the highest death rate per capita in the occupied Western European countries. That and the fact that 100,000 Dutch citizens volunteered to serve in the German armed forces, mostly in the Waffen SS on the Eastern Front, speaks for itself. And finally, the Frank family, like so many of the resistance heroes, was betrayed to the Nazis, it seems, by a fellow Dutch citizen.

More shopping, a lot more walking, some lunch, dinner, more photo taking and finally back to the hotel and bed. On our way back through the Red Light district, I noted that by comparison, the coffee shop scene with its stoned college kids and dreadlocked skateboarders appeared downright wholesome.

In the morning, I managed one last stroll around the canals before leaving to meet our noon train for Paris.

Well two elite Czech soldiers, both of whom were decorated upon their homecoming by the Czech defence minister and chief of staff, evidently thought it a good idea to do so. Jan Cermak and Hynek Matonoha, members of a rapid reaction unit stationed up until recently in Logar province, sported for most of their deployment emblems of the 9th Waffen SS Panzer Division “Hohenstaufen” and 36th Waffen Grenadier Division Of The SS “Dirlewanger” respectively. Literally a brigade of criminals the latter were nefarious even by Nazi standards – rapes, corruption, robberies, indiscriminate murders, etc and major players in suppressing the Slovak National Uprising.

Commander of the Czech forces in the Logar province Petr Prochazka ordered the badges and any photos of them be burnt, but fortunately some survived. Fearing that the military would attempt to cover up the whole business members of the Czech police, who’d also been serving in Afghanistan, secretly passed details of the story over to one of the Czech Republic’s leading newspapers, Mladá fronta Dnes:

Report in English and Czech (translator may take a few seconds to load)

Cermak, who claimed it was a joke – he apparently being unaware that the badge he’d worn was associated with the Nazis (hmmm, could he not have czeched?) – his co-emblem wearer Matonoha, and “the cleaner” Prochazka have all been suspended today as a result. Bloody good job too, say I . . . .

Perang Dunia II adalah sebuah awal perang dimana teknologi senjata dan keberadaan pasukan elit memainkan peran utama. Pasukan-pasukan elite ini menjalankan misi-misi khusus yang tidak dapat dilakukan pasukan lain. Seperti misalnya misi sabotase, penculikan dan pembunuhan atau infiltrasi. Keberadaannya sangat ditakuti oleh lawan-lawan karena sangat berpengaruh pada jalannya peperangan.

Axis adalah persekutuan antara Jerman dan Italia, yang merupakan salah satu blok di Front Europe. Selama perang dunia II Jerman memiliki mesin perang yang paling ditakuti, dimana yang ditakuti bukan hanya karena kemampuan tempur yang sangat tinggi melainkan juga karena kekejaman, loyalitas yang tanpa batas dan sangat fanatik pada ideologi Nazi dan sang Führer Adolf Hitler. Mesin-mesin perang Jerman:

1. Waffen-SS
Pasca kekalahan Jerman dalam Perang Dunia I, kekacauan politik dan anarki melanda Jerman. Partai ultra sayap kanan Nazi (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) menjanjian perubahan dan revolusi bagi Jerman yang diketuai oleh Adolf Hitler, yang merupakan orator ulung yang berbakat mempengaruhi massa, Karena dianggap melakukan kudeta terhadap pemerintahan Republik Weimar, Hitler di tangkap dan ia menghabiskan 13 bulan di Penjara Landsberg.

Pada Bulan April 1925, Hitler mengorganisir para pengawal pribadinya yang disebut dengan Schutztaffel (Pasukan Pelindung). Dari sinilah nama SS yang sangat ditakuti mulai dikenal. Hitler menunjuk Heinrich Himmler sebagai pemimpin SS. Himmler berambisi berambisi menjanjikan SS sebagai kekuatan elit bersenjata dalam partai Nazi. Loyalitas kepada Adolf Hitler tetap menjadi etos dan syarat utama SS. Proses rekrutmen anggota SS juga sangat ketat, menekankan pada kemurnian ras selain kekuatan fisik dan keyakinan politik serta ideologi. Sampai akhir tahun 1933, SS telah memiliki 52.000 anggota, tidak hanya terdiri dari pengawal pribadi Hitler tapi juga berkembang menjadi badan intelejen rahasia yang disebut Sicherheitsdientst (SD). Nama Waffen-SS baru dikenal Maret 1940, agar tidak menyinggung Wehrmact yang tetap diakui sebagai Angakatan Bersenjata Jerman. Menjelang meletusnya Perang Dunia II (1939), Hitler menempatkan SS-Verfugungstruppe (SS-VT) dibawah komando Wehrmacht (OKW) dalam invasi ke Polandia. Kenyataan dilapangan memang menunjukkan bahwa prajurit Waffen-SS memiliki semangat tempur yang luar biasa dan pantang menyerah dibandingkan dengan tentara regular Wehrmact.

Waffen-SS merupakan penguasa seni perang mekanis karena memiliki divisi-divisi Panser yang sangat disegani dan ditakuti lawannya di darat. Banyak Jago-jago tank yang sangat termasyhur selama perang berasal dari Waffen-SS, diantaranya Michael Wittmann (dengan catatan korban 138 tank lawan dan 132 meriam anti-tank), Franz Straudegger seorang prajurit SS yang masih berusia 20 tahun ketika berhasil menghancurkan 22 tank T-34 Uni Soviet seorang diri dalam pertempuran Kursk. Serta Ernest Barkman (Das Reich), seorang ace tank Panther yang paling terkenal.

Waffen-SS sebagai Pasukan Multinasional merupakan ide dari Heinrich Himmler untuk merekrut sukarelawan dari berbagai bangsa. Hal ini didorong oleh semakin berkurangnya sumber daya manusia yang bisa didapatkan dari bangsa Jerman sendiri. Sukarelawan asing yang berhasil direkrut mencapai jumlah ratusan ribu orang yang tersiri dari orang Perancis, Belanda, Norwegia, Finlandia, Rusia, dan lain-lain. Ekspansi ini sekaligus bagian dari rencana Adolf Hitler untuk menancapkan pengaruh ideologinya ke seluruh penjuru Eropa dan sebagai eksperimen Himmler untuk membentuk ‘Angkatan Bersenjata Eropa’.

Meskipun divisi-divisi elit Panzer Waffen-SS sangat terkenal dan disegani sebagai unit-unit tempur terbaik yang tampil dalam Perang dunia II, keterlibatan pasukan SS sebagai mesin pembunuh Nazi Jerman dalam kekejaman dan pembantaian warga sipil selama perang di Eropa sedikit banyak telah menodai reputasi mereka.

2. Fallschirmjäger
Fallschirmjäger adalah pasukan payung Jerman yang pertama kali dalam sejarah melakukan pendaratan dengan parasut dari udara dalam skala besar-besaran. Penerjunan pasukan dalam pertempuran sebenarnya bukan hal yang baru. Tetapi Fallschirmjäger-lah yang mempelopori operasi penerjunan besar-besaran seperti yang dilakukan oleh Jendral Kurt Student untuk merebut pulau Kreta di Laut Tengah dari tangan Inggris. Operasi besar-besaran ini harus dibayar mahal dengan besarnya jumlah korban jiwa di pihak Jerman meskipun mereka berhasil menuntaskan misi merebut Kreta.

Fallschirmjäger lahir dari ambisi Herman Göring, pemimpin Lutwaffe untuk memperkuat armada kebanggaannya pada Juli 1938. Salah satunya dengan memiliki dan memperkuat divisi penerjun paying. Tetapi, persiapan pasukan penerjun paying sampai menjelang meletusnya Perang dunia II masih belum seksama. Ketika perang mulai meletus, Jerman memang telah memiliki divisi-divisi pasukan paying yang siap tempur meskipun masih belum begitu terlatih dengan baik. Selama Perang Dunia II, Fallschirmjäger telah kehilangan 55.000 orang tewas, dan 8000 orang lain masih dinyatakan hilang dalam tugas.

3. Bradenburg
Bradenburg adalah satuan komando Jerman yang dibentuk pada tahun 1939. Cikal bakal kesatuan ini telah ada sejak Perang Dunia I, dimana Hauptmann (Kapten) Theodor von Hippel memiliki gagasan untuk membentuk satu unit pasukan khusus berukuran kecil, mampu bergerak cepat, sangat terlatih dalam aksi penyusupan dan sabotase, serta mahir berbicara dalam bahasa asing. Unit pasukan ini diharapkan dapat menyusup ke garis belakang lawan untuk membuat kakacauan dan menghancurkan suplai logistik, jalur komunikasi, dan garis komando lawan.

Berbeda dengan Waffen-SS, Bradenburg tidak memiliki kaitan apapun dengan partai Nazi. Mereka berada langsung di bawah komando Abwehr (Badan intelejen Angkatan Bersenjata Jerman) dan merupakan satuan pasukan komando yang menjalankan misi-misi khusus.

Selasai perang, para veteran Bradenburg banyak yang tidak kembali kepada kehidupan sipil yang damai dan memilih tetap bertugas di kemiliteran. Sebagian besar dari mereka bergabung dengan Legiun Asing Perancis, atau sebagai penasehat militer di berbagai Negara. Termasuk diantaranya adalah penasehat militer Presiden Indonesia pertama yaitu Soekarno.

REFERENSI:

Brandenburgs Ministerpräsident Matthias Platzeck (SPD) hat gefordert, den “überfälligen Prozess der Versöhnung” (SPIEGEL-Essay) in Ostdeutschland, gemeint war wohl der Umgang mit ehemaligen SED-Funktionären, “endlich an[zu]fangen”. Es ziehe sich ein “ungesunder Riss [...] durch die ostdeutsche Gesellschaft”.

Schön und gut, aber Platzeck vergleicht die Situation mit der, in der Kurt Schumacher zwei frühere hohe Offiziere der Waffen-SS empfängt und sich damit rechtfertigt, es sei eine “menschliche und staatsbürgerliche Notwendigkeit”, die Ausgrenzung zu beenden.

Ein Nazivergleich! Ex-SED = Ex-Waffen-SS, da ist die Empörung natürlich groß, quer durch alle Parteien.

Ein Nazivergleich? Meiner Meinung nach ist das Unsinn. Keineswegs wird hier tatsächlich ein System-Vergleich angestellt, es werden zwei Situationen verglichen, in denen es (laut der Beteiligten) einer Versöhnung bedarf. Problematisch ist dieser Vergleich dennoch, denn die Situation in der Bundesrepublik nach offiziellem Ende des Faschismus war doch eine andere als die der Bundesrepublik knapp 20 Jahre nach Vereinigung. Allerdings besteht der Unterschied keineswegs darin, so wie es Dagmar Ziegler (SPD) sehen will, dass “es keine Ausgrenzung der LINKEn gebe, deren Führung zu den Gewinnern der Einheit” zählen (FOCUS) – dies impliziert, dass es eine Ausgrenzung der (lies “armen”?) Faschisten gegeben habe, die zu den Verlierern des 2. Weltkrieges gezählt haben sollen.

Hier liegt in der Tat der Hund begraben. Die Empörung über den Vergleich ist nichts weiter als eine Empörung darüber, dass ein ausgewiesener “Antikommunist” es nun wagt, sich mit dem Ex-Feind professionell abzugeben und den allgemeinen Umgang mit diesem zu beklagen. LIES: Es wird sich darüber empört, dass die gleichzeitige Verwendung von hoher Symbolpotenz (unter Verwendung des maximalen Platzhalters “Waffen-SS” / “Nazis”) mit einer ausgestreckten Hand die zukünftige tatsächliche Vergleichsmöglichkeit (Ex-SED/ex-PDS/LINKE = Nazis) entschärft, also für die Empörten entwertet wird. Dies verhindert u.U. zukünftige beliebte “Diktaturvergleiche” für diejenigen im bürgerlichen Lager, die gerne einmal (wie übrigens Schumacher auch) Linksradikale und Rechtsradikale als “politische Radikale” in einen Topf werfen. Es wird sich also eigentlich darüber empört, dass gerade kein (implizierter) Nazivergleich stattfindet, gleichzeitig aber solche Vergleiche für die Zukunft erschwert werden.

Note: This is the first of a series of four articles dealing with the campaign in France and Germany in 1944-1945.  The second installment “Mortain to Market-Garden” was posted a couple of months back. The link to that article is here: http://padresteve.wordpress.com/2009/09/17/mortain-to-market-garden-a-study-in-how-armies-improvise-in-rapidly-changing-situations/

The others should be posted in the coming weeks.

Introduction

Eisenhower and 101st Airborne

The American landings on Omaha Beach were critical to the success of the Allied invasion northwestern Europe in the overall Overlord plan.  Without success at Omaha there would have been a strong chance that the German 7^th Army and Panzer Group West could have isolated the remaining beachheads, and even if unsuccessful at throwing the Allies into the sea could have produced a stalemate that would have bled the Allies white.  This quite possibly could have led to a political and military debacle for the western allies which would have certainly changed the course of World War II and maybe the course of history.[i] This is not to say the Germans would have won the war, but merely to state that a defeat on Omaha could have changed the outcomes of the war significantly.   Subsequent to the successful landing there were opportunities both for the Allies and the Germans to change the way that the campaign unfolded, thus the battles leading up to the breakout at Avranches are critical to its development and the subsequent campaign in France.

OVERLORD: The Preparations

The planning for the Normandy invasion began in earnest after the QUADRANT conference in Quebec in August 1943.  The timetable for the operation was established at the Tehran conference where Stalin sided with the Americans on the need for an invasion of France in the spring of 1944.[ii] Prior to this there had been some planning by both the British and Americans for the eventual invasion initially named ROUNDUP.  These preparations and plans included a large scale raid at Dieppe in 1942 which ended in disaster but which provided needed experience in what not to do in an amphibious assault on a heavily defended beach.        The failure at Dieppe also darkened the mood of the Allies, the British in particular to the success of such operations, bringing to mind the failed Gallipoli campaign of 1915 as well as the opposed landings at Salerno and the USMC experience at Tarawa.[iii] Despite this the Americans led by General Marshall pushed for an early invasion of northwest Europe. Churchill and the British due to their weakness in land power pushed for land operations in the Mediterranean, and even in Norway as an option to the assault in France. The conflicted mindset of the Allies left them in the position of planning almost exclusively for the success of the initial landings and build up to the near exclusion of planning for the subsequent campaign once they landed. This especially included what one writer described as “the maze of troubles awaiting behind the French shore.”[iv]

LST-325 at Normandy, Specialized Landing Ships and Craft were in High Demand and Short Supply in June 1944

Despite conflicts between the Americans and British political and military leadership the planning for the Normandy landings detailed in NEPTUNE and OVERLORD moved ahead.  General Dwight Eisenhower was appointed as the commander of SHAEF with his major subordinates for Land, Air and Sea which caused consternation on both sides of the Atlantic.[v] [vi] The planned operation was expanded from the initial 3 division assault on a narrow front to a minimum 5 division assault on a broad front across Normandy[vii] supplemented by a strong airborne force.[viii] Overall the plan as it developed reflected a distinctly “American willingness to confront the enemy head-on in a collision which Britain’s leaders had sought for so long to defer.”[ix] It is ironic in a sense that the British avoidance of the head on attack was based on their known lack of manpower.  Britain had few infantry reserves to sustain the war effort and the Americans only late recognized their own deficiency in both quantity and quality of infantry forces on which their strategy depended.  That the western allies, so rich in material and natural resources would be so deficient in infantry manpower was a key constraint on the subsequent campaign in France and Germany.  The shortage of infantry forces would cause great consternation among the Allies as the campaign in France wore on. The Germans too faced manpower shortages due to the immense losses sustained on the Eastern front, those lost in Africa and those tied down in Italy, the Balkans and Norway as well as the drain caused by Luftwaffe Field Divisions and troops diverted into the Waffen-SS.   The German Army resorted to smaller divisions and the created many “static” divisions manned by elderly or invalid Germans to plug the gaps along the Atlantic wall. The Germans were also forced to recruit “Volksdeutsch” and foreign “volunteers” to fill out both Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS formations.

Omaha Beach

Prior to the final decision to mount an invasion the Allied planners had contended with the location of the assault in northwestern France.  The Pas de Calais provided a direct route was rejected because it was where the Germans would expect the strike to occur and because it was where the German defenses were strongest.  The fiasco at Dieppe had provided ample proof of what could happen when making an assault into a heavily fortified port.  Likewise the mouth of the Seine near Le Harve was rejected because of the few beaches suitable for landing and because the forces would be split on both sides of the river.  Brittany was excluded due to its distance from the campaigns objectives in Germany.[x] This left Normandy which offered access to a sufficient number of ports and offered some protection from the weather. Normandy offered options to advance the campaign toward the “Breton ports or Le Harve as might be convenient.”[xi] Omaha beach, situated on the center right of the strike would be crucial to the success of the assault situated to the left of UTAH and the right of the British beaches.

Outnumbered Paratroops of II Fallschirmjaeger Corps Delayed US Forces Considerably in Normandy

Once Normandy was selected as the location for the strike by the Allies, the planning sessions remained contentious.  This was especially true when the Allies debated the amount and type of amphibious lift that could be provided for the landings, particularly the larger types of landing ships and craft to support the Normandy invasion and the planned invasion of southern France, Operation ANVIL.  The increase in OVERLORD requirements for landing craft had an impact in the Mediterranean and resulted in ANVIL being postponed until later in the summer.

As part of their preparations the Allies launched a massive deception campaign, Operation FORTITUDE.  This operation utilized the fictitious First Army Group under the “command” of General George Patton. Patton was still smarting from his relief of command of 7^th Army following slapping commanded an “Army Group” which incorporated the use of dummy camp sites, dummy tanks, aircraft and vehicles, falsified orders of battle and communications to deceive German intelligence.[xii] The success of this effort was heightened by the fact that all German intelligence agents in the U.K. had been neutralized or turned by the British secret service.  Additionally the Luftwaffe’s limited air reconnaissance could only confirm the pre-invasion build ups throughout England without determining the target of the invasion.[xiii] The German intelligence chief in the west, Colonel Baron von Roenne “was deceived by FORTITUDE’s fantasy invasion force for the Pas de Calais.”[xiv] Despite this Commander of the 7^th Army recognized by 1943 that Normandy was a likely Allied target and efforts were made to shift 7^th Army’s center of gravity from Brittany to Normandy.  The one potential German success in getting wind of when the Allied landings would occur was lost when German intelligence discovered two lines of Verlaine’s “Chason d’ Automme” in June 1944 which were to alert the French Resistance of the invasion.  The security section of 15^th Army heard them transmitted on the afternoon of 5 June and notified General Jodl at OKW, but no action was taken to alert forces on the coast.[xv] Allied intelligence was aided by ULTRA intercepts of coded German wireless transmissions. However this was less of a factor than during the African and Italian campaigns as more German communications were sent via secure telephone and telegraph lines vice wireless.[xvi] Allied deception efforts were for the most part successful in identifying German forces deployed in Normandy. However they were uncertain about the location of the 352^nd Infantry Division which had been deployed along OMAHA and taken units of the 709^th Infantry Division under its command when it moved to the coast.[xvii]

8th Air Force Bombers Helped Hit German Oil Production Facilities and caused the Luftwaffe to spend its fighter squadrons over Germany than France

The Allied air campaign leading up to the invasion was based on attempting to isolate the invasion site from German reinforcements. Leigh-Mallory the Air Chief developed the “TRANSPORTATION PLAN” which focused efforts on destroying the French railroad infrastructure.[xviii] A more effective effort was led by General Brereton and his Ninth Air Force which was composed of medium bombers and fighters.  Brereton’s aircraft attacked bridges and rapidly achieved success in crippling German efforts to reinforce Normandy.[xix] Max Hastings gives more credit to the American bombing campaign in Germany to crippling the German defense in the west. General Spaatz and the 8^th Air Force destroyed German production capacity in oil and petroleum as well as the degraded the German fighter force.  The American daylight raids so seriously degraded the German fighter force that it could not mount effective resistance to the invasion.[xx] Russell Weigley also notes that Albert Speer the Reich Armaments Minister said that “it was the oil raids of 1944 that decided the war.”[xxi]

Landing craft passing USS Augusta

Planning and preparations for OMAHA were based around getting the 1^st and 29^th Infantry Divisions ashore and them securing a beachhead “twenty-five kilometers wide and eight or nine kilometers deep.”[xxii] American preparations were thorough and ambitious, but the American assault would go through the most heavily defended sector of German defenses in Normandy.  The landing beaches were wide and bordered by dunes which were nearly impassable to vehicles and “scrub covered bluffs thirty to fifty meters high…rough and impassable to vehicles even to tracked vehicles except at a few places.  The exits were unimproved roads running through four or five draws that cut the bluffs.”[xxiii] Dug in along those bluffs was the better part of the 352^nd Division. The Americans compounded their selection of a difficult and heavily defended landing zone the Americans failed to take advantage of many of the “gadgets” that were offered by the British which in hindsight could have aided the Americans greatly.  The Americans made use of two battalions of DD (Dual Drive) tanks but turned down the offer of flail tanks, flamethrower tanks, and engineer tanks, the “funnies” developed by General Hobart and the British 79^th Armored Division.[xxiv] Weigley believes that the American view of “tanks as instruments of mobility rather than of breakthrough power.” Likewise the Americans victories in the First World War were won by infantry with little tank support.[xxv] In this aspect the Americans were less receptive to utilizing all available technology to support their landings, something that when considering the fact that Americans were great lovers of gadgets and technology. The British use of the Armor, including the “Funnies” on the beaches to provide direct fire into German strong points lessened their infantry casualties on D-Day. Due to this lack of armor support on the beach American forces on OMAHA had little opportunity to exercise true combined arms operations during the initial landings.[xxvi]

Dual Drive or DD Tanks took heavy Losses at Omaha

German preparations for an Allied landing in Normandy were less advanced than the Pas de Calais.  However they had made great strides since late 1943. Field Marshal Rommel greatly increased defensive preparations along the front, including the Normandy beaches.  One of Rommel’s initiatives was to deploy Panzer Divisions near the coast where they could rapidly respond to an invasion.  However Rommel did not get everything that he wanted.  The OKW only allotted him two Panzer Divisions to be deployed near the Normandy beaches.  Only one of these the 21^st Panzer Division was deployed near Caen in the British sector.  One wonders the result had the 12^th SS Panzer Division been deployed behind OMAHA. [xxvii]

OMAHA: The Landings

Like the rest of the Allied invasion forces the 1^st and 29^th U.S. Infantry Divisions set sail from their embarkation ports with the intent of landing on June 5^th.  General Bradley, commanding the First Army until the American XII Army Group would be activated accompanied the invasion force.  The OMAHA landing was under the command of General Gerow and his V Corps while VII Corps led by the 4^th Infantry Division landed at Utah supported by airdrops of the 82^nd and 101^st Airborne Divisions inland.  American command and control during the invasion was exercised from sea as in the Pacific, although General Officers were to go ashore with each of the American divisions.  A severe channel storm disrupted the plan to land on the 5^th and Eisenhower delayed the invasion one day catching a break in the weather and electing to go on the 6th.[xxviii] This delay while uncomfortable for the embarked troops caused the Germans to believe that no invasion would take place until the next favorable tide and moon cycle later in the month.[xxix] The assumption that no invasion was possible ensured that a number of key senior German leaders, including Rommel were absent from the invasion front when the Allies landed.[xxx]

1st Infantry Divison Troops at the Omaha Beach Sea Wall

The landing beaches at OMAHA stretched about 6500 meters from Colleville-Sur-Mer to Vierville-Sur-Mere in the west.  The beaches are wide with bluffs overlooking them and a seawall between the beaches and the bluffs.  Additionally several small towns dot the beach. To the west of the town of Vierville, a prominent height overlooked the entire beachhead.  Named Pont du Hoc, it was believed to house a 150mm battery sighted where it could enfilade the OMAHA landing zones.  The Americans assigned to the 2^nd Ranger Battalion to make a seaborne assault to land, scale the cliffs and take the battery.  Companies from this battalion made a heroic landing and scaled the cliffs to capture the strongpoint only to discover that the guns had not been emplaced.  The Rangers took heavy casualties and held their isolated beachhead against German counterattacks until relieved by the 29^th Division on the morning of June 8^th.[xxxi]

H-Hour for OMAHA was 0630.  Unfortunately the assault troops were transferred to their LCVP landing craft 16-20 kilometers from the beach.  The result was a long and dangerous ride in the small craft for the infantry.  Most of the infantry were completely soaked in sea spay and seasick before going ashore and they carried loads far above what they normally would carry into battle.[xxxii] The Armor support was one battalion of DD tanks, the 741^st Armored Battalion, supporting the 16^th Infantry Refiment of 1^st Infantry Division. These were also launched too far out and nearly all of the tanks were swamped and lost before firing a shot in anger.[xxxiii] Other American support units needed to provide firepower on the beach were equally unfortunate. Weigley notes that at OMAHA “at least 10 of the LCVPs sank” as did “the craft carrying almost all of the 105mm howitzers that were to be the first artillery ashore after the tanks.”[xxxiv] The losses would cripple the assault on OMAHA and nearly cause its abandonment.

Panzers and Grenadiers in Normandy

As the soldiers of the American divisions on OMAHA came ashore they faced German defenders of the 352^nd, 716^th and a regiment of the 709th Infantry Division, the latter under the tactical command of the 352^nd.   Without the bulk of their tanks artillery and lacking close air support the Americans struggled across the beaches and were cut down in large numbers before being pinned down behind the sea wall.[xxxv] With the Americans pinned down on the beach unable to advance, the time tables for the reinforcing waves became snarled amid the German beach obstacles which had not been cleared.  This was in large part due to 40% casualties among the Combat Engineers and the loss of all but five bulldozers.[xxxvi] Naval officers were frustrated in their attempts to provide naval gunfire support by the lack of identifiable targets on the beaches.  Yet German strongpoint’s were “knocked out by either by superbly directed vigorous gunfire from destroyers steaming as close as 800 yards offshore, or by determined action from Rangers or infantry.[xxxvii]

Soldiers ashore discovered that they were not facing the static 716^th Division but the veteran 352^nd Division as well.[xxxviii] Only the leadership and actions of Brigadier General Norman Cota the 29^th Division’s Deputy Commander and Colonel Charles Canham of the 116^th Infantry kept the situation from complete collapse.  They were able to rally their troops. Under their leadership small units from the 116^th which had its linage back to the “Stonewall Brigade” as well as elements of the 16^th and 18^th Infantry Regiments began to move forward.  Surviving junior leaders began to lead survivors through the dunes and up the bluffs to attack German defenders of the roads leading up from the beach from the flank and rear.  A mid-day break in the weather allowed some close tactical air support giving the troops badly needed support.

With the situation desperate General Bradley considered the evacuation of OMAHA.  At sea events were as confused as Bradley and his staff attempted to make sense of what was going on.  Even later in the evening there was discussion of diverting all further reinforcements from OMAHA to the British beaches.[xxxix]At 1330 hours “Gerow signaled Bradley: “Troops formerly pinned down on beaches…advancing up heights behind beaches.”[xl] By the end of the day Bradley’s aid Major Hansen noted Bradley’s comments to Collins: “They are digging in on Omaha beach with their fingernails. I hope they can push in and get some stuff ashore.”  And Montgomery: “Someday I’ll tell Gen[eral] Eisenhower just how close it was for a few hours.”[xli]

The Author Teaching at Point du Hoc in 2004

The landings at OMAHA succeeded at a cost of over 2000 casualties.  Critical to the success of the landings were the German inability to reinforce their defending troops on the beach.  Likewise the weakness of the units available to mount the standard counterattack that was critical to German defensive plans on D-Day itself kept the Germans from driving the Americans back into the Channel. The 352^nd Division fought superbly under the full weight of V Corps and the British XXX Corps on its right suffering heavy casualties as they contested every inch of ground.  The 716^th Division composed of second rate troops melted under the onslaught.  Allied air supremacy played a key role as sorties by the 8^th and 9^th Air Forces helped keep German reinforcements from arriving and interdicted counter attacks inland.  Weigley credits the Allied air superiority with the success of the landings and with limiting casualties.[xlii] Von Rundstedt and other German commanders in France were limited by the delay and refusal of Hitler and OKW to release Panzer reserves when needed most early on June 6^th.  By the close of D-Day allied forces had secured the five invasion beaches but not achieved their objectives of taking Caen and Bayuex.  Since the forces on the various beachheads had not linked up the beaches would have been extremely vulnerable had the Germans been able to mount a rapid counterattack by Panzers and strong infantry formations as they had at Salerno.

Major Battles to the Breakout at Avranches

Securing the Beachheads:

It took the V and VII Corps nearly a week to secure the beachheads. German forces including the stalwart 352^nd Division resisted stubbornly and mounted sharp local counterattacks which kept the Americans off balance.  Elements of the 29^th Division and the 90^th Division began to push inland and to expand the beachhead toward UTAH. Opposed by the 352^nd Division and elements of the 91^st Airlanding Division and other non-divisional units the fighting revealed the inexperience of the American infantry formations and the uneven quality of their leadership.  As the Americans tackled the Germans in the labyrinth of the Bocage country the defensive skill of the Germans cost many American lives and delayed the joining of the beachheads. On the 13^th the link up was solid enough to enabling the Americans to conduct the follow up operations needed to expand the beachhead, secure Cherbourg and clear the Cotentin.

Tiger Tank and Crew in Normandy

In some American divisions the hard fighting triggered a leadership crisis.  The lack of success of the 90^th Division led General “Lightening Joe” Collins of VII Corps relieve the division commander and two regimental commanders of command, a portent of things to come with other American units.[xliii] As the V and VII corps pushed into the “Bocage” they were followed by a massive build up of troops and equipment delivered to the beaches and to the artificial “Mulberry” harbors.  Despite their numeric superiority, air supremacy and massive Naval gunfire support and facing the weakened 352^nd, 91^st and the 6^th Parachute Regiment and other less than quality formations, survivors of the static divisions, the Americans made painfully slow progress as they moved off the beachhead and into the Bocage.[xliv]

The Capture of Cherbourg

Once the beachheads had been consolidated the Americans turned their attention toward Cherbourg. Cherbourg was the major naval port at the far northwest tip of the Cotentin.  D-Day planners counted on its swift capture and rehabilitation to serve as a supply port for the Allied forces. The 9^th Division drove south to the coast near Barneville on the 18^th of June cutting off the German forces covering the approaches to Cherbourg.[xlv] This put the Germans in a bind as the 7^th Army “had to split its forces in the peninsula in order to hold the fortress a little longer and thus to gain time for the establishment of the southern front on the Cotentin peninsula.[xlvi] The German forces arrayed before Cherbourg waged a desperate defense centered around the 243^rd Infantry Division and other assorted battle groups of LXXXIV Corps, whose commander General Marcks one of the best German Generals was killed in action on 12 June.[xlvii] The U.S. VII Corps under Collins with the 9^th, 4^th and 79^th Divisions pushed up the peninsula capturing Cherbourg on June 29^th.  Bradley pushed hard for the capture of the port as the Mulberries had been ravaged by a severe Channel storm the week prior. The port of Cherbourg was thoroughly demolished by German engineers and would not be fully operational for months. The loss of the Mulberries and delay in Cherbourg’s availability meant that few supplies were landed on the beaches would “hinder the escape from the constricting land of the hedgerows into which the Americans had come in search of a port.[xlviii]

The Battle of Caumont Gap

V Corps under Gerow made a cautious advance by phase lines toward Caumont, St Lo and Carentan.  The deliberate advance by the Corps toward a line weakly held by the Reconnaissance battalion of the 17^th SS Panzer Grenadier Division was directed by Bradley who did not want to divert attention from the effort against Cherbourg.   After capturing Caumont V Corps halted and continued aggressive patrolling to deceive the Germans while digging in.[xlix] The possibility existed that a strong push against the weak German line could have led to an opportunity to envelope the German line west of Caen. This was a missed opportunity that in part led to the bloody and controversial campaign to capture Caen.[l]

British efforts around Caen

Montgomery had ambitious plans to break out of Normandy by capturing Caen on D-Day and driving toward Falaise and Argentan.  The British plans for this were frustrated by the rapid reinforcement of the sector by the Germans and the activities of 21^st Panzer, Panzer Lehr, and the 12^th SS Panzer Divisions.  A flanking maneuver at Villers-Bocage was frustrated by a few Tiger tanks led by the legendary Waffen SS Panzer commander Captain Michael Wittman whose tanks devastated a British Armored battalion.[li] A series of disastrous attacks toward Caen (EPSOM, CHARNWOOD and GOODWOOD) strongly supported by air strikes and Naval gunfire finally succeeded in taking that unfortunate city on July 18^th but failed to take the heights beyond the town.[lii] Against crack well dug in German forces the British took heavy casualties in tanks and infantry seriously straining their ability to conduct high intensity combat operations in the future.[liii] The one benefit, which Montgomery would claim after the war as his original plan was that German forces were fixed before Caen and ground down so they could not be used against Bradley’s breakout in the west at St Lo.[liv]

Panzer Ace Captain Michael Wittmann on His Tiger Tank

Clearing the Bocage: The Battle of the Cotentin Plain

Other German forces arrived, and reinforced the Caumont gap which no longer “yawned invitingly in front of V Corps.” [lv] Bradley wished to push forward rapidly to achieve a breakthrough in the American sector.[lvi] Facing the most difficult terrain in France amid the Bocage and swamps that limited avenues of approach to the American divisions committed to the offensive.  The Americans now faced their old foe the 352^nd division as well various elements of II Parachute Corps, the 17^th SS Panzer Grenadier and Panzer Lehr Divisions.  American tanks and infantry made slow progress and incurred high losses as they dueled the Germans at close range.  In the VIII Corps sector alone the attack “consumed twelve days and 10,000 casualties to cross eleven kilometers of the Bocage…the achievements of the VII and XIX Corps were no better than comparable.[lvii]

St. Lo

St. Lo was a key to Bradley’s breakout efforts.  His Army had to capture it and the roads leading out of it to launch Operation COBRA along the coast.  The task of capturing St. Lo was assigned to GEROW’S V Corps and Corlett’s XIX Corps.  They faced opposition from the tough paratroops of the German 3^rd Parachute Division of II Parachute Corps.  The 2^nd, 29^th, 30^th and 83^rd Divisions fought a tough battle advancing eleven kilometers again with high numbers of casualties especially among the infantry to secure St. Lo on 18 July.[lviii] They finally had cleared the hedgerows.  St Lo epitomized the struggle that the American Army had to overcome in the Bocage.  Hard fighting but outnumbered German troops in excellent defensive country exacted a terrible price in American blood despite the Allied control of the skies.[lix]

US Tanks and German Prisoners at St Lo

Operation COBRA

With the Bocage behind him Bradley desired to push the Germans hard.  COBRA was his plan to break out of Normandy.  Bradley ably assisted by Collins they realized that the better terrain, road networks favored a breakout.  American preparations included a technical advance that allowed tanks to plow through hedgerows. This was the “Rhino” device fashioned by American troops which was installed on 3 of every 5 First Army Tanks for the operation.[lx] VII Corps was to lead the attack which was to begin on July 24^th. American planning was more advanced than in past operations.  Collins and Bradley planned for exploitation operations once the breakthrough had been made. A massive air bombardment would precede the attack along with an artillery barrage by Collins corps artillery which was reinforced by additional battalions.   A mistake by the heavy bombers in the 24^th resulted in the American troops being hit with heavy casualties and a postponement of the attack until the 25th.[lxi] The following day the attack commenced.  Another mistake by the bombers led to more American casualties[lxii] but VII Corps units pressed forward against the determined resistance of the survivors of Panzer Lehr and the remnants of units that had fought the Americans since the invasion began.  Although it was a “slow go” on the 25^th Bradley and his commanders were already planning for and beginning to execute the breakout before the Germans could move up reinforcements.  The 26^th of June brought renewed attacks accompanied by massive air strikes.  While not much progress was made on the 26^th, the Americans discovered on the 27^th that the German forces were retreating.  The capture of Marigny allowed VIII Corps to begin exploitation down the coastal highway to Coutances.  On the 27^th General Patton was authorized to take immediate command of VIII Corps a precursor to the activation of his 3^rd Army.  COBRA ripped a hole in the German line and inflicted such heavy casualties on the German 7^th Army that it could do little to stop the American push.[lxiii] As the American forces pushed forward they reinforced their left flank absorbing the local German counterattacks which were hampered by the Allied close air support.

Avranches and Beyond

As the breakthrough was exploited the command of the forces leading it shifted to Patton and the newly activated 3^rd Army. By the 28^th VIII Corps led by the 4^th and 6^th Armored Divisions had reached Avranches and established bridgeheads over the See River with additional bridges being captured intact on the 30^th.[lxiv] The capture of Avranches allowed the Americans to begin exploitation operations into Brittany and east toward the Seine. Weigley notes that for the first time in the campaign that in Patton the Americans finally had a commander who understood strategic maneuver and would use it to great effect.[lxv]

Conclusion

The American campaign in Normandy cost the U.S. Army a great deal. It revealed weaknesses in the infantry, the inferiority of the M4 Sherman tank to most German types, problems in tank-infantry cooperation and also deficiencies in leadership at senior, mid-grade and junior levels. Heavy casualties among infantry formations would lead to problems later in the campaign. Numerous officers were relieved including Division and Regimental commanders.  Nonetheless during the campaign the Americans grew in their ability to coordinate air and ground forces and adapt to the conditions imposed on them by their placement in the Cotentin.  The deficiencies would show up in later battles but the American Army learned its trade even impressing some German commanders on the ground in Normandy.[lxvi]

[ii] Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN, 1981 p.33

[iii] Ibid pp. 34-35

[iv] Ibid p.35

[v] General Montgomery 21^st Army group and Land Forces, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsey as Allied Naval Expeditionary Force and Air Marshall Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as Commander in Chief Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Weigley p.43

[vi] Max Hastings in Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984, comments that many in Britain wondered if Eisenhower with the lack of actual battle experience could be a effective commander and that Eisenhower was disappointed in the appointment of Leigh-Mallory and Ramsey, and had preferred Alexander over Montgomery, pp. 28-29.

[vii] Ibid. Weigley p.40.  Montgomery was the first to object to the 3 division narrow front invasion rightly recognizing that seizing Caen with its road junctions could provide a springboard for the campaign into open country.

[viii] Ibid. p.37

[ix] Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984 p.29  Hastings finds the irony in the selection of the British officers to execute the plan that reflected the American way of thinking.

[x] The Germans agreed with this in their planning leaving Brittany very lightly defended.  See  Isby, David C. Ed. “The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion.” p.27 The report of General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff OB West noted that only 3 divisions were assigned to Brittany.

[xi] Ibid. Weigley, pp. 39-40

[xii] Ibid. p.73

[xiii] See Isby p. 69.  General Max Pemsel of 7^th Army noted that “During  the spring of 1944, Seventh Army received only tow good photographs of British southern ports, which showed large concentrations of landing craft.”

[xiv] Ibid. Hastings p.63.  Hastings comments also about the success of using the turned Abwehr agents.

[xv] Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Pp.422-423

[xvi] Ibid. Weigley pp. 53-54

[xvii] Ibid. p. 67

[xviii] Ibid. pp.57-64  Weigley spends a great deal of time on the wrangling between Eisenhower, Leigh Mallory and Spaatz on the nature of the plan, the allocation of forces both strategic and tactical assigned to carry it out and its success, or in the light of postwar analysis the lack of effect that it had on German operations.

[xix] Ibid. p.67-68.

[xx] Ibid. Hastings pp. 43-44 In large part due to the long range P-51 Mustang which accompanied the American bombing raids beginning in 1943.  Another comment is that the campaign drew the German fighters home to defend Germany proper and prevented their use in any appreciable numbers over the invasion beaches.

[xxi] Ibid. Weigley p.69

[xxii] Ibid. p.89

[xxiii] Ibid. pp. 88-89

[xxiv] Ibid. p.87

[xxv] Ibid. Weigley also talks about the rejection of General Corlett’s ideas to use Amtracks used by the Marines in the Pacific to land on less desirable, but less defended beaches to lessen casualties on the beaches and the need for additional support equipment even on smooth beaches.  One of Corlett’s criticisms was that too little ammunition was allotted to supporting the landings and not enough supporting equipment was provided. pp. 46-47

[xxvi] Hastings notes that with the strength and firepower of the German forces on OMAHA that many of these vehicles had they been employed would like have ended up destroyed further cluttering the beachhead. “Overlord” p.102

[xxvii] The battle over the deployment of the Panzer Divisions is covered by numerous historians.  The source of the conflict was between Rommel who desired to place the Panzer Divisions on the Coast under his command due to the fear that Allied air superiority would prevent the traditional Panzer counterthrust, General Gyer von Schweppenburg commander of Panzer Group West (Later the 5^th Panzer Army) and Field Marshal Von Rundstedt who desired to deploy the divisions order the command of Rundstedt for a counter attack once the invasion had been launched, a strategy which was standard on the Eastern Front, and Hitler who held most of the Panzer reserve including the SS Panzer Divisions under his control at OKW.  Hitler would negotiate a compromise that gave Rommel the satisfaction of having three Panzer Divisions deployed behind coast areas in the Army Group B area of responsibility.  21^st Panzer had those duties in Normandy.

[xxviii] Ibid. p.74-75

[xxix] Von Luck, Hans.  “Panzer Commander“ Dell Publishing, New York, 1989 pp. 169-170.  Von Luck a regiment commander in 21^st Panzer noted that General Marcks of 84^th Corps had predicted a 5 June invasion at a conference May 30^th.

[xxx] Almost every D-Day historian talks about the weather factor and its effect on the German high command’s reaction to the invasion.  Rommel was visiting his wife for her birthday and planned to make a call on Hitler. Others including commanders of key divisions such as the 91^st Airlanding Division were off to a war game in Rennes and the 21^st Panzer Division to Paris.

[xxxi] Ibid. Weigley p. 96

[xxxii] See Cornelius Ryan, “The Longest Day” Popular Library Edition, New York 1959. pp. 189-193 for a vivid description of the challenges faced by soldiers going from ship to landing craft and their ride in to the beaches.

[xxxiii] Ibid. Weigley. p.78 Weigley talks about the order for the tanks to be carried ashore on their LCTs that did not get transmitted to the 741^st.

[xxxiv] Ibid.

[xxxv] Ibid. Weigley  p. 87 The weather prevented the aerial bombardment from being effective. Because the bombers could not see their targets they dropped their bomb loads further inland, depriving the infantry of support that they were expecting.  Naval gunfire support had some effect but had to be lifted as the troops hit the beach leaving much of that support to come from Destroyers and specially equipped landing craft which mounted rockets and guns.

[xxxvi] Ibid. Hastings. pp. 90-91.

[xxxvii] Ibid. p.99

[xxxviii] Ibid. Weigley p.80

[xxxix] Ibid. p.101  Also see Weigley p.80

[xl] Ibid. p.99

[xli] Ibid. Weigley. p.95

[xlii] Ibid. p.94

[xliii] Ibid. p.99 Both Weigley and Hastings make note of the failure of both the Americans and British to train their troops to fight in the bocage once they had left the beaches.

[xliv] Ibid. Hastings. pp.152-153

[xlv] Ibid. Weigley p.101

[xlvi] Isby, David C., Ed. “Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage.” Greenhill Books, London,  2001.  p.143

[xlvii] Ibid. Hastings p.173 Allied fighter bombers exacted a fearful toll among German commanders. The Commanders of the 243^rd and 77^th Divisions fighting in the Cotentin were also killed by air attacks on the 17^th and 18^th.   Further east facing the British the commander of the 12^th SS Panzer Division, Fritz Witt on the 17^th.

[xlviii] Ibid. Weigley. p.108

[xlix] Ibid. p.111-112.

[l] Ibid.

[li] The efforts of the 51^st Highland Division and 7^th Armored Division were turned aside by the Germans in the area and were dramatized by the destruction of  a British armored battalion by SS Captain Michael Wittman and his platoon of Tiger tanks.  See Hastings pp.131-135.

[lii] The British 8^th Corps under General O’Connor lost 270 tanks and 1,500 men on 18 July attempting to crack the German gun line on the ridge beyond Caen. Weigley, pp.145-146.

[liii] Hastings comments about the critical British manpower shortage and the pressures on Montgomery to not take heavy casualties that could not be replaced. Overlord. pp.241-242.

[liv] Ibid. Weigley pp.116-120

[lv] Ibid. p.122

[lvi] Ibid. p121 Bradley told Eisenhower “when we hit the enemy this time we will hit him with such power that we can keep going and cause a major disaster.”

[lvii] Ibid. 134

[lviii] Ibid. Weigley. pp. 138-143.  Weigley notes of 40,000 U.S. casualties in Normandy up to the capture of St. Lo that 90% were concentrated among the infantry.

[lix] Weigley quotes the 329^th Regiment, 83^rd Division historian “We won the battle of Normandy, [but] considering the high price in American lives we lost. P.143. This is actually a provocative statement that reflects America’s aversion to massive casualties in any war.

[lx] Ibid. p.149

[lxi] Ibid. p. 152

[lxii] Ibid. pp. 152-153.  Among the casualties were the command group of the 9^th Division’s 3^rd Battalion 47^th Infantry and General Leslie McNair who had come to observe the assault.

[lxiii] Ibid. pp.161-169. Weigley notes the advances in U.S. tactical air support, the employment of massive numbers of U.S. divisions against the depleted German LXXXIV Corps, and the advantage that the “Rhino” device gave to American tanks by giving them the ability to maneuver off the roads for the first time.

[lxiv] Ibid. pp.172-173.

[lxv] Ibid. p.172

[lxvi] Ibid. Isby, David C. “Fighting in Normandy,” p.184, an officer of the 352^nd Division referred to the American soldier “was to prove himself a in this terrain an agile and superior fighter.”

Bibliography

Carell, Paul. “Invasion: They’re Coming!” Translated from the German by E. Osers, Bantam, New York 1964.

Hastings, Max. Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy Vintage Books, New York, 1984

Isby, David C. Ed. “The German Army at D-Day: Fighting the Invasion.” Greenhill Books, London 2004

Isby, David C., Ed. “Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage.” Greenhill Books, London, 2001.

Ryan, Cornelius, “The Longest Day” Popular Library Edition, New York 1959

Tsouras, Peter. “Disaster at D-Day: The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944,” Greenhill Books, London 1994.

Von Luck, Hans.  “Panzer Commander“ Dell Publishing, New York, 1989

Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd. Warlimont, Walter. “Inside Hitler’s Headquarters: 1939-1945.” Translated from theGerman by R.H. Barry. Presidio Press, Novao CA, English Edition Copyright 1964 Wiedenfeld and Nicholson Ltd.

Weigley, Russell F. Eisenhower’s Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-1945, Indiana University Press, Bloomington IN, 1981

Chapter 1

Near Uman, Ukraine, Dec. 23, 1943; 2:45 PM

The cold, thought Special Boat Squadron Corporal St. John Burnett. Bugger the cold. The wind pushed daggers through the tarp shielding his body, sliced through the layers of his sheepskin winter coat. Cold seeped through his boots and fur-lined gloves. It cut upward from the frozen soil that eventually might bear yellow oceans of sunflowers or swaying seas of wheat just six months from now. It condensed the core of his being into a quivering lump located somewhere near his liver. Burnett groaned softly as his chest muscles spasmed, rolling his shoulders forward as his body shook.

The forced inactivity was worse than paddling his folboat up the River Bug for three Russian winter nights. Worse than fighting the sudden surges of snowmelt that battered him from the stern. Worse even than the two soul-numbing nights he camped out in the rubble of a destroyed bridge before meeting up with the squadron of Ukrainian legionnaires.

Burnett slowly pushed his numb legs out from his fetal curl and willed his mind to imagine yellow. Daffodils in the Lake District before Easter. Marigolds glowing in the sun in his parent’s Dorset garden. Emily’s persimmon wisp of a silk dress, framed by weeping willows and cattails at the banks of the Thames near Windsor, where they had spent their last radiant summer weekend before he went to war. But it didn’t work. He then tried to visualize the blue swells of the Aegean where his unit was awaiting his return. Swilling red wine, he presumed, dining on lamb chops traded for American pork conserves from quiet, sweating Greek peasants.

It was no use.

All he could see was dirty white snow and frozen mud, overgrown with patches of man-high thistles whose frayed gray stalks had cracked and broken and bent down to the soil. And only when one of the six Ukrainians around him moved was there a shudder of field-gray uniforms. Cold. Again, his body cramped. Burnett thought long and hard before removing his sheepskin mitten, then fumbled a small container of benzedrines from a pocket. Numb fingers picked three of them and hastily pushed them into his mouth.

Bugger the bleedin’ cold. The information passed to MI6 by the German Panzer officer better be right!

Then he heard it. Faint at first, then gradually increasing in volume. The roar of three Maybach engines. Powerful 692 horsepower behemoths. Burnett imagined he could hear the rattle of the suspension system, formed by overlapping road wheels, whose only fault was that it occasionally would freeze solid in Russian winter nights. Suddenly, the chill and the spasms were gone. A rush of adrenaline, some natural, some blasted into his system by the bennies, poured through his frozen limbs. He raised his binoculars. He could see them now, three- then two-hundred yards away. Lumbering masses of grey. There were no Panzergrenadiere attached to the convoy. No bundled-up killers spoiled the stark outlines of the steel. Burnett grasped for the American-made anti-tank rocket launcher, felt for the German-made magnetic T-mines that were attached to his harness. He looked at the luminous face of his watch. Leave it to the damn Hun to be on time in a blizzard!

If anything, they were early.

Out of the whirling snow, three Tiger tanks solidified. They moved slowly. Fifteen miles per hour, calculated Burnett, their usual cross-country jog. The muzzles of their 88 mm KwK 36L/56 cannons were protected by stiff wraps of grey canvas. About fifteen miles behind the German lines, they didn’t expect trouble. Then again, few things could trouble a Tiger. Its two 7.92 mm machine guns could terminate all life in arcs of red-hot steel. And the main gun barrel, which reminded Burnett of a horizontal telephone pole, fired the dreaded PzGr 40 projectile. With a tungsten steel cap over an explosive core, its tip painted with phosphorous tracer, it could sear through armor plate five inches thick at 1,400 yards.

It was the 88 mm that had kept His Majesty’s Special Boat Squadron from requesting backup from the Soviets. That and the justified reluctance to sharing sensitive information with Stalin, figured Burnett. Russian armor would have been of limited use in the best of cases. Because the only thing that could stand up to a Tiger, smash through its 100 mm front and 60 mm side armor, were the Soviet T-34/76 and the KV-1. And even their frontal armor was inferior to the Tiger, which maintained the Germans’ standoff advantage over virtually everything the Allies could throw at it. To kill a Tiger, Allied guns had to get well into the range of the main gun. That meant movement, fast and frequent and without the benefit of cover—at the utter mercy of the Tiger’s main armament. And neither a Tiger nor the five Panzer soldiers inside its steel viscera were much inclined for mercy.

Because in this war, mercy meant you die first.

But where tanks were useless, human flesh was not. Men could close in unexpectedly where machinery couldn’t. Attack the weaker side armor and the tracks of the Tiger at point-blank range. With armor-piercing grenades and mines. With the bile and loathing of Abwehr-trained Ukrainian “Nightingales” turning on the Germans who had ravaged their country.

This was what he was here for. Burnett sprang into action. Six mounds of dirt and snow came alive and fanned out into pre-assigned positions.

Wedged between Panzer soldiers, Untersturmführer Katt, of the SS Panzer Division’s Heavy Tank Bataillon, adjusted the sights of the machine gun in front of him with practiced movements. According to his calculations, they’d be hitting the airfield in less than thirty minutes. Of course, you never knew. Even here, miles behind the front, there were Soviet infiltrators. Katt’s fingers traced the smooth surface of the metal Canister he held in his lap. He wondered again what would warrant an escort of three Tiger tanks. Then again, he had been a soldier long enough not to ask questions.

Outside, gusts of wind whipped up tattered white shrouds. But Katt was dripping beneath his tunic. The men around him, too, perspired heavily. Tank warfare smelled of sweat, fear, and heavy machine oil. These men were old hands at this game, a game that didn’t allow many to advance in years. Occasionally, Katt caught one of them glancing at the silver runes on his collar, the leering death head on his cap that he carried wedged into the opening of his tunic. And at the leaden weight of the Canister on his lap. The SS wasn’t popular among Panzer troops. But the prospects of spending a night at the airfield, eating Luftwaffe rations, emptying maybe a bottle or two of Krim champagne outweighed every bit of inquisitiveness the men could muster.

Then hell broke loose.

Suddenly, the tank was rocked by a thunderous blast. Forty-five tons of steel jumped straight up in the air. From one second to the next, the crew was pounded with the crashing and roaring of unleashed high explosive. Greasy red-hot smoke scorched deep into their throats and lungs, and their eyes seared with the bilious burn of superheated oil. Men were thrown about like puppets. Had it not been for the padded crash helmets, heads would have burst open colliding with the tank’s interior like ripe melons hit with a sledge hammer. Katt was thrown against the wall, his right eye destroyed from when it slammed into the machine gun in the first explosion.

The Tiger stood still, its tracks hanging in shreds. As the men took to the guns, the turret began to rotate. The 88 mm responded in shrieks of flame jetting from its breech-block. Red-hot shell casings clattered into the tank’s well where the overheated yellow brass instantly oxidized into swirls of blue and green and red. The tank was hurt. But very much alive…

Much to Corporal Burnett’s chagrin, the trap had sprung just a moment too soon. Be it fingers numb with the cold, be it nerves, one of the Nightingales had fired early and missed his target, the large tracks of the hindmost Tiger. While the other two-man teams succeeded in hobbling their assigned vehicles, one Tiger was on the loose: 692 horsepower of combustive mechanical fury reared against frozen humanity.

A Ukrainian commando, racing toward the immobilized Tiger with a magnetic T-mine in his hand, was blown to bits by a direct hit from the 88 mm. The tungsten steel projectile sheared his body in two at the belt, the upper torso spraying blood and bone splinters into the snow as the mine exploded.

The leading Tiger shook. Having blown its right track as a result of a full hit with the Anti-Tank Rocket, two Nightingales had been able to attach their magnetic T-mines to the sides and on the underbelly of the tank just as the rear escape hatch flew open and tankers scrambled into the open. The explosions cut through the side and bottom armor, triggering an internal chain reaction of exploding ammunition and fuel that blew the turret hatch off the tank from the inside in a bluish white geyser of metal and charred flesh. Both Nightingales hit the snow dead, their bodies rendered by steel splinters and human debris.

Smoke belched from the second Tiger. Flames licked toward its ruptured fuel tank. The crew tried to escape being broiled to death by pouring from the burning vehicle, only to be mowed down by Burnett’s submachine gun. That left four men to tackle the third Tiger.

But now the tables had turned.

Clutching the Canister to his chest as he scrambled from the roaring Tiger, Katt dove for a dip in the ground a second or two before his leading tank blew up. A blunt punch slammed into his lower body. He rolled into the hollow as the tank blew up behind him, partly shrouding the battlefield from his view. Retching from the stabbing pain in his guts, he rose to his knees.

The remaining Tiger’s machine gun was spitting armor-piercing projectiles at the surviving legionnaires. One was killed instantly as a neat, diagonal line of fist-size holes appeared in tattered red on his snow camo poncho. The other was caught in a blast of the flame thrower. His shriek cut out abruptly as the proteins in his brain congealed. Burnett watched in horror as the last survivor threw away his Panzerfaust and ran, T-mines still slapping against his body.

The Tiger fell silent, as if considering its options.

Then the Maybach thundered and the behemoth lurched forward after the running man. A second later, the predator caught up with its prey. Screaming, the man disappeared beneath the tracks.

The Tiger stopped. Then reversed a few yards.

Then advanced again, like a giant rocking horse—a hobnailed boot squashing an insect to death on the sidewalk. It succeeded… but not before the man had activated his T-mines.

The Tiger was flung up into the air. It flipped atop a rapidly expanding cloud of oily black smoke and landed on its back a hundred feet away. What life was left inside was extinguished by a cacophony of blasts as the ammunition responded to the fires.

Stunned, his eardrums destroyed from the noise and vibrations, Burnett rose to his feet. He looked at his watch. Two minutes ago, seven commandos and fifteen German soldiers had been going about their business. Now only one man was alive. In front of him, several million Reichsmark worth of equipment had turned into twisted scrap as three times eight-hundred liters of heavy fuel blazed skyward.

A funeral pyre for twenty-one men. Where snow and ice had melted, oily puddles stared like dead eyes from the black soil.

Emily, Burnett thought. Emily in the yellow silk dress, reclining against the weeping willows at the banks of the Thames. Emily, too, was dead. Buried alive in the rubble of a London apartment building during the first days of the Blitz.

It was the last thought Corporal St. John Burnett was able to entertain.

From a dip in the ground rose the scorched, tattered figure of an SS-man. His right eye was gone, his face a scarlet mask of pain and rage. His left arm clutched the dully metallic Canister into the bleeding mess of his lower body. His right hand, missing a finger and a half, remained surprisingly steady when he fired a single shot from his Mauser M712 pistol.

As his eyes stared ahead into eternity, a dime-sized hole appeared squarely in the middle of his forehead. Corporal Burnett, of His Majesty’s Special Boat Squadron, stiffly took two more steps before he collapsed.

Like a chicken, thought Untersturmführer Matthias Katt with a snarl that may have passed for a laugh with the gods of slaughter. Like a goddamn chicken with its head cut off.

He dropped the pistol, clutched his bleeding belly. The wind had picked up, grating his charred, raw face with blades of ice. Clumsily, he picked a compass from his tunic pocket. He aligned the needle, looked through the dancing stars and sparks that exploded inside his remaining eye, and then, holding the compass in front of him, he staggered on. Toward the airfield that he knew was an impossible seven kilometers to the West. The airfield with the Junkers 52 transport planes and the Krim champagne.

Of course, he knew he wouldn’t make it. He was already dead. Within a few minutes, he’d collapse in a snowdrift and bleed what remained of his life into the accursed Russian soil. But an SS man walks as long as he has legs. Until a higher authority issued new orders and covered up his broken body with a shroud of pure white.

Cradling the dully metallic Canister, he set leg before leg. Tears of rage and grief ran from his one good eye. Rage for the charred and mangled men he left behind in the dirt. Grief for his own short life spent in mud and muck, among the mutilated dead and those about to die. Dead man walking, he thought grimly. Just over the ridge ahead. Walk as long as you’ve got legs. Set leg before leg. Like a chicken.

A hoarse, rasping laugh escaped his raw throat and was snatched up by the wind.

Like a goddamn chicken.

The Lazarus Smile will be available as an e-book from Amazon.com on Nov. 1, 2009.

Every time I have an idea for a model that involves something new I try to build something else to practice it. Most of the time the something else ends up being pretty involved at the end, but no harm I guess. For the SdKfz. 251/1 I wanted to model some Waffen-SS figures. So I took a Dragon figure and started practicing Waffen-SS camo painting following Calvin Tan’s technique from his book. First results were pretty bad.

As I practiced I got a bit better, although one thing I couldn’t really get right was painting faces with acrylics only, so I went back to the oil paints and finished the figure. I still have the equipment to paint and fix on teh figure. I still need to give it a flat clear coat.

This is going to go with some of the Melusine PVC figures I bought a while ago, which I have repainted and I am in the process of weathering.

Propaganda of modern day Russia, name-calling Latvian Legion soldiers “Nazis” and accusing them of “crimes against humanity” (what even Soviet propaganda in the times of highest might of the USSR was not taking liberty to do), keeps telling, that International Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal would have declared Baltic soldiers, fighting on the German side during WWII against Soviet Red Army, war criminals.

Though, as it often happens with the Russian (and formerly Soviet) mass media – the truth is considerably different. Yes, indeed, Latvian Legion soldiers had their place in Nuremberg, but in a role that is quite different from what Russian mass produced disinformation is trying to depict.

Everybody has seen soldiers with white helmets and white gloves standing along the walls in Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal hall. They are Americans. But only few know, that people dressed in similar uniforms – former Latvian and Estonian legionaries – were guarding imprisoned Nazis and securing facilities of Allied army.

Let us see what photographic images of the time and contemporaries do tell us.

“In 1946 next to English and American armies there were founded so called Guard companies. (The first one was called Viesturs company.) Legionaries were recognized as units in no way connected to the crimes of SS.” “Four companies (approx. 1000 men), including Viesturs company, in 1947 took over the guard at the Nuremberg Palace of Justice (!) and the prison!” “At their sleeves and later at their helmets there were the red-white-red national colors of Latvia” “Besides it shall be taken into account, that attitude of Allied authorities to the Nazi war criminals was very serious and consistent”. [1]

”References about the Baltic soldiers were good[...]. Almost all “viesturians” were former legionaries, therefore soldier drilling was not required, only “americanised” military code had to be adjusted to. [...] Officers and soldiers of the company were on garrison duty in several cities of Germany (from spring 1947 – were also on guard in Nuremberg Palace of Justice and the prison).” [2]

“Paramilitary units of Latvians and Estonians in Germany were also working at the Nuremberg Trials (1947 – 1949), where they were guarding war criminals. [...] guard posts were located not only at the perimeter of the Palace of Justice, but also at the doors to the cells. Baltic guards were escorting inmates to the walking areas and to the interrogations. [...] Only two functions at the Nuremberg Trials were performed by American military police: escort of inmates in the court hall and to the execution (hanging).” “When Berlin crisis took place and airlift for supply of West Berlin started to operate, viesturians were transferred to the forests near the border to secure the most important field storages of the USA Army. After that Latvian guards were transferred to the surroundings of Stuttgart to guard USA Army corps headquarters”.[3]

The sign of the Viesturs company.[4]

Viesturs company being visited by the ambassador of the Latvian Republic Karlis Zarins. American Zone, Stuttgart, 1948.[5]

Ambassador Karlis Zarins visits Viesturs company. Stuttgart, 1948. g.[6],[7]

Ambassador Karlis Zarins (right) and guards of the Viesturs company. Stuttgart, 1948.[8]

On duty. Stuttgart, 1948.[9]

American zone. Stuttgart, 1948.[10],[11]

Legionaries in Nuremberg. Parade at the Palace of Justice.[12]

Legionaries in Nuremberg. Before going to guard duty at the Palace of Justice.[12]

Criminal Wing I in the Justice Prison. Nuremberg, 1947.
“It was in one of these cells along this particular corridor that Hermann Goering, Rudolf Hess, and other top Nazis were confined during their international trial.”[13] Baltic guards – former legionaries – patrol and check the cells.
Image 1: American officers discussing guard matters (left). “Behind them, peering into individual cells, are Baltic guards utilized by the U.S. Army to supplement American personnel in such work.” [13]
Image 2: American officer checks guard roster with Baltic interpreter.[14]

Baltic guards on patrol. Nuremberg, 1947.
“Baltic guards form security detatchment in the Justic(e Prison?) at Nurnberg. Her on the second and third floors they pat(rol?) the cells in Criminal Wing I. Miles of wire mesh were in(stalled?) along all catwalks to prevent suicide leaps..”[15]

Baltic guard inspects a prisoner. Nuremberg, 1947.
“A Baltic guard checks the cell of two defendants of a war crimes case at the Nurnberg Justice prison. Ports in the cell door are kept open at all times and sentinels moving along the block stop for periodic inspection of the prisoners.”[16]

Member of a Latvian paramilitary unit. English zone.
“English military authorities established paramilitary units, where DPs [i.e. “displaced persons”] could come to serve.” ”They were former legionaries, who were used to do different jobs at the [displaced persons] camp and also as guards.”[17]

English zone, Luebeck, February 1949.
English regiment commander is inspecting Latvian paramilitary unit, Latvian section commander is following him.[18]

Details of the images seen above:

* Banner of the Viesturs company sign in Latvian national colors, bearing inscription BALTIC.
* Obviously Viesturs company sleeve chevron.
* Different sleeve chevron (because of English zone?) – similar in shape to the chevrons of the Legion. Diagonally placed colors of the Latvian flag and inscription LATVIJA(?).
* Samples of helmet painting in Latvian national colors.

Sources:

[1] “Es neesmu karojis”, Ilmārs Knaģis. Latvijas Politiski represēto apvienība
[2] Juris Ciganovs, “Latvijas avīze”, 16.01.2004 . Quote from LPRA article
[3] “Latviešu un igauņu paramilitārās vienības Vācijā”, memoirs of V.Kukainis
[4] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1961
[5] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1962
[6] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1928
[7] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1929
[8] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1963
[9] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1966
[10] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1959
[11] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 1958
[12] “Es neesmu karojis” – “Latviešu leģionāri Nirnbergas tiesu pils un cietuma apsardzē”, Ilmārs Knaģis. Latvijas Politiski represēto apvienība
[13] Columbia Law School, Arthur W. Diamond Law Library. OMTPJ-P-25
[14] LOUISiana Digital Library Collections Online. Criminal Wing I
[15] LOUISiana Digital Library Collections Online. Baltic guards on patrol
[16] LOUISiana Digital Library Collections Online. Baltic guard inspects a prisoner
[17] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 380
[18] “DP albums. Latviešu dzīve bēgļu nometnēs Vācijā 1945-1950″. ID 490

Introduction

Einsatzgruppen Massacre sites (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org)

The German war against the Soviet Union was the first truly race-based ideological war in history with the campaign against Poland its precursor.  Adolf Hitler’s racial theories and beliefs played a dominant role in Germany’s conduct of the war in the East in both the military campaign and occupation.  This has become clearer in recent years as historians have had the opportunity to examine Hitler’s writings, those of senior Nazi officials and military officers and documents which had been unavailable until the end of the Cold War.  Understanding the Nazi ideological basis and the underlying cultural prejudice against the Jews and eastern Europeans in general is foundational to understanding Hitler’s conduct of the war and why the destruction of the Jews figured so highly in his calculations.  One must also understand the military and police cultures and doctrines that enabled them to cooperate so closely in the conduct of the war.

The German war in the east would differ from any previous war.  Its underlying basis was ideological. Economic and geopolitical considerations were given importance in relationship to the understanding of the German “Master Race.”  Race and Lebensraum was the goal of the State that “concentrates all of its strength on marking out a way of life for our people through the allocation of Lebensraum for the next one hundred years…the goal corresponds equally to the highest national and ethnic requirements.[1] Hitler believed that Germany was “entitled to more land…because it was the “mother of life” not just some “little nigger nation or another.”” [2] The Germans planned to “clear” the vast majority of the Slavic population and the “settlement of millions of hectares of eastern Lebensraum with German colonists” complimented by a short term exploitation of the land to “secure the food balance of the German Grossraum.”[3] Joachim Fest notes that Hitler called it a “crime” to wage war only for the acquisition of raw materials. Only the issue of living space permitted resort to arms.”[4]

Previous wars emphasized conquest of territory and natural resources be they for empire or self sufficiency. The Thirty Years War had a heavy religious component but was more about increasing the power of emerging nation states led by men not necessarily loyal to their religious brethren.[5] The American and Russian Civil wars had some ideological basis and helped usher in the brutality of total war. Both had major effect in these nations’ development and both were bitterly contested with the winners imposing to various degrees political changes on their vanquished brothers they were civil wars.[6] While Adam Tooze sees the Holocaust as the first step of the “last great land grab in the long and bloody history of European colonialism…”[7] this argument does not take away from the basic premise that the war was at its heart ideological.

Adolf Hitler

The root of this war was in the mind of Adolf Hitler himself. His years in Vienna were foundational as he absorbed the ideas of Pan-German, anti-Semitic groups and newspapers like the Deutsches Volksblatt. [8] In Vienna he made the connection between the Jews and Marxism.[9] Joachim Fest notes that in Vienna Hitler became obsessed by the fear of the Slavs and Jews, hated the House of Hapsburg, the Social Democratic Party, and “envisioned the end of Germanism.”[10] His racial views were amplified after the war in turbulent Weimar Germany where he became a member of the NDSAP, rising rapidly within it, eventually taking over party leadership, reorganizing it so that it “became the instrument of Hitler’s policies.”[11] Following the unsuccessful Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 Hitler wrote Mein Kampf while imprisoned in the Landsberg prison in which he enunciated his views about the Jews, Slavs and Lebensraum. Hitler believed that Imperial Germany had been “hopelessly negligent” in regard to the Jews[12] and that the Jews in conjunction with the Catholic Center Party and Socialists worked together for “maximum damage to Germany.”[13] Likewise he saw the Jews as heading the “main ideological scourges of the nineteenth and twentieth century’s.”[14] It was the ideology of Hitler’s “obsessive anti-Semitism”[15] that drove Nazi Germany’s policy in regard to the Jews and against Jewish-Bolshevism.  By the 1920s Hitler had “combined his hatred of the Jews and of the supposedly Jewish dominated Soviet state with existing calls to conquer additional Lebensraum, or living space, in the east.”[16] Hitler wrote: “The fight against Jewish world Bolshevism requires a clear attitude toward Soviet Russia. You cannot drive out the Devil with Beelzebub.”[17] Richard Evans notes that Mein Kampf clearly enunciated that “Hitler considered racial conflict…the essence of history, and the Jews to be the sworn enemy of the German race ….” And that the “Jews were now linked indissolubly in Hitler’s mind with “Bolshevism” and “Marxism.”[18] When Hitler became the dictator of Germany “his ideology and strategy became the ends and means of German foreign policy.”[19] His aims were clear, Hitler remarked to Czech Foreign Minister Chvalkovsky on 21 January 1939: “We are going to destroy the Jews.”[20] It was clear that Hitler understood his own role in this effort noting to General Heinrici that “he was the first man since Charlemagne to hold unlimited power in his own hand. He did not hold this power in vain, he said, but would know how to use it in the struggle for Germany…”[21]

Wilhelm Keitel: “war was a fight for survival….dispense with outdated and traditional ideas about chivalry and the generally accepted rules of warfare…” Bundesarchiv Bild

This study will focus on the German policy of ideological-racial war in Poland and Russia. The German war against the Soviet Union and to a certain extent Poland was waged with an unforgiving ferocity against Hitler’s enemy, the Jewish-Bolshevik state and the Slavic Untermenschen. It was characterized by the rise of “political-ideological strategy”[22] in which “Barbarossa showed the fusion of technocracy and ideology in the context of competitive military planning.”[23] Hitler’s “ideological and grandiose objectives, expressed in racial and semi-mystical terms, made the war absolute.”[24] Field Marshal Keitel noted a speech in March 1941 where Hitler talked about the inevitability of conflict between “diametrically opposed ideologies” and that the “war was a fight for survival and that they dispense with their outdated and traditional ideas about chivalry and the generally accepted rules of warfare.”[25] General Halder, Chief of the OKH in his War Dairy for that meeting noted “Annihilating verdict on Bolshevism…the leaders must demand of themselves the sacrifice of understanding their scruples.”[26] Based on Lebensraum and race, the German approach to war would combine “racism and political ideology” for the purpose of the “conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization.”[27] Hitler explained that the “struggle for the hegemony of the world will be decided in favor of Europe by the possession of the Russian space.”[28] Conquered territories would be “Reich protectorates…and that these areas were to be deprived of anything in the nature of a Slav intelligentsia.”[29] This goal was manifest in the “Criminal Order” issued by OKW which stated that the war was “more than mere armed conflict; it is a collision between two different ideologies…The Bolshevist-Jewish intelligentsia must be eliminated….”[30] Other displaced inhabitants of the conquered eastern lands would be killed or allowed to starve.[31] Part of this was due to economic considerations in the Reich, which gave Germans priority in distribution of food, even that from the conquered lands. Starvation was a population control measure that supplemented other forms of annihilation.[32] As Fest notes in Russia Hitler was “seeking nothing but “final solutions.””[33] Despite numerous post-war justifications by various Wehrmacht generals, the “Wehrmacht and army fell into line with Hitler because there was “a substantial measure of agreement of “ideological questions.””[34]

Waffen SS Volksdeutsch Recruiting Poster

Ideology was key to Hitler’s worldview and fundamental to understanding his actions in the war.[35] However twisted Hitler’s ideological formulations were his ideas found acceptance beyond the Nazi faithful to the Army and Police, who would execute the campaigns in Poland and Russia in conjunction with the Einsatzgrüppen and Nazi party organizations.  In these organizations he found allies with pre-existing cultural, political and doctrinal understandings which allowed them to be willing participants in Hitler’s grand scheme of eastern conquest.

Doctrinal and Ideological Foundations

While Hitler’s racial ideology was more extreme than many in the German military and police, these organizations had cultural beliefs and prejudices as well as doctrinal and ideological foundations which helped them become willing accomplices to Hitler.  These factors were often, consciously or unconsciously, excluded from early histories of World War II. The Allies relied on German officers to write these histories at the beginning of the Cold War, developing the “dual myth of German military brilliance and moral correctness.”[36] B.H. Liddell-Hart makes the astounding statement that “one of the surprising features of the Second World War was that German Army in the field on the whole observed the rules of war than it did in 1914-1918-at any rate in fighting its western opponents….”[37] While he might be excused by lack of knowledge of German army atrocities, not just the SS who he blamed the atrocities, it helps present a myth as truth.[38] The myths were helped by the trials of Manstein and Kesselring where “historical truth had to be sacrificed…to the demands of the Cold War.”[39] Kenneth Macksey confronts the myth that only the “Waffen SS committed barbaric and criminal acts” noting: “Not even the Knights of the Teutonic Order and their followers in the Middle Ages sank to the depths of the anti-Bolshevik Wehrmacht of 1941.”[40]

Germany had a long running history of anti-Semitism before Hitler.  German anti-Semitism often exhibited a “paranoid fear of the power of the Jews,”[41] and included a “fashionable or acceptable anti-Semitism”[42] which became more pronounced as the conditions of the Jews became better and Jews who had fled to Eastern Europe returned to Germany.[43] Sometimes this was tied to religious attitudes, but more often focused on the belief that the Jews “controlled certain aspects of life” and presented in “pseudo-scientific garb” along with the “myth of a secret Jewish plot for world domination which was simultaneously part of the internationalism of Freemasonry.”[44] Admiral Wilhelm Canaris provides an example as he “had grown up in the atmosphere of “moderate” anti-Semitism prevailing in the Ruhr middle class and in the Navy believed in the existence of a “Jewish problem”” and would “suggest during 1935-1936 that German Jews should be identified by a Star of David as special category citizens….”[45] Wehrmacht soldiers were “subject to daily doses of propaganda since the 1930s” and that with the “start of the Russian campaign propaganda concerning Jews became more and more aggressive.”[46] Some objected to Nazi actions against Jews. Von Manstein protested the “Aryan paragraph” in the Reichswehr on general principal.”[47] Yet some who planned and executed the most heinous crimes like Adolf Eichmann had “no fanatical anti-Semitism or indoctrination of any kind.”[48]

Anti-Jewish Poster: He is guilty for the war

The military “looked to the regime to reshape society in every respect: political, ideological, economic and military…Propaganda would hammer home absolute nature of the struggle…”[49] Ideological training began in the Hitler Youth and Reichsarbeitsdienst and produced a soldier in which “Anti-Semitism, anti-communism, Lebensraum – these central tenants of Nazism were all inextricably linked with the Landser’s conception of duty, with his place and role in the vast machinery of war.”[50] Following the dismissal of General Fritsch in 1938, General Brauchitsch promised that “he would make every effort to bring the Army closer to the State and the State’s ideology.”[51] Alfred Novotny, a Austrian soldier in the Gross Deutschland division noted how training depicted the Russians as Untermenschen and how they were “subjected to official rantings about how the supposedly insidious, endless influence of the Jews in practically every aspect of the enemy’s endeavors…Jews were portrayed as rats, which were overrunning the world….”[52] This added to the already “harsh military discipline” which had a long tradition in Germany conditioning soldiers to violence and brutalization of their enemy. Similar programs existed in the Order Police which would play a large part in the eastern campaign, the “image of “treasonous” leftists and Jews helped shape the personal and political beliefs of many policemen throughout the interwar period.”[53] Even ordinary police training before the war in German speaking Europe was brutalizing.”[54] These troops were recipients of an ideological formation which “aimed at shaping the worldview of the police leading to the internalization of belief along National Socialist lines.”[55] Waffen SS soldiers, especially those of the Totenkopf division were subjected to even more systematic political indoctrination on the enemies of National Socialism, the Jews, freemasonry, Bolshevism and the churches.[56]

Along with cultural anti-Semitism and the Nazification of German thought in the 1930s, there were aspects of military doctrine which helped prepare the way for the eastern campaign. The most important were the Army’s anti-partisan and rear area security doctrine.  The history of security anti-partisan operations dated back to the Prussian Army’s Ettapen, which began in 1813 with the Landwehr’s role in security against looters and others.[57] These units supported and supplied offensive operations from the rear to the combat zone with a secondary mission of countering partisans and preventing disruptions in the rear area. The Ettapen would be reformed and regulated in 1872 following the Franco-Prussian War.[58] The German experience fighting guerrillas and partisans, the francs-tireurs in the Franco-Prussian War, “scarred the Army’s institutional mentality.”[59] Von Moltke was “shattered,” writing his brother that “war was now taking on an ever more hate-inspired character.”[60] He was “appalled by improvised armies, irregular elements, and appeals to popular passion, which he described as a “return to barbarism.”[61] He wrote: “Their gruesome work had to be answered by bloody coercion. Because of this our conduct of the war finally achieved a harshness that we deplored, but which we could not avoid.”[62] The brutal German response to the franc-tireurs found legal justification in Franz Lieber’s principles for classification of belligerents and non-belligerents, which determined that guerrillas were outlaws or bandits.[63] In response, the Germans systematically reorganized the Ettapen to include railroad and security troops, special military courts, military police, intelligence and non-military police, including the Landespolizei and the Grenzschutzpolizei.[64]

Pre-Nazi Exterminator: General Lothar Von Trotha led the Genocide against the Herero in Namibia

The doctrinal response to partisans, or as they would become known in German writings as “bandits,” was that bandits should be encircled and destroyed. This was employed in the Southwest Africa German colonies.  The Germans, influenced by the experience in France, “displayed a ferocity surpassing even that of the racially brutalized campaigns of its imperialist peers.”[65] The campaign against the Herero tribes which resisted the occupation of Namibia from 1904-1912 utilized encirclement operations, racial cleansing and what would become known as Bandenkämpfung operations.[66] This was further developed in the First World War, especially in the east where General Fritz Gempp described the security problem as a “ruthless struggle” in which German pacification policy “was in reality the application of terror to galvanize the population into accepting German rule.”[67] Anti-partisan doctrine was codified in the Truppenführung of 1933 which stated that “area defense against partisan warfare is the mission of all units” and that the preferred method of combating partisan bands was that they be surrounded and destroyed.[68] General Erhard Rauss later described active and passive measures used to deal with partisans, focusing on the tactic of encirclement to destroy the enemy.[69]

Anti-partisan doctrine focused on the destruction of the partisans, was coupled a total war philosophy and provided fit well with Hitler’s radical ideology.  The “propensity for brutality in anti-guerrilla warfare was complimented by officers’ growing preoccupation, both during and after World War I, with the mastery and application of violence.”[70] Michael Geyer notes: “ideological mobilization for the creation of a new national and international order increasingly defined the parameters of technocratic planning.”[71] The acceptance of long used brutal tactics to destroy the enemy combined with Hitler’s radical racial animus against the Jews could only be expected to create a maelstrom in which all international legal and moral standards would be breached.

Beginnings in Poland

The Polish campaign was a precursor to the Russian campaign and was not totally race driven. It contained elements of Germany’s perception of the injustice of Versailles which gave Poland the Danzig corridor and Germany’s desire to reconnect East Prussia to the Reich, as well as the perceived necessity to remove a potential enemy from its rear as it faced France, yet it was a campaign steeped in Nazi racial ideology.  Poland resisted German efforts to ally itself with Germany in 1939, thus Hitler determined it “would be crushed first.”[72] Meeting with military leaders on 23 May 1939 Hitler “made it plain that the real issue was not Danzig, but securing of Germany’s Lebensraum….”[73] On 22 August he enjoined the generals to “Close your hearts to pity! Act brutally! Eighty million people must obtain what is their right.”[74] Even so, most military leaders failed to appreciate what Hitler was calling on them to do; Manstein would note that “what Hitler had to say about an eventual war with Poland, could not, in my opinion, be interpreted as a policy of annihilation.”[75] Others such as Canaris was “utterly horrified” as he read his notes to his closest colleagues “His voice trembled as he read, Canaris was acutely aware that he had witnessed something monstrous.”[76] General Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of 8^th Army who would be the military commander in Poland did not leave any notes about the meeting, but his biographer notes that he “may have naively attached a military meaning to these terms since he was busy with military matters and soon to begin operations.”[77] This was the interpretation of Manstein as well.[78] Keitel noted that the speech was “delivered in the finest sense of psychological timing and application,” molding “his words and phrases to suit his audience.”[79] In light of the mixed interpretations by military leaders, it is possible that many misinterpreted Hitler’s intent and did not fully appreciated his ideology as they went into Poland, carefully secluding themselves in the narrow confines of their military world. While such an explanation is plausible for some, it is also true that many others in light of subsequent actions were in full agreement with Hitler. One author notes that “no man who participated in the Führer Conferences….and there were present the highest ranking officers of the three services, could thereafter plead ignorance of the fact that Hitler had laid bare his every depth of infamy before them, and they had raised no voice in protest either then or later.”[80] In July, General Wagner, the Quartermaster General issued orders that “authorized German soldiers to take and execute hostages in the event of attacks by snipers or irregulars.”[81]

Regardless of the meaning ascribed to Hitler’s speech, Hitler had already laid plans to destroy the Jews in Poland and decimate the Polish intelligentsia and leadership.   Hitler gave Himmler the task of forming “Einsatzgrüppen to follow the German troops as they advanced into Poland and liquidate Poland’s upper class wherever it was to be found.”[82] While senior party leaders remained at Hitler’s side following the conference, Himmler worked to coordinate his troops, including the reinforced Totenkopf battalions and Einsatzgrüppen with the Army.[83]

Einsatzgruppen Troops gathering Ukrainian Jews for Execution Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Wiesbaden

Himmler began planning in early May and the Army decided to “use SS and police units to augment their own forces for security tasks.”[84] Himmler established “five Einsatzgrüppen to accompany each of the numbered German armies at the start of the campaign.”[85] Placed under the aegis of Reinhard Heydrich the groups were broken down into smaller units of 100-150 men and allotted to army corps.  All senior posts were occupied by officers of the Sicherhietsdienst.[86] Two additional groups were formed shortly after the invasion.[87] Additionally 3 regiments of the SS Totenkopfverbande, under the direction of SS General Theodore Eicke were deployed in the rear areas of the advancing armies.[88] The purpose of these units was shielded from the Army in the planning stages,[89] although Heydrich worked with the Army to develop lists of up to 30,000 people to be arrested.[90] To eliminate the Polish elites without disturbing the Army, Himmler and Heydrich gave the Army “only the bare minimum of information.”[91] The deception was initially successful.  Blaskowitz’s 8^th Army defined the mission of the Einsatzgrüppen in a traditional manner, noting their mission as “the suppression of all anti-Reich and anti-German elements in the rear of the “fighting troops, in particular, counter espionage arrests of politically unreliable persons, confiscation of weapons, safeguarding of important counter-espionage materials etc…”[92] General Wagner issued orders in July 1939 that “authorized German soldiers to take and execute hostages in the event of attacks by snipers or irregulars.” Despite the deception, there was no way to disguise the murder of Polish intelligentsia and Jews, and had the Army had the political acumen it could have considerably restricted the terror campaign.[93] .

Heinrich Himmler: Implementer of Hitler’s Ideas Authorizes formation of Einsatzgruppen

The campaign demonstrated Hitler’s intent. Heydrich talked about the “murdering the Polish ruling class” of the aristocracy, Catholic clergy, communists and Jews on 7 September.[94] The Army moved east with the Einsatzgruppen and Totenkopf Verbande, conducting arrests and executions in its wake.  The Army worried about Polish soldiers left behind in rear areas, and a paranoia developed as some generals believed that a “brutal guerilla campaign has broken out everywhere and we are ruthlessly stamping it out.”[95] Yet some actions against the Polish elites and the Jews drew Army reactions. The unit commanded by SS General Woyrsch “behaved with such unparalleled bestiality that it was throw out of the operational area” by General List of 14^th Army.[96] Totenkopfverbande Brandenburg came to Army attention when its commander remarked that the “SSVT would not obey Army orders,” and the conclusion of the Army General was that “the SSVT commander was following orders from some non-military authority to terrorize the local Jews.”[97] These atrocities as well as those of other Waffen-SS units were hard to hide and brought reactions out of army commanders who sought to punish the offenders. Blaskowitz and others attempted to put a halt to SS actions against Poles and Jews,[98] but most officers turned a blind eye to the atrocities or outright condoned them.  It is believed that General Walter Model and others “not only knew what was occurring in Poland but actually took part in what Halder himself described in October as “this devilish plan.””[99] It appears that many who objected were not motivated so much by humanitarian, moral or legal considerations, but rather by the effect on good order and discipline.[100] Likewise it is clear that many officers, even if they did not participate in the actions probably approved of them.  Many biographies and histories of this period written by authors influenced by surviving German officers make no or little mention of the Army’s part in these actions. Himmler and Heydrich were sensitive to the perception of the Army and resented the fact that the Army believed them to be responsible for actions that they were carrying out under the direction and order of Hitler and that their troops were “undisciplined gangs of murderers.”[101] After the establishment of the Government General led by Hans Frank there was conflict between the Army under Blaskowitz, the SS, Police and the Nazi administration. Blaskowitz made an “elaborate report on the atrocities of the SS,”[102] expressing concern about his “extreme alarm about illegal executions, his worries about maintaining troop discipline under those circumstances, the failure of discussions with the SD and Gestapo and their assertions that they were only following SS Orders.”[103] While it is unclear if the memorandum made it to Hitler, it is clear that Hitler did know about the protest and Blaskowitz fell into disfavor and was reassigned after a period of continued conflict with the Nazi administration. Hitler’s reaction according to his adjutant was that the Army’s leaders used “Salvation Army” methods, and their ideas “childish.”[104] Likewise General Georg von Külcher was relieved of command for protesting SS and police atrocities.[105] SS Officers convicted by Army courts-martial were given amnesty by Hitler on “4 October 1939 who two weeks later removed SS units from the jurisdiction of military courts.”[106] While the army remained, it was not longer in charge and would assist the SS and Police in combat and further atrocities. One German officer, later a conspirator in the July 20^th plot, remarked in November 1939 about the killings that he “was ashamed to be German! The minority are dragging our good through the mud by murdering, looting and torching houses will bring disaster on the whole German people if we do not stop it soon…”[107]

Ordungspolizei in Action: Street Cops Become Executioners

The Army was relieved of responsibility for policing Poland which fell on the Ordungspolizei battalions and Gendarmerie.  These units would wreak their own devastation on Poland in the coming months and years.[108] Poland would also be the first Nazi driven shift in population to exploit the newly won Lebensraum as Poles were driven into the newly formed Government General and ethnic Germans moved into previously Polish occupied territories. By 1941 over 1,200,000 Poles and 300,000 Jews had been expelled and 497,000 ethnic Germans brought into provinces lost in 1919.[109] Prior to the war about 3.3 million Jews lived in Poland. After the war 50-70,000 were found to have survived in Poland, the Polish Army and camps in Germany. A further 180,000 were repatriated from the Soviet Union.[110]

Russia

The Nazi war against Russia was the penultimate test of Hitler’s ideology. Planning began after 21 July, when Hitler made “his intentions plain” and “von Brauchitsch set his planners to work.”[111] Detailed preparations began in the winter of 1940-41 following the Luftwaffe’s failure against Britain and postponement of Operation Sea Lion.  Hitler intended to “crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign which was to begin no later than March 15, 1941, and before the end of the war with England.”[112] Keitel noted the final decision came in “early December 1940” and from then he had “no doubt whatsoever that only some unforeseen circumstance could possibly alter his decision to attack.”[113] The plan focused on the destruction of “the Red Army rather than on any specific terrain or political objective,”[114] although these objectives would arise in later planning and in the campaign.  Hitler stated: “What matters is that Bolshevism must be exterminated. In case of necessity, we shall renew our advance whenever a new center of resistance is formed. Moscow as the center of doctrine must disappear from the earth’s center….”[115]

Besides preparations aimed at the destruction of the Red Army and overthrow of the Soviet State, the “war against the Soviet Union was more openly ideological from the start.”[116] Hitler set the stage on March 3^rd 1941: “the forthcoming campaign is more than a mere armed conflict; it is a collision between two different ideologies…this war will not be ended merely by the defeat of the enemy armed forces” and that “the Jewish-Bolshevist intelligentsia must be eliminated….”[117] Hitler noted that “this is a task so difficult that it cannot be entrusted to the Army.”[118] Reichskommissars would be appointed in the conquered areas, but since normal civilian powers would be insufficient to eliminate the Bolshevists, that it “might be necessary “to establish organs of the Reichsführer SS alongside the army’s Secret Field Police, even in the operational areas….”[119] The “primary task was to liquidate “all Bolshevist leaders or commissars” if possible while still in the operations zones,”[120] yet the orders did not contain “a syllable that in practice every Jew would be handed over to the extermination machine.”[121] This was followed on 13 March by an agreement between the Army represented by General Wagner and the SS, which stated in part that “the Reichsführer SS has been given by the Führer special tasks within the operations zone of the Army…to settle the conflict between two opposing political systems.”[122] Likewise the agreement dictated that Himmler would “act independently and on his own responsibility” while ensuring that “military operations are not affected by measures necessary to carry out his task.”[123] A further instruction of 26 March issued by Wagner gave the Army’s agreement to the use of the Einsatzgrüppen in the operations zone, specifying coordination between them and army authorities in the operational zone and communications zones to the rear.  Cooperation was based on the “principals for co-operation between the State Secret Police and the Field Security organization of the Wehrmacht agreed with the Security branch of the War Ministry on 1 January 1937.”[124]

The most significant act for the Army in this was the Commissar Order, sometimes known as the “Criminal Order” which was used war as evidence at Nurnberg as against Keitel and the High Command of the Wehrmacht.  The order specified the killing of Soviet Political Commissars attached to the Red Army and as “they were not prisoners of war” and another order specified that “in the event that a German soldier committed against civilians or prisoners, disciplinary action was optional….”[125] The order noted regarding political commissars that “in this struggle consideration and respect for international law with regard to these elements is wrong.” [126] The “Guidelines for the Conduct of Troops in Russia” issued on May 19, 1941 called for “ruthless and vigorous measures against Bolshevist inciters, saboteurs [and] Jews.”[127]

Shortly before the order was issued, Hitler previewed it to the generals saying that the war in Russia “cannot be conducted in a knightly fashion” and that it would have to be waged with “unprecedented, unmerciful and unrelenting harshness…”[128] and that they would have to “dispense with all of their outdated and traditional ideas about chivalry and the generally accepted rules of warfare: the Bolsheviks had long since dispensed with them.”[129] He explained that his orders were beyond their comprehension stating “I cannot and will not change my orders and I insist that that they be carried out with unquestioning and unconditional obedience.”[130] Hitler’s speech was protested by some according to Von Brauchitsch,[131] who refused to protest to Hitler but issued an order “threatening dire penalties for excesses against civilians and prisoners of war” which he maintained at Nurnberg “was sufficient to nullify the Commissar Order.”[132] Yet Von Brauchitsch would tell commanders to “proceed with the necessary hardness.”[133] Warlimont noted that Von Bock, who would “later emerge as an opponent of the Commissar Order…makes no special comment on the meeting or the restricted conference that followed.” [134] Keitel said that he “stubbornly contested” the clause “relating to the authority of the SS-Reichsführer… in the rearward operational areas.”[135] Keitel blamed the Army High Command, but the order came out with his signature on behalf of Hitler, which was key evidence against him at Nurnberg. He stated that “there was never any possibility of justifying them in retrospect by circumstances obtaining in the Russian campaign.”[136] Some commanders refused to publish the orders and “insisted that the Wehrmacht never implemented such policies…” blaming them instead on the SS. One writer states “such protests were undoubtedly sincere, but in practice German soldiers were far from innocent. The senior professional officers were often out of touch with their subordinates.”[137] The orders were a “license to kill, although not a great departure from German military traditions….”[138] The effect was terrifying, for in a sense the Einsatzgruppen, “could commit ever crime known to God and man, so long as they were a mile or two away from the firing line.”[139] Security Divisions were “instructed to give material and logistical support to…units of the Einsatzgruppen.”[140] Even worse, army units in rear areas “could be called on to assist Himmler’s SS police leaders.”[141]

Einsatzgruppe troops finishing off Jewish Women

The SS formed four Einsatzgruppen composed of SD, Waffen-SS and Police troops designated A-D with “A” being assigned to Army Group North, B to Army Group Center, C to Army Group South and “D” to 11^th Army.  They were not standardized in manpower or equipment, the largest unit being A in the North at 990 personnel[142] and D with only 550.[143] These units had SS, SD or Police commanders. Additionally nine Ordnungspolizei battalions were initially assigned to the invasion forces.[144] The police contingent would grow over time so that by 1943, these units would be grouped under regiments and number about 180,000 men assisted by 301,000 auxiliaries.[145] These units would act in concert with 9 Army Security Divisions which handled rear area security.[146] Himmler initially did not reveal their intent and planned use to Einsatzgruppen commanders, only speaking of a “heavy task…to “secure and pacify” the Russian area using Sicherheitspolizei and SD methods.”[147] Understanding the effect of these operations, Himmler would state that “in many cases it is considerably easier to lead a company in battle than to command a company responsible to…carry out executions, to deport people…to be always consistent, always uncompromising-that is in many cases far, far harder.”[148]

Nazi actions are well documented; the Einsatzgruppen, Police, Army and locally recruited Schutzmannschaft battalions[149] ruthlessly exterminated Jews and others in the operational area. No sooner had an Einsatzgruppe unit entered a city, a “deadly stranglehold” would grip the “Jewish inhabitants claiming thousands and thousands of victims day by day and hour by hour.”[150] Non-Jewish Russians were encouraged to conduct programs which Heydrich noted “had to be encouraged.”[151] Einsatzgruppen D report 153 noted: “During period covered by this report 3,176 Jews, 85 Partisans, 12 looters, 122 Communist functionaries shot. Total 79,276.”[152] By the spring of 1942 Einsatzgruppe A had claimed “more than 270,000 victims, the overwhelming majority of whom were Jewish.”[153] The total killed for all groups then was 518,388 people, mostly Jews.[154] Germany’s Romanian ally acted against Jews in Odessa as well; “on 23 October 1941 19,000 Jews were shot near the harbor… probably 200,000 Jews perished either at Romanian hands or after being turned over by the Romanians to the Germans.”[155]

Many Anti-Jewish Massacres were Labeled “Anti-Partisan” Operations

Operations against Jews were often called anti-partisan operations.  Himmler referred to Einsatzgruppen as “anti-Partisan formations[156] while Wehrmacht Security divisions “murdered countless Soviet civilians and burned Russian settlements to the ground under the pretext of subduing partisan resistance.”[157] The attitude in 1941-1942 was that “’all Jews are partisans and all partisans are Jews.” From 1943, all armed resistance was “banditry” and all Jews irrespective of circumstances were treated as “bandits.””[158] The commander of the 221^st Security Division endeavored to persuade his “subordinate units that the Jews were carriers of Bolshevik contamination and, therefore, the ultimate source of any sabotage or difficulty the division faced.”[159] The extermination of the Jews and partisan war were closely intertwined with the Reich’s economic policies designed to exploit the natural resources of the Russia. This included the “hunger plan” which German authorities seemed to imagine that “millionfold starvation could be induced by requisitioning off all available grain and “shutting off” the cities.”[160] Hitler told Halder that in 1941 that he “intended to level Moscow and Leningrad, to make them uninhabitable, so there would be no need to feed their populations during the winter.”[161] Economic officials held life and death power over villages. Those that met agricultural quotas were “likely to be spared annihilation and evacuation…the culmination of this process, during 1943, would be the widespread creation of “dead zones.””[162] All told the German killed nearly 1.5 million Russian Jews.[163] By 1942, 2 million Soviet POW’s were killed.  600,000 shot outright, 140,000 by the Einsatzkommandos.[164] All told 3.3 million Soviet POWs died in German captivity through starvation, disease and exposure,[165] are included in a total of over 10 million Red Army Combat deaths.[166] Bracher notes: “The reality and irreality of the National Socialism were given their most terrible expression in the extermination of the Jews.”[167]

The Killer Becomes a Victim: Arthur Nebe’s experience commanding an Einsatzgruppe so traumatized him that he would be reassigned and then become active in the attempt to kill Hitler and lose his life

Himmler and others continued to use euphemistic language to describe their efforts talking in terms of “Jewish resettlement.”[168] Terms such as special actions, special treatment, execution activity, cleansing and resettlement were used in place of the word murder.[169] At the same time these operations led to problems in the ranks, one SS trooper observed: “deterioration in morale among his own men who had to be issued increasing rations of vodka to carry out their killing orders.”[170] Even commanders were affected, Nebe would say “I have looked after so many criminals and now I have become one myself.”[171] A fellow conspirator would describe him as a “shadow of his former self, nerves on edge and depressed.”[172] Erich Bach-Zelewski, who led the SS anti-partisan efforts would suffer a nervous breakdown which included “hallucinations connected to the shootings of Jews” which hospitalized him in 1942.[173] Himmler would state in October 1943 that “to have gone through” the elimination of the Jews had “and remained decent, that has made us tough. This is an unwritten, never to be written, glorious page in our history.”[174]

Conclusion

The German war against Poland and Russia was heavily dependent on the racist ideology of Adolf Hitler.  He was the true spirit behind the atrocities committed by his nation as one noted in Russia: “Here too the Führer is the moving spirit of a radical solution in both word and deed.”[175] He saw the partisan war as “the chance to stamp out everything that stands against us.”[176] Belief in Germany’s right to Lebensraum the superiority of the German Volk and necessity to settle the Jewish problem provided a fertile ground for Hitler’s plans.  German military doctrines, especially those of anti-partisan and total warfare abetted Hitler’s goals.

It is quite clear that many in the Wehrmacht were in agreement with Hitler’s ideology of racial-war. Prepared by cultural prejudice and long traditions of thought, the “Prussian and in later German military must be regarded as a significant part of the ideological background of the Second World War.”[177] General Reichenau’s orders to his troops are revealing: “The most important goal of the campaign against Jewish-Bolshevism is the complete destruction of its grip on power and the elimination of the Asian influence from our European cultural sphere.”[178] Von Rundstedt appeared to agree with Reichenau to “use the partisan threat as excuse for persecuting Jews, so long as the dirty work was largely left to SS Einsatzgruppen.”[179] The Army command…on the whole acquiesced in the extermination of the Jews, or at least closed its eyes to what was happening.”[180] Even if the Generals had been more forceful in their opposition, they would have been opposed by the highly Nazified youth that made up the bulk of their Army, especially junior officers. SS leaders fanatically executed Hitler’s policies aided by the civil administration. Genocide was to bring the Reich “long term economic gains and trading advantages” and was seen as a way of “financing the war debt without burdening the German taxpayer.”[181] Some individuals attempted to resist the most brutal aspects of the Nazi campaign against the Jews. Some like Wilhelm Kube, Reichskommissar for White Russia and a virulent anti-Semite was shocked at the murders of the Jews calling them “unworthy of the German cause and damaging to the German reputation” and would later attempt to spare Jews by employing them in war industries, would be “defeated by Himmler’s zealots.”[182] Army officers who objected like Blaskowitz and Külcher were relieved, or like Von Leeb, told by Hitler to “in so many words told to mind his own business.” Leeb stated: “the only thing to do is to hold oneself at a distance.”[183] Rommel knew of crimes through Blaskowitz but blamed the crimes “on Hitler’s subordinates, not Hitler himself.”[184]

Partial Justice: The Einsatzgruppen Trial

Hitler’s ideology permeated German military campaigns and administration of the areas conquered by his armies. No branch of the German military, police or civil administration in occupied Poland or Russia was exempt guiltless in the crimes committed by the Nazi regime. It is a chilling warning of the consequences awaiting any nation that allows it to become caught up in hate-filled political, racial or even religious ideologies which dehumanizes opponents and of the tragedy that awaits them and the world. In Germany the internal and external checks that govern the moral behavior of the nation and individuals failed. Caught up in the Nazi system, the Germans, especially the police and military abandoned the norms of international law, morality and decency, banally committing crimes which still reverberate today and which are seen in the ethnic cleansing actions in the former Yugoslavia and other nations.

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Weinberg, Gerhard L. Ed. Hitler’s Second Book: The Unpublished Sequel to Mein Kampf by Adolph Hitler. Translated by Krista Smith, Enigma Books,  New York, NY 2006. Originally published as Hitlers zweites Buch, Gerhard Weinberg editor, 1961.

Weinberg, Gerhard L. Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leasers. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY 2005

Westermann, Edward B. Hitler’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 2005

Wette, Wolfram. The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2006. Originally published as Die Wehrmacht: Feindbilder, Vernichtungskreig, Legenden. S. Fischer Verlag, GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, 2002

Wheeler-Bennett, John. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press Inc. New York, NY 1954

[2] Davidowicz, Lucy S. The War Against the Jews 1933-1945 Bantam Books, New York, NY 1986. p.91

[3] Tooze, Adam. The Wages of Destruction Penguin Books, New York, NY, 2008. First Published by Allen Lane Books, Penguin Group, London UK, 2006. p.463

[4] Fest, Joachim, Hitler. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, San Diego, New York, London, 1974.  German Edition by Verlag Ullstein 1973 pp. 607-608

[5] Note the actions of Cardinal Richelieu in France who worked to expand French power at the expense of other Catholic nations and the Vatican itself.

[6] In the United States the Reconstruction policies produced great resentment in the south with decidedly negative results for the newly freed slaves which lasted another 100 years, while in the Soviet Union great numbers of “opponents of Socialism” were killed, imprisoned or driven out of the county.

[7] Ibid. Tooze. The Wages of Destruction p.462

[8] Ibid. Davidowicz, The War Against the Jews pp.8-9

[9] Ibid. Davidowicz. The War Against the Jews p.12

[10] Ibid. Fest  Hitler. p.47

[11] Bracher, Karl Dietrich. The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Effects of  National Socialism. Translated by Jean Steinberg, Holt Rinehart and Winston, New York, NY 1979. Originally Published under the title Die Deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur,Folgen des Nationalsocialismus. Verlag Kiepenheuer & Witsch. Koln and Berlin, 1969 p.93

[12] Weinberg, Gerhard L. Germany Hitler and World War II . Cambridge University Press, New York, NY 1995 p.61

[13] Ibid. Weinberg, Hitler’s Second Book p.60

[14] Friedlander, Saul Nazi Germany and the Jews 1939-1945: The Years of Extermination. Harper Perennial, New York, NY 2007 p.xviii

[15] Ibid. Friedlander, The Years of Extermination p.xvii  Friedlander called this anti-Semitism “Redemptive anti-Semitism” in which “Hitler perceived his mission as a kind of crusade to redeem the world by eliminating the Jews.

[16] Megargee, Geoffrey P. War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front 1941.Bowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. Lanham, Boulder, New York. 2007 p.4

[17] Hitler, Adolf Mein Kampf translated by Ralph Manheim. Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, NY 1999. Houghton Mifflin Company 1943, copyright renewed 1971. Originally published in Germany by Verlag Frz. Eher Nachf. GmbH 1925. p.662.

[18] Evans, Richard J. The Coming of the Third Reich Penguin Books, New York 2004.  First published by Allen Lane 2003 p.197

[19] Ibid. Davidowicz The War Against the Jews pp. 88-89

[20] Rhodes, Richard. Masters of Death: The SS Einsatzgruppen and the Invention of the Holocaust. Vintage Books a division of Random House, New York, NY 2002 p.37

[21] Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Collier Books, a Division of MacMillan Publishers, Inc. New York, NY 1970 p.166

[22] Geyer, Michael. German Strategy 1914-1945 in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 1986. p.582

[23] Ibid. Geyer. German Strategy p.587

[24] Strachan, Hew. European Armies and the Conduct of War. George, Allen and Unwin, London, UK 1983 p.174

[25] Goerlitz, Walter. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel: Chief of the German High Command 1938-1945.  Translated by David Irving. Cooper Square Press 2000,  First English Edition 1966 William Kimber and Company Ltd.  German edition published by Musterschmnidt-Verlad, Gottigen 1961 p. 135

[26] Ibid. Fest, Hitler.  p. 649

[27] Ibid. Megargee, War of Annihilation p.7

[28] Trevor-Roper, H.R. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944 with an introduction by Gerhard L Weinberg,  Translated by Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens, Enigma Books, New York, NY 2000. Originally published in Great Britain by Weidenfeld & Nicholoson, London 1953 p. 27 Goebbels notes a similar theme in his recollection of Hitler’s reasons for destroying Russia a power .  See Taylor, Fred, Editor and Translator. The Goebbels Diaries 1939-1941, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth UK and New York NY 1984 pp. 413-415.

[29] Goerlitz, Walter. History of the German General Staff.” Translated by Brian Battershaw, Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1985. Originally published as Die Deutsche Generalstab Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte, Frankfur am Main, 1953 p.390

[30] Warlimont, Walter. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-45. Translated by R.H. Berry, Presido Press, Novato CA, 1964 p. 150

[31] Weinberg, Gerhard L. Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leasers. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY 2005. p. 24

[32] Aly, Gotz and Heim, Susanne. Architects of Annihilation :Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction Phoenix Paperbacks, London, 2003, Originally published as  Vordenker der Vernichtung, Hoffman und Campe, Germany 1991, English translation by Allan Blunden.  First published in Great Britain Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 2002 pp. 245-246

[33] Ibid. Fest. Hitler p.649

[34] Wette, Wolfram. The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality. Translated by Deborah Lucas Schneider. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2006. Originally published as Die Wehrmacht: Feindbilder, Vernichtungskreig, Legenden. S. Fischer Verlag, GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, 2002 p.93

[35] This understanding is different than many historians who as Friedlander notes advocate something like this: “The persecution and extermination of the Jews of Europe was but a secondary consequence of major German policies pursued toward entirely different goals.” Friedlander p.xvi

[36] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.xii

[37] Liddell-Hart, B.H. The German Generals Talk. Quill Publishing, New York, NY. 1979. Copyright 1948 by B.H. Liddell-Hart p.22

[38] It has to be noted that Liddle-Hart published this work in 1948 and was limited in the materials available, his primary sources being German officers who he viewed with sympathy because he saw them as exponents of his theory of the indirect approach.

[39] Ibid. Wette. The Wehrmacht p.224

[40] Macksey, Kenneth. Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority. Barnes and Noble Books, New York 2006, originally published by Greenhill Books, 1996. p.139

[41] Stern, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder and Building of the German Empire. Vintage Books a division of Random House, New York 1979 First published by Alfred a Knopf 1977.  p.495

[42] Ibid. Stern. Gold and Iron p.494

[43] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.34

[44] Ibid. Bracher The German Dictatorship pp.34-35

[45] Höhne, Heinze. Canaris: Hitler’s Master Spy. Translated by J. Maxwell, Brownjohn. Cooper Square Press,

New York 1999. Originally published by C. Bertelsmann Verlag Gmbh, Munich 1976, first English edition by Doubleday and Company 1979 p. 216.  Canaris would later protest the Kristalnacht to Keitel (p.334) and become convinced of the crime of the Nazis against the Jews.

[46] Ibid. Witte. The Wehrmacht p.98

[47] Ibid Witte The Wehrmacht, p.73

[48] Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Revised and Enlarged Edition. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England and New York, NY 1965. Originally published by Viking Press, New York, NY 1963 p.26

[49] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.6

[50] Fritz, Stephen G. Frontsoldaten: The German Soldier in World War II.  The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 1995 p.195

[51] Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945. Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1955 p.495

[52] Novatny, Alfred. The Good Soldier. The Aberjona Press, Bedford, PA 2003 p.40

[53] Westermann, Edward B. Hitler’s Police Battalions: Enforcing Racial War in the East. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 2005 p.64  Westermann also notes the preponderance of SA men who entered the Order Police in the 1930s, a factor which helped further the politicization of that organization.

[54] Ibid. Rhodes Masters of Death p.23

[55] Ibid. Westermann Hitler’s Police Battalions p.103

[56] Sydnor, Charles W. Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division, 1933-1945. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NY 1977 p. 28

[57] Shepherd, Ben. War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2004 p.41

[58] Blood, Philip. Hitler’s Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Occupation of Europe. Potomac Books Inc. Washington, DC 2008 p.11

[59] Ibid. Shepherd. War in the Wild East p.42

[60] Ibid. Goerlitz. History of the German General Staff p.93

[61] Rothenburg, Gunther. Moltke, Schieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Peter Paret, editor. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ. 1986 p.305

[62] Hughes, Daniel J. editor. Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, translated by Harry Bell and Daniel J Hughes. Presidio Press, Novato CA 1993. p.32

[63] Ibid. Blood Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.6   Lieber was a Prussian emigrant to the US who taught law at Columbia University.

[64] Ibid. Blood Hitler’s Bandit Hunters pp.12-13

[65] Ibid. Shepherd Wild War in the East p.42

[66] Ibid. Blood. Hitler’s Bandit Hunters pp.16-19

[67] Ibid. Blood. Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.22

[68] Condell, Bruce and Zabecki, David T. Editors. On the German Art of War: Truppenführung , Lynn Rienner Publishers, Boulder CO and London 2001. p.172

[69] Tsouras, Peter G. Editor, Fighting in Hell: The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front The Ballantine Publishing Group, New York, 1998. First published 1995 by Greenhill Books. Pp. 142-146.  It is interesting to note that Rauss does not describe any actual anti-partisan operation.

[70] Ibid. Shepherd. War in the Wild East p.45

[71] Ibid. Geyer. German Strategy p.584

[72] Ibid. Weinberg. Visions of Victory p.8

[73] Ibid. Goerlitz, History of the German General Staff p.346

[74] Höhne, Heinze. The Order of the Death’s Head: The Story of Hitler’s SS. Translated by Richard Barry. Penguin Books, New York and London, 2000. First English edition published by Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd. London 1969. Originally published as Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf, Verlag Der Spiegel, Hamburg 1966 p.259

[75] Manstein, Erich von. Forward by B.H. Liddle Hart, Introduction by Martin Blumenson. Lost victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General. Zenith Press, St Paul MN 2004. First Published 1955 as Verlorene Siege, English Translation 1958 by Methuen Company p.29

[76] Ibid. Hohne. Canaris p.347

[77] Giziowski, Richard. The Enigma of General Blaskowitz. Hppocrene Books, New York 1997 p.119

[78] Ibid. Manstein. Lost Victories p.29

[79] Ibid. Goerlitz. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel p.87

[80] Wheeler-Bennett, John. The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918-1945. St. Martin’s Press Inc. New York, NY 1954 p.448

[81] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.13

[82] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p.297

[83] Padfield, Peter. Himmler. MJF Books, New York 1990 p.264

[84] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.13

[85] Ibid. Westermann. Hitler’s Police Battalions p.127

[86] Ibid.  Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p.297

[87] Ibid. Westermann. Hitler’s Police Battalions p.127

[88] Ibid. Sydnor Soldiers of Destruction p.37 These would become the nucleus of the Totenkopf Division

[89] Ibid. Giziowski Blaskowitz p.120

[90] Ibid. Witte. The Wehrmacht p.100

[91] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head pp. 297-298

[92] Ibid. Giziowski Blaskowitz p.120

[93] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p.298

[94] Ibid. Witte. The Wehrmacht p.100

[95] Newton, Steven H. Hitler’s Commander: Field Marshal Walter Model-Hitler’s Favorite General Da Capo Press a division of Perseus Books Group, Cambridge MA 2005. p.74

[96] Ibid. Giziowski. The Enigma of General Blaskowitz pp.165-166

[97] Ibid. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction pp. 42-43 Note SSVT is the common abbreviation for the SS Totenkopf Verbande

[98] Ibid. Goerlitz. History of the German General Staff p.359

[99] Ibid. Newton. Hitler’s Commander p.78

[100] Ibid. Witte The Wehrmacht p.102

[101] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p.298

[102] Ibid. Goerlitz. History of the German General Staff .p.359

[103] Ibid. Giziowski. The Enigma of General Blaskowitz p.173

[104] Ibid. Giziowski. The Enigma of General Blaskowitz p.173

[105] Ibid. Witte The Wehrmacht p.102

[106] Burleigh, Michael and Wippermann, Wolfgang. The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 Cambridge University Press, New York NY and Cambridge UK 1991. p.100

[107] Ibid. Witte The Wehrmacht p.102

[108] For a good account of one of the Police Battalions see Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101mand the Final Solution in Poland by Christopher Browning Harper Perennial Publishers, San Francisco CA 1992

[109] Reitlinger, Gerald.  The SS: Alibi of a Nation. The Viking Press, New York, 1957. Republished by Da Capo Press, New York, NY p.131

[110] Ibid. Davidowicz The War Against the Jews pp.395-397

[111] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.24

[112] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett The Nemesis of Power p.511

[113] Ibid. Goerlitz. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. P.132

[114] Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 1995 p.31

[115] Trevor-Roper, H.R. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944 with an introduction by Gerhard L Weinberg,  Translated by Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens, Enigma Books, New York, NY 2000. Originally published in Great Britain by Weidenfeld & Nicholoson, London 1953 p.6

[116] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.10 More openly ideological as compared to Poland.

[117] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.150

[118] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.151

[119] Ibid. Reitlinger, The SS p.175

[120] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 354

[121] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 354  Again another deception.

[122] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.153

[123] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.153

[124] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters pp. 158-159

[125] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed p.56

[126] Ibid. Davidowicz. The War Against the Jews p.123

[127] Ferguson, Niall. The War of the Worlds: Twentieth Century Conflict and the Descent of the West. The Penguin Press, New York, 2006 p.442

[128] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett. Nemesis of Power p.513

[129] Ibid. Goerlitz. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel p.135

[130] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett. Nemesis of Power p.513

[131] Ibid. Wheeler-Bennett Nemesis of Power p.513 and footnote. He cites the three Army Group commanders, Leeb, Rundstedt and Bock. However Von Rundstedt’s biographer notes that “no evidence exists as to what Von Rundstedt’s to this was at the time.” Messenger, Charles, The Last Prussian: A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt 1875-1953 Brassey’s (UK) London England 1991. p.134

[132] Ibid. Reitlinger, The SS p.176

[133] Ibid. Megargee. War of Annihilation p.33

[134] Ibid. Warlimont. Inside Hitler’s Headquarters p.162

[135] Ibid. Goerlitz. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel p.136

[136] Ibid. Goerlitz. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel pp.136-137

[137] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed p.56

[138] Ibid. Blood. Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.52

[139] Ibid. Reitlinger The SS p. 177

[140] Ibid. Shepherd. War in the Wild East p.54

[141] Ibid. Reitlinger The SS p. 177

[142] Ibid. Rhodes Masters of Death pp.12-13

[143] Ibid. Westermann. Hitler’s Police Battalions p.167

[144] Ibid. Westermann. Hitler’s Police Battalions p.164

[145] Ibid. Blood Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.141

[146] Ibid. Shepherd Wild War in the East p.48. Shepherd notes the deficiencies of these units in terms of organization, manpower and equipment which he calls “far short of the yardstick of military excellence with which the Wehrmacht is so widely associated.

[147] Ibid.  Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 356 Only one of the Einsatzgruppen commanding officers was a volunteer, Arthur Nebe who was involved in the conspiracy to kill Hitler. It is believed by many that Nebe volunteered to earn the clasp to the Iron Cross to curry favor with Heydrich and that initially “Nebe certainly did not know that “employment in the east” was synonymous with the greatest mass murder in history.

[148] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.422

[149] Ibid. Blood Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.55

[150] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 360

[151] Ibid.  Friedlander The Years of Extermination p.207

[152] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 360

[153] Ibid. Tooze The Wages of Destruction p.481

[154] Ibid. Ferguson. The War of the World p.446

[155] Di Nardo, Richard L. Germany and the Axis Powers: From Coalition to Collapse. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS. 2005 p.133 The Hungarians would also engage in ant-Jewish operations. Only the Italian army would not conduct operations against the Jews.

[156] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 369

[157] Ibid. Wette The Wehrmacht p.127

[158] Ibid. Blood. Hitler’s Bandit Hunters p.117

[159] Ibid. Shepherd. War in the Wild East pp.90-91

[160] Ibid. Tooze The Wages of Destruction p.481

[161] Ibid. Magargee. War of Annihilation p.64

[162] Ibid. Shepherd. War in the Wild East pp.127-128

[163] Ibid. Davidowicz The War Against the Jews from the table on page 403. This included 228,000 from the Baltic republics (90%) 245,000 from White Russia (65%) 900,000 from the Ukraine (60%) and 107,000 from Russia proper (11%)

[164] Ibid. Rhodes. Masters of Death p.241

[165] Ibid. Glantz and House When Titans Clashed p.57

[166] Ibid. Glantz and House. When Titans Clashed table on p.292

[167] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.431

[168] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.430

[169] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 367

[170] Ibid. Rhodes. Masters of Death p.225

[171] Ibid. Rhodes Masters of Death p.225

[172] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 363

[173] Ibid. Höhne The Order of the Death’s Head p. 363

[174] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.423

[175] Ibid. Bracher. The German Dictatorship p.430

[176] Ibid. Megargee War of Annihilation p.65

[177] Ibid. Wette. The Wehrmacht p.293

[178] Ibid. Wette. The Wehrmacht p.97

[179] Messenger, Charles. The Last Prussian A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd Von Rundstedt 1875-1953 Brassey’s London, 1991 p148

[180] Ibid. Bracher The German Dictatorship pp.430-431

[181] Ibid. Aly and Heim Architects of Annihilation p.242

[182] Ibid. Padfield Himmler pp.341-342

[183] Ibid. Megargee War of Annihilation p.97

[184] Fraser, David. Knight’s Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel Harper Perennial, New York 1995, first published by Harper Collins in Britain, 1993. p.536

Hohe Leistungen zum Wohle des Volkes

Deutsche Frauen, deutsche Männer, meine politische Arbeit, die ich für das deutsche Volk und für die ganze Menschheit leiste, in der Gemeinschaft der Besten dieser Welt, in der Gemeinschaft von United Anarchists, bekomme ich von niemandem bezahlt.

Naja, das deutsche Volk bezahlt Winfried Sobottka schon – in Form von Arbeitslosengeld 2, welches er nach eigenem Bekunden seit sehr langer Zeit bezieht. Und es stimmt, Sobottka leistet sich so einiges, allerdings nicht für die ganze Menschheit.

Es ist nicht gelogen, dass unsere Kämpfer noch weitaus stärker motiviert sind als etwa die Kämpfer der Waffen-SS es waren: Wir sind die absolute Elite in allem, worauf es uns ankommt.

Die Waffen-SS war keine absolute Elite, sondern ein stinkender Haufen Scheiße. Das wären Sobottkas Kämpfer auch, wenn denn solche Kämpfer existieren würden.