Introduction

World War II saw some of most rapid technological advances impacting military forces in history. The advances in technology impacted the organization and tactics of major power military forces, especially those of the United States, Germany, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.  These advances combined to revolutionize the way wars were fought and military forces have been organized to the current day.

Heinz Guderian’s Theories of Mechanized and Combined Arms Warfare and His Organizational Genius Revolutionized  Land Warfare

The technical developments and their relationship to military organization and tactical applications began in the years following World War I as various writers began to analyze that war and formulate ways not to repeat the grist mill of trench warfare that dominated it.  The writers looked at tactical innovations, new technology and enunciated ways that technology and tactics could be combined with organizational changes to revolutionize the ways that wars were fought.  Chief among these writers were General Fuller and Captain B.H. Liddell Hart in Britain, Colonel Heinz Guderian and Erwin Rommel in Germany.  Airpower theories were dominated by the strategic bombing theories of Italy’s Guido Douhet and tactical air theories of American Marine General Roy Geiger as well as the pioneers of tactical air support in the Luftwaffe.   In the United States General George C. Marshall helped initiate doctrinal changes that would change the way that the U.S. Army would fight.

Among the common elements found in the works of these men was the necessity to apply technology to overcome the pitfalls that all of the armies which fought in the First World War found themselves.

The Mechanization of Ground Forces

Mass Speed and Firepower: The Germans Would Pioneer the New Style of Warfare

There were a number of major technological advances between the wars and during the war that helped change the nature of warfare.  One of the earliest was the mechanization of armies which began toward the end of the First World War and continued between the wars to varying degrees in each country.  All the major armies experimented with mechanized forces to one degree or another. In Britain these got the earliest start with some formations being 100% mechanized by the early 1930s.  France was more circumspect about mechanization only slowly converting forces as they were focused on a defensive strategy based on the Maginot Line.  Many in the German high command resisted Guderian and other innovators regarding the mechanization of the Wehrmacht as well as the development of the Panzerwaffe.

The Soviet Union Would Turn the Tables on the Germans using their own Tactics

The Soviet Union had a large number of mechanized and armored formations prior to the war though they were not proficient in their use and had not developed doctrine to match the forces that they controlled.  The Untied States also resisted efforts to mechanize its Army but seeing the results of the German Blitzkrieg quickly overcame years of resistance to become an Army that save for 2 Cavalry Divisions was 100% mechanized.  The development of Airborne formations added the possibility of vertical envelopment to ground operations. These developments impacted nearly every campaign in Europe and North Africa and to a much lesser degree the Pacific theater. German performance in the early Polish, French, North African and Balkan Campaigns as well as the initial foray into the Soviet Union were all successful due to the proficiency of their combined mechanized, Panzer and tactical air forces.  The Soviets would develop and become very effective at this type of warfare on a much large scale than the Germans could have imagined beginning with the Stalingrad counteroffensive and especially in the destruction  of the German Army Group Center in the summer of 1944.

Though Using Lighter Armored Forces the Americans Would become Proficient in the New Type of Warfare by the Summer of 1944

The Americans became proficient at mobile operations during the war, especially during the “dash across France” and the breakout in the Saar-Palatine campaign in 1945,  but many times uninventive commanders squandered the advantage and allowed themselves to be sucked into battles of attrition that their forces were not made for.

Communications

A key development that accompanied and accentuated the mechanization of ground forces were advances in tactical wireless communications which made it possible for commanders to keep up with fast moving formations and react in near real time to changing tactical situations.  The Germans were the first to become very proficient in this as they not only developed communications for ground forces but also for coordination between tactical air forces and ground forces.  This made the German Blitzkrieg the first example of modern air-ground combat cooperation.  The Americans, British and Soviets would follow suit but it was the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe that pioneered the communications revolution.  As the war went on communications capabilities increased and armies became more dependent on tactical and long range wireless communications.  The dependency of military forces on communications networks became a major factor in operational planning and the success of the Allies in breaking Japanese and German codes gave them an advantage in anticipating German or Japanese moves.

Armor, Firepower and Mobility: The Tank Comes into its Own

World War Two Saw Tanks become Deadly Instruments of Modern Warfare

Mechanization was a major factor in the war and the most decisive component of the mechanization of ground forces was the development of the tank as well as specialized formations which employed tanks in close cooperation with other arms, such as mechanized infantry and artillery.  The development of such forces really began with the British but the best example of this was the German Panzer Division.  The Panzer Division was a totally mechanized and integrated force of all arms which was employed in mass and capable like all German units to be task organized into Kampfgruppen to optimize tactical flexibility.  British Armored Divisions were tank heavy and infantry light which made them far less flexible organizations.  Soviet Armored forces were slow to develop but they became masters of large level operational maneuver using mechanized and tactical air forces to a deadly effect against the Wehrmacht.  The Americans delivered a light and flexible armored formation and became very proficient in combined arms warfare though the divisional structure often proved too light and not as resilient as German formations.  It was in this environment that the tank truly came into its own to dominate the battlefield in a way that many could not have imagined prior to the war. Firepower, protection and mobility advantages gained through technological advances increased the lethality and survivability of the tank and forced each side to develop better ways of neutralizing tanks through more powerful anti-tank guns, sabot rounds and shaped charges.

Tactical and Strategic Air developments

The Americans and the British Would Develop the Concept of Strategic Bombing against Germany

With the technical revolution came revolution in the skies both at the strategic and tactical levels.  Modern bombers with good navigational gear guided by radar and assisted by modern bombsites such as the Norden developed by the United States would wreak havoc on industrial and civilian centers. Advances in aircraft technology saw fast and more lethal aircraft being fielded by all powers as the war progressed and while Jet propulsion developed during the war would doom piston powered aircraft as first line assets.

The P-47 Thunderbolt Would Serve as both a Long Range Bomber Escort and as Seen Here as an Excellent Ground Attack Aircraft

Tactical air developments would be led by the Germans but as the war went on the Allies developed sophisticate tactical air forces that dominated battlefields when the weather permitted. The Germans pioneered the use of ballistic missiles as well as the cruise missile while the United States and Britain developed the Atomic Bomb.  Specialized types of tactics and organizations were developed for strategic, tactical and naval air forces. At the strategic level there were the dueling schools of precision versus area bombing while at the tactical level the developments were as much predicated on air-ground communications as they were the aircraft flown.  Specialized aircraft were developed or modified as tank-killers while fighter forces became more specialized to into interceptors, bomber escorts and night fighters.

The Obselecent Junkers JU-87 found New Life on the Eastern Front as a Tank Killer armed with 2 37mm FLAK cannon

The influence of air assets, especially at the tactical level would become more pronounced as the war went on.  Allied air superiority ensured that the landings in France and the breakout in Normandy succeeded and tactical air dominance by US Navy and Marine air forces in the Pacific aided ground operations as well as sea battles.

Amphibious Warfare developments

The US Navy and Marine Corps Would Perfect Amphibious Operations in the Pacific

Technology came to the fore in amphibious operations with the development of specialized landing craft, beach clearing equipment and naval gunfire support.  This effort was led by the United States with the most advanced force being the Marines.   The combined use of air, land, sea and naval air forces to include the use of Aircraft Carriers revolutionized how the campaign in the Pacific would be fought to a conclusion long before anyone thought that it could be.

General Naval Developments

At sea ship design advanced new and better classes of warships as technologic advances in radar, sonar, gunnery systems, torpedo and ant-aircraft technology made warships far more formidable than those built only years before the war.  This was nowhere more apparent than in submarine development especially that of Germany’s U-boat arm with the development of streamlined hulls and “schnorkel” technology.  The use of U-Boats and later American submarines in the Pacific into “Wolf Packs” increased the lethality of submarine forces to a near decisive state in the war.  Naval tactics were influenced by the use of air and surface search radar as well as sonar.

US Fast Carrier Task Forces Would Dominate the Pacific War and Naval Warfare to the Present Day

The development of the US Navy into the dominant Naval Power of the next 65 years was built upon the success of the Navy in the Second World War.  The largest and some of the bloodiest sea battles in history were fought in the Pacific with decisive results in that theater of operations.  Operationally the major Navies all were influenced to one degree or another by the theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Summary and Conclusion

The course of World War Two was determined by the strategic and operational theories developed in the inter-war years. These were applied correctly by some powers and not by others.   The use technological advances and more effective organizational structure developed in the inter-war years and refined by the experience of war impacted the war on land, at sea and in the air in every theater of war.  The use of combined arms and joint operations revolutionized the manner in which wars would be fought.  If the technology, theory and force structure had not come together when it did the war might have been fought much as the First World War.  Instead warfare became faster and more lethal than ever and would lead to even more advances in the years to come.

Der lange Anlauf zum Zweiten Weltkrieg. Was hat die Generation meines Vaters dazu bewegt, nur 20 Jahre nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg Adolf Hitler in einen neuen Krieg zu folgen? Die Suche des Autors nach einer Antwort führt zu überraschenden Ergebnissen. Dokumente beteiligter Außenministerien, Notizen und Memoiren englischer, französischer, italienischer und amerikanischer Regierungschefs, Minister, Diplomaten und Armeeoberbefehlshaber belegen: Es war eine ganze Anzahl von Staaten, die den Zweiten Weltkrieg angezettelt haben. Zusammenhänge werden deutlich, die bislang schlichtweg übergangen wurden. „Dieser Krieg“, so Schultze-Rhonhof, „hatte viele Väter“. Vieles in unserer deutschen Geschichte zwischen 1919 und 1939 ist ohne Kenntnis des zeitgleichen Geschehens in anderen Ländern nicht zu verstehen, zu eng greifen oft Wirkung und Wechselwirkung ineinander. Doch es ist nicht allein die zeitgleiche Geschichte unserer Nachbarvölker, die den Kriegsbeginn beeinflußt hat, es ist auch – und das nicht unerheblich – die gemeinsame Vorgeschichte der streitenden Parteien. Der israelische Botschafter in Bonn, Asher ben Nathan, antwortete in einem Interview auf die Frage, wer 1967 den 6-Tage-Krieg begonnen und die ersten Schüsse abgegeben habe: „Das ist gänzlich belanglos. Entscheidend ist, was den ersten Schüssen vorausgegangen ist.“ So hat fast jede Geschichte ihre Vorgeschichte. Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof war 37 Jahre lang Soldat der Bundeswehr, zuletzt als Generalmajor und Territorialer Befehlshaber für Niedersachsen und Bremen. 1995 zog er das Interesse der Medien auf sich, als er das Bundesverfassungsgericht wegen seines sogenannten „Soldaten sind Mörder“-Urteils öffentlich kritisierte.

Ein Gastkommentar von Markus Lobis

Einer, der die Südtiroler Medienszene in meiner Wahrnehmung negativ geprägt hat, war Josef Rampold. Schon in meiner ersten Jugendzeit hatte ich giftige Leserbriefduelle mit Mister X., die dieser auf äußerst perfide Weise zu seinem Vorteil zu drehen versuchte: Er fügte den Leserbriefen, die damals noch mit der Post eingeschickt oder bei den Athesia-Filialen abgegeben werden mussten, in der Zeitung ein paar oft hinterfotzige und belehrende Bemerkungen an, gegen die sich der Leserbriefschreiber nicht wehren konnte und die oft den Sinn des Leserbriefes oder dessen Schreiber ins Lächerliche rückten.

Es ist ihm hoch anzurechnen, dass ihm dieses sein Verhalten später selbst nicht mehr korrekt vorkam und dass er es in einem Interview zum Siebzigsten ausdrücklich bedauerte, so gehandelt zu haben.

Ein System braucht motivierte Erfüllungsgehilfen und Rampold schien mir in seinem missionarischen Eifer für die deutsche Sprache und die “alten” Werte (was immer man darunter verstehen mag) manchmal so überdienstfertig, dass ich ihn einmal als den tintenspritzenden Kettenhund vom Weinbergweg bezeichnet habe.

Als leidenschaftlicher Vertreter und Verteidiger der Wehrmachtsgeneration sah sich Rampold dazu berufen, die Legende von “sauberen” Wehrmacht nach Kräften zu unterstützen und er benutzte – nein: mißbrauchte! – dazu verschiedene Male das Tagblatt “Dolomiten”. Dabei brachte er verschiedentlich Aussagen zu Papier, die anderswo in einem seriösen Tagblatt wohl nicht gedruckt worden wären.

Zum Beispiel diese “Randbemerkung”, die am 5. März 1985 unter dem Kürzel X. in den “Dolomiten” veröffentlicht wurde:

DIE RANDBEMERKUNG
Von Dir redet keiner …

Jetzt ist es also vorbei. Wir hatten ein Jahr Bedenkzeit, und die wurde gut genützt. Es gab nur wohldosierten Heldenmythos, und man konnte auch hören und lesen, dass die Tiroler rückständige Bauerntölpel waren, die den französisch-bayerischen Fortschritt nicht begriffen (wie Tiroler überhaupt zuweilen den Fortschritt schwer begreifen – was sich nicht selten als Vorteil erwiesen hat). Aber sonst kamen sie mit einem blauen Auge davon, der Anderle Hofer, der Speckbacher oder – am wenigsten – der Haspinger, denn der war ein ganz Arger.

Man versäumte nicht, die Brücke zur Gegenwart oder zur jüngeren Geschichte zu schlagen. Da durften die Verteidiger Tirols von 1915/18 gerade noch mitzockeln, aber das Schwergewicht lag auf Option und Widerstand. Die Jugend wurde über „wahres“ Heldentum belehrt, und so war es auch ein Belehrjahr.

Nur von Dir, mein Freund, redete kaum einer. Du hattest höchstens die Chance, dann und wann – wenigstens in den Landgemeinden – in die “Gefallenen aller Kriege” eingeschlossen zu werden, denn dann brauchte man nicht das sagen, was Du warst.

Du warst ein deutscher Soldat im zweiten Weltkrieg, und darüber redet man besser nicht, sind wir doch alle, auch Du mein Freund und ich, mit Hurra hinausgezogen ins Feld der Unehre.

Oder nicht? Wenn ich so an unsere Maturaklasse denke, dann hat überhaupt keiner Hurra geschrieen. Einige waren sogar wegen der damals unter den verschiedenen Jugendgruppen ausgetragenen Meinungsverschiedenheiten eingelocht worden, wie Du, mein Freund.

Aber dann sah man, dass das Soldatsein auch eine Art innere Emigration sein konnte, denn wir konnten nicht wie Stauffenberg in Adolfs Hauptquartier eine Bombe deponieren. Aber wir hielten unsere alten Ideale hoch, wir planten für spätere Zeiten, anfangs noch – dann nimmer. Das große Inferno begann. Wir wussten, dass alles einem furchtbaren Ende zustrebte, zustreben musste. Oft hielt uns nur mehr das Band der Kameradschaft zusammen – und der Blick auf die hellen Bombennächte, in denen die Alten und unsere Mütter und Geschwister zu Grunde gingen, als lebende Fackeln verbrannten.

Von ihnen, mein Freund, redet auch kaum einer mehr.

Auch von unseren Freunden nicht, die in ihren Panzern verbrannten, im Luftkampf fielen, in den eisernen Särgen der U-Boote am Meeresgrund ruhen, im Sand Afrikas oder im Eis des Nordens – oder die in den Gefangenenlagern verhungert sind. Von ihnen redet kaum einer mehr – höchstens jene, die unsere Generation mit einer relativ kleinen – aber unheimlich wirksamen – Verbrecherclique gleichsetzen, der wir selbst das Lebenslicht ausgeblasen hätten, wären wir noch einmal zu Wort gekommen.

Du, mein Freund, bist nicht mehr zu Wort gekommen. Damals, als wir uns beide im Osten schützend vor die Flüchtlinge stellten und gegen die Rote Armee ankämpften, damals bist Du noch in den letzten Tagen gefallen, in Schlesien.

So hast Du nicht mehr erlebt, dass man uns, die wir nur Deutsche waren, pauschal als Anhänger einer Weltanschauung bezeichnete, der tatsächlich viele Irregeleitete im guten Glauben gefolgt waren, die aber niemals mit dem Wort “deutsch” gleichgesetzt werden darf. Das ist Betrug – genauso wie die Mär von der “Kollektivschuld”.

Aber das alles hast Du nicht mehr erlebt. Du hast Ruhe. Wir haben übrigens auch nicht das Wort bekommen, das übernahmen andere. Viel Gutes haben sie über uns nicht gesagt, bestenfalls seien wir Opfer gewesen, oder Trottel.

Sei froh, mein Freund, dass Du das alles nicht mehr erlebst. Deutsch sein zu wollen, würde Dir als Nationalismus ausgelegt. Sei auch froh, dass Du nicht mehr erleben musst, wie geldgierige Gangster unser schönes Land zerstört haben, von dem wir in langen Nächten geträumt haben, sei froh, dass Du nicht mehr die vergiftete und verpestete Welt erlebst, in der wir vegetieren, außen vergiftet und vor allem innen.

Sei froh, dass Du noch Musik erlebtest und nicht das Gegröle von ,,Liedermachern”, dass Du noch die großen Werke unserer Klassiker auf der Bühne gesehen hast und nicht erleben musst, wie sich jeder Dahergelaufene heute einfach als Hanswurst austoben kann, weil dieser Zeit nichts Neues mehr einfällt und kaum mehr etwas heilig ist.

Es ist gut, dass Du manche ,,Kunst” nicht sehen, und dass Du nicht miterleben musst, wie man vor einer angeblich geförderten Jugend ganz offen Geschäfte mit der Pornographie macht.

Sei froh, dass Du nicht erlebt hast, wie man die Generation unserer Kinder gegen uns aufgehetzt hat, dank Gott, dass Du den Irrsinn der “antiautoritären” Erziehung und die Verhöhnung der großen Leistungen unseres Volkes nie erlebt hast und es ist auch gut, dass Du Dein Bild als deutscher Soldat in den Filmen der Sieger – und noch erbärmlicher in den eigenen, in den “deutschen” Filmen – nie gesehen hast.

Da ist Dir, mein Freund, viel erspart geblieben – auch die Tatsache, dass Deutsche von Deutschen durch Zäune und Schussapparate getrennt sind und dass in unserem Heimatland leichtfertig aufs Spiel gesetzt wird, was die Generation unserer Väter als heiliges Erbe übernommen und durchgekämpft hat.

Aber von Dir – wie gesagt – und von einer einstmals anderen Zeit redete kaum einer, Du hast nicht in das Festprogramm gepasst. Sei froh. Es wurde so manches gesagt und geschrieben, worüber ich mich an Deiner Stelle geschämt habe.

Und denk daran, dass Dich diejenigen die reinen Gewissens durch den Feuerofen gegangen sind, niemals vergessen werden. X.

(„Dolomiten“, 5. März 1985)

Dem entsprechend fiel auch mein Nachruf aus, als er vor zwei Jahren, genau genommen am 12. November in Bozen starb. In die fast unerträglich hochschwappende Hochachtung und die grenzenlose Bewunderung für sein Lebenswerk mischte ich einige kritische Töne und schrieb folgenden Nachruf für meinen Blog und auszugsweise in das Kondolenzbuch von STOL:

Zum Tod von Josef Rampold | Heimatschützer, Schriftleiter, Ausgrenzer

Mit Josef Rampold ist ein großer Südtiroler verstorben, der sein Land geliebt und ihm viel gegeben hat. Seine Sachkenntnis und sein Engagement als konservativer Heimatschützer haben eine wichtige und unüberhörbare Stimme getragen, die nun zwar verstummt ist, aber weiter Wirkung entfalten wird.

Josef Rampold war aber auch ein scharfer Ausgrenzer, der seine Macht als „Schriftleiter“ eingesetzt hat, um Menschen zu bekämpfen, die einen gesellschaftlichen und politischen Entwurf Südtirols zur Diskussion stellen wollten, der Rampold und den seinen nicht gefallen hat.

Es war vielleicht auch eine gewisse politische Nervosität in den Achtziger-Jahren, die zu überzogenen Reaktionen durch die viel zu wenig kritisierten Machthaber geführt haben, denen sich Rampold verpflichtet fühlte.

Dass es dabei öfter zu persönlichen Verunglimpfungen und Ausgrenzung als zu echten Debatten gekommen ist, liegt am Machtgefüge unseres Landes und am Mangel an Streit- und Diskussionskultur. Josef Rampold hat in meinen Augen wenig zur Behebung dieses Mangels beigetragen.

Wer erinnert sich nicht an die scharfen Kolumnen von „Mister X“, in denen Rampold immer wieder „gewisse Kreise“ attackiert und ihnen Verrat an Südtirol vorgeworfen hat, von einem erkennbaren Ekel gegenüber allem Roten und Grünen zu höchsten Stufen der Empörung getrieben?

Auch wenn Rampold anlässlich seiner Pensionierung zum 70. Geburtstag ein sehr versöhnliches Interview gegeben hat, in dem er sich deutlich selbst kritisiert und auch sein Bedauern über manches “Vergaloppieren im Zorn” äußert, kann dies nicht darüber hinwegführen, dass er doch mit Stolz und Verve seine Rolle als moralische Instanz ausgespielt hat, wenn es galt, mißliebige Zeitgenossen in die engen Südtiroler Schranken zu weisen.

Dann auch die standhafte Verteidigung der „sauberen“ Wehrmacht und die zornige Verdammung jener, die das nicht so sahen. Wenn es in Südtirol noch zu keiner ehrlichen und konsequenten Aufarbeitung von Nationalsozialismus und Faschismus gekommen ist, dann hat dies auch mit der sturen Unterstützung der „Schwamm-drüber-Lösung“ zu tun, die auch von Rampold als konstituierendes Element der Südtiroler Nachkriegsgeschichte gepflegt und nach Kräften gefördert wurde. Als „Hauptschriftleiter“ des Tagblattes „Dolomiten“ kam Josef Rampold dabei eine Schlüsselrolle zu.

Ich hatte in den Achtziger-Jahren verschiedentlich kleine Buchstaben-Scharmützel mit Rampold auszutragen, da schon damals der Leserbrief an „die Zeitung“ eine der wenigen Möglichkeiten war, kleine Diskussionen anzuzetteln. Öfter als heute musste man es sich damals gefallen lassen, dass dem abgedruckten Leserbrief Redaktions-Reaktionen beigefügt wurden – eine perfide Art, den Inhalt eines Leserbriefs zu relativieren, zumal dessen Schreiber keine Möglichkeit zur unmittelbaren Entgegnung hatte.

Der enorme Rampold-Jubel, den das Tagblatt der Südtiroler heute betreibt, scheint mir doch etwas übertrieben und ich werde den Eindruck nicht los, dass der Tod des zweifellos großen Südtirolers ein Anlass für den Weinbergweg ist, durch die massive Betonung der Werte, für die Rampold stand, die eigene tragende Rolle für das Land Südtirol zu unterstreichen.

Pepi Feichtinger war auch unter denen, die Rampold Kritisches nachriefen. Er hat einen Leserbrief in der FF geschrieben, der auch an die Schattenseiten des knallkonservativen Oberlehrers Rampold erinnerte. Die Töchter Rampold antworteten mit einem empörten Leserbrief in der FF, was mich wiederum provozierte, ebenfalls einen Leserbrief an die FF zu schicken, der am 13. Dezember 2007 ebendort erschien und wie folgt lautete:

Nihil sine bene?

Josl Rampolds heimatkundliche Schriften, seine Radiosendungen und sein gutes Deutsch in allen Ehren – Rampold war für mich in erster Linie ein scharfer Ausgrenzer, ein Gräbenzieher und vehementer Verteidiger eines politischen Systems, das viele Schattenseiten hat.

Ich erinnere mich an die perfiden Beisätze zu den Leserbriefen. Ich habe das einfach als hinterfotzig empfunden, wenn ein kritischer Text, für den man bei uns eh schon mehr Mut brauchte als anderswo, durch ein paar gehässige Zeilen ins Gegenteil gekehrt wurde und man als besudelter Schreiber keine Gelegenheit zur Entgegnung hatte.

Dann die oftmals arroganten Randbemerkungen in denen der zornbebende Tintenwüterich gegen „gewisse Kreise“ polemisierte, die „aufjaulen“ und das hehre Werk der treu und allzeit sauber der Wehrmacht dienenden Väter zu zerstören drohten. Jeder wusste, wer damit gemeint war: Jene progressiven – oft studentischen – Gruppen und Personen, die den Mut hatten, unbequeme Fragen zu stellen und die die Lust verspürten, über ein Südtirol nachzudenken, das jenseits von Edelweiss und Volkstumsk(r)ampf seine Bestimmung und Zukunft haben könnte. Rampold hatte Einfluss. Er hat ihn nicht dazu genutzt, für ein offeneres Südtirol, für mehr Dialektik oder eine faire politische Streitkultur einzutreten.

Steter Tintentropfen höhlt das Erscheinungsbild und so genießen Südtirols politische Querdenker und Oppositionskräfte heute noch nicht den selbstverständlichen Respekt, den jede/r verdient, der/die sich – bei welcher Gruppe auch immer – politisch betätigt. In Südtirol konnte man nach dem Tod von Rampold viel Scheinheiligkeit wahrnehmen und ich werde den Eindruck nicht los, dass die überdimensionierte Würdigung des Verstorbenen vor allem dazu diente, die Macht und den Einfluss des Weinbergweges zu feiern. (Markus Lobis, Brixen)

Josef Rampold und seine Waffe für die alten Tage
(Foto: Scan aus den “Dolomiten”)

Tiger I…

 

Tiger Ausf. E
Tiger I in Sicily in 1943
Type	Heavy tank
Place of origin	Nazi Germany
Service history
In service	1942–1945
Wars	World War II
Production history
Designer	Henschel & Son
Designed	1942
Manufacturer	Henschel
Unit cost	250,800 RM
Produced	1942–1944
Number built	1,347
Specifications
Weight	56.9 tonnes or 62.72 tons
Length	6.29 m (20 ft 8 in)8.45 m (27 ft 9 in) (gun forward)
Width	3.55 m (11 ft 8 in)
Height	3.0 m (9 ft 10 in)
Crew	5
Armour	25–120 mm (0.98–4.7 in)[3][4]
Primary armament	1× 8.8 cm KwK 36 L/56 92 rounds
Secondary armament	2× 7.92 mm Maschinengewehr 34 4,800 rounds
Engine	Maybach HL230 P45 (V-12 petrol) 700 PS (690.4 hp, 514.8 kW)
Power/weight	12.3 PS/tonne
Suspension	torsion bar
Operational range	110–195 km (68–120 mi)
Speed	38 km/h (24 mph)

 

The Tiger I was a German heavy tank used in World War II, produced from late 1942 as an answer to the unexpectedly formidable Soviet armour encountered in the initial months of Operation Barbarossa, particularly the T-34 and the KV-1. The Tiger I design gave the Wehrmacht its first tank mounting the 88 mm gun, which had previously demonstrated its effectiveness against both aircraft and tanks. During the course of the war, the Tiger I saw combat on all German battlefronts. They were usually deployed in independent tank battalions, which proved to be quite formidable.

While the Tiger I was feared by many of its opponents, it was over-engineered, expensive and time-consuming to produce. Only 1,347 were built between August 1942 and August 1944. The Tiger was prone to mechanical breakdowns and in 1944, production was phased out in favour of the Tiger II.

The tank was given its nickname Tiger by Ferdinand Porsche, and the Roman numeral was added after the later Tiger II entered production. The initial official German designation was Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausführung H (‘Panzer VI version H’, abbreviated PzKpfw VI Ausf. H), but the tank was redesignated as PzKpfw VI Ausf. E in March 1943. It also had the ordnance inventory designation SdKfz 181.

Today only a handful of Tiger Is survive in museums and exhibitions worldwide. The most notable specimen is perhaps the Bovington Tank Museum’s Tiger 131, currently the only one restored to running order.

Design…

The Tiger differed from earlier German tanks principally in its design philosophy. Its predecessors balanced mobility, protection, and firepower, and were sometimes out gunned by their opponents.

The Tiger I represented a new approach that emphasised firepower and armour at the expense of mobility. Design studies for a new heavy tank had been started in 1937, without any production planning. Renewed impetus for the Tiger was provided by the quality of the Soviet T-34 encountered in 1941. Although the general design and layout were broadly similar to the previous medium tank the Panzer IV, the Tiger weighed more than twice as much. This was due to its substantially thicker armour, the larger main gun, and the consequently greater volume of fuel and ammunition storage, larger engine, and more solidly-built transmission and suspension.

[edit] Armour

 

The Tiger I’s armour reached up to 120 mm on the mantlet. This tank is assigned to the Schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 operating in northern France in 1944.

The Tiger I had frontal hull armour 100 mm (3.9 in) thick and frontal turret armour of 120 mm (4.7 in), as opposed to the 80 mm (3.1 in) frontal hull and 50 mm (2 in) frontal turret armour of contemporary models of the Panzer IV.It also had 60 mm (2.4 in) thick hull side plates and 80 mm armour on the side superstructure and rear, turret sides and rear was 80 mm. The top and bottom armour was 25 mm (1 in) thick; from March 1944 the turret roof was thickened to 40 mm (1.6 in). Armour plates were mostly flat, with interlocking construction. The armour joints were of high quality, being stepped and welded rather than riveted.

Gun…

 

Turmzielfernrohr TZF 9c gun sight

The gun breech and firing mechanism were derived from the famous German “88″ dual purpose flak gun. The 88 mm Kwk 36 L/56 gun was the variant chosen for the Tiger and was, along with the Tiger II’s 88 mm Kwk 43 L/71, one of the most effective and feared tank guns of World War II. The Tiger’s gun had a very flat trajectory and extremely accurate Zeiss Turmzielfernrohr TZF 9b sights (later replaced by the monocular TZF 9c). In British wartime firing trials, five successive hits were scored on a 16 by 18 in (410 by 460 mm) target at a range of 1,200 yards (1,100 m). Tigers were reported to have knocked out enemy tanks at ranges greater than 1 mile (1,600 m), although most World War II engagements were fought at much shorter ranges.

Ammunition used

• PzGr.39 (Armour Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap)
• PzGr.40 (Armour Piercing Composite Rigid)
• Hl. Gr.39 (High Explosive Anti-Tank)
• Sch Sprgr. Patr. L/4.5 (Incendiary Shrapnel)

War years…

Army…

A Heeresadler (“Army Eagle”) decal for the helmets of the Wehrmacht Heer (model 1942).

The German Army furthered concepts pioneered during World War I, combining ground (Heer) and Air Force (Luftwaffe) assets into combined arms teams. Coupled with traditional war fighting methods such as encirclements and the “battle of annihilation”, the German military managed many lightning quick victories in the first year of World War II, prompting foreign journalists to create a new word for what they witnessed: Blitzkrieg.

The Heer entered the war with a minority of its formations motorized; infantry remained approximately 90% foot-borne throughout the war, and artillery primarily horse-drawn. The motorized formations received much attention in the world press in the opening years of the war, and were cited as the reason for the success of the German invasions of Poland (September 1939), Norway and Denmark (April 1940), Belgium, France and Netherlands (May 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941) and the early campaigns in the Soviet Union (June 1941).

With the entry of the United States in December 1941, Germany and other Axis powers found themselves engaged in campaigns against three major industrial powers. At this critical juncture, Hitler assumed personal control of the Wehrmacht high command, and his personal failings as a military commander arguably contributed to major defeats in early 1943, at Stalingrad and Tunis in North Africa.

The Panzerjäger-Abteilung 39 (‘Tank-hunter battalion 39′, part of “Kampfgruppe Gräf“, part of the 21. Panzer Division) of the Afrika Korps on the move.

The Germans’ military strength was managed through mission-based tactics (rather than order-based tactics) and an almost proverbial discipline. In public opinion, the German Army was, and sometimes still is, seen as a high-tech army. However, such advanced equipment, while featured much in propaganda, was often only available in small numbers or late in the war, as overall supplies of raw materials and armaments ran low. For example, only 40% of all units were motorized, baggage trains often relied on horse-drawn trailers and many soldiers went by foot or used bicycles (Radfahrtruppen).

Some historians, such as British author and ex-newspaper editor Max Hastings, consider that ” … there’s no doubt that man for man, the German army was the greatest fighting force of the second world war”. Similar views were also explained in his book “Overlord: D-Day and the battle for Normandy”, while in the book World War II : An Illustrated Miscellany, Anthony Evans writes: ‘The German soldier was very professional and well trained, aggressive in attack and stubborn in defence. He was always adaptable, particularly in the later years when shortages of equipment were being felt’. However, their integrity was compromised by war crimes, especially those committed on the eastern front. They were over-extended and out-maneuvered before Moscow in 1941, and in North Africa and Stalingrad in 1942, and from 1942/3 onwards, were in constant retreat. Other Axis powers fought with them, especially Hungary and Romania, as well as many volunteers from other nations.

Among the foreign volunteers who served in the Heer during World War II were ethnic Germans, Dutch, and Scandinavians along with people from the Baltic states and the Balkans. Russians fought in the Russian Liberation Army or as Hilfswilliger. Non-Russians from the Soviet Union formed the Ostlegionen. These units were all commanded by General Ernst August Köstring and represented about five percent of the forces under the OKH.

Air Force…

Separate from the elite Fallschirmjäger, the Luftwaffe also fielded regular infantry in the Luftwaffe Field Divisions. These units were basic infantry formations formed from Luftwaffe personnel. Lacking competent officers and composed in the main of recruits for the air-force unhappy with their unexpected use as infantry, they understandably lacked in morale. By Göring’s personal order they were intended to be restricted to defensive duties in quieter sectors to free up front line troops for combat. The Luftwaffe, being in charge of Germany’s anti-aircraft warfare, also used thousands of teenage Luftwaffenhelfer to support the Flak units.

Navy…

The German Navy (Kriegsmarine) played a major role in World War II as control over the commerce routes in the Atlantic was crucial for Germany, Britain and later the Soviet Union. In the Battle of the Atlantic, the initially successful German U-boat fleet arm was eventually defeated due to Allied technological innovations like sonar, radar, and the breaking of the Enigma code. Large surface vessels were few in number due to construction limitations by international treaties prior to 1935. The “pocket battleships” Admiral Graf Spee and Admiral Scheer were important as commerce raiders only in the opening year of the war. No aircraft carrier was operational, as German leadership lost interest in the Graf Zeppelin which had been launched in 1938. Following the loss of the Bismarck in 1941, with Allied air superiority threatening the remaining battlecruisers in French Atlantic harbours, the ships were ordered to make the Channel Dash back to German ports. Operating from fjords of Norway, which had been occupied in 1940, convoys from the USA to the Soviet port of Murmansk could be intercepted even though the Tirpitz spent most of her career as Fleet in being. After the appointment of Karl Doenitz as Grand Admiral of the Kriegsmarine, Germany stopped constructing battleships and cruisers in favour of U-boats.

Theaters and campaigns…

German cavalry and motorized units entering Poland from East Prussia during the Invasion of Poland of 1939.

The Wehrmacht directed combat operations during World War II (from 1 September 1939 to 8 May 1945) as the German Reich’s Armed Forces umbrella command organization. After 1941 the OKH became the de facto Eastern Theatre higher echelon command organization for the Wehrmacht, excluding Waffen-SS except for operational and tactical combat purposes. The OKW conducted operations in the Western Theatre.

For a time the Axis Mediterranean Theatre and the North African Campaign was conducted as a joint campaign with the Italian Army, and may be considered a separate theatre.

• North African Campaign in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt between the U.K. and Commonwealth (and later, US) forces and the Axis forces.
• The Italian “Theatre” (1943–45) was in fact a continuation of the Axis defeat in North Africa, and was a Campaign for defence of Italy.

The operations by the Kriegsmarine in the North and Mid-Atlantic can also be considered as separate Theatres considering the size of the area of operations and their remoteness from other Theatres.

Eastern theatre…

The Eastern Wehrmacht campaigns included:

• Czechoslovakian campaign
• Austrian Anschluss campaign
• Battle of Poland campaign (Fall Weiss)—a joint invasion of Germany, Soviet Union and Slovakia.
• Balkans and Greece (Operation Marita)
• Operation Barbarossa Campaign, also known as the Eastern Front, was the largest and most lethal campaign that the Wehrmacht Heer fought in during World War II. The Campaign against the Soviet Union was strategically the most crucial for Germany and its allies during World War II because of the economic and political repercussions defeat of the Soviet Union would have had on the outcome of the war, including that of the conflict with the United Kingdom and the United States in the Western Theatre. The Eastern Front was also the Theater that demanded more resources than any other Theater throughout the war. The large area covered by the Eastern Front necessitated the division of the Theatre in to four separate Strategic Directions overseen by the Army Group North, Army Group Centre, Army Group South, and the Norwegian Army. These commands would conduct their own interdependent strategic campaigns within the Theater.
• Battle of the Caucasus.
• A subset of the Eastern Front was a number of anti-partisan operations against guerrilla units and counter-insurgency operations largely by Waffen-SS units behind Axis lines.

However, Hitler demanded that the Wehrmacht had to fight on other fronts, sometimes three simultaneously, thus stretching its resources too thin. By 1944, even the defense of Germany became impossible.

Western theatre…

Soldiers of German Wehrmacht in front of the Arc de Triomphe du Carrousel in the occupied Paris, 1940.

• Phony War (Sitzkrieg).
• The Denmark campaign as Operation Weserübung
• The Norwegian Campaign.
• The largest campaign in the Western Theatre involving combat was conducted against the Netherlands, Belgium, etc. and France (Fall Gelb) in 1940. This predominantly land campaign evolved into two subsequent campaigns, one by the Luftwaffe against the United Kingdom, and the other by the Kriegsmarine against the strategic supply routes linking the United Kingdom to the rest of the World.
• The Western Front resumed in 1944 against the Allied forces with the Battle of Normandy.
• The strategic air campaigns the Luftwaffe won in 1939 and 1940 in Poland and France ended with the Battle of Britain. From 1941 to the end of 1943, the Luftwaffe entered a long and bloody air battle with the Red Air Force that affected its participation in the campaign against the RAF. Allied air forces enjoyed aerial superiority on all three Theatres by the summer of 1944. In respect to the Battle of Britain, had the Luftwaffe pursued its early goal of bombing the RAF airfields and fighting a war of attrition, it is likely they would have been victorious. However, in response to a string of events beginning with a small-scale air raid on Berlin by British bombers, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe bomber forces to attack British cities. These reprisal attacks shifted the weight of the Luftwaffe away from the RAF and onto British civilians, allowing the RAF to rebuild its fighting strength and, within a few short months, turn the tide against the Luftwaffe in the skies above England.

• The Battle of the Atlantic resulted in early Kriegsmarine successes that forced Winston Churchill to confide after the war that the only real threat he felt to Britain’s survival was the “U-Boat peril.”

Casualties…

Approximately 5,533,000 German soldiers and from other nationalities fighting for the German army are considered killed or MIA in World War II. The number of wounded surpasses 6,000,000, and the number of prisoners of war reaches 11,000,000, making a total of 22 million casualties from all causes during that conflict.

Numbers…

The total number of soldiers who served in the Wehrmacht during its existence from 1935 until 1945 is believed to approach 18.2 million. This figure was put forward by historian Rüdiger Overmans and represents the total number of people who ever served in the Wehrmacht, and not the force strength of the Wehrmacht at any point. About 1.3 million Wehrmacht soldiers were killed in action; 250,000 died from non-combat causes; 2.0 million missing in action and unaccounted for after the war; and 359,000 POW deaths, of whom 77,000 were in the custody of the U.S., UK, and France; POW dead includes 266,000 in the post war period after June 1945, primarily in Soviet captivity.

Command structure..

Legally, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht was Adolf Hitler in his capacity as Germany’s head of state, a position he gained after the death of President Paul von Hindenburg in August 1934. In the reshuffle in 1938, Hitler became the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and retained that position until his suicide on 30 April 1945. Administration and military authority initially lay with the war ministry under Generalfeldmarschall Werner von Blomberg. After von Blomberg resigned in the course of the Blomberg-Fritsch Affair (1938) the ministry was dissolved and the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) under Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel was put in its place. It was headquartered in Wünsdorf near Zossen, and a field echelon (Feldstaffel) was stationed wherever the Führer’s headquarters were situated at a given time. Army work was also coordinated by the German General Staff, an institution that had been developing for more than a century and which had sought to institutionalize military excellence.

The OKW coordinated all military activities but Keitel’s sway over the three branches of service (army, air force, and navy) was rather limited. Each had its own High Command, known as Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, army), Oberkommando der Marine (OKM, navy), and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL, air force). Each of these high commands had its own general staff. In practice the OKW had operational authority over the Western Front whereas the Eastern Front was under the operational authority of the OKH.

 

Flag for the Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces (1935–1938).

• OKW—the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces—Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel (1938 to 1945)

Chief of the Operations Staff (Wehrmachtführungsstab)—Generaloberst Alfred Jodl

• OKH—the Supreme Command of the Army

Army Commanders-in-Chief

Generaloberst Werner von Fritsch (1935 to 1938)

Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch (1938 to 1941)

Führer and Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler (1941 to 1945)

Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schörner (1945)

Chief of Staff of the German Army

General Ludwig Beck (1935 to 1938)

General Franz Halder (1938 to 1942)

General Kurt Zeitzler (1942 to 1944)

Generaloberst Heinz Guderian (1944 to 1945)

General Hans Krebs (1945, committed suicide in the Führer Bunker)

• OKM—the Supreme Command of the Navy

Navy Commanders-in-Chief

Grossadmiral Erich Raeder (1928 to 1943)

Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz (1943 to 1945)

Generaladmiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg (1945)

• OKL—the Supreme Command of the Air Force

Air Force Commanders-in-Chief

Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (until 1945)

Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim (1945)

The OKW was also tasked with central economic planning and procurement, but the authority and influence of the OKW’s war economy office (Wehrwirtschaftsamt) was challenged by the procurement offices (Waffenämter) of the single branches of service as well as by the Ministry for Armament and Munitions (Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition), into which it was merged after the ministry was taken over by Albert Speer in early 1942.

Wehrmacht…

The straight-armed Balkenkreuz, a stylized version of the Iron Cross, the emblem of the Wehrmacht.
Active	1935–1945
Country	Nazi Germany
Allegiance	Nazi Germany
Role	Armed Forces of Nazi Germany
Size	18.2 million
Garrison/HQ	Zossen
Patron	Adolf Hitler
Engagements	Spanish Civil War World War II
Commanders
Notable commanders	Adolf Hitler Karl Dönitz
Insignia
Identification symbol	Balkenkreuz

Wehrmacht (German: “defence force”) was the name of the unified armed forces of Germany from 1935 to 1945. It consisted of the Heer (army), the Kriegsmarine (navy) and the Luftwaffe (air force).

The Waffen-SS, the combat arm of the Nazi Party, became the de facto fourth branch of the Wehrmacht, as it expanded from three regiments to 38 divisions by 1945.

Origin and use of the term…

Before the rise of the NSDAP, the term Wehrmacht generically described the domestic armed forces, of any nation, being used as the “home defence” version of the German Streitmacht or foreign war forces, thus, Britische Wehrmacht denoted “British defence forces”. The term is in Article 47 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution, establishing that “Der Reichspräsident hat den Oberbefehl über die gesamte Wehrmacht des Reiches” (“The National President holds supreme command of all armed forces of the nation). From 1919 until its renaming to Wehrmacht in 1936, the German armed force had been known as the Reichswehr (“National Defence”).

After World War II, and under Allied occupation, the Wehrmacht was abolished in Germany. In 1955, when the western Federal Republic of Germany re-militarized, its armed forces were named the Bundeswehr (“Federal Defence”). In 1956, upon formal establishment, the armed forces of the eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR) were named the Nationale Volksarmee (National People’s Army), some of whom, with materiel, were incorporated to the present-day Bundeswehr when the GDR was incorporated to the Federal Republic of Germany in the German reunification of 1990.

In German and English usage, Wehrmacht customarily refers to Germany’s NSDAP-era and World War II armed forces. Using Wehrmacht to refer only to the Heer (land army), while technically inaccurate, is common in English writing. As branch-of-service identification, Wehrmacht vehicles had an alpha-numeric identity license plate reading WH for the Heer, WL for the Luftwaffe, and WM for the Kriegsmarine, plus, SS for the Waffen-SS.

History…

After World War I ended with the armistice of 11 November 1918, the armed forces were dubbed Friedensheer (peace army) in January 1919. In March 1919, the national assembly passed a law founding a 420,000 strong preliminary army as Vorläufige Reichswehr. The terms of the Treaty of Versailles were announced in May, and in June Germany was forced to sign the contract which, among other terms, imposed severe constraints on the size of Germany’s armed forces. The army was limited to one hundred thousand men with an additional fifteen thousand in the navy. The fleet was to consist of at most six battleships, six cruisers, and twelve destroyers. Submarines, tanks and heavy artillery were forbidden and the air force was dissolved. A new post-war military (the Reichswehr) was established on 23 March 1921. General conscription was abolished under another mandate of the Versailles treaty.

By 1922, Germany had begun covertly circumventing these conditions. A secret collaboration with the Soviet Union began after the treaty of Rapallo. Major-General Otto Hasse traveled to Moscow in 1923 to further negotiate the terms. Germany helped the Soviet Union with industrialization and Soviet officers were to be trained in Germany. German tank and air force specialists could exercise in the Soviet Union and German chemical weapons research and manufacture would be carried out there along with other projects. Around three hundred German pilots received training at Lipetsk, some tank training took place near Kazan and toxic gas was developed at Saratov for the German army.

After the death of President Paul von Hindenburg on 2 August 1934, Hitler assumed the office of Reichspräsident, and thus became commander in chief. All officers and soldiers of the German armed forces had to swear a personal oath of loyalty to the Führer, as Adolf Hitler now was called. By 1935, Germany was openly flouting the military restrictions set forth in the Versailles Treaty, and conscription was reintroduced on 16 March 1935. While the size of the standing army was to remain at about the 100,000-man mark decreed by the treaty, a new group of conscripts equal to this size would receive training each year. The conscription law introduced the name Wehrmacht, so not only can this be regarded as its founding date, but the organization and authority of the Wehrmacht can be viewed as Nazi creations regardless of the political affiliations of its high command (who nevertheless all swore the same personal oath of loyalty to Hitler). The insignia was a simpler version of the Iron Cross (the straight-armed so-called Balkenkreuz or beamed cross) that had been used as an aircraft and tank marking in late World War I. The existence of the Wehrmacht was officially announced on 15 October 1935.

Auch er verteidigt unsere „Demokratie" am Kaukasus

Die 49-Jährige Heike Gross war als Bundeswehrärztin zweimal in Afghanistan im Einsatz. Vorab musste sie, wie ihre Kollegen ein Testamente verfassen, falls im Todesfall geregelt ist, welches Kind welchen Anteil vom Erbe bekommt. Natürlich musste auch festgehalten werden, was passiere wenn man nur mit einem Arm oder Fuß vom Hindukusch zurück nach Deutschland kommt. Auch in der Bundeswehr wird alles bürokratisch deutsch korrekt gemacht!

Selbst mit über 15 000 Einsätzen wurde die heute in Neu Seeland lebende Ärztin in Afghanistan böse überrascht. Denn dort „richtet sich die Gewalt gezielt gegen meine Patienten und gegen uns alle”, so erklärte sie gegenüber dem ZEIT Magazin vom 05.11.2009.

Auch hatte sie im Krisengebiet kaum Zeit ihre Mission zu hinterfragen. Denn Desertieren kommt für einen Soldaten nicht in Frage. „Ich hatte Vertrauen in die Führung. Diese Loyalität zu hinterfragen ist ein längere Prozess. Das ist wie bei Kindesmisshandlungen, Eltern müssen einem Kind schon sehr viel antun, damit es sie nicht mehr liebt. Ich bin in Afghanistan geblieben um meinem Eid zu erfüllen,” sagte die Bundeswehrärztin im Rückblick.

Die Frage stellt sich für den Bürger, inwieweit es in Ordnung geht, dass weiterhin gegen die Mehrheit der Bundesbürger Soldaten nach Afghanistan geschickt werden? Und sollte ein Soldat immer den Eid stets befolgen, wenn auch erkenntlich ist, dass auch Deutsche am Kaukasus zur Waffe greifen müssen?.
Tucholsky wusste schon richtigerweise : „Soldaten sind Mörder!”

Aufgepasst liebe korrupte, engstirnige und korrupte Politker. Das Wohl der Menschen und nicht die deutsch-amerikanische Waffenlobby sollte das Schicksal der Afghanen bestimmen. Wenn Soldaten nur den Eid der Oberbefehlshaber, in diesem Fall der Bundesregierung horchen, und nichts hinterfragen, kann dies böse enden. Selbst in der Wehrmacht wussten viele der Offiziere, dass was sie aufgetragen bekommen hatten, falsch und menschenunwürdig war. Dennoch sahen sie sich wegen ihres Eids gezwungen die Kommandos von oben zu befolgen. Wie das ganze ausging, im Kaiserreich sowie unter Hitler wissen wir…

Ein steht sicher fest: Afghanistan wird nicht durch den ISAF-Einsatz  in eine Demokratie wenden. Schon gar nicht wenn die Deutschen vor Ort mit mischen um unsere „Demokratie” dort zu verteidigen!

Heike Gross lässt in ihrem Buch “Ein schöner Tag zum Sterben” ihre Einsätze in Afghanistan Revue passieren. Ein gewiss lesenswertes Werk.